Social cognition in young
children and
chimpanzees
Malinda Carpenter
Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary
Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany
carpenter@eva.mpg.de
Introduction to this course
• Many differences between apes and humans
– culture
• artifacts
• beliefs, customs, rituals
• language
– collaborative activities
•
•
•
•
institutions (collective beliefs, e.g., money, marriage, government)
skyscrapers
symphony orchestras
summer schools
– everyday life
• showing your vacation photos
• holding a door open for someone
• taking a walk together
•
Where do these differences come from?
– language X
– ‘theory of mind’ (  )
– shared intentionality 
•
We propose that all these abilities involve sharing and
collaboration. The crucial difference between human
cognition and that of other species is the ability to
participate with others in collaborative activities with
shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality
(Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005).
• Two components:
1) understanding of others’ psychological states
2) motivation to share psychological states with others
• Outline
– ‘theory of mind’ (understanding of others’ mental states)
• beliefs, knowledge, desires
• intentions, attention
– shared intentionality
•
•
•
•
some types of social learning
some types of communication
motivation to share psychological states with others
collaboration
– comparisons
• infants and apes: collaborative vs. individual versions of each
• children with autism
– discussion, evolutionary story
– questions, discussion welcome!
‘Theory of mind’: Children’s and
chimpanzees’ understanding of
others’ mental states
Part 1: False beliefs, knowledge, and
desires
Theory of mind
Your roommate goes to her dresser, pulls on the handles
of a drawer several times, harder and harder, hits the
sides of the dresser, pulls again, and then walks away.
• random pulling/hitting behavior?
or
• She thought something she wanted was in there and
she was trying to open the drawer to get it out.
• We make sense of others’ behavior by figuring out why
they’re behaving the way they are – by figuring out what
they’re thinking, what they want, what they are intending.
Theory of mind
Your roommate goes to her dresser, pulls on the handles
of a drawer several times, harder and harder, hits the
sides of the dresser, pulls again, and then walks away.
• random pulling/hitting behavior?
or
• She thought something she wanted was in there and
she was trying to open the drawer to get it out.
• We make sense of others’ behavior by figuring out why
they’re behaving the way they are – by figuring out what
they’re thinking, what they want, what they are intending.
• ‘Theory of mind’: the attribution of mental states (e.g.,
thoughts, beliefs, desires, intentions) to others (and self)
(Premack & Woodruff, 1978).
• Understanding of mental states (‘mindreading’) allows us
to explain observable events (actions) by inferring
unobservable entities (beliefs, desires, etc.).
• Also involves understanding that others’ mental states
may differ from one’s own, and may differ from reality
(e.g., false belief, unfulfilled attempt).
• We use it everyday: make sense of others’ behavior,
deception, prediction, etc.
• Debate over whether really a theory, and how children
do this (acquire rules and principles vs. use own imagination to simulate
other’s mind).
• Original definition included all mental states, but most
tests are of beliefs, especially false beliefs.
– one reason: beliefs are often less directly observable in
behavior, can be more detached from reality
– great interest in this: search  729 papers on false belief
• Generally accepted criterion for crediting someone with a
theory of mind is an understanding of others’ false
beliefs
– important that the other’s belief does not match reality, so cannot
answer based on own belief/knowledge – if ask about other’s true
beliefs, children could respond correctly even if didn’t know anything
about others’ minds, by answering according to what they know
Understanding of others’ beliefs
• Beliefs
– Children begin to explain others’ behavior in terms of
their beliefs around age 3 years. For example:
Sam wants to find his puppy. The puppy might be
hiding in the garage or under the porch. But Sam
thinks the puppy is under the porch. Where will Sam
look for the puppy: in the garage or under the
porch? (Wellman & Bartsch, 1988)
– Three-year-olds pass this test. But 3-year-olds do
badly on tests of false beliefs.
• False Beliefs
– standard tests:
• Sally-Anne or Maxi test (change of location): BaronCohen, Leslie, & Frith (1985); Wimmer & Perner (1983)
• Smarties test (deceptive box): Perner, Leekam, &
Wimmer (1987)
False Beliefs:
Sally-Anne (Maxi)
test
(Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith,
1985; Wimmer & Perner, 1983)
control questions:
− Where is the marble really?
− Where did Sally put the marble
at the beginning of the story?
 3-year-olds say box, where it is
(fail); 4+-year-olds say basket
from Frith (1989)
False Beliefs:
Smarties test
(Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer,
1987)
tests self and other: self & other
answers related (Gopnik & Astington,
1988)
?
control questions:
− Is that what’s really in here?
− What is really in here?
 again, 3-year-olds fail (say
pencil); 4+-year-old pass (say
Smarties)
?
from Frith (1989)
Development of understanding of false beliefs
– Meta-analysis on over 100 studies using the
standard, verbal tests (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001):
• younger than 3½ years: below chance (choose incorrect)
• 3½-4 years: at chance
• older than 4 years: above chance (choose correct)
– ‘Implicit’ tests
• Clements & Perner (1994): standard ‘Sally-Anne’
scenario, but measured to which location children looked in
anticipation of the protagonist’s return. Evidence of implicit
understanding at age 2;11.
• Onishi & Baillargeon (2005): 15-month-olds looked
longer at displays in which an actor’s search for a toy was
inconsistent with her belief about the toy’s location.
Onishi & Baillargeon (2005)
Infants watch as actor takes
object, plays, puts in green box.
[Pause, curtain]
Actor reaches into green box as if
to take object. [Pause, curtain]
Belief induction trial:
e.g., False Belief (unseen switch):
infant but not actor sees object
move from green to yellow box.
Test trial: e.g., actor reaches into
yellow box. [Pause until trial
ends]
• Other belief induction trials:
– True belief (seen switch): actor watches as object moves from
green to yellow.
– True belief (no switch): actor watches as yellow box moves but
object does not come out of green box
– False belief (one seen, then one unseen switch): actor watches as
object moves from green to yellow, then does not watch as object
moves back to green.
– Test trial: for half the infants actor reached to yellow and for half
reached to green box.
• Results
– In each of the four conditions, infants looked longer during the test
when the actor reached to the location that was inconsistent with
where she thought the object was (where she correctly or falsely
believed - ? – it to be).
 False belief understanding in 15-month-olds??
• Given these findings,
why do 3-year-olds fail
the standard tests?
– Zaitchik (1990):
compared out-of-date
beliefs to out-of-date
photographs (same
structure, cognitive demands)
– 3-year-olds fail this too
executive function
problems? (difficulty
inhibiting the perceptually
salient response? – not a
problem in tasks using
looking measures)
from Happé (1994)
Factors influencing children’s performance
– Executive function
• performance on false belief tasks is related to performance on executive
function tasks (e.g., inhibition, working memory)
• in versions with no ‘pull of the real’ (the object is no longer in the
container), many 3-year-olds pass (Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2002; Gergely &
colleagues ‘eating the Smarties task’).
– Language
• question asked (“where will she look first?” helps a little)
– but verbal and nonverbal tests yield similar results
• correlations between false belief understanding and language skills
(especially the types of constructions that include mental state terms: ‘I
know that x’; ‘She thinks x’)
– deaf children of nonsigning parents show delays in false belief
understanding
– Family
• children with older (but not younger) siblings do better (Perner, Ruffman, &
Leekam, 1994).
• children whose mothers generally talk more about mental states do
better (Dunn et al., 1991).
Understanding of others’ knowledge
• e.g., Povinelli & deBlois (1992): guesser vs. knower
– 3- and 4-year-olds
– the ‘hider’ E hid a surprise in one of two cups while the ‘leaver’
E was out of the room.
– When the ‘leaver’ E returned, both Es pointed to a cup (hider to
correct and leaver to incorrect).
 4-year-olds chose the correct cup; 3-year-olds did not.
O’Neill (1996)
• 2-year-olds
• Children watched as a toy
was hidden in one of two outof-reach containers.
• Sometimes their parent
witnessed the hiding too;
sometimes not.
 Children’s requests were
more informative when parents
were ignorant than
knowledgable (more gestures,
identifying verbalizations).
But: if the parent‘s eyes are covered
at an irrelevant point in the hiding
process (before but not during the
hiding), young 2-year-olds treat the
parent as ignorant (Dunham,
Dunham, & O‘Keefe, 2000).
Tomasello & Haberl (2003)
• 12- and 18-month-olds
• E and the child play with two
toys successively. While E2 and
the child play with a third toy,
– E is out of the room (experimental
condition)
– E stands near the door and
watches (control condition).
• E returns and shows excitement
toward the group of three toys.
• E tells the child “Give it to me.”
In the experimental condition, children of both ages chose
the new object significantly more often than would be
expected by chance.
Number of children
18-month-olds
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
First
Second
Experimental
Control
Third
(target)
Condition
 12- and 18-month-olds can identify which of several
objects is new to another person based on her past
visual experience (knowledge by acquaintance).
Understanding of others’ desires
• Repacholi & Gopnik (1997):
– 14- and 18-month-olds
– E presents two bowls of food: one of crackers (appealing
food), one of broccoli (unappealing food).
– Child tastes each food and tells E which he prefers.
– Then E tastes each food and produces either a happy
emotional expression (“Mmm!”) or a disgusted expression
(“Eww!”), depending on the experimental condition.
– E holds her hand out in between the two bowls and asks the
child “Can you give me some?” (without looking at or indicating
either bowl).
 18-month-olds gave the food E was happy about, even if it
was not the one they themselves preferred. 14-month-olds
gave the food they preferred.
Summary:
It depends on the measure
• False belief:
– verbal tests: 4+ years
– less verbal, but still action measure tests: 3 years
– implicit, looking measure tests: 15 months
• Knowledge/ignorance:
– guesser vs. knower: 4 years
– tailor communication: 2 years
– knowledge by acquaintance: 12 months
• Desire
– 18 months
Apes
• False beliefs
– few nonverbal tests (mostly Call & Tomasello et al.)
– only one study showing evidence consistent with
false belief understanding (Call, Hare, Tomasello) – but
other explanations are possible
• Knowledge/ignorance
– guesser vs. knower (Povinelli)
– what have seen in past (Call, Hare, Tomasello)
– informing (Call & Tomasello, Gomez, Whiten)
Apes
• Desires
– Buttelmann, Call, & Tomasello (in preparation): Ape
knows that E hid two pieces of (good) food. Ape
sees E react happily to one container and with
disgust to the other, then sees E eating. Ape is
allowed to choose a container. Apes choose the
container E reacted to with disgust, assuming that
he ate the food he reacted to happily.  Apes know
something about the relation between desire
(emotion?) and action.
Children with autism
• False beliefs
– many studies, consistent results: children with
autism have difficulty with false belief tests
– why?
• some evidence of difficulty with executive function, but not
so clear-cut
– in addition, they pass the out-of-date photo test, which has
the same executive function demands (Leslie & Thaiss,
1992).
• also not because trouble with representations in general
(they pass the out-of-date photo test; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992)
• seems to be trouble with mental representations specifically
– but not all mental states…
Children with autism
• Knowledge/ignorance
– understanding knowledge easier than false belief
• e.g., Leslie & Frith (1988): E2 watched as E1 hid a counter
in one hiding place. E2 left. E1 hid another counter in
another hiding place. Child asked “where will E2 look for a
counter when she comes back?” Few passed (23-44%) but
more children passed this than false belief.
• Desires
– Baron-Cohen (1991): children with autism
understand the relation between desire and emotion
• If Jane wanted x and was given x she would be happy; if
she wanted x and was given y she would be sad
Summary
• Apes, children with autism have trouble understanding false beliefs
– also deaf children raised by nonsigning parents
• Three-year-old and younger children have trouble understanding false
beliefs too (depending on the study), but probably for different
reasons.
– apes, children with autism: no understanding of complex mental states
– younger children: task demands
(?)
Seminar: We’ll discuss the different false belief tests, trying to figure out
whether they really measure false belief understanding (alternative
explanations, methodological issues, other problems). We’ll also discuss ways to
test understanding of (unobservable) mental states nonverbally (in the
meantime, please try to think of some!).
(plus any other questions you have…)
Seminar
• questions?
• discussion of false belief tests:
– do they really test understanding of false belief?
• might not need false belief understanding to pass: instead
learned rules of thumb, e.g., people usually look for things in the
last place they saw them
– Lohmann, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello (2005): update by telling
– (Moll, Carpenter, & Tomasello: sound)
• standard tests have other demands besides false belief
understanding: verbal, executive function demands
• other problem with standard tests: tests don’t always correlate
• what does Onishi & Baillargeon show?
– how to design nonverbal theory of mind tests?
• control condition: true belief (chance issue)
• measures?