Russia’s Position vis-à-vis
USA/NATO on
Ballistic Missile Defense
and
Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons
Simon Saradzhyan
December 2012
1
Russian Assessment of Missile Threats
Posed by 3rd Countries: RF Government
•
•
•
Then-Chief of General Staff Nikolai Makarov at MoD’s May 2012 conference on
BMD: “We have concluded that it will be very difficult, if not impossible for
Pyongyang and Teheran under the current conditions of international sanctions to
commission intercontinental ballistic missiles.”
GRU chief Igor Sergun’s presentation at the May 2012 conference on BMD :
– At present it is shorter-range and tactical missiles that are mostly spread
around the world.
– A direct missile attack threat to leading states of the world including NATO
member-states look very insignificant.
– At this stage the problem of missile proliferation can and should be addressed
not solely by the use of force and not through building expensive BMD assets,
that are not always adequate to existing missile threats, but by engaging
preventive diplomacy and strengthening arms control and non-proliferation
regimes as well as reducing weapon systems.
Repeated statements by Vladimir Putin and other top Russian officials: Russia has
no evidence that Iran is working on nuclear weapons.
2
Russian Assessment of Missile Threats Posed by
3rd Countries: Expert Community
• EastWest Institute’s 2009 paper “Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Potential: A
Joint Threat Assessment by U.S. and Russian Technical Experts:
– “On basis of the technology currently available to it, Iran could hypothetically
build IRBMs and ICBMs. These would be large, visible, and cumbersome
systems with serious drawbacks as military missiles; in particular, they would
be vulnerable to preemption.”
– Iran will not be able to master independently the “critical technologies” for
advanced mobile or silo-based IRBMs and ICBMs in 15 years.
• Ex-secretary of Security Council Andrei Kokoshin’s 2011 Belfer paper:
“Series of medium-range missile tests conducted by Iran could make
military and strategic sense only if such missiles were equipped with
WMD, primarily with nuclear warheads.”
• EASI’s 2012 report: "there is sufficient consensus regarding the threat risk
from medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (up to 4,500 km)
to begin now to develop a response, with deployment commensurate with
the progression of the threat.“
3
Russia’s Assessment of U.S/NATO BMD plans:
RF Government’s views:
•
•
•
•
Vladimir Putin on the U.S. missile defense plans in September 2012: “The ambition is to
upset the strategic balance.”
Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov at MoD’s May 2012 conference on BMD:
"The American missile defense system is of a global nature.”
Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov in September 2012: Russia is concerned with
U.S. plans to deploy a new missile defense shield in Southeast Asia. Moscow’s concerns
about the situation arise from the technology involved, as well as the “geography and
the US capability to deploy these assets in different locations.”
Col. General Valery Gerasimov of General Staff’s May 2012 presentation:
– “Concept for a BMD posture is global in character
– BMD assets in Europe and in Asia Pacific Region are elements of the global BMD
system primarily intended for protection of selected sites in the US territory
– BMD assets pose a threat to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force based across
Russia
• Poland-based BMD shooters featuring third-phase performances would pose a
threat to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force, while failing to assure protection
of the entire Western Europe against the threat of missile strikes from the
south
• Close-to-Russia sea-launched BMD shooters would be posing a threat to the
Russian Strategic Nuclear Force.”
4
Russia’s Assessment of U.S/NATO MD
Plans: Industry and Expert Views
• Russia’s lead designer of ballistic missiles Yuri Solomonov in March
2011: "All these 'Aegis' and associated things do not present any
threat to the Russian strategic nuclear forces.” "All that fuss"
around U.S. missile defense elements in Europe "is totally
senseless. “It is a political game and it is not very smart. Someone
needs it to achieve one's goals,” he said.
• Ex-chief of RVSN staff Viktor Yesin in April 2012: Russian ICBM RS18 (SS-19 Stiletto) launched from Kozelsk, Kaluga region, in the
northwestern direction could be detected by the radar at Vardo in
Northern Norway and shot down by SM-3 Block II, but it would take
5 to 10 of these interceptors to shoot down one warhead.
• U.S. fuels Russia’s fears of BMD?
– East Coast BMD proposal.
– A U.S. official cited in James Acton’s 2011 paper: SM-3 Block IIBs
can intercept Russian ICBM’s if deployed very close to Russia, such
as in the Barents Sea.
5
Russia’s demands for
binding guarantees:
•
Vladimir Putin in February 2012: “We would like to receive military and
technological guarantees fixed in legally binding documents. Statements like ‘don’t
be afraid, we promise that nothing will happen’ are clearly insufficient in the
modern world. This is childish. We need guarantees and serious agreements in the
security sphere.”
•
Vladimir Putin in September 2012 on Mitt Romney’s portrayal of Russia as
America’s No.1 "geopolitical foe”:“The most important thing for us is that even if
he doesn’t win now, he or a person with similar views may come to power in four
years. We must take that into consideration while dealing with security issues for a
long perspective.”
•
Dmitry Medvedev in November 2011:”Our partners should realize that these
guarantees cannot be general and abstract. They need to be formulated in such a
way that Russia can rely not on promises, but on objective military data to
determine whether the steps the United States and NATO take in developing
missile defense are in line with their declarations, or whether they are infringing
our interests and undermining the strategic nuclear parity, which is the foundation
of global security today.”
6
Red lines and deadlines:
• Dmitry Medvedev in July 2012: “Time is gradually running out. If by
2018 we fail to reach any agreement on this issue, then we might
face a new arms race, which would be an extremely negative as
well as a costly and absolutely ineffective outcome for everyone.”
• Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov in September 2012:
“When the implementation of the third and then fourth and
subsequent stages of the phased adaptive approach on the [U.S.]
global defense system begins, the situation could alter for us.”
• Then-Chief of General Staff Nikolai Makarov at MoD’s May 2012
conference : "A thorough analysis by the Defense Ministry's
research organizations showed that once the third and fourth
stages (of EPAA) are deployed, the capability to intercept Russian
intercontinental ballistic missiles will be real.”
• Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin in November 2012: Russia
will “react in the sharpest manner” to any U.S. ships equipped with
the Aegis combat system attempting to sail by its shores.
7
Russia’s response if no BMD deal with USA:
Dmitry Medvedev in November 2011:
1.
“Activate an early warning radar in Kaliningrad.”
2.
“Urgently strengthen its defensive capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Forces
installations.”
3.
ICBMs and SLBMs “will be fitted with advanced missile defense penetration systems
and the latest effective warheads.”
4.
“Develop a set of measures that will enable Russia… to destroy the data exchange
and control centers of the missile defense system.”
5.
“If the aforementioned measures prove to be insufficient, the Russian Federation will
deploy, along its western and southern borders, advanced offensive systems capable
of destroying the European component” of MD, including Iskander missiles in
Kaliningrad.
6.
“If problems persist, Russia reserves the right to refrain from taking further steps as
regards disarmament and arms control. …Russia may have sufficient grounds to
withdraw from the New START Treaty.”
Dmitry Medvedev’s 2010 decision to establish AeroSpace Defense Forces.
Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin in October 2012: “The Russian response [to EPAA] is
currently mostly virtual, political and diplomatic in character, but under certain circumstances
we would be forced to deliver a technical response, which I don't think you'll like.”
8
Withdrawal from New START unlikely
Deployed Delivery Systems
1000
900
882
822
812
812
806
806
800
New START Ceiling: 700
700
600
521
516
500
494
494
491
491
US Deployed Delivery Systems
RF Deployed Delivery Systems
400
300
Source: New START
Treaty Aggregate
Numbers of Strategic
Offensive Arms, U.S.
State Department.
200
100
0
June of 2011
October of 2011
April of 2012
June of 2012
October of 2012
November of
2012
9
Russia’s response if no BMD deal with USA
“Retaliatory Measures of the Russian Federation” - from then-Chief of General Staff Nikolai
Makarov’s presentation at the May 2012 conference:
 “increase defense of fixed launching sites,
 ensure maximal concealment of Strategic Nuclear Force mobile launchers,
 increase readiness of deployed BM platforms,
 increase capabilities of ICBMs in penetrating modern Ballistic Missile Defense,
 decrease the attacking missile launch fixing time,
 increase the numbers of information sources in order to assure target identification by
Russian AD and BMD assets,
 employ effective systems in fighting mobile BMD assets,
 ensure destruction or disruption of opposing BMD infrastructure assets .
 Taking into account a missile defense system's destabilizing nature -- that is, the
creation of an illusion that a disarming strike can be launched with impunity -- a
decision on pre-emptive employment of the attack weapons available could be
made when the situation worsens.”
 Russia has no plans to abrogate the INF treaty over the missile defense issue.
10
Russian response to U.S./NATO BMD:
Industry and Experts
• Anatoly Shlemov of the United Shipbuilding Company said in
August 2012 that that the Kremlin “has definitely assigned a task”
for Russia’s defense industry to come up with naval missile
interceptor similar to the U.S. Aegis system.
• Russia’s lead designer of ballistic missiles Yuri Solomonov in March
2011: By pursuing a new 10-warhead ICBM as a response to U.S.
missile defense, Russia is making the same mistake that the Soviet
Union did “in relation to Ronald Reagan's well-known SDI program.”
• Ex-chief of RVSN staff Viktor Yesin in September 2012: Russia will
reactivate mothballed ballistic missile silos around Moscow as part
of deep modernization of a missile defense network Moscow.
11
Efforts by RF Government to internationalize
response to US/NATO MD plans
• Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov at MoD’s May
2012 conference: "We see what is happening in the Asia
Pacific region today, and we are certainly thinking together
with our Chinese friends what response should be given to
potential new threats and challenges.”
• Leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization at the
June 2012 summit in Beijing: We rejected the deployment
of missile-defense systems either "by one state or a group
of states," as such actions represent a "threat to
international security."
• Then-Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov in October
2012: Russia views the Collective Security Treaty
Organization as an efficient mechanism of countering U.S.
antimissile activities in Europe.
12
Russian Government continues to hope for
BMD deal with USA or not?
•
•
•
•
Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev in May 2012: "I am certain that we are
capable of finding a formula that would allow us to avoid any division into winners and
losers.”
Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov in May 2012: "I am firmly convinced that we
are capable of achieving a positive result [in talks over missile defense] and solving the
problem. We only need the political will.”
More hopeful after Obama’s re-election:
– Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin in November 2012: “We hope that
President Obama after his re-election will be more flexible on the issue of taking
into the account the opinions of Russia and others regarding a future configuration
of NATO’s missile defense.”
– Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said in November 2012 that he received
confirmation during talks with his U.S. counterpart, Hillary Clinton that the Obama
administration hopes to work toward a deal on European missile defense.
Vladimir Putin in June 2012: "I think that the missile defense issue will not be solved
regardless of whether Obama is elected or not. I think that something can radically
change only in the case if USA agrees with our proposal which says that Russia,
Europe and U.S. were equal participants of this process.”
13
Contours of possible US/NATO-Russia MD deal
NATO and Russia should:
1. Reach consensus on missile threats and impact of MD on strategic stability.
2. Conclude a Founding Act on Missile Defense Cooperation:
– Using language from the 1997 founding act on NATO-Russian relations, this new document should
declare that the signatories “have no intention, no plan and no reason” to target each other’s
strategic nuclear forces
– The act would
• establish two separate systems and institutionalize the continuous sharing of information on
threats collected by radars and other mean (data fusion centers);
• facilitate the interoperability of NATO’s and Russia’s systems through information-sharing
(defense technology cooperation agreement), joint exercises;
• designate Russia and NATO countries separate sectors, but will not ban the United States and
NATO from deploying radars and interceptors to target missile threats that may emerge from
countries located south of Russia
• as part of this act USA should:
– agree to exchange information on missile defense technologies;
– revive 2007 proposal to restrict radar angles and abstain from the deployment of midcourse interceptors in northeastern Europe.
• as part of this act Russia should:
– contribute its assets, such as Armavir and Gabala (?) radars;
– avoid imposing excessive demands.
•
US-Russian cooperation in space as an example (Ryan/Saradzhyan 2012 paper).
14
Evolution of Russia’s nuclear posture in 2000-2012:
• 2009 Strategy of National Security - unequivocal commitment to
pursue full elimination of nuclear weapons
• 2010 Defense Doctrine
– reaffirmed 1st use;
– for the 1st time constrains use of nuclear weapons:
conventional“aggression when the very existence of the state is
threatened” while the 2000 doctrine allowed use in conventional
war if “situations critical to the national security”;
– introduced use of high-precision conventional systems for
strategic deterrence;
– major conventional conflict with a nuclear power may escalate
into a nuclear war;
– no reference to NSNWs;
– NATO - No 1 "external military danger;”
15
The roles Russian strategists have envisioned
specifically for NSNWs:
• Deterring U.S. and NATO and equalizing for the superiority of
Western and Chinese conventional forces. Can be played by SNF.
• Equalizing for strategic nuclear forces’ inferiority. No significant
inferiority.
• Buying time for Russia to narrow the gap with USA In long-range,
precision-guided conventional weapons. Can be played by SNF.
• Deterring powers in the south. Can be played by SNF and
conventional forces.
• Deterring U.S. global missile defense and ensuring the capability of
destroying elements of this defense in Europe.
• De-escalating aggression by disrupting command of the aggression,
eliminating the threat of defeat and changing the balance of forces.
Roles above described in public statements/writings of Russia’s military and political leaders and academics.
16
Russia’s NSNWs
Russia’s NSNWs:
 From 15,000-21,700 in 1991 to 2,000 warheads now assigned to delivery
systems, another several thousand awaiting dismantlement. Of those
assigned:
 Some located in central Russia; others are located in the Far East, in western
Russia, and on the Kola Peninsula relatively close to bases with delivery
systems.
 Air Force: 3 types of aircraft with 730 warheads assigned.
 Navy: 150-nuclear capable ships with 700 warheads assigned.
 Ground forces: 100-200 warheads for short-range missiles.
 Air defense forces: 300-400 warheads.
Country
Estimated warheads
 BMD forces: 68Category
nuclear capable interceptors deployed.
 Coastal defense forces: 20 warheads for cruise missiles.
United States
Russia
air, naval
air, naval, ground, air-defense
760
2,000
Reasons for the assymetry: While the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff sees no role U.S. NSNWs in Europe
that cannot be performed by either U.S. strategic nuclear forces or conventional forces, the
Russian General Staff sees a number of utilities in maintaining a formidable number of NSNWs
both west and east of Urals.
Source: "Nonstrategic nuclear weapons, 2012” Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, BAS,
September 2012.
17
Risks and Costs Incurred by Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons
1.
2.
3.
4.
More likely to be used than SNWs in wartime.
Ambiguity destabilizing in times of crisis.
Entrench Russia and NATO in a military stand-off.
Give other states an excuse, if not a reason, to
seek nuclear weapons.
5. Threat of unauthorized use – diminished, but
still not negligible.
18
Conditions and Obstacles on the Way towards Negotiation
and Implementation of a Verifiable NSNW Reduction and
Accounting Agreement with Russia:
1. Conditioning and bundling with other issues:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe (withdrawal as
precondition).
Missile defense.
Conventional forces in Europe.
Long-range conventional strike weapons.
Weaponization of space.
2. Obstacles:
a) Opposition by military and industry.
b) Difficulties in establishing effective accounting and verification procedures for
NSNW control agreements.
c) Asymmetry in numbers, types and ranges.
d) Lack of a common definition of tactical weapons.
e) Ambiguity of dual-use delivery systems.
19
Options for Possible NSNW
• Russia’s unlikely to concede to major reductions/parity even
though it needs only low hundreds at most, so focus on unilateral
or bilateral steps to attain for (warheads rather than delivery
systems):
– Transparency:
• exchange information on numbers and types of NSNW eliminated by PNIs;
• exchange information on the numbers, types, and location of operationally
deployed NSNWs;
• mutual on-sight inspections.
–
–
–
–
–
Demating.
Relocation.
Consolidation.
No increase commitment.
Bundle with revival of conventional arms control in Europe?
20
The bigger picture: Steps to transition from
“Mutually Assured Destruction” to
“Mutually Assured Stability”
Traditional agenda:
• Missile cooperation as a game changer.
– Putin’s calm reaction to Bush Jr’s 2001 withdrawal
from ABM an indicator: let’s “work out new
framework of strategic relations.”
• Greater transparency in nuclear posture.
• More time for warning and decision.
New agenda: Deep economic cooperation as
foundation for U.S.-Russian partnership.
21
45000
20000
15000
Year 1945
Year 1948
Year 1951
Year 1954
Year 1957
Year 1960
Year 1963
Year 1966
Year 1969
Year 1972
Year 1975
Year 1978
Year 1981
Year 1984
Year 1987
Year 1990
Year 1993
Year 1996
Year 1999
Year 2002
Year 2005
Year 2008
Year 2011
Traditional agenda: Russian and U.S. arsenals
in 1945-2011
Source: NRDC and FAS
Total number of warheads in active stockpiles
40000
35000
30000
25000
US
Russia
10000
5000
0
22
Russia’s top foreign trade partners
Russia's Foreign Trade in 2011 (in mn of USD)
Partner
Volume
Export
Import
% Share
% Growth
1. EU
393987.7
266457.8
127529.9
48.0
128.3
2. APEC
196503.5
92979.6
103523.9
23.9
135.3
3. CIS
122560.1
78260.0
44300.1
14.9
134.2
4. China
83505.0
35240.6
48264.4
10.2
140.8
5. Netherlands
68491.3
62567.3
5924.0
8.3
117.2
6. Germany
71849.8
34173.7
37676.1
8.7
137.2
7. EurAsEC
8. Customs
Union
64603.4
41816.5
22786.9
7.9
132.1
58373.5
37829.2
20544.3
7.1
135.2
9. Italy
45982.7
32582.0
13400.8
5.6
122.6
10. Ukraine
50630.4
30509.6
20120.8
6.2
136.1
11. Belarus
38607.6
24922.6
13685.0
4.7
137.7
12. Turkey
31803.2
25429.1
6374.0
3.9
126.3
13. USA
31205.9
16604.4
14601.5
3.8
133.3
23
Russia and United States from each other’s perspective
Category
Deployed strategic nuclear
weapons.
Oil production.
Russia from the perspective of
U.S. interests
No. 2 (1,537)
USA from the perspective of
Russian interests.
No. 1 (1,800).
Natural gas production.
No. 1 (10,229 thousand barrels
per day).
No. 2 (22,990 billion cubic feet).
No. 3 (10,142 thousand barrels
per day).
No. 1 (26,836 billion cubic feet).
GDP (dollar exchange rate) .
No. 9 ($1,857,770 million).
No 1 ($15,094,000 million).
GDP (PPP).
No 1 ($15,075 billion).
Global exports.
No. 6 ($2,812,383 million, just
behind Germany.)
No. 9 ($520,900 million).
Global imports.
No. 17 ($322,500 million).
No. 1 ($2,236,000million).
Bilateral trade.
Population.
No. 20 on the list of U.S.’
trading partners.
No. 9 (143 million).
No. 8 on the list of Russia’s
trading partners.
No. 3 (314 million).
Total area.
No. 1 (17,098,242 sq. km.)
No. 3. (9,826,675 sq. km.)
Life expectancy.
No. 164 (66.46 years).
No. 51 (78.49 years).
Corruption (the higher the score
and the ranking – the lower
corruption).
No. 143 (score: 2.4).
No. 24 (score: 7.1)
No. 2 ($1,497,000 million).
24
IMF's GDP Forecast PPP
(Billion of USD)
35,000
31,700
30,000
25,850
26,097
25,610
U.S
25,000
20,000
17,925
16,222
15,000
China
20,087
18,437
16,194
14,580
Russia
10,000
8,133
5,926
5,000
1,479
1,900
3,341
4,265
EU
0
2010
2015
2025
2030
25
Population Forecast
(Million)
1600
1400
1338
1453
1431
1396
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
142
359
346
332
309
138
522
514
508
501
135
US
China
Russia
EU
132
0
2010
2015
2020
2025
26