POSC4380f12_notes
Topic 1
O Everybody compares: How do we do it?
O Random?
O Structured?
O Why do we do it?
O What do we learn by comparing things?
O Why do we want to compare politics?
O What exactly do we compare?
O What are we looking for?
O Why are we looking for it?
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Politics generally takes place within polities – municipal to nation state.
There are many of these
They do not all work the same way
O Different structures, rules, histories, leaders, processes, etc
To find out why and even how we compare
We also compare to control (see Lim)
If we cannot have a control case (e.g., who gets the placebo) we need another way to check our
results..
That way is often by comparing some, usually small, number of cases
It helps us decide if what we see is unique or if there’s another interpretation
Whatever is political
O Whole systems, even whole regimes (democracies v. hybrids v. authoritarians)
O Institutions, processes, actors – leaders and ordinary citizens, policies, etc.
O Specific events: elections, assassinations, revolutions, responses to disasters …
O Over time; same place or places
Particularly like whole systems
O St. John’s and Halifax or SJ and Valdivia, Chile
O There’s a hidden angle here. Any thoughts?
O Or the same parts in different systems: courts or elections or parties or political
recruitment or policies
Understanding how things work
O Why some places are democratic, say Costa Rica, and others, say Gabon, aren’t
O What leads to economic development (growth + diversification + benefits for people) and
what impedes it
O So a big part of comparative politics is problem driven
Building a base of knowledge
O To understand, say, parties, we need to go beyond CDA.USA/Weur
O To see how different places address similar problems, e.g., ethnonational separatists
Contributing to theory – mid-range
O More cases from more places
As above:
O Problem solving
O Deeper understanding of politics
O Theory building
O This on the academic, abstract side of PS
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On the practical or applied side
O Do we need to understand Iran?
O Or civil wars or insurrections or how dictators work as a political class
O Or what’s the best way for an ethnically diverse country to integrate and accommodate its
diversity
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Why do so many stay really poor and why have so few escaped poverty?
Why have so few mastered constitutional democracy?
Why do so many have states that are either fragile or brittle?
In short, what does this large class of states show us about how politics works?
And what can PS contributing to answering that question?
O
Foreign governments & their politics
O Evolution of approach
O Utility
O Disciplinary
O Extramural
O Descriptive v. analytical
Cross-polity comparisons
O What this can mean
O How they can be done
O Small-n studies
O Large-n studies
O Can include comparisons between/among rich and poor polities
O Or can compare regime types
O Authoritarian – democratic
O Parliamentary – presidential
O Any number of possible combinations
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Complex causality = Causal complexity
O What causes what?
O Most political phenomena have multiple causes, the importance of each is hard to isolate
O Comparison can help
O Identify causes
O Sort their relative impacts to some extent
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MSS v. MDS (LSS)
MSS:Systems similar on all but the factor we want to explain
O Look to explain the difference
O Strengths: may be easier to zero in
O Weaknesses: Even MSS have more differences than the one in focus and these can
interact
MDS: different on all but the factor selected.
O Look to explain the similarity
O Strengths & weakenesses – like MSS
O Back to the problem of multi-/complex causality  got to look deeper
The Case Study
O Why look at one case?
O Need to know about a case to see it in relation to others
O Want to aim at generalization: What is X a case of?
O Need to know the case very well
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Need to select comparisons carefully and have as many as possible of the
relevant ones
Binary, two-case
O Selection bias: overdetermination
O Note that can be within case; e.g. different times
Bigger Ns, three + cases
O Unless comparison is global (all possible cases in a class) selection rules apply
O Can have too many cases. Why?
Mixed designs: both MSS and MDS
O May be necessary to answer questions that arise
Comparative politics is messy
O Methods often chosen to fit problem
O Often demands detailed knowledge of several places,
Comparative politics can be quantitative
But more often qualitative or mixed
Less tied to a particular set of methods
Less theory driven than some other parts of PS
Topic 2: Comparisons
Lim
O A big deal, but does it mater outside the classroom? Most likely
O Stossel and Moore = advocates not analysts
O Stossel: “selection bias”, sloppiness, or just stunned?
O Only used data supporting his argument
O Comparative politics expects a mixed bag
O Moore derived a hypothesis (culture of fear); didn’t test it but used it as a conclusion
O CP treats such findings as tentative and needing further investigation
O Overall, looks for more cases/data; looks to disprove a hypothesis or established view; expects
partial answers with room for doubt
O Combines
O Rules of logical argument
O Reliable methods for getting, presenting, and evaluating information
O So we get a self-defence mechanism
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MSS points and questions
O Focusing on one key difference is valid but one different result is likely to have multiple
causes.
O Think of the twins’ example
MSS points and questions
O Focusing on one key difference is valid but one different result is likely to have multiple
causes.
O Think of the twins’ example
O Many outcomes in politics/human behaviour shaped by many forces that reinforce each
other = overdetermined (not Lim’s usage)
O Final points re-MSS
O The outcome – dependent variable – is different
O Question is what independent variable(s) could give this outcome
MDS
O The outcome – dependent variable – is different
O Still have to find what factor(s – independent variable(s) – produced it
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Focusing on one key, similar outcome is common in comparative politics
Won’t always be a common independent variable
Skocpol’s three revolutions
Or the three 1979 revos: Iran, Grenada, Nica
Comparative politics can be messy
Outside the classroom:
Complexity, multiple causes &/or no clearly identifiable cause  complex explanations
Law of parsimony?
Cases, binary studies, small-Ns and large-Ns
Cases: Why they matter in CP and in general
O Need to argue a point from one case
O Only one really fits or it’s all we have
O The “a case of what” question
O Analytical induction: serial case studies; narratives
O Hard cases make good social science
Binary studies and the rest
O Selection bias – be careful what cases you chose to include
O Keep the comparison focused
O
Theory (per Lim)
O Theory is not a hypothesis or a hunch
O Theory abstracts and simplifies some part of reality; selects the elements that seem most relevant,
that will explain the most
O So theory tells us what facts matter and how those facts seem to fit together
Theories of development
O Pre-1946, when serious decolonization starts: mainly economic, e.g.. The Big Push theory of Paul
Rosestein-Rodan (Joey)
O Stucturalism
O Raul Prebisch, ECLAC, Centre-Perhphery
O Roughly 1950s
O Indigenous to DW
O Modernization
O 1950s-’60s; US academics + ODA agencies; import
O What it proposed
O How it worked in practice
O Dependency: WE/US academics; based loosely on structuralism; semi-import; 1960s-’70s
O What it said
O Impact?
O Dictatorship  development – late ‘60s
O Democracy  people demand and get benefits  no economic development
O Dictatorships ignore people and can develop (though most don’t)
O Build strong state to control people not a democratic one
O Linked to Samuel Huntington
O New International Economic Order: NEIO
O Early 1980s; aid, trade, debt, globalization
O Brandt Report (North-South: a Programme for Survival[ import
O Never took off
O Caught by debt crisis, 1982 through 1990s
O Structural Adjustment & State Reform, 1982-2002(?)
O Why? What? Who? How? Impact? Imported
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O What stopped it?
Democratic strengthening, 1982O Third Wave; import;
O What? Why? Who> How? Results?
O Now: no dominant theory or model
O Many accept globalized economy; not all, e.g. ALBA
O More democrats than ever before but also very successful authoritarians: PRC, SRVN
O And some successful dems: India, Brazil
O Most diversity in a long time
O Mostly indigenous
Thinking about development
O Ideas about economic “best practices” have changed over time
O Have reflected views of advanced capitalist world
O Keynesian managed capitalism to strict free market structural adjustment.
O Now more open due in part to PRC’s quasi state capitalism
In developed countries
O How developed countries developed, Ha-joon Chang, 2002, Kicking Away the Ladder
O USA
O Canal building: public money
O RR building & land settlement: public land – universities too
O Industries: tariffs; US tariff-happy
O Innovation: defence spending, WWII and after
O Japan
O Opened by West, 1853; Meiji Restoration, 1868
O State-guided development under Free Trade
O Imported capital goods from west; raw materials from Asia
O Exported finished goods to Asia – eventually colonize; staples + artisanal goods
to west
O By end of 19th C, have significant industrial, commercial & military presence
O Emerges as big power; loses WWII, rebuilds
O How?
O As before, state guided
O Strong bureaucratic presence via MITI; picking winners
O Promote vertically integrated oligopolies
O Both US/Japan had large govt role
O True almost everywhere
O Partial exceptions: Holland and Switzerland
O Inductive reasoning  hypothesis: Development needs active state
O How state is active varies
O Need not work (JRS) but rarely works w/o
O Necessary but not sufficient
Readings
O Rapley, 1-2
O Is there an economics of development or is there just economics?
O Does same apply to PS?
O Why do we treat the world’s poor countries as a class to analyze them?
O Do we have other options?
O One size doesn’t fit all, but some prescriptions get very widely adopted
O Postwar era development theory
O John Maynard Keynes and economic thinking, 1945-1975
O Active state, managed capitalism
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Statism in the TW: almost universal
Why?
O State as capitalist; reject capitalism – linked to colonial era; want to break colonial econ
ties
Result = state-led development
O Also used in CDA (NL and QC) and in recovery in W. Eur
Banerjee and Duflo
Not just one school of thought even on economic development
Jeffrey Sachs, 2005, The End of Poverty
O More ODA (aid)
O To break out of POVERTY TRAP: Poor need $$ to break out of poverty but don’t have
$$ so remain poor
William Easterly, 2006, The White Man’s Burden
O Sachs all wet!
O ODA undermines local institutions creates perpetual aid bureaucracy
O Best answer: the free market and individual initiative
B&D, 2011, Poor Economics
O Look at real stuff to see what works
O No grand, universal answer: one size doesn’t fit all
O Propose Randomized Control Trials (RST): large-scale experiments
O Different groups (individuals or communities) get different programs
O Have a control group
O Randomly chosen, so experimental group and control group are alike in aspects
important to study – very different method than S or E.
Giridharadas, 2012, India Calling
The personal side of development
O Deepak Kumar
O The servants
O Ravindra
O Sunita
What has India’s economic boom done to people and their culture
Not something Rapley, Banerjee and Duflo, or Sachs or Easterly consider.
Three different takes
O Rapley, historical evolution of theory and policy
O Banerjee and Duflo, testing policies and RST
O Giridhadas, what happens to people
Politics and Government 1
O Why has constitutional democracy done so badly in developing countries?
O Przeworski and Limongi note the problems of sustaining democracy in poor countries
O But why should that be and why are there some stable, poor democracies?
O Why have the authoritarians so often been harsh dictatorships?
O Coercion cheap and effective?
O Why haven’t dictators built lasting government institutions?
O Get what they want with muscle?
O Take Latin America as the model
O First set of cases (1810-1826 + 3 outliers)
O Immediate post-independence instability in all but Brazil
O Chile and Costa Rica: some stability within 15 years; centralized authority in a dictator
O Why so few?
O Colonial heritage
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O No elite consensus
O Weak state
O Strong challengers
Lasted roughly 40-50 yrs; some longer
Africa repeats the experience
O Similar reasons
Asia marginally different
O Slightly greater stability (India, Malaysia, ROC, PRC,DRVN, Sri Lanka for a bit;
eventually Indonesia)
O But plenty of instability: Pakistan, Bangladesh, Philippines, ROK
O And not many democracies
Middle East
O Slightly more stability – monarchies
O Worse on democracies
Why have new states had so much trouble settling in from 1810 to pretty much now?
Personal Rule
O Normal state institutions weak
O Courts politicized
O Security forces (military and police) too
O Bureaucracy too; even ministers
O Legislatures either absent or weak
O What’s left? The Man! The Boss! Fearless Leader!
O Why have most state institutions been weak?
O Nobody interested?
O Too hard to do? Starting from too far back?
O Problem internal or external?
O Incentives to maintain personal rule?
O NB: Democratic strengthening, ‘80s & “90s
O One big problem=personal rule
O What is personal rule?
O ≠ executive-centred government (ECG)
O Examples of ECG: can be constitutional, thus with some limits
O Not so with personal rule
O Its traits
O Final decisions rest with one person
O Can even affect minutiae
O The boss is the law
O Often patrimonial: treats state and country as personal possession
O Private property not secure, even if model is capitalist
O Its effects
O Little of what we call good governance
O Accountability, responsiveness, transparency, consultation with stakeholders, rule of law
O Unpredictable govt
O Which affects economic/social development
Examples
O Absolute monarchy
O Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, other Gulf states; Brunei
O Similar recent cases: Shah of Iran
O Personal dictatorship
O Often follows overthrow; can follow election
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O Can be through a party or rely on military
Absolute monarchy
O Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, other Gulf states; Brunei
O Similar recent cases: Shah of Iran
Personal dictatorship
O Often follows overthrow; can follow election
O Can be through a party or rely on military
Party dictatorship
O Classic: Communist vanguard
O Castroist variant
O Post-independence vanguard: Kwame Nkrumah, Convention People’s Party, after
winning free elections
O Ordinary one-party rule: DR (1931-61), Spain (1939-78), Liberia (1878-1980); Iraq,
Syria (Baathists ), Turkey (Ataturk), ROC (KMT)
O With personal rule: Castro’s Cuba, Rosas, Federalists (Rojos/Reds), Argentina (1835-52)
Lots to choose among and from three different centuries.
Personal Rule 2
O Absolute monarchy
O Saudi Arabia, Gulf states; Brunei, Morocco, Jordan; not traditional
O Similar recent cases: Shah of Iran
O Oldest form of personal rule; in decline
O Differs from others due to hereditary/dynastic elements (Kims?)
O Behaviourally can be like the rest, though
O Personal dictatorship
O Often follows overthrow; can follow election or be in the family
O Can involve a party or the military
O But the leader controls everything; like an absolute monarch
O Security
O Policy
O Appointments
O Advisers, Cabinet ministers, ambassadors,, top ranking military and police all named and
answerable to Leader
O Leader promotes and demotes, purges and rehabilitates according to his needs
O May have some institutions that at times work as in democracies: courts or bureaucracies
O But these can turn rapidly to leader’s ends
O So personal rule is really personal rule
O Remember how it differs from exec-centred govt
Political Science and Personal Rule
O Longstanding interest
O “Political science without biography is taxidermy.” Harold Lasswell, 1931,
O Lots of biographies + descriptive accounts of leaders
O Not too much that is systematic until fairly recently
Examples
O Specific sub-sets
O 1982, Jackson and Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa: Descriptive + taxonomy
O Typology: classification scheme
O First order comparison
O What goes where and why
O J & R had four sub-types
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O
Prophets, Princes, Autocrats, Tyrants
O Prophets: ideological, transformational, populist, mass mobilizers
O Nkrumah (Ghana), Castro, Gadhafi (?), Mao (?)
O Princes: not ideological, no big changes, just keep power, clientelism
O Clientelism &” Patron-client relations
O Not just buying support
O Who? Maybe Houphet-Boigny (Ivory Coast); possibly the Somozas to a degree;
O Authoritarians: Like princes but relies more on force; describes a lot of military regimes
O But they can also use patronage; e.g., Stroessner of Paraguay (1954-89)
O Maybe Mahathir of Malaysia or Suharto of Indonesia
O Tyrants: non-ideological and no/few transformational goals but use terror
O Francia (Paraguay, 1809-40); Idi Amin; maybe Gadhafi; Assads; Saddam
Hussein, Trujillo (DR).
O What were J&R using as classifying criteria?
O Not important if it’s not exhaustive
O What matters is that they set out a framework for classifying rulers and comparing their
governments
O Next installment comes in 1998
O Sultanism
O Chehabi and Linz, eds, 1998, Sultanistic Regimes
O Exercise power without restraint and usually without a guiding ideology
O Overlap three of J&R’s
O Most likely in more underdeveloped states
O Tend to be patrimonial; i.e., treat state as their property
O Private property not secure; implications for economic development
O Paternalistic and clientelistic
O Need to be able to use all state’s resources to keep power
O Their Examples
O Trujillo, Batista (Cuba), Marcos (Philippines,), Somozas (Nicaragua), Duvaliers (Haiti),
Pahlavis (Iran); Bongos (Gabon)
O All had official parties that couldn’t lose
O Marcos and Duvalier 1 took power via elections then closed that door
O Not as many as 40 years ago
O Could more be coming?
O Other breakdowns and classifications could have populists, tyrants, military authoritarians,
religiously driven (can also be anti-clericals), etc.
Most Recent
O Since end of Third Wave, late 1990s
O PS starts to look at authoritarians again, especially dictators
O Often personal rulers; not always
O Start looking at the institutions of personal dictatorships
O Compare them to other dictatorships – military and party
O Who does this?
O Jennifer Gandhi; Natasha Ezrow and Erica Frantz; Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way;
Barbara Geddes; Dan Slater, Jason Brownlee; and more every day
O What do they say? Look briefly at Gandhi and Ezrow and Franz
O Share common interest in what causes dictatorships to emerge, survive and/of fail
O And are interested in how the structure of the regime (personalist vs military vs party) impacts
O Policy choices and performance
O Survival
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JG : interest is whether inclusive authoritarians, those that have functioning legislatures and
parties, last longer than those that don’t
O Hypothesized yes; found no
O Next task will be to find out why
O Did find that use of legislatures & parties among dictatorships is not rare
O Correlated with social policy decisions
O Why be concerned if dictatorship is inclusive?
O Used to coopt or keep eye on opponents
O May be preferable to coercion
O Linked with policy outcomes
O E&F are most concerned about the relations between dictators and political elites
O Even dictatorships must have political elites
O Boss may eventually control everything but can’t manage all in the day to day –
though some may have
O Ask about effect of “internal architecture” of regime
O Find, as does JG, that personalist regimes give dictator most power
O And are most resistant to overthrows
O Why do those findings make sense?
What we’ve seen
O Structure and agency
O Structure: More or less fixed; newer word: to be abstract has to deal with stable phenomena
O Agency: Individual; older stuff; highly variable; hard to model, except as “individual factors”
O Lets us study personal rule like other politics
Authoritarians and Hybrids
Regimes
O What’s a regime?
O The Third Wave et après
O Transition and consolidation
O But consolidation not automatic
O Still room for authoritarians
O But authoritarians changing
O Implications?
O Classifying regimes: What criteria?
O Aristotle: virtuous and corrupt
O Monarchies and republics
O Presidential and parliamentary
O Democracies and totalitarians
O Democracies and authoritarians
O Is a dichotomy sufficient? Need a continuum?
O Dichotomies easier to deal with
O Continua more realistic
O Both have problem of where to draw line
O Since at least 2002 PS has put intermediate categories between democracies and dictatorships or
authoritarians
O Semi- case.flawed examples of one or the other
O Lots of names applied
O Most common is hybrid
To examine authoritarians and hybrids
O Use Economist Intelligence Unit’s definition from its Democracy Index – arbitrary
O Connotative=traits=measurable
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O Have 4 categories: add flawed democracies
Authoritarian: Political pluralism circumscribed; elections not free if held; rights and liberties
not protected; media not free; critics repressed; courts not independent.
O Syria or PRC, for example; Mobutu
O 52 cases – 45 developing; 31.1% of states included; 37.6% of people
Hybrid: elections often have irregularities that compromise fairness; corruption common; rule of
law weak, accountability and civil society, too; some media freedom; rights and liberties not
guaranteed.
O Examples: Singapore, Turkey, Malawi; and Hugo Chavez, Venezuela
O 37– 32 developing; 22.2%; 14% of world population
Can be capitalist or socialist
Mostly among developing states
Can have personal ruler or an institutionalized system
This is the Zaire (now DRC)/Mobutu – Venezuela/Chavez comparison
Readings-Hybrids – 01-10-12
• Diamond, 2002, “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes.” Journal of Democracy. 13:2, 21-35; online
through library.
•
Levitsky and Way, 2002, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism.” Journal of Democracy.
13:2, 51-65; online through library.
•
Schleder, 2010, “Authoritarianism’s Last Line of Defense,” Journal of Democracy. 21:1, 69-80;
online through library.
Suggested
• Collier and Levitsky, 1997,”Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative
Research,” World Politics 49:3, 430-451; online through library.
Hugo Chavez & Hybrids
Authoritarians and hybrids
O Authoritarians
O Repress pluralism
O Not accountable to general public
O May be accountable to what Bueno de Mezquita calls a “selectorate”
O Neither vertically nor horizontally
O Not transparent
O Rule of law inoperative
O If govt wishes
O Personal & collective rights/freedoms not guaranteed
O May use coercion as governing instrument
O Less restrained/accountable in using violence than democracies
O Hybrids
O Some normal traits:
O Very weak rule of law
O Harass civil society & legitimate opponents
O Manipulate elections; not steal, necessarily
O Hegemonic; roll up margins
O May lose some
O Very low transparency
O Some offer some degree of media freedom; others not
O Some security or personal/collective rights
O Most have licensed oppositions that works freely within limits
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O Thus some degree of pluralism; far more than in dictatorships
Background to Chavez
O Do this in steps
O My take
O Venezuelan context, independence to 1998
O Chavez administration: 1998-2012
O Claims to democracy
O Claims to authoritarianism
O Claims to being a hybrid
O Democrat because coup attempt failed
O Vote only road to power
O Opponents have tried to oust him via coup (2002), general strike (2002), a recall election (2004);
and boycotted 2005 legislative election
O See why he might not like them?
O Democrat because coup attempt failed
O Vote only road to power
O Opponents have tried to oust him via coup (2002), general strike (2002), a recall election (2004);
and boycotted 2005 legislative election
O See why he might not like them?
O Has been fairly effective in reducing poverty and has set up useful institutions to alleviate poverty
O Has been active and had some success in promoting alternatives to neoliberalism
O What happens to his Bolivarian Revolution after him?
Venezuela
O Independent finally in 1830– first declared in 1813
O Until 1945 no democracy; not even civic oligarchy
O Limited franchise + elections + mostly constitutional rule—LA + W. Eur, mid-late 19th
O In a minority in LA, esp among bigger states
O 1945:reform coup3-yr dem govt
O 1948: counter-coup; no democracy
O 1957: reform coup; again democracy
O 1958: Punto Fijo Pact
O To guarantee democracy; calmed elite interests
O Turned into 2-party , qualified power-sharing
O Partyocracy: 1958-98
O Caracazo, 1989 – anti-austerity riots
O Failed coup, Hugo, 1992
O Election 1993 – pardon 1994
O 1998 Hugo wins
O The Chavez Model: Electionreferendum on ConCon  ConCon  referendum on Const 
another general election
O Hugo wins all  Bolivarian Revolution and XXI century socialism
O followed by Morales, Bolivia, and Correa, Ecuador
O Originally pretty moderate
O Coup attempt + general strike + recall + boycott = all failed
O Hugo starts to play rough
O Harass and expropriate opposition media; govern by decree (approved by his legislature)
O But also begins serious anti-poverty policies
O Big deal, though, is foreign policy
O Anti-US, ok; normal among LA left and nationalists
O Bolivarian Coalition w/HC at top; seems to have been his goal
O 2007-Referendum, perpetual re-election, lost
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2008: big win in local elections
Repeated 2009, won
2010: legislative elections
HC’s party PSUV, United socialist party of Ven, outvoted 5248 by two opp parties; still gests
60% seats due to FPT districts
O 2011- Cancer; may be terminal
O 2012- Oct 7 presidential election
O Henrique Capriles, rich guy, popular touch – common in LA; not repeating old mistakes;
campaigning hard
O Hugo: slowed down; economy not great
O Still wins w/54% of vote
How he governs
O Electoral and constitutional manipulation
O Targeting opponents for harassment
O Trying to form an official party
O Able to divert state funds to party ends
O Controls courts through nominations
O Has enough seats in Congress to get decree power
O When he loses states or cites changes the legal powers of those entities or charges governors and
mayors with crimes.
O So this is what a hybrid looks like
O Better than a dictator
O May be a model for leaders who distrust democracy.
More on hybrids, especially Venezuela
Definitions
O Regime?
O Popular?
O PS: IR? PP?
O Here: CompPol/Theory
O Hybrid
O Combine EIU + Corrales and Penfold
O Few limits on state’s power: limited accountability
O Elections: Uneven field;tilts toward govt
O Raises incumbent’s advantage
O Limited pluralism
O Weak rule of law
O But
O Most people’s rights respected (exc=foes)
O Media relatively free
O Subject to harassment if too oppositional
O Could use courts; expropriate; deny license
O Opposition has some freedom
O Electoral field tilted; e.g. financing or voter registration
The concept and its background
O O’Donnell, 1994, “Delegative Democracy”
O Election  winner basically unchecked for rest of term; hyperpresidential
O Carothers, 2001, “End of the Transition Paradigm,” J of D
O Gray Zone; Feckless Pluralism (democratic at elections + weak govt) and Dominant
Power Politics (State=Ruler/party)
O Latter close to hybrid
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Term hybrid: Diamond, 2002.
Often also see electoral authoritarianism (Schelder, 2006) or competitive authoritarianism
(Levitsky & Way, 2002)
O Why the term? Did we need a new concept?
Chavez’s brand of hybridism
O What he adds:
O Populism
O LA v. Cdn Populism
O Leader communicates directly with people
O Mobilization
O People take the streets for the leader and at his orders
O Resources
O PDVSA = cash cow
O Off budget
O Hyperpresidential, even for LA
O Clientelism
O Sort of
O Polarization – Why?
O Referenda
O Background
O Populist
O Even more Progressive
O Can’t be held here – only plebiscites
O What’s become of them in US
O Why useful for populists?
O Govern by decree
O Even with fully controlled legislature
O Why?
O Interesting point: this is a lot like historic Latin American politics
O Save that it is substantially more redistributive
Is Chavez another typical LA caudillo?
O Generalities of LA govts
O Especially pre-1990 but even now
O Executive-centred to hyperexecutive
O Courts, electoral authorities, all govt agencies
O Historically “attentive” to president
O Military historically politically active
O Often given active role in constitution
O Less now; not extinct (Honduras ‘09)
O Usual democratic institutions – parties, legislatures, courts, civil society – weak in most countries
O A few exceptions: Costa Rica, Chile, Uruguay
O And occasionally progressive presidents
O Historically few liberal, constitutional democracies
O Oldest continual: Costa Rica, since ‘49
O The rest products of 3rd Wave, so post-1974
O Were rollbacks of democracies in ‘60s and ‘70s
O And backsliding more recently
O Govts elite-dominated
O Relatively high levels of violence
O Rights and liberties iffy
O Run on clientelistic principles
14
O
O Demobilized citizenry
Obviously both differences and similarities
O And both are important
Violence and Politics
O Violence=ultimate persuader
O Always part of ruling
O Maintain order = 1st task of govt
O Need coercion, sometimes violent, to do so
O Questions
O How much?
O For what?
O Against whom?
O Different regimes  different answers
Violence and regimes
O Regime:
O Basis of legitimacy – What gives the right to rule:
O Election, revolution (nature of revo – Marxist, religious, nationalist), coup
(Why?), heredity
O Structure of power – formal and informal
O Who decides? About what? Why?
O Who must be consulted? About what? Why?
O Structure of accountability
O To whom are rulers accountable: History, God, electorate, oligarchy, religious
elite…?
O Who has access to rulers – Influentials?
O Incorporates structure and accountability
O Main traits? Personal circle? Class/sector?
O Ethnicity? Religion? Whatever else?
O Relations with masses: individuals and civil society
O Rights and liberties; potential to influence; political significance = importance to
retaining and exercising power
O All about:
O Who rules? How? To what end?
O Presumably different regimes use violence differently as an instrument of rule
O Most?
O Least?
Violent politics: Examples
O Assassinations
O May be the oldest
O Recent (12 Oct 12) attempt in Mauritania
O Intra-elite, revolutionary, personal
O Death squads
O What? Where? Why?
O Definitions – broad and narrow
O Vigilantes to state sanctioned
O Who organizes the political murders?
O Insurrections and Revolutions
O Definitions and distinctions
O Civil wars
15
O
Coups
O Military
O Could be intra-elite
O Other : organized or spontaneous
O Ethnic
O Religious
O Partisan
O Criminal
O Citizen insecurity
In poor countries
O Lots of violence
O Especially by state
O More than in developed democracies
O Especially non-democratic states
O As in dictatorships generally – ex-SU
O Regular instrument of rule
O Why?
O Was in Currently Developed Democracies (CDD) until last 1/3 (1/4?) of 20th c.
O What are alternatives to violence?
O To maintain order?
O To assure social stability?
O How do CDDs handle these problems?
O How can we make sensible comparisons between the CDDs and LDCs on this score?
O What do we need to do?
O What do we want to know?
O When CDD use state violence v. when LDC do?
O How much is violence used to gain compliance by govts in both sets of systems?
O When did CDD move away from violence and why?
O Incidence of political violence?
O Only/mainly state violence?
O Only/mainly opposition violence?
O Causes and consequences of both?
O How much is use of violence resource-influenced?
O How much reflects scale of problem?
O Drug violence: Colombia, Mexico
O Gang violence: El Sal, Hondo, Guate
O General violence: South Africa or Venezuela
O Why are problems so big?
O Readings
O Maras
O Where they are
O What they are
O Why they are a problem
O Crime in Central America (UNODC 2012)
O World’s highest homicide rate: 41/100,000
O Southern Africa next: 30.5/100k
O W/in CA (per 100k): Hondo, 91.6; El Sal, 69.2; Guate, 38.5; Pan, 21.6; Nica, 13.6; CF, 11/6
O For comparison: Mexico, 22.7, Ven. 46.1; Colombia, 33.4; Malawi, 36; Lesotho, 35.3; SA, 31.5;
T&T, 35.2; Jamaica, 52.2; PRC 1; Norway, 0.6; Italy, 0.9; Canada, 1.6, US, 4.2; NL. 0.78;
Nunavut, 18.6
O UN, 2009: CA most crime-ridden region on earth!!!
16
Why?
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Not especially due to poverty and inequality
Nor to authoritarian heritage
Lots of places have these & less crime
Cruz – points to note
Maras are specifically Central American
O Problem of violence is universal
O And in much of the world has to be faced with meagre resources
Note especially how the mano dura policies backfired
Cruz – points to note
Maras are specifically Central American
O Problem of violence is universal
O And in much of the world has to be faced with meagre resources
Note especially how the mano dura policies backfired
Will the security forces of a small poor country that isn’t a dictatorship be able to cope?
And what’s a dictatorship’s advantage?
Bellin – What makes coercive forces coerce?
When will soldiers shoot civilians?
In Tunisia and Egypt military defected and regime fell
In Bahrain it didn’t and regime survived
What’s the story here?
States need specialists in violence (Harold Laswell, 1941, The Garrison State)
Where does this fit into thinking about political violence?
Democratization-1
O Democracy in perspective
O Do we need a special view of democracy for developing countries?
O First readings
O Carothers
O Lim, ch. 6
O Is it harder to understand why so many of them are not democratic than it is to understand why
Spain and Portugal and Greece took so long to democratize?
O And why Russia still hasn’t?
O Or do all reluctant/unsuccessful democratizers belong together?
O Democratization in general?
O Or in TW?
O Or in authoritarian states?
O Or in Africa, Asia. LA or ME?
Defining democracy
O Democracy about equality
O Left v. Right
O Two kinds of definitions
O Procedural/Formal/Input
O Substantive/Results/Output
O Former easier to operationalize/measure
O Two contenders for Formal
O Dahl, Polyarchy
O Competition and Contestation
O Dahl said they were prereqs to democracy
O But not democracy
O PS ignores poor Professor Dahl
17
O
Schumpeter
O Minimum definition
O A method or procedure for selecting leaders
O Democracy is not rule by the people, but rather rule by politicians, who compete freely
for the people's vote.
2 comments on Schumpeter
O Turns classical theory of democracy on its head
O No more active, engaged citizens 
O Good-bye republican virtue
O A theory of elite accountability
O Under/within constitutional govt
O From Guillermo O’Donnell, 2001, “Democratic Theory and Comp Pol,” SCID
O Minimum theory not minimum. Needs
O Prereqs
O some institutional
O some personal
So what?
O PS uses simplified procedural definitions
O Good
O Sets threshold – throw ‘em out
O Easy to measure
O Leaves policy implications & preferences down the road
O Less good
O Over simplifies democracy
O Produces “false positives”
O Labels democratic systems that aren’t
O Caution called for
PS, democracy and development
O Early days
O Modernization theory
O Democracy natural consequence of modernization
O Wasn’t
O Political practice subordinated democracy to Cold War
O Third Wave: 1974 – 2001(?)
O Samuel Huntington (1991)
O What it was and why it mattered
O Two consequences for PS
1st
O New cottage industry!
O Part I: Democratic transition
O Authoritarian to Democratic
O Electoral focus
O Easy to situate & study
O Part II: Democratic Consolidation
O Messier; harder to operationalize (2 party handovers) and measure
O Didn’t work so well 
O Democracy with adjectives
O Ill-defined: Democracy the only game in town
O Eventual realignment with hybrid regimes
2nd
O Democracy promotion – really more for govts and consultancies
18
O What it was and did
O Did it work? Not as well as promised
O All of these promised democratic futures
O Everybody’s bound for glory!
O Except they weren’t
O Arab Spring  another chance?
Readings
O Thomas Carothers
O Who he is and what he’s done
O The end of the transition paradigm, 2002
O Important for two reasons
O 1st – how PS conceived of democracy for some 20-25 years
O 2nd -- How PS works
O The basics
O Democratic transitions big deal
O The Transition Paradigm’s 5 Core Assumptions
O Note: assumptions
O Move away from authoritarian rule (any non-democratic govt) = transition to democracy
O Set sequence of stages
O Opening, Breakthrough, Transition, Consolidation
O Centrality of elections
O Not quite elections=democracy
O No prerequisites
O Prerequisites to democracy
O Waived
O But do need elite commitment to democracy
O Government of, by and for the people?
O And elections open way to all good democratic things
O No need to build state
O Was part of initial modernization scheme
O Here a functioning state was assumed
O Didn’t work
O Especially consolidation
O Gray zone –now called hybrids
O Feckless pluralists
O Dominant-Power politics
O Not part of the original deal
O But transition paradigm not dropped
O Govt holds on longer than PS
O Think of CDN/US govt pronouncements on Afghanistan
O PS actually begins moving to new issues in late ‘90s
O 2002 “hybrid” enters PS vocabulary
O Some “whys?”
O Why did transition paradigm take hold so firmly and quickly?
O Why did it generate so many spin off studies?
O Not specifically raised by TC but it happened
O Why did it take so long to change?
O First signs of grey areas by late ‘80s
O Especially, why did govt hang on so long?
O What does this suggest about govt and PS?
O Two last comments
19
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O Note relation between broad principles and narrow specifics
O Note that Carothers not an outsider but maybe the ultimate insider
Lim, ch. 6,What Makes a Democracy?
How PS, especially CP, looks at democracy
Not the way normative theory does
O Little about ideal democratic citizen
O Ditto for democratic ideals to pursue
Covers much of the same ground we did
O More and different detail
Reiterates why PS uses a minimalist definition
O If somebody asks you to define democracy
O Can use that but should explain why
Note how he uses one work – Rueschmeyer, Collier and Collier – to illustrate
O What’s good about that? Bad?
O Remember that RCC aren’t perfect
O Just his model
On transitions – useful
Two kinds of ousters of authoritarians
1st – top-down
O Elite-centred
O Pacted – strengths and weaknesses
O Recall Punto Fijo system in Venezuela
Elite-led transitions mostly in S. Europe and LA + SS Africa
Bottom-up
O Popular pressure
O May undo pacts (Poland)
O Ex-Communist Europe; South Korea, Philippines
We might add a 3rd, mixed category
O Indonesia, maybe Taiwan and S. Africa
Shouldn’t forget failures
O Burma
Or those that didn’t see a sign of democracy
O Cuba, Singapore
Why would elite-led models dominate for so long?
Was it because they were the first and the first to be studied?
Did they define the paradigm and build a Procrustean Bed?
Last point: Culture an democracy
Are there cultures that are inherently non- or anti democratic?
O Now Islamic or at least Arab
O But once spoke of Iberian and Ibero-American exceptional
O Before that it was non-Protestants
And there’s always the tutelary democracy that some see needed in very poor countries.
But culture does make a difference: Canada v. US v. UK
Democratization – Cases
LA& Iberia
O Why include Iberia (Portugal and Spain)?
O Were poorer than Argentina at time of transition
O Transitions are really interesting
O Portugal: grows from a coup
O Spain: counts on a king
20
LA: Overview
O Peter Smith
O Democracies = electoral democracies ~ minimal definition
O None before 1911; none stable before 1916
O Some growth during ‘20s; rollback in ‘30s; expands through ‘50s
O Another rollback after Cuban Rev
O Bottoms out in ‘77
O Paul Drake
O Sees democratic initiatives from independence (1810-) on
O Lots of what today we call hybrids
O Usually with limited franchise
O Very similar to European experience, incl. UK
O So LA not as much of an outlier as we’re led to believe.
Chronology
O 1977: 3 democracies; 4 hybrids; 13 authoritarian – per Polity IV – easiest to qualify as a
democracy
O 2012: using Freedom House, hardest to qualify as democracy: 10 democracies; 9 hybrids; 1
authoritarian
O Polity IV gives 16 (3 full democracies), 3 and 1!
O What happened and when
O Non-democratic, semi-democratic and non-liberal democratic systems fall
O External pressure via Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP); electoral democracy
needed to get loans
O Militaries stand down in face of bad economy
O 1982-1998: most parties elected are from right
O Exceptions: Nicaragua, 1984-1990; Chile 1989-2010; Colombia (centre to centre-right
whole period)
O Electoral democracy  austerity politics in most places
O Centre-left and left start back in 1998
O Pink Tide of 2006
O Murillo, Oliveros & Vaishnav
O What they found: Latin American left became a normal, acceptable political option in
2006
O So voters could turn the right out w/o fear
O Big shift
Becoming Democratic
O Costa Rica, Costa Rica, democratic since 1949
O Before, pretty Central American
O Last coup 1919; govt lasted 2 yrs
O Civil war 1948; 5 wks, 2000 killed out of ~ 800k; bloodiest in national history
O Context of late ‘40s
O Highly polarized
O 1940 election -- Calderon Guardia and welfare state
O Merchant elite displeased
O Split in Calderon’s party
O Calderon allies with PVP (Communists) with blessing of Archbishop Sanabria
O 1944 elections: Picardo- Calderon’s handpicked successor wins; deemed dirty
O 1946 Cold War – Calderon breaks w/PVP
O 1948 election – Calderon claims victory; ratifies by congressional majority of his party
O Civil war
21
O
O
O
O
O
Not led by losing party but by Jose Figueres
O Part of reform coalition
O Anti-cafetelero (coffee barons) & anti-communist modernizers
O Had to use violence due to electoral weakness
O Win civil war
Govern for 18 months; hand over to party they deemed winners in ‘48 – cafeteleros
Get new constitution; more democratic
Form party, PLN in ‘51; take power in 1953; lose presidency in 1958; don’t lose Leg Assy until
1978
Oldest democracy in LA
Portugal, 1074
O Authoritarian, 1926-74
O 1933-74: O Estado Novo
O Anti-democratic, anti-liberal, pro-Catholic
O Persecute opponents
O PIDE = secret police
O Rigged elections for president & congress
O Colonial wars – Africa: Mozambique, Angola. Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde and São Tomé e
Principe
O Portuguese soldiers begin to identify with insurgents and get Marxist outlooks
O 25 April 1974 oust Estado Novo
O Install radical regime under military rule
O From 04/74 to 11/75: 6 govts of left; rightists coup attempts; leftist coup attempta
O Finally coup led by moderate leftist General Eanes  elections and democratic constitution
O Doesn’t fit model
Spain, 1967-81
O Dictatorship, 1923-31; Republic, 1931-39; Civil War 1936-39; Dictatorship under Gen. Francisco
Franco
O Very much a caudillo, hence personal rule with military and Church support
O No obvious signs of political moderation
O Heavy repression
O Fighting ETA, Basque nationalist, Marxist terrorists
O Assassinate Adm. Carerro Blanco in 1973 – Was to succeed Franco
O 1975 Franco dies
O Had earlier named Juan Carlos to succeed him as head of state and be part of sustaining old
system
O Juan Carlos throws a curve
O Picks a modernizing, pro-democracy PM
O Adolfo Suárez
O Legalizes Communists (PCE) and Socialists (PSOE)
O 1978 constitution = democratic + gives measure of autonomy to 3 regions; later extended to all 17
O Upsets right
O Especially the military and the Guardia Civil
O Lt. Col. Antonio Tejero attempts golpe 23 Feb 1981
O Fails when Juan Carlos declares for democracy
O 1982, PSOE wins election, forms govt and eventually agrees to enter NATO
Nicaragua, 1979-1990
O From 1821 to 1979
22
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O 35 years of civil oligarchy, 1858-1893
O 8 years of electoral democracy, 1928-36
O Everything else, 115 years, either dictators or civil war
1979 Sandinista Revolution
O Overthrows Somoza family dictatorship
Though Marxist-inspired, quite pluralistic
O In CA only Costa Rica more so
FSLN, Sandinista National Liberation Front
O Originally vanguardist-Leninist
O Though not entirely Marxist
O And far less violence than in post-rev Cuba
1982: renounce Leninist vanguardism and accept electoral competition
O Saw selves as unbeatable dominant party
O Like AB Tories or first Dems now GOP in Solid South
1984 win free, clean elections against v. small parties
1981-90 – fighting counterinsurgent war against counterrevolutionaries
1987 Contadora Treaty  talks with Contras
O Opening to more parties in 1990 elections
O Which are set forward by 8½ months
O And with international observers
1990 Elections: Sandis lose;
O Leave office after sacking everything – Somozas did that to them
O Piñata – a scandal
So far so good.
Two clean elections + leave after clear loss
Would backslide later
2000 power-sharing pact with rightist party
O Make judicial appointments, Controller’s office and electoral commission partisan
2006 win elections and back in power
2008 Probably steal municipal elections
2011 Probably inflate margin in general elections
This adds a twist: Democracy isn’t necessarily forever
Argentina, Brazil, Chile
O All three extremely harsh military dictatorships
O And all handed back to civilians on their own terms
O They weren’t thrown out
O Argentina, 1976- 1983
O One year after Falklands/Malvinas War
O Military disgraced but still left under own steam
O Raul Alfonsin elected 1983-89; resigned early
O Problems included military pressures
O Carlos Menem, 1989-1999, suceded Alfonsin and pardoned most of those involved in the
dictatorship
O This was overturned in 2007 by courts
O Many now tried and jailed
O Despite having 5 presidents over Xmas 2001-02
O Military stayed out
O Current president, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, shows signs of wanting a third term
O Courts denied this to Menem in 1998
O Brazil, 1964-85
23
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Set up two parties, one govt and one opposition, in 1966 to maintain political life.
O After a while the opp became as popular as govt
1985: Indirect presidential elections
O Mil govt’s candidate was trounced, 73-27
1986, free congressional elections; 1988, new and very democratic constitution; 1989, direct
presidential elections
2002, Luiz Ignacio da Silva (Lula), of leftist Workers’ Party (PT), elected president; served two
terms
2010 succeded by Dilma Roussef, also of PT and first woman president of Brazil
Brazil stands out because
O Military government generally ban parties and legislatures, but Braz. Mil wanted to lay
down new norms – didn’t
O Has been effective now since 1985
O Even almost impeached President Collor de Mello, who resigned on last day of
Senate trial on charges.
Chile, 1973-1988-89
Like others, coup against elected president or constitutional successor (Argentina)
Very violent
Shut down politics for 15 years
O Did carry plebiscite on new const. in ‘80
Protests in mid-’80s led by civil society
1988 referendum on extending Pinochet for 9 more years
O Lost, 55-43
1989, elections
O Begin 21-year run for the centre-left Concertación
Like the other military regimes (Uruguay too) Chile had an established tradition of constitutional
government for about 50 years pre-coup
So these were re-democratizations
O Unlike Portugal, Spain or Nicaragua
O Also different from Costa Rica, where break was shorter
Mexico: 1994-2000
O Other than 1910-11, not much democratic experience
O 1929-2000 Federal govt in hands of PRI, Institutional Revolutionary Party
O “The Perfect Dictatorship”
O Did not lose control of even one state until 1989
O Or of Chamber of Deputies until 1997
O Always used electoral fraud
O But Beatriz Magaloni argues that until at least 1976 presidential election fraud was only used to
inflate margin of victory
O Show PRI’s strength – able to mobilize massive turnouts and spend prodigiously
O 1982: Threatened default on foreign loan payments  austerity
O Including privatizing mans SOE (state-owned enterprises)
O PRI has less access to funds and jobs
O PRI becomes less able to mobilize and impress
O 1988 wins via massive fraud
O 1994: Peso crisis, Zapatista rebellion, assassination of PRI presidential candidate
O Still win election; considered cleanest in country’s over 180-year history
O PRI, under President Ernesto Zedillo, make deals with two big opposition parties: PAN, National
Action, & PRD, Party of the Democratic Revolution
O Includes an independent electoral commission, IFE –Federal Electoral Institute
24
O
O
O
O
2000 PRI loses presidency and congress – PAN wins, PRD 2nd, PRI 3rd
2006: repeated but with controversy as PRD presidential candidate cries foul
2012: PRI wins, PAN, PRD
PRI went from hegemonic (couldn’t lose) to competitive but opposition to competitive but govt
RECAP
O Lots of different paths to democracy just among 22 countries
O Need to simplify to deal with everybody
O Need to get details to grasp the range of alternatives.
ECONOMY-1
To start
O Economy = Social System: So what?
O Economy = Market + Framework: So what?
O  Two persistent questions:
O Do we need a “development economics”?
O Has “development” worked or not?
O
O
How to develop: Smith or Marx?
O Settled?
If capitalism what version?
O Managed or Unregulated?
O National or Global?
O Democratic or Authoritarian?
Who’s done what?
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Aid (Official Development Assistance –ODA)
Good? Bad? Why?
Worked? Failed? When? Where? Why?
Does this matter?
Assistance via NGOs?
Good? Bad? Why?
Worked? Failed? Why?
Why does this matter?
O
Terms from Rapley
O Import Substitution Industrialization: ISI
O What it was
O Where and when it was used
O Its objectives
O How it worked and why
O
O
O
O
Neoclassical economics
Its analysis
Its prescriptions
Its relation to rational actor models
O
O
O
Development state
State is agent of development = the main capitalist of necessity
But concentrated economic & political power
25
Some history per Rapley
O Traces history of development policy and development practice, finding:
O At first, most policies prescribed from outside
O Most fail – all falter eventually
O New paradigm discards old
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Starts ~ 1946
Economic thinking then?
Developmental State
Modernization
What was supposed to happen and why
Why?
O Extrapolated from our experience
O Theory – Big Push, Rosenstein-Rodan
What? Per Modernization ~ Joey
What was to be fixed?
Under what conditions?
Using what policies?
O
O
O
O
Period covered in Chs 3-4
1946 to 1982
Post-war boom: 1946-73
Impact on development?
The Next Phase
O When? 1973-82; 1982-2002
O Why breakdown?
O Diagnosis?
O Prescription
O
O
O
O
O
O
Exceptions: Asian model
Who? Japan, Tigers, Little Tigers, PRC. RVN
O Not India – Why?
Capitalism w/o free market – not original
O Ha-joon Chang
Why it looked odd
Its limits
The PRC variant: >100k SOE
ISI
O Big deal for Rapley and neoliberals, too
O What it did
O How it differs from Infant Industry Industrialization (Canada, USA, Germany…)
O Why it failed
And the Developmental State
O Recall René Lévesque, 1962: The state is our capitalist
O Why ISI made sense
O Why it worked – under what conditions
O Why DS/ISI stopped working: a hypothesis
Failure & Response: Neoliberal Political Economy
26
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Environment for policy ideas
Analysis:
O What it got right.
O What it got wrong.
Prescription
Application
Results
O Not what was expected
Benefits
O Problems ameliorated or corrected
Costs
O Problems ignored, exacerbated or caused
Comments + Questions
O No policy is 100% effective
O No policy will be prescribed unless it has a theoretical justification
O How different from NL or Canada in general?
O Why are there waves of policy thinking & prescription?
O What’s excluded ex ante?
27