AREVA NP > AREVA NP GmbH • NRPP-G, 2009-05-27 All rights are reserved, see liability notice. 1 BELENE NPP SAFETY I&C SYSTEMS BASED ON TELEPERM XS Speaker: Co-Author: Ognyan Trichkov (MSC) – AREVA NP GmbH Dipl.-Ing. Hartwig Blessing – AREVA NP GmbH BULGARIAN NUCLEAR ENERGY – NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND WORLD ENERGY SAFETY Varna 27-29.05.09 AREVA NP > AREVA NP GmbH • NRPP-G, 2009-05-27 All rights are reserved, see liability notice. 2 Guideline for the Presentation 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. AREVA NP Requirements by Customer and IAEA Identification of I&C Systems Plant Control Philosophy Overview System Platform Teleperm XS Teleperm XS References > AREVA NP GmbH • NRPP-G, 2009-05-27 All rights are reserved, see liability notice. 3 1. Requirements by NEK and IAEA Correlation between Classification Concepts NEK requires a Safety function classification based on IAEA and International Electro technical Commission (IEC) Nuclear Standard The correlation between > Safety classes of fluid-retaining components > Classes of I&C systems according to IAEA NS-G-1.3 > Classes of I&C systems according to IEC 61513 > Categories of I&C FSE according to IEC 61226 is provided in this table. AREVA NP > AREVA NP GmbH • NRPP-G, 2009-05-27 All rights are reserved, see liability notice. 4 1. Requirements by NEK and IAEA Safety Philosophy Safety Philosophy Off-site emergency response Availability Control of design base accidents Detection and Interception Line of Defense Main Line of Defense Reliability Detection & interception of deviations from normal operation Preventive Line of Defense Maintainability Compliance of normal operation Redundancy and Single Failure Criterion, 1st Line Integrity - Security 2nd Line Credibility AREVA NP Risk Reduction Line of Defense Distribution of I&C Functions > > Name of Defense Line 3rd Line > Concept of Defense in Depth 4th Line > > > Fission Products Operational I&C System Process Automation System (PAS) Preventive Protection System Prevention of Common-Cause Failures Diversity of I&C Systems Independence and Separation > AREVA NP GmbH • NRPP-G, 2009-05-27 Reactor Limitation Control System (RLCS) Safety Automation System (SAS) Safety Systems Protection System with Reactor Trip and ESFAS I&C Control of beyond design accident Post Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) I&C Systems which implements the Defense Lines All rights are reserved, see liability notice. 5 2. Identification of I&C Systems The I&C functions are grouped as follows: > > > > > > Process information and control functions Reactor limitation functions Reactor power control functions Protection functions Automatic backup functions Post accident monitoring functions On the basis of the identification of functions that are required I&C systems are established to perform these functions. The main systems are: > Process Information and Control System (PICS) > Safety Information and Control System (SICS) > Process Automation System (PAS) > Safety Automation System (SAS) > Reactor Limitation and Control System (RLCS) > Protection System (PS) > Passive Heat Removal System (PHRA) > Post Accident Monitoring System (part of SICS) These I&C systems make up the architecture of the Instrumentation and Control System. AREVA NP > AREVA NP GmbH • NRPP-G, 2009-05-27 All rights are reserved, see liability notice. 6 3. Plant Control Philosophy Main Control Room (MCR) Remote Shut Down Station IEC 61226 Safety Functions QDS 1 QDS 2 PAMS Post Accident Monitoring System SICS OM Process Control and Information unclassified Category A Category B Category C PAS (SPPA-T2000) SAS (SPPA-T2000) By Siemens By Siemens RLCS (TXS) QDS 2 Service Unit PAMS Post Accident Monitoring System Process Control and Information PICS PICS QDS 1 OM SICS PHRA PS (TXS) (TXS PLD) PACS (TXS) Instrumentation Operational System AREVA NP > AREVA NP GmbH • Switchgears Operational System NRPP-G, 2009-05-27 Control Trip Core Control Rods Instrumentation Switchgears Safety Systems Safety Systems All rights are reserved, see liability notice. 7 3.1 Protection System > > > > Redundancy: fourfold Functional Diversity Automatically initiates the reactivity control system (Reactor Trip) ESFAS (Engineered Safety Features Actuation System) initiate and control safety systems that remove heat or otherwise assists in maintaining the integrity of the three physical barriers to radioactive release (cladding, reactor coolant pressure boundary and containment). > The Protection System design is carried out redundantly and diversely according to single failure criterion and with consideration of the common course failure. AREVA NP > AREVA NP GmbH • NRPP-G, 2009-05-27 All rights are reserved, see liability notice. 8 3.2 Passive Heat Removal Activation System (PHRA) > > > Redundancy fourfold > Programmable logic control system with a different hardware (TXS PLD) Hardware diversity Open air gates in case of Protection System failure (Power Supply is available) This picture is taken from the presentation “Experimental Calculation basis parameter for Passive Heat Removal System”, Authors L. Egorova and A. Plakseev of Atomenergoprom, Bulatom Conference 2008 AREVA NP > AREVA NP GmbH • NRPP-G, 2009-05-27 All rights are reserved, see liability notice. 9 3.3 Reactor Limitation and Control System > Redundancy fourfold > Limitation functions for reactor power and other important process parameters > Support functions in case of actuation of Protection System > Reactor control functions (twofold redundancy) > The design is carried out redundantly according to single failure criterion. AREVA NP > AREVA NP GmbH • NRPP-G, 2009-05-27 All rights are reserved, see liability notice. 10 3.4 Priority Actuation Control System (PACS) Solution by AV42 (special type of function modules dealing with all actuator control tasks, especially for priority control, and monitoring for each single actuator) MCR RSS CRSEL Control tile OM PS RLCS Organization of priority commands (from high to low) > > > > > AREVA NP Protection System Reactor Limitation and Control System Plant bus OPDIS R AP(SPPA) S1 or PROFIBUS Front plate Simulation Commands Safety classified part Priority control of module AV42 Operational non classified part Bus interface PAC Safety Automation System Process Automation System Control tile To switchgear Manual control signals from SICS > AREVA NP GmbH • NRPP-G, 2009-05-27 All rights are reserved, see liability notice. 11 3.5 Supervision and Control Level AREVA NP > As human machine interface serves the Process Information and Control system (PICS), it is used for process monitoring and operating in all plant situations. > Safety Information and Control System (SICS) contains 4 safety panels for operating and monitoring of ESFAS functions and the Reactor Protection Panel (RPP) with all indications for messages from the Protection System and the most important messages from RLCS. > AREVA NP GmbH • NRPP-G, 2009-05-27 All rights are reserved, see liability notice. 12 4.Overview System Platform Teleperm XS Tools for Engineering and Maintenance AREVA NP TXS System Software TXS System Documentation TXS System Hardware Gateways and Interface Solutions > AREVA NP GmbH • NRPP-G, 2009-05-27 All rights are reserved, see liability notice. 13 Sequence of Qualification Steps TELEPERM XS Qualification and Licensing AREVA NP > AREVA NP GmbH • Site Tests Factory Acceptance Test Project-Specific Qualification of Application has to be performed in each project Manufacturing Tests Hardware Software Verification of Specification Integration and System Test Component Type Tests Hardware Software Concept Review of System Development NRPP-G, 2009-05-27 Generic System Qualification performed once and maintained for the TELEPERM XS system platform All rights are reserved, see liability notice. 14 5.References TELEPERM XS, SPPA-T2000 and SIMATIC S5/S7 Implementations and orders Plant Units 72 Plants 45 Countries 17 Reactor Supplier* 11 * Chinese Designs have been merged AREVA NP > AREVA NP GmbH • NRPP-G, 2009-05-27 All rights are reserved, see liability notice. 15 THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION AREVA NP > AREVA NP GmbH • NRPP-G, 2009-05-27 All rights are reserved, see liability notice. 16