European Law and Life Culture
第八單元：Corruption
Lecturer:
Fr. Jonah Mourtos,
The Orthodox Church in Taiwan
Unless noted, the course materials are licensed under Creative Commons
Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Taiwan (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0)
1
•
Hans Sinn IFO institute
http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/facts/DICE/Public-Sector/PublicGovernance-and-Law/Corruption/Freedom-from-Corruption/visualstory
2
•
Hans Sinn IFO institute
http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/facts/DICE/Public-Sector/PublicGovernance-and-Law/Corruption/Corruption-Perceptions-Index/visualstory
3
Hans Sinn IFO institute
•
•
http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/facts/DICE/DICESearch.html?DICEsearch.query=corruption&DICEsearch.search=+&DICEsearch.face
t_hasVisualStory=true&DICEsearch.facet_isArchived=false
http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/facts/DICE/Public-Sector/PublicGovernance-and-Law/Corruption/Control-of-Corruption-Worldwide-GovernanceIndicators/visualstory
4
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2010/results
DID YOU SEE
THE BRIDGE?
ANECTDOTE
5
From economist , bribery
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2013/07/daily-chart-8
DID YOU SEE
THE BRIDGE?
ANECTDOTE
6
The rational irrationality
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/05/091005fa_fact_cassidy
DID YOU SEE THE BRIDGE?
ANECTDOTE
7
generalities
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/cor02.htm
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/corruption/
But many acts of corruption are not unlawful. That paradigm of
corruption, bribery, is a case in point. Prior to
1977 it was not
unlawful for US companies to offer bribes to secure
foreign contracts; indeed, elsewhere such bribery
was not unlawful until much later.[10] So corruption is not
necessarily unlawful. This is because corruption is not at bottom simply
a matter of law; rather it is fundamentally a matter of morality.
An academic who plagiarises the work of others is not committing an economic
crime or misdemeanour; and she might be committing plagiarism
simply in order to increase her academic status.
8
SIEMENS SCANDAL http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/9502146/Debt-crisisGreek-government-signs-330m-settlement-with-Siemens.html
9
http://compliancestrategists.net/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/siemens.ethikos.pdf
10
• Years After Mayor's Death, Killer Remains on
Payroll
• Case Highlights Frustrations Facing Greek
Bailout Reform Efforts
• http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014
24052702304526204579097150213981632WH
Y? EXPLAIN!!!!
11
Adam Smith
• *It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or
the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard for
their own interest. Each participant in a competitive economy
is led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no
part of his intention.* Adam Smith, 1776
12
Normative (Nash) vs descriptive (smith)
13
game
•
•
•
•
write a number X from 0 – 100
What is the MAX number?
Who is close to MAX/2 ?
YOU WIN !!!!! X/N
• What number you must choose that YOU
WILL NEVER REGRET?
14
• EVERY GAME has a NASH
EQUILIBRIOUM
• Which bargain (negotiation)
will happen (not which is
more correct , ethical etc…)
15
• ‘Nash’s elegant solution was to say how two or more
bargainers split up the gains from exchange depends on
how much each values the benefits of the deal, and what
the parties’ alternatives are.
• Each looks for his or her best deal assuming everyone else is
looking for the best deal too, and the trade is made at the
point at which no one has any incentive to change position,
given the actions of the other. …
• Both walk away better off that they would have been had
they not traded at all, thus capturing the on-zero sum gains
of co-operation.’
16
• Smith stated the conditional proposition (Wealth of Nations, Book 1,
chapter ii): ‘give me this what I want and you shall have that which
you want’, which is the meaning of all bargain propositions.
• Nash, however, assumed: Highly rational bargainers, who can accurately
compare each other’s desires; they have equal bargaining skills (by
assuming them away); who have full knowledge of each other’s
tastes and preferences (preventing bluffing and ploys) and
they desire to maximise their gains – the difference
between what they ‘give up’ compared to what they ‘get’
in exchange.
• http://oyc.yale.edu/economics/econ-159/lecture-5
17
18
To Bribe or Not to Bribe? Is it a Question?
sir y
Sir x
BRIBE
NOT BRIBE
BRIBE
(10 x,10y)
(30x,-5y)
NOT BRIBE
(-5x,30y)
(13x,13y) ?
19
Game theory: what YOU suggest?
Salary
$100/month
COOPERATE:
Lobby, strike etc..
So government
increases salary to
$300/month
20
CORRUPT OFFICIAL
CITIZEN
accept
Do not accept
Give & report
(-5, -5)
(0,0)
Give & NOT report
(5, 10)
(0.0)
CORRUPT OFFICIAL
CITIZEN
accept
Do not accept
Give & report
(15,-5)
(0,-2)
Give & NOT report
(5,10)
(0,-2)
DO NOT GIVE
(10,0)
(0,-2)
BRIBER
LEGAL !!
THE RULE OF LAW. Such law may be rejected from the HIGH COURT.
But the RULE of law is based on pre assumptions:
Choose :
EFFICIENCY OR LEGALITY?
21
Pay-off
Corrupt Official: Confess
Corrupt Official: Silence
Knowing Colleague:
Confess
Corrupt Official: -7 (Prison & Damages)
Knowing Colleague: -0.1 (Mild Official
Reprimand)
Corrupt Official: -10 (Prison & Damages)
Knowing Colleague: 0 (Free of guilt?)
Knowing Colleague: Silence
Corrupt Official: -5 (Prison & Damages)
Knowing Colleague: -0.2 (Stern Official
Reprimand
Corrupt Official: -0.05 (Guilt and Fear?)
Knowing Colleague: -0.05 (Guilt and
Fear?)
Pay-off
Corrupt Official: Confess
Corrupt Official: Silence
Knowing Colleague:
Confess
Corrupt Official: -7 (Prison & Damages)
Knowing Colleague: -0.1 (Mild Official
Reprimand)
Corrupt Official: -10 (Prison & Damages)
Knowing Colleague: 2 (Award of a Fraction
of Damages
Knowing Colleague: Silence
Corrupt Official: -5 (Prison & Damages)
Knowing Colleague: -0.2 (Stern Official
Reprimand
Corrupt Official: -0.1 (Guilt and Fear?)
Knowing Colleague: -0.1
"Knowing Colleague” It can be seen that regardless of whether the corrupt official
comes clean or not, it is best for the "Knowing Colleague" to "confess
22
•
•
The doping dilemma
http://www.wired.com/opinion/2012/10/lance-armstrong-and-the-prisonersdilemma-of-doping-in-professional-sports/
23
Prisoners of the prisoner Dilemma
• If government wants to stop corruption must take economic
measures (increase salaries, spend for public wellness , etc…
• The MARKETS will suspect that the country wastes money …
• --- RELUCTUNT TO INVEST.
• If markets do not like you , bailout is coming. (greece)
• So better NOT to do anything………
• If ALL COUNTRIES SIMULTANUSLY decide to act against
corruption, then they win.
• THIS SEEMS IMPOSSIBLE
24
both players simultaneously choose an integer from 0 to
3 and
they both win the smaller of the two numbers in points.
In addition, if one player chooses a larger number than the
other,
then he/she has to give up two points to the other.
PLAYER-2
0
PLAYER -2
1
PLAYER -2
2
PLAYER-2
3
PLAYER-1 -> 0
(0,0)
(2,-2)
(2,-2))
(2-2)
PLAYER -1 ->1
(-2,2)
(1,1))
(3,-1)
(3,-1)
PLAYER -1 ->2
(-2,2)
(-1,3)
(2,2)
(4,0)
PLAYER -1 ->3
(-2,2)
(-1.3)
(0,4)
(3,3)
25
• Now, when Thomson Reuters was discovered to
have been selling this insider information to
favored clients--this is the two-second advantage-the New York attorney general said that this is
outrageous, it will, you know, harm the markets,
and threatened to take action. Thomson Reuters
stopped selling the information on the twosecond advantage, but asserted that it had a legal
right to do so.
•
http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=767&Itemid=74&jumiv
al=10714
26
• "What if we prefer to pursue our self-interest through political rent-seeking,
rather than renouncing that for a Liberal economic order that can only
benefit us much less directly?” it turns out that there really are TWO
Prisoner's Dilemmas, one for the short term and one for the long run.
• Robert Axelrod, invited computer program entries for a computer
"tournament" of a Prisoner's Dilemma game
• The champion entry was called "TIT FOR TAT" and was one of the simplest
possible. It only contained two rules:
• (1) start with Keep Faith,
• (2) do the next turn what the opponent did on the last turn.
• Any entry willing to Keep Faith with TIT FOR TAT will consistently do well. Any
entry trying to Betray TIT FOR TAT will not be able to betray it more than once
in a row, and a particularly treacherous entry will consistently be Betrayed
itself, accumulating little. A consistently Faithful entry will do fine with TIT
FOR TAT, but it will of course get wiped out by the treacherous entries, so its
overall score will be lower.
27
• 以牙還牙（Tit for tat）是一個用於博弈論的重覆囚徒困境
（Reiterated Prisoner's Dilemma）非常有效的策略。這策
略最先由數學家阿納托·拉普伯特（Anatol Rapoport）提出，
並在密西根大學社會學家羅伯特·阿克塞爾羅（Robert
Axelrod）有關囚徒困境的研究中擊敗其他方法，脫穎而出，
成為解決囚徒困境的最佳策略[1]。
28
29
•
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) where the Prisoner's Dilemma is played (forever) and each player remembers
all the past outcomes and acts accordingly. In this case, a celebrated strategy called "tit-for-tat" is an equilibrium
strategy for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma where one begins by "cooperating" and then doing exactly what
one's opponent did in the last round, cooperating if one's opponent is cooperative and retaliating otherwise. It
is clear that for a pair of players using "tit-for-tat" neither can benefit themselves by using a different strategy.
• How does this relate to corruption?
• But secrecy is maintained for the same reasons that "tit-for-tat” perform
well in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. However, if a pair of
"accomplices" (possibly one corrupt official and another who just knew
but didn't report it immediately) knew that they would not have to deal
with the implications of the past by the next week, say because both
would be emigrating to different countries, the situation would revert to
one better modelled by the (single-round) Prisoner's Dilemma, where
confessing (defecting) would be a dominant strategy. But clearly, we
cannot rely on such "changes in the context" to get people to talk... and if
this post is titled "Implementing Bottom-Up Anti-Corruption Measures in
Dominant Strategies", clearly it suggests that there should be a way to do
this.
30
•
•
http://www.friesian.com/rent.htm
Public Choice theory gives rise to a serious Prisoner's Dilemma. The largest
benefits with the least effort come from political rent-seeking, and those who fail
to participate in the political process will have their wealth drained way with no
corresponding return. Even if it is obvious to all that not everyone can live off of
the wealth of everyone else (1,1), and that the best mutually beneficial course is
for everyone to give up political rent-seeking (3,3), it is obvious that the best
course for each individual group is to get everyone else to give up rent-seeking
while they alone covertly continue to collect their monopoly rents (5,0). The fear
that others will pursue such a strategy is easily sufficient motivation not to give up
rent-seeking. No one, of course, blatantly advertises their rent-seeking in terms of
their own self-interest. Instead, there are always high sounding, moralistic slogans
and rationalizations, arguments that special benefits are necessary because of
poverty, compassion, discrimination, racism, the environment, greedy insurance
companies, greedy businessmen, etc. Whatever the arguments, the significant
question to ask is whether they can be translated, as P.J. O'Rourke says, into "Give
me a dollar."
31
The revenge of the future
• Global debt increase
• Punishment from the future: Tsohatzopoulos
32
NASH BARGAIN
NASH STATE CONTRACT
http://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm
http://patentlawcenter.pli.edu/2011/07/28/judge-nashbargaining-is-no-solution-for-patent-damages/
33
NASH BARGAIN SOLUTION
• Efficiency: The players will exploit the full value v. They will leave no portion of
v undistributed.
• Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA): This means that if options that
none of the players would have chosen are removed from the game, there is no
change in outcome. Suppose, for example, player A has three offers they could
make x, y and z. Suppose, further, that A thinks z would be best. Now, along
comes a third party who removes offer x from A's pool of possible offers.
According to IIA, nothing will change since A was never going to choose x
anyway.
• Symmetry: If the players' utility functions for v are the same, they should each
receive the same outcome.
• Independence of (Linear) Utility Rescaling: The utility functions for players can
be calibrated or scaled in somewhat arbitrary ways. With this assumption, Nash
is saying that if we recalibrate or rescale the utility function on a linear basis,
we do not change the solution to the game. This is a good thing since utility
functions are arbitrarily scaled. Note that this would not apply if the rescaling
were non-linear
34
• The strategy!!!!!!!
• http://lesswrong.com/lw/dr9/game_theory_a
s_a_dark_art/
35
• Nash equilibrium exists.
• But HOW TO ACHIVE? Is there any mathematical
way to go to Nash equilibrium?
• NO !!!! DASKALAKIS THEOREM.
36
•
•
•
http://www.itcsc.cuhk.edu.hk/Seminars/Seminars_2008/Constantinos_Daskalakis_20081215.htm
How long does it take a market or, more broadly, a game to reach an equilibrium state? I will
present joint work with Paul Goldberg and Christos Papadimitriou, showing that convergence to a
Nash equilibrium may take prohibitively long. Since a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist in
every game---by Nash's seminal result, NP-completeness does not seem appropriate for
characterizing its complexity. Our result is that the Nash equilibrium is as hard computationally as
the general Brouwer fixed-point computation problem, in a precise technical sense. The existence
of the Nash equilibrium is established via Brouwer fixed-point theorem; hence our result is the
computational converse of Nash's theorem.
To alleviate the negative implications of this hardness result for the predictive power of the Nash
equilibrium, it is important to study the computation of approximate equilibria: an efficient
approximation scheme would imply that games can in principle come arbitrarily close to a Nash
equilibrium in a sufficiently large number of game-plays. I will discuss such polynomial-time
approximation schemes for special classes of two-player games and describe obstacles towards
obtaining a polynomial-time approximation scheme for the general two-player case. I will then turn
to a large and important class of multi-player games, called anonymous, in which the players's
utilities, although potentially different, do not differentiate among the identities of the other
players; examples arise in congestion, social interactions, and certain auction settings. I will present
several approaches for approximating multi-player anonymous games with two strategies,
culminating in an efficient PTAS with quasi-polynomial dependence on the approximation.
37
• CONFIDENCE IN INSTITUTIONS
• http://www.cesifogroup.de/ifoHome/facts/DICE/Values/Political
-Values/Confidence-in-Institutions.html
38
THE RULES: PRINCIPLES ? OR COOPERATION?
• One only has to compare the constitution of the USA with that of
the old USSR to see why. USSR document is a wondrous list of
utopian aspirations, but entirely useless to the citizens of the
USSR because those holding power held its provisions in
contempt.
• The constitution of the USA, on the other hand, was written by
people who understood that the best a constitution can do is to
help in coordinating behavior on one of the many equilibria in the
actual game of life that would be played by American citizens in
the future. Accepting the pretence that the Supreme Court merely
reinterprets constitutional provisions rather than rewriting them
to bring them up to date with current opinion, its survival is a
tribute to the hard-headed realism of its authors.
39
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
An example of decision-making by backward induction[edit]
Consider an unemployed person who will be able to work for ten more years t = 1,2,...,10. Suppose that each year in
which she remains unemployed, she may be offered a 'good' job that pays $100, or a 'bad' job that pays $44, with
equal probability (50/50). Once she accepts a job, she will remain in that job for the rest of the ten years. (Assume for
simplicity that she cares only about her monetary earnings, and that she values earnings at different times equally,
i.e., the discount rate is zero.)
Should this person accept bad jobs? To answer this question, we can reason backwards from time t = 10.
At time 10, the value of accepting a good job is $100; the value of accepting a bad job is $44; the value of rejecting
the job that is available is zero. Therefore, if she is still unemployed in the last period, she should accept whatever job
she is offered at that time.
At time 9, the value of accepting a good job is $200 (because that job will last for two years); the value of accepting a
bad job is 2*$44 = $88. The value of rejecting a job offer is $0 now, plus the value of waiting for the next job offer,
which will either be $44 with 50% probability or $100 with 50% probability, for an average ('expected') value of
0.5*($100+$44) = $72. Therefore regardless of whether the job available at time 9 is good or bad, it is better to
accept that offer than wait for a better one.
At time 8, the value of accepting a good job is $300 (it will last for three years); the value of accepting a bad job is
3*$44 = $132. The value of rejecting a job offer is $0 now, plus the value of waiting for a job offer at time 9. Since we
have already concluded that offers at time 9 should be accepted, the expected value of waiting for a job offer at time
9 is 0.5*($200+$88) = $144. Therefore at time 8, it is more valuable to wait for the next offer than to accept a bad job.
It can be verified by continuing to work backwards that bad offers should only be accepted if one is still unemployed
at times 9 or 10; they should be rejected at all times up to t = 8. The intuition is that if one expects to work in a job for
a long time, this makes it more valuable to be picky about what job to accept.
A dynamic optimization problem of this kind is called an optimal stopping problem, because the issue at hand is when
to stop waiting for a better offer. Search theory is the field of microeconomics that applies problems of this type to
contexts like shopping, job search, and marriage.
40
Origen: the angels fall because of
being boring in paradise
•
•
•
•
Why the empires fall? CORRUPTION
Why corruption? THEY HAVE ALL!!!
They do not want anything more.
End of creativity
41
Gödel vs. Adam smith
• Is the system stable?
• The hand of ethics
• If it is not my personal
interest then what is?
• http://video.ias.edu/csdm/
invisiblemarket
42
Mission statement
•
•
•
•
•
Ideology
Religion
Ethics
Kurt Gödel incompleteness
Beyond regulations
43
• For example, in Germany in 1999, after a campaign finance scandal
broke out around Helmut Kohl, the former chancellor and leader of
the Christian-Democratic Union (CDU), his party lost the election. As
Angela Merkel, secretary-general of the CDU said in the wake of the
scandal, ‘Never again can Kohl lead the CDU as a chancellor candidate
in a federal election . . . [Kohl’s confession] is a tragedy for Helmut
Kohl, a tragedy for the CDU’.5 In contrast to the French case where
the oppo- sition was silent about the corruption scandals, the CDU’s
main oppo- nent, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), seized the
opportunity to criticize the CDU. Just a week after Kohl’s confession,
the SPD’s leader and new German chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder,
accused the CDU of bringing Germany to the brink of bankruptcy,
proclaiming that ‘the only thing they fixed up was their party
accounts’.6 Voters responded forcefully by strengthening the SPD’s
position in both houses of the German parliament.
44
Egalitarian or utilitarian 平等或功利?
• Rawls’ basic intuition about how real fairness norms work,
but the result in the real world of rational bargaining in the
original position will nevertheless be egalitarian—not in
exactly the sense he proposed, but in the sense made
precise by what game theorists call the egalitarian (or
proportional) bargaining solution (Binmore [2]). Aristotle
[1] made the essential point long ago when he said:
• “What is fair . . . is what is proportional”
• http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/papers/uploaded/331.pdf
45
版權聲明
頁碼
作品
版權圖示
來源/作者
1
Greece and Italy are Europe’s most corrupt
http://www.happensingreece.com/greece-and-italy-are-europes-most-corrupt/#more1610
依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2013/10/30。
2
CESifo DICE Database, Freedom from Corruption (Index of Economic Freedom),
1995 – 2013.
http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/facts/DICE/Public-Sector/Public-Governanceand-Law/Corruption/Freedom-from-Corruption/visualstory
依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2013/10/30。
3
CESifo DICE Database, Corruption perceptions index, 1995-2012.
http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/facts/DICE/Public-Sector/Public-Governanceand-Law/Corruption/Corruption-Perceptions-Index/visualstory
依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2013/10/30。
5
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS, 2010.
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2010/results
依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2013/10/30。
46
頁碼
作品
來源/作者
The Economics, graphic detail
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2013/07/daily-chart-8
依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2013/10/30。
6
8
版權圖示
But many acts
of corruption…
increase her
academic status
Corruption/ Miller, Seumas
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/corruption/
依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2013/10/30。
9
The Telegraph / photo: reuters. Debt crisis: Greek government signs €330m
settlement with Siemens
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/9502146/Debt-crisis-Greekgovernment-signs-330m-settlement-with-Siemens.html
依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2013/10/30。
10
At Siemens, Bribery Was Just a Line Item, The New York Times, Dec 21, 2008.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/21/business/worldbusiness/21siemens.html?pagew
anted=all&_r=1&
依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2013/10/30。
12
亞當史密斯 / ‫مايكل هارت‬
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:37.Adam_Smith.jpg
依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2013/10/30。
47
頁碼
作品
12
It is not from…
part of his
intention
版權圖示
來源 / 作者
Can the Theory of Algorithms Ratify the “Invisible Hand of the Market”? / Vijay V.
Vazirani
http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-642-30642-6_1
依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2013/10/30。
13
Wikimedia commons / Economicforum
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:John_Forbes_Nash,_Jr..jpg
本作品以創用CC「姓名標示－相同方式分享」3.0版授權釋出。
瀏覽日期：2013/10/30。
13
Wikimedia commons / wikispaces
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:John_von_Neumann.jpg
本作品以創用CC「姓名標示－相同方式分享」3.0版授權釋出。
瀏覽日期：2013/10/30。
16
‘Nash’s elegant
solution… onzero sum gains
of co-operation.’
Nash Equilibrium is Not a Theory of Bargaining / Gavin Kennedy
http://adamsmithslostlegacy.blogspot.tw/2006/08/nash-equilibrium-is-not-theoryof.html
依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2013/10/30。
17
Smith stated the
conditional…
what they ‘get’
in exchange.
同上。
48
頁碼
作品
版權圖示
來源 / 作者
18
Death By Trolley / Encyclopæpia Britannica, Inc.
http://deathbytrolley.wordpress.com/2013/01/14/society-is-handcuffed-in-theprisoners-dilemma/
依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2013/10/30。
20
Edward Mead
http://www.outspokenaffairs.com/2012/05/game-theory-of-corruption.html
依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2013/10/30。
23
WIRED / Bruce Schneier. Lance Armstrong and the Prisoners’ Dilemma of Doping
in Professional Sports; Flickr / Wayne England
http://www.wired.com/opinion/2012/10/lance-armstrong-and-the-prisonersdilemma-of-doping-in-professional-sports/
依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2013/10/30。
27
28
What if we
prefer to…
score will be
lower.
Rent-Seeking, Public Choice, and The Prisoner's Dilemma / Kelley L. Ross, Ph.D
http://www.friesian.com/rent.htm
依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2013/10/30。
以牙還牙…解
決囚徒困境的
最佳策略。
維基百科
http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E4%BB%A5%E7%89%99%E9%82%84%E7%89%9
9#cite_note-tit_for_tat-1
本作品以創用CC「姓名標示－相同方式分享」臺灣3.0版授權釋出。瀏覽日期：
2013/10/30。
49
頁碼
作品
版權圖示
來源/作者
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary
opponent / William H. Press and Freeman J. Dyson
http://www.pnas.org/content/109/26/10409/F1.expansion.html
依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2013/10/30。
29
31
Public Choice
theory
gives… ”Give
me a dollar!”
Rent-Seeking, Public Choice, and The Prisoner's Dilemma / Kelley L. Ross, Ph.D
http://www.friesian.com/rent.htm
依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2013/10/30。
34
Efficiency:….
the rescaling is
non-linear
The Nash Bargaining Solution / John Danaher
http://philosophicaldisquisitions.blogspot.tw/2010/10/nash-bargaining-solution.html
本作品以創用CC「姓名標示－非商業性─禁止改作」3.0版授權釋出。瀏覽日
期：2013/10/30。
Constantinos Daskalakis / Image by Sarah A. King
http://people.csail.mit.edu/costis/
依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2013/10/30。
36
37
How long does
it … on the
approximation.
Computing Equilibria in Large Games / Dr. Constantinos Daskalakis
http://www.itcsc.cuhk.edu.hk/Seminars/Seminars_2008/Constantinos_Daskalakis_2
0081215.htm
依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2013/10/30。
50
頁碼
40
作品
An example of
decisionmaking … job
search, and
marriage.
版權圖示
來源/作者
Wikipedia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backward_induction
本作品以創用CC「姓名標示－相同方式分享」臺灣3.0版授權釋出。瀏覽日期：
2013/10/30。
Wikimedia commons / Unknown. Kurt Friedrich Gödel
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kurt_g%C3%B6del.jpg
依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2013/10/30。
42
44
For example,…
houses of the
German
parliament.
International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Susan RoseAckerman(ed.), (pp.141), 2006, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.
依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。
45
Rawls’ basic
intuition
about … is what
is proportional.
Game Theory and Institutions / Ken Binmore
http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/papers/uploaded/331.pdf
依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。瀏覽日期：2013/10/30。
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