Critique of Radical Autonomy
1NC
Critique of Radical Autonomy 1NC
The affirmative participates in a form of radical individualism that promotes
separation of the self-this makes dangerous otherization and violence inevitable
West 88 [Robin, is the Frederick J. Haas Professor of Law and Philosophy and Associate Dean (Research
and Academic Programs) at the Georgetown University Law Center, “Jurisprudence and Gender”,
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1642&context=facpub] alla
I will start with the liberal description of separation, because it is the most familiar, and surely the most
dominant. According to liberal legalism, the inevitability of the individual’s material separation from the
“other,” entails, first and foremost, an existential state of highly desirable and much valued freedom:
because the individual is separate from the other, he is free of the other. Because I am separate from
you, my ends, my life, my path, my goals are necessarily my own. Because I am separate, I am
“autonomous.” Because I am separate, I am existentially free (whether or not I am politically free). And,
of course, this is true not just of me, but of everyone: it is the universal human condition. We are each
separate and we are all separate, so we are each free and we are all free. We are, that is, equally free.
This existential condition of freedom in turn entails the liberal’s conception of value. Because we are all
free and we are each equally free, we should be treated by our government as free, and as equally free.
The individual must be treated by his government (and by others) in a way that respects his equality and
his free dom. The government must honor at the level of politics the existential claim made above: that
my ends are my ends; that I cannot be forced to embrace your ends as my own. Our separation entails
our freedom which in turn entails our right to establish and pursue our own concept of value,
independent of the concept of value pursued or favored by others. Ronald Dworkin puts the point in this
way: What does it mean for the government to treat its citizens as equals? That is . . . the same question
as the question of what it means for the government to treat all its citizens as free, or as independent,
or with equal dignity... . [To ac cord with this demand, a government must] be neutral on what might be
called the question of the good life. . . . [P]olitical decisions must be, so far as is possible, independent of
any particular conception of the good life, or of what gives value to life. Since the citizens of a society
differ in their conceptions, the government does not treat them as equals if it prefers one conception to
another, either because the officials believe that one is intrinsically superior, or because one is held by
the more numerous or more powerful group.5 Because of the dominance of liberalism in this culture,
we might think of autonomy as the “official” liberal value entailed by the physical, material condition of
inevitable separation from the other. separation from the other entails my freedom from him, and that
in turn entails my political right to autonomy. I can form my own conception of the good life, and pursue
it. Indeed, any conception of the good which I form, will necessarily be my conception of the good life.
That freedom must be respected. Because I am free, I value and have a right to autonomy. You must
value it as well. The state must protect it. This in turn implies other (more con tested) values, the most
important of which is (or may be) equality. Dworkin continues: I now define a liberal as someone who
holds. . . . [a] liberal .. . theory of what equality requires. Suppose that a liberal is asked to found a new
state. He is required to dictate its constitution and fundamental institutions. He must propose a general
theory of political distribution . . . . He will arrive initially at something like this principal of rough
equality: resources and opportunities should be distributed, so far as possible, equally, so that roughly
the same share of whatever is available is devoted to satisfying the ambitions of each. Any other general
aim of distribution will assume either that the fate of some people should be of greater concern than
that of others, or that the ambitions or talents of some are more worthy, and should be supported more
generously on that account.6 Autonomy, freedom and equality collectively constitute what might be
called the “up side” of the subjective experience of separation. Autonomy and freedom are both
entailed by the separation thesis, and autonomy and freedom both feel very good. However, there’s a
“down side” to the subjective experience of separation as well. Physical separation from the other
entails not just my freedom; it also entails my vulnerability . Every other discrete, separate individual—
because he is the “other”—is a source of danger to me and a threat to my autonomy. I have reason to
fear you solely by virtue of the fact that I am me and you are you . You are not me, so by definition my
ends are not your ends . Our ends might conflict. You might try to frustrate my pursuit of my ends. In
an extreme case, you might even try to kill me—you might cause my annihilation.
This separation undermines the possibility of true community-it is a denial of what
makes us human
Phillips 14—author of "Reclaimed: This Catholic Faith is Mine," is a trusted resource on the topics of
Catholicism and social justice (Gregory, “Humanity is Defined by Loving Community,” 6/2,
http://www.gregoryerichphillips.com/humanity-defined-loving-community/)//FJ
Think for a moment how you know yourself: it is in relation to other people. Without the context provided by
others, can you even accurately say who you are? Our human experience is defined, enlivened and validated through
relationships. It is through our communities that we come to know ourselves and gain our identity .
Even though we know we need relationships, sometimes we forget how very much we rely on the loving community around us. These
communities do more than support us. They quite literally make us who we are. Relationships our bound by love. Love is
therefore the fullest expression of our humanness. Emotions and actions in opposition to love (jealousy, selfishness, apathy), make us less
True community creates a virtuous cycle where love can thrive . Each person is nourished and sustained by
the love of the others. It is an intertwined relationship of support, standing at each other’s needs. It is not always easy to maintain
true community. Whether it is a family, group of friends, church, or even a whole town, a community will always have
problems; jealousies, resentments and distrusts are inevitable in any group. Amongst people who have known each
human.
other a long time, love will always have ongoing challenges. Sometimes it can feel like the easy path would be to step out of the community and
think of one’s own needs. Are these difficult relationships really worth it? However,
as soon as personal needs are prioritized
at the expense of, or separate from community, it leads to an isolation of selfishness . At the extreme, it
leads to a loss of true human identity . Communities create an environment for fostering love, and the
mutual humanness of the members. With this in mind we must remember one community of which we
are all a part—the entire human family. Communities frequently distort themselves into rivaling factions intent not on their own
nourishment but on the destruction of a different community. Sadly, this is the way many religious groups relate to one another.
Individualism makes extinction inevitable-causes alienation and rejects community
oriented solutions necessary to resolve every global problem
Mitchell 10 [David, David worked on Energy Policy and Innovation as a Breakthrough Generation
Fellow in Summer 2010. He graduated from Oxford University in June 2008 with a BA in Geography. He
gained his master's degree from Yale University in May 2011, having focused on Energy Economics,
Environmental Law, and Competitive Strategy, “6.8 billion Dependents: a critique of Individualism,
http://thebreakthrough.org/generation_archive/68_billion_dependents_a_critiq] alla
Individualism is a project focused on the self. You, alone, are the measure of all things. You, alone, are
the most important unit of consideration. The individual must therefore oppose external influences
and pursue one's own goals and desires. For individualism, self-reliance is the name of the game. Ralph
Waldo Emerson, a champion of individualism, believed we could "build our own worlds", while Thoreau,
a contemporary, famously told us to "go confidently in the direction of (our) dreams". Yet while
individualism as a theory is not all bad, we must refuse to embed ourselves in any mode of thinking
which discounts the importance of community and which proposes living and thinking within a
vacuum. ¶ Many of the problems we face, we face together. Global warming may be the best example
of this, revealing the interconnectedness of all 6.8 billion of us like never before. Our solutions, then,
must not be formed in isolation - we need collective action, not narrow individualism. It is not so much
that we must reject individualism as a project - the problems we face have confidently done that for us.¶
To be sure, there are some positive things to draw from individualism as a moral philosophy: ideas
about being authentic, self-reliant, and being critical of following the herd, can help to drive progress in
certain areas. Taken to the extreme, however, these ideas are harmful. ¶ We are not, and will never be,
self-reliant individuals. We live in an interdependent world, each of us relying on others. Furthermore,
we are beings longing for community, not isolation; and relationship, not loneliness. As such, selfactualization will never come to any of us through a focus purely on the self. ¶ A crucial failure of
Emerson's argument is that his account of his own "genius" is somewhat ahistorical; he forgets that his
class, his race, his Harvard education, and his setting have shaped his own ideas. His thinking was not
formed in a vacuum. ¶ Emerson's account therefore cuts off any discursive potential between
individuals, suggesting rather that we are better left to our own devices. Indeed, his essay on selfreliance begins with the maxim: "ne te quaesiveris extra", meaning, "do not seek things outside of
yourself". As such, Emerson admonishes the individual to "trust thyself", and to "insist on yourself;
never imitate". ¶ Such thinking may appeal to our baser instincts. It is not, however, the type of stance or
posture that will deliver solutions to our common problems; nor will it create societies we would long
for.¶ In addition, Emerson appears to assume that the imitation of ideas is always a bad thing. This is not
the case. Indeed, in the public policy world, we form ideas with the express intent that others will weigh
them and eventually imitate them. Political projects are not formed in a vacuum and political ideas are
not intended to stay in a vacuum; they are distributed and shared amongst increasing numbers of
people, with numerous actors inputting along the way. ¶ It is worrying then to see the "rise of self"
within our society. Despite the evident failure of individualism, our society is self-centered and selfabsorbed, while grossly lacking in self-esteem. Of great concern is the fact that our pursuit of selfactualization has focused for too long on the self, leading to feelings of social isolation and alienation.
We have, in short, been chasing self-esteem, not self-actualization. Thus, in the pursuit of the individual,
we have lost our sense of belonging. ¶ Robert Putnam's now famous book, Bowling Alone, published in
2000, detailed the death of social movements, and the death of social engagement more broadly. He
explained how the reasons for this decline are fourfold: longer working hours and the entrance of
women into the workforce; suburban sprawl, putting greater distance between family and friends and
work; increased television watching and media consumption; and the rise of me-orientated generations
(from Break Through, Nordhaus & Shellenberger). In short, in seeking our own goals and in seeking to
fulfill our own desires, we have forgotten what it means to be part of a larger network and a larger
project.¶ To turn the tide, we must reject individualism as a stand-alone concept. There is evidence that
this is occurring and that our society is longing to feel "whole" again.¶ For example, Rick Warren's book
The Purpose Driven Life has sold over 30 million copies, emphasizing peoples' longing for meaning both
within and outside of themselves. The book begins with this simple line: It's not about you. In Break
Through, Nordhaus and Schellenberger wrongly suggest that the book is not a rejection of individualism,
when it quite clearly is. While the book does note the importance of the individual, as Break Through
recounts, it also stresses that the individual is fully actualized only when one is positioned within the
setting of a broader plan and community . It celebrates the individual, but only as a citizen of a larger
group.¶ In the face of today's challenges, we must stress this point again: it's not about you. It is, in fact,
about Us. Collectively. Together.¶ The problems of the day - global warming, the economic recession,
national security, and the search for identity - teach us that this is true. Our interdependence has never
been more apparent. What we need, then, is an "integrated individuality", which celebrates the
individual, in the context of the community. Put simply, we are born dependent and we die dependent;
we should stop trying to live and think during the intervening years any other way. Instead, we must
celebrate each other as a part of a community which values and cares for its members. Selfactualization, then, must be a group project. It cannot be attained alone.
The alternative is to reject the affirmatives conception of radical individualism and
embrace a new conception of “social self”
Friedman 89 [Marilyn, works in social and political philosophy, ethics, and feminist theory., “Feminism
and Modern Friendship: ¶ Dislocating the Community”, January 1989,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381435] alla
A predominant theme in much recent feminist thought has been the ¶ critique of the abstract
individualism which underlies some important ¶ versions of liberal political theory.' Abstract
individualism considers individual human beings as social atoms, abstracted from their social contexts, ¶
and disregards the role of social relationships and human community in ¶ constituting the very identity
and nature of individual human beings. ¶ Sometimes the individuals of abstract individualism are posited
as rationally ¶ self-interested utility maximizers.2 Sometimes, also, they are theorized ¶ to form
communities based fundamentally on competition and conflict ¶ among persons vying for scarce
resources, communities which represent ¶ no deeper social bond than that of instrumental relations
based on calculated self-interest.3 Against this abstractive individualist view of the self and of human ¶
community, many feminists have asserted a conception of what might be called the "social self."4 This
conception fundamentally acknowledges ¶ the role of social relationships and human community in
constituting ¶ both self-identity and the nature and meaning of the particulars of individual lives.5 The
modified conception of the self has carried with it ¶ an altered conception of community. Conflict and
competition are no ¶ longer considered to be the basic human relationships; instead they are ¶ being
replaced by alternative visions of the foundation of human society ¶ derived from nurturance, caring
attachment, and mutual interestedness .6 ¶ Some feminists, for example, recommend that the motherchild relationship ¶ be viewed as central to human society, and they project major changes ¶ in moral
theory from such a revised focus.7
Links
Link-Community
Neoliberal autonomy destroys social control by eliminating a sense of community.
Smith 12— Sociology Lens Journal (Candace, “Neoliberalism and Individualism: Ego Leads to
Interpersonal Violence?,” The Society Pages, 12/4,
http://thesocietypages.org/sociologylens/2012/12/04/neoliberalism-and-individualism-ego-leads-tointerpersonal-violence/)//FJ
As a result of this focus on the individual and the dismissal of society, neoliberalism runs the risk of
increasing criminality. By discharging society and by highlighting the relationship between individual success and morality,
neoliberal states are in danger of losing the beneficial aspects of social control (Horsley 2010). Without
proper amounts of social control, Hirschi (1969) has argued, individuals are more likely to act on their selfinterest and to behave in a criminal manner. Considering that neoliberalism insists on individualization
and self-interest, it makes since that those living under neoliberal regimes may have fewer reasons not
to act criminally. As Engels wrote during the early days of capitalism, this market-based philosophy threatens to create people who care
for nothing but self-interest and advancement (Lea 1996). This mindset, he continued, would result in many people settling interpersonal
differences with violence. In this sense, then, neoliberalism
can be seen as indirectly contributing to interpersonal
violence by acting through the neoliberal process of individualization. In an attempt to more clearly examine the
interconnections between neoliberalism, individualism, and interpersonal violence, consider the case of France. Although this
country has been more hesitant about adopting neoliberalism than other Western states, the policies of this ideology have been creeping in
since the mid-1980s. Bourdieu (1992) claims that ever
since the arrival of neoliberalism, France has become less
concerned with the social welfare of its citizens and it has become more concerned with economic
matters. It is likely that this slow shift away from the welfare state has had an impact on the French people. Hofstede
(2001) found, for instance, that France scores relatively high on the individualistic index compared to other nations. This means that the French
are generally more concerned with themselves and with their direct families than they are with belonging to a collective group. And,
since
the enactment of neoliberal policies, the violent crime rate in France has amplified. Fougère, Kramarz, and
Pouget (2009) note, for example, that violent crime increased dramatically in that country from 1990-2000. Considering Hirschi’s focus on the
importance of social control on deterring crime, it
seems quite possible that the introduction of pro-individualistic
neoliberal policies may have contributed to France’s growing violent crime problem.
Link-Ocean
The ocean is a key site for perpetuating individualist ethics
Beam 10—an American journalist and a reporter for The New Republic (Christopher, “The Trouble
With Liberty,” The New York Magazine, 12/26, http://nymag.com/news/politics/70282/)//FJ
The last best hope for Libertopia may be the ocean . There’s a long, not-so-proud history of seeking
freedom at sea. In 1972, Nevada real-estate developer Michael Oliver built an island in the southwest
Pacific by dredging sand near an an existing reef, which he called the Republic of Minerva. The nearby
Kingdom of Tonga quickly conquered it. A proposal in the late nineties to create a “Freedom Ship” nearly a mile
long that would house 50,000 people never got past the planning stage. That hasn’t stopped Patri Friedman,
grandson of libertarian hero Milton Friedman, from trying once more. Friedman founded the Seasteading Institute in 2008
with the goal of creating a floating society free from government’s grasp. While seasteading communities would
start small—just a bunch of family-size platforms floating off the coast—Friedman imagines them harvesting energy and
growing food. What distinguishes seasteading from pure fantasy is money. Peter Thiel, who co-founded PayPal and bought a stake in
Facebook back in 2004, has become the Johnny Appleseed of futurist libertarians. Since 2008, he’s given upwards of $750,000 to the
Seasteading Institute. He recently announced that he will offer twenty grants of up to $100,000 each to teenagers who want to start their own
tech companies—a proposal that drew liberal scorn. Thiel is unapologetic about his disdain for government. “I no longer believe that freedom
and democracy are compatible,” he wrote in a 2009 essay. He’s not alone. Silicon Valley has produced a whole cadre of libertarian
entrepreneurs, including longtime Sun Microsystems president Scott McNealy, Craigslist founder Craig Newmark, and Cypress Semiconductor
CEO T. J. Rodgers.
Impacts
Impact-Otherization/Violence
Individual autonomy is the root cause of violence—lack of mutual ends and
psychological bias to fear all “Others”
West 88 [Robin, is the Frederick J. Haas Professor of Law and Philosophy and Associate Dean (Research
and Academic Programs) at the Georgetown University Law Center, “Jurisprudence and Gender”,
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1642&context=facpub] alla
I will start with the liberal description of separation, because it is the most familiar, and surely the most
dominant. According to liberal legalism, the inevitability of the individual’s material separation from the
“other,” entails, first and foremost, an existential state of highly desirable and much valued freedom:
because the individual is separate from the other, he is free of the other. Because I am separate from
you, my ends, my life, my path, my goals are necessarily my own. Because I am separate, I am
“autonomous.” Because I am separate, I am existentially free (whether or not I am politically free). And,
of course, this is true not just of me, but of everyone: it is the universal human condition. We are each
separate and we are all separate, so we are each free and we are all free. We are, that is, equally free.
This existential condition of freedom in turn entails the liberal’s conception of value. Because we are all
free and we are each equally free, we should be treated by our government as free, and as equally free.
The individual must be treated by his government (and by others) in a way that respects his equality and
his free dom. The government must honor at the level of politics the existential claim made above: that
my ends are my ends; that I cannot be forced to embrace your ends as my own. Our separation entails
our freedom which in turn entails our right to establish and pursue our own concept of value,
independent of the concept of value pursued or favored by others. Ronald Dworkin puts the point in this
way: What does it mean for the government to treat its citizens as equals? That is . . . the same question
as the question of what it means for the government to treat all its citizens as free, or as independent,
or with equal dignity... . [To ac cord with this demand, a government must] be neutral on what might be
called the question of the good life. . . . [P]olitical decisions must be, so far as is possible, independent of
any particular conception of the good life, or of what gives value to life. Since the citizens of a society
differ in their conceptions, the government does not treat them as equals if it prefers one conception to
another, either because the officials believe that one is intrinsically superior, or because one is held by
the more numerous or more powerful group.5 Because of the dominance of liberalism in this culture,
we might think of autonomy as the “official” liberal value entailed by the physical, material condition of
inevitable separation from the other. separation from the other entails my freedom from him, and that
in turn entails my political right to autonomy. I can form my own conception of the good life, and pursue
it. Indeed, any conception of the good which I form, will necessarily be my conception of the good life.
That freedom must be respected. Because I am free, I value and have a right to autonomy. You must
value it as well. The state must protect it. This in turn implies other (more con tested) values, the most
important of which is (or may be) equality. Dworkin continues: I now define a liberal as someone who
holds. . . . [a] liberal .. . theory of what equality requires. Suppose that a liberal is asked to found a new
state. He is required to dictate its constitution and fundamental institutions. He must propose a general
theory of political distribution . . . . He will arrive initially at something like this principal of rough
equality: resources and opportunities should be distributed, so far as possible, equally, so that roughly
the same share of whatever is available is devoted to satisfying the ambitions of each. Any other general
aim of distribution will assume either that the fate of some people should be of greater concern than
that of others, or that the ambitions or talents of some are more worthy, and should be supported more
generously on that account.6 Autonomy, freedom and equality collectively constitute what might be
called the “up side” of the subjective experience of separation. Autonomy and freedom are both
entailed by the separation thesis, and autonomy and freedom both feel very good. However, there’s a
“down side” to the subjective experience of separation as well. Physical separation from the other
entails not just my freedom; it also entails my vulnerability . Every other discrete, separate individual—
because he is the “other”—is a source of danger to me and a threat to my autonomy. I have reason to
fear you solely by virtue of the fact that I am me and you are you . You are not me, so by definition my
ends are not your ends . Our ends might conflict. You might try to frustrate my pursuit of my ends. In
an extreme case, you might even try to kill me—you might cause my annihilation.
Impact-Alienation/Violence
Neoliberalism causes alienation among individuals – replicates violence.
Smith 12—Sociology Lens Journal (Candace, “Neoliberalism and Individualism: Ego Leads to
Interpersonal Violence?,” The Society Pages, 12/4,
http://thesocietypages.org/sociologylens/2012/12/04/neoliberalism-and-individualism-ego-leads-tointerpersonal-violence/)//FJ
As is evidenced by the French example, there may very well be a link between neoliberalism, individualism, and
interpersonal violence. By focusing so strongly on the individual and by disregarding the importance of
community
(Peters 2001; Brown 2003), neoliberalism increases the importance of individuality while decreasing the importance of
society (Amable 2011). This obsession
with the individual, research indicates, can result in a loss of social
control and, as a result, a potential for violence (Hirschi 1969). In support of this contention, Horsley (2010:20) writes that
“neo-liberalism may not directly cause criminality and violence…but its consequences certainly create
the circumstances in which crime rates are more likely to rise.” Undoubtedly, in addition to individualism, one of the
primary consequences of neoliberalism is inequality. The interaction between inequality and
individualization suggests that the non-elite may feel aggressive and frustrated with their social
position and may experience too little social control to contain these feelings. With many of the social bonds
that had previously discouraged violence gone, alienated individuals may be more apt to respond to stress with
violence.
The plan’s affirmation of autonomy re-entrenches neoliberalism – replicates violence
by tearing apart social bonds.
Smith 12— Sociology Lens Journal (Candace, “Neoliberalism and Individualism: Ego Leads to
Interpersonal Violence?,” The Society Pages, 12/4,
http://thesocietypages.org/sociologylens/2012/12/04/neoliberalism-and-individualism-ego-leads-tointerpersonal-violence/)//FJ
There appears to be a link between neoliberalism, individualism, and violence. In reference to the association
between neoliberalism and individualism, consider neoliberalism’s insistence that we do not need society since we
are all solely responsible for our personal well-being (Peters 2001; Brown 2003). From a criminological standpoint, it is
not hard to understand how this focus on the individual can lead to violence . According to Hirschi’s (1969) social
control theory, for instance, broken or weak social bonds free a person to engage in deviancy. Since, according to this
theory, individuals are naturally self-interested, they can use the opportunity of individualization to
overcome the restraining powers of society. Bearing in mind neoliberalism’s tendency to value the
individual over society, it could be argued that this ideology is hazardous as it acts to tear apart
important social bonds and to thereby contribute to the occurrence of ego-driven crime s, including
violent interpersonal crimes. Such a thought suggests that as neoliberalism becomes more prominent in a country, it can be expected
that individualism and, as a result, interpersonal violence within that country will increase.
Prioritization of individual interest destroys interconnectedness of people – increases
violence.
Horsley 10— a first class undergraduate dissertation submitted in May 2006 for the Degree of BSc
(Hons) Criminology, Division of Sociology and Criminology (Mark, “Capitalism and Crime: The
Criminogenic Potential of the Free Market ,” Internet Journal of Criminology,
http://www.internetjournalofcriminology.com/Horsley_Capitalism_and_Crime_Oct_2010.pdf)//FJ
Neo-liberalism with its emphasis on self-fulfilment and the competitive individual could well be
undermining one of the central concerns of the ‘civilising process’ , that of the interconnectedness of
people
– pushing some into reformulating it as the ‘Pseudo-Pacification Process’ (Hall, 2000; Hall & Winlow, 2004; Hall et al, 2005). This
might imply that we were never really ‘civilised’ in any permanent way, that we were happy enough to live peaceful lives while it was the
easiest option. Some
commentators have even noted a growing “affinity to the general barbarism that the
Enlightenment and capitalism’s unique civilising project had palpably failed to leave behind” (Hall & Winlow,
2004: 281). This raises questions around the purpose of the ‘civilising process’ as well as Elias’ (1994) assertion that people were simply getting
better in line with the liberal ideals of civility, freedom and democracy. It would seem that if this had been the aim all along, such civility would
be unshakable by the forces of neo-liberalism and increased competition both globally and individually. What might have been missing from
Elias’ account was a Foucaultian/Marxian appreciation of the reasons behind increasing civility. Foucault (1979) asserts that the primary
motivation was a need to protect the new property rights of the bourgeois class and to socialise the population into an effective working force
for capitalism’s new industries, this is why we saw the growth of the prison as a means of punishment.
Although there is little doubt
that the civilising process did reduce crime and specifically instances of serious interpersonal violence
(Hall & Winlow, 2004: 282), this was purely temporary because it was motivated by the needs of the bourgeois
classes to protect themselves and their property not because of a widely acknowledged need for greater
civility and pacification.
Individualism within neoliberalism contributes to violence – loss of social control
encourages one to commit crimes for personal benefit.
Horsley 10— a first class undergraduate dissertation submitted in May 2006 for the Degree of BSc
(Hons) Criminology, Division of Sociology and Criminology (Mark, “Capitalism and Crime: The
Criminogenic Potential of the Free Market ,” Internet Journal of Criminology,
http://www.internetjournalofcriminology.com/Horsley_Capitalism_and_Crime_Oct_2010.pdf)//FJ
The third and final element of the neoliberal transition we have space to discuss appears to be a set of
changes in the way we organise and perform ‘social control’ (social structures that hold us to the norms of our society).
Over the course of the last 50 years many western nations have implemented changes in their internal construction of social control. Broadly
speaking this
has been expressed as a move away from traditional forms of control towards a “more egodominated self regulation allowed for the reflexive and flexible calculation that came to be expected”
(Wouters, 1999: 416). As we relax the informal controls associated with the post war era and begin to rely more on personal
judgement in combination with a rapid expansion of legal penalty perhaps more are likely to consider
the possibility of committing deviants acts . Most criminological explanations of this development tend to focus on either
changing control or upon the disintegration of morality and ineffective socialisation. What actually happened, however, was a relaxation of
some controls and an intensification of others. In other words we
have moved away from expecting individuals to be
controlled by society and toward each individual controlling him or herself (ibid.) with an expansion of penalties if
we fail. If this development is coupled with the current of individualisation promoted by neoliberalisation,
the deepening of social inequality as well as the development of a more expansive consumer culture it is
just possible that some individuals may ‘control’ themselves into criminality in order to fulfil unrealistic
expectations gathered from interactions between consumer culture and the ‘hegemonic liberal cult of
the self’. For the relatively well off, adopting the codified rules (laws) of our post industrial society may be advantageous enough to mitigate
against a certain amount of criminality (if we ignore the white-collar variety) but for those who are disadvantaged by the
current political economy, who live in areas where there are no jobs and no way of fulfilling their
desires, what reason remains to be law abiding? In fact, many of the characteristics of the current political
economy “such as reflexivity of the self and the weakening of collective identities” (Furlong & Cartmel, 1997: 82)
that have been discussed above, m ay well have a deleterious effect upon social cohesion and control and perhaps
even
contribute to the crime rates of neoliberal nations.
Impact-Suffering
Radical autonomy puts those dependent on community in a position of constant
suffering by refusing to help them.
Horsley 10— a first class undergraduate dissertation submitted in May 2006 for the Degree of BSc
(Hons) Criminology, Division of Sociology and Criminology (Mark, “Capitalism and Crime: The
Criminogenic Potential of the Free Market ,” Internet Journal of Criminology,
http://www.internetjournalofcriminology.com/Horsley_Capitalism_and_Crime_Oct_2010.pdf)//FJ
During the post-war social democratic era (roughly 1945 to late 1970s) traditional working class communities
were fairly solid, stable entities where individuals gained identity through their work and through
ideological identification with their compatriots. For sake of argument this relatively prosperous period came
to an end in 1979 with the election of Margaret Thatcher, the leader of our first neoliberal government. This government
simply were not willing to protect and subsidise industries like coal mining that were not ‘profitable’ in a world of increased global competition.
Though this might sound reasonable enough with modern sensibilities, its affects on those who relied on such industries for their livelihood
seem to have been largely ignored. With
the destruction of these traditional forms of working class life the
‘proletarian hard-man’, the pre-requisite workforce of heavy industry, was reduced “to a position of
radical insignificance”
(Hall, 2000: 36). He simply did not and could not fit into the burgeoning new service economy, leaving many
inner city estates originally built to service particular industries struggling to find a source of income. Today
many of these areas
have become areas of permanent local recession (Taylor, 1999) with no jobs and permanently marginalised
populations. “Seeing no attraction in the… routine forms of exploitation offered by neo-capitalist
consumer/service work, many males continue to seek new functions and rewards…in the unregulated
alternative economies” (Hall et al, 2005: 109).
Impact-Extinction
Individualism makes solutions to global problems impossible—causes alienation—only
a community based approach can solve—our offense subsumes theirs—only
communities can give value to the individual
Mitchell 10 [David, David worked on Energy Policy and Innovation as a Breakthrough Generation
Fellow in Summer 2010. He graduated from Oxford University in June 2008 with a BA in Geography. He
gained his master's degree from Yale University in May 2011, having focused on Energy Economics,
Environmental Law, and Competitive Strategy, “6.8 billion Dependents: a critique of Individualism,
http://thebreakthrough.org/generation_archive/68_billion_dependents_a_critiq] alla
Individualism is a project focused on the self. You, alone, are the measure of all things. You, alone, are
the most important unit of consideration. The individual must therefore oppose external influences
and pursue one's own goals and desires. For individualism, self-reliance is the name of the game. Ralph
Waldo Emerson, a champion of individualism, believed we could "build our own worlds", while Thoreau,
a contemporary, famously told us to "go confidently in the direction of (our) dreams". Yet while
individualism as a theory is not all bad, we must refuse to embed ourselves in any mode of thinking
which discounts the importance of community and which proposes living and thinking within a
vacuum. ¶ Many of the problems we face, we face together. Global warming may be the best example
of this, revealing the interconnectedness of all 6.8 billion of us like never before. Our solutions, then,
must not be formed in isolation - we need collective action, not narrow individualism. It is not so much
that we must reject individualism as a project - the problems we face have confidently done that for us.¶
To be sure, there are some positive things to draw from individualism as a moral philosophy: ideas
about being authentic, self-reliant, and being critical of following the herd, can help to drive progress in
certain areas. Taken to the extreme, however, these ideas are harmful. ¶ We are not, and will never be,
self-reliant individuals. We live in an interdependent world, each of us relying on others. Furthermore,
we are beings longing for community, not isolation; and relationship, not loneliness. As such, selfactualization will never come to any of us through a focus purely on the self. ¶ A crucial failure of
Emerson's argument is that his account of his own "genius" is somewhat ahistorical; he forgets that his
class, his race, his Harvard education, and his setting have shaped his own ideas. His thinking was not
formed in a vacuum. ¶ Emerson's account therefore cuts off any discursive potential between
individuals, suggesting rather that we are better left to our own devices. Indeed, his essay on selfreliance begins with the maxim: "ne te quaesiveris extra", meaning, "do not seek things outside of
yourself". As such, Emerson admonishes the individual to "trust thyself", and to "insist on yourself;
never imitate". ¶ Such thinking may appeal to our baser instincts. It is not, however, the type of stance or
posture that will deliver solutions to our common problems; nor will it create societies we would long
for.¶ In addition, Emerson appears to assume that the imitation of ideas is always a bad thing. This is not
the case. Indeed, in the public policy world, we form ideas with the express intent that others will weigh
them and eventually imitate them. Political projects are not formed in a vacuum and political ideas are
not intended to stay in a vacuum; they are distributed and shared amongst increasing numbers of
people, with numerous actors inputting along the way. ¶ It is worrying then to see the "rise of self"
within our society. Despite the evident failure of individualism, our society is self-centered and selfabsorbed, while grossly lacking in self-esteem. Of great concern is the fact that our pursuit of selfactualization has focused for too long on the self, leading to feelings of social isolation and alienation.
We have, in short, been chasing self-esteem, not self-actualization. Thus, in the pursuit of the individual,
we have lost our sense of belonging. ¶ Robert Putnam's now famous book, Bowling Alone, published in
2000, detailed the death of social movements, and the death of social engagement more broadly. He
explained how the reasons for this decline are fourfold: longer working hours and the entrance of
women into the workforce; suburban sprawl, putting greater distance between family and friends and
work; increased television watching and media consumption; and the rise of me-orientated generations
(from Break Through, Nordhaus & Shellenberger). In short, in seeking our own goals and in seeking to
fulfill our own desires, we have forgotten what it means to be part of a larger network and a larger
project.¶ To turn the tide, we must reject individualism as a stand-alone concept. There is evidence that
this is occurring and that our society is longing to feel "whole" again.¶ For example, Rick Warren's book
The Purpose Driven Life has sold over 30 million copies, emphasizing peoples' longing for meaning both
within and outside of themselves. The book begins with this simple line: It's not about you. In Break
Through, Nordhaus and Schellenberger wrongly suggest that the book is not a rejection of individualism,
when it quite clearly is. While the book does note the importance of the individual, as Break Through
recounts, it also stresses that the individual is fully actualized only when one is positioned within the
setting of a broader plan and community . It celebrates the individual, but only as a citizen of a larger
group.¶ In the face of today's challenges, we must stress this point again: it's not about you. It is, in fact,
about Us. Collectively. Together.¶ The problems of the day - global warming, the economic recession,
national security, and the search for identity - teach us that this is true. Our interdependence has never
been more apparent. What we need, then, is an "integrated individuality", which celebrates the
individual, in the context of the community. Put simply, we are born dependent and we die dependent;
we should stop trying to live and think during the intervening years any other way. Instead, we must
celebrate each other as a part of a community which values and cares for its members. Selfactualization, then, must be a group project. It cannot be attained alone.
Impact-Value to lIfe-Human
Living within political community is the essence of being human – the alternative is a
life of alienation.
Parekh 11—an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Northeastern University (Serena, “Between
Community and Humanity: Arendt, Judgment, and Responsibility to the Global Poor,” Philosophical
Topics, Volume 39, Number 2, Fall 2011, pp. 145-163, Project Muse,
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/philosophical_topics/v039/39.2.parekh.pdf)//FJ
The right to have rights "means to live in a framework where one is judged by one's actions and opinions, and the right to
belong to some kind of organized com- munity " (Arendt 1978,296—97). This means that inclusion in a community
is fun- damental since without this, it is impossible to have one's rights either recognized or protected.18
Political belonging is important in another way as well. Though a political community is necessary to protect rights, it also provides the
framework for the possibility of action. Belonging means being able to live within a framework where
you are judged according to who, and not merely what, you are; it is to be treated as a person based
on your words and deeds, and not merely on your mem- bership in a category (Arendt 1998, 178—79).
Without the possibility of public dis- closure, we are left with a life of alienation, a loss of meaning,
and a loss of being at home in the world. So fundamental is political belonging that Arendt thought, "no man can live
without belonging to some community" (Arendt 2003,150). By this she did not mean merely that biological survival is impossible
but that political communities create the possibility for one to exercise her humanity through speech and
action. Effectively, political communities for Arendt were necessary to preserve freedom understood not as
freedom of the will but as the freedom to pursue common ends in a public sphere. Freedom, for Arendt, is the
ability to act in concert with others in a public realm, rather than the ability to pursue private interests unobstructed by the government. Thus,
rather than diminish freedom, the laws of a state protect freedom insofar as "laws are the positively
established fences which hedge in, pro- tect, and limit the space in which freedom is not a concept, but
a living, political reality" (Arendt 1983,81-82). For Arendt, then , political communities are funda- mental both for
human rights and for the possibility of being fully human.
Humanity defines community – creates the conditions for cooperation and love that
prevent a life of selfishness.
Phillips 14—author of "Reclaimed: This Catholic Faith is Mine," is a trusted resource on the topics of
Catholicism and social justice (Gregory, “Humanity is Defined by Loving Community,” 6/2,
http://www.gregoryerichphillips.com/humanity-defined-loving-community/)//FJ
Think for a moment how you know yourself: it is in relation to other people. Without the context provided by
others, can you even accurately say who you are? Our human experience is defined, enlivened and validated through
relationships. It is through our communities that we come to know ourselves and gain our identity .
Even though we know we need relationships, sometimes we forget how very much we rely on the loving community around us. These
communities do more than support us. They quite literally make us who we are. Relationships our bound by love. Love is
therefore the fullest expression of our humanness. Emotions and actions in opposition to love (jealousy, selfishness, apathy), make us less
True community creates a virtuous cycle where love can thrive . Each person is nourished and sustained by
is not always easy to maintain
true community. Whether it is a family, group of friends, church, or even a whole town, a community will always have
problems; jealousies, resentments and distrusts are inevitable in any group. Amongst people who have known each
human.
the love of the others. It is an intertwined relationship of support, standing at each other’s needs. It
other a long time, love will always have ongoing challenges. Sometimes it can feel like the easy path would be to step out of the community and
think of one’s own needs. Are these difficult relationships really worth it? However,
as soon as personal needs are prioritized
at the expense of, or separate from community, it leads to an isolation of selfishness . At the extreme, it
leads to a loss of true human identity . Communities create an environment for fostering love, and the
mutual humanness of the members. With this in mind we must remember one community of which we
are all a part—the entire human family. Communities frequently distort themselves into rivaling factions intent not on their own
nourishment but on the destruction of a different community. Sadly, this is the way many religious groups relate to one another.
Impact-Value to Life-Competition
Neoliberal communities demoralize individuals through the constant need for
competition.
Horsley 10— a first class undergraduate dissertation submitted in May 2006 for the Degree of BSc
(Hons) Criminology, Division of Sociology and Criminology (Mark, “Capitalism and Crime: The
Criminogenic Potential of the Free Market ,” Internet Journal of Criminology,
http://www.internetjournalofcriminology.com/Horsley_Capitalism_and_Crime_Oct_2010.pdf)//FJ
Willem Bonger (2003 [1916]) also wrote on this topic during the early 20th century. He proposed that a ‘favourable environment’ could prevent
egoistic acts but an
economic system based upon exchange instead of utility “cannot fail to have an egoistic
character” (ibid. 58). Bonger thought that a society based on exchange would isolate individuals from each other
by “weakening the bonds that unite them” (Ibid.). The primary bond between individuals in early
capitalist society was a sense of shared interest and common fate, but (neoliberal) capitalism might
actually dismantle this bond by forcing people to compete with each other for work, income and social
position. It seems quite obvious that this all sounds very normal in the present day and is no more than a statement of reality but we must
remember that this economic type was still relatively new at the beginning of the 20th century. Bonger’s explanations for the rise of social
inequality and for the demoralising effect that capitalism can have on individuals arose from the necessity of labour to capitalist production and
in particular the need of the producer to purchase labour (and from the labourer’s need to sell). Bonger argues that people are forced to sell
their labour to avoid starvation, which, in most cases, does not enter the equation now because of the remnants of our welfare state. However,
it is still the case that we need to work to provide for ourselves, thus Bonger’s idea that this situation gives rise to exploitation may still be
relevant. “Little
by little one class of men has become accustomed to think that the others are destined to
amass wealth for them” (Ibid. 60), this, thought Bonger, demoralises both the producer and the
labourer. In the producer it creates greed and a disregard for those under his or her charge who are
seen solely as profit making machines. In the labouring classes it creates feelings of insecurity and
demoralisation because there is always a surplus of labour with which we can be threatened if we fail to
live up to expectations.
Impact-Ethics-Collective Responsibilty
The aff’s notion that all individuals can be autonomous is flawed – a refusal for
compromise would destroy collective responsibility which is key to societal
advancement.
Beam 10—an American journalist and a reporter for The New Republic (Christopher, “The Trouble
With Liberty,” The New York Magazine, 12/26, http://nymag.com/news/politics/70282/)//FJ
It’s a compelling story. But like many libertarian narratives, it’s oversimplified. If the biggest banks had failed, bankers
wouldn’t have been the only ones punished. Everyone would have lost his money. Investors who had no idea
how their dollars were being used—the ratings agencies gave their investments AAA grades, after all—would have gone broke. Homeowners
who misunderstood their risky loans would have gone into permanent debt. Sure, the bailouts let some irresponsible people off easy. But not
intervening would have unfairly punished a much greater number. There’s
always tension between freedom and fairness.
We want less government regulation, but not when it means firms can hire cheap child labor. We want a free
market, but not so bankers can deceive investors. Libertarianism, in promoting freedom above all else, pretends the
tension doesn’t exist. Case in point: A house in Obion County, Tennessee, burned to the ground in September because the owner had
not paid the annual $75 fee for opt-in fire protection. As the fire raged, the house owner told the dispatcher that he would pay the cost of
putting out the fire. The fire department still refused to come. The house burned down, with four pets inside. Libertarians point out that this is
how opt-in services—as opposed to taxpayer-funded public services—works. If you don’t pay, you don’t get coverage. The firefighters can’t
make exceptions without creating moral hazard. This makes sense in theory. In practice, not so much. The firefighters showed up to protect a
neighboring property. The homeowner offered to pay not just the cost of the fire protection but the full cost of the spray. A court would have
enforced that contract. But because the firefighters stuck to a rigid principle of opt-in services, a house was destroyed. Will this serve as a
cautionary tale next time a rural resident of Obion County is deciding whether to buy fire insurance? No doubt. But will someone else inevitably
not learn his lesson and make the same mistake? No doubt. And that’s just the government side. Consider the social side of Libertopia. It’s no
coincidence that most libertarians discover the philosophy as teenagers. At
best, libertarianism means pursuing your own
self-interest, as long as you don’t hurt anyone else. At worst, as in Ayn Rand’s teachings, it’s an explicit
celebration of narcissism.
“Man’s first duty is to himself,” says the young architect Howard Roark in his climactic speech in The
Fountainhead. “His moral obligation is to do what he wishes.” Roark utters these words after dynamiting his own project, since his vision for the
structure had been altered without his permission. The
message: Never compromise. If you don’t get your way, blow
things up. And there’s the problem. If everyone refused to compromise his vision, there would be no
cooperation. There would be no collective responsibility . The result wouldn’t be a city on a hill. It
would be a port town in Somalia. In a world of scarce resources, everyone pursuing their own self-interest would yield not Atlas
Shrugged but Lord of the Flies. And even if you did somehow achieve Libertopia, you’d be surrounded by
assholes.
Turns Structural Violence
Affirmation of individualism leads to structural inequality – the poor are blamed for
their suffering
Smith 12— Sociology Lens Journal (Candace, “Neoliberalism and Individualism: Ego Leads to
Interpersonal Violence?,” The Society Pages, 12/4,
http://thesocietypages.org/sociologylens/2012/12/04/neoliberalism-and-individualism-ego-leads-tointerpersonal-violence/)//FJ
When it comes to individualization, this idea is one of the fundamental aspects of neoliberalism. In fact, Bauman (2000:34) argues that in
neoliberal states “individualization is a fate, not a choice.” As Amable (2011) explains, neoliberals have realized
that in order for their ideology to be successful, a state’s populace must internalize the belief that
individuals are only to be rewarded based on their personal effort. With such an ego-driven focus, Scharff (2011)
explains that the process of individualization engenders a climate where structural inequalities are
converted into individual problems . That is, neoliberalism surmises that anyone can overcome obstacles if only they work hard
enough. Similarly, Brown (2003) describes how neoliberal policies place a moral component on success. By insisting that only the
immoral fail to achieve success, this concept permits and even encourages a society to blame the poor for
their suffering (Passas 2000). And, because people are responsible for their own fate as individuals,
neoliberalism further entails that a state should not interfere with this process since doing so would be
counterintuitive to the basic premise that only merit should determine success (Amable 2011). As Thatcher once
said about the role of the state, “There is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and there are families…there’s no such
thing as entitlement” (Keay 1987:8-10).
Turns Minority Oppression
Individualism is the primary cause of racism – the belief that each individual is imbued
with equal rights creates a worldview that is hostile to disproportionally helping
minorities.
Guay and Lamont 14—(*Joseph AND **Lamont, “Is neoliberalism a threat to civil rights?,” The
Boston Globe, 5/7, http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/05/07/neoliberalism-threat-civilrights/GOy4Uw3yBH5kE4VTLTsdgO/story.html)//FJ
New research by Leanne S. Son Hing, a professor of psychology at the University of Guelph, suggests racism is in many cases
associated with what seem to be highly sophisticated beliefs in neoliberal hallmarks like
entrepreneurialism, individualism, self-reliance, and a strong work ethic. Neoliberalism as economic policy
endorses privatization, the liberalization of trade, and minimal state intervention in the market. Over the span of 30 years, these prescriptions
have rewarded active participation, risk taking, and innovation, providing the fuel for unprecedented economic growth in the modern era. But
as these policies influence our worldviews, market
principles may serve to justify racial antipathy and cause us to
turn a blind eye to structural restraints that often marginalize vulnerable minority communities, according
to Son Hing. By employing neoliberal narratives premised on equal competition for prosperity, for instance,
whites may reason that, “discrimination no longer exists,” that blacks’ “demands for special treatment
are unfair,” and that blacks “fail to get ahead because of a lack of hard work and self-reliance.” To make
matters worse, as the current economic system exacerbates competition over scarce resources, heightens uncertainty about the future, and
fosters greater inequality, neoliberals,
who reject worldviews where things are not up to the individual, may
become hostile to policies such as affirmative action or any other form of group remediation.
Son Hing is
quick to point out that the picture is mixed — a “left-right political and economic orientation does not map perfectly onto prejudice. There are
a number of aversive racists (characterized by unconsciously holding negative values) on the political left who are prejudiced and principled
conservatives on the right who are not particularly prejudiced.” Furthermore, some would argue that the sink-or-swim nature of our current
economic system is what makes it work regardless of race, sex, creed, or any other social or physical determinant; reliance on strict market
principles, in this view, is really the only way to ensure equity for all. By introducing some other, lower standard of judgment for those of
different color/culture, we would be engaging in the very sort of racism that we want to eliminate. Nevertheless, the research by Son Hing
raises the possibility that in
a neoliberal world, traditional variants of racism can more easily survive under the
cover of evenhandedness. It is thus prudent that while we commemorate the legislation that has opened the door politically for
millions of minorities here in the United States, we also contemplate the role that our economic beliefs can have in hampering that political
progress in the days to come.
The affirmative’s individualism cannot break away from structures of oppression –
minorities will never be able to gain true access to the autonomy that aff claims to
create – neoliberalism proves.
Cooke 13—(Christina, “On The Neoliberal Ego,” OF THAT CLOSE KERNING, SO SPLENDIFEROUS,
REPLETES, 12/13, http://ofthatclosekerningsosplendiferousrepletes.wordpress.com/2013/12/07/onthe-neoliberal-ego/)//FJ
You know the kind I’m talking about: the kumbaya preaching of “all voices are equal!” which conveniently ignores
the systemic prejudices and structural disadvantages barring most non-white, non-native (in terms of
migration), non-straight people from partaking in this supposed laissez-faire “freedom”. What sorts of
disadvantages? For example, more often than not, when people see me (I am not so foolish as to attempt to speak for all marginalized peoples
who’re similar to myself. The last thing black feminism needs is another saviour who’s deadset on saving The Race), they see my black skin –
which makes them wary. They see my button-downs and loose pants, and read me as male – which makes them nervous. When they realize I’m
cis-female, however, that just makes them flat-out confused. From there, the conversation usually devolves into them trying to put a
recognizable label on me instead of actually listening to what I’m there to say. Neoliberal equality
claims to push against such
by emphasizing a social free-for-all in a seeming gesture of inclusivity, which usually
reveals itself to be more concerned with preserving the colonial and capitalist ego than anything else :
forms of denigration
singing the sugary anthem of “we’re all the same” affords white neoliberals the false right to ignore
social, racial, economic and cultural differences in a so-called attempt to acknowledge our Universal
Humanity. Such a stance also ensures white, settler, upper-class concerns always have a (prominent) seat at the discussion table: “If we’re
all the same, then my white concerns deserve to be heard amidst this black-centered discussion, too!” Heaven forbid we non-mainstream folk
ever do anything that doesn’t focus on, relate to, or continually gush gratitude to our white counterparts for granting us the space to be!
Turns Gender-Activism
The focus on freedom and individualism siphons off activism to resist gender
oppression
Scharff 11—Lecturer in Culture, Media and Creative Industries at King's College (Christina,
“Disarticulating Feminism: Individualization, Neoliberalism and the Othering of ‘Muslim Women,”
European Journal of Women’s Studies, May, Sage Journals)//FJ
In addition, processes of individualization create a climate in which structural ine- qualities are regarded as
individual problems. Exploring feminist consciousness in 10 white middle-class women in Britain, Rich
(2005) found that individual achievement is believed to be sufficient to overcome social constraints. These
empirical observations resonate with broader sociological arguments about individualization (Beck, 1992; Beck and Bcck-Gcrnshcim. 1995;
Giddcns, 1991) and more critical perspectives on processes of individualization in particular (Bauman, 2000,2001; McRobbic, 2009). Writing
about the contemporary era, Bauman argues that
'Individualization is a fate, not a choice ' and that refusal to participate in the
'individualizing game is emphatically not on the agenda' (Bauman, 2000: 34; emphasis in original). 'Everything . . .', he states, 'is now down to
the individual' (Bauman, 2000: 62); the
conditions in which individuals live, their expe- riences and narratives
undergo a relentless process of individualization. Discussing The Aftermath of Feminism, McRobbic (2009: 16) draws on
Bauman's arguments to develop the concept of "female individualization'. Examining young women's repudiation of
feminism, she claims that feminism has been replaced with 'aggressive individualism' (McRobbic, 2009: 5).
Turns Gender-Violence
Private individualism allows for the subordination of non-masculine identities—root
cause of sexual violence against women
Olsen 93 [Frances, Professor of Law at the University of California, “Constitutional Law: Feminist
Critiques of the Public/Private Distinction”,
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/ccum10&div=25&g_sent=1&collection=journals#
325] alla
Many of the feminist arguments for more state intervention in¶ the family are based on this first level of
criticism of the public/ private distinction. Feminist lawyers have objected to the withdrawal of the law
from the so-called domestic sphere on the basis¶ that the withdrawal left women unprotected from
abuse and gave¶ the ideological message that domestic life was less important than¶ commercial life or
other aspects of society governed by law.13 It¶ should no longer be overlooked that while police and
district attorneys have tended to treat the matter as private when a husband¶ beats his wife, and to
suggest that they should let the couple work¶ out their differences, police and district attorneys have
always¶ treated it as public when the wife shoots the husband, never seeing¶ that as one way for the
couple to work Out their differences. 14¶ The movement against sexual violence against women and¶
against sexual abuse more generally pointed out how the asserted¶ “privacy” of things sexual resulted
in very limited protection for¶ women against sex crimes. The slogan that “rape is about violence¶ not
sex” was an effort to move rape from the “private” realm,¶ where it was all too often tolerated or
subjected to minimal controls, 15 to the “public” realm, where one might expect the criminal law would
be applied in a reasonable manner to punish and deter¶ rape.’6 This critique was expanded into a
critique of the complex¶ and subtle ways in which the power that men as a group exercised¶ over
women as a group was seen all too much as private .17¶ In a similar vein, women have questioned why
it is that men¶ are so able to see the appeal of laws placing limits on the rights of¶ the homeless to beg
for money, especially as some of them do so¶ aggressively and threateningly, and so unable to see any
justification¶ for laws limiting the rights of men to beg for sex, even when many¶ of them do so
aggressively and threateningly. Indeed many more¶ men seize sexual pleasure of one form or another
from women than¶ homeless people seize money or other property from those who¶ choose not to
engage in the gratuitous transfer requested.¶ On the second level of criticism, “public” and “private”
are¶ shown not to be analytic categories at all. On this level of critique,¶ the problem is not just that
private actions can be made to look like¶ state action and vice versa, but rather that there really is no
way to¶ say that certain action is private action.’ I have often used the¶ example of state intervention in
the family to illustrate this point.’9¶ Is the state intervening or not intervening if it allows a deceased¶
man’s same-sex lover instead of his parents to make funeral arrangements? What is the noninterventionist state response, for example, if parents try to reclaim their child from an aunt to whom¶
the child has fied?20¶ For most of us, what we want to do and be left alone to do¶ seems like private
action—thus beating up one’s son, oppressing¶ one’s workers, supporting a political party,
discriminating against¶ African-American customers, and publishing Salmon Rushdie’s ad¶ dress or the
name of a rape victim are all considered private by the¶ person who engages in the activity. The laws
that facilitate the in¶ jury of one person by another seem like state action when they seem unjust, but
go unnoticed or are treated as a neutral background of¶ law to those who support the rules. Acts of
racial discrimination¶ which are now widely seen as state action used to seem like private¶ action to
those who supported discrimination.21 The interesting¶ question is how the particular behavior is
successfully characterized¶ as private or public, and why the legitimation or delegitimation¶ works.¶
The important critical point is that injustice cannot be justified¶ by means of the public/private
distinction. Thus, I disagree with¶ the assertion in Larry Alexander’s paper that “absolutely nothing¶
follows” from this criticism of the state action doctrine or of the¶ public/private dichotomy.22 What
follows from the criticism is that¶ the asserted presence or absence of state action is not a justification¶
for an otherwise unjust decision.¶ On a third level of critique, deeper political meanings are found¶
behind the appeal of privacy. Notions of individualism ,23 of¶ choice24 and of desire,25 and the
reasons why we value privacy26 are¶ deeply related to the peculiar importance placed on the
male/female distinction and to the subordination of women. Privacy is re¶ lated to manhood;
“private parts” are sexual; and the classical¶ liberal individual is not an asexual “person” but the male
head of a¶ family. Privacy is most enjoyed by those with power. To the powerless, the private realm is
frequently a sphere not of freedom but of uncertainty and insecurity.27 On this level of critique, the
point is not just that men enjoy a kind of privacy in the family that women¶ and children do not enjoy
(but rather too often suffer under).¶ Rather, the standard situation in which one enjoys privacy and
free¶ dom is not a situation of equality but one of hierarchy. We virtually¶ never all enjoy privacy
equally, and the pretense that equality is the¶ norm, and situations of domination an exception, is
simply another¶ way of maintaining the status quo.
Individual distancing allows for gendered violence to occur—the male is never held
accountable for “private” issues
Schneider 91 [Elizabeth M., Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School, “The Violence of Privacy”,
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/conlr23&div=35&g_sent=1&collection=journals#
987] alla
Historically, the dichotomy of “public” and “private” has been¶ viewed as an important construct for
understanding gender. The tradi¶ tional notion of “separate spheres” is premised on a dichotomy
between¶ the “private” world of family and domestic life (the “women’s”¶ sphere), and the “public”
world of marketplace (the “men’s” sphere).’¶ Nadine Taub and I have discussed elsewhere the difference
between¶ the role of law in the public and private spheres.’° In the public sphere,¶ sex-based
exclusionary laws join with other institutional and ideological¶ constraints to directly limit women’s
participation.” In the private¶ sphere, the legal system operates more subtly. The law claims to be¶
absent in the private sphere and has historically refused to intervene in¶ ongoing family relations.’2¶
Tort law, which is generally concerned with injuries inflicted¶ on individuals, has traditionally been held
inapplicable to inju¶ ries inflicted by one family member on another. Under the¶ doctrines of
interspousal and parent-child immunity, courts¶ have consistently refused to allow recoveries for
injuries that¶ would be compensable but for the fact that they occurred in¶ the private realm. In the
same way, criminal law fails to pun¶ ish intentional injuries to family members. Common law and¶
statutory definitions of rape in most states continue to carve¶ out a special exccption for a husband’s
forced intercourse with¶ his wife . Wife beating was initially omitted from the definition¶ of criminal
assault on the ground that a husband had the right¶ to chastise his wife. Even today, after courts have
explicitly¶ rejected the definitional exception and its rationale, judges,¶ prosecutors, and police officers
decline to enforce assault laws¶ in the family coñtext.’3¶ Although a dichotomous view of the public
sphere and the private¶ sphere has some heuristic value, and considerable rhetorical power, the¶
dichotomy is overdrawn.” The notion of a sharp demarcation between public and private has been
widely rejected by feminist and Critical¶ Legal Studies scholars.15 There is no realm of personal and
family life¶ that exists totally separate from the reach of the state. The state de¶ fines both the family,
the so-called private sphere, and the market, the¶ so-called public sphere. “Private” and “public” exist on
a continuum.¶ Thus, in the so-called private sphere of domestic and family life,¶ which is purportedly
immune from law, there is always the selective¶ application of law. Significantly, this selective
application of law invokes “privacy” as a rationale for immunity in order to protect male¶ domination.
For example, when the police do not respond to a battered¶ woman’s call for assistance, or when a civil
court refuses to evict her¶ assailant, the woman is relegated to self-help, while the man who beats¶ her
receives the law’s tacit encouragement and support.’° Indeed, we¶ can see this pattern in recent
legislative and prosecutorial efforts to¶ control women’s conduct during pregnancy in the form of “fetal”
pro¶ tection laws. These laws are premised on the notion that women’s¶ childbearing capacity, and
pregnancy itself, subjects women to public¶ regulation and control. Thus, pregnant battered women may
find them¶ selves facing criminal prosecution for drinking liquor, but the man who¶ battered them is not
prosecuted.17 The rhetoric of privacy that has insulated the female world from¶ the legal order sends
an important ideological message to the rest of¶ society. It devalues women and their functions and
says that women¶ are not important enough to merit legal regulation.¶ This message is clearly
communicated when particular¶ relief is withheld. By declining to punish a man for inflicting¶ injuries on
his wife, for example, the law implies she is his¶ property and he is free to control her as he sees fit.
Women’s¶ work is discredited when the law refuses to enforce the man’s¶ obligation to support his wife,
since it implies she makes no¶ contribution worthy of support. Similarly, when courts decline¶ to enforce
contracts that seek to limit or specify the extent of¶ the wife’s services, the law implies that household
work is not¶ real work in the way that the type of work subject to contract¶ in the public sphere is real
work. These are important¶ messages, for denying woman’s humanity and the value of her¶ traditional
work are key ideological components in maintain¶ ing woman’s subordinate status. The message of
women’s in¶ feriority is compounded by the totality of the law’s absence¶ from the private realm . In
our society, law is for business and¶ other important things. The fact that the law in general claims¶ to
have so little bearing on women’s day-to-day concerns re¶ flects and underscores their insignificance.
Thus, the legal or¶ der’s overall contribution to the devaluation of women is¶ greater than the sum of the
negative messages conveyed by¶ individual legal doctrines.’9¶ Definitions of “private” and “public” in any
particular legal con¶ text can and do constantly shift. Meanings of “private” and “public”¶ are based on
social and cultural assumptions of what is valued and im¶ portant, and these assumptions are deeply
gender-based. Thus, the in¶ terrelationship between what is understood and experienced as “pri¶ vate”
and “public” is particularly complex in the area of gender, where¶ the rhetoric of privacy has masked
inequality and subordination. The¶ decision about what we protect as “private” is a political decision
that¶ always has important “public” ramifications.2° In general, privacy has been viewed as problematic
by feminist¶ theorists.2’ Privacy has seemed to rest on a division of public and private that has been
oppressive to women and has supported male dominance in the family. Privacy reinforces the idea that
the personal is¶ separate from the political ; privacy also implies something that should¶ be kept
secret. Privacy inures to the benefit of the individual, not the¶ community. The right of privacy has been
viewed as a passive right,¶ one which says that the state cannot intervene.22
Turns Gender-Psychology
The psychology and philosophy of radical freedom is predicated on the idea of woman
as a threat to freedom. It is designed to deny consciousness to woman and promote
male domination
Simons 90 [Margaret A., Professor of Philosophical Studies at Southern Illinois University at
Edwardsville, “Sexism and the Philosophical Canon: On Reading Beauvoir's The Second Sex”,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2709626]
Barrett gives three objections to Sartre's dualistic psychology: man is isolated from nature the existence
of the unconscious is denied, and human relationships become "a perpetual oscillation between sadism
and masochism" that "turns love and particularly sexual love into a perpetual tension and indeed
warfare." It is this third objection that concerns us here. Barrett describes Sartre's analysis of
relationships in frightening terms, as "a dialectical ingenuity that is almost fiendish.... [T]he glance of the
Other, in Sartre, is always like the stare of Medusa, fearful and petrifying" (229). The argument that
follows is Barrett's attempt to explain away this dangerous human relationship. He begins by criticizing
Sartre's "fundamentally masculine psychology that misunderstands or disparages the psychology of
woman." He finds "the element of masculine protest" "strong" in "Sartre's philosophical analysis ... of
the viscous, the thick, sticky substance that would entrap his liberty like the soft threat of the body of a
woman. And the woman is a threat, for the woman is nature and Sartrean man exists in the liberty of his
project, which, since it is ultimately unjustified and unjustifiable, in effect sunders him totally from
nature" (230). Barrett could have responded to this Sartrean vision as Beauvoir did in The Second Sex, by
examining the roots of men's fears and myths about woman that explain male domination. Beauvoir
contrasts these with women's experience of oppression and desire for liberation and argues for
reciprocity. Instead, Barrett seeks to eliminate the battle between the sexes by eliminating
woman/nature as a threat, thus providing a secure foundation for male domination. His solution is twofold: to reunite man with nature through the unconscious and to deny consciousness to women. Let
Barrett himself take up the narrative at the point following his reference to The Second Sex: ... Take an
ordinary woman, one of the great number whose being is the involvement with family and children, and
some of whom are happy at it, or at least as humanly fulfilled by it as the male by his own essentially
masculine projects. What sense does it make to say that such a woman's identity is constituted by her
project? Her project is family and children, and these do in fact make up a total human commitment;
but it is hardly a project that has issued out of the conscious ego. Her whole life, with whatever freedom
it reveals, is rather the unfolding of nature through her (232). Barrett's solution to the battle of the sexes
is both simple and traditional: woman is revered, and silenced, as a passive expression of nature. Since
woman lacks consciousness, the oscillation between sadism and masochism stops; woman never
becomes subject. Woman, whose being is involvement with the family, mediates in that role between
man and nature, a relation that for man functions at the level of unconscious, not as a subject for
conscious concern. Another problem for Barrett and others in the interpretation of Beauvoir's
philosophy is that many of her texts, especially beginning with The Second Sex, stubbornly resist being
cast in a Sartrean context. Barrett saw French existentialism as a European philosophy of despair,
diametrically opposed to American optimism and belief in technology. But Beauvoir's philosophy in The
Second Sex is optimistic, based on faith in the liberating potential of technology, which had brought
violence and productivity into the physical grasp of women-as it had brought control over reproduction.
Barrett could not have maintained his conceptual framework and at the same time have incorporated
The Second Sex into his analysis.
Turns Gender-Masculine Ethics
Radical individualism always prioritizes masculine ethics—destroys community
cooperation
Tong and Williams 14 [Dr. Rosemarie Tong is Distinguished Professor of Health Care Ethics in the
Department of Philosophy and Director of the Center for Applied and Professional Ethics at UNC
Charlotte and Nancy Williams is Associate Professor at Department of Philosophy at Wofford, "Feminist
Ethics", Fall 2014, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-ethics/] alla
Clearly, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century feminist thinkers like Wollstonecraft, Mill, Beecher,
Stanton, and Gilman contributed to the development of a wide-range of feminist approaches to ethics
that focused on the similarities and differences between “male/masculine” ethics and
“female/feminine” ethics. In doing so, they inaugurated a discussion of the different ontologies and
epistemologies that underpin these types of ethics. In the main, they challenged the ontological
presupposition that the more separate the self is from others, the more fully-developed that self is.
They also questioned the presupposition that the more universal, abstract, impartial, and rational
knowledge is, the more closely it mirrors reality. In place of these presuppositions, decidely present in
most traditional ethics, they instead suggested the ontological assumption that the more connected the
self is to others, the better the self is. They also offered the epistemological presupposition that the
more particular, concrete, partial, and emotional knowledge is, the more likely it represents the way in
which people actually experience the world. Thus, it is not surprising that “communal woman” gradually
began to replace “autonomous man” in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century feminist approaches to
ethics (Tong, Feminine and Feminist Ethics, 1993). Building on the legacy of many of the thinkers who
preceded them, a prominent group of twentieth-century feminist ethicists have continued to use
“communal woman” to develop a variety of care-focused feminist approaches to ethics. Unlike nonfeminist care-focused approaches to ethics, feminist ones are highly attune to gender issues. Feminist
care-focused ethicists are quick to notice instances of female subordination and the tendencies of
patriarchal societies not to properly esteem women's ways of thinking, writing, working, and loving. 2.1
Feminist Care Ethics: The Different Voice Proponents of feminist care ethics, including Carol Gilligan and
Nel Noddings stress that traditional moral theories, principles, practices, and policies are deficient to the
degree they lack, ignore, trivialize, or demean values and virtues culturally associated with women.
Gilligan offers her work as a critique of the Freudian notion that whereas men are morally welldeveloped, women are not. Freud attributed women's supposed moral inferiority to girls' psychosexual
development. Whereas boys break their attachment to their mothers for fear of being castrated by their
fathers if they fail to do so, girls remain tied to their mothers because the threat of castration has no
power over them. As a result of this theorized male-female difference, girls are supposedly much slower
than boys to develop a sense of themselves as autonomous moral agents, personally responsible for the
consequences of their actions: as persons who must obey society's rules or face its punishments. In
other words, boys and men come to respect law more than girls and women do. According to Gilligan,
Freud is simply one of many traditional thinkers who have viewed women as morally inferior to men.
She singles out educational psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg for extended criticism. Kohlberg claimed
that moral development is a six-stage process. Stage One is the “punishment and obedience
orientation.” To avoid the pain of punishment and/or to receive the pleasure of a reward, children do as
they are told. Stage Two is “the instrumental relativist orientation.” Based on the notion of reciprocity
— scratch my back and I'll scratch yours — children meet others' needs only if others meet their needs.
Stage Three is the “good boy-nice girl” orientation. Adolescents adhere to prevailing norms to secure
others' approval and love. Stage Four is the “law and order orientation.” Adolescents develop a sense of
duty, defer to authority figures, and maintain the social order to secure others' admiration and respect.
Stage Five is the “social-contract legalistic orientation.” Adults adopt a utilitarian moral point of view
according to which individuals may do as they please, provided they do not harm other people. Stage Six
is “the universal ethical principle orientation.” Adults adopt a Kantian moral perspective that transcends
all conventional moralities. Adults are no longer ruled by self-interest, the opinion of others, or the fear
of punishment, but by self-imposed universal principles. (Kohlberg in Mischel, ed., Cognitive
Development and Epistemology, 1971). Although Gilligan concedes that Kohlberg's moral ladder appeals
to many people schooled in traditional ethics, she points out that wide acceptance of a moral
development theory is not necessarily the measure of its truth. She asks whether Kohlberg's six stages of
moral development are indeed universal, invariant, and hierarchical. In particular, she asks why, in the
Kohlbergian scheme of things, women rarely climb past Stage Three, whereas men routinely make it to
Stages Four or even Five? Does this gender difference mean that women are less morally developed
than men are? Or does it instead mean there is something wrong with Kohlberg's methodology — some
bias in it that permits men to achieve higher moral development scores than women? Gilligan believes
that Kohlberg's methodology is male-biased. Its ears are tuned to male, not female, moral voices. Thus,
it fails to register the different voice Gilligan claims to have heard in her study of twenty-nine women
reflecting on their abortion decisions. This distinctive moral voice, says Gilligan, speaks a language of
care that emphasizes relationships and responsibilities. Seemingly, this language is largely unintelligible
to Kohlbergian researchers who speak the dominant moral language of traditional ethics—namely, a
language of justice that stresses rights and rules.
Turns Gender-Male Domination
Individualism is premised on masculine ideals—entrenches male domination
Thompson 3 [Denise, Dr Thompson, BA (Hons), PhD University New South Wales, “Feminism and The
Problem Of Individualism”, July 2003, http://users.spin.net.au/~deniset/brefpap/cfemindivid.pdf] alla
Perhaps this is a terminological quibble. After all, Jaggar is fully aware of the social relations of male
dominance as the central problematic of feminist politics: ‘All feminists are concerned to end male
dominance, and all feminist political theory is designed to show how this can be done’ (Jaggar, 1983:
147). And the reference to ‘male bias’ is a step in the right direction since it identifies a connection
between individualism and male interests . But the fact that she was later to stop referring to male
dominance, substituting instead expressions like ‘strategic gender interests’ (citing Maxine Molyneux)2
(Jaggar, 1998), indicates that far more is at stake than terminological niceties. It suggests there is a
closer relationship between individualism and male supremacy than Jaggar allowed, and that
carelessness in theorizing individualism is also carelessness in theorizing male domination. Scheman
gives a more detailed account of how a male dominated society might construct what Jaggar referred to
as the ‘human desires and interests’ of abstract individualism. Following feminist object relations theory,
she links the ‘ separate, autonomous, sharply individuated self embedded in liberal political and
economic ideology and in individualist philosophies of the mind’ with masculinity. She argues that one
of the reasons for the widespread acceptance of individualism is the cultural requirement that males be
‘deeply motivated’ to differentiate themselves from the women who are their primary caregivers in
infancy (Scheman, 1983: 235).
Egoism Bad
Egoism justifies the worst forms of violence – allows one to inflict harm on another for
self-benefit.
Rachels 97—(James, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, University of Alabama, pp. 85)//FJ
Ethical Egoism ,
namely that it would endorse wicked actions — provided , of course, that those actions benefit the person
who does them . Here are some examples, taken from various news- papers: To increase his profits, a pharmacist filled
prescrip- tions for cancer-patients using watered-down drugs. A nurse raped two patients while they
were unconscious. A paramedic gave emergency patients injections of sterile water rather than
morphine, so that he could sell the morphine. Parents fed a baby acid so that they could fake a lawsuit,
claiming (he baby's formula was tainted. A 13-year-old girl was kidnapped by a neighbor and kept
shackled in an underground bomb-shelter for 181 days, while she was sexually abused. Suppose that, by
doing such things, someone could actu- ally gain some benefit for himself. Of course, this means that he
would have to avoid being caught. But if he could get away with it, wouldn't Ethical Egoism have to
Curiously, philosophers have not paid much attention to what you might think is the most obvious argument against
say that such actions are permissible? This seems enough by itself to discredit the doctrine. I believe this is a valid complaint;
nonetheless, one might think that it begs the question against Ethical Egoism, because in saying that these actions are wicked, we are appealing to a noncgoistic conception of wickedness. So we might ask if there isn't some further problem with Ethical Egoism, that doesn't beg the
question.
Communal rules are key to resolve conflicting interests – ethical egoism exacerbates
these conflicts by promoting self-interest.
Rachels 97—(James, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, University of Alabama, pp. 85)//FJ
The Argument That Ethical Egoism Cannot Handle Conflicts of Interest. In his book The Moral Point ofVieto (1958), Kurt Baler argues that
Ethical Egoism cannot be correct because it cannot provide solutions for conflicts of interest. We need
moral rules, he says, only because our interests sometimes come into conflict— if they never conflicted,
then there would be no problems to solve and hence no need for the kind of guidance that morality
provides. But Ethical Egoism does not help to resolve conflicts of interest; it only exacerbates them.
Baier
argues for this by in- troducing a fanciful example:Let B and K be candidates for the presidency of a certain Country and let it he granted that it
is in the interest of ei- ther to be elected, but that only one can succeed. It would then be in the interest of B but against the interest of K if B
were elected, and vice versa, and therefore in the inter- est of B but against die interest of K if K were liquidated, and vice versa. But from this
it would follow that B ought to liquidate K that it is wrong lor B not to do so, that B has not "done his duty" until he has liquidated K: and vice
versa. Similarly K, knowing that his own liquidation is in the interest of Band therefore, anticipating B's attempt-* to secure it, ought to take
step* to foil B's endeavors. It would be wrong for him not to do so. He would "not have done his duty" until he had made sure of stopping B ...
litis is obviously absurd. For morality is designed to apply in just such cases, namely, those where interests con- flirt. But if die point of view of
morality were that of self- inlcrcsi. then there could never be moral solutions of con- flicts of interest-
Does this argument prove
that Ethical Egoism is unacceptable? It does , t/the conception of morality to which it appeals is accepted. The argument
assumes that an adequate morality must provide solutions for conflicts of interest in such a wav that everyone con- cerned can live together
harmoniously .
The conflict between B and K , for example, should be resolved so that they would no longer
at odds with one another . (One would not then haw a duty to do something that the other has a duty to prevent.) Ethi- cal
Ik-
Egoism does not do that, and if you think an ethical theory should, then you will not find Ethical
Egoism acceptable.
Increased egoism kills progress – leads to increased violence and re-entrenches
oppression – turns the aff.
Fischer 14—Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Berkeley (Claude S., “Libertarianism
Is Very Strange,” Boston Review, 1/27, http://www.bostonreview.net/made-america/claude-s-fischerlibertarianism-very-strange)//FJ
Social psychologists have demonstrated how anomalous is the Western, especially American, view of autonomous selves. For example,
Americans are likelier than others to explain what happens to people as a result of their individual traits and choices, to perform better when
we are allowed to choose our own tasks, to get upset if we sense a lack of personal freedom, and to care greatly about our self-esteem.
Psychologists Joseph Henrich, Steven Heine, and Ara Norenzayan synthesized much of this work in a well-received 2010 article, “The Weirdest
People in the World?” They conclude that, yes, Americans
are the weirdest; they are most likely to “conceive of
themselves primarily as self-contained individuals . . . as autonomous agents,” rather than as
“ interpersonal beings intertwined with one another in social webs.” Americans, for example, seem unique in
assigning babies their own rooms. That such fundamental cross-national differences persist after centuries of Western colonialism and a
hundred years of American cultural hegemony testifies to the historical oddity of the libertarian premise. The
individual was not the
prime mover of history, but its result. Emile Durkheim objected to “deducing society from the individual” for “we possess no
knowledge that gives grounds for believing in the possibility of such a spontaneous generation.” “Collective life,” he argued, “did not
arise from individual life; on the contrary, it is the latter that emerged from the former.” Libertarian thinkers
have reinvented history to place the autonomous self at creation. Of course, libertarians can concede that society preceded the individual but
still argue that government was formed by contract. Spontaneous, voluntary groups grew into the minimal state, which they see as the only
legitimate state. But this is also bad history. The state, as a distinguishable institution—whether Roman, Aztec, American—is distinctive, but
rulership is universal, or nearly so. Chiefs, councils of elders, and “big men” all sought to monopolize power and maintain order. Government
rarely if ever emerged from social contracts. (A few supra-governments emerged from contracts among lesser governments, as in Philadelphia,
1789.) Bentham thundered this point in the early days of libertarianism: “There
are no such things as natural rights—no such
things as rights anterior to the establishment of government.” Research explaining why rates of
interpersonal violence have declined over the centuries backs this up: domestic order is necessary so
that individuals can have rights against the assaults of other individuals.
“The origination of governments,”
Bentham continues, “from a contract is a pure fiction . . . . It never has been known to be true in any instance . . . . All governments that we
have any account of have been gradually established by habit, after having formed by force.” Libertarians can concede this, too, claiming only
that their just-so story serves moral philosophy. Nozick writes, “We learn much by seeing how the state could have arisen, even if it didn’t arise
that way” because he is making a moral argument. Modern Westerners do indeed endorse the principles of individual self-ownership and
universal rights. We do so, however, not because the principles are self-evident but because our thoughts on the matter are the product of
modern Western philosophy. If libertarian positions cannot be justified by reasoning from history or anthropology, they might be justified by
practicality: “That government which governs best governs least . . . . [indeed,] that government is best which governs not at all,” Thoreau
claimed in a characteristically solipsistic declaration. (Not paying taxes was Thoreau’s way of remaining unstained by connection to slavery, yet
it took big government to end slavery.) In today’s policy debates,
libertarians argue that their philosophy guides us toward
both more individual freedom and better collective outcomes. Writing in Salon, Michael Lind taunted libertarians on this
claim: “If your approach is so great, why hasn’t any country anywhere in the world ever tried it ?” In the
scramble to answer the challenge, conservative blogger Ben Domenech, quoting Robert Tracinski, points to “America itself, up to about 100
years ago,” with “no federal welfare state, no Social Security, no Medicare. . . . Life for the common man was better than it had ever been
before.” Yet Domenech concedes, “Life was nowhere near as good [then] as it is for Americans today—after another century of progress.”
Americans’ life expectancy, health, physical security, and living standards soared in the 20th century—
not, however, because of the march of libertarianism , as Domenech insinuates, but in great measure because
of the welfare state and of regulation of food, medicine, water, work safety, pollution, and so on .
Personal liberty itself has also improved in the last century, with civil rights for minorities and
women and broader guarantees of civil liberties . These advances, too, largely developed not against
government but with it.
The American western frontier illustrates what libertarians might consider the minimal, “night watchman”
state. Yet that watchman was often outgunned by desperadoes and vigilantes. The high homicide rates there and in the frontier-like quarters of
19th century American cities came down largely because a bigger state—policing—stood up. American history testifies against the libertarian
thesis. So do contemporary cross-national data using the Human Development Index, which measures a population’s well-being in terms of
health, education, and wealth. The HDI, corrected for internal distribution (the Bill Gates-makes-all-Americans-look-rich factor), is typically
higher in OECD nations where governments are relatively large. Both historical and contemporary research suggests that Thoreau was wrong;
the government that governs least does not govern best, whether the criterion is promoting the general
welfare or promoting individual liberty. This does not mean that the converse is true, that maximal government is best. There
appears to be a reasonable balancing point. We Americans seem to be below that reasonable point, and libertarianism threatens to
drive us further down. Of course, Rand’s John Galt wouldn’t give a damn.
Alternative
Alternative-Re-envisioned State
Radical individualism undermines the possibility of building a re-envisioned state that
provides for the common good
West 1 [Robin, is the Frederick J. Haas Professor of Law and Philosophy and Associate Dean (Research
and Academic Programs) at the Georgetown University Law Center. West's research is primarily
concerned with feminist legal theory, constitutional law and theory, philosophy of law, and the law and
literature movement, “Rights, Capabilities, and the Good Society”,
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1275&context=facpub] alla
In a number of books and articles over the last ten years, Martha¶ Nussbaum and Amartya Sen have
carved out a third position, which,¶ they argue, is in greater accord with liberal commitments to
individual¶ autonomy, and particularly the autonomous right of individuals to¶ determine their own
conceptions of the good.8 The state, Nussbaum¶ and Sen argue, as a matter of goodness and justice
both, must not¶ ensure minimal welfare directly-that would indeed be unduly¶ paternalistic, illiberal,
and in important respects, impossible: a state¶ cannot ensure, say, a healthy, long life for each citizen.9
Rather, a¶ decent and liberal state in a good society must ensure that citizens¶ achieve and enjoy
certain fundamental human capabilities (thereby¶ leaving to the citizens the choice whether or not to
avail themselves of¶ those capabilities) -including the capability to live a safe, well nourished,
productive, educated, social, and politically and culturally¶ participatory life of normal length.10 Thus,
to be "fully human,"¶ Nussbaum argues, and to be possessed of the full dignity that one's¶ humanity
implies, just is to enjoy this minimal threshold level of¶ capability." If they are to have fully human lives,
citizens must have¶ access to, and the capability to attain, non-alienating, nondiscriminatory and nonhumiliating work." They must have, or have¶ the capability to acquire, various welfare goods such as
decent healthcare, adequate food, shelter, and clothing. 3 They must have a good¶ and liberal
education, a safe upbringing, protection against physical¶ and sexual assault, and security in their
intimate and affiliative¶ associations. Citizens must have access to the material preconditions¶ of these
capabilities, if they are to have the ability to live fully human¶ lives.'4¶ Furthermore, Nussbaum argues,
for many or even all of us, these¶ preconditions cannot be met without considerable state and¶
community assistance, or more pointedly, without considerable state run redistribution and regulation.
15 These are not preconditions¶ readily satisfied in either a state of nature or a minimally regulated¶
social order. A good society, therefore, Nussbaum concludes, and a¶ liberal, just society, is one in which
the state is not just permitted, but¶ is obligated to ensure, on behalf of its citizens, that these material¶
preconditions of our fundamental human capabilities are met. 6 All¶ states, particularly liberal states,
ought to regard their obligation to¶ secure the preconditions of basic human capabilities as
fundamental¶ and as required by justice." Liberal states should regard their¶ obligation to secure the
minimal material preconditions of the basic¶ human capabilities to be a basic constitutional duty.
The demand for individual rights destroys all positive state actions—insulates the
individual from the state
West 1 [Robin, is the Frederick J. Haas Professor of Law and Philosophy and Associate Dean (Research
and Academic Programs) at the Georgetown University Law Center. West's research is primarily
concerned with feminist legal theory, constitutional law and theory, philosophy of law, and the law and
literature movement, “Rights, Capabilities, and the Good Society”,
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1275&context=facpub] alla
Liberal, constitutional rights, according to their legions of critics¶ and numerous rights theorists,
undercut any state obligation to secure¶ the preconditions for the fundamental human capabilities for
two¶ basic and interconnected reasons. The first is political. The good¶ society, as envisioned by virtually
all "good society" theorists, requires¶ substantial state intervention into various "private" spheres, and¶
substantial redistribution of the goods, resources, and power found in¶ those spheres.24 Liberal rights,
as defended and constructed by¶ contemporary constitutional theorists and jurists both, limit the
power¶ of states to do precisely that. Were a state to go about the task of¶ ensuring the material
preconditions of a good life for all, or, in the¶ Nussbaumian version of the same idea, ensuring the
preconditions for¶ the capabilities which are themselves requisite to a "fully human life,"¶ it would have
to break down the walls of insularity that liberal rights,¶ both in theory and to a considerable degree in
practice, protect. To¶ secure the minimal preconditions of the good society for all of us, the¶ state
would have to violate the rights we hold as individuals - rights of¶ liberty, property, contract, and
privacy. Indeed, not only do we lack a¶ "right" to a state obligated to ensure minimal preconditions of a
good¶ society-whether the "good society" is as envisioned by Karl Marx,¶ John Dewey, Michael Sandel,
Frank Michelman, William Forbath, or¶ Martha Nussbaum-but if anything, we have a right to a state
that¶ does not attempt to ensure that the material preconditions of a good¶ society are met. Rights
protect us against the paternalistic state that¶ might otherwise regard the "good society" as its
business.¶ Furthermore, rights deter the creation of a state interested in good¶ society ambitions by
structural design, not because they are misused¶ by Machiavellian political actors. In many liberal states,
and virtually¶ by definition in the United States, rights are overwhelmingly negative.¶ We have whatever
rights we have, against the state, and against the state's actions, and against the state's actors; we do
not have rights¶ that positively obligate the state to do something. We do not have¶ rights that require,
rather than forbid, the state to take some action. It¶ is, of course, because we have rights against the
state (and only against¶ the state) rather than rights to some particular sort of state action or¶ state
intervention, that rights protect the individual against an¶ overreaching state in the manner celebrated
by rights advocates. But¶ it is also because of their negativity that rights preclude the state from¶ taking
any role in securing to citizens the material preconditions of the¶ good society.¶ Negative rights thus
disempower the state from pernicious,¶ intermeddling, paternalistic, or malign intervention into the
private¶ affairs of individual citizens. By virtue of so doing, however, negative¶ rights also disempower
the state from intervening into the private¶ sphere for the democratically progressive purpose of
redistributing¶ power or resources within it. Negative rights elevate or empower the¶ citizen relative to
an overreaching, paternalistic state. Yet by staying¶ the paternalist's intervening hand, negative rights
both subordinate¶ that citizen to his stronger brother-thereby entrenching private¶ inequalities-and
disable the state from securing, on behalf of weaker¶ citizens, the material preconditions to developing
the capabilities¶ necessary to a fully human life. Good society theorists, rights critics,¶ and a number of
liberal rights theorists, have all concluded from this¶ argument that rights, as conceived and employed in
at least United¶ States liberal and constitutional jurisprudence, are fundamentally at¶ odds with any
purported state obligation to ensure the material¶ preconditions of a good society. If this conclusion is
correct, then it¶ obviously holds for a capabilities approach to welfarism as well. If so,¶ the state's
obligation to promote conditions that secure the minimal¶ capabilities essential to a fully human life,
even if such an obligation¶ exists, would have to be secured by some means other than individual¶ rights.
The demand for radical autonomy distances the self from the community—destroys
the ability of the state to have any positive benefits
West 1 [Robin, is the Frederick J. Haas Professor of Law and Philosophy and Associate Dean (Research
and Academic Programs) at the Georgetown University Law Center. West's research is primarily
concerned with feminist legal theory, constitutional law and theory, philosophy of law, and the law and
literature movement, “Rights, Capabilities, and the Good Society”,
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1275&context=facpub] alla
First, for there to be a state obligation to provide for minimal¶ capabilities requisite to a fully human life,
at least in a democratic¶ state in which state actors, and hence the "state" itself, are some¶ subset of
citizens, there must exist the political will for it. That will, in¶ turn, requires some degree of communal
solidarity among citizens.¶ Rights, however, disincline us to even regard each other, much less¶ assume
responsibility for each others' welfare. Rights erode rather¶ than enhance our feelings of obligation
toward our neighbors, cocitizens, and arguably even our intimates and family members. Rights¶ leave us
identified with our possessions, rather than with each other.¶ For that reason alone, they seriously
undercut the empathic solidarity¶ necessary to sustain a democratic case for a state obligation to
provide¶ for the well-being of others.¶ Second, at least some of the material preconditions of human¶
capabilities which a good state is obligated to provide are those¶ preconditions for our capability for
social affiliation or connection¶ with others, and mutual and moral responsibility for each others' well¶
being.' To live a fully human life, according to Nussbaum and others,¶ means in part to have the
capability to live responsibly and safely with and for others, at work, at home, and in the community! The¶ capability for doing just that, then, is part of what a just state is¶ obligated to ensure, if the state is
obligated to ensure the minimal¶ material preconditions of a good society. The atomism that is at the¶
core of liberal understandings of rights, however, implies at most an¶ atomistic individual in need of
rights of isolation, of privacy, and of¶ individuation; not rights that might stem from a frank recognition
of¶ our social or relational nature. In terms of capabilities, current rights¶ rhetoric implies that the
capability for autonomy is the core capability¶ in need of protection through rights, to the virtual
exclusion of¶ relational capabilities . Because of the power of modern individualistic¶ rights rhetoric,
we not only lack "relational rights" that might bolster¶ our social capabilities, but we become disinclined
to even envision or¶ argue for them. In an atomistic rights culture, we come to view¶ ourselves, and
then increasingly come to be, possessors of individual¶ rights against each other and the state. We are
not only without any¶ responsibilities toward others, but also without any rights to ensure¶ that we have
the capabilities to safely exercise those responsibilities¶ toward others. As a result, we come to identify
our "rights" – our most precious political entitlements, and hence our political identity as rights to
individuate and distance or sever ourselves from, rather¶ than rights to safely connect or relate to, our
families, intimates,¶ communities, or co-citizens.
Alternative-Feminist “social Self”
The alt is to vote negative to reject the masculinzied concept of radical freedom Radical freedom cannot take place without institutional change designed to allow
women the equal capacity to assert their freedom. The belief in radical autonomy can
only produce gender inequality if not preceded by calls for institutional
transformation.
Kruks 1987 [Sonia, Robert S. Danforth Professor of Politics at Oberlin College and received her Ph.D. in
Government from the London School of Economics, “Simone de Beauvoir and the Limits to Freedom”,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/466482]
If we compare de Beauvoir's account of woman's situation with Sartre's discussion of situation in Being
and Nothingness, several striking divergences emerge. Most obviously, situation becomes, in de
Beauvoir's analysis, above all externally constituted (though subjectively experienced): it is not brought
into being by woman's project. It is, moreover, a condition which is general to women as a certain social
category of human beings. While in Being and Nothingness other people are commonly presented as
only a peripheral or indirect structure of "my" situation, for de Beauvoir others are directly involved in
my own constitution of the meaning of even a free project. For example, in contrast to Sartre's
description in Being and Nothingness of the climber's solitary project, de Beauvoir had described, in
Pyrrhus et Cine'as, a solitary walker experiencing his or her relation to nature-but, as soon as the walk
was over, needing to share the experience with a friend in order to confirm it.23 For de Beauvoir, my
situation is always mediated for me by others-hence, as we have seen, her argument that I need
freedoms equal to mine in the world. For woman (and other oppressed groups), however, such a
confirmation through others is impossible : paradoxically the social nature of her situation constitutes
for her a denial of her freedom, not its confirmation. For woman lacks the relations of equality with man
necessary for a reciprocal recognition of freedoms Along with her direct, personal relations of inequality
and oppression, woman also encounters of what we might call a set of social institutions.24 It is these
instittions in their generality which function analogously to natural forces in perpetuating her
immanence. If all that took place was a Hegelian (or Sartrean) struggle of consciousnesses between two
human beings, one of whom happened to be male and one female, we could not anticipate in advance
which one of them would win. However, if we examine the relations of a husband and a wife, then it is
very different. For the institution of marriage in all its aspects-legal, economic, cultural, etc.-has formed
in advance for the protagonists their own relation of inequality. As de Beauvoir points out in a strikingly
unSartrean passage, ... it is not as single individuals that human beings are to be defined in the first
place; men and women have never stood opposed to each other in single combat; the couple is an
original Mitsein; and as such it always appears as a permanent or temporary element in a larger
collectivity The relations of any particular couple are embedded in the relations of the larger collectivity
and they are delimited by it. Thus, as de Beauvoir also points out, although man has imposed her
situation on woman, individual men may be as much the victims of what has become an impersonal
system of forces as are women A colonial administrator has no possibility of behaving well towards the
natives, nor a general towards his soldiers; the only solution is to be neither a colonist nor a military
chief; but a man could not stop himself from being a man. So there he is, guilty in spite of himself and
oppressed by this fault which he himself has not committed. ...The evil does not originate from
individual perversity ... it arises from a situation against which all individual action is powerless In other
words, the result of multiple, free (male) human action throughout history has been to create a set of
institutions-forms of what Sartre was later to call the "practico-inert"-which function as real limits on
freedom, female or male. If woman is to become a free existent (and indeed if male freedom is to be
increased), the process of change will have to commence from the radical transformation of the
institutional aspects of woman's situation. Marriage, motherhood, her exclusion from economic and
public activity, all will have to be extensively transformed.27 Liberation is not only a matter of
individual choice , but a process of complex social transformation . De Beauvoir is (in retrospect
naively) optimistic that, as women begin to attain social equality, in time an "inner metamorphosis" will
also take place.28
Alt solves the case—doesn’t reject the idea of an individual but reframes the starting
point of the aff to focus on gender problems
Friedman 89 [Marilyn, works in social and political philosophy, ethics, and feminist theory., “Feminism
and Modern Friendship: ¶ Dislocating the Community”, January 1989,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381435] alla
This article is an effort to redirect communitarian thought so as to ¶ avoid some of the pitfalls which it
poses, in its present form, for feminist ¶ theory and feminist practice. In the first part of the article, I
develop ¶ some feminist-inspired criticisms of communitarian philosophy as it is ¶ found in writings by
Michael Sandel and Alasdair MacIntyre. 1 " My brief ¶ critique of communitarian thought has the aim of
showing that communitarian theory, in the form in which it condones or tolerates traditional ¶
communal norms of gender subordination, is unacceptable from any ¶ standpoint enlightened by
feminist analysis. This does not preclude ¶ agreeing with certain specific communitarian views, for
example, the ¶ broad metaphysical conception of the individual, self, or subject as constituted by its
social relationships and communal ties, or the assumption ¶ that traditional communities have some
value. But the aim of the first ¶ section is critical: to focus on the communitarian disregard of gender
related problems with the norms and practices of traditional communities.
Affirmative
Only an insistence on radical autonomy from power structures can avoid replication of
oppression – South Africa proves.
Roos 13—a writer, activist, filmmaker, and founding editor at Roar Magazine (Jerome, “South Africa’s
untold tragedy of neoliberal apartheid,” Roar Magazine, 11/12, http://roarmag.org/2013/11/southafrica-marikana-anc-poor/)//FJ
The ANC and all other so-called revolutionaries betrayed the poor the moment they made it their aim to
take over the institutions of apartheid and reproduce them in a different form . But with the ANC’s crisis
of legitimacy deepening following the Marikana massacre, more and more people who do not feel represented are
being driven towards the only sensible conclusion. Earlier this year, in March, one thousand shackdwellers stormed a piece
of land in Cato Crest in Durban, occupied it, and called it Marikana in honor of the slain miners. The action was just one more expression of the
dawning realization around the world that, in these times of universal deceit, only an insistence on
radical autonomy can take the revolution forward.
In South Africa, the only way to overcome the social segregation that
continues to needlessly kill hundreds every day, is to embrace a political philosophy of needs that focuses on the empowerment of
communities; that operates through democratic participation and militant direct action; and that — instead
of trying to
‘emancipate’ South Africans by becoming more like their former oppressors — actively breaks out of the
cycle of exploitation by building interracial autonomy from below.
Individualism ultimately serves to benefit the greater good – natural generosity.
Branden 01—the author of 20 books, including The Art of Living Consciously, Taking Responsibility,
and most recently, My Years with Ayn Rand (Nathaniel, “Reflections on Self-Responsibility and
Libertarianism,” The Free Man, 4/1, http://www.fee.org/the_freeman/detail/reflections-on-selfresponsibility-and-libertarianism)//FJ
The ideal of self-responsibility in no way forbids us to help one another, within limits, in times of need. As noted,
Americans have a long tradition of doing this. We are the most charitable people in the world. This is not a contradiction but a natural result of
the fact that ours is the first and still the only country in history to proclaim the right to selfishness in “the pursuit of happiness.” The happiness
the Declaration of Independence refers to is our own. In
proclaiming and defending our right to pursue our own selfinterest, to live for our own sake, the American system released the innate generosity in everyone (when
they are not treated as objects of sacrifice). It is interesting to observe that during the 1980s, the so-called “decade
of greed,” Americans gave more than twice the amount to charity they had given in the previous
decade, in spite of changes in the tax laws that made giving less advantageous. Our private, not-for-profit organizations—the Boy Scouts and
Girl Scouts, the Salvation Army, churches, not-for-profit hospitals, and philanthropic agencies of every conceivable kind—perform
benevolent work far more extensive than in any other country. What needs to be challenged in our
country today is not the desirability of helping people in difficulty (intelligently and without self-sacrifice), but
rather the belief that it is permissible to abrogate individual rights to achieve our social goals. We
must stop looking for some new use of force every time we encounter something that upsets us or
arouses our pity.
Individualism is the foundation of a true community – responsibility for one’s own
actions removes dependency which is the precondition for good will.
Branden 01—the author of 20 books, including The Art of Living Consciously, Taking Responsibility,
and most recently, My Years with Ayn Rand (Nathaniel, “Reflections on Self-Responsibility and
Libertarianism,” The Free Man, 4/1, http://www.fee.org/the_freeman/detail/reflections-on-selfresponsibility-and-libertarianism)//FJ
We hear a great deal about the need for a “greater sense of community.” Government by pressure group is
the antagonist of community. This is why I stress that individualism and self-responsibility are the necessary
foundation for true community. If we are free of each other, we can approach each other with good
will. We do not have to be afraid. We do not have to view each other as potential objects of sacrifice,
nor view ourselves as potential meals on someone else’s plate. If we live in a culture that upholds the
principle that we are responsible for our actions and the fulfillment of our desires, and if coercion is not
an option in the furtherance of our aims, then we have the best possible context for the triumph of
community, benevolence, and mutual esteem.
Capitalism’s consumerism makes community a breeding ground for fear and
competition.
Block 10 – author, consultant and citizen of Cincinnati, Ohio (Peter, “Restoring Humanity in our
communities and institutions: an interview with Peter Block,”
http://www.peterblock.com/_assets/downloads/Converse8%20Peter%20Block.pdf)//FJ
In Community: The Structure of Belonging, Peter highlights the pervasive spread of consumerism into every corner of our lives. Whilst this
has brought huge ‘improvements’ to the quality of millions of people’s lives, it has come at a cost. The
dominance of the consumer mindset has led to our creeping ‘colonisation’ by the sense of entitlement …
from the dominant ‘other’… with a consequential diminution of self and our planet . Peter picks up the theme in
our conversation. Peter:
The existing community context is one that markets fear, assigns fault, and
worships self-interest… the provider-consumer transaction is the breeding ground for entitlement and
it is unfriendly to our definition of citizen and the power inherent in that tradition… When we expect others to
be in control, it is a short step to participating in a way in which we expect others to take responsibility for our wellbeing (patriarchy),
idealising them and then blaming them when they fail to live up to our expectations. (Caryn Vanstone, in her article on page 27, refers to this
as the child/parent dynamic). Peter argues that
we can only exert our freedom and accountability if we can shed the
outdated assumptions and mindsets that have colonised our culture and ourselves.