PALGRAVE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF IMPERIALISM AND ANTI-IMPERIALISM
Sendero Luminoso
David Scott Palmer
Boston University
dspalmer@bu.edu
Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path, emerged in 1980 as a guerrilla organization in the
south-central highland department of Ayacucho, Peru. Espousing a radical Maoist ideological
line of people’s war from a part of the country that was both quite isolated and largely rural
and indigenous seemed at the time to be quixotic in the extreme, given the larger national
context at that very moment of an unprecedented democratic transition. Yet over the course of
the next decade or so political violence in Peru brought death and destruction to large swaths
of the country and brought central government virtually to its knees. Just when it appeared that
Sendero was poised for victory, however, the tables abruptly turned with the September 1992
capture of the group’s founder and maximum leader, Abimael Guzmán Reynoso. Within
months, government forces had regained the advantage, and by the mid-1990s the guerrillas
were a spent force.
Although no longer a threat to the state, scattered armed cadre remnants remained
which, beginning in 2006, gradually regenerated a modest operational capacity in coca growing
and cocaine producing enclaves of the Upper Huallaga and Apurímac river valleys. Some
Sendero sympathizers also retained influence within the national teachers union, while others
established a popular front type political wing based in Lima in an effort to influence national
politics. While it is unlikely that what remains of Shining Path in its most recent manifestations
will become a significant guerrilla or political force in the future, its violent past continues to
affect Peru in multiple ways.
Explaining the Origins and Rise of Sendero Luminoso
Guerrilla movements usually emerge in response to some combination of repressive
dictatorships, systematic exploitation, and sustained economic crisis. The case of Peru and
Shining Path, however, was in a number of ways the product of a somewhat different and more
complex set of forces. The military regime in power there between 1968 and 1980 was
authoritarian, to be sure, but at the same time was, arguably, also the most reformist
government in Peru’s post-independence history. This self-titled “Revolutionary Military
Government” carried out a major agrarian reform, nationalized the country’s most important
mining companies, began the reorganization of private industry into worker-managed
enterprises, and became a leader in the international non-aligned movement. The stated goal
of the military leaders was, at root, focused on national security. They wanted to reduce or
1
even eliminate the possibility of a guerrilla insurgency by overcoming extreme poverty and
exploitation through a “revolution from above” under their direction for the benefit of peasants
and workers.
However, for a variety of reasons the military in power gradually lost its reformist
momentum. First, it was unable to generate from the domestic economy the large quantity of
new resources needed to finance its ambitious initiatives, so it turned to short-term foreign
loans. Secondly, the expected revenues from exports of significant oil deposits discovered in
1972 were delayed for several critical years by problems in developing the infrastructure which
would bring them to market. Third, the regime lost its most ardent reformer with the illness,
replacement, and death of head of state (1968-75) General Juan Velasco Alvarado. Fourth, an
economic crisis which included stagnation in economic growth, rising inflation, and significant
arrears in repayment of the ballooning foreign debt gripped Peru in 1977 and 1978.
In addition, the implementation of the agrarian reform in the highlands, or sierra,
turned out to be ill-suited to the dominant pattern there of large numbers of indigenous
communities and few prosperous private estates subject to expropriation. As a result, the
heightened expectations generated by the official rhetoric of “land to the tiller” were dashed
with the implementation of the agrarian reform, as the already modest pre-reform livelihoods
of most highland peasants deteriorated even further.
In combination, then, a significant unintended and totally counterproductive
consequence of the military’s multiple initiatives to change the structure of economic, social,
and political power in Peru was the gradual fostering of a reality that was more rather than less
favorable for guerrilla activity, particularly in parts of the Peruvian sierra.
Other factors, both historical and contemporary, also help to explain the emergence of
Sendero Luminoso as a guerrilla force in the sierra more generally and in Ayacucho in particular.
One relates to the Spanish conquest of the Inca Empire centered in the Andean highlands and
almost 300 years of Spanish administrative control of the region under a viceroyalty from its
capital, Lima, on the coast. This introduced a centuries-long period of coastal domination of the
largely indigenous sierra, a pattern of centralized control which continued for almost 200 more
years, from independence in the 1820s all the way through the 20th century. As a result,
government resources as well as economic activity were concentrated in Lima and the coast,
leaving most of the sierra population poor and marginalized and progressively reinforcing over
time an ethnic cleavage as well as the profound natural geographic cleavage between the two
regions.
A more contemporary factor specific to Ayacucho was the re-founding of the colonial
university there in 1959, some 80 years after its closure due to Peru’s economic collapse with
2
its loss to Chile in the War of the Pacific (1879-83). The National University of San Cristóbal de
Huamanga (UNSCH) was reopened with the lofty goal, unique at the time, of serving as an
incubator and promoter of local development and of providing an opportunity for first
generation Spanish speakers from the indigenous communities predominating in the region to
receive a university education. During its first few years, with an ample budget and a unique
vision among Peruvian universities of the day, it attracted some of the country’s leading
scholars with a diversity of ideological perspectives, along with a few recent graduates of other
institutions, including, in mid-1962, Abimael Guzmán Reynoso.
Although no one could have predicted it at the time, Guzmán turned out to be
another critical factor in laying a foundation for the armed struggle in Peru – the key figure any
potential revolutionary movement must have to organize, inspire, and lead a guerrilla campaign
against established authority. Originally appointed as a professor of philosophy in the
Education Program, he soon had revitalized the Communist Party of Ayacucho and had
established himself as a leading Marxist at UNSCH as well. A charismatic teacher, strategist, and
organizer, he attracted many students and a number of fellow professors as well with his
Marxist-Leninist and then Maoist rhetoric after the 1962-63 Sino-Soviet split. He became the
head of the teacher training school, where he helped to prepare a generation of elementary
school teachers, many of whom returned to the primary schools in their home indigenous
communities of rural Ayacucho. After his supporters won university-wide elections in 1968, he
was named UNSCH Secretary-General, with control over most appointments. Over time, he
became a dominant figure in the Maoist movement and then its undisputed leader by the early
1970s. In the name of ideological purity, he gradually undermined the early academic diversity
of the university and turned its original regional development role into a vehicle for expanding a
Maoist world view throughout the Ayacucho hinterlands.
With the financial support of the Beijing government, Guzmán made at least three
extended trips to China for training between 1965 and 1976, along with most of the other
members of his party’s central committee, which was drawn largely from former UNSCH
students and faculty. Their trips coincided with the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).
Over time the Peruvian contingent progressively identified with the Cultural Revolution’s most
radical faction, led by Madame Mao as the head of the so-called Gang of Four, which advocated
permanent revolution in the name of ideological purity. When this faction eventually lost out
within China to the more moderate elements led by Deng Xiaoping, Chinese support for
Guzmán and Peru’s Maoists ended and they were left to fend for themselves.
This unanticipated event marked an historical turning point in the development of
Sendero Luminoso over the next four years. Guzmán’s analysis of successful Communist
revolutions, including the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba, concluded that all had betrayed the
3
Marxist, Leninist, and Maoist ideological principles upon which they had been founded. As a
result, he believed, the only way to sweep away the forces of capitalism as well as the now
corrupted socialist states was through a new world Communist revolution, which would lead in
time to the establishment of more pure “New Democracies.” Given such a betrayal, it would be
necessary, Guzmán believed, to begin anew with a true revolution that would start in Peru
under his leadership.
Having been cast aside by China, his erstwhile outside mentor and supporter, Guzmán
was determined to build a revolutionary force with resources drawn totally from within the
country. He would lead the guerrilla struggle with the group that he had been slowly building
for more than a decade. He considered it to be the only truly revolutionary communist party,
which he insisted in calling the Communist Party of Peru (PCP) even though those outside the
movement continued to label Sendero Luminoso or Shining Path. With the foundations of local
organization and support already well established under his guidance in Ayacucho, Guzmán
concluded that the Maoist people’s war would begin there. Since this region remained quite
isolated from the rest of the country both geographically and administratively, the preparation
of armed cadre and organizational capacity took place over time mostly unperceived by central
government. As the military regime lost momentum and legitimacy in the late 1970s and began
the transition to national elections and civilian government, Guzmán decided that this was the
right moment to launch the people’s war, a decision ratified in an April 1980 PCP assembly.
The initial action took place on May 17, 1980 in Chuschi, a small district capital in
Ayacucho, with the burning of ballot boxes which had been readied for the next day’s national
elections, Peru’s first since 1963. There was no way of knowing at the time that this act would
presage years of guerrilla war and military response and produce close to 70,000 deaths and
the destruction of over $20 billion in property and infrastructure, along with some 650,000
internal refugees and more than one million emigrants. Although the department of Ayacucho
bore the brunt of the violence, over the course of the next dozen years political violence and
physical destruction spread to almost every part of the country, and for a time threatened the
very foundations of the Peruvian state.
Explaining Sendero Luminoso Guerrilla Advances
Several factors help to explain why Sendero Luminoso’s people’s war advanced as far as
it did. They include both the nature of the Peruvian state’s response and the way the Shining
Path pursued the armed struggle. As far as the role of the state was concerned, an important
consideration was the initial reluctance of the newly elected civilian government to take the
group seriously and to respond when it was still a small, weak, and localized guerrilla force.
Ayacucho was remote and far removed from the capital in Lima, and the early actions of
Sendero were seen as nothing more than those of local cattle rustlers and their ilk. In addition,
4
newly elected President Fernando Belaúnde Terry (1963-68 and 1980-85) had been removed
from office by a military coup during his first term. As a result, he was very sensitive to any
initiative he might take at the outset of his second term which would expand the role of the
armed forces and quite possibly put his presidency at risk once again.
President Belaúnde delayed issuing a presidential order to commit the military to
engage Sendero in Ayacucho and the surrounding area until December 1982, more than a year
and a half after the first guerrilla actions. As a result, the insurgents had time to grow and to
establish a presence in much of rural Ayacucho as well as in the neighboring sierra departments
of Huancavelica and Apurímac. They attacked the small police stations scattered throughout
the provincial capitals, seizing the weapons and ammunition stored there and forcing the
virtually complete withdrawal of their personnel to the department capital. With the
countryside then bereft of government presence, Sendero cadre and sympathizers were able to
gain control of scores of indigenous communities in the region. The one action Belaúnde did
take, in 1981, was a disaster. He ordered a specialized contingent of police, called Sinchi, to
Ayacucho, but when their actions included pillage, rape, and drunken brawls, he was forced to
remove them in disgrace.
Under the Peruvian Constitution of 1979, provinces under significant natural or manmade threat could be declared to be Emergency Zones, which included suspension of
constitutional guarantees and the supplanting of civilian authority with military control.
President Belaúnde finally invoked this provision in seven provinces of Ayacucho, Apurímac,
and Huancavelica at the end of 1982. Over the course of the following decade as political
violence spread, about one-third of Peru’s 185 provinces, containing over half the national
population, became subject to military authority.
Unfortunately, throughout the 1980s, central government’s response to the expanding
threat of Shining Path was almost exclusively military in nature, and as such, it actually made
the situation worse by often indiscriminate killings and repression of local populations, more
than often indigenous. The first two years of major military operations to deal with the
guerrillas, 1983 and 1984, were also among those marked by the highest numbers of civilian
casualties (well over 4,000 each year) during the entire conflict. There was a lack of awareness
or understanding of sierra mores and customs, made even worse by central military authority’s
unwillingness to send troops from the area to their regions of origin. Such levels of violence
against citizens by forces ostensibly sent to protect them from Sendero wound up pushing
many into the arms of the very group the state was trying to eliminate.
By the end of the decade, Shining Path was in effective control of large swaths of rural
Ayacucho, where its operatives had established between 700 and 800 “generated
organizations” at the community level of an approximate total of 1100 such building blocks
5
sierra-wide of what was to become the group’s “New Democracy.” With a central committee
headed by Guzmán and six regional committees under his guidance but with operational
autonomy, guerrilla violence spread throughout most of the sierra. Annihilation squads
targeted local figures for elimination, focusing primarily on elected officials and judges, which
dissuaded many others from running for office. In the 1988 local elections, hundreds of districts
lacked candidates and turnout was dramatically reduced. At about the same time, Guzmán,
believing the moment had arrived to “encircle the cities,” began a campaign to cut off Lima’s
access to food, water, and electricity from the sierra and to take the guerrilla war to the capital.
With access to new sources of revenue after 1987 in the coca-producing Upper Huallaga Valley
in the north central highland department of San Martín from “taxes” levied on the cocaine
paste carried by planes flying out of the valley to Colombia, Shining Path was becoming an even
more formidable adversary. By the end of a decade of “people’s war,” Sendero was estimated
to have between 7,000 and 10,000 armed cadre operating in all but one of Peru’s 24
departments and between 200,000 and 300,000 supporters and sympathizers nation-wide.
At the same time, the so-called “heterodox” economic policies pursued by the elected
government of Alan García Pérez (1985-90) were producing rapidly increasing inflation and
negative growth which generated a significant erosion of central government capacity and
popular support. With hyperinflation gripping Peru and Lima facing greater and greater
shortages provoked by a combination of foreign debt default and Sendero’s urban campaign,
hundreds of thousands of Peruvians fled the country. As the 1990 national elections
approached, Peru’s situation appeared to be increasingly dire. Given the successive failures of
two successive traditional parties to govern effectively in office (Belaúnde’s Acción Popular – AP
and García’s Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana – APRA), it is not surprising that an
increasingly desperate electorate turned to an outsider with no prior political experience or the
backing of an organized political party, Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000).
In the short run, the situation worsened. Inflation peaked in 1990 at 7,650 percent, an
economic shock program created even greater hardships among an already beleaguered
population, and government institutions verged on collapse. Guzmán declared the guerrilla war
at a stage of “strategic equilibrium” in its battle against government forces and began to predict
victory in the very near future. President Fujimori appeared to play into Sendero hands in April
1992 when he suspended congress, the judiciary, and constitutional guarantees in an autogolpe
or self-coup that ended democratic process. In the months that followed, Guzmán and his
Central Committee drew up plans for a “final offensive” scheduled to begin in October and
culminate with a guerrilla triumph in December, the month of Mao’s birthday.
6
Explaining Sendero Luminoso’s Failure
Yet just when Sendero appeared to be on the verge of a stunning triumph, Guzmán and
several key subordinates were captured, along with the guerrilla organization’s master files,
blows from which it never recovered. The explanation for such a dramatic and apparently
sudden turnaround relates to a number of factors involving both government and the guerrillas.
Beginning in 1989, the armed forces, belatedly recognizing the failure of their longstanding approach to fighting Sendero which focused almost exclusively on military actions,
conducted a comprehensive review that produced a new counterinsurgency doctrine. Core
tactics now began to emphasize civic action, human rights training, the use of military
personnel from the localities of operations, and, for the first time, the training and equipping of
community civil defense groups, or rondas campesinas as the first line of defense against
guerrilla attacks. At about the same time, the Interior Ministry responsible for the national
police established a small autonomous unit with the task of locating and tracking Sendero
leadership. Both of these significant initiatives begun near the end of the García administration
were continued and reinforced by President Fujimori.
In 1991 and 1992, the Fujimori government also established several micro-development
organizations explicitly designed to provide small-scale assistance to the poorest districts in
Peru, almost all of which were rural and were affected by political violence. Communities chose
the projects, which included potable water, electrification, roads, schools, irrigation, soil
conservation, and reforestation. They provided the labor and the oversight, while the
organizations, each comprised of no more than 300 well-qualified professionals with substantial
regional autonomy, gave materials and technical assistance. Between 1992 and 1998, these
small micro-development programs, though averaging about $2,000 each, delivered over $1
billion in projects to poor districts and contributed to a reduction in extreme poverty by more
than 50 percent.
A more controversial initiative, but one born of necessity, was the establishment of
“faceless” judges to protect officials from threats and assassination while they oversaw trials of
captured guerrillas. Since between 1988 and 1992 Shining Path cadre had killed over 100 judges
and had threatened hundreds of others, this appeared at the time to be the only way to protect
judicial system personnel while fostering greater efficiency and effectiveness. Though later
declared void by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), thereby requiring
new trials in the early 2000s, the unorthodox judicial procedures helped to reestablish a
semblance of the rule of law and governmental capacity in the eyes of the Peruvian public.
Another measure, instituted after the capture and trial of Guzmán and the rounding up
of hundreds of upper and middle level guerrillas, was a government-decreed repentance law. It
7
was designed to encourage Shining Path members and sympathizers to turn themselves in with
whatever weapons and information they possessed, in exchange for government-sponsored
rehabilitation, job training, and a stipend, followed by their return to their home communities.
During the two years the law was in effect, over 5,000 availed themselves of this opportunity,
effectively draining Sendero of much of its remaining support.
While this array of government initiatives, however belated, contributed in various ways
to help overcome the very real threat that Shining Path posed to the continued existence of the
state, other factors relating to the guerrilla organization itself also played a significant role in its
demise.
One of the most important was the remarkably hydrocephalic structure of Sendero.
Abimael Guzmán Reynoso was not only the founder, but also the key interpreter of MarxistLeninist-Maoist ideology as well as the organizer and strategist. From his earliest years at the
University of Huamanga in the 1960s through the twelve years of “people’s war,” Guzmán
embraced a cult of personality toward himself far beyond that of any previous successful
revolutionary leaders elsewhere during the course of their guerrilla struggles. Given his
overwhelmingly dominant role, then, his capture effectively cut off the head of the movement,
left no legitimate successor, and dealt a devastating psychological blow from which Sendero
never recovered. “The capture of the century,” as Peruvian media called it, was the definitive
turning point in the guerrilla war; besides vindicating official counterinsurgency strategy, it also
gave government the public support it so desperately needed at that critical juncture in its
struggle to survive.
Another key factor was Guzmán’s obsession with ideological purity in his quest for a
true revolution that would not fall into revisionism once successful, as he believed had occurred
in the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba, among others. His writings are replete with labored
analyses of the ideology of leading Marxists in his search for ideological correctness. Such an
obsession led him to misinterpret totally the actual reality of Peru as he prepared for and then
led his guerrilla war – the military’s reforms, however incomplete, had ended any vestiges of
feudalism and landlord domination in the countryside, while hundreds of centuries-old
indigenous communities retained their presence throughout the sierra. Peru in the 1980s bore
little resemblance to China of the 1930s in spite of Guzmán’s insistence that they were at
similar stages of pre-capitalist and capitalist development.
He also failed to follow Mao’s dictum that the rural-based guerrilla movement must be
like “fish in the water” during the struggle and respond to peasant priorities to gain their
support. Instead, he insisted on ending ubiquitous indigenous markets because they were
capitalist manifestations and also imposed a new structure of ideologically correct “generated
organisms” in communities where indigenous structures of ayllu and varyoc had prevailed for
8
centuries. As a result of the local resistance created by such initiatives in areas under Sendero
influence, guerrilla cadre resorted to increasingly repressive measures to retain control. When
the government finally changed its counterinsurgency approach, beginning in 1989-1990, local
populations increased their efforts to take on Shining Path forces with community-based
rondas and progressively abandoned guerrilla control as government presence increased across
the sierra.
Another significant factor in Sendero’s demise was Guzmán’s decision to apply Maoist
tactics of “surrounding the cities from the countryside,” specifically Lima, beginning in 1988.
This campaign experienced initial successes by cutting off two of the three major electrical
transmission lines from the sierra into Lima, as well as sabotaging the most important
aqueduct, the rail line, and the one paved highway from the highlands to the capital. In
addition, the urban campaign included targeted assassinations of some key popular
neighborhood leaders, along with regular bombings of banks, commercial establishments, and
even apartment buildings in middle class neighborhoods. As the guerrilla campaign began to
seriously affect the daily lives of the capital city’s eight million people for the first time, the
realization grew that this struggle was not limited to remote areas of the highlands, and public
pressure grew for central government to take effective action. Such pressure contributed to the
major review of official approaches to the insurgency in 1989 and 1990 and to the significant
adjustments that occurred as a result. These played major roles in defeating Shining Path in the
early 1990s.
In addition to provoking the large urban population, the decision to take the guerrilla
war to Lima as a prelude to the “final offensive” had the unintended consequence of giving
Peru’s intelligence services an advantage they had not had in the sierra. They were much more
familiar with the urban setting and had a much stronger presence in the capital. As a result,
government intelligence operatives were better equipped to track down guerrillas there, and
had a number of successes even before locating and capturing Sendero’s maximum leader in
the Lima suburb of Surco in September 1992. This operation was a model of urban
counterinsurgency, which included several weeks of placing police intelligence personnel in key
locations around Guzmán’s “safe” house and disguising them as neighbors, vendors, and
garbage collectors. When one of the guerrilla leader’s subordinates went out to buy wine and
cigarettes at the corner store, they followed her back into the house and, without firing a shot,
captured Guzmán, four other members of the Central Committee, and the master plans for the
“final offensive.”
Conclusion
Although it took some time for the political violence to subside, the blow to Sendero
with the dramatic capture of its leader signaled that the government’s victory over the
9
guerrillas was all but inevitable. In combination with economic recovery and the restoration of
sustained growth without inflation, as well as the reestablishment of democratic procedures
under pressure from the Organization of American States (OAS), Peru gradually regained its
equilibrium. Although President Fujimori was removed from office by congress in 2000 for
pursuing an increasingly corrupt and authoritarian political agenda, a combination of elected
presidents and economic growth since then have gradually helped to consolidate democracy in
Peru. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission produced a comprehensive study of the conflict in
2004 which documented abuses by both Shining Path and the military and made
recommendations for reparations to the most affected communities and individuals,
overwhelmingly concentrated in Ayacucho and surrounding districts. After long delays,
remuneration for some 1500 communities was provided in 2011, and for more than 17,000
individuals by late 2013.
Remnants of Shining Path reemerged in the Apurímac and Upper Huallaga river valleys
after 2006, both financed by coca and cocaine production, but, after some years of official
missteps, were significantly weakened by police (2012, Upper Huallaga) and combined militarypolice (2013, Apurímac) responses and represent no threat to the state. A political group based
in Lima, the Movement for Amnesty and Fundamental Human Rights (MOVADEF), is
sympathetic with a variation of Sendero ideology but espouses protest rather than violence and
tried unsuccessfully to register as a political party for either the 2011 national or the 2014 local
elections. Guzmán remains in jail, serving a life sentence, and now asserts that this is not a
moment to pursue revolutionary violence in Peru.
While the effects of the 1980-1992 “people’s war” linger, especially in those parts of the
sierra which experienced most of the violence, the nation was able to overcome the most
serious internal threat ever faced in its history as an independent republic.
10
REFERENCES
Borja Arce, Luis, and Janet Talavera Sánchez, “La entrevista del siglo: El Presidente Gonzalo
rompe el silencio,” El Diario (Lima), July 24, 1988, 2-48
Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (CVR), Informe final, Tomo I, Primera parte: El proceso,
los hechos, las víctimas (Lima: Editorial Navarrete, 2003)
Degregori, Carlos Iván, Ayacucho 1969-1979: El surgimiento de Sendero Luminoso (Lima:
Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1990)
__________, “After the Fall of Abimael Guzmán: The Limits of Sendero Luminoso,” in Maxwell
A. Cameron and Philip Mauceri, eds. The Peruvian Labyrinth: Polity, Society, Economy
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 179-91
__________, “Harvesting Storms: Peasant Rondas and the Defeat of Sendero Luminoso in
Ayacucho,” in Steve J. Stern, ed. Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 131.40
Gorriti Ellenbogen, Gustavo, Sendero: Historia de la Guerra milenaria en el Perú (Lima: Editorial
apoyo, 1990)
Guzmán Reynoso, Abimael, “¡Que el equilibrio estratégico remezca más el país! (Gran
culminación de la III campaña de impulsar),” unpublished typescript, November 1991
__________, “Exclusive Comments by Abimael Guzmán,” World Affairs 156:1 (Summer 1993),
52-7
__________, De puño y letra (Lima: Manoalzada, 2009)
Jiménez Bacca, Benigno, Inicio, desarrollo y ocaso del terrorismo en el Perú, Vols. I-III (Lima:
Editorial SANKI, 2000)
Palmer, David Scott, “Rebellion in Rural Peru: The Origins and Evolution of Sendero Luminoso,”
Comparative Politics 18:2 (January 1986), 127-46
__________, ed. Shining Path of Peru, 2nd edition (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994)
__________, “Terror in the Name of Mao: Revolution and Response in Peru,” in Robert J. Art
and Linda Richardson, eds. Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past
(Washington DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 195-219
Starn, Orin, ed. Hablan los ronderos: La búsqueda por la paz en los Andes, Documento de
Trabajo 45 (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1993)
11
Tapia, Carlos, Las Fuerzas Armadas y Sendero Luminoso: Dos estrategias y un final (Lima:
Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1997)
12