1NC vs MM Lin Li
OFF
1nc extra t
A. Interpretation-The aff can only defend advantages based off the
instrumental implementation of the plan.
B. Violation-they claim advantages off reading the aff and things like in round
epistemology-that has nothing to do with implementation of the plan
C. Kills clash-they can access infinite advantages or ethical framing from the
extra topical parts of the aff- they literally claim offense in the 1AC for reading
“Islamopobia bad” which we can’t contest.
D. Topicality is a voter because the ability to prepare and clash the aff promotes
better debating.
1nc pic
We affirm the entirety of the 1ac except for the plan text.
The assumption of 1AC solvency papers over reality with normative legal talk,
emotionally disconnecting them from the implications of the speech act and
evacuating our agency
Delgado 1991 [Richard (Professor of civil rights and critical race theory @ University of Alabama Law School), “Norms and
Normal Science: Toward a Critique of Normativity in Legal Thought,” U Penn Law Review, Vol. 139: 933,
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3742&context=penn_law_review, Accessed 7/21/15, pg. 957-958, AX]
Normativity not only anesthetizes powerful actors, making it easier for them to do their work,
it can paralyze the rest of us, leading us to cooperate passively in our own mistreatment. The
principal danger to human autonomy and worth today is large bureaucracies -- corporations, Health
Maintenance Organizations, mega-universities, and the like. Because of their own internal structures and needs, these organizations
function best if they can treat the rest of us like numbers, according to routine. 99 Yet this must
not appear to be so -- we would revolt, would demand more personalized treatment, which would disrupt the routine.
Bureaucracies thus adopt the discourse of normativity to make us think we are being treated
with care and consideration when we are not. And they employ a host of smiling agents -- publicists,
insurance adjusters, account clerks, claims agents, and other "front" persons to talk soothing normatives with us. "We want,
of course, to do what is fair. You must, however, acknowledge your responsibility in this situation. Surely
you don't think our HMO should grant every claim -- we must think of our other patients." Yet the script always ends up having been written by the
Home Office.
The insurance adjuster, it turns out, does not really care for us as persons. 100 If we
enter into this numbing, but vaguely reassuring formal discourse, we will cause little trouble.
But we will, from time to time, get a small jolt -- end up blind-sided by the inexorable weight of the bureaucracy behind the adjuster. We are like
the doe in the headlights, transfixed at the approaching automobile. Like the doe, we
sometimes think we have been spared. The automobile swerves, the kind driver slows. The adjuster turns out to have a little
discretion, which he or she exercises in our favor: The doctor will see us next month, after all. But the doe's problem is not the car
-- it is the road. Another car will come along. Staring at the headlights prevents the doe from
seeing that problem, just as entering into platitudinous, scripted discourse with the various
insurance [*958] adjusters of the world prevents us from appreciating our own dilemma.
The preoccupation with pretending to be policymakers traps them in a
spectator position and bars them from recognizing the bureaucratic violence of
the legal praxis
Schlag 90 (Pierre Schlag, professor of law@ univ. Colorado, stanford law review, november,
page lexis)
All of this can seem very funny. That's because it is very funny. It is also deadly serious. It is deadly serious, because all this
normative legal thought, as Robert Cover explained, takes place in a field of pain and death. n56 And in a
very real sense Cover was right. Yet as it takes place, normative legal thought is playing language games -utterly oblivious to the character of the language games it plays, and thus, utterly
uninterested in considering its own rhetorical and political contributions (or lack thereof) to
the field of pain and death. To be sure, normative legal thinkers are often genuinely
concerned with reducing the pain and the death. However, the problem is not what normative legal thinkers do
with normative legal thought, but what normative legal thought does with normative legal thinkers. What is missing in
normative legal thought is any serious questioning, let alone tracing, of the relations that the
practice, the rhetoric, the routine of normative legal thought have (or do not have) to the field of
pain and death. And there is a reason for that: Normative legal thought misunderstands its own situation. Typically, normative
legal thought understands itself to be outside the field of pain and death and in charge of organizing and policing that field. It is as if
the action of normative legal thought could be separated from the background field of pain and death. This theatrical distinction is
what allows normative legal thought its own self-important, self-righteous, self-image -- its congratulatory sense of its own
accomplishments and effectiveness. All this self-congratulation works very nicely so long as normative legal [*188] thought
continues to imagine itself as outside the field of pain and death and as having effects within that field. n57 Yet it is doubtful this
image can be maintained. It is not so much the case that normative legal thought has effects on the field of pain and death -- at least
not in the direct, originary way it imagines. Rather, it is more the case that normative legal
thought is the pattern, is
the operation of the bureaucratic distribution and the institutional allocation of the pain and
the death. n58 And apart from the leftover ego-centered rationalist rhetoric of the eighteenth century (and our routine), there is
nothing at this point to suggest that we, as legal thinkers, are in control of normative legal thought. The problem for us, as legal
thinkers, is that the
normative appeal of normative legal thought systematically turns us away
from recognizing that normative legal thought is grounded on an utterly unbelievable representation of the field it claims to describe and regulate. The problem for us is that
normative legal thought, rather than assisting in the understanding of present political and
moral situations, stands in the way. It systematically reinscribes its own aesthetic -- its own
fantastic understanding of the political and moral scene. n59Until normative legal thought begins to deal with
its own paradoxical postmodern rhetorical situation, it will remain something of an irresponsible enterprise.
In its rhetorical structure, it will continue to populate the legal academic world with individual
humanist subjects who think themselves empowered Cartesian egos, but who are largely the
manipulated constructions of bureaucratic practices -- academic and otherwise.
Our impact is especially true in context of racialized law- one step reforms are
trumpeted as complete wins and used to ignore systemic problems
Delgado 1991 [Richard (Professor of civil rights and critical race theory @ University of Alabama Law School), “Norms and
Normal Science: Toward a Critique of Normativity in Legal Thought,” U Penn Law Review, Vol. 139: 933,
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3742&context=penn_law_review, Accessed 7/21/15, pg. 945-946, AX]
The ability of normative assertion to change the way we perceive reality was demonstrated by
Stanley Milgram in an experiment now considered a classic.40 Milgram, a psychologist at Yale University, told volunteers that
they would be participating in an experiment on learning. In fact, the purpose of the experiment was to see whether
the subjects could be induced to violate their ethical norms and inhibitions. Each subject -was seated
in front of a console with acalibrated dial, and told that by turning the dial they would administer electric shocks to a "learner"
seated in another room. The subjects were told in no circumstances to turn this dial beyond a point marked with red-doing so could
administer a fatal dose of electricity to the other subject. After the rules were explained, a second investigator, wearing a white coat
and an authoritative demeanor, entered the room and directed the subjects to turn the dials to particular settings. Each time, a
trained actor in the other room emitted a realistic groan or exclamation of pain. The investigator directed the subjects to turn the
dial to higher and higher settings and eventually to exceed the point marked in red. A
high percentage of the subjects
cooperated with the experiment, even administering what they thought might be a lethal dose ofelectricity. Afterward, many
subjects confessed to doubts aboutwhat they were doing, but said they went along with the experiment because, "If he
(meaning the high-authority doctor in charge) said it was all right, then it must be so." Apparently, the
investigator's assurances that administering pain was permissible and part of theexperiment actually
changed the way they saw their behavior.41Ordinary life is full of similar examples in which the mere
pronouncement of something as normatively good or bad changes our perception of it. The
decision in Brown v. Board of Education changed the way we thought about minorities.
Reagan and Reaganomics changed things back again.43 During war, we demonize our enemies,
and thereafter actually see them as grotesque, evil and crafty monsters deserving of their fate on
the battlefield.44 Later, during peacetime, they may become our staunch allies once again. Derrick Bell and other Critical Race
theorists have been pointing out the way in which standard, liberal-coined civil rights law injures the chances
of people of color and solidifies racism.45 Accordingto these writers, one function of our broad system
of race-remedies law is to free society of guilt. Although the remedies are ineffective, they
enable members of the majority group to point to the array of civil rights statutes and case
law which ostensibly assure fair and equal treatment in schools, housing, jobs, and many
other areas of life. With all these elaborate anti discrimination laws on the books, if black people
are still poor and unhappy-well, what can be done? The law's condemnation of racism thus enables us
to blame the victim, praise ourselves for our liberality, and thereby deepen the dilemma of
people of color.
1nc politics
Obama can hold off a veto now – but his political capital is key
Walsh and Barrett 7/16 (Deirdre, Senior Congressional Producer for CNN, Ted, senior
congressional producer for CNN Politics, “WH dispatches Joe Biden to lock down Iran deal on
Capitol Hill,” CNN, 7/16/2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/15/politics/iran-deal-white-housedemocrats-congress/)//duncan
Two days after the Iran deal was unveiled, the Obama administration's sales job is in full
swing.¶ Vice President Joe Biden traveled to Capitol Hill on Wednesday to convince House
Democrats to support the deal, while a small group of senators were invited to the White House to get their questions
answered directly from officials who sat across from the Iranians at the negotiating table. Biden meets with Senate Democrats of the
Foreign Relations Committee on Thursday.¶ House lawmakers said Biden was candid about the strengths and weaknesses of the
compromise deal. One described his behind closed doors pitch.¶ "I'm going to put aside my notes and talk to you from my heart
because I've been in this business for 45 years," Biden said in his opening comments, according to Rep. Bill Pascrell, D-New Jersey,
who attended the session.¶ "I'm not going to BS you. I'm going to tell you exactly what I think," the vice president reportedly said.¶
Obama got a boost from the leader of his party in the chamber when Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi
formally announced Thursday that she was backing the deal.¶ SInce Republicans in the House and
Senate are firmly against the Iran nuclear deal -- announced by President Barack Obama on Tuesday -- the
administration is cranking up its campaign to sway concerned Democrats to back the
agreement.¶ Under legislation that allows Congress to review the agreement, the White House needs to secure
enough votes from members of his own party to sustain the President's promised veto on an
resolution of disapproval -- 145 in the House and 34 in the Senate.¶ After the session with Biden, several House Democrats
stressed that while the process is just beginning, right now the administration likely has the
votes to sustain the President's veto on a resolution to block the deal.¶ "I'm confident they will like it
when they understand it all," the vice president told reporters on his way into the session, beginning what will be a two month
campaign culminating in a vote, expected in September.¶ Democrats,
both for and against the deal, praised
Biden's presentation.¶ "Joe Biden was as good as I've seen him," Rep. John Larson, D-Connecticut, told CNN. "I thought he
did an excellent job."¶ Texas Democratic Rep. Henry Cuellar said Biden is a "master of detail" and helped clarify some
concerns he had about the verification provisions in the deal, but he still planned to carefully study it and said he was
undecided.¶ Pascrell also cited the verification issue as a potential sticking point but said he is leaning 'yes' on the agreement.¶
"On our side of the aisle there is concern and skepticism shared by a number of members but an
openness to be persuaded if the facts take them that way," Rep. Gerry Connolly of Virginia said. "I think
(Biden) made some real progress on behalf of the administration today."¶ But Democratic Rep. Steve Israel of New York, a former
member of Democratic leadership, told reporters he wasn't sold yet.¶ "For me, I still have some very significant questions with
respect to lifting of the embargo on conventional arms. And missiles. The (International Atomic Energy Agency) verification process
for me is not any time anywhere, I think there are some very significant delays built into that," Israel said.¶ Larson noted that both
Biden's presentation, along with Hillary Clinton's a day earlier, who he said spoke favorably about the deal, helped lay
the groundwork for most Democrats to back the White House.¶ At the same time on Wednesday that the
President held a news conference trying to persuade the public he had brokered an strong and effective deal with Iran, Sen. Joe
Manchin, a Democrat from West Virginia, and a handful of other senators, were in a separate part of the White House meeting with
some of the President's top negotiators, who had just returned from Vienna.¶ "I was very satisfied with an awful lot of the answers
we received," Manchin told CNN.¶ The
intimate meeting for senators was another example of the White
House's effort to shore up support in the Senate where leaders believe as many as 15
Democrats could oppose the deal. If they did, it could provide Senate Republicans the votes
needed to override a veto of the disapproval resolution and scuttle the deal.¶ But Manchin, a
centrist who has close relations with senators on both sides of the aisle, said at this point he
has not detected major blowback from Senate Democrats to the deal.¶ "At caucus yesterday I didn't get
a reading there is hard, hard opposition. I did not," he said.¶ In fact, Manchin said he thought Republicans actually might struggle
getting the 60 votes they will need to pass the disapproval resolution, much less the dozen or so votes that might be needed to
sustain a veto.¶ One
key senator whose position will be closely monitored by the White House and his
colleagues from both parties on the Hill, is Sen. Chuck Schumer of New York, the third-ranking Democrats who is poised to
become the Democratic leader in the next Congress. Schumer has many Jewish voters in his state who are
wary of the impact of the Iran agreement on the security of Israel. Schumer said he is skeptical
of the deal and won't decide whether to support it before doing his homework.¶ "I will sit down, I will read the agreement
thoroughly and then I'm gonna speak with officials -- administration officials, people all over on all different sides," he said when
asked about his decision-making process. "Look, this is a decision that shouldn't be made lightly and I am gonna just study this
agreement and talk to people before I do anything else."¶ Sen. John McCain, R-Arizona, a leading critic of the agreement with
Iran, said "the
pressure will be enormous from the administration," as it tries to keep
Democrats from defecting. As chairman of the Armed Services Committee, McCain said he intends to hold hearings to
demonstrate what he calls the "fatal flaws" in the deal.¶ House conservatives speaking at a forum sponsored by the Heritage
Foundation, a conservative think tank, one after another ripped the Iran deal. But they conceded that ultimately they
may not be able to block it.¶ "The game is rigged in favor of getting this done" Ohio Rep. Jim Jordan
said.
Obama will fight the plan in Congress- Recent meeting proves he supports
surveillance of Muslims
Blumenthal 14 (Max Blumenthal: Writer for Alternet- Syndication service and
online community of the alternative press, featuring news stories from
alternative newsweeklies, magazines and web publications, “Obama Humiliates
Muslim Guests at White House Ramadan Event, Endorses Israel’s Gaza Assault
and NSA Surveillance,” 7/17/14, http://www.alternet.org/world/obama-humiliatesmuslim-white-house-guests-endorsing-israels-gaza-assault-defending-nsa, Accessed:
7/17/15, RRR)
At the annual White House Iftar dinner commemorating the Muslim holiday of Ramadan, President Barack Obama endorsed Israel’s ongoing
assault on the Gaza Strip and defended
government spying on Muslim-Americans. Alongside dozens of MuslimWhite House welcomed Israeli Ambassador to the US Ron
Dermer, an outspoken advocate of Israel's settlement enterprise who has claimed Muslim and
Arab culture is endemically violent.¶ In the past, the annual Iftar dinner passed without much notice. Last year, President Barack
American community activists and Muslim diplomats, the
Obama delivered a boilerplate speech to the assembled crowd of Muslim-American community activists and Middle Eastern ambassadors about his
efforts to spur entrepreneurship. But this time, amidst a one-sided Israeli assault on the Gaza Strip that was about to claim its 200th death in just a
week, and which the US had backed to the hilt, the heat was on. ¶ While Obama prepared his remarks, calls rang out with unprecedented intensity for
invitees to boycott the July 14 ceremony. Among those who urged a boycott in protest of the Gaza assault and ongoing government spying on MuslimAmericans was the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), an established presence in Washington representing the country’s largest
Arab-American advocacy group.¶ Joining the boycott call was Mariam Abu-Ali, the sister of Ahmed Abu Ali, a US citizen renditioned to Saudi Arabia for
torture before being sentenced to life in prison on dubious charges of threatening to kill George W. Bush. “The
White House Iftar is a
slap in the face to those in the Muslim community who have been victims of U.S. civil-rights
and human-rights abuses,” Abu Ali wrote. “It is an attempt by administration after administration to
whitewash the crimes of the U.S. government against Muslims by painting a less-thanaccurate picture of their relationship with the American Muslim community.”¶ As established MuslimAmerican leaders like Laila Al-Marayati lined up to boycott (Al-Marayati rejected an invitation to the State Department’s Iftar), others defended their
presence at the ceremony. Most vocal among them was Rep. Keith Ellison (D-MN), one of the two Muslim members of Congress. “I disagree with the
tactic,” Ellison remarked in a statement released by his office. “It will not close Guantanamo Bay, guarantee a cease-fire between Israel and Palestine or
undo the NSA’s targeting of Muslims.”¶ The Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) echoed Ellison, insisting that the event would “allow [them] to
engage with senior White House officials for a decent amount of time on substantive issues.” ¶ While Muslim-American civil rights groups like the
Council on American Islamic Relations have assumed a more confrontational posture towards the White House and boycotted a prayer breakfast with
former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg in protest of his support for NYPD surveillance of Muslims, MPAC has taken an altogether different
tack. Its role as a paid consultant on the cable TV series, “Tyrant,” was perhaps the best example of its accommodationist stance. ¶ Produced by Howard
Gordon, the creator of “24” and “Homeland,” the show starred a white actor playing a pathological Arab dictator who ruled over the deeply
dysfunctional fictional nation of Abuddin. Even mainstream TV critics derided the series as unbearably Orientalist, with the Washington Post’s Hank
Stuever describing it as a “stultifyingly acted TV drama stocked with tired and terribly broad notions of Muslim culture in a make-believe nation on the
brink.” Leading up to the White House Iftar, a leader of a major Muslim advocacy organization told me on background that MPAC was bleeding support,
especially from younger activists.¶ At the Iftar dinner, Obama launched into a defense of Israel’s assault on the Gaza Strip, declaring, “I will say very
clearly, no country can accept rockets fired indiscriminately at citizens. And so, we’ve been very clear that Israel has the right to defend itself against
what I consider to be inexcusable attacks from Hamas.”¶ He went on to claim against all evidence that his administration had “worked long and hard to
alleviate” the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, and that it had “emphasized the need to protect civilians, regardless of who they are or where they live.”¶ Ali
Kurnaz, the central regional director for the Florida-based Emerge USA, was in the audience. He told me that Obama’s
remarks
provoked deep discomfort, with attendees exchanging disturbed looks and rolling their eyes
in astonishment. No one walked out in protest, however.¶ “After the dinner, I overheard at least three different exchanges attendees
pointing out that Palestinians should have a right to defend themselves too,” Kurnaz recalled. ¶ Like many others who joined the dinner, Kurnaz was not
aware that Israeli Ambassador Ron Dermer had been invited. Dermer was a longtime confidant of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the
son of the Republican former Mayor of Miami Beach. This year, Dermer broke diplomatic protocol by appearing at a fundraiser for the Republican
Jewish Committee, helping to raise money for a partisan organization dedicated to undermining Obama’s agenda. ¶ Perhaps
the most
startling aspect of Dermer’s presence at the Iftar dinner was his stated belief that “a cultural
tendency towards belligerency” is “deeply embedded in the culture of the Arab world and its
foremost religion.”¶ According to Kurnaz, Dermer spent the evening isolated in the White House’s Green Room adjacent to the main
reception area, where he milled around mostly without company. None of the activists invited to the dinner approached him. ¶ When dinner began,
Kurnaz said Obama was unusually candid with those seated at his table. They
confronted him on the issue of domestic
spying, an issue that took on renewed immediacy after revelations by the Intercept that the
NSA and FBI has spied on leading Muslim-American civil rights activists. Obama attempted to
remind them that the spying had begun under his predecessor, Bush, but defended the
practice nonetheless, denying that the NSA had violated any laws.
Failure will spur prolif and war with Iran – the plan tanks Obama’s ability to
hold off Congress
Beauchamp 14 (Zack – B.A.s in Philosophy and Political Science from Brown University and an
M.Sc in International Relations from the London School of Economics, former editor of TP Ideas
and a reporter for ThinkProgress.org. He previously contributed to Andrew Sullivan’s The Dish at
Newsweek/Daily Beast, and has also written for Foreign Policy and Tablet magazines, now
writes for Vox , “How the new GOP majority could destroy Obama's nuclear deal with Iran,”
http://www.vox.com/2014/11/6/7164283/iran-nuclear-deal-congress,)
There is one foreign policy issue on which the GOP's takeover of the Senate could have huge ramifications, and beyond just the US:
Republicans are likely to try to torpedo President Obama's ongoing efforts to reach a nuclear deal
with Iran. And they just might pull it off. November 24 is the latest deadline for a final agreement between the United
States and Iran over the latter's nuclear program. That'll likely be extended, but it's a reminder that the negotiations could soon
come to a head. Throughout
his presidency, Obama has prioritized these negotiations; he likely doesn't
want to leave office without having made a deal. But if Congress doesn't like the deal, or just wants to see
Obama lose, it has the power to torpedo it by imposing new sanctions on Iran. Previously, Senate
Majority Leader Harry Reid used procedural powers to stop this from happening and save the nuclear talks. But Senate Majority
Leader Mitch McConnell may not be so kind, and he may
have the votes to destroy an Iran deal. If he tries,
we could see one of the most important legislative fights of Obama's presidency. Why Congress can
bully Obama on Iran sanctions At their most basic level, the international negotiations over Iran's nuclear program (they include
several other nations, but the US is the biggest player) are a tit-for-tat deal. If Iran agrees to place a series of verifiable limits on its
nuclear development, then the United States and the world will relax their painful economic and diplomatic sanctions on Tehran.
"The regime of economic sanctions against Iran is arguably the most complex the United States and the international community
have ever imposed on a rogue state," the Congressional Research Service's Dianne Rennack writes. To underscore the point,
Rennack's four-page report is accompanied by a list of every US sanction on Iran that goes on for 23 full pages. The US's sanctions
are a joint Congressional-executive production. Congress puts strict limits on Iran's ability to export oil and do business with
American companies, but it gives the president the power to waive sanctions if he thinks it's in the American national interest. "In
the collection of laws that are the statutory basis for the U.S. economic sanctions regime on Iran," Rennack writes, "the President
retains, in varying degrees, the authority to tighten and relax restrictions." The
key point here is that Congress gave
Obama that power — which means they can take it back. "You could see a bill in place that
makes it harder for the administration to suspend sanctions," Ken Sofer, the Associate
Director for National Security and International Policy at the Center for American Progress
(where I worked for a little under two years, though not with Sofer directly), says. "You could also see a bill that says the president
can't agree to a deal unless it includes the following things or [a bill] forcing a congressional vote on any deal." Imposing
new
sanctions on Iran wouldn't just stifle Obama's ability to remove existing sanctions, it would
undermine Obama's authority to negotiate with Iran at all, sending the message to Tehran
that Obama is not worth dealing with because he can't control his own foreign policy. So if
Obama wants to make a deal with Iran, he needs Congress to play ball. But it's not clear that Mitch
McConnell's Senate wants to. Congress could easily use its authority to kill an Iran deal To understand why the new Senate is such a
big deal for congressional action on sanctions, we have to jump back a year. In November 2013, the Obama administration struck an
interim deal with Iran called the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA). As part of the JPOA, the US agreed to limited, temporary sanctions relief
in exchange for Iran limiting nuclear program components like uranium production. Congressional Republicans, by and large, hate
the JPOA deal. Arguing that the deal didn't place sufficiently serious limits on Iran's nuclear growth, the House passed new sanctions
on Iran in December. (There is also a line of argument, though often less explicit, that the Iranian government cannot be trusted with
any deal at all, and that US policy should focus on coercing Iran into submission or unseating the Iranian government entirely.)
Senate Republicans, joined by more hawkish Democrats, had the votes to pass a similar bill. But in February, Senate Majority leader
Harry Reid killed new Iran sanctions, using the Majority Leader's power to block consideration of the sanctions legislation to prevent
a vote. McConnell blasted Reid's move. "There is no excuse for muzzling the Congress on an issue of this importance to our own
national security," he said. So now that McConnell holds the majority leader's gavel, it will remove that procedural roadblock that
stood between Obama and new Iran sanctions. To be clear, it's far from guaranteed that Obama will be able to reach a deal with Iran
at all; negotiations could fall apart long before they reach the point of congressional involvement. But if he does reach a deal, and
Congress doesn't like the terms, then they'll be able to kill it by passing new sanctions legislation, or preventing Obama from
temporarily waiving the ones on the books. And make
no mistake — imposing new sanctions or limiting
Obama's authority to waive the current ones would kill any deal. If Iran can't expect Obama to
follow through on his promises to relax sanctions, it has zero incentive to limit its nuclear
program. "If Congress adopts sanctions," Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif told Time last December, "the entire deal is dead."
Moreover, it could fracture the international movement to sanction Iran. The United States is far
from Iran's biggest trading partner, so it depends on international cooperation in order to
ensure the sanctions bite. If it looks like the US won't abide by the terms of a deal, the broadbased international sanctions regime could collapse. Europe, particularly, might decide that going along with
the sanctions is no longer worthwhile. "Our ability to coerce Iran is largely based on whether or not the international community
thinks that we are the ones that are being constructive and [Iranians] are the ones that being obstructive," Sofer says. "If they don't
believe that, then the international sanctions regime falls apart." This could be one of the biggest fights of Obama's last term It's
true that Obama could veto any Congressional efforts to blow up an Iran deal with sanctions.
But a two-thirds vote could override any veto — and, according to Sofer, an override is entirely
within the realm of possibility. "There are plenty of Democrats that will probably side with Republicans if they try to
push a harder line on Iran," Sofer says. For a variety of reasons, including deep skepticism of Iran's intentions and strong
Democratic support for Israel, whose government opposes the negotiations, Congressional Democrats are not as
open to making a deal with Iran as Obama is. Many will likely defect to the GOP side out of
principle. The real fight, Sofer says, will be among the Democrats — those who are willing to take
the administration's side in theory, but don't necessarily think a deal with Iran is legislative
priority number one, and maybe don't want to open themselves up to the political risk. These
Democrats "can make it harder: you can filibuster, if you're Obama you can veto — you can make it
impossible for a full bill to be passed out of Congress on Iran," Sofer says. But
it'd be a really tough battle, one that
would consume a lot of energy and lobbying effort that Democrats might prefer to spend
pushing on other issues. "I'm not really sure they're going to be willing to take on a fight about an Iran sanctions bill," Sofer
concludes. "I'm not really sure that the Democrats who support [a deal] are really fully behind it enough that they'll be willing to give
up leverage on, you know, unemployment insurance or immigration status — these bigger issues for most Democrats." So if
the
new Republican Senate prioritizes destroying an Iran deal, Obama will have to fight very hard
to keep it — without necessarily being able to count on his own party for support. And the
stakes are enormous: if Iran's nuclear program isn't stopped peacefully, then the most likely
outcomes are either Iran going nuclear, or war with Iran. The administration believes a deal
with Iran is their only way to avoid this horrible choice. That's why it's been one of the
administration's top priorities since day one. It's also why this could become one of the biggest legislative fights of
Obama's last two years.
Nuke war
Stevens 13 (Philip Stevens, associate editor and chief political commentator for the Financial
Times, Nov 14 2013, “The four big truths that are shaping the Iran talks,”
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/af170df6-4d1c-11e3-bf32-00144feabdc0.html)
The who-said-what game about last weekend’s talks in Geneva has become a distraction. The
six-power negotiations with Tehran to curb
Iran’s nuclear programme may yet succeed or fail. But wrangling between the US and France on the terms of an acceptable deal
should not allow the trees to obscure the forest. The organising facts shaping the negotiations have not changed.¶ The first of these is that Tehran’s acquisition
of a bomb would be more than dangerous for the Middle East and for wider international security. It would most likely
set off a nuclear arms race that would see Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt signing up to the
nuclear club. The nuclear non-proliferation treaty would be shattered. A future regional conflict
could draw Israel into launching a pre-emptive nuclear strike. This is not a region obviously
susceptible to cold war disciplines of deterrence.¶ The second ineluctable reality is that Iran has
mastered the nuclear cycle. How far it is from building a bomb remains a subject of debate. Different intelligence agencies give different answers. These
depend in part on what the spooks actually know and in part on what their political masters want others to hear. The progress of an Iranian warhead programme is one of the
known unknowns that have often wreaked havoc in this part of the world.¶ Israel points to an imminent threat. European agencies are more relaxed, suggesting Tehran is still
two years or so away from a weapon. Western diplomats broadly agree that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has not taken a definitive decision to step over the line. What Iran has been
seeking is what diplomats call a breakout capability – the capacity to dash to a bomb before the international community could effectively mobilise against it.¶ The third fact –
and this one is hard for many to swallow – is that neither a negotiated settlement nor the air strikes long favoured by Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, can offer the
rest of the world a watertight insurance policy.¶ It should be possible to construct a deal that acts as a plausible restraint – and extends the timeframe for any breakout – but no
amount of restrictions or intrusive monitoring can offer a certain guarantee against Tehran’s future intentions.¶ By the same token,
bombing Iran’s nuclear
sites could certainly delay the programme, perhaps for a couple of years. But, assuming that even the hawkish Mr Netanyahu is not proposing
permanent war against Iran, air strikes would not end it. ¶ You cannot bomb knowledge and technical
expertise. To try would be to empower those in Tehran who say the regime will be safe only
when, like North Korea, it has a weapon. So when Barack Obama says the US will never allow Iran to get the bomb he is indulging in, albeit understandable,
wishful thinking.¶ The best the international community can hope for is that, in return for a relaxation
of sanctions, Iran will make a judgment that it is better off sticking with a threshold capability.
To put this another way, if Tehran does step back from the nuclear brink it will be because of its own
calculation of the balance of advantage.¶ The fourth element in this dynamic is that Iran now has a leadership
that, faced with the severe and growing pain inflicted by sanctions, is prepared to talk. There is nothing to say that
Hassan Rouhani, the president, is any less hard-headed than previous Iranian leaders, but he does seem ready to weigh the options.
1nc cp
Text: The Unites States federal judiciary should adopt a strict scrutiny standard
to prohibit domestic surveillance of mosques.
CP spills over- strict scrutiny standard solves both federal and local
discrimination
Love 2012 [Erik, (Assistant Professor of Sociology @ Dickinson College), "NYPD: Whose side are you on?", Institute for Social
Policy and Understanding, http://www.ispu.org/GetArticles/48/2461/Publications.aspx, Accessed 7/16/15, AX]
Despite the recent outpouring of support of these discriminatory programmes, a federal investigation of the NYPD's
practices is sorely needed. It's likely that if the NYPD's crudely constructed policies of religious and racial
profiling were brought into the courts, the judicial principle of strict scrutiny would definitively show
that the NYPD had grossly violated the constitutional right to equal protection under the law. Strict
scrutiny is the standard applied by the courts to determine whether the government can move beyond
constitutional limits due to extraordinary circumstances. It's called "strict" because the government must rise
to a tripartite standard: first, it must prove that it has a compelling interest; second, that the policy is narrowly
tailored to achieve that interest; and, finally, the policy must use the least restrictive means to achieve that
interest. Preventing terrorism is, undoubtedly, a compelling state interest. But spying on anyone who happens to be in a
mosque or restaurant cannot possibly be "narrowly tailored". Similarly, a programme so paranoid that it
spied on its own anti-terrorism partners and kept track of any Muslim who changed their name clearly
isn't the "least restrictive means" towards achieving the goal of anti-terrorism. The case for proving
that the NYPD has violated the constitution appears easy to prove in a court. The inability of Muslim
American and civil liberties advocates to get these programmes into the courts, so far, is another sign of
political oppression. What might be even worse than the flagrant violation of civil rights, however, is that the NYPD
programme is likely to make New York and the rest of the country less safe from terrorism . The best
scholarship on terrorism suggests that devout Muslims are very unlikely to join up with terrorists. A February 2012 report from the
Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security concluded that terrorism from Muslim Americans was a
"miniscule threat to public safety". An earlier report from the same centre found that Muslim American "practices"
effectively "prevent radicalisation".
Avoids politics- Obama won’t fight court rulings
Grove 12 (Tara Leigh Grove, Associate Professor, William and Mary Law School, “FEDERAL
COURTS, PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: ARTICLE: A (MODEST) SEPARATION OF POWERS SUCCESS
STORY,” April, 2012, Notre Dame Law Review,
http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?oc=00240&hnsd=f&hgn=t&lni=5
633-19X0-00CTS05R&hns=t&perma=true&hv=t&hl=t&csi=270944%2C270077%2C11059%2C8411&secondRedir
ectIndicator=true)
The Article I lawmaking process has thus proven to be an important safeguard for the federal
judiciary. Political factions have repeatedly used their structural veto to block jurisdictionstripping efforts. But there is an additional structural safeguard: the executive branch. The
executive has various tools at its disposal to oppose constitutionally questionable legislation. The President can veto or
threaten to veto problematic legislation. n65 The executive can also use its role in enforcing
federal laws to ensure that laws are applied in a manner that accords with constitutional
values. n66 Social science research suggests that the executive branch has a strong incentive to use this
constitutional authority to oppose efforts to curb federal jurisdiction. First, scholars have argued that
the President often advances his constitutional philosophy through litigation in the federal
courts. n67 Accordingly, the President has some incentive [*1660] to defend the scope of
federal jurisdiction over constitutional claims. The President should have a particularly
overriding interest in protecting the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, because its
"decisions ... establish the legal and ideological framework within which [the lower courts] ...
operate." n68 These presidential incentives are reinforced by the institutional incentives of the Department of Justice. n69 The
Solicitor General is in charge of virtually all federal litigation in the Supreme Court . n70 Thus, as
former Solicitor General Drew Days put it, "once cases reach the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General plays an important role in the
development of American law" and can have a substantial "impact upon the establishment of constitutional and other principles."
n71 This
institutional position gives the DOJ a strong interest in protecting the Supreme Court's
appellate review power. By defending the authority of the Supreme Court, the DOJ can
maximize its own power and influence over the development of federal law. n72 [*1661] This social
science research suggests that the executive branch has a strong incentive to block the two types of
jurisdiction-stripping measures that most concern scholars: efforts to strip the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction and federal jurisdiction over constitutional claims.
Case
Islamophobia
The 1AC’s praxis reinscribes the ideology of anti-Muslimness- speaking for
others destroys Islamic agency and homogenizes the Muslim body
ISJ 2014 [Bi-annual publication that focuses on the critical analysis of Islamophobia, “Islamophobia Studies Journal Volume
2 Issue 2 Fall 2014”, http://crg.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/ISJ_2014-15_Fall_Issue_-Final_Volume.pdf, Accessed 7/24/15, pg.
32-33, AX]
The war on terror discourse reinforces the basic premise of Orientalism, the absolute difference
between Islam and the west. Islam and Muslims are associated with an “inherent,” uncivilized
propensity for violence, which is connected to the Orient as something to be both feared and
controlled for this reason. This fear of the violent potential of the Muslim Other takes its contemporary form through the trope of
“dangerous Muslim man” who evokes fear through terrorism, anchored by the civilized, white, “good”, heroic American on the other
side.19This American is part of the construction of the western “family of white nations, a civilization, obliged to use force and terror
to defend itself against a menacing cultural Other.”20 A second way in which the
war on terror discourse extends
Orientalist constructs is through the idea of an unchanging and uniform Muslim Other who
cannot speak for her/himself. This is about two issues: first, the idea that all Muslims
everywhere are the same, and second, the agency of Muslims to define themselves. They can
only be seen and heard if they are interpreted and mediated by the west through its privilege
to both set the terms of the discourse of the war on terror and to define them as particular
types of Muslims through it. The subject positions available to Muslims in this hegemonic
discourse are linked to the way in which terrorism is defined as an “Islamic” problem because
Muslims carried out the 9/11 attacks. Terrorism is explained as a religious problem, rather than as a political issue, by linking it to the
religion of the attackers. By
association then, all Muslims have this “inherent” tendency to be potential
terrorists because they are Muslims. Their actions can be explained solely and exclusively through reference to their
religion, which is also perceived as “inherently” violent. Quranic verses are often presented as literal evidence of this Muslim
propensity for “Islamic” terrorism.
Damage-centered research commodifies suffering – the aff’s pain narratives
force the Muslim other to embody abjection in order for intellectual profit and
voyeuristic pleasure – the impact is psychic violence which turns the case.
Tuck & Yang ‘14 (Eve, & K.W., 2014, “R-Words: Refusing Research.” In n D. Paris & M. T. Winn (Eds.) Humanizing research:
Decolonizing qualitative inquiry with youth and communities https://faculty.newpaltz.edu/evetuck/files/2013/12/Tuck-and-Yang-RWords_Refusing-Research.pdf)
Urban communities, and other disenfranchised communities. Damage-centered
researchers may operate, even
benevolently, within a theory of change in which harm must be recorded or proven in order to
convince an outside adjudicator that reparations are deserved. These reparations presumably
take the form of additional resources, settlements, affirmative actions, and other material,
political, and sovereign adjustments. Eve has described this theory of change as both colonial
and flawed, because it relies upon Western notions of power as scarce and concentrated, and
because it requires disenfranchised communities to position themselves as both singularly
defective and powerless to make change (2010). Finally, Eve has observed that “won” reparations rarely
become reality, and that in many cases, communities are left with a narrative that tells them
that they are broken. Similarly, at the center of the analysis in this chapter is a concern with the
fixation social science research has exhibited in eliciting pain stories from communities that
are not White, not wealthy, and not straight. Academe’s demonstrated fascination with telling
and retelling narratives of pain is troubling, both for its voyeurism and for its consumptive
implacability. Imagining “itself to be a voice, and in some disciplinary iterations, the voice of
the colonised” (Simpson, 2007, p. 67, emphasis in the original) is not just a rare historical occurrence in anthropology and
related fields. We observe that much of the work of the academy is to reproduce stories of oppression
in its own voice. At first, this may read as an intolerant condemnation of the academy, one that refuses to forgive past
blunders and see how things have changed in recent decades. However, it is our view that while many individual
scholars have chosen to pursue other lines of inquiry than the pain narratives typical of their
disciplines, novice researchers emerge from doctoral programs eager to launch pain-based inquiry
projects because they believe that such approaches embody what it means to do social
science. The collection of pain narratives and the theories of change that champion the value
of such narratives are so prevalent in the social sciences that one might surmise that they are
indeed what the academy is about. In her examination of the symbolic violence of the academy, bell hooks (1990)
portrays the core message from the academy to those on the margins as thus: No need to hear
your voice when I can talk about you better than you can speak about yourself. No need to
hear your voice. Only tell me about your pain. I want to know your story. And then I will tell it
back to you in a new way. Tell it back to you in such a way that it has become mine, my own.
Re-writing you I write myself anew. I am still author, authority. I am still colonizer the
speaking subject and you are now at the center of my talk. (p. 343) Hooks’s words resonate with our
observation of how much of social science research is concerned with providing recognition to the
presumed voiceless, a recognition that is enamored with knowing through pain. Further, this
passage describes the ways in which the researcher’s voice is constituted by, legitimated by, animated by
the voices on the margins. The researcher-self is made anew by telling back the story of the
marginalized/subaltern subject. Hooks works to untangle the almost imperceptible differences
between forces that silence and forces that seemingly liberate by inviting those on the
margins to speak, to tell their stories. Yet the forces that invite those on the margins to speak also say, “Do not
speak in a voice of resistance. Only speak from that space in the margin that is a sign of
deprivation, a wound, an unfulfilled longing. Only speak your pain” (hooks, 1990, p. 343).
Using the term “Islamophobia” reinscribes discrimination- it labels racism as an
irrational fear rather than a conscious individual choice and dehistoricizes AntiMuslim discrimination
Richardson 2012 [Robin (director of Runnymede Trust, pioneer in Muslim Studies),“Islamophobia or anti-Muslim racism –
or what?– concepts and terms revisited”, http://www.insted.co.uk/anti-muslim-racism.pdf, Accessed 7/24/15, AX]
The disadvantages of the term Islamophobia are significant. Some of them are primarily about the echoes
implicit in the concept of phobia. Others are about the implications ofthe term Islam. For convenience, they can be itemised as
follows. 1.Medically,
phobia implies a severe mental illness of a kind that affects only a tiny
minority of people. Whatever else anxiety about Muslims may be, it is not merely a mental illness and does
not merely involve a small number of people.2.To accuse someone of being insane or irrational is to
be abusive and, not surprisingly, to make them defensive and defiant. Reflective dialogue with them is then
all but impossible. 3.To label someone with whom you disagree as irrational or insane is to absolve
yourself of the responsibility of trying to understand, both intellectually and with empathy, why they
think and act as they do, and of seeking through engagement and argument to modify their perceptions and
understandings.4.The concept of anxiety is arguably more useful in this context than the concept of phobia. It is widely recognised
that anxiety may not be (though certainly may be)warranted by objective facts, for human beings can on occasions perceivedangers
that do not objectively exist, or anyway do not exist to the extent that is imagined. Also it can sometimes be difficult to identify, and
therefore to name accurately, the real sources of an anxiety. 5.The
use of the word Islamophobia on its own
implies that hostility towards Muslims is unrelated to, and basically dissimilar from, forms of
hostility such as racism, xenophobia, sectarianism, and such as hostility to so-called fundamentalism
(Samuels 2006).Further, it may imply there is no connection with issues of class, power, status and
territory; or with issues of military, political or economic competition and conflict. 6.The term
implies there is no important difference between prejudice towards Muslim communities within
one’s own country and prejudice towards cultures and regimes elsewhere in the world where Muslims
are in the majority, and with which ‘the West’ is in military conflict or economic competition. 7.The term is inappropriate for
describing opinions that are basically anti-religion as distinct from anti-Islam. ‘I am an Islamophobe,’ wrote the journalist Polly
Toynbee in reaction to the Runnymede 1997 report, adding ‘... I am also a Christophobe. If Christianity were not such a spent force
in this country, if it were powerful and dominant as it once was, it would still be every bit as damaging as Islam is in those theocratic
states in its thrall... If I lived in Israel, I'd feel the same way about Judaism’. 8. The
key phenomenon to be addressed
is arguably anti-Muslim hostility, namely hostility towards an ethno-religious identity within western
countries (including Russia), rather than hostility towards the tenets or practices of a worldwide
religion. The 1997 Runnymede definition of Islamophobia was ‘a shorthand way of referring to dread or hatred of Islam – and,
therefore, to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims’. In retrospect, it would have been as accurate, or arguably indeed more accurate,
to say ‘a shorthand way of referring to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims – and, therefore, dread or hatred of Islam’.
Democracy
The impact does not assume the internal link – infringing on some rights does
not translate to a completely authoritarian government.
Pro democratic peace studies are flawed – questionable evidence set excludes
different kinds of wars
Henderson 2Errol Henderson, Assistant Professor, Dept. of Political Science at the University of Florida, 2002, Democracy and War The End of an Illusion?, p. 1415
. The most recent studies alluded to
which indicate that democracies are less likely to fight each other and are more peaceful, in general, than non-democracies, are
beset by research design problems that severely hinder their reliability (e.g., Oneal and Russett, 1997; Oneal and Ray, 1997;
Russett and Oneal, 2001). For example, many of them rely on a questionable operationalization of joint democracy
that conflates the level of democracy of two states with their political dissimilarity. Only by teasing out the
To my mind, the empirical evidence in support of both the dyadic and the nomadic DPP is problematic for several reasons
earlier,
effects of each factor are we in a position to confidently argue that shared democracy, rather than other factors, is actually the motivating force driving democratic states
the findings used to support monadic DPP claims also rely
on questionable research designs that exclude whole categories of international war—namely, extrastate wars,
toward their allegedly more peaceful international relations. In addition,
which are usually imperialist and colonial wars. The exclusion of these wars from recent tests of the DPP leaves us unable to determine the actual applicability of the DPP to the
full range of international war. In addition, given that some scholars suggest that the DPP is applicable to civil wars (Krain and Myers, 1997; Rummel, 1997), it is important to
determine to what extent we observe a “domestic democratic peace” for the most civil war prone states—the postcolonial, or third world, states. Previous work has not tested
the DPP for this specific group of states, and it is important that our research design address this omission.
Alternate explanations disprove democratic peace theory
Rosato 11 PhD, Department of Political Science, The University of Chicago, Assistant Professor
of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. The Handbookon the Political Economy of
War By Christopher J. Coyne, Rachel L. Mathers
There is considerable evidence that factors other than democracy account for the peace among
democratic states . As a prelude to elaborating on this point, a few words arc in order about the temporal scope of
the finding. It is generally agreed that there is scant evidence of mutual democratic pacifism prior to
1945 . Henry Farber and Joanne Gowa (1995, p. 143) adopt the most extreme position, claiming that democratic
dyads were significantly more likely to fight between 1816 and 1913 than other pairs.15 However, even
proponents of the theory admit that there is no clear cut evidence for a democratic peace before
the Cold War. Thus Oneal and Russett (1999b, pp. 226-7) find that if they exclude all but the first year of the wars in
their sample a move that is wholly appropriate given that the theory refers only to the incidence of conflict - there is
scant support for the democratic peace between 1870 and 1945. Elsewhere, they arc more bullish about the
democratic peace, arguing that double democratic "dyads . . . were the most peaceful after about 1900," though it is
worth noting that this period constitutes a small fraction of the entire multipolar era for which data are available
(1816-1945) (Oneal and Russett 1999a, p. 28). This is not surprising. As Russett (1993, p. 20) observes, the nineteenth
century-was a period of "very imperfect democracy," therefore we should expect to find a number of inter-democratic
rivalries, violent conflicts and, as some have suggested, even wars. When coupled with the fact that there were few
democracies in the world at the time, this observation suggests that we are unlikely to find a democratic peace before
1945. There is widespread agreement that, in contrast to the pre-World War II period, there is good evidence of a
democratic peace during the Cold War. I Icnderson (2002, p. 15), for example, describes the postwar period as "the
period within which the democratic peace is most evident." Indeed, even Farber and Gowa (1995, p. 145) admit that
"after World War II, there was a marked and statistically significant lower probability of disputes short of war between
democracies." Proponents of the theory attribute this to two changes at mid-century: the number of democratic states
increased markedly, and democratic norms and institutions became stronger and more entrenched, thereby exerting a
greater restraining effect on conflict (Maoz and Russett 1993, p. 627; Oneal and Russett 1997, p. 273). The problem for
democratic peace theory is that there are several factors other than democracy that plausibly account for the peace
among democratic states after World War II. Farber and Gowa (1995), for example, attribute the democratic
peace not to joint democracy, but to alliance tics brought on by the Cold War conflict. Proponents of
the democratic peace respond by claiming that in their analyses joint democracy is still related to peace even when
controlling for alliance ties. But henderson (2002, p. 134) refutes this claim, noting that in his replication of Oneal
and Russett, "alliance membership, more than joint democracy, contributed to peace in the
postwar era ." Crucially, Farber and Gowa and Henderson demonstrate that it is not shared
democracy that causes democracies to ally with one another in the first place - thus democracy
does not have even an indirect effect on peace. Another research tradition argues that the interdemocratic peace can be attributed to economic factors, specifically economic interdependence and
development. Solomon Polachek, for example, finds that "introducing trade explains away democracy's
impact" on conflict in his analysis of interstate disputes between 1958 and 1967. "Democracy per se does not reduce
conflict. Instead a more fundamental factor than being a democracy in causing bilateral cooperation is trade" (1997, p.
306, emphasis in original). Similarly, Erik Gartzkc (2007) finds that adding variables for financial and monetary
integration and economic development to the standard Oneal and Russett model renders the
effect of joint democracy insignificant. Thus he concludes that "capitalism, and not democracy, leads to peace"
(2007, p. 180). Mousseau (2009) makes a similar argument, claiming that it is advanced capitalist states - he refers to
them as contract intensive economies - rather than democracies that do not fight one another. His analysis suggests
thai the democratic peace is spurious - contract intensive economies caused democracy and peace between 1961 and
2001 (2009, pp. 53-4). Scholars have come up with several other purported causes of the democratic
peace that do not tit neatly into the security or economic categories. For Gartzke (2000), the finding can
be attributed to the fact that democracies tend to have similar preferences. Adding a control for
"preference affinity" makes the relationship between democracy and peace insignificant.
Importantly, there is only a modest correlation between preference affinity and democracy. Thus he concludes that,
contrary to the views of his critics, the elTeet of preferences on conflict is not largely a by-product of regime type. I lis
results "challenge the notion that the democratic peace is due largely, or even substantially, to democracy" (2000, p.
209).16 Douglas Gibler (2007, p. 529), meanwhile, concludes that the democratic peace is "in fact a stable
border peace." After adding a control for stable borders on the assumption that the removal of
territorial issues has a pacifying effect on interstate relations, Gibler finds that democracy has
little or no effect on conflict. Most of these findings - and therefore the postwar peace among democracies can plausibly be explained by realism. The argument goes as follows. Beginning in 1945. the United States
found itself in a life and death struggle with the Soviet Union. In order to compete and ultimately prevail in that
contest. Washington implemented a two-pronged strategy. First, it established a far-reaching network of military
alliances to resist Soviet aggression wherever it might occur. Second, it created an open economic order designed to
generate enough wealth to fund the military effort and to combat communist subversion. In other words, it was the
exigencies of the Cold War that generated the alliances, economic integration, advanced
economies, and perhaps even the preference affinity that scholars have found to be powerfully
associated with the peace among democracies since 1945.17
Solvency
The FBI will circumvent – whistleblowers are punished
ACLU 13 [American Civil Liberties Union, September 2013, “UNLEASHED AND UNACCOUNTABLE; The FBI’s Unchecked Abuse of
Authority,” https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/unleashed-and-unaccountable-fbi-report.pdf]//dickies
The FBI has a notorious record of retaliating against FBI employees who report misconduct or
abuse in the FBI and has used aggressive leak investigations to suppress other government
whistleblowers. Congress exempted the FBI from the requirements of the Whistleblower
Protection Act of 1989 and instead required the Justice Department to establish an internal system
to protect FBI employees who report waste, fraud, abuse, and illegality. Still, FBI Director Robert Mueller
repeatedly vowed to protect Bureau whistleblowers: I issued a memorandum on November 7th [2001] reaffirming the protections
that are afforded to whistleblowers in which I indicated I will not tolerate reprisals or intimidation by any Bureau employee against
those who make protected disclosures, nor will I tolerate attempts to prevent employees from making such disclosures.180 Yet
court cases and investigations by the Justice Department Office of Professional Responsibility and Inspector
General have repeatedly found that FBI officials continue to retaliate against FBI employees who
publicly report internal misconduct, including Michael German,181 Sibel Edmonds,182 Jane Turner,183 Robert Wright,184
John Roberts,185 and Bassem Youssef.186 Other FBI whistleblowers choose to suffer retaliation in silence.
Special Agent Chad Joy courageously blew the whistle on a senior FBI agent’s serious misconduct during the investigation and
prosecution of Alaska Sen. Ted Stevens, which resulted in the trial judge overturning the conviction against him, but only after the
senator had lost re-election.187 Special Agent Joy was publicly criticized by his then-retired supervisor, subjected to a retaliatory
investigation, and then taken off criminal cases.188 Joy resigned and no longer works at the FBI, while the FBI agent responsible for
the misconduct in the Stevens’ case continues to be assigned high-profile investigations—a clear sign that the FBI culture continues
to protect agents involved in misconduct more than those who report it.189 These
high-profile cases of
whistleblower retaliation discourage other FBI personnel from coming forward. A 2009 Inspector
General report found that 28 percent of non-supervisory FBI employees and 22 percent of FBI
supervisors at the GS-14 and GS-15 levels “never” report misconduct they see or hear about on the job.190 That such
a high percentage of officials in the government’s premiere law enforcement agency refuse to report internal misconduct is shocking
and dangerous and perpetuates the risk that Americans like Sen. Stevens will continue to be victimized by overzealous investigations
and prosecutions. The FBI has also been involved in suppressing other government whistleblowers through inappropriately
aggressive leak investigations. For example, when
the U.S. media reported in 2005 that the National Security Agency
(NSA) was spying on Americans’ communications without warrants in violation of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, the FBI didn’t launch an investigation to enforce the law’s criminal provisions. It
instead went after the whistleblowers, treating leaks to the American public about
government malfeasance as espionage.191 After more than a year of aggressive investigation and interviews, armed
FBI agents conducted coordinated raids on the homes of four former NSA and Justice Department officials and a House Intelligence
Committee staffer, treating them as if they were dangerous Mafiosi instead of dedicated federal employees who held the
government’s highest security clearances. William Binney, who served more than 30 years in the NSA, described an FBI agent
pointing a gun at his head as he stepped naked from the shower.192
Curtailing surveillance in specific areas will just cause agencies to literally
surveil areas outside/around it- mosque surveillance tactics prove
Goldman et. al, 12
(Adam and Matt are editors for the Associated Press. “NYPD Defends Tactics Over Mosque
Spying; Records Reveal New Details On Muslim Surveillance.”
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/24/nypd-defends-tactics-over_n_1298997.html.
Date Accessed- 7/13/15. Anshul Nanda)
NEW YORK -- The New York Police Department targeted Muslim mosques with tactics normally
reserved for criminal organizations, according to newly obtained police documents that showed police collecting the
license plates of worshippers, monitoring them on surveillance cameras and cataloging sermons
through a network of informants.¶ The documents, obtained by The Associated Press, have come to light as the NYPD fends
off criticism of its monitoring of Muslim student groups and its cataloging of mosques and
Muslim businesses in nearby Newark, N.J.The NYPD's spokesman, Paul Browne, forcefully defended the legality of
those efforts Thursday, telling reporters that its officers may go wherever the public goes and collect intelligence, even outside city
limits.¶ The new documents, prepared for Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly, show how the NYPD's roster of paid
informants monitored conversations and sermons inside mosques. The records offer the first
glimpse of what those informants, known informally as "mosque crawlers," gleaned from
inside the houses of worship.¶ For instance, when a Danish newspaper published inflammatory cartoons of Prophet
Muhammad in September 2005, Muslim communities around the world erupted in outrage. Violent
mobs took to the streets in the Middle East. A Somali man even broke into the cartoonist's house in Denmark with
an ax.¶ In New York, thousands of miles away, it was a different story. Muslim leaders preached peace and urged people to protest
lawfully. Write letters to politicians, they said. Some advocated
boycotting Danish products, burning flags and
holding rallies.¶ All of that was permissible under law and protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution. All was
reported to the NYPD by its mosque crawlers and made its way into police files for Kelly.¶ "Imam
Shamsi Ali brought up the topic of the cartoon, condemning them. He announced a rally that was to take
place on Sunday (02/05/06) near the United Nations. He asked that everyone to attend if possible and reminded everyone to keep
their poise if they can make it," one report read.¶ At the Muslim Center of New York in Queens, the report said, "Mohammad Tariq
Sherwani led the prayer service and urged those in attendance to participate in a demonstration at the United Nations on Sunday."¶
When one Muslim leader suggested planning a demonstration, one of the people involved in the discussion
about how to get a permit was, in fact, working for the NYPD.¶ "It seems horrible to me that the NYPD is treating
an entire religious community as potential terrorists," said civil rights lawyer Jethro Eisenstein, who reviewed
some of the documents and is involved in a decades-old class-action lawsuit against the police department for spying on protesters
and political dissidents.¶ The lawsuit
is known as the Handschu case, and a court order in that case
governs how the NYPD may collect intelligence.¶ Eisenstein said the documents prove the NYPD has violated
those rules.¶ "This is a flat-out violation," Eisenstein said. "This is a smoking gun."¶ Browne, the NYPD spokesman, did not discuss
specific investigations Thursday but told reporters that, because of the Handschu case, the NYPD operates under stricter rules than
any other department in the country. He said police do not violate those rules.¶ His statements were intended to calm a controversy
over a 2007 operation in which the NYPD mapped and photographed all of Newark's mosques and eavesdropped on Muslim
businesses. Newark Mayor Cory Booker said he was never told about the surveillance, which he said offended him.¶ Booker and his
police director accused the NYPD of misleading them by not revealing exactly what they were doing. Had they known, they said it
never would have been permitted. But Browne said Newark police were told before and after the operation and knew exactly what
it entailed.¶ Kelly, the
police commissioner, and Mayor Michael Bloomberg have been emphatic
that police only follow legitimate leads of criminal activity and do not conduct preventive
surveillance in ethnic communities.¶ Former and current law enforcement officials either involved in or with direct
knowledge of these programs say they did not follow leads. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not
authorized to discuss the secret programs. But the documents support their claims.¶ The effort highlights one of the most difficult
aspects of policing in the age of terrorism. Solving crimes isn't enough; police are expected to identify would-be terrorists and move
in before they can attack.¶ There are no universally agreed upon warning signs for terrorism. Terrorists have used Internet cafes,
stayed in hostels, worked out at gyms, visited travel agencies, attended student groups and prayed at mosques. So the NYPD
monitored those areas. In doing so, they monitored many innocent people as they went about their daily lives.¶ Using plainclothes
officers from the squad known as the Demographics Unit, police swept Muslim neighborhoods and catalogued the location of
mosques. The ethnic makeup of each congregation was logged as police fanned out across the city and outside their jurisdiction, into
suburban Long Island and areas of New Jersey.¶ "African American, Arab, Pakistani," police wrote beneath the photo of one mosque
in Newark.¶ Investigators looked at mosques as the center of Muslim life. All their connections had to be known.¶ David Cohen, the
NYPD's top intelligence officer, wanted a source inside every mosque within a 250-mile radius
of New York, current and former officials said. Though the officials said they never managed to reach
that goal, documents show the NYPD successfully placed informants or undercovers - sometimes
both - into mosques from Westchester County, N.Y., to New Jersey.¶ The NYPD used these sources to get a sense
of the sentiment of worshippers whenever an event generated headlines. The goal, former officials said, was to alert police to
potential problems before they bubbled up.¶ Even when it was clear there were no links to terrorism, the
mosque informants gave the NYPD the ability to "take the pulse" of the community, as Cohen and
other managers put it.¶ When New York Yankees pitcher Cory Lidle and his flight instructor were killed on Oct. 11, 2006, when their
small plane crashed into a Manhattan high-rise apartment, fighter planes were scrambled. Within hours the FBI and Homeland
Security Department said it was an accident. Terrorism was ruled out.¶ Yet for days after the event, the NYPD's mosque crawlers
reported to police about what they heard at sermons and among worshippers.¶ (View the PDF documents on Danish cartoons,
mosque targeting and summaries of plane crash.)¶ At the Brooklyn Islamic Center, a confidential informant "noted chatter among
the regulars expressing relief and thanks to God that the crash was only an accident and not an act of terrorism," one report reads.¶
"The worshippers made remarks to the effect that `it better be an accident; we don't need any more heat,'" an undercover officer
reported from the Al-Tawheed Islamic Center in Jersey City, N.J.¶ In some instances, the NYPD
put cameras on light
poles and trained them on mosques, documents show. Because the cameras were in public space,
police didn't need a warrant to conduct the surveillance.¶ Police also wrote down the license
plates of cars in mosque parking lots, documents show. In some instances, police in unmarked cars
outfitted with electronic license plate readers would drive down the street and record the
plates of everyone parked near the mosque, former officials recalled.¶ "They're viewing Muslims like they're
crazy.