Traits of Success: The Shared Characteristics
of Sulla and Mithridates
CLAS 209 Research Paper
Professor Rife
4/22/2010
Matt Grichnik
Grichnik 1
On the Night of the Vespers, over 80,000 Roman men, women, and children perished in
Anatolia.1 Mithridates Eupator of Pontus orchestrated this massacre, and incited the Mithradic
Wars which consumed Rome at a time of great peril and aptly earned him distinction as one of
Rome’s greatest enemies. The republic’s answer to this challenge came in the form of Lucius
Cornelius Sulla, who battled Mithridates for the fate of Greece and Asia Minor. These men
knew of each other only as adversaries, yet ironically they shared many of the same
characteristic which brought them to prominence. Such attributes enabled them to seize power
and change history, and thus are imperative to understanding this age. Both Mithridates and
Sulla embodied three qualities which made them successful throughout the late Roman Republic:
they shrewdly manipulated allies for the acquisition of power and disposed of them once they
became a threat, they proclaimed an ideology that even they could not embody, and they
promoted a type of populism that enabled abject cruelty against their enemies.
In order to understand the rationale behind the actions taken by Mithridates and Sulla, it
is necessary to comprehend Eastern Roman foreign policy prior to the Mithradic Wars. The
Italians had dominated the region since the conclusion of the Third Macedonian War (168BCE)
and Pergamum’s entrustment to Rome (133BCE), becoming hegemon in the affairs of the
Hellenistic kingdoms.2 Contrary to modern opinion however, Rome did not hold absolute
supremacy in Anatolia. It seems that Rome manifested its interests in merely maintaining the
status quo among kingdoms, without regards for a balance of power and moreover had no
territorial ambition in this province.3 Consequently, Rome left room for Asiatic kings to rule
independently, thus allowing ambitious kings such as Mithridates to assert his dominance before
1
Keaveney, 1982, p. 65
Sherwin-White, 1977, p. 64
3
Ibid, p. 64-65
2
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Rome intervened. With such an approach, Rome frequently had to intercede “after a fait
accompli to restore the situation to status quo.”4
Within this political context, Mithridates manipulated political alliances to ensure that the
Romans were unaware of his transgressions until he had grown strong enough to confront them.
The king understood that expansion into Western Anatolia would attract greater Italian attention
than his previous exploits, and therefore made the decision to make an alliance with Nicomedes
of Bithynia, the strongest of his potential rivals.5 Secure in their new coalition, Mithridates and
Nicomedes promptly overran Paphlagonia and Galatia. This cooperation allowed both kings to
avoid blame for this aggression, which tempered Rome’s response and allowed “the kings to
ignore the order,” to cease this expansion. 6 This partnership protected Mithridates from the
brunt of Rome’s criticism while his power remained fragile, allowing him to expand without
facing full repercussions for his actions.
It was “mutual interest that brought the two powers together,” cementing an affiliation
based upon power relations that could collapse if the political situation changed.7 Therefore, as
circumstances evolved, Mithridates used, and then conquered Nicomedes in order to enhance his
control over Anatolia. A quarrel over the possession of Cappadocia catalyzed the disintegration
of this alliance. Mithridates began to intervene in this state by assassinating Ariarathes VI.
Events progressed and a series of murders, puppet kings, and pretenders to the throne created
animosity between Nicomedia and Pontus as each country tried to assert its control over this
territory. It became apparent to Mithridates that his ally had become a threat to his control, and
he thus provoked Nicomedes into attacking him, using the occasion to call on the Romans to
4
Sherwin-White, 1977, p. 66
Brill, 1986, p. 67
6
Ibid, p. 69
7
Ibid, p. 68
5
Grichnik 3
“defend their ally, or restrain Nicomedes.”8 By this point, Pontus had become much stronger
then Bithynia, and Nicomedes no longer posed a military threat by his invasion. In this way
Mithridates used Nicomedes one last time to garner better relations with Rome and delay their
reprisal, before he finished off Bithynia and began his greater conquest of Greece and Asia
Minor. Mithridates manipulated his partner to every extent. After using to become the dominant
power in the region, he disposed of him as soon as he became a threat to the Pontic king’s
ambitions.
Likewise, Sulla benefited from a powerful partnership in order to achieve prominence.
He befriended Marius in his first consulship as a Quaestor, and earned a position as cavalry
commander under him in the war against Jugurtha. Sulla then “won great credit for himself”
during the campaign, especially through his role in befriending the king of Mauritania, Bocchus.9
In fact, Sulla eventually convinced Bocchus to betray Jugurtha, and ended the Jugurthine War.
This success benefited both Marius and Sulla, who became victors of a triumphant campaign.
Marius acquired the majority of the credit as commander of this triumphant army, yet many who
either envied him or knew of the campaign “attributed the glory and success to Sulla.”10
Therefore, Sulla profited immensely from his collaboration with Marius, using the opportunity in
order to become recognized as a prominent military commander without actually attaining the
command position usually needed for recognition.
In the same manner as Mithridates, Sulla’s cooperation with Marius fell apart as Sulla
became more confident with his position and the general became more of a threat. The
conclusion of the Jugurthine War only led to more fighting for these partitions, as the Cimbri and
the Teutons threatened to invade Italy providing greater opportunity for Sulla to gain
8
Ibid, p. 80
Plutarch, 1916, p. 331
10
Ibid, p. 333
9
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prominence. As it became necessary to campaign once more, Sulla and Marius travelled north to
halt the barbarian advance. Throughout the conflict, Sulla performed fantastically, yet “Marius
was vexed with these successes” which led to the end of cooperation between the two
patricians.11 Consequently, Sulla and Marius ended their collaboration at a point in which Sulla
had the gained sufficient military prestige to garner fame on his own, whereby Marius became
more of a threat then a protecting force. Thus, Sulla used Marius to help elevate himself to the
point at which “his reputation was sufficient to justify political activities” and could gain no
more benefit under Marius’s tutelage.12
This relationship, like the one of Mithridates and Nicomedes, ended in hostility. At the
conclusion of the Social War, Sulla emerged as a military hero, even earning Rome’s highest
military honor, the “grass crown,” for his efforts in the war.13 Sulla also earned a generalship in
the next campaign against Pontus in Asia, an assignment which Marius greatly desired and
attempted to obtain through legal coercion. Marius, through Sulpicius, nullified Sulla’s
command, and Sulla promptly responded by invading Rome. He took control of the government
and “passed a sentence of death on Marius,” thus removing a powerful political rival.14 In this
way Sulla, like Mithridates, used his ally to gain initial prestige, and then did away with him
once he became an adversary.
Mithridates and Sulla both espoused an ideology they did not represent in order to
advance their political position. This is evident in Mithridates’ use of philhellenism to secure the
loyalty of the Greeks in both Anatolia and mainland Greece. The Pontic king had precedent in
espousing this ideology; his territories had citizens of both Greek and Iranian citizens
11
Ibid, p. 334
Plutarch, 1916, p. 335
13
Keaveney, 1982, p. 43
14
Plutarch, 1916, p. 357
12
Grichnik 5
necessitating “phillhellinism as a way of proving Pontus was a member of the civilized Greek
world.”15 However, Mithridates differed from previous Hellenistic kings as he used this
ideology as a weapon to expand his kingdom.16 He applied these principles vigorously, using
coins featuring Greek gods such as Apollo, Artemis, Perseus, and Heracles as a mechanism to
spread his propaganda.17 In fact, he even changed the background of his royal portrait to a stag
in order to promote Artemis and further Hellenize his image.18 Moreover, Mithridates
“represented himself to the Greek east as an Alexander figure,” clearly using Greek culture in
order to win the approval of the Greek world.19 With statues, coins, and portraits, Mithridates
used philhellenism in order to win the approval of the Greeks as he expanded his kingdom.
This policy had great effect. In one telling instance, the priests of Delos and Athens
made dedications to Mithridates in their Serapiums prior to his conquest of mainland Greece.20
Furthermore, Mithridates maintained consistent popular support throughout his conquests,
demonstrating the benefits of his ideological propaganda. Many areas, such as Bithynia,
received him almost without a fight. Other places, “actually invited him in.”21 With his
extensive proclamation of Hellenism Mithridates conquered Asia Minor extremely easily, and in
many instances, the Romans made no efforts to defend their territory.22 The greatest testament
to Mithridates propaganda, however, was the enthusiasm with which Mithridates subjects
murdered their neighbors during the Night of the Vespers.23
15
Brill, 1986, p. 89
Ibid, p. 90
17
Ibid, p. 96
18
Ibid, p. 98
19
Ibid, p. 101
20
Ibid, p. 91
21
Ibid, p. 112
22
Ibid, p. 110
23
Ibid, p. 106
16
Grichnik 6
In spite of all his rhetoric, Mithridates Eupator had Persian descent and ruled a minority
Greek kingdom. In fact, Mithridates boasted to be part of the Seven Families of Persia, and that
his lands had been granted personally by Darius I.24 Therefore, despite such pride in his
inheritance, the King of Pontus choose to misrepresent himself in order to win the affection of
his Greek subjects and reduce animosity in his planned conquests. As a Hellenistic king,
Mithridates followed a cultural tradition which fused elements of Greek and Iranian society, yet
the degree to which he endeared himself to the Hellenes excessively falsifies the image of a king
who remains ethnically Persian. Mithridates espoused an ideology representing a falsehood,
which benefited him by changing loyalties in the Greek world he planned to conquer.
Sulla’s republican ideology is similarly distorted. Throughout his career, he embraced
senatorial virtues in order to justify his actions, yet simultaneously undermined these principles
with his tyrannical behavior. Markedly, Sulla refuted his republican motives so much as to
directly assault his own republic. In 88 BCE, Sulla violated the pomerium and marched on
Rome, slaughtering Marius’s gladiators and the citizens of Rome and seizing of the city. The
actions that Sulla took demonstrated a massive change in Roman politics; he was “unanimously
admitted by ancients and moderns alike to be the first master of the client army,” and thereby set
a precedent for civil war that would quickly spell the end of the Roman Republic.25 Keaveney
succinctly summarizes the implications of Sulla’s actions: “for the first time a Roman army,
conscious only of its allegiance to its general, was prepared to disregard its loyalty to the state
and march on Rome.”26 As later generals imitated these actions, Sulla can be held indirectly
responsible for the fall of the Roman Republic, staunchly repudiating his republican principles.
24
Wheatley, 1998, p. 155
Levick, 1982, p. 505
26
Keaveney, 1982, p. 62
25
Grichnik 7
Moreover, Sulla invaded Rome a second time, further disrupting the institutions of the
republic. As a result of this civil war, he claimed control and reinstated the title of ‘Dictator’,
which had not been used since the Second Punic War. As Sulla took control of Rome, he
addressed the Senate during his slaughter of the Cinna’s army, throughout which “the shrieks
and groans of so many men being murdered in so small a space carried clearly and the senators
started in dumbfound horror.”27 These horrific practices clearly demonstrated despotic
measures, and seriously impaired republican Rome. Through his two invasions of Rome and
brutally repressive measures, Sulla’s precedents contributed to the downfall of the Roman
Republic which clearly contradicts his republican leanings.
In spite of his dictatorial actions, Sulla championed a republican ideology and
implemented it both as a justification for his actions and through decrees strengthening
representative control over Rome. When asked to justify his first march on Rome, Sulla claimed,
“he had come to deliver her [Rome] from tyrants,” and aimed to end the coercive rule imposed
by Marius and Sulpicius.28 Moreover, once in power Sulla enacted republican legislation,
decreeing that no business should be brought before the people of Rome without the prior
consent of the senate.29 Sulla also implemented representative government abroad, restoring
democracy to a dictatorial Athens, and enacting constitutional amendments “designed as an
assurance against repeated arconships.”30 Most importantly however, Sulla retired from
government after his second march on Rome, and allowed dissent after his reign as dictator. As
a consequence, Sulla’s actions show a genuine devotion to republican ideology, yet his
27
Keaveney, 1982, p. 148
Ibid, p. 64-65
29
Ibid, p. 68
30
Geagan, 1967, p. 5
28
Grichnik 8
tyrannical methods of achieving power outweighed his representative principles. In the same
manner as Mithridates, Sulla ascribed to a belief that he personally cannot embody.
Finally, both Mithridates and Sulla promoted populism, which led to cruel repression, in
order to advance their ambitions. In Pontus, Mithridates explicitly garnered the support of the
populations of Greece and Asia Minor as an effort to strengthen allegiance throughout his
conquests. It is suggested that Mithridates made strategic use of social unrest in Asia, projecting
himself as a social reformer in order to earn lower class sympathy. He achieved this through
“manumission of slaves, cancellation of debts, and the partial redistribution of property.” 31
Therefore, Mithridates garnered the devotion of the masses improving their livelihoods
significantly, sending a populist message in order to both maintain support in conquered territory
and reduce opposition in future conquests. For these reasons, Appian claimed “debtors, metics,
and slaves maintained support for Mithridates” even after his failure in the war, as Mithridates
successfully used populism in order to attain the support of the lower class population throughout
his expansion.32
The broad base of support that Mithridates acquired also allowed him to commit acts of
terrible cruelty. As the Pontic king achieved the loyalty of populace of Anatolia, he gained the
ability to use extreme brutality in order to spread his anti-Roman message. In this manner,
Mithridates proclaimed that his subjects “should set upon all Romans and Italians in their towns,
and upon their wives and children and their domestics of Italian birth,” enacting a terrible
massacre which obliterated the Italians from Asia Minor in a single night.33 This dreadful deed
served two purposes for Mithridates: it provoked the Romans into conflict and served to solidify
his support in Asian Minor through elimination of his adversaries. Therefore, Mithridates’
31
Keaveney, 1982, p. 155
Appian, 1996, p. 48
33
Ibid, p. 22
32
Grichnik 9
populism obtained the support of the general populace through benefactions, which in turn
allowed him to use cruelty to further acquire loyalty by eliminating his adversaries.
Consequently, Sulla used extensive populism in order to gain the support of the men he
commanded. When he became a cavalry commander under Marius, Sulla “instantly set about
making himself popular with the army,” where he treated the soldiers with the utmost kindness
and affability.34 Moreover, Sulla consistently worked with his soldiers, and became conspicuous
by his participation in hard labor.35 Through these actions, Sulla won great reputation with the
troops and secured their complete loyalty. Sulla treated his troops extremely well during the
course of his campaigns, always responding to their desires, such as allowing them to “plunder
Greece” when Sulla desired to return quickly to Rome.36 Through his promotion of populism,
Sulla became the first man to secure the absolute loyalty of his men through populism, even to
the point of civil war, thus demonstrating the political benefit of Sulla’s actions.
Sulla used the loyalty he accrued through his populist tactics in order to crush his
enemies. Sulla had a policy of rough justice; in his monuments he inscribed that he “had never
failed to repay the kindness of a friend or the hurt of an enemy.”37 As Sulla had clearly acquired
the complete loyalty of his troops, he began to castigate his adversaries once he acquired power
in Rome. During his dictatorship, Sulla’s repression developed into a reign of terror, in which
“throughout the land murder, exile, and confiscation were the order of the day,” as he squashed
dissent and took vengeance on those who had done him wrong. Sulla organized this subjugation
through public death orders, known as The Proscriptions, which listed “public enemies who
34
Keaveney, 1982, 16
Ibid
36
Ibid, p. 111
37
Ibid, p. 157
35
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could be killed with impunity.”38 In this manner, Sulla used his popular support to enact to
dominate his enemies, benefitting his position through the removal of his enemies. Therefore
both Mithridates and Sulla used populism which allowed repression to further their politcal
ambitions, both endearing the populace and crushing their political enemies.
The Mithridatic Wars that occurred in the late Roman Republic were devastating to
nation beset conflict. The Jugurthine War, invasions of the Cimbri and Teutons, and the Social
War had all previously inundated the empire, and the strength of Mithridates Eupator of Pontus’s
challenge earned him distinction as one of Rome’s greatest enemies. Throughout this conflict,
Mithridates and Sulla confronted each other as adversaries, yet shared many of the same qualities
which brought them to prominence. Both great men’s manipulation of allies, misrepresentation
of ideologies, and employment of a barbaric populism earned them political power which led to
their confrontation in the ancient world. The similarities in the actions of these two men are
striking, and further comparative analysis of ancient adversaries may yield a greater
understanding of the successful political characteristics that defined leaders in the classical
world.
38
Keaveney, 1982, p. 150
Grichnik 11
Works Cited:
Appian. The History of Rome. “The Mithradic Wars.” translated by Horace White.
http://www.livius.org/ap-ark/appian/appian_mithridatic_00.html.
Bosworth, A.B., and P.V. Wheatley. "The Origins of the Pontic House." The Journal
of Hellenistic Studies 118 (1998): 155-164.
Geagan, Daniel J.. The Athenian Constitution after Sulla (Hesperia Supplement).
Volume XII ed. ASCSA: American School Of Classical Studies, 1967. Print.
Keaveney, Arthur. Sulla: The Last Republican. 2 ed. New York: Routledge, 2005.
Levick, B.M. “Sulla’s March on Rome in 88B.C.” Historia: Zeitschrift fur Alte
Geshichite 31.4 (1982) 503-508
Mcging, B. C.. The Foreign Policy of Mithridates VI Eupator, King of Pontus
(Mnemosyne Ser.: Suppl.89). Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill
Academic Publishers, 1997.
Plutarch. Parallel Lives. “The life of Sulla.” Translated by Bill Thayer.
http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Sulla*.html
Sherwin-White, A.N.. "Roman Involvement in Anatolia, 167-88 B.C.." The Journal
of Roman Studies 67 (1977): 62-75.