Aff Workplace Raids
1AC
1AC – Labor Rights
Worker exploitation is rampant in the status quo and existing
agencies are insufficient
Chen 12--Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School [Ming Hsu, Where You
Stand Depends on Where You Sit: Bureaucratic Incorporation of Immigrants in Federal
Workplace Agencies (March 9, 2012). Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law, 2012; U
of Colorado Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-03. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2019181 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2019181]
Few would dispute that the legal and political climate for immigrant workers, especially
undocumented workers, has been forbidding over the last decade. Immigrant workers have
always been vulnerable to workplace abuse, but ever since the passage of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) the workplace has become a site of
contention and fear. The Supreme Court’s landmark Hoffman Plastic v. NLRB decision in 2002
interpreted the employer sanctions provision of IRCA to limit remedies for undocumented
workers subjected to unlawful discharge for reporting workplace abuses. The combined effect of
Hoffman and IRCA was to create perverse economic incentives for employers to
exploit immigrant workers suspected of lacking status and to dim the prospects for
immigrant workers to challenge those abuses. The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS)
aggressive use of workplace raids as a strategy for immigration control—first under President
Bush and continuing under President Obama, albeit to a lesser extent—has exacerbated the
situation, making credible employer threats to expose the status of their immigrant
workers lacking documentation in retaliation for those workers’ complaints.14 Tasked
with enforcing employment laws in a climate entangling immigration control with employment,
workplace agencies have been caught in the crossfire: their statutory mandate to protect workers
remains intact, while the political and legal context blunts their tools to implement that
mandate. Each of the federal agencies discussed in this Article has struggled to reconcile the
competing demands of their professional ethos with aggressive immigration enforcement and
with contracting immigrants’ rights.
Abhorrent labor rights for unauthorized workers hurt global and
national wage and work standards.
Braker 12—Columbia Law School [‘Julie. "Navigating the Relationship between the DHS and
the DOL: The Need for Federal Legislation to Protect Immigration Workers' Rights." Colum. JL
& Soc. Probs. 46 (2012): 329]RMT
Labor rights are critically important to the advancement of international human rights, as
well as to the development of workplace standards for all workers. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, enumerates the following as
fundamental human rights:
(1)
[T]he right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and
. . . [T]he right to equal pay for equal work. (3) . . . [T]he right to just
and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human
dignity. (4) . . . [T]he right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 28
to protection against unemployment. ( 2)
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, to which 160 countries are parties,29
also enumerates labor rights.30
Labor rights for all workers, authorized or unauthorized, are also important because the wages
and conditions of all workers are interconnected . As Professor Lori Nessel explains,
“Excluding the undocumented from labor and employment protection statutes allows
employers to exploit undocumented workers with impunity and has a chilling effect
upon the rights of all workers.” 31 Further, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that
“ acceptance by illegal aliens of jobs on substandard terms as to wages and working
conditions can seriously depress wage scales and working conditions of citizens and
legally admitted aliens ; and employment of illegal aliens under such conditions can
diminish the effectiveness of labor unions .”32 Thus, labor rights are important both
as a source of individual rights and of workplace standards.
Before discussing how immigration enforcement can interfere with employment rights, specifically those of unauthorized workers, it is important to
identify what employment rights these workers have. To fully address this complex, contested issue would require an analysis beyond the scope of this
Note.33 However, some
employment rights have been unequivocally held to apply to all workers.
Generally, immigration status will not affect an employee’s rights to the wage and hour protections
of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),34 and the right to organize and participate in a union, as
provided by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).35 Thus, this Note proceeds by acknowledging that it cannot fully
address the exact rights of unauthorized workers, but that all workers are entitled to certain labor and
employment rights under the FLSA and NLRA.
Labor rights for immigrants are intertwined with labor rights for
domestic workers
Read 6—General Counsel of Friends of Farmworkers, Inc. in Pennsylvania since 1982. He has
a J.D. from New York University School of Law in 1976.[Arthur, “PROTECTING WORKER
RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF IMMIGRATION REFORM” Journal of Law and Social Change,
Volume
9,https://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jlasc/articles/volume9/issue1/Read9U.Pa.J.L.%26Soc.
Change65(2006).pdf]RMT
When the rights of undocumented and migrant2 workers are not protected, the
rights of all workers are diminished . Unscrupulous employers seek out undocumented
immigrants or temporary workers because they believe that there are no consequences for
violating their rights. These employers gain a competitive advantage over employers who abide
by the law. This creates a perverse incentive for employers to hire undocumented
workers over citizens or authorized workers. The position of citizen and authorized
workers is weakened when they confront abuse or discrimination because their undocumented
coworkers have fewer legal avenues for redress of labor violations, including unlawful
retaliation, and therefore they have far less incentive to participate in efforts to improve
conditions. My views on this issue are guided by historical, economic, and sociological reading on
the impact of new immigrant, migrant, and other foreign-born workers on the terms and conditions of employment for more
established immigrant communities. However, most
importantly, my perspective is shaped by the practical
experience of over 30 years of legal advocacy for worker rights and, in particular, for immigrant
worker rights.3 This experience includes legal work relating to two principal temporary worker Frograms: the H-2A program
for temporary agricultural workers and the H-2B program for temporary non-agricultural workers. 5
Higher wages lead to increased remittances - several statistical
models prove.
Thomas Joseph, Yaw Nyarko, and Shing-Yi Wang 2015, Thomas Joseph is a professor
of Business Policy and Strategy at IIM Udaipur, (Ph.D) in Corporate Strategy and Policy (2008)
- Indian Institute of Management,Bangalore, Yaw Nyarko is a Professor of Economics, CoDirector of the Development Research Institute, received his Ph.D. from Cornell University,
Shing-Yi Wang is an Assistant Professor of Business Economics and Public Policy at Wharton.
She is also an affiliate of the Bureau for Research and Economic Analysis of Development
(BREAD) and a research fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). She
received her Ph.D. in economics from Yale University, Wharton, “Information and Remittances:
Evidence from Matched Administrative Data,”
http://assets.wharton.upenn.edu/~was/wage_remitV6.pdf
We begin by examining whether remittances vary with fluctuations in earnings. More specifically, we
estimate the
relationship between the logarithm of individuals’ earnings and the logarithm of the amount
that they sent in remittances. The relationship presented here is not necessarily the causal impact of fluctuations in
earnings on remittance patterns. For example, individuals may choose to exert more effort, work more hours and receive higher
earnings in months where they want to remit more to their families.21 The
results in this section provide the
statistical relationship between earnings and remittances whereas the subsequent analyses
provide better identified estimates of the causal relationship between earnings and remittances.
The results are presented in Table 2. All the regressions include individual fixed effects, and year fixed effects. The standard errors
are clustered at the individual level.22 For each estimate, we present a parsimonious specification as well as one that allows the
effects of individual characteristics (age, Indian nationality, male and an indicator for high education) to vary by year. Panel A
includes only those person-month observations where there is both a remittance transaction and a salary disbursal. Panel B assumes
that the migrant did not earn anything in months without a salary disbursal. Panel C shows the results with the sample where the
migrant does not remit anything in months where no remittance is observed in our data. Column 1 of Table 2 (Panel
A)
presents the fixed effects estimates of the relationship between salary and remittances in the
sample in months where either remittances or salary are not observed are dropped. The results
indicate that higher salaries of 10% correspond with 3.3% more remittances. All of the estimates
in the table are significant at the 1% level. There are almost no differences in the estimates with
and without time-varying effects of worker characteristics. Thus, in the results in the remainder of the paper,
we focus on the parsimonious specification with individual fixed effects. Despite the fact that workers are on fixed
contracts, there is substantial variation in their earnings month-to-month that reflects variation
in the hours that they have worked. The average absolute value of the change in earnings from
the previous month for the same individual is 20%. If we assume that the variation in a worker’s
earnings is driven primarily by circumstances that are outside of the control of the individual
worker, then the fixed effects estimate of the relationship between log earnings and log
remittances provides the income elasticity of demand for remittances. Panel B displays the fixed effects
estimates that correspond with the sample in which the months where salary disbursal is not observed are
treated as months in which earnings equal zero.23 The coefficients drop substantially. Withinperson changes in earnings of 10% map into 0.5% higher remittances. However, the results still
suggest that fluctuations in earnings month-to-month correspond positively to changes in the
remittance behavior of migrant workers. Panel C shows the estimates in which unobserved
remittance are treated as if there were no remittances. Here the coefficient estimates
increase substantially and suggest an earnings-remittance elasticity that is close to
one; each additional percent change in earnings maps into the same percent
change in remittances . While the results indicate the magnitude of the relationship between remittances and earnings
depends on the assumptions made about the months in which transactions are not observed, the sign of the relationship
remains the same and significant at the 1% level. The results suggest that month-to-month
fluctuations in earnings correspond with fairly large changes on the amounts that migrant
workers remit each period. These results are consistent with a number of models of remittances.
We present a new estimate of the income elasticity of remittances based on high frequency, administrative data. These estimates
may be of interest to policy-makers who are interested in leveraging remittances as a mechanism of improving the well-being of
households in developing countries. It provides an estimate of how remittances would respond to policies in more developed
countries that affect the earnings of migrants.
Remittances are critical for economic development of
underdeveloped nations
Peria and Mascaro 8--María Soledad Martínez Pería is a Senior Economist in the
Development Research Group, World Bank, Washington, DC. Yira Mascaró is a Senior Financial
Economist in the Finance and Private Sector Development Department of the Latin America and
the Caribbean Region, World Bank, Washington, DC.[María Soledad Martínez Pería, Yira
Mascaró, and Florencia Moizeszowicz “Do Remittances Affect Recipient Countries’ Financial
Development?” *REMITTANCES AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT 173]RMT
Similarly, because remittances are typically lumpy, recipients might have a need for financial
products that allow for the safe storage of these funds. In the case of households that receive their remittances
through banks, the potential to learn about and to demand other financial products is even larger. On
the other hand, because remittances can also help relax individuals’ financing constraints, they might lead to a lower demand for
credit and have a dampening effect on credit market development. Also, a rise in remittances might not translate into an increase in
credit to the private sector if these flows are instead channeled to finance the government. Finally, remittances might not increase
bank deposits if they are immediately consumed or if remittances recipients distrust financial institutions and prefer other ways of
saving these flows. Recent accounts of financial institutions’ attempts to “bank” remittances recipients—by
lowering
remittances fees and offering specially designed products—suggest that financial institutions
perceive the likely impact of remittances on financial development to be positive.1 However,
empirical research on the impact of remittances on financial development is largely lacking. One
exception is a recently completed study by Aggarwal, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martínez Pería (2006). Using
balance of payments (BOP) statistics for over 90 countries during the period 1975–2003, the study
uncovers a positive relationship between remittances and financial development. However, this study
looks at all developing countries combined and does not test whether this relationship holds across regions and, in particular, for
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). This chapter investigates
the association between remittances and
financial development for Latin American countries both at the macro and micro levels. At the
macro level, using the data and empirical approach pursued by Aggarwal, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martínez Pería (2005), we compare
the impact of remittances on financial development for countries in Latin America and outside the region. We try
to correct for
the potential endogeneity of remittances by using economic conditions in migrant-receiving (or
remittances-source) countries as instruments. At the micro level, the chapter presents research
on the association between remittances and the use of banking services in Latin America. With data
from 19 household surveys for 11 Latin American countries, we test whether the proportion of
households that use financial services is different between remittances recipients and
nonrecipients in Latin America. Furthermore, we present results from detailed case studies on El
Salvador (see Demirgüç-Kunt and Martínez Pería 2006) and Mexico (see Demirgüç- Kunt et al. 2007), two of the
largest remittances recipients in the region. These case studies investigate the association between remittances and
financial development more rigorously, attempting to correct for potential endogeneity biases. Finally, we complement the
micro-level results with findings from interviews with officials of selected banks in the Latin
American region (primarily from Colombia and Guatemala). These less rigorous case studies help to illustrate
the increasing interest of banks in the remittances business, report on key contributing or limiting
factors for the “bancarization” of recipients and senders, and showcase incipient efforts to develop
specialized products for cross-selling of services to remittances recipients (see annexes A and B). The
The macro-level analysis suggests that
remittances have a positive impact on the financial development of developing
countries overall, but this effect is smaller for Latin American countries. The micro-level analysis reveals that while there
findings from this chapter can be summarized as follows.
is evidence that the likelihood of using deposit accounts is higher among remittances recipients, and deposit markets are more
developed in areas where a larger percentage of the population receives remittances, no such effects are present thus far when it
comes to bank loan use and credit market development
Low growth in developing economies increases the risk of and creates
a cycle of war in post conflict countries
Kim and Conceicao 10 - United Nations - Department of Economic and Social Affairs
(DESA),United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) [Namsuk Kim and Pedro Conceição.
“THE ECONOMIC CRISIS, VIOLENT CONFLICT, AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT”
International Journal of Peace Studies, Volume 15, Number 1, Spring/Summer 2010]RMT
The unfolding global economic crisis is expected to bring the world economy into recession in 2009. Figure
1 shows the population weighted real GDP growth from 1991 to 2009 (estimates for 2008 and projection for 2009) for the world economy and for
different groups of countries. The annual
real GDP growth rate of the global economy was 5.1% in 2007, but
the world economy is projected to shrink by -1.3% in 2009 (IMF, 2009). Emerging and developing
economies are also projected to suffer a sharp slowdown as a result of the crisis, with a projected
growth rate of 1.6% in 2009 compared to 8.3% in 2007. For many developing countries,
the sharp economic slowdowns will translate into deep recessions . The United
Nations (UN) projects that 15 developing countries will have negative per capita growth in 2009
(UN, 2009, p. 131), while projections from the World Bank adjusting for terms-of-trade changes increase this to 50 (World Bank, 2009a, p. 2).
Given that the probability of conflict recurrence is high, as elaborated upon below, post-conflict
countries – those that have experienced armed conflicts until recent years – may be
particularly vulnerable . A post-conflict country in this paper refers to a country with armed
intra-state conflicts that ended, or significantly diminished, after the end of the Cold war (UNDP,
2008a, p. 7). As Figure 1 shows, post-conflict countries are projected to have a substantial decrease in the
economic growth, from 7.4% in 2007 to 3.1% in 2009. Advanced economies may have a sharper slowdown (2.7% in 2007 and - 3.8% in
2009), but they have well-developed social protection, and stable political systems that may facilitate the recovery and absorb the pressures for social
instability and conflict. In contrast, post-conflict
countries, may be more vulnerable to a more protracted and
slower recovery from the slowdown, given the higher risks of conflict recurrence. A recent strand
of literature, reviewed in some detail in this paper, suggests that economic conditions are important
determinants of the outbreak and recurrence of conflict. In particular, wars often start following
growth collapses (Collier et al., 2009, p. 15). Sharp economic slowdowns and low levels of income
per capita appear to increase the likelihood of conflicts . In this context, it is opportune to explore insights
from this literature, linking it also with the human development implications of both growth slowdowns and conflict. In particular, the paper highlights
the risks of the emergence of low human development/conflict traps. When it comes to the consequences of conflict, there is no doubt that
violent conflict is one of the most extreme forms of suppressing choices and
advancing rights, and therefore a major threat to human development (UNDP, 2005, p. 151).
Since 1990, more than 3 million people have died in armed conflicts in developing countries (Marshall,
2005). The total war deaths are far more than the battle deaths. For example, the total war deaths are
estimated as 1.2 million in Ethiopia during 1976-1991, but only 2% of them were directly
engaged in the battles. (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2004). Conflict has also non-lethal consequences that may last across generations (UNDP,
2008a). The conflict becomes even more hazardous if conflict results in a persistent conflict trap. A
typical country reaching the end of a civil war faces a 44 percent risk of returning to conflict
within five years (Collier et al., 2003, p. 83). Whether or not a country will experience a new civil war can be best predicted by whether the
country experienced wars in the past (Collier et al., 2004). As far as drivers of conflict are concerned, one of the most robust findings
in the literature is that many economic conditions (low income, slow growth, and especially severe economic downturns)
are correlated with the outbreak of conflict, with some evidence strongly suggesting that the
causal direction runs from economic conditions to conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). There is also
a rich literature on the impact of horizontal inequality and dependence on natural resources as drivers of increases in the risk of conflict. A simple and
narrow approach to the conflict related to economic growth might overlook other dimensions of human nature. It is
true that the high
rates of recurrence of conflict, along with the economic determinants of conflict, suggest the
possibility of the existence of poverty-conflict traps (Collier et al., 2003; Bloomberg et al., 2000). However, poverty
and low per capita income are also correlated with worse health and education outcomes, and
also these outcomes suffer as a result of conflict, (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Justino and Verwimp, 2006; Alderman,
Hoddinott and Kinsey, 2004). Therefore, the relationship between conflict and human development can be
conceptualized in the framework of a low human development – conflict trap. A self-reinforcing circle from
conflict to low human development, and vice versa, is suggestively illustrated below (Chart 1). Conflict destroys accumulated
physical and human capital, forces replacement of labor, and deteriorates
institutional capacity. A country experiencing conflict cannot secure long term returns for
investments in both physical and human capital, resulting in low investment in health and education. All of these
factors lead to low levels of human development. A country with low levels of human
development has more difficulty in improving institutions, and in increasing productivity and
potential growth. In turn, lower growth rates heighten the risk of conflict, potentially
trapping a country in the loop . The remainder of the paper discusses the empirical findings and theoretical background for
linkage between the low human development and conflict. Section 2 considers how low levels of human development can affect the risk of violent
conflict. Section 3 shows how the conflict can result in low human development, completing the vicious circle. Section 4 concludes the paper with a
brief discussion on the policy responses.
Best Data proves a causal relation between economic performance
and incidence of conflict—every small increase in growth reduces the
chance of armed conflict
Kim and Conceicao 10 - United Nations - Department of Economic and Social Affairs
(DESA),United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) [Namsuk Kim and Pedro Conceição.
“THE ECONOMIC CRISIS, VIOLENT CONFLICT, AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT”
International Journal of Peace Studies, Volume 15, Number 1, Spring/Summer 2010]RMT
empirical studies find that poor economic
performance is associated with higher incidence of conflict . Being a poor country is
correlated with most forms of violence (UNDP, 2008a). Growth rates are also strongly associated with
risks of conflict in developing countries. If the growth rate in developing countries is increased by 1
percentage point from the mean, the risk of conflict decreases by 0.6 percentage points to 4.0
percent (Collier et al., 2009). Kang and Meernik (2005) show that the growth rate in conflict countries in the
five years prior to conflict , including cases of conflict recurrence, was on average 0.5 percent
compared to 2 percent in the countries that remained peaceful . Figure 2 shows that economic
development and conflicts are observed to be clearly related. The level of GDP is negatively correlated with observing a
new conflict. Collier et al. (2009) finds that the predicted risk for a hypothetical country with
characteristics set at the study‟s sample mean was 4.6 percent. If the level of per capita income were to be halved
from this level, the risk would be increased to 5.3 percent. Empirical analysis of growth and conflict has inherent data
limitations, but some recent studies using more careful methodology shows a strong causal link
running from poor economic performance to conflict.
While there are a number of factors that could cause conflict,
Independently human development drastically reduces the risk war—
even rational actors have an incentive to go to war
Kim and Conceicao 10 - United Nations - Department of Economic and Social Affairs
(DESA),United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) [Namsuk Kim and Pedro Conceição.
“THE ECONOMIC CRISIS, VIOLENT CONFLICT, AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT”
International Journal of Peace Studies, Volume 15, Number 1, Spring/Summer 2010]RMT
Not only the economic performance variables (level of income or growth rate), but other
components of human development,
such as education attainment, may also affect the risk of conflict. Stylzed facts suggest that education
outcomes are closely linked with the outbreak of conflict. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find strong
evidence that higher levels of secondary school attainment are associated with a lower risk of
civil war. If the enrollment rate is 10 percentage points higher than the average in their sample, the risk of war is reduced by about three percentage
points (a decline in the risk from 11.5 percent to 8.6 percent). This draws on date that refers to the period between
1960 and 1999 for developing countries. Very few countries with low human
development could achieve high levels of political stability. We use the Human Development Index
(HDI) to measure the human development (UNDP, 2008b), and the Political Stability and Absence of Violence reported in
Kaufmann et al. (2009, p.6) to capture perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated
violence and terrorism. Figure 3 plots the political stability indicator and HDI for 178 countries. High values of the political
stability indicator imply that the country suffers less violence, and the high HDI represents high levels of human development. The figure suggests that
high HDI (say, above 0.5) does not guarantee high political stability. However, low HDI (below 0.5) is
clearly associated with political instability (below zero). Going now to the theory behind the outbreak of conflict, a
great number of potential channels and mechanisms have been studied through which social,
political and economic factors can cause conflict. Following Blattman and Miguel (2009), four distinctive models are briefly
reviewed in this section: 1) Contest model; 2) Rational behavior with asymmetric information or imperfect bargaining; 3) Collective action and selective
incentives; 4) Feasibility hypothesis. The most well-known framework is the contest model where two competing parties allocate resources to
production and appropriation (Garfinkel, 1990; Skaperdas, 1992). The chance of winning the contest depends on the relative efficiency of the
technology to allocate resources, and the model has been supported by some empirical findings. Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007) employ conventional
optimization techniques and game-theoretic tools to study the allocation of resources among competing activities - productive and otherwise
appropriative, such as grabbing the product and wealth of others as well as defending one's own product and wealth. The prediction of the contest
model is consistent with the human development and conflict nexus. If
the human development is low, then resources
might not be allocated efficiently by the government because of weak institutions and low
human capital. The ineffective resource mobilization by the government can be exploited by
skillful revolutionary leaders, and the odds of overtaking the political power increases.
Therefore, the low human development can increase the incentive to organize the rebel, and in
turn, increase the risk of political instability. When the conflict is regarded as a deviation from
equilibrium between players, it could occur when the players either act irrationally, or
act rationally with asymmetric information or incomplete bargaining (Fearon, 1995).
Especially, rational wars can occur if: (i) there is private and exclusive information about military
strength, or there is an incentive to misrepresent the information; (ii) two parties cannot commit
a cease-fire in the absence of a third-party enforcer (Blattman and Miguel, 2009, p.11). Acemoglu and Robinson (2006)
demonstrate the existence of an equilibrium in a bargaining process between the rich and the poor . A
number of studies, including Powell (2007), Esteban and Ray (2008), Chassang and Pedro-i-Miquel (2008), and Dal Bó and Powell (2007),
show how conflict is sometimes unavoidable with asymmetric information or in multi player
settings. Conflict can also occur when the bargaining process is incomplete, that is, credible
commitment to maintain peace cannot be made (Powell, 2006; Walter, 2006; Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2000). The
relationship between low human development and conflict might support various theoretical works on conflicts between rational players with
incomplete information or bargaining.
Regional wars escalate—risks US and Chinese confrontation over
nation building efforts
Tierney 12 - Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, an associate professor of
political science at Swarthmore College, official correspondent at The Atlantic. [Dominic,
“Gulliver’s Troubles: Great Powers and Failed States”, Foreign Policy Research Institute, June
2012]RMT
During the Cold War, for example, the developing world became the frontline of the global
struggle, as both the United States and the Soviet Union aided proxy forces. Washington poured blood and
treasure into South Vietnam in a bid to prop up this failed state. Meanwhile, the United States actively
destabilized Afghanistan by aiding the Mujahadeen rebels fighting the Soviet Union, and deepened the Nicaraguan Civil War by
supporting the Contra rebels battling the leftist government. What
will happen next? The pendulum is about to
swing again. With the rise of China, the United States will move from the current Lilliputian era toward a
Brobdingnagian era—with a shift in focus away from failed states toward great power diplomacy. The
Secretary of Defense recently declared that: “We will of necessity rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific region.” Obama announced that
2,500 American Marines would be deployed to Australia as a sign of the new East Asian strategy. The
emerging
Brobdingnagian phase reflects the fact that China is viewed as the major long-term threat to
U.S. security. And this transition is reinforced by public and elite frustration with the costs of
stabilizing Afghanistan and Iraq. Americans would rather engage in great power diplomacy than repeat the nationbuilding Labors of Sisyphus. The pendulum is unlikely to swing back entirely to the Brobdingnagian
extreme. After all, a second Cold War is hardly imminent. Unlike the Soviet Union, China has not
built an empire at the point of a bayonet or proclaimed an aggressive ideology inimical to
American democracy and capitalism. Furthermore, given the continuing concerns over
terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and human rights , the dangers emanating from failed
and failing states will continue to hold attention in Washington. Instead, the pendulum may move
toward a middle position, with the United States keeping one eye on the inherent challenges of
weak states, and one eye on the consequences for great power diplomacy. What will be the effects? First,
the United States will view failed states less as an inherent problem, and more as
an arena for great power rivalry over strategic bases and energy resources .
Washington may show increasing sensitivity to the issue of “relative gains,” or whether the
United States or China benefits more from continuing instability in Afghanistan, Haiti, or
Sudan. If a failed state is a U.S. ally, concerns over China could redouble Washington's efforts to
restore order in the troubled land. But if a failed state is hostile or pro-Chinese, the United States
may cast a blind eye to the country's travails, or even deliberately pull the thread that leads to its unraveling.
China, after all, has recently expanded its diplomatic and economic activities in failed or failing states. Since 2004, China
has sent over 1,000 police to help stabilize Haiti, in part because Haiti is one of 23 countries that
still recognize Taiwan. The long-term goal may be to draw Haiti into China's diplomatic orbit. In 2007, China
contributed engineering troops to a joint African Union-United Nations operation in the Darfur
region of Sudan. China has also made significant investments in oil, natural gas, and copper
production in Afghanistan. After 9/11, Washington welcomed Brobdingnagian help in dealing with the Lilliputian threat,
by encouraging Chinese investment in Afghanistan. But if we move into a new era of enhanced great power rivalry, Americans may
look at Afghanistan in a different light, favoring the country's stability only if it aids U.S. interests, and competing with China over
the control of Afghan resources. Fortunately, we live in a time of great power peace, and war with China is unlikely. But
competition
over failed states is one of the more plausible scenarios for military conflict . Jakub
Grygiel described the potential for “vacuum wars” where the absence of effective government in failed
states lures in great powers. If Indonesia were to collapse, for instance, China might intervene to
protect the Chinese minority, provoking military action by other regional powers. If the rise of
China occupies U.S. attention, there may be less bandwidth available for purely humanitarian
operations like in Somalia. These types of missions tend to occur only in Lilliputian eras. At times of great power
competition, Washington lacks the will for a purely idealistic venture. And a rival great power may
also resist Washington's capacity to intervene. Interestingly, Americans dramatically altered their
view of failed states over the last century even when the countries themselves did not change.
Haiti has been beset by problems since it gained independence in 1804. An ordinary Haitian might not understand
why, during the twentieth century, the United States became suddenly concerned about the
stability of Haiti, then lost interest, and then became worried again. Similarly, an ordinary
Afghan might not comprehend why Washington, in turn, destabilized Afghanistan in the 1980s,
ignored the country, began a major nation-building mission costing billions of dollars--and may
soon rethink the value of Afghan stability based on whether the United States or China benefits more. The waxing and
waning of great power rivals has always shaped the American view of failed states. As China
rises, Gulliver will view the Lilliputian threat through the Brobdingnagian lens.
1AC - Cooperation
Status quo ICE operations erode community trust – only a
curtailment of the agency’s power can solve
Kati L. Griffith 12, Proskauer Assistant Professor of Employment and Labor Law, Industrial
and Labor
Relations School at Cornell University, 2012, UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS: CROSSING THE
BORDERS OF IMMIGRATION AND WORKPLACE LAW, CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND
PUBLIC POLICY,
http://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=785068073073027082119015102075110007098
03206806003306507810309101409912003110508703105712103812604704503209711210201
609409101003103300708003201200400102911510500409900000602012406911409510708
2106113098108006097088086123117070089089125064103105072112&EXT=pdf&TYPE=2
||RS
Scholars and commentators have also identified ways that the agency in charge of workplace-based immigration
enforcement, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE), has impeded workplace law
enforcement and employee organizing in some circumstances. ICE agents, for instance, have
misrepresented themselves to workers as employee health and safety agents in order to
capture undocumented workers.86 On other occasions, ICE has reportedly initiated workplace
immigration raids in response to “tips” from employers who contact immigration authorities as a
way of deterring employee organizing and workplace law claims.87 Moreover, the National Employment
Law Project recently reported on three cases that involved “ICE surveillance of picket lines or other labor activities” and four cases
that involved immigration enforcement activities at workplaces despite “ICE
knowledge of an ongoing organizing
campaign or labor dispute.”88 Therefore, despite the DOL-ICE Memorandum of
Understanding described in Part III, ICE’s interventions have sometimes sent the message to
employees that labor disputes bring about immigration enforcement and that undocumented
employees are not safe to organize or to come forward with complaints related to their workplace
rights.89
That erosion of community trust spills over – it effects every law
enforcement official
Abby Sullivan 8, J.D. Candidate at University of California, Hastings College of the Law, On Thin ICE: Cracking Down on
the Racial Profiling of Immigrants and Implementing a Compassionate Enforcement Policy, Hastings Race and Poverty, 2008,
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/hasrapo6&div=6&g_sent=1&collection=journals ||RS
Furthermore, racial
profiling will instill in the immigrant community distrust of all law
enforcement officials , be they immigration or general law enforcement officers. Such fear
and distrust will make immigrants reluctant to report crime, destabilizing immigrant
communities and rendering them less safe. This result is contrary to the Immigration and Nationality Act, which
exempts certain undocumented individuals from removability if they are "helpful to a Federal, State, or local law enforcement
official... investigating or prosecuting criminal activity." 21 2 The statute provides relief as a reward for cooperation with law
enforcement in the investigation of a broad category of crimes, including rape, torture, trafficking, domestic violence, sexual assault,
kidnapping, blackmail, extortion, homicide, assault, obstruction of justice, and 213 perjury. Although the Department of Homeland
Security has attempted to restrict the categories of crimes for which such relief would be available in exchange for cooperation with
law enforcement, 2 14 the language of the Act makes clear Congress' desire that immigration status not be a basis to dissuade such
cooperation. Selective
immigration law enforcement based on race, resulting in mounting distrust
and tension between immigrants and officers, is in direct conflict with this congressional
objective.
Police-immigrant relations are critical to deter domestic terrorism
International Association of Chiefs of Police, IACP, 14, a dynamic organization that serves as
the professional voice of law enforcement, 2014, Using Community Policing to Counter Violent
Extremism,
http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/documents/pdfs/Final%20Key%20Principles%20Guide.pdf
||RS
Engaging Immigrant Communities through Community Policing Law
enforcement agencies nationwide have used
community policing principles to build bridges with immigrant communities that may be wary
of law enforcement because of past experiences in their home country .13 Law enforcement
agencies have also used these principles, and continue to use them today, to demonstrate their
commitment to balancing the needs of protecting their communities while also protecting
individuals from hate crimes and civil rights and liberties violations . However, groups that share,
or have been perceived to share, the national background or religions of the perpetrators of the
9/11 attacks may still be hesitant to share tips and may be cautious about partnering with law
enforcement .This hesitancy can only be overcome by building trusting
relationships, being transparent, and communicating with community members ,
regardless of their citizenship or immigration status . The principles of community policing extend beyond the residents of a specific
community and encompass working in partnership with other government agencies, public and private stakeholders, and faith- and
community-based organizations . For example, enhanced
information exchange between local, state, tribal, and federal
law enforcement and homeland security partners; improved partnerships between federal, state, and local officials;
information sharing between law enforcement and private entities; and, advances in communications technology and interoperable
all be used to address terrorism and violent extremism .14 Using
interoperable databases and sharing information with nonprofits and the private sector provides
law enforcement with additional opportunities to prevent violent attacks by extremist
individuals and groups .
databases, can
The internal link is unique – declining police budgets means that
community cooperation is uniquely key
International Association of Chiefs of Police, IACP, 14, a dynamic organization that serves as
the professional voice of law enforcement, 2014, Using Community Policing to Counter Violent
Extremism,
http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/documents/pdfs/Final%20Key%20Principles%20Guide.pdf
||RS
Applying Community Policing to Homeland Security Issues Community
policing approaches have been adapted
to address a broad range of concerns . Besides traditional crime issues, community policing has
been used to address diverse issues such as gangs and gang violence, civic engagement, and
community awareness. Community policing’s broad approach encompasses greater emphasis on
proactive and preventive policing . Applying the same community policing principles that have
helped reduce general crime, violence, and social disorder to terrorism and violent extremism can also aid in
preventing future attacks . Building partnerships with public and private community stakeholders,
interacting with residents and community leaders, sharing information, and investigating
reports of suspicious or unusual behavior are all components of community policing that are easily
transferable to terrorism prevention and countering violent extremism .10 Interacting
with residents and other community stakeholders can help law enforcement identify and engage
citizen groups as partners to address community grievances that may lead to violent extremism .
Building trusting relationships based on interaction and collaboration may also lead to
increased reporting of suspicious activity as well as sharing of information, target hardening,
and improved coordination .11 Especially in a time of shrinking budgets and increasing
expectations for law enforcement agencies, one of the most beneficial aspects of community policing is
the principle of leveraging the strength of communities and their members . Community
members are an important force multiplier .They can help identify, prevent, and
eliminate terrorist ideologies and behaviors before violence occurs .The importance of individual
community members is embodied in the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI), which encourages
individuals to take an active role in reporting any type of suspicious or criminal activity to authorities . During his 2011 State of the
Union address, President Barack Obama called on American law enforcement and their communities to continue to work together to
stop homegrown violent extremists before their plans become operational: “Thanks to our intelligence and law enforcement
professionals, we’re disrupting plots and securing our cities and skies.And as extremists try to inspire acts of violence within our
borders, we are responding with the strength of our communities…” 12 Introduction 3 By
empowering communities to
take an active role in ensuring their safety, law enforcement is well positioned to take a central
role in preventing terrorism and countering violent extremism .
Domestic bioterror is coming now – wide range of new technical
capabilities ensure use
Sharon Cheatham 12, B.S. from Georgetown University, Bioterrorism In The Homeland:
The Impact Of Acts Of Bioterrorism On American Culture, 11/19/12,
http://hdl.handle.net/10822/558323 ||RS
The threat of domestic cases of bioterrorism is a major concern; a concern that is
comprehensive when considered in its entirety. Ideally, perfect biological weaponry choices would be those
needed in small quantities, those which are easily manufactured or acquired, and most importantly,
those which are somewhat obscure and perhaps even microscopic. World at Risk, a report by the Commission on the
Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Proliferation and Terrorism, reveals that most biological
pathogens are “poorly secured and widely available for sinister purposes.”32 Myriad
resources are available to extremists and terrorist organizations desirous of
launching attacks of bioterrorism on American soil . “It is unknown exactly how much
and which types of biological weapons may be on the black market or in unauthorized hands,
since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and subsequent logistical chaos in the
former Red Army.”33And even still, closer to home , specifically here on American soil , fields of
study which include biomedical engineering, pharmaceuticals, and agriculture require specific
biotechnological proficiencies which can easily be incorporated into biological weaponry,
making it more difficult to detect and identify the existence of harmful agents, and subsequently,
protect against the harm they may cause.34 The defense community at large realizes that biological
agents and toxins are available to individuals whom may not seek to act in the best interest of others. Moreover, the
defense community also recognizes that while countermeasures may exist to limit the proliferation of harmful biological and
chemical agents, timely
identification of bioterrorist activity, as well as distribution of medicines to combat the
affects of these harmful agents may be difficult. Subsequently, the following piece of legislation was introduced to lessen, and
hopefully prevent, acts of biological warfare.
Synthetic biology makes the impact unique- creates means and motive
Rose, 14 -- PhD, recognized international biodefense expert
[Patrick, Center for Health & Homeland Security senior policy analyst & biosecurity expert,
National Defense University lecturer, and Adam Bernier, expert in counter-terrorism, "DIY
Bioterrorism Part II: The proliferation of bioterrorism through synthetic biology," CBRNePortal,
2-24-14, www.cbrneportal.com/diy-bioterrorism-part-ii-the-proliferation-of-bioterrorismthrough-synthetic-biology/, accessed 8-16-14]
In Part I of this series, we examined how the advancement of synthetic
biology has made bio-engineering
accessible to the mainstream biological community. Non-state actors who wish to employ
biological agents for ill intent are sure to be aware of how tangible bio-weapons are becoming
as applications of synthetic biology become more affordable and the probability of success
increases with each scientific breakthrough. The willingness of non-state actors to engage in biological attacks is not a new concept;
however, the past biological threat environment has been subdued compared to that of conventional or even chemical terrorism. The
frequency and deadliness of biological attacks has, thankfully, been limited; much of which can be attributed to the technical
complexity or apparent ineptitude of the perpetrators developing biological weapons. Despite
the infrequency and
ineffectiveness of biological attacks in the last four decades, the threat may be
changing with the continued advancement of synthetic biology applications. Coupled
with the ease of info rmation sharing and a rapidly growing do-it-yourself-biology
(DIYbio) movement (discussed in Part I), the chances of not only , more attacks , but potentially
more deadly ones will inevitably increase .¶ During the last half century terrorist organizations
have consistently had an interest in using biological weapons as a means of attacking their targets,
but only few have actually made a weapon and used it. The attraction is that terrorist activities with biological weapons are difficult
to detect and even more difficult to attribute without a specific perpetrator claiming responsibility. Since 1971 there have been more
than 113,113 terrorist attacks globally and 33 of them have been biological. The majority of bio-terrorism incidents recorded
occurred during the year 2001 (17 of the 33); before 2001 there were 10 incidents and since 2001 there were 6 (not counting the
most recent Ricin attacks). The lack of a discernable trend in use of bio-terrorism does not negate the clear intent of extremist
organizations to use biological weapons. In fact, the capacity to harness biological weapons more effectively today only increases the
risk that they will successfully be employed.¶
The landscape is changing : previously the instances where biological
attacks had the potential to do the most harm (e.g., Rajneeshees cult’s Salmonella attacks in 1984, Aum Shinri Kyo’s Botulinum
toxin, and Anthrax attacks in the early 90’s) included non-state actors with access to large amounts of funding and scientists.
Funding and a cadre of willing scientists does not guarantee success though. The
assertion was thus made that
biological weapons are not only expensive, they require advanced technical training to
make and are even more difficult to effectively perpetrate acts of terrorism with. While it is difficult to
determine with certainty whether the expense and expertise needed to create biological weapons has acted as a major deterrent for
groups thinking of obtaining them, many experts would argue that the cost/expertise barrier makes the threat from biological
attacks extremely small. This assertion is supported by the evidence that the vast majority of attacks have taken place in Western
countries and was performed by Western citizens with advanced training in scientific research.¶ In
the past decade the
cost/expertise assertion has become less accurate. Despite the lack of biological attacks, there are
a number of very dangerous and motivated organizations that have or are actively
pursuing biological weapons. The largest and most outspoken organization has been the global Al Qaeda network,
whose leaders have frequently and passionately called for the development (or purchase) of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).
The principal message from Al Qaeda Central and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has included
the call to use biological WMDs to terrorize Western nations. Al Qaeda has had a particular focus on biological
and nuclear weapons because of their potential for greatest harm. Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Anwar al-Awlaki have
all called for attacks using biological weapons, going so far as to say that Muslims everywhere should seek to kill Westerners
wherever possible and that obtaining WMDs is the responsibility of all Muslims. Before the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, Al
Qaeda had spent significant funds on building a bio-laboratory and had begun collecting scientists from around the world; however,
the Afghanistan invasion and subsequent global War on Terrorism is thought to have disrupted their capabilities and killed or
captured many of their assets. Despite the physical setbacks, this disruption
does not appear to have
changed the aggressive attitude towards obtaining WMDs (e.g., more recently U.S.
Intelligence has been concerned about AQAP attempting to make Ricin).¶ The
emergence of synthetic biology and DIYbio has increased the likelihood that Al Qaeda
will succeed in developing biological WMDs. The low cost and significantly
reduced level of necessary expertise may change how many non-state actors
view bio logical weapons as a worthwhile investment. This is not to say that
suddenly anyone can make a weapon or that it is easy. To the contrary making an
effective biological weapon will still be difficult, only much easier and cheaper
than it has been in the past.¶ The rapid advancements of synthetic bio logy could
be a game changer , giving organizations currently pursuing biological weapons
more options, and encouraging other organizations to reconsider their worth.
Because the bar for attaining bio logical weapons has been lowered and is likely to
continue to be lowered
as more advances in biological technology are made, it is important that the international
community begin to formulate policy that protects advances in science that acts to prevent the intentional misuse of synthetic
biology. Disregard
for this consideration will be costly. A successful attack with a
potent biological weapon, where no pharmaceutical interventions might exist, will
be deadly and the impact of such an attack will reverberate around the globe
because biological weapons are not bound by international borders.
Bioterror causes extinction
Mhyrvold ‘13 Nathan, Began college at age 14, BS and Masters from UCLA, Masters and PhD, Princeton
“Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action,” Working Draft, The Lawfare Research Paper Series Research paper NO . 2 –
2013
As horrible as this would be, such a pandemic is by no means the worst attack one can imagine, for several reasons. First, most
of the classic
bioweapons are based on 1960s and 1970s technology because the 1972 treaty halted
bioweapons development efforts in the United States and most other Western countries. Second, the
Russians, although solidly committed to biological weapons long after the treaty deadline, were never on the cutting edge of biological research. Third
and most important, the
science and technology of molecular biology have made enormous
advances, utterly transforming the field in the last few decades . High school biology students
routinely perform molecular-biology manipulations that would have been impossible even for
the best superpower-funded program back in the heyday of biological-weapons research. The
biowarfare methods of the 1960s and 1970s are now as antiquated as the lumbering mainframe
computers of that era. Tomorrow’s terrorists will have vastly more deadly bugs to choose
from. Consider this sobering development: in 2001, Australian researchers working on mousepox, a nonlethal virus that infects mice (as chickenpox
does in humans), accidentally discovered that a simple genetic modification transformed the virus.10, 11 Instead of producing mild symptoms, the new
virus killed 60% of even those mice already immune to the naturally occurring strains of mousepox. The new virus, moreover, was unaffected by any
existing vaccine or antiviral drug. A team of researchers at Saint Louis University led by Mark Buller picked up on that work and, by late 2003, found a
way to improve on it: Buller’s variation on mousepox was 100% lethal, although his team of investigators also devised
combination vaccine and antiviral therapies that were partially effective in protecting animals from the engineered strain.12, 13 Another saving grace is
that the
genetically altered virus is no longer contagious. Of course, it is quite possible that future
tinkering with the virus will change that property, too. Strong reasons exist to believe that the
genetic modifications Buller made to mousepox would work for other poxviruses and possibly for other classes of viruses as
well. Might the
same techniques allow chickenpox or another poxvirus that infects humans to be turned into a
100% lethal bioweapon, perhaps one that is resistant to any known antiviral therapy? I’ve asked this
question of experts many times, and no one has yet replied that such a manipulation couldn’t be
done. This case is just one example. Many more are pouring out of scientific journals and conferences every year.
Just last year, the journal Nature published a controversial study done at the University of Wisconsin–Madison in which virologists enumerated the
changes one would need to make to a highly lethal strain of bird flu to make it easily transmitted from one mammal to another.14
Biotechnology is advancing so rapidly that it is hard to keep track of all the new potential
threats. Nor is it clear that anyone is even trying. In addition to lethality and drug resistance, many other
parameters can be played with, given that the infectious power of an epidemic depends on
many properties, including the length of the latency period during which a person is contagious
but asymptomatic. Delaying the onset of serious symptoms allows each new case to spread to
more people and thus makes the virus harder to stop. This dynamic is perhaps best
illustrated by HIV , which is very difficult to transmit compared with smallpox and many other viruses. Intimate contact is needed, and even
then, the infection rate is low. The balancing factor is that HIV can take years to progress to AIDS , which
can then take many more years to kill the victim. What makes HIV so dangerous is that infected people have lots of
opportunities to infect others. This property has allowed HIV to claim more than 30 million lives so far, and approximately 34 million people are now
living with this virus and facing a highly uncertain future.15 A
virus genetically engineered to infect its host
quickly, to generate symptoms slowly—say, only after weeks or months—and to spread easily through the
air or by casual contact would be vastly more devastating than HIV . It could silently
penetrate the population to unleash its deadly effects suddenly . This type of epidemic
would be almost impossible to combat because most of the infections would occur before
the epidemic became obvious. A technologically sophisticated terrorist group could develop
such a virus and kill a large part of humanity with it. Indeed, terrorists may not have to develop it themselves:
some scientist may do so first and publish the details. Given the rate at which biologists are making
discoveries about viruses and the immune system, at some point in the near future, someone
may create artificial pathogens that could drive the human race to extinction . Indeed, a
detailed species-elimination plan of this nature was openly proposed in a scientific journal. The
ostensible purpose of that particular research was to suggest a way to extirpate the malaria mosquito, but similar
techniques could be directed toward humans.16 When I’ve talked to molecular biologists about this method, they are
quick to point out that it is slow and easily detectable and could be fought with biotech remedies. If you challenge them to come up with improvements
to the suggested attack plan, however, they have plenty of ideas. Modern
biotechnology will soon be capable, if it is
not already, of bringing about the demise of the human race — or at least of killing a
sufficient number of people to end high-tech civilization and set humanity back 1,000 years or
more. That terrorist groups could achieve this level of technological sophistication may seem far-fetched, but keep in mind that it takes only a
handful of individuals to accomplish these tasks. Never has lethal power of this potency been accessible to so few, so easily. Even more dramatically
than nuclear proliferation, modern biological science has frighteningly undermined the correlation between the lethality of a weapon and its cost, a
fundamentally stabilizing mechanism throughout history. Access to extremely lethal agents—lethal enough to exterminate Homo sapiens—will be
available to anybody with a solid background in biology, terrorists included.
1AC - Plan
The United States Immigrations and Customs Enforcement Agency,
the Department of Labor and/or other relevant agencies should revise
the existing Memorandum of Understanding such that the United
States Immigrations and Customs Enforcement Agency should be
required to obtain permission from the United States Department of
Labor and/or other relevant labor agencies before conducting
investigations and raids of a home and/or workplace.
1AC – Solvency
The existing Memorandum of Understanding is limited and
impermanent—it has insufficient interagency coordination, occurs
during litigation, and still authorizes state searches. It causes a
dangerous chilling effect that precludes seeking of legal recourse.
Braker 12—Columbia Law School [‘Julie. "Navigating the Relationship between the DHS and
the DOL: The Need for Federal Legislation to Protect Immigration Workers' Rights." Colum. JL
& Soc. Probs. 46 (2012): 329]RMT
The main strength of the MOU is the firewall that it establishes between DOL and ICE, limiting the risk that employers who are being investigated will
use the threat of immigration enforcement to silence immigrant workers who assert their workplace rights. The MOU helps to prevent “abusive
employers from manipulating DHS to rid themselves of workers who assert their rights”88 by ensuring that immigration enforcement cannot occur
while a labor investigation is taking place. However, with
respect to the broader goal of balancing immigration
enforcement and labor enforcement, the MOU is weak because it is of an impermanent
and limited nature and because it does not cover other forums in which workers
bring employment law claims.
1. The MOU is an Impermanent and Limited Measure The
inherent limitations of an MOU make it a weak tool
for protecting unauthorized workers when they bring labor claims and for ensuring that immigration enforcement does
not interfere with labor enforcement. As explained above, interagency MOUs are tentative and limited: they
can be changed when agencies see fit and, although they are subject to review by the
OLC,89 they are generally unreviewable and unenforceable by courts .90 Also, the DOL DHS MOU specifically states that it does not create a private right of action.91
Further, MOUs, like
other contracts, are limited to the parties that sign it. Given that labor
enforcement occurs in other forums besides the DOL, a balance of labor and immigration
enforcement can only be achieved by coordinating with other agencies, such as the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and the courts. Thus, the MOU’s tentative and limited nature
inhibit its ability to achieve coordination in immigration and labor enforcement because it is not a long-term, stable legal
mechanism. Because of a greater need for stability and multi-forum change, federal legislative reform may be the
best option for securing labor protections for immigrants , an idea that will be discussed in Part IV.C
the MOU is that it is only between DHS and DOL, and does not limit DHS’s ability to
conduct immigration enforcement when other agencies, such as EEOC, investigate workplace
complaints. The MOU also does not preclude ICE involvement when federal
litigation, a crucial means of obtaining redress for wronged workers, is ongoing.
Given that the DOL’s Wage and Hour Division cannot handle the volume of wage and hour
complaints that are filed nationwide,92 many individuals choose to file lawsuits in federal court
instead.93 Just as immigration enforcement can interfere with DOL investigations, it can also impede
federal litigation.
Another major limitation of
The 2008 Pilgrim’s Pride lawsuit is a prime example of the need for federal employment-rights lawsuits to be protected
against DHS involvement.94 United Steelworkers District 9, which represented poultry workers in Pilgrim’s
Pride poultry plant in Chattanooga, Tennessee, was recruiting Latino workers, who had low levels of union participation, to
join the union.95 At the same time, a wage-and-hour class action lawsuit against Pilgrim’s Pride was
pending.96 When ICE raided the Chattanooga plant in April 2008, the raid had a chilling effect on the
workers, even those who were working legally, as they became more hesitant to unionize due to the
fear of possible immigration consequences, both to themselves and to family members.97 The union
representative stated, “These workers are in no shape to engage in a contract fight with Pilgrim’s Pride.
They’re terrified.”98
the ICE raid inhibited the ability of lawyers to contact those who were part of the classaction lawsuit, but were detained in the raid, as ICE refused to ensure that notice of the lawsuit
reached detained workers who had a right to join the lawsuit.99 As an attorney who worked on the wage-and-hour litigation explained, “The
raid definitely had a chilling effect. Immigrant workers, even those legally authorized to work in
the United States, were afraid of opting in to the class because they were afraid that somehow it
would jeopardize a family member.”10
Further,
This chilling effect can be even more drastic for workers who do not have legal status. In a report on
immigrant workers in the meat and poultry industry, many of whom were unauthorized,
Human Rights Watch found:The possibility of an inquiry into workers’ documentation during a
proceeding adjudicating their claims creates a dilemma for them. The questions are intimidating
— and designed to be so. They force workers to choose between seeking legal recourse
for wage and hour violations, health and safety violations, job discrimination, workplace injuries
and illnesses, reprisals for union activity and other violations, on one hand, or exposing
themselves , on the other hand, to dismissal and deportation by responding to such inquiries when
they seek such recourse. Not surprisingly, they have a chilling effect on workers’ willingness to file
claims.101
the threat of immigrant enforcement stifling reporting of workplace violations exists in other sectors,
including agriculture, the restaurant and hotel industry, and textile manufacturing.102
The problem of
Thus, the documented chilling effect of threats of immigration enforcement on workers reporting workplace violations demonstrate the need to prevent immigration
the Fair Labor Standards Act, which enumerates basic
employment rights such as the minimum wage and overtime pay103 and contains an anti-retaliation provision,104
the fact that federal lawsuits and other forms of legal complaint are still stifled demonstrates
that the MOU does not sufficiently address fears of immigration consequences. Thus,
enforcement from thwarting labor enforcement. Although
more steps need to be taken to balance immigration- and laborenforcement priorities in the context of federal litigation
3. Protections Are Needed for State Litigation and Investigations by State Agencies State court
cases and state labor-enforcement activities should also be protected from interference by immigration enforcement. States
play a role in enforcing labor rights that the DOL-DHS MOU does not address. Much labor,
employment, and employment-discrimination law enforcement takes place at the state level; for
example, in New York, the state Department of Labor investigates state labor law violations105 and the Division of Human Rights investigates
discriminatory employment practices that violate the state’s Human Rights Law.106 Professor Jayesh Rathod also points out that “all U.S. states, with
some
states have minimum wage rates above the federal level.108 Some states “establish independent,
more stringent standards and are enforced by state entities that are largely independent of the
DOL.”109 Thus, many workers rationally pursue labor enforcement in state courts or with state
agencies, as their rights come from state law and thus their complaint must be resolved by a state agency investigation or in
state court. However, workers can experience the same chilling problems that occur in federal
litigation, making it appropriate to balance immigration and laborenforcement priorities in the state context as well.
the exception of Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Tennessee, have some form of minimum wage law.”107 Further,
4. Protections Are Needed for State and Local Law Enforcement Interference The
DOL-DHS MOU also does not address the
issue of state and local law enforcement agencies’ participation in immigration law enforcement.
It is crucial to look at the role that state and local law enforcement may play in the interplay of workers’ rights and immigration as, increasingly, local
law enforcement is becoming enmeshed in immigration enforcement.110 For example, in the case of Durrett
Cheese Sales, a cheese- and dairy-products wholesale company, a number of workers organized, after having not been paid for several weeks.111
Realizing that the workers were organizing, their supervisor fired them and contacted the local sheriff’s department, who reported them to ICE.112
Although no charges were filed against the workers, this action surely stifled any subsequent attempt by workers to organize to pursue their right to be
paid.
Notably, local
law enforcement officials are essentially exempt from the parallel duties that ICE has
towards the DOL. As Professor Stephen Lee points out, “had the Durrett supervisor reported the
workers to ICE — and had the receiving officer suspected that Durrett was in the midst of a labor
dispute — in theory, ICE would have had to withhold or delay action under existing operating
instructions.”113 However, local law enforcement agencies do not have such a duty to
balance laborenforcement and immigration -enforcement goals. This is especially concerning due to the increasing
participation of nonfederal actors in the enforcement of federal immigration laws.114 The Secure Communities program, which directs state and local
law-enforcement agencies to send fingerprints of arrestees to ICE to check their immigration statuses, is one example.115 Thus, because of their
potential involvement in immigration investigations, state law-enforcement agencies should also be included in efforts to ensure that threats or fears of
immigration consequences do not prevent workers from bringing valid workplace claims.
It is possible that the provision of the MOU according to which ICE has agreed to “be alert to and thwart attempts by other
parties to manipulate its worksite enforcement activities for illicit or improper purposes”116 actually prevents local law enforcement
from using immigration enforcement to interfere with labor enforcement to some extent. The National
Employment Law Project (NELP) has suggested that “[t]his language may mean that retaliation carried out by an employer’s surrogate (such as local
police or insurers) could trigger the MOU.”117 Thus, according to NELP’s interpretation, local law enforcement could be considered a “surrogate”
where, as in the Durrett Cheese case, the police officer reported unauthorized workers to ICE at the employer’s behest. If NELP’s interpretation is
adopted, ICE would have to be alert to local law enforcement’s efforts to thwart
labor enforcement when they report
suspected immigration violations. However, this would still not include situations where local
law enforcement is interfering with a labor investigation on its own accord, without acting on behalf of an
employer. Thus, although the MOU is a valuable tool for enforcing labor rights, it fails to encompass the diverse
forums in which labor enforcement occurs, and does not protect against local lawenforcement activity.
Despite conflicting mandates government entities can cooperate and
best support the interests of immigrants
Chen 12--Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School [Ming Hsu, Where You
Stand Depends on Where You Sit: Bureaucratic Incorporation of Immigrants in Federal
Workplace Agencies (March 9, 2012). Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law, 2012; U
of Colorado Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-03. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2019181 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2019181]RMT
How do bureaucrats exercise their discretion when confronted with competing
mandates? There are two dominant answers in the relevant literatures: political control and
professionalism . The political control perspective suggests that political controversies about immigration
in the post-Hoffman era, for example, will lead toward punitive enforcement practices and a lack of
support in service delivery from governmental agencies.86 There are several reasons for these
outcomes: undocumented immigrants’ powerlessness in electoral politics; the power of interest
groups such as employers within corporations and trade associations prone to capturing
agencies; and the tendency for principals to bring bureaucrats in line.87 Political control thereby
defrays a mission-focused professional ethos that includes fidelity to substantive laws, such as labor
standards or antidiscrimination or inclusiveness.88 Underlying this perspective is an implicit belief
that policy is rational and therefore strategically directed at accomplishing instrumental ends.89 In Graham Alison’s
typology, this model of government behavior infers that if a government official performed a
particular action, that official must have felt the action represented the best way of accomplish a
desired end.90 Revealing the strategic thinking that leads linearly from means to ends, then, is the key to
understanding why a policy is enacted.91 In the context of understanding the federal
government’s policies toward undocumented workers, one must seek to understand: (1) the
values and objectives of the federal government (i.e., deterring unauthorized migration by staunching employment
of undocumented immigrant workers); (2) the perceived policy alternatives (i.e., punishing employers for hiring
undocumented workers, rather than the immigrants themselves); (3) the range of intentional and unintentional
consequences that can flow from each policy alternative (i.e., not punishing employers to keep the onus of
responsibility on workers and to prevent unjust enrichment of workers); and (4) the net value of each set of policy
consequences.92 A corollary interpretation of federal workplace agencies protecting
undocumented workers would follow the same line of analysis with the starting assumption that the
workplace agencies’ objective is to maintain labor compliance for all workers and that ensuring compliance for U.S. citizen workers
requires simultaneously ensuring compliance for noncitizen workers In contrast, social
scientists who focus on the
influence of professionalism over political control emphasize the “cultural” attributes of the
organizations in which the professionals reside.93 Those theorists of professionalism who focus on
professionals within government bureaucracies begin by recognizing that the government
consists of a confederation of “semi-feudal, loosely allied organizations, each with
a life of its own.” 94 Those organizations follow set “repertoires” when taking action; these repertoires are
often fueled by their organizational imperatives and manifested in a “fixed set of standard
operating procedures.”95 Policies and practices are analyzed as organizational outputs.96 Bureaucratic incorporation
theorists allege that government actors sit on top of the conglomerate of organizations, and they perceive problems through
“organizational sensors.”97 Thus, partisan politics are constrained, countered and sometimes overcome by the “norms and ethos of
civil servants” within the agencies.98 In
the instance of bureaucrats serving immigrants from within
workplace agencies, an organizational theorist would say that the motivating ethos is one of
professionalism.99 Most civil servants trained as attorneys and employed by federal workplace agencies are “socialized
into understanding their role as unelected officials in a democratic political system where Congress dictates their agency
mission.”100 Their
legal training makes them particularly cognizant of legal constraints related to
the professional norm of procedural justice.101 While mindful of their political leadership, they
strive to maintain their agency mandate across changing presidential priorities.102 Change happens,
but it occurs gradually and infrequently: organizations tend toward “parochial priorities” such as
organizational health, expressed in dollars appropriated and bodies assigned; attempting higher
functions through banal tasks like preparing budgets and reports; evaluating options in terms of
administrative feasibility; and updating their practices based on past practices, such as using
last year’s budget as a template for this year’s expenditures. 103 Organizational parameters mostly persist
through recruitment of loyal personnel, tenure of longstanding employees, and rewards for following existing procedures.104 More
dramatic change occurs in periods of budgetary feast or fast.105 Problems often occur at the
juncture of jurisdictional overlap of multiple organizations and require coordination for
solution.106 Several recent empirical studies of immigrant-serving law enforcement
agencies demonstrate the professional motivation to serve immigrants within
hostile political climates . Building on foundational work studying social service delivery to immigrants
despite restrictive government policies,107 scholars find that moments when restrictive government policies
collide with bureaucrats’ beliefs about fairness and appropriate action toward their clients most
vividly reveal bureaucrats’ professional norms.108 Political scientists Paul Lewis and Karthick
Ramakrishnan study inclusive policing practices in cities with many immigrants.109 They contend that local
law enforcement departments increasingly are professional agencies that use discretion to engage in a search for practices that will
help them to serve the local community in defending itself, rather
than mechanically taking political cues from
elected leadership who may view immigration control as an electoral prerogative in the down
economy.110 Law enforcement officials view themselves as public servants and
professionals who follow an ideal of service , and they recognize the importance of the public they serve in
order to do their job well.111 Insofar as immigrants are part of that constituency, local law enforcement
relies on them to accomplish core tasks of keeping the peace, gaining trust in the community,
and maintaining quality of life for all concerned. Sociologist Shannon Gleeson extends the
professionalism emphasis in bureaucratic incorporation theory to state law enforcement and
regulation, where partisan politics are potentially more salient and immigration policies more fractured than at the local level, in
two empirical studies of state-level workplace agencies.113 In one study, she shows that political ideology
remains an insignificant part of bureaucrats’ motivation to serve immigrants.114 When asked
to reflect on the moral worthiness of immigrants who receive their services, statelevel officials in the EEOC and DOL responded that the moral worthiness of their
immigrant clients is irrelevant to their rendering of services, regardless of the immigrants’
official eligibility for those services.115 “Doing the right thing,” Gleeson argues, “can sometimes have little
to do with a bureaucrat’s personal sense of conviction towards a client.”116 Instead, Gleeson offers an
institutionalized account for why bureaucrats promote immigrants’ rights: “in addition to exercising discretion and
pursuing creative solutions,” bureaucratic actions are contingent on ‘predictable and
institutionalized practices. ’ ”117 Although agency staff was sometimes sympathetic to immigrants,
overwhelmingly they articulated their commitment to immigrants as a means to achieve
organizational goals such as resource allocation and labor compliance.118 Gleeson’s research design, which
compares regulation of the workplace in liberal California with conservative Texas, shows that
political pressure is constrained by professionalism : service to immigrants was
available in both jurisdictions and did not depend on heroic actions or proimmigrant advocacy on the part of individual bureaucrats. 119
Interagency tension is inevitable – only the counterplan can
productively harness it –
Lee 11 --Acting Professor of Law University of California, Irvine School of La [Stephen,
“Monitoring Immigration Enforcement”, (December 19, 2011). Arizona Law Review, Vol. 53,
2011; UC Irvine School of Law Research Paper No. 2012-01. Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1974624 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1974624] RS
While such a solution is workable, such relief rests largely within the scope of the enforcement discretion of immigration officials—
which is precisely what the interagency monitoring framework attempts to constrain.147 Therefore, unless and until Congress
amends the scope of the statutory language, the ability of unauthorized workers to obtain U visa relief will continue to be
circumscribed by the generosity of executive discretion.148 In this sense, monitoring and temporary visas apply pressure on
enforcement decisions from either side in the hopes of deterring overreaching. But in another sense, ex
ante monitoring can
cure one set of pathologies that ex post visas cannot: It can help minimize the externalities that
ICE actions can impose on other agencies downstream.149 A part of the problem with the current
arrangement is that the DOL exerts little influence over ICE enforcement decisions and—as was
evident from the Goldsboro worksite raid—it is forced to internalize the costs of overzealous
worksite raid decisions. So long as ICE remains the lead agency in the context of workplace enforcement and operates free
from constraint, it will almost certainly continue to exercise its enforcement discretion in a manner that best serves its interests at
the expense of those of the DOL.150 Because
the immigration bureaucracy is comprised of multiple
agencies, tension and disharmony will persist as constitutive features of the administration of U.S. immigration
laws. Framed this way, interagency monitoring offers one way to harness the tension and
diversity of viewpoints into something productive. 151 Therefore, my argument is that interagency
tension can be productive provided that we can find an arrangement where labor agencies can
exert greater influence over ICE’s workplace enforcement decisions. Put differently, monitoring requires
embracing interagency tension while simultaneously reallocating power.
Absent Ex ante monitoring requirements ICE will continue workplace
raids and labor exploitation will be rampant
Lee 11 --Acting Professor of Law University of California, Irvine School of La[Stephen,
“Monitoring Immigration Enforcement”, (December 19, 2011). Arizona Law Review, Vol. 53,
2011; UC Irvine School of Law Research Paper No. 2012-01. Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1974624 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1974624] RMT
How should this relationship be structured? Historicall y,
interagency arrangements have been either easily
circumvented by bad-actor employers (e.g., interactions between agencies can productively inform the formation of strategy and
policy as these agencies discuss enforcement goals and compliance definitions. Several years after IRCA was passed, different
agencies began assessing whether and to what extent employers were complying with the
prohibition against hiring unauthorized workers. The INS and the DOL each conducted their own
studies, with the INS finding a 70–80% compliance rate and the DOL determining a 40%
compliance rate.141 The DOL deemed an employer to be noncompliant if, after a workplace investigation, it
sent a notice to the INS of the possible presence of an immigration-related violation. Although these
two agencies could not agree on the meaning of employer compliance, this disagreement created
the opportunity for what has been referred to in another context as a reason-producing conversation;142 it forced
each agency to reconsider and refine its approach to a common goal. Although the precise contours of worksite
reformation are beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth elaborating on how monitoring adjustments could place greater
pressure on ICE officials to take the labor consequences of their decisions seriously. One
robust form of monitoring would require ICE to obtain permission from the DOL
before investigating a particular workplace . If, for example, ICE received a tip that a particular
employer had hired unauthorized workers, before proceeding to investigate the workplace, ICE
officials would have to confer with the DOL and other labor agencies to determine whether a
laborrelated complaint had been filed against the employer.138 In other words, the DOL would have to
affirmatively consent to the investigation before ICE could proceed. Such an arrangement would
also serve to constrain the overzealous decisions of officials blinded by their mission orientation. Drawing
inspiration from the Fourth Amendment example, this type of ex ante check would act as a constraint on the
exercise of executive power.139 In a twist on the rationale that police officers are likely to see probable cause where none exists,
history has shown that ICE officials are likely to ignore signs of labor exploitation
where plenty exist. Against this backdrop, two questions concerning agency coordination emerge as central to solving the puzzle of
workplace enforcement. First, why has the Department of Labor, our nation’s top labor enforcement
agency, struggled to protect unauthorized workers against exploitative practices despite the scope and
seriousness of the problem? And second, why has ICE, our nation’s top immigration enforcement agency,
resisted taking into account the labor consequences of its actions?14 The answers to these
questions can be traced to a peculiar dynamic: ICE, whose primary mission is to target
noncitizens for detention and deportation, has relatively little interest in regulating the
employer– unauthorized worker relationship, while the DOL has a relatively high interest but lacks
the autonomy to effectively do so. Although ICE and the DOL are both charged with the duty of
regulating employers for hiring unauthorized workers, their relationship has largely been an
asymmetric one. ICE has been able to effectively dictate the terms of our nation’s workplace enforcement strategy and has largely been resistant
or indifferent to the labor consequences of its decisions. Taken together, these dynamics, especially when combined with other exacerbating
factors,15 tend to disrupt agency coordination and enable labor exploitation to persist. Moreover, traditional
administrative law fixes do not offer easy or obvious solutions to the problem of asymmetric enforcement authority in the workplace. For example, as
administrative law scholars well know, the
President is free to use his oversight and monitoring powers to
coordinate the enforcement priorities of the various agencies within the executive branch of the
federal government. And President Obama has, more than his predecessors, demonstrated a willingness to use this power
to bring immigration enforcement goals in line with labor enforcement goals. This oversight power,
combined with the election of a President sympathetic to the interests of unauthorized workers and the appointment of a Secretary of Labor who shares
those sympathies, should spell the end of the Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) triumph over the DOL and the displacement of labor
interests in the workplace. Yet, there
are plenty of signs that DHS officials, who are steeped in a work culture
geared toward law-and-order methods of regulation, have resisted the President’s entreaty to
consider the labor consequences of their enforcement decisions. Change at the top offers no guarantee that change
will easily follow at the bottom, at least in the divided world of workplace regulation. Another administrative law fix with intuitive appeal is agency
splitting— the breaking apart of an agency and reallocation of authority. If the problem is that DHS tends to target unauthorized workers to the
exclusion of the employers who hire and exploit these workers, then agency-splitting advocates would suggest transferring the latter power to labor
agencies like the DOL, an agency with a mission orientation that might better accommodate an enforcement mandate involving employers. But past
administrative experiments that even suggested that the DOL was empowered to directly regulate employers for immigration violations proved costly;
often, labor
officials ended up alienating unauthorized workers, the very cross-section of workers
interagency collaboration should protect.16
Monitoring ICE decisions is possible and will be sucessful
Braker 12—Columbia Law School [‘Julie. "Navigating the Relationship between the DHS and
the DOL: The Need for Federal Legislation to Protect Immigration Workers' Rights." Colum. JL
& Soc. Probs. 46 (2012): 329]RMT
interagency monitoring,” which would provide an ex
ante constraint on ICE to ensure that their immigration-enforcement actions do not interfere
with labor enforcement.118 Labor agencies such as DOL could be empowered “to monitor DHS to ensure
that immigration officials account for the labor consequences of their
enforcement decisions.”119 Such an approach would enhance accountability between the DHS and DOL.
This proposed system would specifically force ICE to take into consideration the effect of its actions
on labor violations: For much of its history, ICE has been largely insulated against meaningful oversight as
to its workplace enforcement decisions, enabling its officers to rely on tips, leads, and other
information without considering whether an investigation enables a bad-actor employer to
escape liability for labor violations or chills the reporting of labor violations by unauthorized workers.120 Since ICE does not internally
monitor the impact of its actions on worksite enforcement, “only by moving in the direction of an ex ante
constraint . . . that can be enforced by an external source . . . can any interagency arrangement hope to influence ICE.”121
Professor Lee’s proposal would require ICE to obtain permission from DOL before
investigating a workplace, and perform a pre-investigation check prior to
embarking on a civil in-vestigation .122 Such solutions could help balance the two agencies’ enforcement goals by giving DOL more
One innovative solution, proposed by Professor Stephen Lee, would create a system of “
power than it currently has to voice concerns when ICE conducts immigration enforcement at given workplaces.
The Stage is set—Obama’s executive order created a framework for
interagency cooperation
Gene T. Schaeffer, Jr. 14, a member of the Labor & Employment Practice Group, President Obama’s Executive Orders on
Immigration – Interagency Cooperation and DOL Initiatives, The National Law Review, November 24, 2014,
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/president-obama-s-executive-orders-immigration-interagency-cooperation-and-dol-initi
||RS
On November 20, 2014, President Obama announced a series of executive actions designed to
reduce the strain on the country’s immigration system. Many of these policies will have a direct effect on employers and the business
community and demonstrate that the increased
interagency cooperation and enforcement we have seen in recent
years will continue. The
President has ordered the creation of an interagency working group
consisting of U.S. Department of Labor ( DOL), U.S. Department of Homeland Security ( DHS ), U.S. Department of
Justice (DOJ), U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to
identify policies and procedures to promote the consistent enforcement of labor, employment and immigration laws. Two
of the
topics the working group will review include 1) promoting worker cooperation with enforcement
authorities without fear of retaliation based on immigration status, and 2) ensuring that
employers do not use federal agencies to undermine worker protection laws by introducing
immigration authorities into labor disputes. DOL’s interagency working group fact sheet is available here. This
interagency group appears to be ready to continue the DOL-DHS discussions that began with the signing in March 2011 of a
Memorandum of Understanding (which has since been revised) between those two agencies governing their coordination with
respect to their various civil enforcement activities and avoidance of conflicts.
2AC Labor Rights Backlines
2AC – Extension: Poverty Conflict Trap
Poverty – Conflict correlation is true and foreign stimulus is best for
stability
Patrick 7 - senior fellow and director of the Program on International Institutions and Global
Governance at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Prior to joining CFR, he directed the
Center for Global Development’s project on Weak States and U.S. National Security. [Stewart,
“‘Too Poor for Peace?’ Global Poverty, Conflict, and Security in the 21st Century”, Washington,
DC: Brookings Institution, 2007.
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ECSPReport13_Patrick.pdf]RMT
According to Berkeley economist Edward Miguel, “the poverty-violence link is arguably the most
robust finding in the growing research literature investigating the causes of civil wars” (p. 51).
But is poverty breeding violence, or vice versa? To answer this question, Miguel and two
colleagues employ an intriguing natural experiment: They analyze the impact of drought—a
purely exogenous economic shock that increases poverty—on state propensity for conflict in
Africa. Their findings are startling: “The size of the estimated impact of lagged economic growth
on conflict is huge,” Miguel writes, with a one percent decline in GDP “increasing the
likelihood of civil conflict by more than two percentage points” (pp. 54-56). In
contrast, they find little correlation between violent conflict and variables like political
repression, democratic freedom, ethnic fragmentation, colonial history, or population density.
In sum, “economic factors trump all others in causing African civil conflicts” (p. 55). Miguel
suggests that this robust finding has clear policy implications: Very little foreign aid, he
observes, addresses the immediate triggers of civil conflict. Donors could change this by
directing a significant proportion of external assistance toward helping countries cope with the
sharp income fluctuations created by exogenous shocks, such as poor weather or collapsing
commodity prices. By extending such insurance, the international community could help
remove support for rebel movements.
2AC – AT: Dutch Disease Turn
Dutch disease false and good—Canada proves job losses are replaced
by better jobs
Payton 13—CBC News (cites Stephen Gordon, Professor of Public Policy at Calgary) [Laura,
“'Dutch disease' builds healthier economy, economist says”, Sep 05, 2013,
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/dutch-disease-builds-healthier-economy-economist-says1.1339490]RMT
The concept behind "Dutch
disease" — the idea that a resource boom is bad for the manufacturing
sector — is entirely wrong , economist Stephen Gordon argues in a new report. Federal politicians have argued over Dutch disease as
part of the debate surrounding Canada's oilsands and whether development should be slowed. The argument says that a resource boom — like the one
seen in the oilsands — drives up the value of the currency, making exports more expensive for customers outside of Canada and costing manufacturers
some of their business. That can in turn cause layoffs in the manufacturing sector, the theory holds.But Gordon argues in a report released today by the
University of Calgary's School of Public Policy that job
and wage numbers from 2002 to 2008 tell a different story.
Job losses in the manufacturing sector were mainly due to attrition, he says. Workers quit and
weren't replaced, but the jobs that were lost — mainly through attrition — were lower-paying jobs. And
layoffs were in fact down compared to the 1990s, he writes. The companies were able to invest in more
equipment and research and development, because most of the equipment comes from outside
of Canada and cost less with the higher exchange rate. "The question becomes why are we calling it a disease," Gordon
said in an interview with CBC News. "Losing employment isn't a bad thing if the jobs that were lost were lowpaying and the jobs that replaced them elsewhere were higher-paying and more of them." In his
report, Gordon writes the number of jobs paying $35 per hour or more was largely unchanged between
2002 and 2008. More than 60 per cent of the manufacturing jobs lost paid less than $19.05/hour —
the median wage in 2002, the report said. " The shift out of manufacturing was also
accompanied by an increase in real wages, both in the economy as a whole and in the manufacturing sector.... The
term 'Dutch disease' is a misnomer; the Canadian manufacturing sector was arguably healthier
in 2008 than it was in 2002," Gordon wrote in the report.
Best data proves no Dutch disease—two sector economies and Norway
prove
Thorsud and Bjornland 13--†BI Norwegian Business School and Norges Bank.[Hilde
C. Bjørnland† Leif Anders Thorsrud‡“Boom or gloom? Examining the Dutch disease in a twospeed economy” August 13, 2013, This paper is part of the research activities at the Centre for
Applied Macro and Petroleum economics (CAMP) at the BI Norwegian Business School.
http://www.bi.edu/InstitutterFiles/Samfunns%C2%B0konomi/CAMP/Working_CAMP_62013.pdf ]RMT
Traditional studies of the Dutch disease do not typically account for productivity
spillovers between the booming energy sector and non-oil sectors . This study
identifies and quantifies these spillovers using a Bayesian Dynamic Factor Model (BDFM). The
model allows for resource movements and spending effects through a large panel of variables at the
sectoral level, while also identifying disturbances to the real oil price, global demand and non-oil activity.
Using Norway as a representative case study, we find that a booming energy sector has substantial
spillover effects on the non-oil sectors. Furthermore, windfall gains due to changes in the real oil price
also stimulates the economy, but primarily if the oil price increase is caused by global demand. Oil
price increases due to, say, supply disruptions, while stimulating activity in the technologically intense service sectors and boosting
government spending, have small spillover effects on the rest of the economy, primarily because of reduced cost
competitiveness. Yet, there is no evidence of Dutch disease . Instead, we find evidence
of a two-speed economy, with non-tradables growing at a much faster pace than tradables.
Our results suggest that traditional Dutch disease models with a fixed capital stock and
exogenous labor supply do not provide a convincing explanation for how petroleum wealth
affects a resource rich economy when there are productivity spillovers between sectors.
Dutch disease doesn’t hurt growth—meta studies and their evidence is
flawed
Magud and Sosa 11--Senior Economist at the International Monetary Fund, Senior
Economist in the European Department, IMF [Nicolas Magud, Sebastián Sosa “When and why
worry about real exchange-rate appreciation? The missing link between Dutch disease and
growth”, 15 March 2011, http://www.voxeu.org/article/why-worry-about-real-exchange-ratesmissing-link-between-dutch-disease-and-growth]RMT
In recent research (Magud and Sosa 2010), we examine whether the literature provides strong support
for concerns about the potential adverse effects of the Dutch disease on long-term growth. To this end,
we review over 60 papers on Dutch disease and on the relationship between the
real exchange-rate and growth . To make systematic comparisons of the papers’ results, we construct simple
indices to evaluate their partial and overall implications. In turn, the latter evidence is used to analyse the policy implications of
Dutch-disease shocks. We document that Dutch disease does exist. Shocks that trigger foreign exchange inflows (such as natural
resource booms, surges in capital inflows, foreign aid, remittances, etc.) lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate, generate
we do not find evidence
that Dutch disease reduces economic growth . We also find that real exchange-rate
misalignment – in particular when due to overvaluation – and higher volatility of the real exchange rate
lower growth. Regarding the effect of undervaluation of the exchange rate on economic growth,
the evidence is mixed and inconclusive. The figures below summarise the results. Most of the Dutch disease
empirical literature focuses on the impact of foreign exchange inflows (natural resource booms,
remittances, aid, etc.) on the real exchange rate and the reallocation of resources between the tradable
and non-tradable sectors but does not examine the effects on long-term growth and
does not analyse whether the adverse effects associated to Dutch disease offset the
beneficial effects of inflows. Research in this area has typically not attempted to directly
demonstrate the presence of spillovers or other growth-enhancing qualities in the tradable sector. Hence, the
evidence on the negative impact of Dutch disease on growth is still partial, and generally
inconclusive.
factor reallocation, and reduce manufacturing output and net exports. However, crucially,
2AC – AT: Corruption Turn
Best studies conclude remittances reduce corruption in context of the
migrant workers in the states
Tybruski 14 - Tulane University, Political Science Department, Department Member.
[Michael D., "Curse or Cure? Remittances and Corruption in the Developing World" (2014).
Theses and Dissertations. Paper]RMT
In contrast, I argue that the
relationship between remittances and corruption varies by regime type.
Remittances will likely aggravate corruption in authoritarian regimes where governments require smaller supporting coalitions and may be more
likely to view remittances as an opportunity to increase political patronage. Moreover, the costs of political activity are higher
for remittance recipients in authoritarian regimes, and their probability of influencing
corruption is lower. Remittances may help mitigate corruption, especially in
democratic regimes . Democratic institutions require larger coalitions while lowering the costs of participation. I test the
plausibility of my theory using cross-province level studies of Mexico and India-- two of the largest
remittance-receiving states . Results from these cases do suggest that remittances associate
with reductions in corruption while controlling for other socioeconomic and political
causes. A third, cross-national study tests the theory’s generality. Empirical analyses of panel data from 127
developing states between 2000 and 2010 generally support my expectations . This
research advances social science by refining theoretical implications of migrant
remittances while providing an empirical account of their political importance. Moreover, it guides
future projects to focus on the factors that make remittances a curse in some states and a cure in others.
2AC Cooperation Backlines
2AC – AT: ICE Raids Good/Alt Causes
Curtailing ICE enforcement is key – they perpetuate the institutional
racism present in civil society
Bill Ong Hing 9, Professor of Law at University of California, Institutional Racism, ICE Raids,
and
Immigration Reform, University of San Francisco Law Review, Fall 2009,
http://lawblog.usfca.edu/lawreview/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/5-SAN-44-2-Hing.pdf ||RS
The United Food and Commercial Workers (“UFCW”) Commission heard repeated testimony
about racial profiling. Witnesses testified that workers who appeared to be of Latino national
origin or minorities were singled out by ICE and subjected to the greatest scrutiny . John
Bowen, General Counsel for UFCW Local 7, said “race was, almost without question, the sole criteria for
harsher interrogations” to which the workers were subjected at the Greeley, Colorado plant.45 Fidencio Sandoval, a U.S.
citizen and Swift worker at the Grand Island, Nebraska, plant, recounted how he was treated differently by
ICE agents because he appeared to be Latino: When they said all the U.S. citizens come over to this place, I went up there and
I stood right by my boss. My boss showed his driver’s license and then he was free to go. I showed my driver’s license and my voting registration card
and that was not enough. [The ICE agent] said, no, you need either your passport or citizenship certificate.46 Eventually, he was able to produce his
documents, after his sister was able to go to his home, “break the window from my kitchen and go straight to my closet and get my citizen certificate.”47
Other U.S. citizen coworkers were not as fortunate. Those who did not have a way to prove their citizenship were arrested
and taken to Camp Dodge, located nearly 300 miles from Grand Island. Manuel Verdinez was one of those U.S. citizen
workers from the Marshalltown plant who was detained, arrested, handcuffed, and taken into custody. “I said I
was a U.S. citizen, and then the [ICE] agent started scratching my ID. The agent . . . said they could not find my
status. They put plastic cuffs around my wrists and put all of my belongings into a plastic bag.”48 After twelve hours in detention,
“they found my record . . . and said they had made a mistake. Then [the ICE agent] finally took off
my handcuffs . . . [t]hey called a cab for me and I had to pay $90 for the cab ride back.”49 ICE
raids and increased enforcement are poisoning communities, spawning scores of
state and local anti-immigrant laws and ordinances that target Latinos. All of this
increases discrimination. According to Sam Zamarripa, president of the Board of Directors of the Georgia Association of Latino Elected
Officials and a former State Senator in Georgia, these policies are led and advanced by white supremacist
organizations.50
ICE raids represent the worst form of psychological trauma for
children – only the plan curtails ICE power
Bill Ong Hing 9, Professor of Law at University of California, Institutional Racism, ICE Raids,
and
Immigration Reform, University of San Francisco Law Review, Fall 2009,
http://lawblog.usfca.edu/lawreview/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/5-SAN-44-2-Hing.pdf ||RS
Family separation and the special damage to children have been particularly tragic
consequences of the ICE raids.57 Most of the children impacted by raids were U.S. citizens and most
were very young— about two-thirds were under ten and about one-third were under age five.58 In three sites studied by
the National Council of La Raza, researchers found that “families and relatives scramble[d] to
rearrange care, children spent at least one night without a parent, often in the care of a relative or nonrelative babysitter, in some cases neighbors and in some cases even landlords; some children were cared for by extended families for
weeks and months.”59
Families directly affected by the raid also suffered economic hardship and
financial instability that “creates conditions that are detrimental to children’s development.”60
The National Council of La Raza study also analyzed the emotional and mental side effects upon children. While the long-term
effects of the raids are still unraveling, psychologists
have already observed and are concerned about longterm depression and other mental illness in family members. The report found that younger children
translated the temporary parental absence as abandonment. One parent reported that her child feared that
her father “love[s] money more than he loves me.”61 According to Dr. Amaro Laria, Director of the Lucero Latino
Mental Health Training Program at the Massachusetts School of Professional Psychology and faculty of the psychiatry
department at Harvard Medical School, “[o]ne of the most well established facts in mental
health is that abrupt separation of children from their parents, particularly their mothers, are among the
most severely traumatic experiences that a child can undergo.”62 He testified that in the case of the raid, the
“traumatic separations [were] perpetrated and sanctioned by our nation’s law enforcement
agencies, ironically in the name of protecting citizens.”63 In his opinion, ICE had engaged in terrorism
against these families and children . Dr. Laria told the Commission about a young girl, Deanna, who said, “she
wanted to kill herself because her mother had abandoned her.”64 Dr. Laria also testified about a girl who called 911 looking for her
mother and a young “desperate father, who, after his wife was imprisoned, had to rush their infant daughter to the emergency room
with severe dehydration because she hadn’t been breastfed for days.”65
ICE raids foist severe damage on communities – the plan is key
Bill Ong Hing 9, Professor of Law at University of California, Institutional Racism, ICE Raids,
and
Immigration Reform, University of San Francisco Law Review, Fall 2009,
http://lawblog.usfca.edu/lawreview/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/5-SAN-44-2-Hing.pdf ||RS
ICE raids and increased enforcement have caused severe social
and civic damage and major setbacks for many communities . In Iowa, communities
had developed several successful initiatives designed to stimulate the assimilation of immigrants
into the fabric of the communities where they resided. Great progress toward integration and understanding had
taken place in Marshalltown.66 But the ICE raid undid much of that progress . The raid had
given some members of the community “a justification for discriminating against all immigrants,
E. Damage to Communities
documented or not.”67 Raids also hurt local economies. Jorge Avellanada, city council member and a business leader in Chelsea,
Massachusetts, told the Commission that the raids resulted in a thirty percent decline in sales due in part to the fear that workers
had about going to work, shopping, or going about their normal business.68 The negative ramifications of the raids on communities
manifest themselves in other ways. Increased
enforcement and high profile military-style raids have
resulted in the immigrant community being afraid to report abuse or crime for fear of being turned over
to ICE.69
2AC – AT: Police Community Relations High
Latino – Police relations are very low - surveys
Brenda Gazzar 14, reporter, 12-28-2014, "Latino distrust of law enforcement runs
high in national survey," Los Angeles Daily News, http://www.dailynews.com/governmentand-politics/20141228/latino-distrust-of-law-enforcement-runs-high-in-national-survey ||RS
Miguel Hernandez can’t think of any friends or family offhand who have suffered from police
brutality. But he does worry about excessive force by police against Latinos in general.
“You
see it a lot, unfortunately, on Facebook,” the 42-year-old Highland Park resident, who works as a
taking things too far, where officers are
crossing the line .” While a vast majority (84 percent) of Latino adults nationwide believe local police are there to protect
them and their families, 18 percent said they have friends or family who were victims of police brutality
and more than two-thirds worry that law enforcement will use excess force against Latinos,
according to the W.K. Kellogg Foundation’s “State of the Latino Family” survey of about 1,000
Latino adults. The survey’s results were released last month. “It reminds us that we’ve still got a long way to
go in terms of the relationship between communities and law enforcement, and we need to be very
loan officer in the San Fernando Valley, said. “ Cops
intentional about improving skills and capacities for better relationships at the community level,” said Gail Christopher, vice
president for policy and senior adviser at the W.K. Kellogg Foundation. “We saw that in Ferguson, and I think it’s true with Latino
young people in general.” There
were other signs of distrust. Thirty-seven percent of survey
respondents, which also included some undocumented and legal permanent residents, said that local police, border
patrol and other law enforcement authorities “usually treated Latinos unfairly,” while 28 percent said
they “were sometimes treated fairly.” Thomas A. Saenz, president and general counsel of the Mexican American Legal Defense and
Educational Fund and a San Gabriel Valley resident, believes that a worrisome national context is contributing to this distrust,
including the prominence of figures like Arizona’s Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio. A federal district court ruled last year that
Arpaio violated the U.S. Constitution by using racial profiling as well as illegal detentions that targeted Latinos. Latinos’ views of law
enforcement are also likely colored by Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070, which was signed into law in 2010 and requires police to
determine the immigration status of someone arrested or detained when there’s “reasonable suspicion” that he or she is
undocumented, Saenz said. Similar laws that “invite racial profiling” have been passed in five other states and have all been
challenged, he said. More recently, the Obama administration reissued guidelines about racial profiling that retain an exception in
areas within 100 miles of an international border or ocean, where there are large numbers of Latinos, he said. “These
are
national issues, not California-specific, that get a lot of media attention,” Saenz said. “I think that even for
a state that is more progressive like California, it can contribute to distrust of law enforcement.” Among the survey’s
respondents who would change something about their police department, 16 percent said they
wanted better community policing, 12 percent said they wanted it to treat people with respect,
and 12 percent said they wanted it to stop discrimination and racism. Six percent said they
wanted their department to stop abuse/violence against the public. In Los Angeles, Latino-police
relations reached a low point in 2007 after officers used batons and rubber bullets to disperse a mostly peaceful
gathering at a May Day immigrant rights rally at MacArthur Park. The incident, which resulted in more than 250 reported injuries,
was prompted by a small group of protesters throwing bottles and other objects, according to authorities. An LAPD Police
Commission report faulted inadequate planning and tactical failures for the melee. Activists say that LAPD has made significant
headway in improving relations with Latinos in recent years. They cite a series of community-outreach efforts and the July
announcement that LAPD will no longer honor most federal requests to detain undocumented immigrants arrested for minor
offenses so that they can be deported. But Xiomara Corpeno, director of community education for the Coalition for Humane
Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles, said there are still some officers who abuse their badge by using intimidation tactics, such as
making comments about someone’s race or immigration status, with street vendors or young men of color in their neighborhoods.
”The main thing is how do we get rank-and-file police officers to act according to their own internal regulations?” she said. “LAPD
regulations say they’re not supposed to be harassing people based on immigration status.” LAPD Lt. Alfred Labrada, the Latino
outreach liaison for Police Chief Charlie Beck, said any inappropriate actions or comments about immigration status that are
reported are thoroughly investigated. “If there is an allegation of misconduct, we will act accordingly and take action especially if we
Sometimes the immigrant community will confuse their police
agency with Immigration and Customs Enforcement or another law enforcement
find it to be true,” he said.
entity, which can distort one’s view , Labrada said. In addition, many Latino immigrants came
from authoritarian regimes where they cannot report inappropriate incidents, which can lead to
a similar but misplaced distrust of police here, he said.
2AC Topicality
2AC – T Surveillance
We Meet – the plan restricts information collecting on immigrants–
that’s surveillance
Ellen Nakashima 14, a national security reporter for the Washington Post, 2-18-2014,
"Homeland Security is seeking a national license plate tracking system," Washington Post,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/homeland-security-is-seeking-anational-license-plate-tracking-system/2014/02/18/56474ae8-9816-11e3-9616d367fa6ea99b_story.html |RS
The national license-plate recognition database, which would draw data from readers that scan the tags of every vehicle crossing
their paths, would help catch fugitive illegal immigrants , according to a DHS solicitation. But the
database could easily contain more than 1 billion records and could be shared with other law enforcement agencies, raising concerns
that the movements of ordinary citizens who are under no criminal suspicion could be scrutinized. A
spokeswoman for
DHS’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency ( ICE ) stressed that the database “could only be
accessed in conjunction with ongoing criminal investigations or to locate wanted individuals.” The database would
enhance agents’ and officers’ ability to locate suspects who could pose a threat to public safety
and would reduce the time required to conduct surveillance , ICE spokeswoman Gillian Christensen said.
We meet - ICE conducts raids include 24 hour surveillance
Brianna Lee 15, IBT writer who covers U.S. immigration and Latin America, 6-19-2015, "The
Expensive Business Of Immigration Detention In The U.S.," International Business Times,
http://www.ibtimes.com/expensive-business-immigration-detention-us-1685018 ||RS
Family detention, and immigrant detention in general, have long been targets of criticism from human rights advocates who say the U.S. government
detention beds are
reserved for unauthorized immigrants who pose the greatest risks to public security. But ICE has
often detained lower-risk immigrants: a 2009 ICE report stated that the majority of immigrant detainees were considered to have
has defaulted to a prison model for unauthorized immigrants, including those without criminal convictions. In theory,
a “low propensity for violence.” In the case of family detentions, the rationale is less rooted in public security concerns and more on the government’s
desire to ensure that immigrants appear at their court hearings. The family detention center in Artesia, New Mexico, has been a particular sticking
point for immigrants’ rights advocates; a coalition of civil rights groups filed a lawsuit against the federal government last month over what they said
were abhorrent conditions and lack of due process for immigrants there. But detention is also expensive, costing an estimated $164 a day per detainee.
A large chunk of that money goes to the private prison companies that operate more than half of the immigrant detention beds around the country.
With at least 34,000 immigrants in detention every day, this cost amounts to more than $2 billion in taxpayer funds every year. Meanwhile, the U.S.
has another cheaper option that is readily available, at a maximum cost of just $17 a day per person. Alternative-to-detention
(ATD)
programs have been a part of ICE’s operations for several years. These programs generally
require no full-time facility or 24-hour surveillance; immigrants are supervised by case managers
through period check-ins and, at times, unannounced home visits. One ATD program involves the use of
electronic ankle monitors to track immigrants’ whereabouts, a method that has faced some backlash from advocacy groups. Several non-profits around
the country run ATD programs of their own, providing supervision and care for immigrants awaiting deportation hearings. These programs are
estimated to cost anywhere between 17 cents to $17 a day per person.
Counter interpretation – surveillance is data collection
Verri 14 – Gabriela Jahn Verri, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, “GOVERNMENT
AND CORPORATIVE INTERNET SURVEILLANCE”, World Summit on the Information Society
Forum, http://www.ufrgs.br/ufrgsmun/2014/files/WSI1.pdf
David Lyon describes governmental and corporative surveillance as the “focused, systematic,
and routine attention to personal details for purposes of influence, management, protection, or
direction” (Lyon 2007, 14). The most common form this practice takes in the context of
information and communication technologies (hereinafter ICT) is still so-called data
surveillance, which implies the collection and retention of information about an “identifiable
individual”, often from multiple sources3, which help recognize multiple activities and establish
a pattern of behavior in both the virtual and material realms (Stanley & Steinhardt 2003, 3).
Although less common and fairly recent, institutional Internet surveillance may also acquire the
shape of media surveillance, done by means of – recognized or ignored – image (still or video)
and sound hoarding through a subject’s personal apparatus such as private webcams and
microphones, as well as screen-recording (RWB 2013, 9-33; Stanley & Steinhardt 2003, 2-4)4.
Prefer –
No bright line – no evidentiary distinction between routine and
repetitive raids – contrived interps are bad since they skew debate to
the neg since they can always construct a violation to bracket out the
aff
Overlimits – excludes drug testing, aeriel surveillance, and stop and
frisk – they force us to only debate the snowden revelations.
No ground loss and limits explosion– core generics, substantial,
federal, and domestic check.
Reasonability – competing interpretations creates a race to the
bottom which crowds out substance
2AC - T Domestic
We meet- Domestic” surveillance is defined by the target---the subject
of surveillance must be U.S. persons
Donohue 6 – Laura K. Donohue, Fellow, Center for International Security and Cooperation,
Stanford University, “ANGLO-AMERICAN PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE”, Journal of
Criminal Law & Criminology, Spring, 96 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1059, Lexis
5. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
As the extent of the domestic surveillance operations emerged, Congress attempted to scale back
the Executive's power while leaving some flexibility to address national security threats. n183 The
legislature focused on the targets of surveillance, limiting a new law to foreign powers, and
agents of foreign powers - which included groups "engaged in international terrorism or
activities in preparation therefor." n184 Congress distinguished between U.S. and nonU.S. persons , creating tougher standards for the former. n185
[FOOTNOTE]
n185. The former included citizens and resident aliens, as well incorporated entities and
unincorporated associations with a substantial number of U.S. persons. Non-U.S. persons
qualified as an "agent of a foreign power" by virtue of membership - e.g., if they were an officer
or employee of a foreign power, or if they participated in an international terrorist organization.
Id. 1801(i). U.S. persons had to engage knowingly in the collection of intelligence contrary to
U.S. interests, the assumption of false identity for the benefit of a foreign power, and aiding or
abetting others to the same. Id. 1801(b).
[END FOOTNOTE]
Counter interpretation - “Domestic surveillance” refers to targets that
are within the U.S.---this is the most accurate and historically
grounded interpretation and vital to precise topic education
Wainstein 7 – Kenneth L. Wainstein, Assistant Attorney General for National Security on
FISA Modernization at the Georgetown University Law Center’s National Security Center,
Prepared Remarks at the Department of Justice, 9-10,
http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2007/September/07_nsd_699.html
This conference is a great idea. It gives us an opportunity to share thoughts about where our
surveillance authorities should be -- how the powers should be defined and where the lines
should be drawn. And the line I’d like to talk about today is the line between domestic surveillance
and overseas surveillance – how the law should distinguish between those two areas of surveillance
and how much each area should be subject to judicial review.
There is no question that we should have to get court orders when we want to collect domestic
communications or target individuals within the U.S. The question for today is whether we should
have to do so when we are targeting surveillance against a person who is outside the United States,
where constitutional and privacy protections do not apply.
And, this is not a discussion with only legal or theoretical implications. There are very practical,
operational implications here -- implications that will dictate whether we have sufficient
coverage overseas or only narrow coverage of our foreign adversaries; whether we can move nimbly
and quickly among overseas coverages, or whether we have to go through a resource-consuming
court approval process before we go up on one of our adversaries.
In considering this issue, it’s useful to look back at the history and the evolution of our surveillance
laws. And, when you do that you see that this is a recurring theme . There have been a number of
major turning points in the law along the way, and at each of these turning points, we’ve seen the
repetition and reinforcement of this fundamental distinction between foreign and
domestic surveillance -- a distinction that finds its origins in the Constitutional balancing between
executive authority to take efforts to protect the nation against external threats and the judiciary’s
authority to protect privacy interests.
You can see this consistent theme as you go back through the evolution of the law. The first
turning point in the development of our surveillance law came in the 1960s. In 1967, the
Supreme Court held that telephone conversations were protected by the Fourth Amendment.
The next year, Congress responded to the Court’s decision by passing the wiretap statute that
established a procedure by which the government had to secure a court-issued warrant before
wiretapping the subject of a criminal investigation.
While both the Supreme Court decision and the ensuing legislation were clear on the need for a
warrant requirement when the government was wiretapping a person in the United States for
purposes of a criminal investigation, both the Court and Congress were very careful to carve out
surveillances for national security purposes. They made it clear that domestic surveillance for
evidence in a criminal case was covered by the warrant requirement, but that national security
surveillance involving foreign threats was not.
The next turning point came a decade later, when Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, which imposed a court review mechanism for electronic surveillance designed
to collect foreign intelligence information. We came to this juncture after it was disclosed in the
Church and Pike Hearings that the government had abused its flexibility in the area of national
security investigations to investigate domestic persons who had no connection to a foreign
power. After those disclosures, Congress and the country were understandably looking for a way
to ensure that the executive branch could no longer invade their privacy under the guise of
protecting against foreign threats. The result was legislation that subjected our foreign
intelligence surveillances to court review.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) was passed in 1978, and it created a regime of
court approval for national security surveillances. However, once again, Congress reinforced the
distinction between domestic and foreign surveillance. Congress designed a judicial review
process that would apply primarily to surveillance activities within the United States where
privacy interests are the most pronounced and not to overseas surveillance where privacy
interests are minimal or non-existent. Congress gave effect to this careful balancing through its
definition of the statutory term “electronic surveillance,” the term that identifies those
government activities that fall within the scope of the statute and, by implication, those that fall
outside it. Congress established this dichotomy by defining “electronic surveillance” by reference
to the manner of the communication under surveillance -- by distinguishing between “wire”
communications -- which included most of the local and domestic traffic in 1978 -- and “radio”
communications -- which included most of the transoceanic traffic in that era.
Based on the communications reality of that time, that dichotomy more or less accomplished the
Congressional purpose, as it distinguished between domestic communications that generally fell
within FISA and foreign international communications that generally did not.
But, that finely-balanced distinction has eroded with the dramatic changes in communications
technology in the 29 years since FISA was enacted. In that time, we’ve seen the migration of the
majority of international communications from satellite transmission (which qualified as “radio”
communications under the statute) over to fiber-optic cable (which is “wire” under the statute);
and, as a result, we’ve seen the tipping of that careful balance in the FISA statute. As the
technology evolved further and further away from the paradigm established in the statute, we
had to subject more and more of our overseas collections to review by the FISA Court.
So we had a situation where, on one hand, we have this technological change making it more
difficult for us to surveil overseas threats. And on the other, we have the backdrop of an
increasing national security threat from international terrorism -- from terrorists who had hit us
hard on 9/11; who were bent on inflicting catastrophic damage to us and our allies; who were
taking full advantage of modern modes of communication to organize and command their
international network of terrorist operatives; and who have continued to show resiliency and a
determination about their work -- as reflected quite clearly in the disruption last week of a largescale terrorist plot in Germany, and also as reflected in the recently-issued National Intelligence
Estimate.
And it is the combination of these two historical trends -- the changing technology that
handicapped our efforts to surveil our adversaries and the increasing threat posed by those
adversaries -- that produced the turning point we came to this year.
And, this is the turning point that Congress addressed last month when they passed the Protect
America Act. The legislation was very straight-forward but very effective. In short, it returned FISA to its
original focus on domestic surveillance. And it did that by making it clear that -- regardless of the
type of communication being surveilled or the location where the surveillance takes
place -- FISA does not apply when the surveillance is targeting persons outside the United
States . It does apply – and we have to get a court order – when the communications are domestic or
when we target someone in the U.S. But, when the target is truly foreign , when we’re targeting
someone in another country , we don’t need to go through the FISA Court.
Prefer our interpretation:
Education about immigration is important
The Leadership Conference no date –The Leadership Conference on Civil and
Human Rights (The Leadership Conference), formerly called the Leadership Conference on Civil
Rights, is an umbrella group of American civil rights interest groups.[1][2]
Beginning in 1950 with 30 organizations, mostly civil rights and labor groups, now more than
200 national organizations that comprise The Leadership Conference.[The Leadership
Conference “Why You Should Care About Immigration”
http://www.civilrights.org/immigration/care.html?referrer=https://www.google.com/]RMT
Immigration policy affects all aspects of society. Regardless of status, immigrants have
always played a central role in the life and growth of our nation. Immigrants contribute $10
billion a year to this country's economic growth. Unfortunately, in the wake of September 11
terrorist attacks, immigrants in the United States have increasingly been targets of
discrimination and suspicion. Our country must be defended, but one must not forget this
nation's commitment to the ideals of equality and freedom for all peoples. The
Palmer Raids, the McCarran-Walter Act, the Chinese Exclusion Act, and Japanese internment
all serve as painful reminders of how our overreactions can have drastic implications
for the civil rights of those who are not perceived as being fully "American."
Predictability – they justify restricting surveillance on citizens abroad
or traitors seeking asylum
Overlimiting – all immigration, incoming foreigners, and espionage
affs are excluded.
Precision - “Domestic surveillance” refers to targets that are within
the U.S.---this is the most accurate and historically grounded
interpretation and vital to precise topic education
Wainstein 7 – Kenneth L. Wainstein, Assistant Attorney General for National Security on
FISA Modernization at the Georgetown University Law Center’s National Security Center,
Prepared Remarks at the Department of Justice, 9-10,
http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2007/September/07_nsd_699.html
This conference is a great idea. It gives us an opportunity to share thoughts about where our surveillance authorities should be -how the powers should be defined and where the lines should be drawn. And the line I’d like to talk about today is the
line between domestic surveillance and overseas surveillance – how the law should distinguish
between those two areas of surveillance and how much each area should be subject to judicial review. There is no question
that we should have to get court orders when we want to collect domestic communications or target
individuals within the U.S. The question for today is whether we should have to do so when we are
targeting surveillance against a person who is outside the United States , where constitutional and privacy
protections do not apply. And, this is not a discussion with only legal or theoretical implications. There are
very practical, operational implications here -- implications that will dictate whether we have
sufficient coverage overseas or only narrow coverage of our foreign adversaries; whether we can move nimbly
and quickly among overseas coverages, or whether we have to go through a resource-consuming court approval process before we go
up on one of our adversaries. In considering this issue,
it’s useful to look back at the history and the
evolution of our surveillance laws. And, when you do that you see that this is a recurring theme . There
have been a number of major turning points in the law along the way, and at each of these turning points,
we’ve seen the repetition and reinforcement of this fundamental distinction between
foreign and domestic surveillance -- a distinction that finds its origins in the Constitutional
balancing between executive authority to take efforts to protect the nation against external threats and the
judiciary’s authority to protect privacy interests. You can see this consistent theme as you go back through the evolution
of the law. The first turning point in the development of our surveillance law came in the 1960s. In 1967, the Supreme Court held
that telephone conversations were protected by the Fourth Amendment. The next year, Congress responded to the Court’s decision
by passing the wiretap statute that established a procedure by which the government had to secure a court-issued warrant before
wiretapping the subject of a criminal investigation. While both the Supreme Court decision and the ensuing legislation were clear on
the need for a warrant requirement when the government was wiretapping a person in the United States for purposes of a criminal
investigation, both the Court and Congress were very careful to carve out surveillances for national security purposes. They made it
clear that domestic surveillance for evidence in a criminal case was covered by the warrant requirement, but that national security
surveillance involving foreign threats was not. The next turning point came a decade later, when Congress passed the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, which imposed a court review mechanism for electronic surveillance designed to collect foreign
intelligence information. We came to this juncture after it was disclosed in the Church and Pike Hearings that the government had
abused its flexibility in the area of national security investigations to investigate domestic persons who had no connection to a
foreign power. After those disclosures, Congress and the country were understandably looking for a way to ensure that the executive
branch could no longer invade their privacy under the guise of protecting against foreign threats. The result was legislation that
subjected our foreign intelligence surveillances to court review. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) was passed in 1978,
and it created a regime of court approval for national security surveillances. However, once again, Congress reinforced the
distinction between domestic and foreign surveillance. Congress designed a judicial review process that would apply primarily to
surveillance activities within the United States where privacy interests are the most pronounced and not to overseas surveillance
where privacy interests are minimal or non-existent. Congress gave effect to this careful balancing through its definition of the
statutory term “electronic surveillance,” the term that identifies those government activities that fall within the scope of the statute
and, by implication, those that fall outside it. Congress established this dichotomy by defining “electronic surveillance” by reference
to the manner of the communication under surveillance -- by distinguishing between “wire” communications -- which included most
of the local and domestic traffic in 1978 -- and “radio” communications -- which included most of the transoceanic traffic in that era.
Based on the communications reality of that time, that dichotomy more or less accomplished the Congressional purpose, as it
distinguished between domestic communications that generally fell within FISA and foreign international communications that
generally did not. But, that finely-balanced distinction has eroded with the dramatic changes in communications technology in the
29 years since FISA was enacted. In that time, we’ve seen the migration of the majority of international communications from
satellite transmission (which qualified as “radio” communications under the statute) over to fiber-optic cable (which is “wire” under
the statute); and, as a result, we’ve seen the tipping of that careful balance in the FISA statute. As the technology evolved further and
further away from the paradigm established in the statute, we had to subject more and more of our overseas collections to review by
the FISA Court. So we had a situation where, on one hand, we have this technological change making it more difficult for us to
surveil overseas threats. And on the other, we have the backdrop of an increasing national security threat from international
terrorism -- from terrorists who had hit us hard on 9/11; who were bent on inflicting catastrophic damage to us and our allies; who
were taking full advantage of modern modes of communication to organize and command their international network of terrorist
operatives; and who have continued to show resiliency and a determination about their work -- as reflected quite clearly in the
disruption last week of a large-scale terrorist plot in Germany, and also as reflected in the recently-issued National Intelligence
Estimate. And it is the combination of these two historical trends -- the changing technology that handicapped our efforts to surveil
our adversaries and the increasing threat posed by those adversaries -- that produced the turning point we came to this year. And,
this is the turning point that Congress addressed last month when they passed the Protect America Act. The legislation
was very straight-forward but very effective. In short, it returned FISA to its original focus on domestic
surveillance. And it did that by making it clear that -- regardless of the type of communication
being surveilled or the location where the surveillance takes place -- FISA does not
apply when the surveillance is targeting persons outside the United States . It does apply – and
we have to get a court order – when the communications are
domestic or when we target someone in the U.S.
But, when the target is truly foreign , when we’re targeting someone in another country , we
don’t need to go through the FISA Court.
No limits explosion – substantial, circumvention, and solvency
advocates check
Reasonability is best – competing interps creates a race to the bottom
that crowds out substance
2AC Counterplans
2AC - Courts CP
Permutation do both – courts shield the link
Restricting legal authority doesn’t stop the DHS
Kalhan 13--Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University. A.B., Brown University; M.P.P.M.,
Yale School of Management; J.D., Yale Law School.[Anil, “Immigration Policing and Federalism
Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance, and Privacy”, (August 6, 2013). Ohio State Law
Journal, Vol. 74, 2013; Drexel University School of Law Research Paper No. 2013-A-05.
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2316327]RMT
In the wake of these controversies, the
legal authority for Secure Communities has remained unclear . No
statute unquestionably authorizes the program or mandates state and local
participation, and no regulations specifically govern its operations.107 In addition to appropriations legislation,
DHS has cited the general provision authorizing the Attorney General to maintain and
disseminate crime-related records—the same general provision under which the FBI has issued
regulations governing the NCIC and IAFIS— and a provision in the Visa Reform Act of 2002 directing the federal government
to make its database systems interoperable and “readily and easily accessible” to federal immigration officials “responsible for determining an alien’s
admissibility . . . or deportability.”108 However, the
authority cited by DHS is not unambiguous. The Attorney
General’s general criminal recordkeeping authority—whose “very general nature” long had
prompted the FBI to act “cautiously” in how it maintained and disseminated state and local records in its possession—limits
sharing of those records to “authorized” federal officials, leaving unanswered the extent of any
authority to disseminate FBI-maintained fingerprint records to DHS.109 Moreover, while the Visa
Reform Act seems to clearly authorize access to FBI records when immigration or consular officials
need to make particular decisions about visa issuance, admissibility, or deportability, it is less clear that the
provision authorizes the routine bulk transmission to DHS of all state and local identification
records in its possession—on an ongoing basis as it receives them—of both U.S. citizens and
noncitizens in the absence of specific, pending immigration-related decisions for which DHS needs that
information. Other provisions in the same statute direct the President to place limits on the use and dissemination of the information shared by federal
law enforcement agencies with immigration officials, including mechanisms “to ensure that such information is used solely to determine whether to
issue a visa to an alien or to determine the admissibility or deportability of an alien to the United States” and “to protect any privacy rights of
individuals who are subjects of such information.”110 While
these provisions specify no programmatic details, they
do indicate that Congress appropriately intended for information sharing to be carefully
limited—quite possibly only for purposes of discrete, pending, immigration-related decisions
involving particular individuals.
Courts fail – Regulatory Agencies key
Chen 12--Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School [Ming Hsu, Where You
Stand Depends on Where You Sit: Bureaucratic Incorporation of Immigrants in Federal
Workplace Agencies (March 9, 2012). Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law, 2012; U
of Colorado Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-03. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2019181 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2019181]
“Immigrant
incorporation” refers to the inclusion of noncitizens into society and can occur along
economic, social, political, and cultural dimensions.67 It speaks to the mechanisms that bring someone into full
membership in a community, a topic of growing interest among immigration scholars across academic disciplines.68 The social
science literature on immigrant incorporation focuses on institutions as a key component of the immigrant-receiving society, namely
the United States, and attempts to unpack the processes by which immigrants are absorbed into that society.69 While scholars
studying immigrant incorporation traditionally focused on non-state institutions such as civic
organizations,70 unions and worker groups,71 interest groups,72 and social movement organizations,73 increasing
interdisciplinary attention is being paid to government institutions as sites of immigrant
incorporation.74 An emerging body of scholarship turns to bureaucracies as sites of immigrant
incorporation and to the important role that they play in policy implementation.75 The attention to bureaucracies
partly reflects scholarly recognition that formal legal status is disaggregated into a bundle of
rights.76 The rights within that bundle can also be reordered; that is, the grant of formal legal status that accompanies political
incorporation of immigrants need not precede social or economic rights for immigrants. In some circumstances, economic
rights or social rights provide the foundation for subsequent belonging, and so the rights of membership
for noncitizens can follow the extension of social and economic rights. For example, rights in the workplace have
proved to be an important precursor for immigrants’ full membership in the broader
community.77 At least on the books, workplace protections protect all workers from unsafe
conditions, unfair wages, and discrimination on the basis of statutorily
enumerated classe s.78 Theorists of bureaucratic incorporation suggest that one alternative
to relying on Congress or courts to protect immigrant workers is looking to
regulatory agencies charged with enforcing labor and employment laws. More specifically,
bureaucracy scholars seek to explain the behaviors of civil servants and street-level bureaucrats
working to enforce statutes and case law and to implement administrative policies in their daily work.79 Many everyday law
enforcement tasks occur in agencies vested with responsibility to implement statutes that call on
exercises of bureaucratic discretion and expertise. In the open spaces and ambiguities
within these laws, agencies must set their own priorities. Scholars in political science and
administrative law have long written about the central place of discretion in policy implementation80 although only recently in the
immigrant context.81 Bureaucratic discretion results from a confluence of factors, including public-spiritedness, an ethic of
professionalism, rational self-interest, and political control exerted by elected leadership.82 In the context of regulatory agencies
with mandates to enforce specific statutes, the tension between politics and legal professionalism provides a focal point for
understanding the motivations of career civil servants. These conflicts frequently arise when agencies share “regulatory space.”83
Shared regulatory space can take the form of overlapping agency functions; related jurisdictional assignments; interacting
jurisdictional assignments; and delegations requiring concurrence. Similar conflicts
can also exist within agencies
that must advance multiple goals or that are tasked with enforcing multiple statutes in tension
with one another.84 In each scenario, how to do “the right thing” is not clear: bureaucrats must engage in statutory
interpretation when exercising discretion and implementing their competing mandates.
Court rulings irrelevant – they defer to agency interpretation
Cox 8 - Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School. [Adam B,
“DEFERENCE, DELEGATION AND IMMIGRATION LAW” THE LAW SCHOOL THE
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, February 2008,
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1085&context=public_law_a
nd_legal_theory]RMT
The history of immigration jurisprudence is a history of obsession with judicial deference. The
foundational doctrine of constitutional immigration law—the “plenary power” doctrine—is
centrally concerned with such deference.1 Under the doctrine’s earliest incarnation, the
Supreme Court treated a challenge to a federal immigration policy excluding Chinese
immigrants as nearly nonjusticiable, writing that the federal government’s decisions about how
to regulate immigration were “conclusive upon the judiciary.”2 Even in the modern
constitutional era, the Supreme Court has invoked the plenary power to justify watered-down
review of gender classifications in the immigration code.3 And some lower courts have
suggested that the plenary power precludes any judicial scrutiny of immigration decisions
affecting arriving immigrants. 4 This century-old doctrine has been augmented by developments
in administrative law that often obligate judges to defer to agencies’ factual and legal judgments.
The Chevron doctrine is perhaps the bestknown strand of these developments. Under Chevron,
courts must defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory
provisions, even if the court disagrees with those interpretations.5 Sister doctrines in
administrative law counsel courts to defer to factual determinations by agencies as well. Taken
together, these constitutional traditions and administrative law trends would appear to make it
inevitable that federal courts will passively accept administrative judgments on
immigration matters.
Warranted ICE raids are bad – the counterplan still allows for data
collection which can authorize warranted invasions – those chill
community participation and undermine labor rights
Doesn’t solve workplace raids – 4th amendment precedent is based on
rights of citizens in the home, not at work
2AC – Bioterror CP
Permutation do both
CP doesn’t solve Eric Merriam 14, Lieutenant Colonel at the United States Air Force, June 2014, The International Legal Regime Affecting
Bioterrorism Prevention, National Security Law Journal, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2478444 ||RS
there exists no independent verification
mechanism in the biological weapons arena. Without a verification mechanism, states
and non-state actors alike can act with relative impunity, so long as their activities remain relatively hidden from
international scrutiny. The political and practical difficulties of verification in the bioweapons arena
make it unlikely a comprehensive verification scheme will be implemented in the foreseeable
future. Unfortunately, there is little political will among some of the major players -- importantly,
the United States -- for creating a verification mechanism. The United States' stated basis for opposing a
As discussed above, unlike the nuclear and chemical weapons arenas,
verification mechanism is that it is unlikely to expose illicit activities, a claim with substantial merit given dual use problems and difficulty in locating
biological activity without a state's assistance. However, the
likely real primary basis for the United States' position is
the objection of the United States pharmaceutical industry, based on concerns over trade 34
secrets, industrial espionage, and commercial restrictions. Whether these fears are justified, especially in light of the
chemical industry's ability to create a workable verification mechanism under the CWC under which companies protect trade secrets, is in large part
immaterial, so long as
the United States continues to oppose a verification mechanism. Practical
verification difficulties inherent in the area of biological agents also exist. As alluded to
elsewhere in this article, it is difficult to create a verification regime when any nation with a
developed pharmaceutical industry has the potential to make biological weapons.94 Further, because
biological agents can be readily multiplied, it is unnecessary to produce or store agents in large quantities.95 As a result, a biological warfare program
does not require large production sites or storage sites.96
Threats are unpredictable – preparedness assumes we know what
threats exist to be prepared for – only community cooperation
provides the vital information
Commitment is a major solvency deficit
Chatam House 14, King’s College London, 11/5/14, UNSCR 1540 Ten Years On:
Challenges and Opportunities, International Security Department Meeting Summary,
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/UNSCR%2015
40-summary.pdf ||RS
Adopting appropriate national laws is a vital aspect of adherence to the requirements of UNSCR
1540, though this can be challenging for states . The consensus at the conference was that while there is no
‘onesize-fits-all’ approach, legislative guides such as that prepared by VERTIC can provide a useful baseline for states
needing to build legislation regarding non-proliferation controls.4 Questions remain regarding to the scope and
nature of the legislation needed to meet the requirements of the resolution. Should states adopt
a comprehensive law covering all aspects of UNSCR 1540? If so, should the law also cover the
requirements of other Security Council non-proliferation measures, such as sanctions resolutions on Iran
and North Korea, which are also binding on all states? Should laws place equal emphasis on facility protection
and transhipment if the country does not manufacture or possess WMD-usable materials?
Some debate exists over the merits of legislation versus regulations . In the United States,
for example, the Export Control Act was succeeded by an executive order after its expiration. Pakistan, by contrast opted to institute
an export control act when it adopted its own laws in the early 2000s. There appear to be advantages and disadvantages to both
approaches. It could be that executive-issued regulations provide a quicker route through which to implement non-proliferation
controls, and that they are more easily modified as technology and conditions change. At the same time, national legislation can
The arduous process of drafting and adopting legislation
requires sustained political commitment. To help sustain this political commitment, drawing upon lessons
carry greater legitimacy and support.
from the Nuclear Security Summit process it was suggested that consideration should be given to how heads of state could best
engage with the 1540 process. It was also suggested that further outreach activity should be conducted with parliamentarians.
Politics—leaders won’t comply
Igor Khripunov 14, distinguished fellow and adjunct professor at the Center for
International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia, 2014, A Work in Progress: UN
Security Resolution 1540 After 10 Years, Arms Control Association,
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2014_05/A-Work-in-Progress-UN-Security-Resolution1540-After-10-Years ||RS
Like any innovation, however, Resolution
1540 elicited a mixed reaction. One main reason for skepticism was that
not all UN member states considered the threat of WMD terrorism and illicit trafficking in
related materials to be their top priority. Some countries initially questioned the UN Security
Council’s role in addressing this threat, particularly the council’s decision to impose binding nonproliferation
obligations outside the traditional process of negotiations. UN member states cannot openly disregard their obligations under
Chapter VII. In the absence of clearly defined compliance criteria, however, they could lower the bar for implementation by
addressing some of the resolution’s provisions, especially those requiring changes to domestic law, at their own discretion. Some
governments did just that shortly after the resolution’s adoption. Resolution 1540 demanded the following actions from UN member
states: Refraining from providing any form of support to nonstate actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess,
transport, transfer, or use nonconventional weapons and their means of delivery. Adopting and enforcing laws prohibiting any
nonstate actor from undertaking, assisting, or financing such activities. Establishing domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of
unconventional weapons and related materials, including measures pertaining to accounting, security, physical protection, border
and law enforcement, and export- and trade-related controls. In other words, Resolution
1540 instructed states on
what to do but not how to do it. It left methods to the discretion of individual countries.
Despite this latitude for national discretion, many political and resource
challenges have impeded compliance . For instance, rank-and-file citizens often doubt the scale of domestic
and global terrorist threats. Such doubts are compounded when little concrete evidence exists showing
that such groups operate in some regions. Another obstacle is competing national
priorities, which often limit governments’ ability to channel sufficient resources
into compliance with Resolution 1540 . Inadequate expertise and numbers of personnel
keep some governments from producing the comprehensive reports required by the resolution
to document steps taken to meet their obligations. Some member states are more vulnerable to
proliferation than others, particularly those with nuclear power, chemical, and biological
infrastructure susceptible to malicious acts. Others are only minor participants in world trade, either as
producers or transshippers, and have limited ability to control their borders. Lastly, civil society and the
business community may not be aware of Resolution 1540 and thus may not be doing their part
to manage the WMD problem.
( ) Most countries with nuclear materials already comply – we would
like to insert this chart into the round
NTI 14, the second edition of a unique public assessment of nuclear materials security
conditions around the world.," NTI Nuclear Materials Security Index, 2014,
http://ntiindex.org/indicators/domestic-commitments-and-capacity/unscr-1540implementation/ ||RS
International fiat is a voting issue –
a. Illogical – no rational actor can choose between the counterplan
and the plan – hurts decision making skills
b. Justifies object fiat – hurts aff ground and moots topic
education
c. Request counterplans solve
2AC Disads
2AC – Politics DA
Plan is popular - ICE raids are massively unpopular and spark
backlash
Benjamin Crouse 9, Marquette University Law School, J.D., WORKSITE RAIDS AND
IMMIGRATION NORMS: A “STICKY” PROBLEM, Marquette Law Review, 2009,
http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1524&context=mulr ||RS
According to studies conducted in 2007 and 2008, a substantial portion of the population
disapproves of worksite raids.186 Seventy-five percent of Hispanics and forty-two percent of nonHispanics disapprove of worksite raids.187 Seventy percent of Hispanics oppose criminal sanctions for employers.188
Although opposition to such enforcement tactics is higher among younger, less-educated Hispanics, disapproval is hardly
limited to that group.189 Recently, there have been small signs of a political backlash against
worksite raids. In the summer of 2008, the mayors of Los Angeles, Oakland, and Seattle requested that
the United States Conference of Mayors approve a resolution condemning the immigration
raids.190 The conference passed a resolution that called on ICE to focus entirely upon criminal and national security matters until
Congress passed a comprehensive immigration reform act. 191 At the very least, the mayors requested that ICE focus its worksite
This
backlash may even be visible in Washington, particularly in the two 2008 bills described in
Part III.D. Both the Senate bill expanding immigrant rights and the House DHS appropriations bill
limit worksite enforcement measures to some degree.193 These proposals may be the product of an
antienforcement backlash. On the other hand, the Senate counterpart to the DHS appropriations bill did not limit the
enforcement efforts on companies with a ―history or reasonable suspicion of engaging in exploitative practices.‖192
agency’s worksite enforcement efforts.194 To the contrary, the Senate Appropriations Committee stated that it was ―pleased‖ with
ICE’s recent worksite enforcement efforts and recommended that an additional 108 full-time employees be dedicated to such
efforts.195 Furthermore, both of the immigration reform bills of 2007 contained increased worksite enforcement tools.196
Plan popular
Immigration Impact 4/15 --Immigration Impact is a project of the American
Immigration Council (The American Immigration Council exists to promote the prosperity and
cultural richness of our diverse nation by: Educating citizens about the enduring contributions
of America’s immigrants; Standing up for sensible and humane immigration policies that reflect
American values; Insisting that our immigration laws be enacted and implemented in a way that
honors fundamental constitutional and human rights; Working tirelessly to achieve justice and
fairness for immigrants under the law.) [“ICE Director Saldaña Faces Critics in Congress”,
4/15/2015, http://immigrationimpact.com/2015/04/15/ice-director-saldana-faces-critics-incongress/]RMT
Third, Saldaña received
pointed criticism on ICE’s family detention policies from nearly every
Committee minority Member . Rep. Lofgren pointed out that although President Obama’s policy was to prioritize
“felons, not families,” ICE is detaining increasing numbers of “families, not felons.” Rep. Judy Chu (D-CA)
and others asked how family detention was consistent with ICE’s policy to avoid expending
detention resources on ill and vulnerable populations. Several members noted the recent hunger strikes at the
Karnes facility in Texas, and reports of punitive segregation of the leaders. Rep. Hank Johnson (D-GA) asked for
detailed reports on ICE’s segregation policies in family detention. Others pointed out medical and
psychological evidence of the harms of family detention. Chu summed it up by saying, “There is no way to
detain families humanely.”
Its bipartisan
Chen 12--Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School [Ming Hsu, Where You
Stand Depends on Where You Sit: Bureaucratic Incorporation of Immigrants in Federal
Workplace Agencies (March 9, 2012). Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law, 2012; U
of Colorado Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-03. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2019181 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2019181]RMT
Notwithstanding President Obama’s re-election in 2012, immigration scholars in the legal
academy have been exceedingly pessimistic about the federal government’s commitment to
undocumented1 workers’ rights over the last decade. A majority of the criticisms focus on the
need for comprehensive immigration reform in Congress .2 A considerable number of these
critiques focus on Hoffman as case law limiting the protective remedies of undocumented
workers against employers who exploit the most vulnerable among their labor force.3 The minority of
legal scholars who seriously consider agency actions contend that such actions are insufficient and inadequate, even if wellintended.4 Immigration
scholars have especially expressed dismay about the deleterious effects of
White House policies relying on the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) worksite
enforcement actions as a strategy for immigration control and the inability of workplace
agencies to counter these actions.5 The criticisms extend across Republican and
Democratic administrations .
More evidence
Ludden 8--Correspondent, National Desk [Jennifer, “Immigration Experts Predict Fewer
Workplace Raids” 12/2/08, National Public Radio,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=97700373]RMT
Since the election, immigrant advocacy groups and Democratic members of Congress have
intensified their calls for a moratorium on immigration raids, and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi has
talked of finding a way to end them. Luis Gutierrez (D-IL) says the undocumented workers being
arrested and deported have millions of family members who are legal residents or U.S. citizens, and he
says the effect has been devastating.
2AC – Semi Conductors DA
( ) New international meeting solves counterfeiting
Dan Rosso 15, Semiconductor Industry Association, May 27, 2015, Semiconductor Leaders
Convene to Strengthen Industry through Int'l Collaboration,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/27/sia-wsc-intl-co-opidUSnPn862sHl+82+PRN20150527 ||RS
The Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) today commented on an agreement reached
among global semiconductor industry leaders at the 19th annual meeting of the World
Semiconductor Council (WSC) in Hangzhou, China last week on a series of policy proposals to strengthen the industry
through greater international cooperation. The WSC is a worldwide body of semiconductor industry executives from China, Chinese
Taipei, Europe, Japan, Korea, and the United States that meets annually to address issues of global concern to the semiconductor
industry. Recommendations from this year's meeting are included in the 2015 WSC Joint Statement. " The
World
Semiconductor Council is a unique and effective forum for international collaboration, and its
accomplishments on behalf of the global semiconductor industry are unrivaled by groups in
other industries," said Ajit Manocha, 2015 WSC chairman of the U.S. delegation and former CEO of GLOBALFOUNDRIES.
"The initiatives outlined in the 2015 Joint Statement will help enable more effective
communication, cooperation, and competition in the global semiconductor industry. I'm
especially encouraged the WSC has remained steadfast in its commitment to achieve duty-free
treatment for next-generation semiconductors through expansion of the Information Technology Agreement,
which would be the most commercially meaningful trade agreement for the global technology industry in nearly two decades." The
WSC seeks expanded coverage in the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) for new and innovative semiconductor products,
including multi-component semiconductors (MCOs). An
expanded ITA – estimated to cover $1 trillion in global sales of tech
products – would provide the first opportunity to include in the existing agreement newly
developed products resulting from the dynamic technological developments in the information
technology sector since 1996, when the ITA was originally concluded. MCOs are an important new growth market for the
semiconductor industry. Even now, the inclusion of MCOs in an expanded ITA would save the industry $150 to $300 million in
global annual tariffs. The WSC meeting also featured dialogue with China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology on
China's semiconductor industry support policies and investment funds. The WSC reaffirmed its view that government action related
to such policies should be guided by market-based principles, and committed to continuing dialogue with relevant governments to
promote fair, transparent, market-based, and non-discriminatory practices with regard to government support programs.
Industry leaders also made significant progress on the following initiatives:
Encryption – Deepened industry-government dialogue to work toward an improved global regulatory environment for products with
encryption based on principles of market access, transparency, adoption of international standards, and non-discriminatory and
open procedures and rules. Protection of Intellectual Property – Adoption of a joint set of "core" elements intended to serve as an
international norm for national trade secret protection legislation. Continued progress on the WSC initiative to improve patent
quality, and support for changes to domestic laws to simplify inventor remuneration practices. Customs and Trade Facilitation –
Support for expeditious ratification and implementation of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement to facilitate free and open
markets, reduce barriers to trade, and improve business conditions that will benefit governments, industry and consumers.
Anti-
counterfeiting – Strengthened cooperation with global customs and law
enforcement agencies to combat semiconductor counterfeiting. Environment, Safety and
Health (ESH) – Continued success in reducing the industry's PFC (perfluorocompound) emissions and calling on
Governments/Authorities to take into account the industry's use and management practices when regulating essential chemicals.
Conflict Minerals – Utilization of common, industry-developed tools to achieve a conflict-free supply chain. Growth Initiative –
Promotion of semiconductor-enabled energy efficiency through the inclusion of semiconductor products in the Environmental
Goods Agreement (EGA). Tax – Reduction of the potentially harmful impact of the OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPs)
Action Plan by adopting measures to strengthen dispute settlement procedures and protect corporate information provided to
governments in the master file and country-by-country reports. Industry representatives from the six regions will deliver these
recommendations to an annual meeting of their governments, called the Governments and Authorities Meeting on Semiconductors
(GAMS), which will take place in San Francisco in October. The GAMS meeting represents an opportunity for industry to convey the
importance of implementing the recommendations and explore areas of mutual interest with governments and authorities
worldwide. "The semiconductor industry fuels innovation, job creation, and economic growth in the United States and around the
world," said Greg Lang, president and CEO of PMC. "Ours is a global industry with global challenges, and we must work
collaboratively with our international counterparts to solve problems and ensure fair and open competition. The
agreement
reached by the World Semiconductor Council is a clear step forward that will help open markets,
boost innovation, and increase consumers' access to cutting edge semiconductor technologies."
( ) No link – other agencies will fill in
DHS 14, Department of Homeland Security, 7-16-2014, "Written testimony of ICE for a
Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security hearing titled
“Strengthening Trade Enforcement to Protect American Enterprise and Grow American Jobs”,"
DHS, http://www.dhs.gov/news/2014/07/16/written-testimony-ice-senate-committeeappropriations-subcommittee-homeland-security ||RS
Operation Chain Reaction (OCR) is an IPR Center initiative that combines the effort of 16
federal law enforcement agencies to target counterfeit items entering the supply
chains of the Department of Defense and other U.S. Government agencies. By partnering together,
the participants in OCR are coordinating their efforts to more productively protect the U.S.
Government supply chain. In a case investigated by ICE, DCIS, and NCIS, a Massachusetts man pleaded guilty in June
2014 to importing thousands of counterfeit integrated circuits (ICs) from China and Hong Kong and then reselling them to U.S.
customers, including contractors supplying them to the U.S. Navy for use in nuclear submarines. The subject told his customers,
many of whom specified in their orders that they would not accept anything but new ICs which were not from China, that the ICs
were brand new and manufactured in Europe. Testing by the Navy and one of their contractors revealed the ICs had been resurfaced
to change the date code and to affix counterfeit marks, all in order to hide their true pedigree. In order to purchase these ICs, the
subject wired nearly $2 million to his suppliers' bank accounts in China and Hong Kong, in violation of federal money laundering
laws. This was the second conviction ever under trafficking in counterfeit military goods, a provision in the U.S. criminal code which
was enacted as part of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2011. In another case, the former Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of
Powerline, Inc., a battery distributor, was found guilty of five counts of wire fraud and one count of conspiracy to defraud the United
States by selling more than $2.6 million in cheap, counterfeit batteries to the U.S. Department of Defense. In joint case by ICE and
DCIS, with assistance from DLA and the Defense Contract Audit Agency, investigators discovered that Powerline sold more than
80,000 batteries and battery assemblies that the U.S. Navy used for emergency back-up power on aircraft carriers, minesweepers
and ballistic submarines. The company would affix counterfeit labels falsely identifying the batteries as originating from approved
manufacturers and used chemicals to remove “Made in China” markings from the batteries. The CEO fled the United States, but was
apprehended when undercover HSI special agents hired him to sail his yacht to the U.S. Virgin Islands after spending more than two
years on the yacht near St. Martin. Once the CEO entered U.S. Territory, he was arrested and his yacht was seized. OCR
has
resulted in 40 criminal arrests, 70 indictments, 42 convictions, and 1,078 seizures worth $21.2
million (MSRP) in counterfeit parts, currency, and vehicles. Counterfeit items seized through
OCR include commercial-grade devices re-marked as military-grade and counterfeit
semiconductors intended for use on nuclear submarines.
( ) No Link – The plan restricts ICE raids on immigrants – not all ICE
raids
( ) No Link – ICE raids are not key
SIA 13, Semiconductor Industry Association, August 2013, WINNING THE BATTLE
AGAINST COUNTERFEIT SEMICONDUCTOR PRODUCTS, SIA,
http://www.semiconductors.org/clientuploads/Anti-Counterfeiting/SIA%20AntiCounterfeiting%20Whitepaper.pdf ||RS
3. The
ACTF also partners with law enforcement to help prosecute those involved in the
manufacturing and/or trafficking of counterfeit semiconductor components. SIA companies
conduct in-depth laboratory analyses on suspect components from undercover buys made by
government agencies. Using CBP seizure data as well as OCM laboratory reports on confirmed Copyright © 2013
by the Semiconductor Industry Association 23 counterfeit components, law enforcement agencies
obtain search warrants and conduct enforcement actions (raids) resulting in the
arrest of suspects dealing in counterfeit components . SIA companies provide on-site
support to law enforcement immediately after enforcement actions occur. This support includes
identifying the manufacturing processes used by counterfeiters and determining which seized
components are counterfeit. Subsequent support includes testifying in court cases and providing Victims Statements to
sentencing judges. Recent cases that the ACTF assisted government agencies in investigating and prosecuting, including MVP Micro
in Irvine, California, and VisionTech Components in Clearwater, Florida, have resulted in defendants being ordered to pay
restitution and being sentenced to several years of incarceration. [References 16- 17.] The Epic International Electronics case is in
the prosecution phase, but the defendant is facing up to 20 years in prison if convicted. [Reference 18.] These
and other
high-visibility cases, which have received significant media coverage, serve as a major deterrent
to those manufacturing and/or selling counterfeits or those contemplating doing so.
( ) Status quo solves – awareness programs
SIA 13, Semiconductor Industry Association, August 2013, WINNING THE BATTLE
AGAINST COUNTERFEIT SEMICONDUCTOR PRODUCTS, SIA,
http://www.semiconductors.org/clientuploads/Anti-Counterfeiting/SIA%20AntiCounterfeiting%20Whitepaper.pdf ||RS
The
ACTF has driven counterfeit component awareness and actions. SIA members provide
leadership and give presentations at conferences, technical symposia, and webinars, including
Counterfeit Electronic Parts and Electronic Supply Chain Symposia, and Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material
Shortages (DMSMS) Conferences. [References 22-23.] These presentations focus on the quality and reliability risks posed by
counterfeit semiconductors, along with the critical importance of always buying components directly from OCMs or their Authorized
Distributors and Authorized Resellers to avoid problems with counterfeit components. SIA President Brian Toohey has testified
before both the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Homeland Security Committee on how counterfeit
semiconductors jeopardize the safety and effectiveness of US military personnel and operations. [Reference 8.] SIA
members
also regularly meet with House, Senate, Department of Commerce, Department of Defense,
Administration, and other government officials to brief them on how counterfeit
semiconductors are a danger to the health and safety of the public, and to work with them on solutions to
this insidious problem. Through written responses to Requests for Information and to Notices of Proposed Rulemaking, the ACTF
provides government agencies with specific recommendations on how to avoid counterfeit semiconductor products. The
ACTF
has also been instrumental in driving anti-counterfeiting legislation, regulations, and policies,
including legislation that increases government-industry sharing on suspected counterfeit
semiconductors, and that increases penalties for selling counterfeit components to the military.
( ) Status quo solves – new international standards
SIA 13, Semiconductor Industry Association, August 2013, WINNING THE BATTLE
AGAINST COUNTERFEIT SEMICONDUCTOR PRODUCTS, SIA,
http://www.semiconductors.org/clientuploads/Anti-Counterfeiting/SIA%20AntiCounterfeiting%20Whitepaper.pdf ||RS
4. The
ACTF is active in evaluating component security features and in developing international
standards relating to supply chain assurance and anti-counterfeiting. SIA member companies
use a wide range of security features, both overt and covert, and they work both independently and with thirdparties to continue to advance these features to stay ahead of counterfeiters. Semiconductor companies do not plan to adopt a single,
industry-wide security feature since counterfeiters would then only need to figure out this one feature, and if they did so, they could
readily counterfeit components from any semiconductor company. Rather, OCMs
use security features that change
over time and are tailored to the specific components being manufactured. This approach has
proven to be the most effective at deterring counterfeiters. These security features only have value when they
are dynamic and are kept secret. Therefore, semiconductor companies do not disclose security features to
customers, governments, or any other entities.
( )Status quo solves – international framework
SIA 13, Semiconductor Industry Association, August 2013, WINNING THE BATTLE
AGAINST COUNTERFEIT SEMICONDUCTOR PRODUCTS, SIA,
http://www.semiconductors.org/clientuploads/Anti-Counterfeiting/SIA%20AntiCounterfeiting%20Whitepaper.pdf ||RS
6. In addition to industry-government initiatives, the
SIA ACTF has joined forces with other associations to
advance the battle against counterfeit semiconductor components. The United States SIA is a
leading member of the World Semiconductor Council (WSC) Anti-Counterfeiting Task Force
(ACTF) that has been active since 2012. The WSC unites the six SIAs from the six major semiconductor-producing
countries/regions of the world, i.e., China, Chinese Taipei, Europe, Japan, Copyright © 2013 by the Semiconductor Industry
Association 24 Korea, and the United States. [Reference 25.] The
WSC ACTF recognizes that the counterfeit
semiconductor problem cannot be solved by any one country, but rather requires worldwide
strategies and initiatives focused on both the supply and demand for counterfeits. The WSC ACTF is
reviewing best practices identified by individual SIAs and is working to deploy them more broadly. This requires extensive
interaction with governments worldwide, and a key forum for formalizing these interactions is
the Government and Authorities Meeting on Semiconductors (GAMS), which is held annually.
[Reference 27.] In addition to working with the WSC ACTF and GAMS, the SIA ACTF interfaces with other
associations involved in anti-counterfeiting initiatives, including the Electronic Components
Industry Association (ECIA), the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA), and the US Chamber
of Commerce. [References 28-30.]
( )Alt cause – lack of CBP authority makes it impossible to track
counterfeits.
Brian Toohey 7-7-2011, President & CEO of the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA)
(he has since vacated that position), GPO, Mr. Brian Toohey, President, Semiconductor Industry
Association: Oral Statement “HOMELAND SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS: EXAMINING
DHS’S EFFORTS TO PROTECT AMERICAN JOBS AND SECURE THE HOMELAND,”
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg72254/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg72254.pdf
Historically, Customs and Border Protection also facilitated anticounterfeiting efforts. Prior to
2000, when port officers suspected a shipment contained counterfeit chips, they would contact
the manufacturer and share one of the products. After 2000, but before 2008, port officers
photographed the outside of suspected chips and sent the publicly viewable information to the
chip manufacturer whose trademark appeared on the surface to determine whether the chip was
counterfeit. Using highly confidential databases, manufacturers then determined very quickly,
in about 85 percent of the cases, whether or not the chips were counterfeit by analyzing the
codes on the surface of the chip. It was a system that worked very well and prevented enormous
quantities of counterfeit chips from entering the United States. In mid-2008, however, CBP
officers were instructed to redact or cross out the identifying marks in the photographs except
the trademarks before sending them to manufacturers, thereby scuttling the cooperative system
that worked so well for so many years. The current redaction practice makes it virtually
impossible for the industry, much less the importer or CBP, to authenticate suspected
counterfeit semiconductors. U.S. Treasury officials argue that this policy shift is intended to
shield port officers from criminal liability for disclosure of confidential information; however, to
the extent the codes on the surface of semiconductors which are publicly viewable to anyone
who picks up the chip or looks at the label are confidential, they belong to the manufacturers to
whom the photographs would be sent.
( ) Authorized supply chain ensures no counterfeits enter the market.
SIAACTF 2013, Semiconductors Industry Association Anti-Counterfeiting Task Force, a
trade association and lobbying group at represents the United States semiconductor industry,
SIA, “WINNING THE BATTLE AGAINST COUNTERFEIT SEMICONDUCTOR PRODUCTS,”
August 2013, http://www.semiconductors.org/clientuploads/Anti-Counterfeiting/SIA%20AntiCounterfeiting%20Whitepaper.pdf
The authorized supply chain for semiconductor components is very clear and ensures that this
supply chain is not contaminated by counterfeits. Original Component Manufacturers (OCMs)
sell their products in two ways: 1. Directly through their sales force and through their Internet
sites; 2. Directly through Authorized Distributors, and, in some cases, Authorized Resellers.
Each OCM identifies and qualifies their Authorized Distributors using a broad set of criteria
including longterm business viability, quality systems, order placement and fulfillment
processes, customer support, and customer returns policies. While the details of the processes
for selecting Authorized Distributors vary somewhat between semiconductor companies, the
contracts between OCMs and their Authorized Distributors always require them to obtain
components solely from OCMs. Contracts specify that Authorized Distributor relationships can
be terminated if distributors ever allow product not sold by them to be “returned.” OCMs
periodically audit their Authorized Distributors to ensure products are always handled and
stored properly to prevent ESD and other damage. These audits also include validating that the
distributors’ policies and procedures cannot allow counterfeit or otherwise questionable
components into the supply chain. The net result is that, just as with component purchases
directly from OCMs, customers buying from Authorized Distributors are assured of receiving
legitimate products with high quality and reliability levels. Components bought from Authorized
Distributors carry the same factory warranties as those bought directly from OCMs.
( ) Most countries with nuclear materials already comply – we would
like to insert this chart into the round
NTI 14, the second edition of a unique public assessment of nuclear materials security
conditions around the world.," NTI Nuclear Materials Security Index, 2014,
http://ntiindex.org/indicators/domestic-commitments-and-capacity/unscr-1540implementation/ ||RS
( ) Multitude of things halt Chinese Mil-Mod—Mainly Soft Recruits
Perlez 15 [Jane Perlez, New York Times, Febuary 17, 2015, “Soft Recruits Hinder
China’s Military Modernization”, http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/02/17/softrecruits-hinder-chinas-military-modernization/] JMOV
Many armies have trouble molding capable soldiers from fresh-out-of-school 18-yearolds. China is no exception and, it turns out, has a particular problem with soft recruits.¶
Senior officers in the People’s Liberation Army recognize that many of their volunteers and
conscripts have been raised as spoiled children and that as products of the one-child
policy, many of them need toughening up, says a lengthy report by the RAND
Corporation on the modernization of the army.¶ “After 30 years of the one-child policy, kids come
into the army who are used to being coddled and the apple of their parents’ eyes,” said Scott W. Harold, the deputy director of the
Center for Asia-Pacific at RAND, and one of the seven authors of the report released last week.¶ Newspapers published by the
People’s Liberation Army have carried reports about half the young men in a unit crying, and many wanting to wash out, he said.
Some were reported to have violated discipline by sending texts to their girlfriends. “While
this is a weakness, it is
not clear how much of a weakness,” he added.¶ About 70 percent of People’s Liberation
Army soldiers come from one-child families, and among combat troops, about 80
percent have been raised as only children, Maj. Gen. Liu Mingfu, a professor at the National Defense University
in Beijing, said in a telephone interview.¶ Even President Xi Jinping, who as chairman of the Central Military Commission
is the head of the People’s Liberation Army, has alluded to the problem of insufficiently
hardened soldiers. “We must not make our soldiers soft during the peace era, the mighty
troops have to be mighty, soldiers must have guts and courage,” he said last month, according to a
report in PLA Daily.¶ The RAND report, titled “China’s Incomplete Military
Transformation,” is unusual because rather than stressing the rapid gains by the People’s Liberation Army, the authors
focus on the weaknesses.¶ The idea for the study came from the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, a body
created by Congress in 2000 to study the strategic relationship between the United States and China. The task for RAND: to look at
the shortcomings of the People’s Liberation Army as a way of better understanding what Chinese commanders would be attempting
to improve.¶ Top commanders in the People’s Liberation Army were aware of an array of problems and were aggressively trying to
fix them, the report says.¶ The
People’s Liberation Army has not fought a war since 1979, when it
performed miserably against its neighbor Vietnam in a short, extremely bloody battle. Combat weaknesses
persist, the report says, including insufficient strategic airlift capabilities, a limited number
of special mission aircraft and deficiencies in antisubmarine warfare.¶ “Knowing the weaknesses
— and particularly what P.L.A. officers themselves see as the most important shortcomings — is critical to understanding what areas
the P.L.A. will emphasize as it continues to modernize,” said Michael S. Chase, a senior political scientist at RAND, and one of the
authors. “We are not trying to say the P.L.A. is unprofessional, nor are we trying to say there is nothing for people in the U.S. and
other countries to worry about.”¶ On the contrary, the People’s Liberation Army has made impressive progress over the last few
decades and is capable of causing serious problems for the United States and its allies, he said. Still, along with shortfalls in certain
combat capabilities, the
People’s Liberation Army suffered from corruption and had yet to
transform its antiquated organizational structure into the joint command and control
systems of well-run armies.¶ The catalog of weaknesses that revolve around personnel
and training make fascinating reading because they are not often talked about in public.
Buried in the newspapers published by the commands of China’s seven military regions,
the authors found quite a bit of candor.¶ The authors quote one article that says, “The
overall level of talented personnel in our army does not meet the requirement for
fulfilling its historic mission in the new century.Ӧ And some of the assessments by the Chinese commanders
of the People’s Liberation Army’s capabilities, garnered from more than 300 Chinese-language articles, books and studies, are
scathing. “According
to the CMC (Central Military Commission) Vice Chairman Xu Qiliang,
although the PLA seeks to become an informatized force, it is not (even) fully
mechanized,” the report says.¶ Training often emphasizes form and process rather than the pursuit of better performance, the
study says. Exercises were often overly scripted, and in many cases, completely unrealistic.¶ The People’s Liberation
Army lacked enough technical expertise within its own ranks to properly maintain
advanced equipment, Mr. Harold said. Often, experts from technology companies or from firms
that supplied weapons were brought in for maintenance and repairs, he said.¶ The report makes
clear that the People’s Liberation Army has difficulty attracting first-rate recruits because of
higher salaries and easier lifestyles in the civilian economy. It was possible that starting pay for a
recruit was well below 1,000 renminbi a month, about $160, even as low perhaps as 600 renminbi, said Dennis J. Blasko, a former
military attaché at the United States Embassy in Beijing and the author of the “The Chinese Army Today.”¶ Last month, PLA Daily
reported that an officer who had served for 30 years received a monthly salary of 8,000 to 9,000 renminbi, about $1,280 to
$1,440. Officer salaries were often topped up with allowances and subsidies from a unit’s business dealings, for example from rents
on buildings owned by a unit.¶ But in December, as part of his anticorruption drive, Mr. Xi announced an end to such allowances
and said soldiers would have to learn to live on their salaries, a painful requirement if military salaries are not raised.¶
( )Chinese Mil Mod impossible—even if they did they would be no
where close to the US
Chan 15 [Minnie Chan, February 12, 2015, “China ‘not ready to win wars’ despite PLA
modernisation, says US report”, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1710717/china-notready-win-wars-says-us-report?page=all]JMOV
The People's Liberation Army is incapable of winning wars even though it has spent heavily on
modernisation over the past two decades, according to a report commissioned by a US congressional
committee.¶ Chinese military experts said the shortcomings identified were valid, and the report could be a
"good reference" to the PLA leadership as it showed a thorough understanding of the army's latest
developments.¶ The report by Santa Monica-based research group Rand Corporation, which was released yesterday, said the PLA faced
continuing vulnerability because of widespread corruption, lack of qualified personnel and
insufficient training.¶ "Although the PLA's capabilities have improved dramatically [amid its military modernisation], its remaining
weaknesses increase the risk of failure to successfully perform some of the missions Chinese Communist
Party leaders may task it to execute," said the report, sponsored by the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission.¶ Beijingbased retired Major General Xu Guangyu said that as a veteran, he would like to thank the Rand Corporation for its efforts to help the Chinese
military to understand its shortcomings.¶ "I agree that
corruption is one of the key problems that should be tackled. That's why
President Xi Jinping has urged the anti-graft watchdog to weed out corruption in the army by all means," he said.¶ The report points to
critical weaknesses in the PLA in two categories: organisational and combat capabilities. It said a party-ruled army
could be contributing to potential risk, citing the rift between then premier Wen Jiabao and Guo Boxiong, who was vice-chairman of the PLA's
supreme Central Military Commission (CMC) during the 2008's earthquake in Sichuan province.¶ Wen, who had no military rank, made a tearful call
for the air force to send helicopters to aid the rescue, but there was no response from the military because the army takes its orders only from the
CMC.¶ The report said the PLA enjoyed an almost absolute immunity from external oversight, budgetary transparency, and accountability to the
legislature for how it spent its funds and operates. It cited the recent arrests of two prominent military figures, Gu Junshan , former deputy head of the
army's logistic department, and former CMC vice-chairman Xu Caihou , on suspicion of graft.¶ Li Jie, a
retired senior colonel with the
navy, said it was a fact that "there is a certain gap" between the US and Chinese militaries even though the
PLA had been trying to narrow the distance.¶
( ) No impact to Chinese modernization – it’s all just defensive
Rongfei Gou 14, contributing writer, 10-7-2014, "Are Offensive Realists Overreacting about
China’s Military Modernization?," International Affairs Review, http://www.iargwu.org/content/are-offensive-realists-overreacting-about-china%E2%80%99s-militarymodernization ||RS
Offensive realism, a major school of international relations theories pioneered by John Mearsheimer, consistently
argues that states must always assume the worst because they can never have perfect
information about the intentions of other states. Offensive realists thus argue that while China may not have the
military capability to challenge the status of the United States yet, China will adopt a more offensive grand strategy in the future.
The argument continues that, given China’s economic growth and shift in strategy, the United
States needs to prepare itself for such a change, which will eventually lead to an inevitable
confrontation between the U.S. and China. Such an offensive realist concern is
overblown . China has been contained by its unfriendly neighbor states and Chinese military
modernization only focuses on defensive capability to deter its neighbors and
internal opponents . Thus, the United States does not need to increase its military presence in East Asia, as China has
already been “contained” by neighboring states. First, China’s geopolitical condition serves as a crucial
constraint preventing China from becoming a regional hegemon. Second, the defensive military
doctrines of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) focus on defending China’s sovereign territory
and maintaining internal stability. Unlike the United States, which has relatively unthreatening neighbors and two
oceans as natural defense lines, China is surrounded by powerful countries. Although the end of the Cold War
eliminated the largest land-based threat to China since 1949, Russia retains powerful military capabilities. To its southwest, China
still has major territorial disputes on its land border with India. Japan, a strong economic power that invaded China in World
War II, is a permanent concern for the Chinese government. China also remains engaged in maritime
sovereignty disputes with many of its neighbors in the South China Sea. Internally, the longtime
ethnic uprisings in Tibet and Xinjiang continue to smolder. Given these threats, it is reasonable
for China to maintain a modernized military force to meet its defensive purposes. Even if
China tries to become the regional hegemon in the future, the surrounding countries, such as Japan
and India, are likely to work together to stop Beijing’s expansionary tendencies. The rise of China is
a more direct threat to neighboring states than it is to the United States. Furthermore,
surrounding countries can muster the geopolitical strength to create sufficient deterrent effects
on China. For instance, India has enjoyed rapid economic growth since its economic reforms in 1991. Both Russia and India
maintain nuclear arsenals. Scholars like Charles Glaser argue that “a major U.S. withdrawal, moreover, would not automatically
yield Chinese regional hegemony, because Japan and South Korea might then acquire stronger conventional military capabilities
and nuclear capability of their own.”1 One cannot ignore the possibility that China may use “salami-slicing” tactics, or microaggression, to divide and conquer its regional adversaries. However, China’s recent overt activities to highlight issues with many of
its neighbors do not support this concern. For example, China’s adoption of an “Air Defense Identification Zone” was immediately
protested by all surrounding states in the East China Sea. The maritime sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea only increased
the collective fear toward China among the Southeast Asian countries. If China truly wishes to use “salami-slicing” tactics, it would
be much wiser to deal with each neighbor individually, rather than provoking them altogether as it has done recently. Writing
on
Chinese strategy, MIT associate professor Fravel Taylor notes, “China is not pursuing broadly
expansionist goals, nor is it investing heavily in forces that are inconsistent with its strategic
goals [namely regime security, territorial integrity, national unification, maritime security, and regional stability].”2 Chinese
military forces focus on three capabilities: internal control, periphery area denial, and limited regional force projection. The latest
research from the U.S. Army War College suggests that the PLA’s “New Historical Mission—a military doctrine created by former
president Hu Jintao—emphasizes defending China’s sovereign territory, again demonstrating China’s concern over the possible
conflicts with surrounding states.”3 Additionally, the
ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) fears any political force
that could challenge its rule. Since the Party is unelected, it requires a strong military force to keep it in
power. Such fears also manifest in People’s Liberation Army doctrine. In official PLA doctrine, the first
principle above all else is that the army must “provide an important guarantee for the Party to consolidate its ruling position.”4 The
1989 Tiananmen Square incident was an obvious demonstration by the CCP to show how it can use the PLA to maintain a ruling
position. Such an important mission of the PLA has nothing to do with challenging the United States’ position in the world.
Similarly, the
ethnic uprisings and riots in Tibet and Xinjiang require a large military presence. As
stated by CCP leaders, “the March 2008 demonstrations and riots [in Tibet] only reinforce the view…that ethnic unrest is a
‘strategic issue.’”5 Therefore, 660,000 troops make up an internal control force to deal with political
enemies and uprisings.6 As Xinjiang has experienced an uptick in violence this year, more military personnel and resources
have been assigned to bring stability back to the province. Such operations provide evidence that the premier responsibility of the
PLA remains to focus on internal stability, rather than on territorial expansion or overseas operations. Thus, while China
is in
the midst of modernizing its military, there is no clear evidence from PLA doctrine supporting
the claim that China will try to challenge the status of the United States in East Asia. Given the above
evidence, offensive realists are probably wrong to posit unavoidable confrontation between the United States and China. Unlike the
United States, China is surrounded by powerful neighbors who have direct conflicts or territorial disputes with the country.
Furthermore, the People’s Liberation Army’s military doctrine was designed to maintain regional deterrence and internal stability.7
Neither of these two missions aims to challenge the broad U.S. military position.