Starter Cuba Aff – NDI 2013
**CASE**
Relations Advantage
1AC Relations I/L
Chavez’s death means now is key to solve Cuban and hemispheric relations
Tisdall 3-5 – Simon Tisdall, writer for the Guardian, March 5th, 2013, "Death of Hugo Chávez brings
chance of fresh start for US and Latin America" www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/05/hugo-chavezdead-us-latin-america/print
Hugo Chávez's departure furnishes Barack Obama with an opportunity to repair US ties with
Venezuela, but also with other Latin American states whose relations with Washington
were adversely affected by Chávez's politics of polarisation and the Bush administration's
viscerally unintelligent reaction.¶ In particular, the change of leadership in Caracas could
unlock the deadlock over Cuba, if the White House can summon the requisite political will.¶ Possibly anticipating a
transition, Washington quietly engineered a diplomatic opening with Caracas last November after a lengthy
standoff during which ambassadors were withdrawn.¶ Roberta Jacobson, assistant secretary of state for western
hemisphere affairs, telephoned Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela's vice-president and Chávez's preferred successor, and discussed,
among other things, the restoration of full diplomatic relations .¶ "According to US officials, the Venezuelan vicepresident offered to exchange ambassadors on the occasion of the beginning of President Barack Obama's second term. Jacobson,
in turn, is said to have proposed a step-by-step approach to improve bilateral relations, starting
with greater co-operation in counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism and energy issues," Andres
Oppenheimer reported in the Miami Herald.¶ There is much ground to make up. "Relations between the United States and
Venezuela have ranged from difficult to hostile since Chávez took office in 1999 and began to implement what he calls 21st-century
socialism," wrote a former US ambassador to Caracas, Charles Shapiro.¶ "Chávez blamed a failed 2002 coup against him on the
United States (not true), nationalised US companies, insulted the president of the United States and blamed 'the empire' – his term
for the United States – for every ill … In foreign affairs, the government actively supports the Assad regime in Syria, rejects sanctions
on Iran and generally opposes the US at every turn."¶ Despite such strains, economic self-interest always prevented a complete
rupture. The US remained Venezuela's most important trading partner throughout Chávez's presidency, buying nearly half its oil
exports. Caracas is the fourth largest supplier of oil to the US.¶ In fact, the US imports more crude oil annually from Mexico and
Venezuela than from the entire Persian Gulf. This shared commerce now provides a formidable incentive and a launch platform for a
fresh start.¶ Whether the opportunity is grasped depends partly on Maduro, a Chávez loyalist but a reputed pragmatist with close ties
to Raúl Castro in Cuba.¶ Yet it depends even more on Obama, whose first term, after a promising
start, ended up perpetuating Washington's historical neglect of Latin America. He now has
a chance to do better.¶ The political climate seems propitious. Economic and cultural ties are also
strengthening dramatically. Trade between the US and Latin America grew by 82% between 1998 and
2009. In 2011 alone, exports and imports rose by a massive 20% in both directions.¶ "We do three times more business with Latin
America than with China and twice as much business with Colombia [as] with Russia," an Obama official told Julia Sweig of the US
Council on Foreign Relations. Latinos now comprise 15% of the US population; the US is the world's second largest Spanishspeaking country (after Mexico).¶ Despite this convergence, high-level US strategic thinking about the region has continued to lag,
Sweig argued.¶ "For the last two decades, US domestic politics have too often driven Washington's Latin America agenda – whether
on issues of trade, immigration, drugs, guns or that perennial political albatross, Cuba, long driven by the supposedly crucial 'Cuban
vote' in Florida," she said.¶ Obama could change this dynamic if he tried and one way to do it would be to
unpick the Cuban problem, which continues to colour the way Latin Americans view
Washington.¶ "Having won nearly half of the Cuban American vote in Florida in 2012, a gain of 15
percentage points over 2008, Obama can move quickly on Cuba. If he were to do so, he would find a
cautious but willing partner in Raúl Castro, who needs rapprochement with Washington to
advance his own reform agenda," Sweig said.
The plan allows for US-Cuban energy cooperation—spurs broader relations
Benjamin 10 – Jonathan Benjamin-Alvadaro, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida
International University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director
of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the
American Political Science Association, 2010, Brookings Institution book, “Cuba’s Energy Future:
Strategic Approaches to Cooperation”
Conclusion and Recommendations
Oil exploration is an inherently risky enterprise; there are always trade-offs between negatives and positives relating to energy security, environmental
integrity, and geostrategic considerations. The consensus arising from the studies and the analyses in this book is that the
creation of
mutually beneficial trade and investment opportunities between the United States and Cuba is long
overdue. Throughout most of the twentieth century, Cuban infrastructure and economic development were direct beneficiaries of commercial
relations with the United States. This relationship was instrumental in providing Cuba with access to advanced technologies and the signs of modernity
that were unparalleled in Latin America and far beyond.¶ Once again, the
United States is presented with an opportunity that
might serve as the basis of a new relationship between the United States and Cuba. It holds out
the possibility of enhancing the stability and development of a region that is wrestling with
questions of how and when it too might benefit from engagement with a global economic development
model. The question is whether the United States chooses to be at the center, or to leave Cuba to seek some alternate path toward its goals.¶
Ironically, Cuban officials have invited American oil companies to participate in developing their
offshore oil and natural gas reserves. American oil, oil equipment, and service companies possess the
capital, technology, and operational know-how to explore, produce, and refine these resources in a safe
and responsible manner. Yet they remain on the sidelines because of our almost five-decades-old
unilateral political and economic embargo. The United States can end this impasse by licensing
American oil companies to participate in the development of Cuba’s energy resources. By
seizing the initiative on Cuba policy, the United States will be strategically positioned to play an important
role in the future of the island, thereby giving Cubans a better chance for a stable, prosperous, and
democratic future. The creation of stable and transparent commercial relations in the energy sector
will bolster state capacity in Cuba while enhancing U.S. geostrategic interests, and can help Cuba’s
future leaders avoid illicit business practices, minimize the influence of narcotrafficking enterprises,
and stanch the outflow of illegal immigrants to the United States.¶ If U.S. companies are allowed to contribute to the
development of Cuba’s hydrocarbon reserves, as well as the development of alternative and renewable energy (solar, wind, and biofuels), it will give
the United States the opportunity to engage Cuba’s future leaders to carry out long-overdue
economic reforms and development that will perhaps pave the way to a more open and
representative society while helping to promote Cuba as a stable partner and leader in the region and
beyond.¶ Under no circumstances is this meant to suggest that the United States should come to dominate energy development policy in Cuba. The
United States certainly has a role to play, but unlike its past relationship with Cuba, its interaction and
cooperation will be predicated on its ability to accept, at a minimum, that Cuba will be the dominant
partner in potential commercial ventures, and an equal partner in future diplomatic and interstate
relations. Without a doubt Cuban government actors are wary of the possibility of being dominated by the “colossus of the North,” but as Cuba’s
energy policymakers face the daunting reality of their nation’s energy future, it is abundantly clear that they possess the
willingness and the capacity to assiduously pursue sound policy objectives and initiatives that begin to
address the island’s immediate and long-term challenges. In the end, this course of action will have
direct and tangible benefits for the people of Cuba, it neighbors, and beyond.
Plan shores up US-Cuban relations—that solves US influence in Latin
America, drug trafficking, and stops Chinese encroachment
Benjamin-Alvadaro 6 (Jonathan, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International
University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the
Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American
Political Science Association, “The Current Status and Future Prospects for Oil Exploration in Cuba: A
Special,” http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissioned-reports/oil-cuba-alvarado.pdf)
Given that there are no formal diplomatic of economic relations between the governments of the United States
and Cuba, the level of interest has grown significantly in the 3 years due primarily to three reasons in the following interest
areas: energy security interests; broader regional strategic; and purely economic interests. First, the energy security interests in the
potential of Cuban oil – although it really would not minimize the immediacy of an American energy crisis – is seen as possible if
only partial remedy to energy supply concerns. Second, as Cuba, in part because of the increasing number of oil
partnerships furthers its diplomatic and economic ties to with countries like Venezuela, China, Brazil and
members of the European Union it may prove to provide Cuba for a sufficient buffer against U.S. opposition as it
solidifies it economic and diplomatic role in the region. This is important inasmuch as there is a de facto trend in the
Americas that clearly disavows and attempts to minimize the influence of the United States in the
region, and with the growing demands on the world economy by China, it stands to reason that Cuba may assume an
increasing stature that almost potentially lessens the presence of American influence in Cuban
and hence regional affairs. Finally, and as demonstrated by the presence of American oil interests in the February 2006
U.S.- Cuban Energy Summit in Mexico City, there may be interest in cooperating in joint venture projects, and by
extension assisting in the long-term development in Cuba’s oil industry. ¶ To accomplish this task the report seeks to
lay out some national security policy considerations applying strategic thought to what I will term “Post-Oil” Cuba – a Cuba that has
a small but vibrant and growing oil and gas production capacity with extensive relations with a number of partners, and an
increasingly positive outlook toward addressing energy and economic development questions that have plagued the Castro regime
since the Cuban Revolution.3¶ The primary consideration is to determine the present state of Cuban energy and what possibilities
exist that would be available to American foreign policy decision makers and business interests as the relations with Cuba evolve
over the coming years.4 This is important because any realistic appraisal of how Cuba is to take
advantage of its oil bonanza involves the United States. Previous research in this area has clearly laid out
the scope and objectives of Cuban energy development schemes in the period since the demise of Cuba’s favorable trade
arrangements with the former Soviet Union. Recently, and as a result of the oil discovery and Cuba’s energy
arrangement with the government of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela there is renewed interest in Havana’s energy
policies. Most of that analysis has been focused on concrete possibilities where there can be cooperation in the energy field
between these two neighbors. Specifically, the work has looked at areas for the convergence of energy interests as
they apply to the near- and long-term energy development scenarios facing both countries. Myers Jaffe and Soligo have
addressed this possibility by looking at the potential to increase diversification and dispersion of energy
resources. This is an important consideration when one takes into consideration that well over one-third of all oil refining capacity
resides on or near the Houston shipping channel. The potential negative impact on America’s refining capacity following Hurricane
Rita5 made a significant impression on oil industry analysts for the necessity of diversifying the location of these vital national
resources. The potential of viewing Cuba as a “staging area” for American oil storage and refining is plausible because of the
proximity of the island. The also becomes more attractive because of the growing climatic concerns over the uncertain security of oil
resources in the Gulf region as clearly demonstrated by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005. While it is true that Venezuela has
initiated an investment of $1 billion dollars to bring the Cienfuegos refinery online, there are still many other possibilities
open and available to American companies, as well as a growing number of foreign firms .6 Additionally,
Venezuela remains the fourth largest importer of oil to the United States and one can surmise that the existing trade arrangements
between the U.S. and Venezuela will remain intact, the evolution of the Bolivarian revolution under Chavez and a growing Chinese
presence in the region notwithstanding. Additionally, pursuing such a path would allow United States policymakers
to take advantage of what Cuba has to offer in the following areas: domestic technical capabilities;
continuing human capital development; strategic positioning in the Caribbean, and an improved
diplomatic stature. Cuba, by any measure, possesses a largely untapped technical capacity owing to
advanced training and education in the core mathematic and scientific areas. This was clearly
demonstrated by its attempt to develop a nuclear energy capability in the 1980s and 1990s whereby thousands
of Cubans pursued highly technical career paths leaving Cuba with among the highest ratios of
scientists and engineers to the general population in all of the Americas. Moreover, the foundation
of Cuba’s vaunted public education system remains intact and increased investment under various scenarios suggests that Cuba
will continue to produce a welleducated workforce that will be critical to its future economic vitality. This
raises an important consideration that being the role that Cuba will play in the region in the 21st century. It suffices to say that
Cuba remains the strategically important state by virtue of its geographical location alone, in efforts
against drug and human trafficking and related national and regional security matters. The extent to which a
stable Cuban government has cooperated with the U.S. in drug interdiction efforts in the past suggests that
the results from improved diplomatic relations between neighbors would have the effect of improving national
security concerns related to terrorist activity, illicit weapons transfers and the like. Ultimately, a
successful normalization of relations between the U.S. and Cuba in these areas may well enhance and
stabilize regional relations that could possibly lessen (or at a minimum, balancing) fears of a
Chinese incursion in hemispheric affairs. To lessen those fears it may be useful to review the present structure of
joint-venture projects in the energy sector in Cuba to ascertain the feasibility and possible success of such an undertaking become
available to American firms. Moreover, it is interesting to note that U.S. firms in the agriculture sector have successfully negotiated
and consummated sales to Cuba totaling more than $1 billion dollars over the past four years under conditions that are less than
optimal circumstances but have well-served the commercial interests of all parties involved.
1AC China Impact
Now is key---China is shoring up influence
Boston Globe 2/9 “Cuba’s reforms pave way for new US policy, too”, 2013,
http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2013/02/09/cuba-reform-create-opportunity-dragpolicy-into-century/xER2NTTXGsxdLej0miHwFM/story.html
Relations between the U nited S tates and Cuba have been stuck since the U nited S tates imposed a full
economic embargo in 1962, and during the election season neither President Obama nor Mitt Romney signaled much desire to
change the status quo. Yet while Americans have been looking elsewhere, significant change has come to Cuba.
The communist government of the ruling Castro brothers, Fidel and Raul, is in the midst of a slow experiment to
promote economic entrepreneurship. Late last year, Cuba instituted reforms to its immigration policies that
allow Cubans to travel abroad freely and allow those who have emigrated or fled to return home. These changes, and
the beginning of Obama’s second term, create an unusual opportunity to acknowledge Cuba’s
gestures and respond in a substantive way. Rather than simply extend policies that, in five decades, have failed to
dislodge the Castros, the Obama administration has a chance to drag US policy into the 21st century . The CubanAmerican population, which has historically opposed any loosening of US policy, is no longer monolithic. Supporting greater contact
with friends, family, and the Cuban economy now animates a younger generation of Florida voters. Because of this trend,
Obama — who performed nearly as well with Cuban-American voters as Romney — has more maneuvering room
politically. The first step would be to end the silly claim, reinstated by the Obama administration last summer, that Cuba remains
a “state sponsor of terrorism.” The administration argued that Cuba harbored members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia, or FARC. It has, but the FARC and Colombia are now in negotiations; those peace talks are supported by the Obama
White House in order to end a bloody civil war. By depoliticizing the Cuba portfolio, the U nited S tates could then begin to
lessen trade restrictions, starting with promoting cultural exchanges; ending the travel ban; and eventually allowing for
trade in oil, gas, and other commodities. Over time, billions of dollars in new trade between the two nations will benefit
both. This would include boosts to US farm companies while helping Cubans. Direct relations would also further US
national security and environmental interests; as Cuba opens up, other countries will sweep in to seek
influence, as China has already done. Especially as Cuba increasingly promotes offshore
drilling and other maritime exploration, the United States must improve communication with Havana. Currently,
even though the United States and Cuba are separated by a narrow channel, the two countries have no bilateral
communications to ensure safety standards for their mutual protection from oil spills . Secretary of State John
Kerry should make Cuba a focus of his first months in office. Unfortunately, his successor as chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee is Robert Menendez of New Jersey, a son of Cuban immigrants who has opposed the administration’s efforts to
ease relations. Menendez will need to be convinced that he can help Cubans more by resetting American policy. Absent military
intervention, there are very few opportunities for a president to dramatically alter relations with a historic foe;
Obama has taken such advantage of a disorientingly rapid liberalization by Burma’s military rulers. Raul Castro’s recent
decision to lift travel restrictions on Cuban citizens is similarly momentous — and signals that the timing is ripe for a
new diplomatic agenda with Cuba.
Cuban drilling is key---China is using it to expand ties and isolate Taiwan
Luko 11 James – Served in Washington DC with the National Council For Soviet East European
Research, the Smithsonian Institute and two years as an analyst with the Canadian Department of
National Defence, “China's Moves on Cuba Need to Be Stopped”, 6/29,
http://www.nolanchart.com/article8774-chinas-moves-on-cuba-need-to-be-stopped.html
The Red Dragon takes another wide step of not only flexing its muscles in Asia, but now wishes to supplant Russias and (former USSRs) forward base
presence 90 miles from the United States- CUBA. Cuba
is China's biggest trade partner in the Caribbean region,
trade increased from $440 million in 2001
to $1.83 billion in 2010. [1] In 2006 China and Cuba discussed offshore oil deals and now China's National Petroleum
Corporation is a major player in Cuban infrastructure improvements. [ibid] In 2008, none other than China's President himself, Hu JinTao
visited Cuba with a sweet package of loans, grants and trade deals. If Cuba becomes a 'client' state of China, it will
be a source of leverage against America whenever the U.S. Pressures China on Tibet and Taiwan. Soon
while China is Cuba's second-largest trade partner after Venezuela. Over the past decade, bilateral
we will witness the newly constructed blue-water navy of China cruising Cuba's coast in protection of their trade routes and supply of natural resources.
In 2003 it was reported that Chinese personnel were operating at least TWO (2) intelligence signal sations in Cuba since at least 1999 ! [2] This month,
June 2011, the Vice President of China made an important visit, extending more financial aid, interest-free, as well as related health projects to be paid
for by China. A client state in the making ! [3] The
best way to counter the Chinese in Cuba is to reverse Americas 50 year
and obsolete policy of isolationism and boycott of Cuba. The Chinese threat in Cuba should be the
catalyst for the US to establish open and normalized relations, with economic incentives to re-Americanize
old, ineffective
Cuba, return of American investments and security agreements. Checking the Chinese move in Cuba early on is vital to preventing a strategic Chinese
foothold 90 miles from Florida. Allowing
China to replace Russia in Cuba would be a strategic disaster. China is dangling
is a counter-response to
Americas continued military presence in Asia, continued support of Taiwan and recent increased American aid to the Philippines in its spat
financial assistance and investments in order to establish a beachhead close to the shores of America. This
with China over sovereignty of the Spratly Islands. The Cuban people wish to return to the American fold and re-establish the traditional relationship
with the Cuban anchor in Florida- namely the almost 900,000 Cubans living in Florida alone! [4]
Chinese influence in Latin America causes Taiwan war
Fergusson 12 Robbie, Researcher at Royal Society for the Arts, Featured Contributor at International
Business Times, Former Conference & Research Assistant at Security Watch, Former Researcher at
University College London, Master of Science, China in the International Arena, The University of
Glasgow, “The Chinese Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine,” http://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/23/doeschinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-american-interests/
Taiwan – domestic, or foreign policy?¶ China’s goals in the region amount to more than the capture of natural
resources. Although the People’s Republic of China considers resolution of the Taiwan issue to be a domestic
issue, it is with some irony that one of China’s main foreign policy goals is to isolate Taipei
internationally. The PRC and the ROC compete directly for international recognition among all the states in
the world. . Nowhere is this more evident than in Latin America, where 12 of the 23 nations that still have
official diplomatic relations with the ROC reside.¶ The historical background¶ Following the mainland Communist
victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the nationalist Kuomintang retreated to the island of Formosa (Taiwan) where it continued
to claim to be the legitimate government of all of China. In June 1950 the United States intervened by placing its 7th fleet in the
Taiwan straits to stop a conclusive military resolution to the civil war and slowly the battlefield became primarily political,
concerned with legitimacy.¶ When the United Nations was formed in 1945, the Republic of China (ROC) became one of the five
permanent members of the Security Council. This gave the ROC a de facto advantage over the PRC in attaining recognition from
other nation states; particularly as the diplomatic clout of the hegemonic United States supported its position as the true
representative of the Chinese people, until the rapprochement of the 1970s, when the Nixon administration wished to improve ties
with the de facto rulers of China in order to exploit the Sino-Soviet split. UN Resolution 2758 granted the ’China seat’ to the PRC at
the expense of the ROC who were in effect exiled from the organization, and the famous 1972 visit of President Nixon to China
further added legitimacy to the communist regime. All this resulted in a thawing of world opinion, and gradually as the durability
and permanence of the PRC regime became ingrained, countries began switching their diplomatic recognition from Taipei to
Beijing.¶ The economics of international recognition¶ In the Americas, the PRC had international recognition and longstanding
support from ideological allies such as Cuba. However, the ROC has maintained more diplomatic support in the
Americas than any other region, mainly due to the small nature of the states involved and the importance
of Taiwanese aid to their economies. Li notes that “from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, roughly 10 percent of Taiwan’s
direct foreign investment (FDI) went to Latin America and the Caribbean,” [51] highlighting the concerted effort made in the region.
Economic solidarity is increasingly important to the formation of the Taiwan-Latin America relationship,
for two reasons. The first is that for Latin American states, the decision of which China to support is less
ideological and political than it ever has been; which makes the decision a straight up economic zero-sum
choice. The second is that Latin America is home to natural resources which are of great significance to
the hungry growing economies of the PRC and the ROC regardless of international recognition.¶ However, while the
decision is not political for Latin American countries, for Taiwan, every country which switches its recognition to the
PRC damages its legitimacy as a nation state in the international arena. The Table below shows the designation of
diplomatic recognition in the region in 2008.¶ Countries Recognising the PRC (China)Countries Recognising the ROC
(Taiwan)Central AmericaMexico, Costa RicaEl Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, PanamaCaribbeanAntigua & Barbuda,
Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname, Trinidad & TobagoBelize, Dominican Republic, Haiti,
St Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the GrenadinesSouth AmericaArgentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru,
Uruguay, VenezuelaParaguay¶ On the other hand, for the PRC, every state which withdraws its support for the ROC
takes it one step closer to being in a position where it can resolve the ‘Taiwan issue’ unilaterally.
Subsequently, undermining Taiwan is of the utmost importance to China, and it has taken to ‘outbidding’
Taiwan in offers of foreign aid, a strategy made possible by the decline in aid from the defunct Soviet Union, and the West,
which is pre occupied with terrorism and the Middle East. Li notes that “the region’s leaders have turned to Asia for help to promote
trade and financial assistance, and consequently played the PRC and Taiwan against each other.” [53] Despite its smaller size,
Taiwan has fared remarkably well in this bidding war; focusing its aid investments on infrastructure such as stadiums in St Kitts &
Nevis for the Cricket World Cup in 2007.¶ However, even Taiwan‘s economy can be put under strain by the seemingly relentless
stream of foreign aid which has brought only debateable and mild gains to the Taiwanese cause. This has contributed to the
PRC picking off the few remaining supporters of the ROC – take for example, the Dominican case.¶ In early 2004,
Commonwealth of Dominica asked Taipei for a $58 million aid, which is unrelated to public welfare. The Caribbean nation had
relied on Taiwan to develop its agriculture-based economy since 1983. Diplomatic relationship was soon broken after Taipei turned
down the request. [54]¶ This incident showcased the fact that in economic terms, the PRC is winning the battle for Latin America.¶
Political strategies of the PRC¶ In political terms too; the PRC is in an advantageous position, thanks in part again to
its position within the UN. While it can be argued that China “provides incentives but does not threaten harm to induce countries to
defect from recognizing Taiwan,” [55] the reality is that the use of force and direct harm are not the only means available to an
economic entity as powerful as China. It refuses to maintain official relations with any state that recognises the
ROC; an action which can be quite prohibitive to the country being able to take advantage of the growing
Chinese market. Although Domínguez suggests that the PRC “has not been punitive toward those states that still recognize the
Republic of China (Taiwan),” [56] the legitimacy of this claim has to be brought into question – for example “in June 1996, China
fought the extension of the UN mission in Haiti, to punish the Caribbean nation for its appeal for UN acceptance of Taiwan.” [57]
This incident showed that China is prepared to use its global clout to play spoiler and apply indirect pressure on countries to adopt
its position. Similarly, China’s experience with one-party rule has taught it the importance of party-to-party
relations in addition to state-to-state relations, further cementing the PRC by establishing a relationship
based on goodwill and common understanding. Indeed by the start of 1998 “the CCP had established relations with
almost all major political parties in the countries that were Taiwan’s diplomatic allies in Latin America,” [58] further isolating the
ROC.¶ The effect on American interests¶ Were the ROC to be deserted by its remaining allies in Latin America, the
USA would be disadvantaged in attempting to maintain the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. A Taiwan
that was not recognised by any state from the Americas, or Europe (with the exception of the Vatican) would not be seen as a
genuine sovereign entity whose defence would be more important than the upkeep of good relations between China and the West.
As China’s economic and political position in the world improves vis-à-vis both America and Taiwan, so
might its ambitions. The U.S.A might find itself in a position where it could no longer withstand the
diplomatic pressure to allow the PRC to conclude a settlement on Taiwan, perhaps by force.
Taiwan crisis is likely this year---draws in the U.S.
Mazza 1/3 Michael, research fellow in foreign and defense policy at the American Enterprise Institute,
1/3/13, “Four Surprises That Could Rock Asia in 2013,”
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/01/03/four_surprises_that_could_rock_asia_in_2012?pag
e=full
Since President Ma Ying-jeou came to power in 2008, Taipei and Beijing have improved ties and deepened their
economic integration: cross-strait trade reached $127.6 billion in 2011, an increase of more than 13 percent from 2010. Some
national security experts misinterpret this trend, thinking that growing economic interdependence
will overwhelm factors pushing the two sides apart, and that interdependence will provide Beijing with
leverage it can use to compel unification. But while Taiwan's businesspeople enjoy closer ties with China, the average
Taiwanese voter continues to move toward independence. Over the last 20 years, the portion of citizens of
Taiwan identifying as "Taiwanese" has increased from 17.6 percent of those polled in 1992 to a whopping 53.7 percent today; those
identifying as "Chinese" has declined over the same period from 25.5 percent to just 3.1 percent today. Support for
independence has nearly doubled over the last two decades, from 11.1 percent to 19.6 percent. Support for immediate or
eventual unification, meanwhile, has more than halved, from 20 percent in 1992 to 9.8 percent in 2012.¶ Economic integration
is apparently failing to halt what Beijing sees as a troubling trend . With a cross-strait trade agreement and a
slew of other, easier deals already on the books, Beijing now expects Ma to discuss political issues. But Ma doesn't
have the domestic political support to pursue political talks -- in March 2012, two months after his reelection, 45
percent of those polled said the pace of cross-strait exchanges was "just right," but the share of respondents answering "too fast" had
increased to 32.6 percent, from 25.7 percent before the election. Any Chinese shift toward a more strident Taiwan
policy could portend a new crisis in the Taiwan Strait sooner than many expect, as a lack of
progress on these issues may buttress hawks in the new Xi Jinping administration. And America would
surely be dragged in: Even low-level coercive measures against Taiwan -- a top 10 U.S. trading partner and security
ally -- could throw U.S.-China relations into a tailspin.
Taiwan escalates and goes nuclear---no defense
Lowther 3/16 William, Taipei Times, citing a report by the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, 3/16/13, “Taiwan could spark nuclear war: report,”
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211
Taiwan is the most likely potential crisis that could trigger a nuclear war between China and the
US, a new academic report concludes.¶ “Taiwan remains the single most plausible and dangerous source of tension and conflict
between the US and China,” says the 42-page report by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS).¶ Prepared by the CSIS’ Project on Nuclear Issues and resulting from a year-long study, the report emphasizes that
Beijing continues to be set on a policy to prevent Taiwan’s independence, while at the same time the US
maintains the capability to come to Taiwan’s defense.¶ “Although tensions across the Taiwan Strait have subsided since
both Taipei and Beijing embraced a policy of engagement in 2008, the situation remains combustible,
complicated by rapidly diverging cross-strait military capabilities and persistent political
disagreements,” the report says.¶ In a footnote, it quotes senior fellow at the US Council on Foreign Relations Richard Betts
describing Taiwan as “the main potential flashpoint for the US in East Asia.”¶ The report also quotes Betts as saying that neither
Beijing nor Washington can fully control developments that might ignite a Taiwan crisis.¶ “This is a classic
recipe for surprise, miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation,” Betts wrote in a separate study of his own.¶
The CSIS study says: “For the foreseeable future Taiwan is the contingency in which nuclear weapons would most
likely become a major factor, because the fate of the island is intertwined both with the legitimacy of the
Chinese Communist Party and the reliability of US defense commitments in the Asia-Pacific region.Ӧ Titled Nuclear
Weapons and US-China Relations, the study says disputes in the East and South China seas appear unlikely to lead to major conflict
between China and the US, but they do “provide kindling” for potential conflict between the two nations because the disputes
implicate a number of important regional interests, including the interests of treaty allies of the US.¶ The danger posed by
flashpoints such as Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and maritime demarcation disputes is magnified by the potential for mistakes, the
study says.¶ “Although Beijing and Washington have agreed to a range of crisis management mechanisms, such
as the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the establishment of a direct hotline between the Pentagon and the Ministry of
Defense, the bases for miscommunication and misunderstanding remain and draw on deep
historical reservoirs of suspicion,” the report says.¶ For example, it says, it is unclear whether either side
understands what kinds of actions would result in a military or even nuclear response by the other party.¶
To make things worse, “neither side seems to believe the other’s declared policies and intentions, suggesting
that escalation management, already a very uncertain endeavor, could be especially difficult in any conflict,” it
says.¶ Although conflict “mercifully” seems unlikely at this point, the report concludes that “it cannot be ruled out and may become
increasingly likely if we are unwise or unlucky.”¶ The report says: “With both sides possessing and looking set to retain
formidable nuclear weapons arsenals, such a conflict would be tremendously dangerous and quite possibly
devastating.”
1AC Russia Impact
Cuba’s forming an alliance with Russia—that will lead to war—boosting
relations solves
Inter-American Dialogue 12 (U.S. based think tank for policy analysis, exchange, and
communication on issues in Western Hemisphere affairs, “Are External Tensions Entangling Latin
American Countries?” http://www.cepr.net/documents/CEPR_News/LAA120810.pdf)
A Stephen Johnson, senior fellow and director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies: "It
may or may not be true that Russia's government is seeking to build resupply bases for its navy in Cuba,
Vietnam and the Seychelles islands. While Russian navy officials say 'da,' the foreign ministry says 'nyet.' Similar talk of
establishing bases elsewhere, such as Venezuela, has not materialized. In any case, it would not present a direct threat unless such a
facility became an entry point for hostile arms similar to the nuclear-tipped missiles that provoked the 1962 crisis. Like any other
state, Russia can strike diplomatic agreements to base military units in other countries. On the other hand, it would be a challenge.
First, it would rekindle a military relationship that ended when Russia transferred its signals intelligence
facility at Lourdes to the Cuban government in 2002. A new base might be a shot in the arm to the Cuban economy,
helping the Castro brothers hang on to aspects of their old command economy without going cold turkey for market reforms. A
base could also serve as a hub for military weapons sales to other Latin American nations when the region
needs help in fighting transnational crime. The Soviet Union fell more than 20 years ago, but Russia still has large
military industries and needs to sell arms more than washing machines. Its prime customers would, like
Cuba, be in the Bolivarian alliance. Second, a Russian navy station in Cuba might complicate U.S. politics,
specifically any plans a U.S. administration might have to hand back Guantanamo Naval Base in the near future, for which Cuba's
current government refuses to cash our rent checks. At a time when U.S. Northern and Southern Commands are
gearing more toward military support for civilian law enforcement missions, it would reintroduce a
strategic deterrence component into joint exercises and training. That might not be a bad thing, but it would argue
for more U.S. defense spending on the Western Hemisphere. All of which seems to argue that recent threat trends in
the Americas are not very predictive and that certain old alliances won't go easily into the sunset."¶ A Stephen Wilkinson,
chairman of the International Institute for the Study of Cuba: "Russia is in military talks with Cuba for three reasons.
One is economic, related to Russian investment in Cuban nickel and oil and the need to guarantee protection of these
investments. Another factor is geostrategic. Recent events in Syria have confirmed Russian fears of the longterm strategic aims of the United States. The Russians are very aware that the United States and Western
Europe have been supporting the rebels in Syria and they see this as an indirect attack upon their interests
as Assad provides them with a naval base at Tartus, on the Mediterranean. The third reason is possibly rather more personal,
Vladimir Putin has turned his face against Washington since his recent re-election because he perceived a
U.S. hand in organizing the protests against him. From Cuba's point of view, having a Russian military base would
be a guarantee of security since it would mean that U.S. military action against it would be less likely. If
Washington would not wish for Havana to have such an ally, it ought to reconsider its own policy toward
the island. At present, the embargo, and especially the Helms Burton Law, makes it sensible for the Cuban
government to seek alliances with as many powers as possible in order to protect itself. U.S. military presence in Latin
America has grown in recent years. There are now 24 bases including two new ones in Chile and Argentina. Seven bases in Colombia
are being expanded. The justification for this expansion is the war on drugs and for humanitarian intervention purposes. However, it
should come as no surprise that this is not the way that Cuba or its closest allies such as Hugo Chávez or Evo Morales view them.
They see the bases as potential threats to their independence and sovereignty and a sign that Washington's hegemonic designs on
the region are very much alive."¶ A Wayne S. Smith, senior fellow and director of the Cuba Project at the Center for International
Policy: "Given the history of the 1962 U.S.-Soviet missile crisis, for the Russians now to propose exploring
with the Cubans the setting up of naval bases on the island would seem a rather maladroit idea. The
United States made it clear in 1962 that the positioning of offensive nuclear missiles on the island was
unacceptable and demanded that they be withdrawn. The world has never been so close to an allout
nuclear war. Fortunately, both Kennedy and Khrushchev showed themselves to be sensible men. They reached an understanding
under which Khrushchev agreed to withdraw the missiles and Kennedy gave assurances that the United States would not invade
Cuba. Subsequently, without informing the United States, the Soviets began building a submarine base on the island, but when it
was made clear to them that the United States would consider this a violation of the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding of 1962,
work on the base was quietly halted and never resumed. The United States should of course oppose the positioning of
Russian bases in Cuba today, as should the other countries of the hemisphere. They would serve no reasonable purpose and
could only unnecessarily add to tensions. The United States has not increased its military presence in Latin
America. There is no reason for the Russians to do so."
Increased Russo-Cuban cooperation causes war
Richter 08 (Paul, Staff Writer for New York Times, “Moscow-Havana ties worry U.S.”
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/sep/01/world/fg-usrussia1)
But at a time when Russia has intervened forcefully in Georgia and is extending the global reach of its
rebuilt military, some senior officials fear it may not be only bluster.¶ Russia "has strategic ties to Cuba
again, or at least, that's where they're going," a senior U.S. official said recently, speaking, like others, on condition of
anonymity because of the sensitive implications of the assessments.¶ The officials said they doubted the Russians would risk
stationing nuclear bombers on Cuba. But some believe that Moscow might seek to restore its once-energetic
intelligence cooperation with Havana, and to resume limited military cooperation, possibly including refueling
stops for aircraft and warships.¶ In the current environment, such contacts would make U.S. officials uneasy, serving
as a reminder of a military relationship between Havana and Moscow that stretched from the Cuban Revolution in
1959 until a weakened, post-Soviet Russia finally closed a massive electronic intelligence complex in Lourdes near Havana in 2001.¶
One senior military officer said a return of Russian ships or planes could force additional U.S. deployments in
the region. But the Bush administration and Pentagon declined to comment publicly on the implications.¶ "It is very Cold
War retro," said a government official. "The topic could be reminiscent of the Cuban missile crisis, and
that is a chapter that people don't want to revisit."¶ The Russian Defense Ministry dismissed a report in the newspaper
Izvestia in July that quoted an unidentified Russian official as saying the government intended to begin basing Tupolev Tu-160
Blackjack and Tupolev Tu-95 Bear nuclear bombers in Cuba.¶ However, the report was taken seriously enough in Washington that
Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, the new Air Force chief of staff, said during his Senate confirmation hearing at the time
that sending the bombers would cross a "red line in the sand."
Normalizing relations with Cuba crowds out Russia
Blank 9 (Stephen, Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of
the U.S. Army War College, “Russia in Latin America: Geopolitical Games in the US’s Neighborhood,”
pdf)
The only way in which Russian policy truly threatens the US and Latin America is its military and intelligence
support for Chavez and similar leaders. This support is passed on to insurgents while strengthening
Chavez and his allies. Adequate responses to such threats are inherently economic and political, and only military as a last
resort. ¶ Washington can do much more to facilitate security in Latin America: regenerating its own economy;
simultaneously opening up trade markets and eliminating barriers to Latin American exports; enhancing multilateralism and
interoperability among defense forces as requested by Latin American militaries; and beginning the normalization of
Cuba.¶ Havana is no longer the threat it was, Venezuela has claimed that dubious honor. Rehabilitating Cuba, given
that Castro’s days are clearly numbered, would take the air out of Chavez’s balloon; it is quite clear that
Havana would probably welcome a path towards better relations with the US , especially the economic benefits
they would inevitably bring. A policy with a more symbolically important impact upon Latin America is
currently difficult to imagine.¶ Nonetheless, there should be no illusion that the security problems that plague this region are
easily overcome, quite the opposite. But that is all the more reason why the US cannot ignore the area and let it drift to
Moscow, Tehran, and Beijin for want of a better alternative. That outcome would only confirm once again that in
world politics, there is no such thing as benign neglect. Instead neglect is malign and engenders negative results for the
negligent state along with those neglected. The policies of the Bush administration allowed Russia to gain a
foothold in Latin American politics, a result of Washington’s negligence; under President Obama, the US should
reverse those outcomes and demonstrate what liberal democracy in action can truly accomplish.
Russian expansion spurs a new Cold War and proxy conflicts
Walle 12 (Walter, Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, “Russia Turns to the
South for Military and Economic Alliances,” http://www.coha.org/russia-turns-to-the-south-for-militaryand-economic-alliances/)
Quite clearly, Russia’s interest in Latin America is escalating. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, argued in his
article, “The New Stage of Development of Russian-Latin American Relations,” that there is great attractiveness in establishing
bilateral relations, especially when three of the top twenty emerging economies -Mexico, Brazil and Argentina- are in Latin
America.[23] Lavrov has also stated that the Russian Federation has an interest in joining the Inter-American Development Bank,
perhaps a move to better accommodate Russian interests in the region, while at the same time neutralizing American influence.¶
Demonstrably, Russia has been developing cooperative relationships with prominent organizational bodies of
the region, such as the OAS (Organization of American States), and has ratified visa-free travel agreements with countries like
Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina. In his article, Lavrov argues that Russia’s intention behind quests
for partnerships is the establishment of non-ideologized relationships with Latin American countries, relationships that could be of
mutual benefit to all parties involved.¶ However, the Russian stance on Latin America ultimately may be cause for
apprehension. The establishment of bilateral, cordial relations between Russia and Latin American
countries could evolve to a proxy, neo-Cold War scenario. If the situation in the regions worsens,
some countries would be funded and supported by the U.S., while others, including several members of
Latin America’s “New Left”, would become the major beneficiaries of Moscow. An analogy of such practice
is the Georgia – Russia crisis that surfaced in August of 2008. During this brief war, the U.S. sent military aid to Georgia[24] on
warships to territory Russia considers its “backyard” (i.e. the Caucasus and the Black Sea), infuriating Moscow. A month after the
conflict erupted, ostensibly in retaliation, Russia sent two Tu-160 bombers to conduct military exercises with Washington’s least
favorite nation in Latin America: Venezuela[25]. More importantly, in November of 2008 Moscow conducted war games
with Caracas, in which a small Russian fleet was sent to the Caribbean to participate in joint naval maneuvers with the
Venezuelan navy.[26] This was a powerful symbolic act: as it was the first time that Russian warships had
visited the Caribbean since the Cuban Missile Crisis.¶ In the wake of the post-Georgia conflict, such joint
military maneuvers between Russia and Venezuela were revitalized, and helped to build up the tensions
between Washington and Moscow, sending strong signals of a Cold War revival. Furthermore, in the aftermath
of the declarations of independence by the breakaway regions of Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Venezuela[27] and
Nicaragua[28] were alone among Latin American countries in recognizing the independence of the new republics.
Makes miscalc likely
Orozco 8 (Jose, Correspondent for Christian Science Monitor, “Cold war echo: Russian military
maneuvers with Venezuela,” http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2008/0912/p01s05woam.html)
The last time a Russian Navy ship plied the azure waters of the Caribbean for major joint maneuvers with
an anti-US country was during the cold war.¶ But in a move out of Cuban leader Fidel Castro's historical playbook,
Venezuela's Hugo Chávez announced this week that his nation will host four Russian warships and 1,000 troops in November for
joint military exercises.¶ That was followed Wednesday by the arrival in Venezuela of two Russian long-range bombers.¶ Although
Latin American leaders so far have shrugged off the moves as another act of bravado in Mr. Chávez's push
against what he calls "Yankee hegemony," some diplomats and US officials see the potential for real trouble.¶ The US
typically ignores the leftist leader's angry tirades, and is playing down the news.¶ Still, an extensive military relationship
between Venezuela and Russia could heighten tensions and signal the start of a new regional cold war.¶
"This is a risky step that could provoke the US," says retired Navy Vice Admiral and former Vice Minister of Defense
Rafael Huizi Clavier. "Any incident, any error, could bring problems." This week, Russia announced that it will send a
naval squadron, including the nuclear-powered missile cruiser Peter the Great, as well as long-range patrol planes for the upcoming
joint exercises with Venezuela.
Russian influence leads to proxy wars
Walle 12 (Walter, Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, “Russia Turns to the
South for Military and Economic Alliances,” http://www.coha.org/russia-turns-to-the-south-for-militaryand-economic-alliances/)
With Russia’s new relationships with leftist Latin American governments and the U.S.’ increasingly
aimless presence in the region, one can discern a growing interaction among regional actors. In fact, this
new direction seems to be reminiscent of a slow return to a Cold War modus operandi. As Carácas
modernizes its army with Russian technology[2], Bogota is likewise being buttressed by the U.S., with its
“Plan Colombia” (an international initiative to fight drug trafficking), and other countries like Israel[3] and Spain[4]. While
both Venezuela and Colombia claim that they have decided to arm themselves for legitimate motives
(Colombia as part of the U.S. “Plan Colombia” to combat drug trafficking and Venezuela for defensive purposes against a purported
U.S. threat), this growing tension should not be taken lightly. In 2008, the Vice-president of Colombia, Francisco Santos
Calderón, asked his Russian counterpart to halt arms sales to Venezuela in exchange for military and economic cooperation.[5]
Furthermore, Colombian and U.S. officials have charged Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez of arming the
Colombian guerrilla group, the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia), an insurgent group that represents a persistent disruptive factor between several Latin American
countries. However, in what appeared to be part of an ongoing effort to restore relations between these two countries, in April of
2011 Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, stated that the FARC was no longer operating out of Venezuela[6] , which
represented a very conciliatory posture on Bogota’s part.
Extinction
Helfand and Pastore 9 [Ira Helfand, M.D., and John O. Pastore, M.D., are past presidents of
Physicians for Social Responsibility. March 31, 2009, “U.S.-Russia nuclear war still a threat”,
http://www.projo.com/opinion/contributors/content/CT_pastoreline_03-3109_EODSCAO_v15.bbdf23.html]
President Obama and Russian President Dimitri Medvedev are scheduled to Wednesday in London during the G-20 summit. They must not let the current economic crisis
the greatest threats confronting humanity: the danger of nuclear war. Since the end of
There remain in the world more than 20,000
nuclear weapons. Alarmingly, more than 2,000 of these weapons in the U.S. and Russian arsenals remain
on ready-alert status, commonly known as hair-trigger alert. They can be fired within five minutes and reach targets in
the other country 30 minutes later. Just one of these weapons can destroy a city. A war involving a substantial number
would cause devastation on a scale unprecedented in human history. A study conducted by Physicians for Social
Responsibility in 2002 showed that if only 500 of the Russian weapons on high alert exploded over our cities, 100 million Americans would die in
the first 30 minutes. An attack of this magnitude also would destroy the entire economic, communications and transportation
infrastructure on which we all depend. Those who survived the initial attack would inhabit a nightmare
landscape with huge swaths of the country blanketed with radioactive fallout and epidemic diseases rampant . They
keep them from focusing on one of
the Cold War, many have acted as though the danger of nuclear war has ended. It has not.
would have no food, no fuel, no electricity, no medicine, and certainly no organized health care. In the following months it is likely the vast majority of the U.S. population
If
all of the warheads in the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals were drawn into the conflict, the
firestorms they caused would loft 180 million tons of soot and debris into the upper atmosphere — blotting out the
sun. Temperatures across the globe would fall an average of 18 degrees Fahrenheit to levels not seen on earth since the
depth of the last ice age, 18,000 years ago. Agriculture would stop, eco-systems would collapse, and many
species, including perhaps our own, would become extinct. It is common to discuss nuclear war as a low-probabillity event. But is this
true? We know of five occcasions during the last 30 years when either the U.S. or Russia believed it was
under attack and prepared a counter-attack. The most recent of these near misses occurred after the end of the Cold War on Jan. 25, 1995,
would die. Recent studies by the eminent climatologists Toon and Robock have shown that such a war would have a huge and immediate impact on climate world wide.
when the Russians mistook a U.S. weather rocket launched from Norway for a possible attack. Jan. 25, 1995, was an ordinary day with no major crisis involving the U.S.
and Russia. But, unknown to almost every inhabitant on the planet, a misunderstanding led to the potential for a nuclear war. The ready alert status of nuclear weapons
that existed in 1995 remains in place today.
1AC Drug Violence Impact
Drug violence will massively increase and destabilize Mexico—US action is
key to solve
Hooper 11 (Karen, Stratfor, “The Mexican Drug Cartel Threat in Central America,” 11/17,
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20111116-mexican-drug-cartel-threat-central-america)
Central America's Challenge
Central America has no short-term escape from being at the geographical center of the drug trade and from
the associated violence. Unless and until technologies shift to allow drugs to flow directly from producer to consumer via ocean
or air transport, it appears likely that Central America will only become more important to the drug trade. While
the drug trade brings huge amounts of cash (admittedly on the black market) into exceedingly capital-poor countries, it also
brings extreme violence.¶ The billions of dollars drugs command create an insurmountable challenge for the
regional counternarcotic campaigns. The U.S. "war on drugs" pits the Guatemalan elite's political and financial interests
against their need to retain a positive relationship with the United States, which views the elites as colluding with drug organizations
to facilitate the free passage of drugs and key figures in the drug trade.¶ For the leaders of Central America, foreign cartel
interference in domestic arrangements and increasing violence is the real threat to their power. It is not
the black market that alarms a leader like Perez Molina enough to call for greater involvement by the United States: It is
the threat posed by the infiltration of Mexico's most violent drug cartel into Guatemala, and the threat posed
to all three countries by further Central American drug gang destabilization, which could lead to even
more violence.¶ Looking Forward¶ The United States is heavily preoccupied with crises of varying degrees of importance around
the world and the significant budget-tightening under way in Congress. This makes a major reallocation of resources to Guatemala
or its Central American neighbors for the fight against Mexican drug cartels unlikely in the short term. Even so, key reasons for
paying close attention to this issue remain.¶ First, the situation could destabilize rapidly if Perez Molina is sincere
about confronting Mexican DTOs in Guatemala. Los Zetas have proved willing to apply their signature
brutality against civilians and rivals alike in Guatemala. While the Guatemalans would be operating on their own
territory and have their own significant power bases, they are neither technologically advanced nor wealthy nor unified enough to
tackle the challenge posed by heavily armed, well-funded Zetas. At the very least, such a confrontation would ignite extremely
destabilizing violence. This violence could extend beyond the Northern Triangle into more stable Central
American countries, not to mention the possibility that violence spreading north could open up a new
front in Mexico's cartel war.¶ Second, the United States and Mexico already are stretched thin trying to
control their shared 2,000-mile land border. U.S. counternarcotic activities in Mexico are limited by Mexican sovereignty
concerns. For example, carrying weapons and operating independent of Mexican supervision is not allowed. This hampers the
interdiction efforts of U.S. agencies like the DEA. The efforts also are hampered by the United States' unwillingness
to share intelligence for fear that corrupt Mexican officials would leak it.¶ Perez Molina's invitation for
increased U.S. participation in Guatemalan counternarcotic operations presents a possibility for U.S. involvement
in a country that, like Mexico, straddles the continent. The Guatemalan choke point has a much shorter
border with Mexico — about 600 miles — in need of control, and is far enough north in Central America to
prevent insertion of drug traffickers into the supply chain between the blocking force and Mexico. While the
United States would not be able to stop the illicit flow of cocaine and people north, it could make it significantly more difficult. And
although significantly reducing traffic at the Guatemalan border would not stop the flow of the drugs to
the United States, it would radically decrease the value of Central America as a trafficking corridor.¶
Accomplishing this would require a much more significant U.S. commitment to the drug war, and any such
direct involvement would be costly both in money and political capital. Absent significant U.S. help, the current trend of
increased Mexican cartel influence and violence in Central America will only worsen.
Mexico drug violence leads to oil shocks and economic collapse
Moran 9 (7/31/09, Michael, executive editor and policy analyst, Council on Foreign Relations, “Six
Crises, 2009: A Half-Dozen Ways Geopolitics Could Upset Global Recovery,”
http://fbkfinanzwirtschaft.wordpress.com/2009/08/07/six-crises-2009-a-half-dozen-ways-geopoliticscould-upset-global-recovery/)
Risk 2: Mexico Drug Violence:¶ At Stake: Oil prices, refugee flows, NAFTA, U.S. economic stability¶ A story
receiving more attention in the American media than Iraq these days is the horrific drug-related violence across
the northern states of Mexico, where Felipe Calderon has deployed the national army to combat two
thriving drug cartels, which have compromised the national police beyond redemption.¶ The tales of carnage are
horrific, to be sure: 30 people were killed in a 48 hour period last week in Cuidad Juarez alone, a city located directly across the Rio
Grande from El Paso, Texas. So far, the impact on the United States and beyond has been minimal. But there also isn’t much sign
that the army is winning, either, and that raises a disturbing question: What if Calderon loses?¶ The CIA’s worst nightmare
during the Cold War (outside of an administration which forced transparency on it, of course) was the radicalization or
collapse of Mexico. The template then was communism, but narco-capitalism doesn’t look much better.¶ The
prospect of a wholesale collapse that sent millions upon millions of Mexican refugees fleeing across the northern border so far seems
remote. But Mexico’s army has its own problems with corruption, and a sizeable number of Mexicans regard Calderon’s razor-thin
2006 electoral victory over a leftist rival as illegitimate. With Mexico’s economy reeling and the traditional safety
valve of illegal immigration to America dwindling, the potential for serious trouble exists.¶ Meanwhile,
Mexico ranks with Saudi Arabia and Canada as the three suppliers of oil the United States could not do
without. Should things come unglued there and Pemex production shut down even temporarily, the shock on
oil markets could be profound, again, sending its waves throughout the global economy. Long-term, PEMEX
production has been sliding anyway, thanks to oil fields well-beyond their peak and restrictions on foreign investment.¶
Domestically in the U.S., any trouble involving Mexico invariably will cause a bipartisan demand for more
security on the southern border, inflame anti-immigrant sentiment and possibly force Obama to
remember his campaign promise to “renegotiate NAFTA,” a pledge he deftly sidestepped once in office.
Global economic crisis causes nuclear war
Cesare Merlini 11, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe and
chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs, May 2011, “A PostSecular World?”, Survival, Vol. 53, No. 2
Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the
One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and
traditional conflict between states, perhaps even involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis
might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just
experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and
democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national
sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would self-interest and rejection of outside
interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the
premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system.
European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such
amiliar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated . One way or
secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or
converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism.
as those related to immigration might become unbearable. F
another, the
Energy shocks cause great power nuke war
Islam Yasin Qasem 7, a doctoral candidate in the Department of Politics and Social Sciences at the
University of Pompeu Fabra (UPF) in Barcelona, MA in International Affairs from Columbia, July 9,
2007, “The Coming Warfare of Oil Shortage,” online:
http://www.opednews.com/articles/opedne_islam_ya_070709_the_coming_warfare_o.htm
Recognizing the strategic value of oil for their national interests, superpowers will not hesitate to unleash
their economic and military power to ensure secure access to oil resources, triggering worldwide tension, if not
armed conflict. And while superpowers like the United States maintain superior conventional military power,
in addition to their nuclear power, some weaker states are already nuclearly armed, others are seeking nuclear
weapons. In an anarchic world with many nuclear-weapon states feeling insecure, and a global economy in
downward spiral, the chances of using nuclear weapons in pursues of national interests are high.
The drug trade funds Hezbollah and Iran—these funds lead to Middle East
instability, nuclear terrorism, and Iranian prolif
McCaul 12 (Michael, Rep. “A LINE IN THE SAND: COUNTERING CRIME, VIOLENCE AND
TERROR AT THE SOUTHWEST BORDER: MAJORITY REPORT BY THE UNITED STATES HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS,
AND MANAGEMENT,” http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/11-15-12-Line-inthe-Sand.pdf)
Hezbollah remains especially active in the TBA. 25 With an estimated $12 billion a year in illegal
commerce, the TBA is the center of the largest underground economy in the Western Hemisphere.26 Financial crimes are a specialty of the area
and include intellectual property fraud, counterfeiting, money laundering and smuggling. Moreover, lax customs enforcement in the area allows these
crimes to continue largely unabated from one country to the other.27 The
TBA has been described as one of the most lucrative
sources of revenue for Hezbollah outside of state sponsorship.28¶ The evidence to suggest Hezbollah is
actively involved in the trafficking of South American cocaine to fund its operations is mounting as well. In
2008, U.S. and Colombian authorities dismantled a cocainesmuggling and money-laundering organization
that allegedly helped fund Hezbollah operations. Dubbed Operation Titan, the enforcement effort uncovered a money laundering operation that is
suspected of laundering hundreds of millions of dollars of cocaine proceeds a year and paying 12 percent of those profits to Hezbollah.29 Operation
Titan has led to more than 130 arrests and the seizure of $23 million.30 One of those arrests was of Chekri Mahmoud Harb (also known as “Taliban” or
“Tali”) who is a Lebanese national suspected of being a kingpin of the operation. In 2010, Harb pled guilty to conspiracy to manufacture and distribute
five kilograms or more of cocaine knowing the drugs would ultimately be smuggled into the United States.31¶ In another example, the Treasury
Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has listed Ayman “Junior” Joumaa, a Lebanese national and Hezbollah supporter, as a Specially
Designated Narcotics Trafficker based upon his involvement in the transportation, distribution and sale of multi-ton shipments of cocaine from South
America along with the laundering of hundreds of millions of dollars of cocaine proceeds from Europe and the Middle East.32 ¶ Federal prosecutors in
Virginia also charged Joumaa for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and money laundering charges. The indictment alleges Joumaa shipped thousands of
kilograms of Colombian cocaine to the United States via Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico. Specifically mentioned in the indictment was 85,000
kilograms of cocaine that was sold to the Los Zetas drug cartel from 2005 to 2007.33 The indictment further substantiates the established relationship
between Hezbollah, a proxy for Iran, and Mexican drug cartels, which control secured smuggling routes into the United States. This nexus potentially
provides Iranian operatives with undetected access into the United States. ¶ Joumaa allegedly laundered in excess of $250 million of cocaine proceeds
from sales in the United States, Mexico, Central America, West Africa and Europe. Joumaa would typically receive these proceeds in Mexico as bulk
cash deliveries. Once the proceeds were laundered, they would be paid out in Venezuelan or Colombian currency to the cocaine suppliers in Colombia.
Joumaa’s fee for laundering the currency would vary from eight to 14 percent.34 A recent civil complaint filed by the U.S. Department of Justice states
that Joumaa relied heavily upon the Lebanese Canadian Bank (LCB) and the Lebanese exchange houses Hassan Ayash Exchange Company (Hassan)
and Ellissa Holding (Ellissa) to conduct the money laundering operation described above.35 The complaint also alleges these businesses partnered with
Hezbollah in various other money laundering schemes. One such scheme involved LCB allowing Hezbollah-related entities to conduct transactions as
large as $260,000 per day without disclosing any information about the transaction.36 ¶ According to the 2011 State Department Country Reports on
Terrorism, the
Barakat Network in the TBA is another example of drug money being funneled to Hezbollah.
Barakat Network provided, and perhaps still
provides, a sizeable amount of the money sent annually from the TBA to finance Hezbollah and its operations around the
Although the total amount of money being sent to Hezbollah is difficult to determine, the
world.¶ Another scheme that took place from 2007 to early 2011 involved LCB, Hassan and Ellissa transferring at least $329 million of illicit proceeds
to the United States for the purchase of used cars through 30 car dealerships that typically had no assets other than the bank accounts which received
the overseas wire transfers. Once in receipt of the wired funds, these dealerships would purchase used vehicles and ship them to West Africa to be sold.
The cash proceeds would then make their way to Lebanon under the security of Hezbollah and its illegitimate money transfer systems.37¶
Hezbollah has also involved itself in the trafficking of weapons, which fuels the violence so intrinsic to
drug trafficking and terrorism in Latin America. On July 6, 2009, Jamal Yousef, also known as Talal Hassan Ghantou, was indicted
in New York City on federal narco-terrorism conspiracy charges. According to the unsealed indictment, Yousef is a former member of the Syrian
military and an international arms trafficker who was attempting to make a weapons-forcocaine deal with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de
Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC).38 ¶ What Yousef did not know was that he was actually negotiating with an undercover
operative of the Drug Enforcement Administration who was posing as a representative of the FARC. Yousef had agreed to provide the FARC militarygrade weapons that included 100 AR-15 and 100 M-16 assault rifles, 10 M-60 machine guns, C-4 explosives, 2,500 hand grenades and rocket-propelled
grenades. In exchange for the weapons, the FARC was to deliver 938 kilograms of cocaine to Yousef.39 ¶ While negotiations progressed, Yousef stated
that the weapons had been stolen from Iraq and were being stored in Mexico by Yousef’s cousin who is an active member of Hezbollah. To establish
their bona fides for the trade, Yousef’s cousin videotaped the weapons cache on location in Mexico. Towards the completion of the transaction, it was
learned that the weapons cache was actually larger than had been first reported. The deal was amended to include the additional weapons in exchange
for 7,000 to 8,000 more kilograms of cocaine that would be delivered to the coast of Honduras.40¶ The transaction was never completed because
Yousef was arrested and imprisoned in Honduras on separate charges beforehand. In August 2009, Yousef was extradited to New York where he awaits
trial.¶ The
explanation for Iranian presence in Latin America begins with its symbiotic relationship with
Hezbollah.41 United in their dedication to the destruction of Israel, Iran has helped Hezbollah grow from a small group of untrained
guerrillas into what is arguably the most highly trained, organized and equipped terrorist organization in the world.42 In return, Hezbollah has
served as an ideal proxy for Iranian military force – particularly against Israel – which affords Iran plausible deniability
diplomatically.43 Hence wherever Hezbollah is entrenched, Iran will be as well and vice-versa. ¶ The primary reason for Iran’s
increasing presence and influence in Latin America is based on its growing ideological and economic relationship with
Venezuela. Ideologically speaking, both regimes share a mutual enmity of what they perceive as the imperialist agenda of the
United States.44 Economically speaking, the two countries have partnered together in an attempt to survive and
thrive despite being ostracized in varying degrees from the official economy and its financial and trade systems.45 ¶ On the latter score one would
be hard pressed to find a country that has been more successful at overcoming sanctions and embargoes
levied by the United States and international community than Iran. In spite of ever-increasing economic constraints dating
back to the Carter Administration, Iran has managed to fight an eight year war with Iraq, become the world’s biggest
sponsor of terrorism, vigorously pursued its own nuclear program and become the prime destabilizing
factor in the Middle East.46¶ This impressive adaptability relies in no small part on Iran’s creativity in
exploiting unscrupulous businesses, criminal networks and other corrupt regimes for economic survival.
For rogue leaders like Venezuela President Hugo Chavez, who see embargoes and sanctions as just another manifestation of American oppression and
imperialism, Iran has become their champion and welcomed ally.47 This sentiment has developed into a cooperative understanding that, to the extent
they can be successful at overcoming economic sanctions and creating their own economy, Iran and Venezuela can continue to pursue their ideological
agendas beyond the reproach of their Western first-world oppressors.¶ In their efforts to achieve this independence, neither
Iran nor
Venezuela has ignored the pecuniary and political benefits of participating in the illicit drug trade. For
example, Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) General Gholamreza Baghbani has been working in conjunction with the
Taliban to oversee the trafficking of opium and heroin from Afghanistan through Iran in order to generate revenue
to support Hezbollah.48¶ General Baghbani is a commander in the IRGC Qods Force which is the Iranian Special Forces unit that works
closely with Hezbollah in conducting terror operations throughout the world. In a similar fashion to Iran’s ideological relationship with Hezbollah,
Venezuela and the FARC often work together in the trafficking of cocaine for mutual benefit. Numerous Venezuela government officials have been
designated by the OFAC as providing assistance to the FARC in the trafficking of cocaine and the purchasing of weapons.49 In addition to participating
in cocaine trafficking, Venezuela affords the FARC respite from United States and Colombian pursuit via safe havens within the country.50¶ Venezuela
extends this assistance in part because the socialist regime of Hugo Chavez aligns well ideologically with the FARC’s Marxist underpinnings.
Pragmatically speaking, Venezuela provides support to the FARC insurgency because it believes it helps mitigate the perceived threat of United States
intervention in the region.51 The FARC in turn has provided reciprocal support of the Chavez regime by such actions as training pro-Chavez militants
and assassinating anti-Chavez politicians within Venezuela.52¶ Given their own individual propensities in the trafficking of illicit drugs to further
ideological interests, it should come as no surprise that the
activity is so intrinsic to the ongoing VenezuelanIranian
enterprise in Latin America.53 Each country brings valuable infrastructure to drug trafficking that can be used to
help expand and supply a worldwide cocaine market. Assets such as state-owned airlines, shipping companies, airports and sea ports can operate
beyond the watchful eyes of the legitimate world.¶ This can be seen in the regularly scheduled flights between Caracas and Tehran that continue despite
Venezuelan-owned Conviasa Airlines’ claims they ended in September 2010.54 Even though it was described as a regular commercial flight, there was
no means by which to purchase a ticket to travel onboard. Moreover, the flight would depart Caracas from a secluded non-public terminal without the
normal manifests associated with legitimate air commerce.55 Another example that also illustrates the ingenuity of Iran in circumventing international
sanctions involves the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), which is responsible for moving almost one-third of Iran’s imports and exports.
The IRISL has been under OFAC economic sanction since September 2008 for providing logistical services to Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed
Forces Logistics.56¶ In order to stay one step ahead of OFAC and United Nations regulatory efforts, the IRISL regularly reflags and changes the owners
of its ships. Between September 2008 and February 2012, there were 878 changes to the IRISL fleet including 157 name changes, 94 changes of flag,
122 changes of operator and 127 changes of registered ownership. This simple tactic has allowed Iran to continue shipping goods to and from Venezuela
and all over the world despite the best efforts of the international community to prevent it.57¶ Being able to control major modes of transportation that
operate from one safe port to another beyond the watchful eyes of legitimate immigration and customs authorities is a fundamental advantage that is
very difficult to counter. While Iran and Venezuela may be much more interested in using this advantage for commercial, military and nuclear
purposes, there is no reason to doubt they would use it in the trafficking of drugs to finance covert terrorist activities for themselves and their allies.¶
IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY ¶ Iran and Hezbollah have been involved in the underworld of Latin America long
enough to become intimately familiar with all of its inhabitants and capitalize on their capabilities. Former DEA executive Michael Braun has an
interesting way of describing this dynamic:¶ “…If you want to visualize ungoverned space or a permissive environment, I tell people to simply think of
the bar scene in the first “Star Wars” movie. Operatives from FTOs (foreign terrorist organizations) and DTOs (drug trafficking organizations) are
frequenting the same shady bars, the same seedy hotels and the same sweaty brothels in a growing number of areas around the world. And what else
are they doing? Based upon over 37 years in the law enforcement and security sectors, you can mark my word that they are most assuredly talking
business and sharing lessons learned.”58¶ Braun says as Europe's demand for cocaine continues to grow and TCO's operate in West and North Africa to
establish infrastructure to move the drugs:¶ "These bad guys (cartels) are now routinely coming in very close contact with the likes of Hezbollah,
Hamas, Al Qaeda, who are vying for the same money, the same turf and same dollars. It's really a nightmare scenario. And my point being is if
anyone thinks for a moment that Hezbollah and Qods Force, the masters at leveraging and exploiting existing elicit infrastructures
globally, are not going to focus on our southwest border and use that as perhaps a spring board in attacking
our country then they just don't understand how the real underworld works ."59¶ Iran attempted to leverage this
capability in October 2011 with the foiled plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United States. According to a federal arrest complaint filed in
New York City, the Qods Force attempted to hire a drug cartel (identified by other sources as the Los Zetas) to assassinate Saudi Ambassador Adel alJubeir for a fee of $1.5 million. The terror attack was to take place at a popular restaurant in Washington, D.C. without regard to collateral deaths or
damage.60¶ The Qods Force made this solicitation because it knows drug traffickers are willing to undertake such criminal activity in exchange for
money. Moreover, if this terror attack had been successful, the Qods Force intended to use the Los Zetas for other attacks in the future.61 Had it not
been for a DEA informant posing as the Los Zetas operative, this attack could have very well taken place.¶ It has been suggested that this assassination
was directed by the Iranian government in retaliation for a Saudi-led military intervention in Bahrain against an Iranian-backed Shiite Muslim majority
that was protesting a Saudi-backed Sunni Muslim minority government.62 There are also indications that Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei
has ordered the Qods Force to intensify terror attacks against the United States and other Western countries for supporting the ousting of Syrian
President and Iranian ally Bashar al-Assad.63¶ How
all of this plays into the Iranian nuclear threat leaves troubling
possibilities for the U.S. and our ally Israel. We know that Hezbollah has a significant presence in the United
States that could be utilized in terror attacks intended to deter our efforts to curtail Iran’s nuclear
program.64 For this same reason, Israelis in the United States and around the world have gone on high alert to
prevent a repeat of deadly Hezbollah terror attacks against Israeli facilities that occurred in Argentina in 1992 and 1994. ¶
These increasingly hostile actions taken by the Iranian government would be alarming enough without
Iran and Hezbollah having well-established bases of operations in Latin America. While Latin American
bases serve as a finance mechanism for Hezbollah, it is believed the ability exists to turn operational if the need arises. There is
no doubt that the enemy is at our doorstep and we must do something about it now. While a very aggressive foreign
policy to counteract these threats is in order, we must not forget that a secure Southwest border is always our first and last line of defense.
Nuclear terrorism likely—state sponsorship key
Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor
of Government; Faculty Chair, Dubai Initiative, Harvard Kennedy School, 9/7/ 12, "Living in the Era of
Megaterror", belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/22302/living_in_the_era_of_megaterror.html
Today, how many people can a small group of terrorists kill in a single blow? Had Bruce Ivins, the U.S. government microbiologist
responsible for the 2001 anthrax attacks, distributed his deadly agent with sprayers he could have purchased off the shelf, tens of
thousands of Americans would have died. Had the 2001 “Dragonfire” report that Al Qaeda had a small nuclear
weapon (from the former Soviet arsenal) in New York City proved correct, and not a false alarm, detonation of that
bomb in Times Square could have incinerated a half million Americans.¶ In this electoral season, President Obama is
claiming credit, rightly, for actions he and U.S. Special Forces took in killing Osama bin Laden. Similarly, at last week’s Republican
convention in Tampa, Jeb Bush praised his brother for making the United States safer after 9/11. There can be no doubt that the
thousands of actions taken at federal, state and local levels have made people safer from terrorist attacks.¶ Many are therefore
attracted to the chorus of officials and experts claiming that the “strategic defeat” of Al Qaeda means the end
of this chapter of history. But we should remember a deeper and more profound truth. While applauding actions that
have made us safer from future terrorist attacks, we must recognize that they have not reversed an inescapable reality:
The relentless advance of science and technology is making it possible for smaller and smaller groups to kill
larger and larger numbers of people.¶ If a Qaeda affiliate, or some terrorist group in Pakistan whose name readers
have never heard, acquires
highly enriched uranium or plutonium made by a state, they can construct an
elementary nuclear bomb capable of killing hundreds of thousands of people. At biotech labs across the United States and
around the world, research scientists making medicines that advance human well-being are also capable of making
pathogens, like anthrax, that can produce massive casualties.¶ What to do? Sherlock Holmes examined crime scenes
using a method he called M.M.O.: motive, means and opportunity. In a society where citizens gather in unprotected movie
theaters, churches, shopping centers and stadiums, opportunities for attack abound. Free societies are inherently “target rich.”¶
Motive to commit such atrocities poses a more difficult challenge. In all societies, a percentage of the population will be homicidal.
No one can examine the mounting number of cases of mass murder in schools, movie theaters and elsewhere without worrying
about a society’s mental health. Additionally, actions we take abroad unquestionably impact others’ motivation to attack us. ¶ As
Faisal Shahzad, the 2010 would-be “Times Square bomber,” testified at his trial: “Until the hour the U.S. ... stops the occupation of
Muslim lands, and stops killing the Muslims ... we will be attacking U.S., and I plead guilty to that.Ӧ Fortunately, it is more
difficult for a terrorist to acquire the “means” to cause mass casualties. Producing highly enriched
uranium or plutonium requires expensive industrial-scale investments that only states will make. If all fissile
material can be secured to a gold standard beyond the reach of thieves or terrorists, aspirations to become the world’s
first nuclear terrorist can be thwarted.
A nuclear terrorist attack causes extinction
Ayson 10 [Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic
Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington,“After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack:
Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online
to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld]
A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear
worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast
can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in
significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war
as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even
thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place
precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a
catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist
attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive
exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and
tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as
raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered
would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that
in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an
in the event of a terrorist
attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought
into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too
especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example,
nuclear
responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves.
For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and
if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science
fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity
makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most
if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and
officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state
possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would
be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China
be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of
existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers,
would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to
important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively,
American
increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a
proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a
period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United
Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also
raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in
the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to
place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning
runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S.
intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such
actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to
the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or
disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the
location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and
States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack?
as an infringement on their spheres of influence
potentially
and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario
might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with
what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise
alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of
how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist
attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security
Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if
If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of
Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in
cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some
the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory?
connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a
If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten
nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious
nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the
curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability?
the use of,
response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a
state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what
options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear
weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to
Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the
most important trustees of the non-use taboo
reverse the tables.
two
, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very
visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view
such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite
plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind,
In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist
attack, how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to
respond in kind? The phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind . Some might
even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This
might not help the chances of nuclear restraint. ¶ Nuclear Terrorism Against Smaller Nuclear Powers¶ There is also the question of what lesser powers in
would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur?
the international system might do in response to a terrorist attack on a friendly or allied country: what they might do in sympathy¶ or support of their attacked colleague.
Moreover, if these countries are themselves nuclear¶ armed, additional possibilities for a wider catastrophe may lie here as well. For example,¶ if in the event of a terrorist
nuclear attack on the United States, a nuclear armed ally such¶ as Israel might possess special information about the group believed to be responsible and¶ be willing and able to
take the action required to punish that group. If its action involved¶ threats of the use of nuclear force, or the use of nuclear force itself (perhaps against a¶ country Israel
believed to be harboring the nuclear terrorists), how might other nuclear¶ armed countries react? Might some other nuclear powers demand that the United States¶ rein in its
friend, and suggest a catastrophic outcome should this restraint not take place?¶ Or would they wait long enough to ask the question?¶ Alternatively, what if some states used the
nuclear terrorist attack on another country to justify a major—and perhaps even nuclear—attack on other terrorist groups on the grounds¶ that it was now clear that it was too
dangerous to allow these groups to exist when they¶ might very well also be planning similar nuclear action? (Just as Al Qaeda’s attacks on 9/11¶ raised some of the threat
assessments of other terrorist groups, the same and more might¶ occur if any terrorist group had used a nuclear weapon,) If a nuclear armed third party took¶ things into its
own hands and decided that the time for decisive action had now come, how¶ might this action affect the nuclear peace between states?¶ But it needs to be realized that a
catalytic exchange is not only possible if the terrorists¶ have exploded a nuclear device on one of the established nuclear weapons states, including¶ and especially the United
States. A catalytic nuclear war might also be initiated by a nuclear¶ terrorist attack on a country that possesses a nuclear arsenal of a more modest scale, and¶ which is
geographically much closer to the group concerned. For example, if a South Asian terrorist group exploded a nuclear device in India, it is very difficult to see how major¶
suspicions could not be raised in that country (and elsewhere) that Pakistan was somehow¶ involved—either as a direct aider and abetter of the terrorists (including the
provision of¶ the bomb to them) or as at the very least a passive and careless harborer of the groups¶ perpetrating the act. In a study that seeks to reduce overall fears of nuclear
if one of the nuclear powers in South Asia was “thought to be¶
behind a ‘terrorist’ nuclear attack in the region, the risks of the incident escalating into a full
nuclear exchange would be high .”¶ 43¶ Kapur is equally definite on this score, observing that¶ “if a nuclear detonation occurred within India, the
terrorism, Frost¶ nonetheless observes that
attack would be undoubtedly blamed on¶ Pakistan, with potentially catastrophic results.”¶ 44
Middle East war leads to extinction
Stirling 11—B.Sc. in Pol. Sc. & History; M.A. in European Studies (“General Middle East War Nears Syrian events more dangerous than even nuclear nightmare in Japan”, 3/30/11,
http://europebusines.blogspot.com/2011/03/general-middle-east-war-nears-syrian.html)
As insanely dangerous as the mega-nuclear disaster in Japan is, events in the Middle East may be nearing a dangerous flash
point that will be several orders of magnitude greater in terms of danger to the entire human race.
The 'Domino Revolutions' in the Middle East were planned by the US State Department/CIA/Mossad and a select group of key corporate leaders in Internet-based social
networking companies in late 2008. The regime changes have several strategic goals, the most important of which is the replacement of Assad in Syria with a regime that
As Gaddafi is showing
his willingness to fight, you can expect the Syrian government and its allies to go much farther. They
are fully aware that only their joint military threat against Israel has kept them from being destroyed
like Iraq. They know that if the alliance/threat is removed, that their heads will be on the chopping
block. In the event, that a 'revolution' appears to be getting close to success in Syria, they are very likely
to launch a war with Israel instead of waiting like sheep for their own destruction. That puts a 'hair trigger' on current events in Syria.
will break the Iran/Syria/Hezbollah alliance and remove the massive rocket/missile threat to Israel's north, so that it can attack Iran.
There are somewhere between 40,000 and 60,000 or so rockets and guided missiles in Lebanon, placed there by Iran and Syria. These are normally under the 'command'
of Hezbollah, but in reality are effectively controlled by Iranian and Syrian commanders. These rockets and guided missiles constitute a large percentage of the MAD
(mutually assured destruction) strategic counter-force 'throw weight' from the Iranian/Syrian/Hezbollah alliance. Of course, the really 'big guns' are the Iranian Advanced
Biological arsenal of genetically engineered viruses and these do not require rockets/missiles for delivery and in fact are a global strategic WMD (weapon of mass
destruction) comparable in potential kill levels to global strategic thermonuclear warfare weapons.
The large number of 'Hezbollah' rockets/missiles are a grave danger that is specific to Israel. In the Second Lebanon War (which Israel lost), the 'Hezbollah' forces were
simply demonstrating their ability to 'deliver ordinance-on-target' over northern Israel using mostly relatively short range unguided rockets and 'dumb' warheads (simple
high explosive warheads). Like Saddam Hussein did in the first Gulf War with his Scuds (actually al-Hussein missiles; a modified version of the Scud), the Iranians and
Syrians using their Hezbollah proxies, were delivering a warning by firing repeatedly into their enemy. They were demonstrating their ability to hit their enemy but were
only, by choice, using low impact 'dumb' high explosive warheads. Saddam held back a force (19 or more) of missiles armed with WMD, which is why we did not 'finish' the
war the first time. (It was only after he had denuded himself of his WMD and delivery capabilities that we began the Iraqi War - Second Gulf War).
The Iranians and Syrians and their Hezbollah allies/proxies have a considerable selection of WMD available for these 40,000 to 60,000 rockets/missiles (in addition to
their Syrian and Iranian based longer range missiles). The WMD can range from FAE (fuel air explosive) warheads (which if fired in a coordinated pattern can lay down a
FAE 'brew' over a wide area, such as over a heavily populated urban area) and achieve PSI (pounds per square inch) levels higher than standard NATO tactical nuclear
warheads. The WMD can also include chemical warheads of various types. Syria and Iran have one of the largest (if not the largest) joint chemical warfare programs on
Earth. Additionally, they can use Advanced Biologically produced biotoxin warheads for a longer lasting chemical war 'effect'. They can also use 'dirty bombs', that is
Radiological warheads using things like Cobalt 60 and Strontium 90, which give the 'effect' of radiological fallout without using a nuclear blast. They can also use
Radiological weapons encased in an advanced matrix containing hard to remove glue, so that the radioactive particles are glued to buildings, cars, etc., making any
decontamination efforts most difficult.
The Israelis see these rockets/missiles and their assorted warheads as a grave threat. The Second Lebanon War was planned as the first step in a war against Syria and Iran
but the low-cost but powerful AT-14 Russian built and supplied anti-tank missiles proved too much for the IDF armor; the losses were simply too high. This time the IDF
will be using different tactics, strategies, and weapons.
any large-scale Israeli attack on Lebanon/Hezbollah
will be considered an attack on them and will immediately trigger a regional war with themselves and
Israel. They simply cannot allow Israel to destroy the rocket/missile element to their MAD counter-force, as
Both Syria and Lebanon have make it very clear, over the last few months, that
they know that the Syrian and Iranian homelands would be next. So any war on Lebanon/Hezbollah means a General Middle East War from day one.
Any Third Lebanon War/General Middle East War is apt to involve WMD on both side quickly as both sides
know the stakes and that the Israelis are determined to end, once and for all, any Iranian opposition to a 'Greater Israel' domination of the entire Middle East. It will
be a case of 'use your WMD or lose them' to enemy strikes. Any massive WMD usage against Israel will result in the usage of Israeli
thermonuclear warheads against Arab and Persian populations centers in large parts of the Middle East, with the resulting spread of radioactive fallout over large parts of
the Northern Hemisphere. However, the first use of nukes is apt to be lower yield warheads directed against Iranian underground facilities including both nuclear sites and
governmental command and control and leadership bunkers, with some limited strikes also likely early-on in Syrian territory.
The Iranians are well prepared to launch a global Advanced Biological Warfare terrorism based strike against not only Israel and American and
allied forces in the Middle East but also against the American, Canadian, British, French, German, Italian, etc., homelands. This will utilize DNA recombination based
'super killer viruses'
genetically engineered
that are designed to spread themselves throughout the world using humans as vectors. There are very few defenses
against such warfare, other than total quarantine of the population until all of the different man-made viruses (and there could be dozens or even over a hundred different
viruses released at the same time) have 'burned themselves out'. This could kill a third of the world's total population.
Such a result from an Israeli triggered war would almost certainly cause a Russian-Chinese
response that would eventually finish off what is left of Israel and begin a truly global
war/WWIII with multiple war theaters around the world. It is highly unlikely that a Third World War, fought with 21st Century weaponry will be anything but the
Biblical Armageddon.
Iran prolif causes nuclear war
Jeffrey Goldberg 12, Bloomberg View columnist and a national correspondent for the Atlantic,
January 23, 2012, “How Iran Could Trigger Accidental Armageddon,” online:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-24/how-iran-may-trigger-accidental-armageddoncommentary-by-jeffrey-goldberg.html
The experts who study this depressing issue seem to agree that a Middle East in which Iran has four or five nuclear
weapons would be dangerously unstable and prone to warp-speed escalation .¶ Here’s one possible scenario
for the not-so-distant future: Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanese proxy, launches a cross-border attack into Israel, or kills a sizable number of Israeli
civilians with conventional rockets. Israel responds by invading southern Lebanon, and promises, as it has in the past, to destroy Hezbollah. Iran,
coming to the defense of its proxy, warns Israel to cease hostilities, and leaves open the question of what it will do if Israel refuses to heed its
demand.¶ Dennis Ross, who until recently served as President Barack Obama’s Iran point man on the National Security Council, notes Hezbollah’s
political importance to Tehran. “The only place to which the Iranian government successfully exported the revolution is to Hezbollah in Lebanon,”
Ross told me. “If it looks as if the Israelis are going to destroy Hezbollah, you can see Iran threatening Israel, and they begin to change the
readiness of their forces. This could set in motion a chain of events that would be like ‘Guns of August’ on steroids.” ¶ Imagine that Israel detects a
mobilization of Iran’s rocket force or the sudden movement of mobile missile launchers. Does Israel assume the Iranians are bluffing, or that they
are not? And would Israel have time to figure this out? Or imagine the opposite: Might Iran, which will have no second-strike capability for many
years -- that is, no reserve of nuclear weapons to respond with in an exchange -- feel compelled to attack Israel first, knowing that it has no second
chance?¶ Bruce Blair, the co-founder of the nuclear disarmament group Global Zero and an
expert on nuclear strategy, told me
a sudden crisis Iran and Israel might each abandon traditional peacetime safeguards, making an
accidental exchange more likely.¶ “A confrontation that brings the two nuclear-armed states to a boiling point would likely
lead them to raise the launch- readiness of their forces -- mating warheads to delivery vehicles and preparing to fire on
short notice,” he said. “Missiles put on hair-trigger alert also obviously increase the danger of their launch and release on
false warning of attack -- false indications that the other side has initiated an attack.Ӧ Then comes the problem of
misinterpreted data, Blair said. “Intelligence failures in the midst of a nuclear crisis could readily lead to a false impression that the other
side has decided to attack, and induce the other side to launch a preemptive strike.”¶ ‘Cognitive Bias’¶ Blair notes that in a crisis it isn’t
irrational to expect an attack, and this expectation makes it more likely that a leader will read the worst into
incomplete intelligence. “This predisposition is a cognitive bias that increases the danger that one side will jump the
gun on the basis of incorrect information,” he said.¶ Ross told me that Iran’s relative proximity to Israel and the total absence
of ties between the two countries -- the thought of Iran agreeing to maintain a hot line with a country whose existence it doesn’t recognize is farfetched -- make the situation even more hazardous. “This is not the Cold War,” he said. “In this situation we don’t have
any communications channels. Iran and Israel have zero communications. And even in the Cold War we nearly had a nuclear war. We
were much closer than we realized.Ӧ The answer to this predicament is to deny Iran nuclear weapons, but not through an
attack on its nuclear facilities, at least not now. “The liabilities of preemptive attack on Iran’s nuclear program vastly outweigh the benefits,”
that in
Blair said. “But certainly Iran’s program must be stopped before it reaches fruition with a nuclear weapons delivery capability.”
XT – Drilling KT Relations
Offshore drilling is vital to relations---high strategic importance
Grogg 12 Patricia – IPS, Citing Luiz Rene Fernandez – Senior Research and Professor at University of
Havana specializing in international economics, “CUBA: Oil Drilling Opens Up New Possibilities”, 2/16,
http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/02/cuba-oil-drilling-opens-up-new-possibilities/
The search for oil in Cuba’s Gulf of Mexico waters, launched by the Spanish firm Repsol, has triggered speculation about
future prospects for Cuba and the possibility of this country one day making the transition from importer to exporter of crude. Moreover,
given its strategic importance for both the U nited S tates and Cuba, some analysts believe that energy
offers a potential area for cooperation that could eventually help pave the way to the
normalisation of relations between the two countries. For the moment, the Cuban authorities and oil industry personnel
are remaining discreetly silent on the subject. CUPET, the state-owned oil company, has limited itself to officially confirming the arrival in the country
on Jan. 19 of the Scarabeo 9 oil rig for “the resumption in the coming days of deepwater drilling for oil exploration.” Drilling operations presumably
began in late January. According to CUPET, the goal is to continue testing to determine the potential for oil and gas production in Cuba’s exclusive
economic zone (EEZ) in the Gulf of Mexico. The results of the drilling will contribute to defining that potential. After opening up its economy to foreign
investment in 1991, Cuba divided the EEZ, which covers an area of 112,000 sq km, into 59 oil and gas exploration blocks. On Jan. 18, Rafael Tenreiro,
director of exploration and production at CUPET, reiterated a previous estimate of a potential 20,000 million barrels in the area. At the launching of
the book “Perforación de pozos petroleros marinos” (“Offshore Oil Well Drilling”) by Rolando Fernández, supervisor of the Gulf of Mexico operations
group, Tenreiro stated that it was “possible” that Cuba could become an oil exporter. “We have to prepare the country for this good news,” he added,
stressing the need for the production of technology and participation in the entire process. In 2011, more than 20 offshore exploration blocks had
already been leased to large foreign energy companies, including, in addition to Repsol, StatoilHydro of Norway, ONGC Videsh of India, PETRONAS of
Malaysia, PetroVietnam, Gazprom of Russia, Sonangol of Angola the Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA. Reflecting on the potential ramifications
should Repsol’s exploratory drilling prove successful, university professor Fernando Martirena told IPS that large-scale development of the Cuban oil
industry would obviously provide a boost to the government programmes currently underway, since it would represent “a needed injection of fresh
foreign currency into a tense national economy.” This scenario, “combined with the package of measures being implemented as a result of the
‘updating’ of the Cuban economic model, will heat up the issue of the blockade,” said Martirena. Under
the U.S. economic embargo
companies are shut out from profiting from a
potential oil boom in Cuba. In Martirena’s view, if the U.S. Congress wants to be pragmatic, “it will have to choose
between continuing to support the hysterical Cuban-American bloc that does so much lobbying around the issue of the
blockade, or simply accepting reality – that there is no reason to maintain this policy .” Cuban-American members of
against this Caribbean island nation, in place for 50 years this month, U.S.
Congress headed up by the chairwoman of the influential House Foreign Affairs Committee, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, have attempted to block Repsol’s
drilling operations in Cuban waters. While they claim that their opposition is based on concerns for the environment and the security of the United
States, analysts believe that their motivation is primarily political. Before arriving in Cuban waters, the Scarabeo 9 drilling rig – built in China and
assembled in Singapore, and therefore exempt from the prohibitions of the U.S. embargo – successfully passed inspection by personnel from the U.S.
Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement and the U.S. Coast Guard. CUPET has also vouched that the cuttingedge equipment leased by Repsol for its drilling operations has been duly verified to include the necessary features to guarantee the utmost efficiency
and safety. The exploratory drilling is expected to last roughly two and a half months. “Technically speaking, the chances of a mishap occurring in
Cuba’s economic area are extremely small, not only because of the precautions taken, but also for purely statistical reasons. This is one drilling rig out
of the countless rigs operating outside of Cuban waters” in the Gulf of Mexico, economist Luis René Fernández commented to IPS. An expert on CubaU.S. relations, Fernández noted that while there are political risks associated with the issues of security and environmental impacts, there are also
experiences that indicate that these “could and should be reduced.” “(Socialist) Venezuela has not stopped supplying oil to the United States, although
it has tried to diversity its markets,” he mentioned as an example. He also pointed to the migration accords signed by Havana and Washington and
Cuba’s purchases of food from U.S. companies despite “all of the restrictions and limitations.” “In these cases, among the reasons for a certain type of
communication and collaboration, it always boils down to the importance of geography. There
are common issues in which it is
more beneficial for both sides to address them directly and even to cooperate. Not doing so could have high costs, not only
economic, but also for the environment and security,” he said. Fernández stressed that the U.S. government is not a “unified actor” and that there are
different agencies that deal with matters such as energy and the environment. “ There
are experts and professionals who fulfil
their missions and could have real impacts on the concrete political situation,” he said, due to geographical proximity
but also because “it is advisable to cooperate in spite of political and ideological differences .” In his opinion, both
countries are moving in the mid term and especially in the long term towards the normalisation of relations, regardless of the particular political
circumstances in the United States. “On
the Cuban side, there is a well-known willingness to cooperate and even to debate,
could be another important area for
cooperation, precisely because of the strategic significance of energy sources for both the U nited
S tates and Cuba. Are there risks? Without a doubt. But the benefits of cooperation definitely outweigh them,” Fernández
concluded.
on respectful and equal terms, all of the aspects of the bilateral conflict,” he stressed. “This
Modifying embargo regulations can promote successful engagement
throughout Latin America---Cuba is a model
Pascual and Huddleston 9 Carlos – Vice president and Director of Foreign policy – the
Brookings Institution, and Vicki – Visiting Fellow, “CUBA: A New policy of Critical and Constructive
Engagement”, April,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413_cuba.pdf
U.S. policy toward Cuba should advance the democratic aspirations of the Cuban people and strengthen U.S. credibility
throughout the hemisphere. Our nearly 50-year old policy toward Cuba has failed on both counts: it has
resulted in a downward spiral of U.S. influence on the island and has left the U nited S tates isolated
in the hemisphere and beyond. Our Cuba policy has become a bellwether, indicating the extent to which
the U nited S tates will act in partnership with the region or unilaterally—and ineffectually. i nevitably, strategic contact and dialogue
with the Cuban government will be necessary if the United States seeks to engage the Cuban people. This paper proposes a new goal for U.S. policy to ward Cuba: to support the emergence of a Cuban state where the Cuban people determine the polit - ical and economic future of their country through
democratic means. A
great lesson of democracy is that it cannot be imposed ; it must come from within; the type of
policy should therefore encompass the political,
economic, and diplomatic tools to enable the Cuban people to engage in and direct the politics of their country. This policy will
advance the interests of the U nited S tates in seeking stable relationships based on common hemispheric
values that pro - mote the well-being of each individual and the growth of civil society. To engage the Cuban gov - ernment and Cuban people
government at the helm of the island’s future will depend on Cubans. Our
effectively, the United States will need to engage with other govern - ments, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). i n so
doing, U.S. policy toward Cuba would reflect the hemisphere’s and our own desire to encourage the Cuban govern - ment to adopt international
standards of democ - racy, human rights, and transparency. Engagement does not mean approval of the Cu - ban government’s policies, nor should it
indicate a wish to control internal developments in Cuba; legitimate changes in Cuba will only come from the actions of Cubans. i f the United States is
to play a positive role in Cuba’s future, it must not indulge in hostile rhetoric nor obstruct a dialogue on issues that would advance democracy, justice,
and human rights as well as our broader national interests. p erversely, the policy of seeking to iso - late Cuba, rather than achieving its objective, has
contributed to undermining the well-being of the Cuban people and to eroding U.S. influence in Cuba and l atin America. i t has reinforced the Cuban
government’s power over its citizens by in - creasing their dependence on it for every aspect of their livelihood. By slowing the flow of ideas and
information, we have unwittingly helped Cuban state security delay Cuba’s political and economic evolution toward a more open and representa - tive
government. And, by too tightly embracing Cuba’s brave dissidents, we have provided the Cu - ban authorities with an excuse to denounce their
legitimate efforts to build a more open society. The Cuban r evolution of 1959 is a fact of histo - ry that cannot be removed or unlived, but, over time,
Cuba will change. As the Cuban people become inexorably linked to the region and the world, they will themselves come to play a larger role in the way
they are governed. Mortality and time—not U.S. sanctions—have already begun the process of change. A new generation of Cu - ban leaders will replace
the Castro brothers and those who fought in the Sierra Maestra. Although Cuba is already undergoing a process of change, the Bush administration’s
decision to cling to out - moded tactics of harsh rhetoric and confrontation alienated leaders across the region. Cuba policy should be a pressing issue
for the Obama administration because it offers a unique opportunity for the president to transform our rela - tions with the hemisphere. Even a slight
shift away from hostility to engagement will permit the United States to work more closely with the region to ef - fectively advance a common agenda
toward Cuba. By announcing a policy of critical and constructive engagement at the April Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago, the
president can prove that he has been listening to the region. He can under - line this commitment by removing all restrictions on travel and remittances
on Cuban Americans, and engaging in dialogue with the regime, as prom - ised during his campaign. By reciprocally improv - ing our diplomatic
relations with Cuba, we will en - hance our understanding of the island, its people, and its leaders. However, while these measures will promote
understanding, improve the lives of people on the island, and build support for a new relation - ship between our countries, they are insufficient to
ensure the changes needed to result in normal dip - lomatic relations over time. i f the president is to advance U.S. interests and principles, he will need
a new policy and a long- term strategic vision for U.S. relations with Cuba. i f he is prepared to discard the failed policy of regime change and adopt one
of critical and con - structive engagement, he and his administration will lay the foundations for a new approach to - ward Cuba and the l atin America. l
ike his pre - decessors, p resident Obama
has the authority to substantially modify embargo regulations in
order to advance a policy of engagement that would broaden and deepen contacts with the Cuban people and their
government. He has the popular support—domestic and international—to engage Cuba , and, by so doing, to
staunch our diminishing influence on the island and recapture the high road in our relations with the
hemisphere.
Econ Advantage
1AC Econ Advantage
Venezuela is going to cut Cuba off from oil---that wrecks their economy
Keppel 3/16 (Stephen, ABC News, “What Chávez's Death Means for Cuba, Venezuela and the U.S.”
http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/chavezs-death-means-cuba-venezuela-us/story?id=18669003)
Upon hearing news of the death of Hugo Chávez, scores of Venezuelans gathered in cautious celebration in Doral,
a South Florida community with the highest concentration of Venezuelans outside Venezuela. They are hoping that Chávez's passing
will bring about change in their homeland.¶ Others in the region were not as happy.¶ Sure Chávez was politically influential
in Latin America, but in many ways his economic influence was even greater — especially with friendly countries like
Cuba, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Argentina, Bolivia and a score of Caribbean nations that benefited from Venezuela's oil-discount
program, PetroCaribe.¶ In the name of "economic solidarity," Chávez was extremely generous with these
friends, offering oil at discounted rates and with flexible lending conditions. Nicaragua, for example, was known
to pay for Venezuelan oil with shipments of beef, sugar, coffee, milk and even 19,000 pairs of pants.¶ According to figures from the
state-owned oil company PDVSA, in 2011 Venezuela sent 243,500 barrels of oil a day (or around 8 percent of its production) to 16
countries across Latin America.¶ Yet the absence of Chávez and the potential drawdown of economic support
would have the biggest impact on Cuba. That country receives more than 100,000 barrels of discounted
oil per day and billions of dollars each year in exchange for Cuban medical personnel, technology experts, political
consultants and other "professionals."¶ That's because Chávez had a special relationship with Cuba and the
Castros. His relationships with other presidents were also often very personal. That approach may be difficult to sustain
in his absence. Even if Nicolas Maduro, Chávez's chosen replacement, wins the upcoming election, he will be more
susceptible to domestic pressure to reduce Venezuela's foreign aid, given all the economic challenges at
home.¶ The Cubans have bad memories of the ending of Soviet patronage in the 1990s and are right to be
worried about what the death of Chávez may bring.¶ Where will Cuba turn this time if Venezuelan aid dries
up? Maybe the United States. That doesn't mean the U.S. government, however. Rather, Cuba would likely turn to the nearly two
million Cubans living in this country. They are already sending around $2 billion a year back to the island in remittances. Already,
Raul Castro seems to have been preparing to make the Cuban economy a little bit more flexible and open to investment, and the
Obama administration has made it easier for Cubans in the U.S. to send money back home.¶ Which brings us to Venezuela's
financial situation. The truth is the economic state there has been uncertain and chaotic ever since Chavez
got sick, and that is unlikely to change in the short term. There is supposed to be a new election, and it appears that
Maduro will win. But he will face a tough economic situation. Plus, he lacks the charisma of Chávez and may
not be able to maintain popularity if things get tougher.
Venezuelan oil is key to Cuba’s economy
Benjamin-Alvadaro 10 (Jonathan, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International
University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the
Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American
Political Science Association, “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation”)
The power and hydrocarbon sectors are inextricably linked, as Cuba produces about 85 percent of
its power using liquid fuels, a very high percentage compared with other countries.3 The total value of
the energy consumed in Cuba has been estimated at 14 percent of GDP, compared with a world average of
about 10 percent. In 2007, domestic production of crude oil accounted for about 40 percent of total
consumption and the rest was imported from Venezuela. About 50 percent of the total supply of fuel oil is
applied to power generation and 50 percent for transportation and other uses; this is consistent with the usage
breakdown seen in other countries.
Cuban oil solves dependence on Venezuela---revenues lead to political
reforms that create stability
Pinon 11 – Jorge R. Piñón is a visiting research fellow at the Latin American and Caribbean Center’s
Cuban Research Institute at FIU. Spring 2011, "Why the United States and Cuba Collaborate (and What
Could Happen If They Don't)"casgroup.fiu.edu/pages/docs/2157/1306356964_Hemisphere_Vol._20.pdf
If Cuba’s suspected but yet undiscovered hydrocarbon reserves are proven real, it will take between three
and five years to develop them fully. Production volumes would have to reach more than 200,000 barrels per day to have the same
positive economic impact currently derived from foreign oil subsidies. If this occurs, significant revenues from oil, natural
gas and sugarcane ethanol would integrate Cuba into global and regional markets within
the next five years.¶ International oil companies such as Spain’s Repsol, Norway’s Statoil Norsk Hydro and
Brazil’s Petrobras are actively exploring Cuba’s Gulf of Mexico waters. Cuban authorities have invited
United States oil companies to participate in developing the island’s offshore oil and
natural gas resources, but US law does not allow this.¶ Although US oil, oil equipment and service
companies have the capital, technology and operational knowhow to explore, produce and refine Cuba’s
potential reserves in a safe and responsible manner, the almost five-decade old unilateral political and
economic embargo keeps them on the sidelines.¶ Cuba currently relies on heavily subsidized oil
from Venezuela for two-thirds of its petroleum needs. This supply contributes to the Cuban
government’s ability to maintain a politically antagonistic and belligerent position towards
the US.¶ The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 made Cuba aware of the political and economic risks and consequences of depending on a single
source of imported oil. Only when Cuba diversifies suppliers and develops its offshore hydrocarbon
resources, estimated by the United States Geological Survey at 5.5 million barrels of oil and 9.8 trillion
cubic feet of natural gas, will it have the economic independence to consider political and
economic reforms. It is in the US interest to develop a new policy toward the island based on
constructive engagement to support the emergence of a Cuban state in which Cubans themselves can
determine the political and economic future of their country through democratic means. Cuba is about to embark on an
18-month oil exploration drilling program to validate the presence of recoverable hydrocarbon reserves. ¶ US support of such endeavors would be
beneficial in the framework of a constructive engagement policy. The Deepwater Horizon drilling semi-submersible incident and the resulting
catastrophic oil spill demonstrate the urgency of developing a policy of energy and environmental cooperation between the United States and Cuba. As
Cuba develops its deepwater oil and natural gas potential, the possible consequences of a spill call for proactive planning by both countries to minimize
or avoid an environmental disaster.¶ To respond effectively to an oil-related marine accident, any company operating in Cuba would require immediate
access to US oil services companies for the nearinstant technology and know-how needed to halt and limit damage to the marine environment.
Obviously, the establishment of working relations between the US and Cuba in the area of marine environmental protection would assist enormously in
the contingency planning and cooperation necessary for an early and effective response to an oil spill. ¶ The United States and Cuba are already parties
to a number of multilateral oil pollution agreements, such as the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL)
and the 1983 Convention for the protection and Development of the Marine Environment in the Wider Caribbean Region (Cartagena Convention). Both
agreements address prevention of pollution of the marine environment by ships from operational or accidental causes. The 1990 International
Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation also offers a precedent for cooperation. The convention is designed to encourage
and facilitate international cooperation and mutual assistance in preparing for and responding to major oil pollution incidents. Signatory nations are
tasked with developing and maintaining adequate capabilities to deal with such an emergency. In the case of Cuba and the United States, the
capabilities must be transnational, as there is no barrier to the movement of oil from one country’s waters to another’s. The United States, therefore,
must develop appropriate regulatory and procedural frameworks for the free movement of equipment, personnel and expertise between the two
countries as part of any oil spill response.¶ The 1980 Agreement of Cooperation between the United States and Mexico Regarding Pollution of the
Marine Environment by Discharges of Hydrocarbons and Other Hazardous Substances (MEXUS Plan) provides the foundation for a similar protocol
with Cuba. This would include the establishment of joint response teams, coordinating roles, rapid incident notification mechanisms, joint operations
centers and communication procedures, along with regular exercises and meetings. The United States government, irrespective of the current embargo,
has the power to license the sale, lease or loan of emergency relief and reconstruction equipment and the travel of expert personnel to Cuba following
an oil spill.¶ Cuba’s
long-term energy challenges will be a consequence of its future economic growth and
rising standard of living within a market environment. This anticipated growth will depend largely on the
development of a competitively priced, readily available and environmentally sound long-term energy
plan. Cuban energy policy should embrace energy conservation, modernization of the energy
infrastructure, and balance in sourcing oil/gas supplies and renewable energy sources that protect the
island’s environment. The country would benefit from the guidance of a variety of partners,
including the United States.
The US embargo prevents successful Cuban oil development
Benjamin-Alvadaro 6 (Jonathan, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International
University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the
Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American
Political Science Association, “The Current Status and Future Prospects for Oil Exploration in Cuba: A
Special,” http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissioned-reports/oil-cuba-alvarado.pdf)
But why has Sherritt succeeded when the perception on the part of many American observers has been that Cubans
are difficult and mercurial partners? Sherritt Oil is a medium sized firm with medium sized
aspirations that simultaneously seeks to produce a reasonable return on investment for its ventures in Cuba while operating a
commercial enterprise that is working within a country in dire need of reliable energy sources that operates under the strictures of a
command economy.8¶ This perhaps explains why Sherritt has been successful where others failed. The terms of
“doing business” in Cuba are often too severe for conventional profit-seeking firms, but in this
case, Sherritt appears to have altered its basis for success to coordinate its objectives with those available under the prevailing Cuban
joint venture model. The Spanish oil firm, Repsol spent $53 million in oil and gas exploration in 2004 and came up with nothing and
yet has contracted to continue exploration of 8 offshore tracks on the northwest coast of Cuba.9¶ It is also interesting that all, of the
firms operating in Cuba at the present time are operating with dated technology and must be able to
service all of its own exploration operations. This owes in part to the fact that American oil engineering
represents the leading edge of oil exploration technology and explicit in all of its foreign sales are export
control stipulations that none of that technology can be sold or transferred to a short but well known list of
countries: Iraq; North Korea; until recently Libya; and of course, Cuba. This proscription adds up to 30 percent to the
operating costs that what is still for Sherritt, and other joint venture partners, a profit making venture. Sherritt must also
account for being largely responsible for providing all engineering support services as Cuba provides few
of these services owing to the denial of technology on the part of the U.S. ¶ On this point, the U.S. embargo
has been successful in relegating Cuba’s energy development schemes to a less than world
class status. Moreover, it appears to have had a residual effect – as not to appear to be suffering from a
technology gap, Cuba pursues upstream investment, such as the purchase of three drilling rigs from the
Chinese for symbolic as well as practical reasons.10 Legitimately, given the existing resources on the island and interest from oil
and gas exploration firms from Europe, Latin America and Canada, and especially because of Cuba’s cozy relationship with oil-rich
Venezuela it is perhaps a questionable investment. American oil industry experts suggest that for a small
country like Cuba, it could derive a greater benefit from investment in oil infrastructure such as pipelines,
terminals, batteries, etc. These are the types of services essential to oil production and serve as revenue generating sources long after
the reverie of an oil find. In an inherently risk driven industry it makes better sense for a small relatively resource constrained state
to pursue this course of energy investment.
The plan catalyzes investment that is key to Cuban oil development
Benjamin-Alvadaro 6 (Jonathan, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International
University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the
Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American
Political Science Association, “The Current Status and Future Prospects for Oil Exploration in Cuba: A
Special,” http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissioned-reports/oil-cuba-alvarado.pdf)
Why is it important to clarify the current status of Cuban energy in the face of a continuing opposition by
the United States to anything resembling what can be construed as “good news” for the Castro regime? Obviously, because
up until this point it hasn’t cost the United States much if anything. The current policy continues to
clearly place at the forefront the sanctity and utility of a comprehensive economic and political embargo in the hopes that it helps to
foment a change in regime and a peaceful transition to a democratic system of governance and a complimentary market economy.
As energy security concerns continue to percolate up to an increasingly important status in the realm of
national security objectives we may begin to see the erosion of the hard position against the
Cuban regime regardless of its leadership.¶ The overview of the Cuban energy developments clearly
and unambiguously reveals that the Castro regime has every intention of continuing to promote, design and
implement energy development policies that will benefit Cuba for generations to come. Cuba is sparing no effort by
instituting bottom-up and top-down policy initiatives to meet this challenge. It has significantly increased its
international cooperation in the energy sector and continues to enhance its efforts to ensure energy
security in these most uncertain of times. But it stands to reason that no matter how successful these efforts
are, they will come up short. Two factors may alter this present situation. First, Cuba may indeed realize a
bonanza from the offshore tracts that will allow it to possibly address its many energy challenges, from increasing oil production and
refining capacity, to improving the nation’s energy infrastructure, ensuring a stable energy future. Second, and no less
significant, is the possibility of normalization of trade relations with the United States. This is important not
only because it will allow direct foreign investment, technology transfer and information
sharing between these neighboring states but it possibly enhances the energy security of both states , and hence, the
region, realized through a division of labor and dispersion of resources that serve as a hedge against natural disaster and market
disruptions. Moreover, all states could derive benefit from the public information campaigns to promote energy efficiency and
conservation presently being promoted in Cuba in the face of diminishing energy stocks and uncertain global markets. Ultimately,
and only after normalization, the task still falls to the Cuban government, but the cost will necessarily be spread
through a number of sources that are predominately American because of strategic interests, proximity
and affinity. It suffices to say that the requisite investment and assistance will have a distinct
American tinge to it, inasmuch as American corporations, U.S. government agencies, and international
financial institutions, of which the U.S. is a major contributor, will play important roles in the funding of
the effort to revitalize the Cuban energy sector. Cuban officials are not averse and perhaps would prefer
that the U.S. be its major partner in this effort owing to the fact that most if not all of the cutting-edge
technology in energy, oil and gas comes from the United States. It is remarkable that the Cuban energy
sector is as vibrant as it presently is, absent the type of infrastructural investment that is available to most
developing states, in large part because of the American economic embargo. ¶ Finally, the cost is significant and it
stands to reason that the longer one waits to address the challenge at hand the higher the cost of
modernizing the energy sector. For this reason alone, the American role in assisting Cuba in this effort will
be significant and every day that the task is put off, it increases the long-term cost of the effort. This should
serve as an obvious point of entry into cooperation with the Cuban government and perhaps can
serve as a catalyst for promoting confidence, trust and cooperation in this critical issue
area across the region.
Cuban instability causes Caribbean instability, democratic backsliding, and
refugee flows
Gorrell 5 (Tim, Lieutenant Colonel, “CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED
STRATEGIC CRISIS?” 3/18, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074)
Regardless of the succession, under the current U.S. policy, Cuba’s problems of a post Castro transformation only
worsen. In addition to Cubans on the island, there will be those in exile who will return claiming authority.
And there are remnants of the dissident community within Cuba who will attempt to exercise similar
authority. A power vacuum or absence of order will create the conditions for instability and civil war.
Whether Raul or another successor from within the current government can hold power is debatable. However, that
individual will nonetheless extend the current policies for an indefinite period, which will only compound the Cuban
situation. When Cuba finally collapses anarchy is a strong possibility if the U.S. maintains the “wait and see”
approach. The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast. In the midst of this chaos,
thousands will flee the island. During the Mariel boatlift in 1980 125,000 fled the island.26 Many were criminals; this time the
number could be several hundred thousand fleeing to the U.S., creating a refugee crisis.¶ Equally important,
by adhering to a negative containment policy, the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal
problems. Cuba is along the axis of the drug-trafficking flow into the U.S. from Columbia. The Castro government as a matter of policy does not
support the drug trade. In fact, Cuba’s actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as
indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs – 7.5 tons in 1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.27 While there may be
individuals within the government and outside who engage in drug trafficking and a percentage of drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, the
Cuban government is not the path of least resistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban
restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and
accelerate considerably.¶ In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist
groups to operate in the region increases. If these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to
the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere then the war against this extremism gets more
complicated. Such activity could increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies, threatening the
stability of the fragile democracies that are budding throughout the region. In light of a failed state
in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy military forces to Cuba, creating the conditions for
another insurgency. The ramifications of this action could very well fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout
the Americas. A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems.¶ U.S. domestic political support is also turning against the
current negative policy. The Cuban American population in the U.S. totals 1,241,685 or 3.5% of the population.28 Most of these exiles reside in Florida;
their influence has been a factor in determining the margin of victory in the past two presidential elections. But this election strategy may be flawed,
because recent polls of Cuban Americans reflect a decline for President Bush based on his policy crackdown. There is a clear softening in the CubanAmerican community with regard to sanctions. Younger Cuban Americans do not necessarily subscribe to the hard-line approach. These changes signal
an opportunity for a new approach to U.S.-Cuban relations. (Table 1)¶ The time has come to look realistically at the Cuban issue. Castro will rule until
he dies. The only issue is what happens then? The
U.S. can little afford to be distracted by a failed state 90 miles off its
coast. The administration, given the present state of world affairs, does not have the luxury or the resources to pursue
the traditional American model of crisis management. The President and other government and military leaders have warned
that the GWOT will be long and protracted. These warnings were sounded when the administration did not anticipate operations in
Iraq consuming so many military, diplomatic and economic resources. There is justifiable concern that Africa and the Caucasus
region are potential hot spots for terrorist activity, so these areas should be secure. North Korea will continue to
be an unpredictable crisis in waiting. We also cannot ignore China. What if China resorts to aggression to
resolve the Taiwan situation? Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan? Additionally, Iran could conceivably be the next
target for U.S. pre-emptive action. These are known and potential situations that could easily require all
or many of the elements of national power to resolve. In view of such global issues, can the U.S. afford to sustain
the status quo and simply let the Cuban situation play out? The U.S. is at a crossroads: should the policies of the past 40 years
remain in effect with vigor? Or should the U.S. pursue a new approach to Cuba in an effort to facilitate a manageable transition to post-Castro Cuba?
Caribbean terrorism leads to attack on the US---they’ll use bioweapons
Bryan 1 (Anthony T. Bryan, director of the North-South Center’s Caribbean Program, 10-21-2001. CFR,
Terrorism, Porous Borders, and Homeland Security: The Case for U.S.-Caribbean Cooperation, p.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/4844/terrorism_porous_borders_and%20_homeland_%20security.htm
l)
Terrorist acts can take place anywhere. The Caribbean is no exception. Already the linkages between drug
trafficking and terrorism are clear in countries like Colombia and Peru, and such connections have similar potential in the
Caribbean. The security of major industrial complexes in some Caribbean countries is vital . Petroleum refineries
and major industrial estates in Trinidad, which host more than 100 companies that produce the majority of the world’s methanol,
ammonium sulphate, and 40 percent of U.S. imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG), are vulnerable targets.
Unfortunately, as experience has shown in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, terrorists are likely to strike at U.S.
and European interests in Caribbean countries. Security issues become even more critical when one
considers the possible use of Caribbean countries by terrorists as bases from which to attack the
United States. An airliner hijacked after departure from an airport in the northern Caribbean or the Bahamas can be flying
over South Florida in less than an hour. Terrorists can sabotage or seize control of a cruise ship after the vessel leaves a Caribbean
port. Moreover, terrorists with false passports and visas issued in the Caribbean may be able to move easily through passport
controls in Canada or the United States. (To help counter this possibility, some countries have suspended "economic citizenship"
programs to ensure that known terrorists have not been inadvertently granted such citizenship.) Again, Caribbean countries
are as vulnerable as anywhere else to the clandestine manufacture and deployment of biological
weapons within national borders.
Bioterror leads to extinction
Anders Sandberg 8, is a James Martin Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity
Institute at Oxford University; Jason G. Matheny, PhD candidate in Health Policy and Management at
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health and special consultant to the Center for Biosecurity at
the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center; Milan M. Ćirković, senior research associate at the
Astronomical Observatory of Belgrade and assistant professor of physics at the University of Novi Sad in
Serbia and Montenegro, 9/8/8, “How can we reduce the risk of human extinction?,” Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists,http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/how-can-we-reduce-the-risk-ofhuman-extinction
The risks from anthropogenic hazards appear at present larger than those from natural ones. Although great progress has been made
in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world, humanity is still threatened by the possibility of a global
thermonuclear war and a resulting nuclear winter. We may face even greater risks from emerging
technologies. Advances in synthetic biology might make it possible to engineer
pathogens capable of extinction-level pandemics. The knowledge, equipment, and materials needed to
engineer pathogens are more accessible than those needed to build nuclear weapons. And unlike other weapons, pathogens
are self-replicating, allowing a small arsenal to become exponentially destructive. Pathogens have been
implicated in the extinctions of many wild species. Although most pandemics "fade out" by reducing the density of
susceptible populations, pathogens with wide host ranges in multiple species can reach even isolated individuals. The intentional or
unintentional release of engineered pathogens with high transmissibility, latency, and lethality might be capable
of causing human extinction. While such an event seems unlikely today, the likelihood may increase as biotechnologies
continue to improve at a rate rivaling Moore's Law.
1AC Latin American Democracy Impact
Latin American democracy solves the environment
Callejas 10 (Danny, Professor of Economics at the Universidad de Antioquia, Colombia, “Democracy
and Environmental Quality in Latin America: A Panel System of Equations Approach, 1995-2008,”
November)
Democracy has a positive effect on environmental quality. The theory suggests that democracy sustains
and encourages freedom of speech, freedom of press, political participation and social awareness. These
elements provide a conduit for social demands. As urban population and income grow, citizens
increase their demand for higher environmental standards and quality. The enactment of new policies and
regulations that incentive individuals and firms may lead to a reduction in pollution, environmental
degradation and deforestation; therefore, leading to a higher level of environmental quality.¶ This
study analyzed 19 Latin America countries for the period 1995-2008. A panel data system of equations estimates suggest that a 10% increase in democracy may
reduce CO2 emissions per capita in 0.48% or 0.60% in Latin America. Similarly, a 10% increase in education may reduce emissions in 0.71% or 0.73%. These results suggest that
democracy and education have a positive effect on environmental quality.
Extinction
Takacs 96 (David, Philosophies of Paradise, The Johns Hopkins Univ. Pr., Baltimore)
"Habitat destruction and conversion are eliminating species at such a frightening pace that extinction of many
contemporary species and the systems they live in and support ... may lead to ecological disaster and severe alteration
of the evolutionary process," Terry Erwin writes." And E. 0. Wilson notes: "The question I am asked most frequently about the
diversity of life: if enough species are extinguished, will the ecosystem collapse, and will the extinction of most other species follow
soon afterward? The only answer anyone can give is: possibly. By the time we find out, however, it might be too late. One planet, one
experiment."" So biodiversity keeps the world running. It has value in and for itself, as well as for us. Raven, Erwin, and
Wilson oblige us to think about the value of biodiversity for our own lives. The Ehrlichs' rivet-popper trope makes this same point;
by eliminating rivets, we play Russian roulette with global ecology and human futures: "It is likely that
destruction of the rich complex of species in the Amazon basin could trigger rapid changes in
global climate patterns. Agriculture remains heavily dependent on stable climate, and human beings
remain heavily dependent on food. By the end of the century the extinction of perhaps a million species in the
Amazon basin could have entrained famines in which a billion human beings perished. And if our
species is very unlucky, the famines could lead to a thermonuclear war, which could extinguish
civilization.""
Democratic backsliding in Latin America causes regional proliferation and
nuclear conflict
Schulz 2k (Donald Schulz, Chairman of the Political Science Department at Cleveland State
University, March 2000, The United States and Latin America: Shaping an Elusive Future,
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub31.pdf)
A second major interest is the promotion of democracy. At first glance, this might appear to be a peripheral concern. For
much of its history, the United States was perfectly comfortable with authoritarian regimes in Latin America, so long as they did not
threaten higher priority interests like regional security or U.S. economic holdings. But that is no longer the case. U.S. values have
changed; democracy has been elevated to the status of an "important" interest. In part, this has been because American leaders
have gained a greater appreciation of the role of legitimacy as a source of political stability. Governments
that are popularly elected and respect human rights and the rule of law are less dangerous to both their
citizens and their neighbors. Nations which are substantively democratic tend not to go to war with one
another. They are also less vulnerable to the threat of internal war provoked, in part, by government
violence and illegality.(5) In short, democracy and economic integration are not simply value preferences,
but are increasingly bound up with hemispheric security. To take just one example: The restoration of
democracy in Brazil and Argentina and their increasingly strong and profitable relationship in Mercosur
have contributed in no small degree to their decisions to foresake the development of nuclear weapons.
Perceptions of threat have declined, and perceptions of the benefits of cooperation have grown, and this
has permitted progress on a range of security issues from border disputes, to peacekeeping, environmental protection,
counternarcotics, and the combat of organized crime.¶ CONTINUES¶ Until recently, the primary U.S. concern about Brazil has been
that it might acquire nuclear weapons and delivery systems. In the 1970s, the Brazilian military embarked on a secret program to
develop an atom bomb. By the late 1980s, both Brazil and Argentina were aggressively pursuing nuclear development programs that
had clear military spin-offs.54 There were powerful military and civilian advocates of developing nuclear weapons and ballistic
missiles within both countries. Today, however, the situation has changed. As a result of political leadership transitions
in both countries, Brazil and Argentina now appear firmly committed to restricting their nuclear programs
to peaceful purposes. They have entered into various nuclear-related agreements with each other—most notably the
quadripartite comprehensive safeguards agreement (1991), which permits the inspection of all their nuclear installations by the
International Atomic Energy Agency—and have joined the Missile Technology Control Regime. Even so, no one can be
certain about the future. As Scott Tollefson has observed: • . . the military application of Brazil’s nuclear and
space programs depends less on technological considerations than on political will. While technological
constraints present a formidable barrier to achieving nuclear bombs and ballistic missiles, that barrier is not insurmountable. The
critical element, therefore, in determining the applications of Brazil’s nuclear and space technologies will be primarily political.55
Put simply, if changes in political leadership were instrumental in redirecting Brazil’s nuclear program
towards peaceful purposes, future political upheavals could still produce a reversion to previous
orientations. Civilian supremacy is not so strong that it could not be swept away by a coup, especially if
the legitimacy of the current democratic experiment were to be undermined by economic crisis and growing
poverty/inequality. Nor are civilian leaders necessarily less militaristic or more committed to democracy than the military. The
example of Peru’s Fujimori comes immediately to mind. How serious a threat might Brazil potentially be? It has been estimated that
if the nuclear plant at Angra dos Reis (Angra I) were only producing at 30 percent capacity, it could produce five 20-kiloton weapons
a year. If production from other plants were included, Brazil would have a capability three times greater than India
or Pakistan. Furthermore, its defense industry already has a substantial missile producing capability. On the other hand, the
country has a very limited capacity to project its military power via air and sealift or to sustain its forces over long distances. And
though a 1983 law authorizes significant military manpower increases (which could place Brazil at a numerical level slightly higher
than France, Iran and Pakistan), such growth will be restricted by a lack of economic resources. Indeed, the development of all these
military potentials has been, and will continue to be, severely constrained by a lack of money. (Which is one reason Brazil decided to
engage in arms control with Argentina in the first p1ace.) In short, a restoration of Brazilian militarism, imbued with nationalistic
ambitions for great power status, is not unthinkable, and such a regime could present some fairly serious problems. That
government would probably need foreign as well as domestic enemies to help justify it’s existence. One obvious
candidate would be the United States, which would presumably be critical of any return to dictatorial rule. Beyond this,
moreover, the spectre of a predatory international community, covetous of the riches of the Amazon, could help rally political
support to the regime. For years, some Brazilian military officers have been warning of “foreign intervention.” Indeed, as far back as
1991 General Antenor de Santa Cruz Abreu, then chief of the Military Command of the Amazon, threatened to transform the
region into a “new Vietnam” if developed countries tried to “internationalize” the Amazon . Subsequently, in
1993, U.S.-Guyanese combined military exercises near the Brazilian border provoked an angry response from many high-ranking
Brazilian officers.57 Since then, of course, U.S.-Brazilian relations have improved considerably. Nevertheless, the basic U.S./
international concerns over the Amaazon—the threat to the region’s ecology through burning and deforestation, the presence of
narcotrafficking activities, the Indian question, etc.—have not disappeared, and some may very well intensify in the years ahead. At
the same time, if the growing trend towards subregional economic groupings—in particular, MERCOSUR—continues, it is likely to
increase competition between Southern Cone and NAFTA countries. Economic conflicts, in turn, may be expected to intensify
political differences, and could lead to heightened politico-military rivalry between different blocs or coalitions
in the hemisphere.
Key to stop global prolif
Beamont and Rubinsky 12 (Paul D. Beamont and Thomas Rubinsky, International Law and
Policy Institute, “An Introduction to the Issue of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean,”
December, http://nwp.ilpi.org/?p=1851)
As the world continues to grapple with the issues of non-proliferation and disarmament, the experience of
Latin America and the Caribbean in creating the Tlatelolco regime remains important. One should be careful
not to generalise to much from the experience of one disarmament regime in a region almost unique in its absence of serious armed
conflict[128] Nonetheless, the Tlatelolco experience does provide some lessons that that advocates of nuclear disarmament would be
wise to heed. The Latin American NWFZ demonstrates quite clearly the wisdom in creating a treaty with the long game in mind.¶
The flexible entry-into force-requirements allowed the Treaty to gain vital impetus at its inception while it also kept the more
reluctant countries tied to the treaty’s principles. Together with its flexible amendment procedure, this allowed it to pick up
momentum when favourable changes in geopolitics and domestic conditions permitted it. Using this formula the Treaty of
Tlatelolco created the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in the inhabited world, and has successfully
expanded to include every state in the region. With the successful product of ingenuity, dedication and above all patience,
Latin America’s NWFZ has consolidated the regions reputation for peaceful co-operation.
The Treaty’s permanent secretariat, OPANAL, is active in both building regional consensus and in enhancing the
region’s presence in international organizations. While it remains to be seen how future disarmament efforts
will unfold, Latin American states are well positioned to play a significant role in the continuing efforts
aimed at reaching the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.
New prolif ensures widespread nuclear conflict --- asymmetries
Lyon 9 Program Director, Strategy and International, with Australian Strategic Policy Institute,
previously a Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Queensland, “A delicate issue,
Asia’s nuclear future”, December, online
Deterrence relationships in Asia won’t look like East–West deterrence. They won’t be relationships of mutual
assured destruction (MAD), and there will be many asymmetries among them. Regional nuclearweapon states will articulate a spectrum of strategies ranging from existential deterrence to minimum deterrence to assured
retaliation; and sometimes doctrinal statements will outrun capabilities . The smaller arsenals of Asia and the absence of
severe confrontations will help to keep doctrines at the level of generalised deterrence. Extended nuclear deterrence will continue to be important
to US allies in East Asia, although it is hard to imagine other Asian nuclear weapon states ‘extending’ deterrence to their clients or allies.
Alagappa’s propositions contain a ‘picture’ of what a more proliferated Asia might look like. It could well remain a region where deterrence
dominates, and where arsenals are typically constrained: an Asia, in fact, that falls some way short of a ‘nuclear chaos’ model of unrestrained
proliferation and mushrooming nuclear dangers.¶ An order in flux? Notwithstanding Alagappa’s more reassuring view, we
shouldn’t understate the extent of the looming change from a nuclear relationship based on bipolar symmetry to a
set of relationships based on multiplayer asymmetries. As one observer has noted, when you add to that change the relatively
constrained size of nuclear arsenals in Asia, the likelihood of further nuclear reductions by the US and Russia, and ballistic missile defences of
uncertain effectiveness, the world is about to enter uncharted territory (Ford 2009:125). ¶ Some
factors certainly act as stabilising
influences on the current nuclear order, not least that nuclear weapons (here as elsewhere) typically induce caution, that the regional great
powers tend to get along reasonably well with each other and that the region enters its era of nuclear pre-eminence inheriting a strong set of robust
norms and regimes from the earlier nuclear era. But
other factors imply a period of looming change: geopolitical
dynamism is rearranging strategic relationships; the number of risk-tolerant adversaries seems
to be increasing; most nuclear weapons states are modernising their arsenals; the American arsenal is ageing; and the US’s position of
primacy is increasingly contested in Asia.¶ Indeed, it may be that dynamism which could most seriously undermine the Solingen model of East
Asian nonproliferation. Solingen, after all, has not attempted to produce a general theory about proliferation; she has attempted to explain only
proliferation in the post-NPT age (see Solingen 2007:3), when the P-5 of the UN Security Council already had nuclear weapons. In essence,
though, it’s exactly that broader geopolitical order that might be shifting. It isn’t yet clear how the Asian nuclear order will evolve. It’s one of those
uncertainties that define Australia’s shifting strategic environment. It’s not too hard to imagine an order that’s more competitive than the one we
see now.¶ The ‘managed system of deterrence’¶ The second approach to thinking about the Asian nuclear order is to attempt to superimpose upon
it William Walker’s two key mechanisms of the first nuclear age: the ‘managed system of deterrence’ and the ‘managed system of abstinence’. What
might those ‘systems’ look like in Asia?¶ In Walker’s model, the managed system of deterrence included:¶ the deployment of military hardware
under increasingly sophisticated command and control; the development of strategic doctrines to ensure mutual vulnerability and restraint; and
the establishment of arms control processes through which policy elites engaged in dialogue and negotiated binding agreements. (Walker
2007:436)¶ It
isn’t obvious that those core aspects of the ‘managed’ system are all central features of Asian
nuclear relationships. Perhaps most importantly, it isn’t obvious that the world even has a good model for how deterrence works in
asymmetric relationships. Within the US, there’s been something of a revival of interest in matters nuclear as strategic analysts attempt to
reconceptualise how nuclear relationships might work in the future. Recent work on the problems of exercising deterrence across asymmetrical
strategic contests, for example, suggests a number of problems: ‘In
asymmetric conflict situations, deterrence may not
only be unable to prevent violence but may also help foment it’ (Adler 2009:103).¶ Some of the
problems arise precisely because weaker players seem increasingly likely to ‘test’ stronger players’
threats—as part of a pattern of conflict that has emerged over recent centuries, in which weaker
players have often prevailed against stronger opponents.3 If we were to look at the case study of the India–Pakistan
nuclear relationship—which is grounded in an enduring strategic rivalry, and therefore not ‘typical’ of the broader nuclear relationships in Asia—
it’s a moot point whether Pakistani behaviour has been much altered by the ‘deterrence’ policies of India. ¶ Indeed, the case seems to show that
Pakistan doesn’t even accept a long-term condition of strategic asymmetry with India, and that it intends to use its nuclear weapons as an
‘equaliser’ against India’s larger conventional forces by building a nuclear arsenal larger than the Indian arsenal arrayed against it. That would
imply, more broadly, that increasing
strategic rivalries across Asia could be accompanied by efforts to
minimise asymmetrical disadvantages between a much wider range of players. In short, in a more
competitive Asian strategic environment, nuclear asymmetries that are tolerable now
might well become less tolerable.¶ Furthermore, we need to think about how we might ‘codify’ deterrence in Asia. In the
Cold War days, the MAD doctrine tended to be reflected in arms control accords that limited wasteful spending and corralled the
competition. As Walker acknowledges, the agreements were important ‘stabilisers’ of the broader nuclear relationship,
but to what extent can they be replicated in conditions of asymmetry? It might be possible to codify crisis management procedures, but designing
(and verifying) limitations on weapons numbers would seem to be much more difficult when the arsenals
are of uneven size, and when the weaker party (perhaps both parties) would probably be relying on
secrecy about the numbers and locations of weapons to minimise the vulnerability of their arsenals.
Nuclear war
Cimbala 10 - Prof. of Political Science @ Penn State, (Stephen, Nuclear Weapons and Cooperative Security in the 21st Century, p. 117-8)
A five-sided nuclear competition in the Pacific would be linked, in geopolitical deterrence and
proliferation space, to the existing nuclear deterrents in India and Pakistan, and to the emerging nuclear
weapons status of Iran. An arc of nuclear instability from Tehran to Tokyo could place U.S. proliferation
strategies into the ash heap of history and call for more drastic military options, not excluding preemptive war, defenses,
and counter-deterrent special operations. In addition, an eight-sided nuclear arms race in Asia would increase the likelihood of
accidental or inadvertent nuclear war. It would do so because: (1) some of these states already have histories
of protracted conflict; (2) states may have politically unreliable or immature command and
control systems, especially during a crisis involving a decision for nuclear first strike or retaliation; unreliable or immature
systems might permit a technical malfunction that caused an unintended launch, or a deliberate but
unauthorized launch by rogue commanders; (3) faulty intelligence and warning systems might cause
one side to misinterpret the other’s defensive moves to forestall attack as offensive preparations for
attack, thus triggering a mistaken preemption.
Obama Cred Advantage
1AC Obama Cred Adv
Engagement with Cuba revitalizes Obama’s diplomatic power
Dickerson 10 – Lieutenant Colonel Sergio M. Dickerson, 2010, "United States Security Strategy
Towards Cuba," Strategy Research Project, www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA518053
Conclusion¶ Today, 20 years have passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall – it’s time to chip away at the diplomatic
wall that still remains between U.S. and Cuba. As we seek a new foreign policy with Cuba it is imperative
that we take into consideration that distrust will characterize negotiations with the Cuban government . On
the other hand, consider that loosening or lifting the embargo could also be mutually beneficial.
Cuba’s need and America’s surplus capability to provide goods and services could be profitable and
eventually addictive to Cuba. Under these conditions, diplomacy has a better chance to flourish.¶ If
the Cuban model succeeds President Obama will be seen as a true leader for multilateralism.
Success in Cuba could afford the international momentum and credibility to solve other
seemingly “wicked problems” like the Middle East and Kashmir. President Obama could
leverage this international reputation with other rogue nations like Iran and North Korea
who might associate their plight with Cuba. 35 The U.S. could begin to lead again and
reverse its perceived decline in the greater global order bringing true peace for years to
come.
Concessions to Cuba are uniquely key to Obama’s credibility
French 10 (Anya, Director for the U.S.-Cuba Policy Initiative at the New America Foundation, “Stiffing
Havana,” http://cuba.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2010/stiffing_havana_38758)
In the high-stakes world of international diplomacy, bluffing is a seldom-seen practice -- the stakes are simply too
high to risk getting called out. But, that's precisely what seems to have happened with the Obama
administration's stated policy of détente toward Cuba. Havana is making concessions, but Washington seems
incapable of responding in kind. The United States may be fumbling away its best chance at influencing
Cuba in the way that it has claimed to have wanted for decades.¶ It was nearly one year ago that President Barack Obama delivered
a message to President Raúl Castro via Spain's prime minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero: "We understand that change can't
happen overnight, but down the road, when we look back at this time, it should be clear that now is when those changes began,"
Obama said. "We're taking steps, but if they don't take steps too, it's going to be very hard for us to continue." If Cuba proved
willing to improve relations with the United States, Obama seemed willing to reciprocate. ¶ Obama's
conciliatory message may have been on Castro's mind as the Cuban government began making
improvements to its much maligned human rights record this summer. More than 40 Cuban political prisoners have been
released from jail in recent months. Dozens more might soon follow as part of the government's unprecedented human rights
dialogue with the Cuban Catholic Church; it's the first such dialogue of its kind for the church, an institution that previously had
been treated with suspicion, if not hostility, by the Cuban government. The political changes have been paired with
sweeping labor and economic reforms that have, however belatedly, begun to liberalize the moribund economy: 10 percent
of Cuba's workforce will shift into the private sector by next year.¶ The ball, clearly, is now in the United States' court. But
so far, the Obama administration has failed to respond to the very concessions Washington has long
demanded, and very recently promised to reward. Rather than greet the changes, Obama has replied with mild
skepticism. "I think that any release of political prisoners, any economic liberalization that takes place in Cuba is positive, positive
for Cuban people, but we've not yet seen the full results of these promises," Obama told Hispanic media at the White House
Tuesday.¶ Washington and Havana remain locked in their 50-year dispute. The U.S. trade and travel embargoes
have only gotten tighter over the decades; under President George W. Bush, tensions threatened to reach a tipping point. Obama has
called the inherited status quo a failure, but most of the Bush policies remain in place today. (Some in Washington argue that Obama
has already made significant gestures to Havana by easing restrictions on Cuban-American families' travel and remittances to the
island last year. But that change was more a gesture to Cuban-Americans in Miami -- where he campaigned on a promise to ease
Bush's harsher restrictions on Cuban immigrant families -- than it was any significant political concession to Havana.)¶ The
Obama administration should instead be honoring the changes in Cuba by taking considerable steps of its own: A
bold response by Washington will put the spotlight back on Havana to continue with its reforms. Obama's
choice isn't between the status quo and a wholesale abandonment of the embargoes: There are many ways to craft a foreign
policy that could help spur the economic growth needed to support the half-million new workers in Cuba's fledging private
sector. Only Congress can lift the Cuban travel ban entirely, but the president possesses broad authority to allow some Americans to
travel freely to the island. Cultural and academic trips to Cuba by Americans are currently permitted under U.S. law, at the
discretion of the federal government; the Obama administration could easily broaden the definition of such "people-to-people" trips.
That policy would trace its roots to the successful citizen diplomacy with the Soviet Union that President Ronald Reagan
championed during the Cold War. President Bill Clinton successfully enacted such a policy toward Cuba during his time in office, but
it was rolled back by Bush.¶ But what if Obama chooses to do nothing or dithers so long that this historic opportunity to
influence Cuban reforms passes? If the president fails to move now, after Cuba has apparently acted in good faith to the offer
of an outstretched hand, his administration will lose credibility --not just in Havana, but among global allies
that will see the president's reversal as a sign of weakness, incoherence, and even dishonesty.¶ No
one can say for sure, of course, where Cuba's reforms will lead. But it's clear -- even to Fidel Castro in his most unguarded moments - that the old model just doesn't work anymore. Raúl Castro's reforms, deeper and broader than the limited Cuban reforms of the
1990s, signal that Havana is in search of a new system. It may or may not be the model America would choose, but if
Washington wants to have any influence at this pivotal moment, the time to engage Cuba is now.
Obama’s strength is uniquely key to solve conflict
Ben Coes 11, a former speechwriter in the George H.W. Bush administration, managed Mitt Romney’s
successful campaign for Massachusetts Governor in 2002 & author, “The disease of a weak president”,
The Daily Caller, http://dailycaller.com/2011/09/30/the-disease-of-a-weak-president/
The disease of a weak president usually begins with the Achilles’ heel all politicians are born with — the desire to be popular. It leads to pandering to different
audiences, people and countries and creates a sloppy, incoherent set of policies. Ironically, it ultimately results in that very politician losing the
trust and respect of friends and foes alike.¶ In the case of Israel, those of us who are strong supporters can at least take comfort in the
knowledge that Tel Aviv will do whatever is necessary to protect itself from potential threats from its unfriendly neighbors. While it would be preferable for the Israelis to
be able to count on the United States, in both word and deed, the fact is right now they stand alone. Obama and his foreign policy team have undercut the Israelis in a
Obama’s weakness
could — in other places — have implications far, far worse than anything that might ultimately
occur in Israel. The triangular plot of land that connects Pakistan, India and China is held together
with much more fragility and is built upon a truly foreboding foundation of religious hatreds,
radicalism, resource envy and nuclear weapons.¶ If you can only worry about preventing one foreign
policy disaster, worry about this one.¶ Here are a few unsettling facts to think about:¶ First, Pakistan and India have fought
multitude of ways. Despite this, I wouldn’t bet against the soldiers of Shin Bet, Shayetet 13 and the Israeli Defense Forces.¶ But
three wars since the British de-colonized and left the region in 1947. All three wars occurred before the two countries had nuclear weapons. Both countries now
possess hundreds of nuclear weapons, enough to wipe each other off the map many times over. ¶ Second,
Pakistan is 97% Muslim. It is a question of when — not if — Pakistan elects a radical Islamist in the
mold of Ayatollah Khomeini as its president. Make no mistake, it will happen, and when it does the world will have a far
greater concern than Ali Khamenei or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and a single nuclear device.¶ Third, China sits at the
northern border of both India and Pakistan . China is strategically aligned with Pakistan. Most
concerning, China covets India’s natural resources. Over the years, it has slowly inched its way into the
northern tier of India-controlled Kashmir Territory, appropriating land and resources and drawing
little notice from the outside world.¶ In my book, Coup D’Etat, I consider this tinderbox of colliding forces in Pakistan, India and China as a thriller
writer. But thriller writers have the luxury of solving problems by imagining solutions on the page. In my book, when Pakistan elects a
radical Islamist who then starts a war with India and introduces nuclear weapons to the theater,
America steps in and removes the Pakistani leader through a coup d’état.¶ I wish it was that
simple.¶ The more complicated and difficult truth is that we, as Americans, must take sides. We must be willing to be unpopular in certain places. Most important,
we must be ready and willing to threaten our military might on behalf of our allies. And
our allies are Israel and India.¶ There are many threats out there — Islamic radicalism,
Chinese technology espionage, global debt and half a dozen other things that smarter people
than me are no doubt worrying about. But the single greatest threat to America is none of these. The single greatest
threat facing America and our allies is a weak U.S. president. It doesn’t have to be this way. President Obama
could — if he chose — develop a backbone and lead. Alternatively, America could elect a new president. It has to be one or the
other. The status quo is simply not an option.
Engagement is inevitable the only question is effectiveness—strong Obama
foreign policy stops Syrian instability, Iran nuclearization, South China
Seas conflict, and Russian resurgence
Ghitis 13 (Frida, world affairs columnist for The Miami Herald and World Politics Review. A former
CNN producer and correspondent, she is the author of The End of Revolution: A Changing World in the
Age of Live Television. “World to Obama: You can't ignore us,” 1/22,
http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/22/opinion/ghitis-obama-world)
President Obama made it very clear: The second term is all about the domestic agenda. If only the world
would cooperate.¶ Obama outlined his goals for the next four years, sketching above all a progressive vision of a country with
less inequality and more justice. And, judging by his inaugural speech, he plans to put his shoulder to the wheel. After all, much of
the first term was consumed with averting a national economic catastrophe. Now he can get on with building a legacy, reviving that
hope and change he promised back during the 2008 campaign.¶ But the most subtly striking part of Obama's inauguration speech
was how it largely ignored the rest of the globe. In his 20-minute address, he dedicated perhaps one minute to foreign
policy.¶ America, he said, will "try and resolve our differences with other nations peacefully." He vowed the country "will remain the
anchor of strong alliances" and it will support democracy. He also declared the United States "must be a source of hope for the poor,
the sick, the marginalized, the victims of prejudice..." and stand for "human dignity and justice." ¶ Beyond that, he did not spare
a single word for tens of thousands killed by dictators, as they have been in Syria; nothing about the struggle for liberal
democratic rights in places like Egypt, which sets the tone for the Middle East. Nothing about repression and thwarting of
freedom of expression, the rollback of democratic rights, or the push to destroy existing democracies, statements that could have
come as welcome words of encouragement for people who share American values of freedom and justice in places like Egypt,
China, Iran, Russia or Mali.¶ The president should keep in mind that millions around the world yearn to know
they have the backing of the most powerful country on Earth. As he surely knows, even his words make a big
difference.¶ And while Obama plans to dedicate his efforts to the domestic agenda, a number of brewing international
crises are sure to steal his attention and demand his time. Here are a few of the foreign policy issues that,
like it or not, may force Obama to divert his focus from domestic concerns in this new term.¶ Syria unraveling: The
United Nations says more than 60,000 people have already died in a civil war that the West has, to its shame, done little to
keep from spinning out of control. Washingtonhas warned that the use of chemical or biological weapons might force its hand. But
the regime may have already used them. The West has failed to nurture a moderate force in the conflict. Now Islamist
extremists are growing more powerful within the opposition. The chances are growing that worst-case
scenarios will materialize. Washington will not be able to endlessly ignore this dangerous war.¶ Egypt and
the challenge of democracy: What happens in Egypt strongly influences the rest of the Middle East -- and hence world peace -- which
makes it all the more troubling to see liberal democratic forces lose battle after battle for political influence against Islamist parties,
and to hear blatantly anti-Semitic speech coming from the mouth of Mohammed Morsy barely two years before he became
president.¶ Iran's nuclear program: Obama took office promising a new, more conciliatory effort to persuade Iran to drop its
nuclear enrichment program. Four years later, he has succeeded in implementing international sanctions, but Iran has
continued enriching uranium, leading United Nations inspectors to find "credible evidence" that Tehran is working on
nuclear weapons. Sooner or later the moment of truth will arrive. If a deal is not reached, Obama will have to decide if
he wants to be the president on whose watch a nuclear weapons race was unleashed in the most
dangerous and unstable part of the world.¶ North Africa terrorism: A much-neglected region of the world is becoming
increasingly difficult to disregard. In recent days, Islamist extremists took American and other hostages in Algeria and France sent
its military to fight advancing Islamist extremists in Mali, a country that once represented optimism for democratic rule in Africa,
now overtaken by militants who are potentially turning it into a staging ground for international terrorism.¶ Russia repression:
As Russian President Vladimir Putin succeeds in crushing opposition to his increasingly authoritarianrule, he and his
allies are making anti-American words and policies their favorite theme. A recent ban on adoption of Russian
orphans by American parents is only the most vile example. But Washington needs Russian cooperation to achieve its goals at the
U.N. regarding Iran, Syria and other matters. It is a complicated problem with which Obama will have to wrestle.¶
Then there are the long-standing challenges that could take a turn for the worse, such as the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Obama may not want to wade into that morass again, but events may force his
hand.¶ And there are the so-called "black swans," events of low probability and high impact. There is talk that China and
Japan could go to war over a cluster of disputed islands.¶ A war between two of the world's largest economies could
prove devastating to the global economy, just as a sudden and dramatic reversal in the fragile Eurozone economy could spell
disaster. Japan's is only the hottest of many territorial disputes between China and its Asian neighbors. Then
there's North Korea with its nuclear weapons.¶ We could see regions that have garnered little attention come back to the forefront,
such as Latin America, where conflict could arise in a post-Hugo Chavez Venezuela.¶ The president -- and the country -- could also
benefit from unexpectedly positive outcomes. Imagine a happy turn of events in Iran, a breakthrough between Israelis and
Palestinians, the return of prosperity in Europe, a successful push by liberal democratic forces in the Arab uprising countries, which
could create new opportunities, lowering risks around the world, easing trade, restoring confidence and improving the chances for
the very agenda Obama described in his inaugural speech.¶ The aspirations he expressed for America are the ones he should express
for our tumultuous planet. Perhaps in his next big speech, the State of the Union, he can remember America's leadership
position and devote more attention to those around the world who see it as a source of inspiration and
encouragement.¶ After all, in this second term Obama will not be able to devote as small a portion of his attention
to foreign policy as he did during his inaugural speech.¶ International disengagement is not an option. As
others before Obama have discovered, history has a habit of toying with the best laid, most well-intentioned plans
of American presidents.
South China Sea conflicts cause extinction
Wittner 11 (Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York/Albany, Wittner is the
author of eight books, the editor or co-editor of another four, and the author of over 250 published articles and book reviews. From
1984 to 1987, he edited Peace & Change, a journal of peace research., 11/28/2011, "Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?",
www.huntingtonnews.net/14446)
While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used . After all, for centuries national
conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration
of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this
phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by
China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the
South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other
nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific
power.” But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all,
both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S.
government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during
the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu . In the midst of the latter confrontation,
President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or
anything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate.
But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should
convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some
pundits argue that nuclear weapons
prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil
War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur.
Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war
escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while
India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don’t
nuclear weapons deter a
nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s
strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a
Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really
believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars ” and its
modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems
needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might ? Of course, the bottom line
for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might
be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S.
government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover,
only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But
what would that “victory” entail? A
nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million
Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese
death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering,
radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would
blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture,
creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.
Russia expansionism causes nuclear war
Blank 9 (Dr. Stephen, Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S.
Army War College, March, “Russia And Arms Control: Are There Opportunities For The Obama Administration?,”
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub908.pdf)
Proliferators or nuclear states like China and Russia can then deter regional or intercontinental attacks either by denial or by threat of
retaliation.168 Given a multipolar world structure with
little ideological rivalry among major powers, it is
unlikely that they will go to war with each other. Rather, like Russia, they will strive for
exclusive hegemony in their own “sphere of influence” and use nuclear instruments
towards that end. However, wars may well break out between major powers and weaker “peripheral” states or between
peripheral and semiperipheral states given their lack of domestic legitimacy, the absence of the means of crisis prevention, the visible absence of
crisis management mechanisms, and their strategic calculation that asymmetric wars might give them the victory or respite they need.169
Simultaneously,¶ The states of periphery and semiperiphery have far more opportunities for political maneuvering. Since war remains a political
option, these states may find it convenient to exercise their military power as a means for achieving political objectives. Thus international
crises may increase in number. This has two important implications for the use of WMD. First,
they may be used deliberately to offer a decisive victory (or in Russia’s case, to achieve
“intra-war escalation control”—author170) to the striker, or for defensive purposes when imbalances in military capabilities are
significant; and second, crises increase the possibilities of inadvertent or accidental wars
involving WMD.171¶ Obviously nuclear proliferators or states that are expanding their nuclear arsenals
like Russia can exercise a great influence upon world politics if they chose to defy the
prevailing consensus and use their weapons not as defensive weapons, as has been
commonly thought, but as offensive weapons to threaten other states and deter nuclear
powers. Their decision to go either for cooperative security and strengthened international military-political norms of action, or
for individual national “egotism” will critically affect world politics. For, as Roberts observes, ¶ But if they drift away from those efforts [to bring
about more cooperative security], the consequences could be profound. At the very least, the effective functioning of
inherited mechanisms of world order, such as the special responsibility of the “great powers” in the management of the interstate system,
especially problems of armed aggression, under the aegis of collective security, could be significantly impaired. Armed with
the ability to defeat an intervention, or impose substantial costs in blood or money on an intervening force or the populaces of the nations
marshaling that force, the
newly empowered tier could bring an end to collective security
operations, undermine the credibility of alliance commitments by the great powers ,
[undermine guarantees of extended deterrence by them to threatened nations and states] extend alliances of their own, and perhaps make
wars of aggression on their neighbors or their own people.172
Iran prolif causes nuclear war
Jeffrey Goldberg 12, Bloomberg View columnist and a national correspondent for the Atlantic,
January 23, 2012, “How Iran Could Trigger Accidental Armageddon,” online:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-24/how-iran-may-trigger-accidental-armageddoncommentary-by-jeffrey-goldberg.html
The experts who study this depressing issue seem to agree that a Middle East in which Iran has four or five nuclear
weapons would be dangerously unstable and prone to warp-speed escalation .¶ Here’s one possible scenario
for the not-so-distant future: Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanese proxy, launches a cross-border attack into Israel, or kills a sizable number of Israeli
civilians with conventional rockets. Israel responds by invading southern Lebanon, and promises, as it has in the past, to destroy Hezbollah. Iran,
coming to the defense of its proxy, warns Israel to cease hostilities, and leaves open the question of what it will do if Israel refuses to heed its
demand.¶ Dennis Ross, who until recently served as President Barack Obama’s Iran point man on the National Security Council, notes Hezbollah’s
political importance to Tehran. “The only place to which the Iranian government successfully exported the revolution is to Hezbollah in Lebanon,”
Ross told me. “If it looks as if the Israelis are going to destroy Hezbollah, you can see Iran threatening Israel, and they begin to change the
readiness of their forces. This could set in motion a chain of events that would be like ‘Guns of August’ on steroids.”¶ Imagine that Israel detects a
mobilization of Iran’s rocket force or the sudden movement of mobile missile launchers. Does Israel assume the Iranians are bluffing, or that they
are not? And would Israel have time to figure this out? Or imagine the opposite: Might Iran, which will have no second-strike capability for many
years -- that is, no reserve of nuclear weapons to respond with in an exchange -- feel compelled to attack Israel first, knowing that it has no second
chance?¶ Bruce Blair, the co-founder of the nuclear disarmament group Global Zero and an
expert on nuclear strategy, told me
a sudden crisis Iran and Israel might each abandon traditional peacetime safeguards, making an
accidental exchange more likely.¶ “A confrontation that brings the two nuclear-armed states to a boiling point would likely
lead them to raise the launch- readiness of their forces -- mating warheads to delivery vehicles and preparing to fire on
short notice,” he said. “Missiles put on hair-trigger alert also obviously increase the danger of their launch and release on
false warning of attack -- false indications that the other side has initiated an attack.Ӧ Then comes the problem of
misinterpreted data, Blair said. “Intelligence failures in the midst of a nuclear crisis could readily lead to a false impression that the other
side has decided to attack, and induce the other side to launch a preemptive strike.” ¶ ‘Cognitive Bias’¶ Blair notes that in a crisis it isn’t
irrational to expect an attack, and this expectation makes it more likely that a leader will read the worst into
incomplete intelligence. “This predisposition is a cognitive bias that increases the danger that one side will jump the
gun on the basis of incorrect information,” he said.¶ Ross told me that Iran’s relative proximity to Israel and the total absence
of ties between the two countries -- the thought of Iran agreeing to maintain a hot line with a country whose existence it doesn’t recognize is farfetched -- make the situation even more hazardous. “This is not the Cold War,” he said. “In this situation we don’t have
any communications channels. Iran and Israel have zero communications. And even in the Cold War we nearly had a nuclear war. We
were much closer than we realized.Ӧ The answer to this predicament is to deny Iran nuclear weapons, but not through an
attack on its nuclear facilities, at least not now. “The liabilities of preemptive attack on Iran’s nuclear program vastly outweigh the benefits,”
that in
Blair said. “But certainly Iran’s program must be stopped before it reaches fruition with a nuclear weapons delivery capability.”
Indo-Pak war escalates quickly to extinction---no checks
Greg Chaffin 11, Research Assistant at Foreign Policy in Focus, July 8, 2011, “Reorienting U.S. Security
Strategy in South Asia,” online:
http://www.fpif.org/articles/reorienting_us_security_strategy_in_south_asia
The greatest threat to regional security (although curiously not at the top of most lists of U.S. regional concerns) is the
possibility that increased India-Pakistan tension will erupt into all-out war that could quickly escalate into a
nuclear exchange. Indeed, in just the past two decades, the two neighbors have come perilously close to war on several
occasions. India and Pakistan remain the most likely belligerents in the world to engage in nuclear war. ¶ Due to
an Indian preponderance of conventional forces, Pakistan would have a strong incentive to use its nuclear
arsenal very early on before a routing of its military installations and weaker conventional forces. In the event of conflict,
Pakistan’s only chance of survival would be the early use of its nuclear arsenal to inflict unacceptable damage to Indian military and
(much more likely) civilian targets. By raising the stakes to unacceptable levels, Pakistan would hope that India would step away
from the brink. However, it is equally likely that India would respond in kind, with escalation ensuing. Neither state
possesses tactical nuclear weapons, but both possess scores of city-sized bombs like those used on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. ¶ Furthermore, as more damage was inflicted (or as the result of a decapitating strike), command and control
elements would be disabled, leaving individual commanders to respond in an environment increasingly
clouded by the fog of war and decreasing the likelihood that either government (what would be left of them)
would be able to guarantee that their forces would follow a negotiated settlement or phased reduction in hostilities.
As a result any such conflict would likely continue to escalate until one side incurred an unacceptable or wholly
debilitating level of injury or exhausted its nuclear arsenal. ¶ A nuclear conflict in the subcontinent would have
disastrous effects on the world as a whole. In a January 2010 paper published in Scientific American, climatology
professors Alan Robock and Owen Brian Toon forecast the global repercussions of a regional nuclear war. Their
results are strikingly similar to those of studies conducted in 1980 that conclude that a nuclear war between the
United States and the Soviet Union would result in a catastrophic and prolonged nuclear winter, which could
very well place the survival of the human race in jeopardy . In their study, Robock and Toon use computer
models to simulate the effect of a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan in which each were to use roughly half their existing
arsenals (50 apiece). Since Indian and Pakistani nuclear devices are strategic rather than tactical, the likely targets would be
major population centers. Owing to the population densities of urban centers in both nations, the number of direct casualties
could climb as high as 20 million. ¶ The fallout of such an exchange would not merely be limited to the immediate area. First, the
detonation of a large number of nuclear devices would propel as much as seven million metric tons of ash, soot,
smoke, and debris as high as the lower stratosphere. Owing to their small size (less than a tenth of a micron) and a lack
of precipitation at this altitude, ash particles would remain aloft for as long as a decade, during which time the world
would remain perpetually overcast. Furthermore, these particles would soak up heat from the sun, generating intense
heat in the upper atmosphere that would severely damage the earth’s ozone layer. The inability of sunlight to
penetrate through the smoke and dust would lead to global cooling by as much as 2.3 degrees Fahrenheit. This shift in
global temperature would lead to more drought, worldwide food shortages, and widespread political upheaval.¶
Although the likelihood of this doomsday scenario remains relatively low, the consequences are dire enough to warrant greater U.S.
and international attention. Furthermore, due to the ongoing conflict over Kashmir and the deep animus held between
India and Pakistan, it might not take much to set them off . Indeed, following the successful U.S. raid on bin
Laden’s compound, several members of India’s security apparatus along with conservative politicians have argued that India should
emulate the SEAL Team Six raid and launch their own cross-border incursions to nab or kill anti-Indian terrorists, either
preemptively or after the fact. Such provocative action could very well lead to all-out war between the two that could quickly
escalate.
Plan/Solvency
1AC Plan
The United States federal government should permit companies to provide
services for the development of Cuban offshore oil
1AC Solvency
CONTENTION __: SOLVENCY
Licensing American companies to develop Cuban offshore resources leads
to effective drilling and increased influence in the region
Pascual and Huddleston 9 Carlos, Vice president and Director of Foreign policy, the Brookings
Institution and Vicki, Visiting Fellow, “CUBA: A New policy of Critical and Constructive Engagement”,
April, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413_cuba.pdf
Licensing U.S. companies to provide services for the development of Cuban offshore oil and gas would
provide benefits to the United States and Cuba. (At this point it should be noted that the Secretary of Treasury has
always had and contin - ues to have the authority—as embodied in OFAC regulations—to license any
transaction found to be in the U.S. national interest. This power has been used over the past
fifteen years by various r epublican and Democratic administrations to license a variety of commercial transactions
between the United States and Cuba). The following are some of the reasons we might wish to become engaged in developing Cuba’s
offshore oil and gas. First, if U.S. and other reputable companies are involved in Cuba’s offshore oil
development it would reduce Cuba’s dependence on Venezuela for two-thirds of its oil imports.
Second, it is preferable that U.S. oil companies with high standards of transparency develop these
resources rather than, for example, Russia’s notoriously corrupt oligarchy. Third, U.S. influence in
Cuba is likely to increase if U.S. companies have an economic relationship on the ground. Fourth, U.S.
companies have the technology and expertise to develop Cuba’s offshore oil and gas.
The plan allows for effective US-Cuban oil cooperation
Benjamin 10 – Jonathan Benjamin-Alvadaro, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida
International University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director
of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the
American Political Science Association, 2010, Brookings Institution book, “Cuba’s Energy Future:
Strategic Approaches to Cooperation”
Conclusion and Recommendations
Undoubtedly, after fifty years of enmity, there is a significant lack of trust and confidence between the United States
and Cuba. This is plain from the almost quaint maintenance of a sanctions regime that seeks to isolate Cuba economically and politically but hardly
reflects the dramatic changes that have occurred on the island since 1991, not to mention since 2008,when Fidel Castro officially stepped aside as
Cuba’s president. Now, the opportunity to advance relations in the energy arena appears to be ripe.
Since 2004, representatives from American companies, trade organizations, universities, and think tanks have had the opportunity to meet with Cuban
energy officials. The scope and objectives of Cuban energy development schemes have been disseminated, dissected, and discussed across a number of
settings where the interested parties are now familiar with and well versed in the agendas and opportunities that exist in this arena. In public
discussions, Cuban
energy authorities have made it clear that their preferred energy
development scenario includes working closely with the U.S. oil and gas industry and using
state-of-the- art U.S. oil technologies. The assessment from U.S. energy experts on the technical
acumen and capability of Cuban energy officials has been overwhelmingly positive.9 Should
the U.S. government and the Obama administration see fit to shift its policy so as to allow broader participation of American academics
and practitioners in the energy field to attend conferences and meet with Cuban energy officials, it may pave the way to establishing
much-needed familiarity and confidence across these communities.¶ The United States and
Cuba will have a unique opportunity to employ a highly educated and competent cadre of Cuban engineers and technicians to
work in critical areas of the energy sector. This will deploy an underused segment of the Cuban workforce,
and allow U.S. oil, construction, and engineering firms to subcontract work to an emerging class of Cuban firms specializing in
these areas. The Cubans have accumulated experience and training from past energy
cooperation projects and exchanges in Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela, and other countries in the
region. Anecdotal evidence suggests that these contacts and exchanges have been wildly successful because of the Cubans’ high level of competence
and strong work ethic. The Cubans have gained invaluable knowledge and experience through the operation and
construction of energy facilities in collaboration with their joint-venture partners on the island.¶ The United
States possesses few options when it comes to balancing the various risks to U.S. energy security and satisfying energy demand, because U.S. energy
independence is not attainable, the policy tools available to deal with energy supply disruptions are increasingly inadequate, and the United States
needs to articulate a new vision of how best to manage international energy interdependence. In particular, even if the United States were to choose to
exploit all of its domestic energy resources, it would remain dependent on oil imports to meet its existing and future demand. The critical need to
improve the integrity of the U.S. energy supply requires a much broader, more flexible view on the quest for resources—a view that does not shun a
source from a potential strategic partner for purely political reasons. U.S. decisionmakers must look dispassionately at potential energy partners in
terms of the role they might play in meeting political, economic, and geostrategic objectives of U.S. energy security.
The Obama administration
has signaled
that it wants to reinvigorate inter-American cooperation and integration; a
movement toward energy cooperation and development with Cuba is consistent with, and may be central to,
that objective. ¶ The energy-security environment for the United States is at a critical juncture. The productive capacity of two of the United
States’ largest oil suppliers, Mexico and Venezuela, has declined, and the supporting energy infrastructure in both countries is in need of significant
revitalization. The vagaries of the politics in the region, the variability of weather patterns, and the overall dismal state of the global economy create a
setting of instability and uncertainty that requires close attention to the national security interests of the United States vis-à-vis energy. Cuba’s energy
infrastructure, too, is in need of significant repair and modernization (its many energy projects notwithstanding); the price tag is estimated to be in the
billions of dollars. Delaying work on many of these projects increases costs, because deterioration of the infrastructure continues and eventually pushes
up the cost of renovation and replacement. It also stands to reason that the lion’s share of the financial burden of upgrading Cuba’s energy
infrastructure will fall to the United States, directly and indirectly. Changes
in U.S. policy to allow investment and
assistance in Cuba’s energy sector are a precondition for international entities to make
significant investments, yet this change implies a large American footprint. Trade and investment in the energy sector
in Cuba have been severely constrained by the conditions of the embargo placed on the Cuban regime. These
constraints also affect foreign firms seeking to do business in Cuba because of the threat of penalties if any of these
firms use technology containing more than 10 percent of proscribed U.S. technologies needed for oil and
gas exploration and production. American private investment and U.S. government assistance will
constitute a large portion of the needed investment capital to undertake this colossal effort. The longer that
work is delayed, the higher the cost to all the investors, which will then potentially cut into
the returns from such undertakings.¶ U.S. cooperation with Cuba in energy just may create an opportunity for the United
States to improve its relations with Venezuela, if it can demonstrate that it can serve as a partner (or at a minimum, a supporter) of the Petrocaribe
The United States could provide much-needed additional investment capital in the development of
Cuba that simultaneously addresses Petrocaribe objectives,
diversifies regional refining capacity, and adds storage and transit capabilities while enhancing regional
cooperation and integration modalities. This does not mean that the United States has to
dismantle the nearly fifty-year-old embargo against Cuba, but the United States will have to
make special provisions that create commercial and trade openings for energy development that serve its broad geostrategic and
energy consortium.
upstream, downstream, and logistical resources in
national security goals, as it has in the case of food and medicine sales to Cuba. ¶ This discussion is intended to help distill understanding of U.S.
strategic energy policy under a set of shifting political and economic environmental conditions in Cuba and its implications for U.S. foreign policy for
the near and long term. Because the policies can be considered works-in-progress, an
understanding of possible outcomes is
important to those crafting future policy and making changes in the policymaking milieu.
Cuba wants US investment—officials and empirics
Stephens et al 11 (Sarah, Executive Director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas, “As Cuba
plans to drill in the Gulf of Mexico, U.S. policy poses needless risks to our national interest,”
http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/Cuba_Drilling_and_US_Policy.pdf)
6. Cuba would welcome U.S. investment.¶ At MINCEX, the staff discussed the impact of the embargo
on Cuba’s access to capital. Ministry staff said the embargo is harmful to Cuba’s ability to attract foreign
investments, capital, and technology. Cuban officials repeatedly emphasized that the country is open to
any foreign investor, and that Havana would welcome U.S. investment, subject to the same conditions it
places on all foreign investors.¶ According to a senior official in Cuba’s diplomatic corps, when Cuba decided to
drill off-shore in the Gulf of Mexico in the mid-1990s, the first letters sent by Cuba’s government to invite
foreign concerns to participate went exclusively to U.S. energy companies. They declined interest, due to
the embargo, and Cuba looked for partners elsewhere.
AT: Squo Solves
US sanctions mean no companies have tech—wrecks solvency
Benjamin-Alvadaro 10 (Jonathan, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International
University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the
Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American
Political Science Association, “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation”)
As long as the economic and trade restrictions imposed on the government of Cuba by the U.S.
government continue, all companies, regardless of their technical competence, will have a very
difficult time in monetizing any newly discovered hydrocarbon resources because they need access to the
U.S. oil services and equipment market. Also Cuba urgently needs, but does not have, a complex oil-refining system able to
process the probable large quantities of heavy crude oil found in Cuba’s offshore waters. Until Cuba develops its own heavy-oilrefining infrastructure, any newly found oil most likely will have to be exported. Its natural market is the United States, the largest
importer of oil in the world—yet that market is closed to Cuba by the trade and commercial restrictions currently in place. ¶ “The
good news is we found oil; the bad news is we found oil” will be the likely announcement of any new oil discovery in the corporate
headquarters of the oil companies doing business in Cuba. Repsol and Statoil–Norsk Hydro certainly have the necessary capacities
and competencies described earlier to develop and produce any oil they find. Their challenge is how and where to commercialize the
“black gold”—refine it and bring it to market. Some international oil companies are in Cuba for strictly economic and
business reasons. Others acquire concessions in the expectations that U.S. policy will change before the end of their
seven-year exploratory term, at which time they will be able to bring in a majority U.S. oil company as a partner.
Others could be grandstanding on behalf of the Cuban government: putting a spotlight on Cuba’s oil and natural gas
potential in order to influence United States special interest groups to lobby for lifting the economic and trade
restrictions.
Companies will say no—don’t want to challenge the US
Benjamin-Alvadaro 10 (Jonathan, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International
University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the
Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American
Political Science Association, “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation”)
The pursuit of deepwater offshore deposits may not unfold as rapidly as the news releases suggest. Exploration in
these areas has been limited in the past because the technology needed to explore and develop deepwater
deposits was owned by international oil companies that were severely constrained by U.S. sanctions. Today,
other companies, such as Petrobras and Norsk Hydro, have the technology, but they are still reluctant to
challenge U.S. sanctions. In addition, under U.S. law, ships that visit Cuban ports are barred from U.S. ports for a period of six
months. If this policy is applied to drill ships, as is most likely, it will impose higher costs on oil companies. Drill ships can earn
several hundred thousand dollars a day, so each day used to move them from one location to another is costly. By denying
immediate access to the U.S. Gulf, the policy forces companies to move their drilling vessels to more
distant locations driving up the cost of using them in Cuba. The absence of markets for services, equipment, and
supplies in Cuba itself adds to the difficulty and cost of mounting a serious exploration and production effort, because oil firms must
plan and bring all equipment and other necessary materials to Cuba rather than rely on local suppliers. Jonathan BenjaminAlvarado estimates that the absence of these suppliers adds up to 30 percent to a project’s cost.17
AT: No Tech
Companies can drill in Cuba
Benjamin-Alvadaro 10 (Jonathan, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International
University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the
Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American
Political Science Association, “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation”)
As of late 2009, Cupet has consigned eighteen of the fifty-nine deepwater blocks in Cuba’s Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) to seven international oil companies. Piñón and Benjamin-Alvarado caution against getting too excited about Cuba’s
immediate offshore oil potential—there are a number of obstacles to be overcome—yet the outlook is basically
positive. Deepwater exploration is expensive and carries a high degree of geological and technical risk, risks that
companies such as Repsol-YPF, Statoil–Norsk Hydro, and Petrobras certainly have the necessary deepwater expertise
to handle. The price of crude oil would have to be over $65 per barrel in order to be worthwhile for most
international oil companies to undertake today, and current prices are close to this.2 If successful, it could take two to three
years to bring the North Coast Basin deepwater project into full development, at an estimated total cost of $1 billion to $3 billion.
AT: Not Enough Oil
Cuba’s oil reserves are huge
Stephens et al 11 (Sarah, Executive Director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas, “As Cuba
plans to drill in the Gulf of Mexico, U.S. policy poses needless risks to our national interest,”
http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/Cuba_Drilling_and_US_Policy.pdf)
4. Cuba may have significant, recoverable supplies of oil offshore in its Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ).9¶ The U.S.
Geological Survey estimates that Cuba has 4.6 billion barrels of oil and 8.6 trillion cubic feet of natural gas
in undiscovered reserves.10 Official estimates by Cuba roughly double those of U.S.G.S. The Financial Times of
London quotes Manuel Marrero Faz saying the reserves equal upwards of 20 billion barrels.11¶ Lisa Margonelli of the New America
Foundation, speaking at the National Foreign Trade Council, pointed to the effort underway by Cuba’s partners to build a rig in
China for its planned offshore drilling in the Gulf. She said that if the oil companies are commissioning a “whole rig for
ultra deepwater drilling that suggests a serious commitment and possibly a fair amount of oil.”12¶ At the
same meeting, Ron Soligo concurred that the U.S.G.S. thinks there are “commercial quantities” there. But
Soligo wondered, “Are these big fields or discrete pockets of oil?”13 How questions like this are answered will determine the
significance of Cuba’s resources and their potential.
Best evidence proves there’s lots of oil
Benjamin-Alvadaro 10 (Jonathan, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International
University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the
Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American
Political Science Association, “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation”)
As pointed out earlier, the U.S. Geological Survey has estimated that Cuba has mean “undiscovered” reserves of
4.6 billion barrels of conventional oil and 9.8 trillion cubic feet of gas in the North Cuba Basin. The USGS defines
“undiscovered recoverable reserves (crude oil and natural gas)” as “those economic resources of crude oil and natural gas, yet
undiscovered, that are estimated to exist in favorable geologic settings.”25 Recovery of these deposits is technically
feasible, given current technology, but not necessarily economically feasible, since feasibility will depend crucially on oil prices as
well as production costs. The USGS develops a probability distribution of these potential reserves. Its high estimate puts them
at 9.3 billion barrels of oil and 21.8 trillion cubic feet of gas. Cupet claims the country has 20 billion barrels of
recoverable oil in its offshore waters, and asserts that the higher estimate is based on new and better
information about Cuba’s geology than that reported by the USGS.26
Oil ev
Park 10 – Hun Park, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy, University of Delaware, March
2010, "Cuba's Response to Energy Crisis," udel.edu/~hunpark/papers/Cuba_s Response to Energy
Crisis.pdf
3.1. Fossil Fuel and Nuclear Energy – More Resources or Less Consumption ¶ Oil is the foremost resource for Cuba ’s energy supply .
Petroleum supplied 7 1.9 % of Cuba’s total primary energy consumption in 2001 ( Alhajji and Maris, 2005 ). ¶ After oil imports from
the Soviet bloc were reduced significantly , Cuba ’s domestic oil reserves have received renewed interests .
Geologically, Cuba has two basins that is proven or considered highly probable to have economic
reserves of crude oil: the Florida - Bahamian Plate and the Caribbean Plate. Between the two basins,
the Florida - Bahamian Plate is analyzed to be economical. The Cuban government enacted a Production
Sharing Agreement to attract foreign oil companies’ investment. ¶ Foreign companies explore possible oil
reserves on their own expenses. When they find a commercially profitable reserve, their costs are
recovered and they share additional profits with the Cuban government. Thanks to the exploration of
foreign (mostly Canadian) companies, crude oil production in Cuba soared to 73,500
barrels per day in 2004 from 18,000 in 1992. (Piñón Cervera, 2005) Because even the U.S.
Geological Survey estimated the probability of new oil reserve in the North Cuba Basin as
95% (USGS, 2005), Cuba will have more opportunity to exploit their deep ocean oil fields .
Foreign oil has been newly imported, in the middle of the U.S. sanctions. Even during the Special Period, Russian oil was bartered
for Cuban sugar, although the amount has precipitously dropped after the Soviet collapse (Alon so and Galliano, 1999). It was a
neighboring country who endowed a big relief to Cuba’s energy crisis. Since 2000, Venezuela agreed to supply its crude
oil to Cuba , requiring substantially long repayment period . The amount was allegedly nearly 85,000 barrels per day.
(Benjamin - Alvarado, 2006) Because the oil deficit of Cuba in 2002 was assumed to be 100,000 barrels per day, this agreement was
fairly beneficial to Cuba. (Piñón, 2004) Venezuela’s generosity toward Cuba went further. In 2005, Venezuela decide d to offer
additional oil in exchange for Cuban medical personnel (Linger, 2006). Crude oil imports from
estimated 98,000 barrels per day (Pérez - López, 2006).
Venezuela are now
AT: Cuba Says No
Cuba loves foreign investment
Stephens et al 11 (Sarah, Executive Director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas, “As Cuba
plans to drill in the Gulf of Mexico, U.S. policy poses needless risks to our national interest,”
http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/Cuba_Drilling_and_US_Policy.pdf)
5. Foreign investment in key economic industries—including in energy and related sectors—is a high priority
of Cuba’s government.¶ Cuba opened up to foreign investment in oil exploration and production in 1995,
when the country’s National Assembly passed the foreign investment law (Law No. 7714) that provided a
legal structure for regulating foreign investment and rules of transparency to benefit investors.¶ Cuba allows
for the participation of foreign investors through the Cuban Model of Production Sharing Contract (or PSC),
a partnership between CUPET, Cuba’s national oil company, and a contractor company, equivalent to a joint venture.¶
Attracting foreign investment and establishing more efficient and reliable relationships with foreign firms
is a core objective of President Raúl Castro. Strategies for how to open Cuba to greater foreign investments are
being discussed in the lead up to the April 2011 Cuban Communist Party Congress. Cuba clearly sees the link
between increased foreign investment and job creation for Cubans, and energy investment already
figures prominently in Cuba’s economic planning going forward. ¶ In July, the staff at the Ministry of Foreign
Investment (MINCEX) told our delegation that Cuba’s foreign investment priorities include replacing imports; risk exploration
contracts in the EEZ; investment in petrochemicals (for the production of aluminum containers, cardboard boxes and plastic wrap);
energy conservation, and solar power. ¶ A brief examination of its investment strategy suggests that Cuba believes
it will play a growing regional role in energy that goes beyond exploration and recovering resources for its own use, and
that it perceives foreign investment as critical to its success.
AT: Slow
Drilling can come online in 3 years
Stephens et al 11 (Sarah, Executive Director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas, “As Cuba
plans to drill in the Gulf of Mexico, U.S. policy poses needless risks to our national interest,”
http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/Cuba_Drilling_and_US_Policy.pdf)
10.The timeline from exploration to production unfolds from 2011 to 2017 or 2018.¶ A deep-water well takes
between 6–18 months to drill.28 Once an oil field is discovered, evaluation wells have to be drilled, and then a
production scheme is drafted. Each field will require its own tailor-made technology. It will take three to
four years after that to get into production. The schedule will depend on the depth of the water, and the remoteness of the
well.29¶ Taking these variables into consideration, a plausible timeline for Cuba’s offshore energy
development would be as follows:¶ Exploration: 2011–2012¶ Evaluation: 2012–2013¶ Production: 2014–2017, 2018¶
As Ron Soligo told the National Foreign Trade Council, “The timeline for developing the resources depends on what
they have.”30
**2AC BLOCKS**
T
2AC T – Economic Engagement
We meet---energy cooperation is economic engagement
Bosserman 12 Bradley, Policy Analyst at NDN and the New Policy Institute, “Oil And Gas Account
For 90% of US Imports from Middle East, US Should Diversify And Strengthen Economic Ties Following
Arab Spring”, 2012, http://www.policymic.com/debates/6690/oil-and-gas-account-for-90-of-usimports-from-middle-east-us-should-diversify-and-strengthen-economic-ties-following-arab-spring
US policy should be directed intensely toward the development of human capital, democratic institutions, broad-based
economic opportunities, and the entrepreneurial culture needed to support a vibrant and democratic political life through out the Middle
East and North Africa. Elections are not enough. Not by a long shot. The UN’s Arab Development Report makes clear that the economic changes
needed to support these democracies are, in fact, quite revolutionary themselves. Before the Arab Spring, the “dominant form of the social contract in
the region [was] one where the population resigns itself to lack of political freedom in exchange for provision of certain services and exemption from or
low taxation.” The
hard work of changing this culture will be done in large part by local stakeholders, but needs to be supported by a
holistic strategy of US economic engagement. Currently, Oil and gas account for over 90% of US
imports from the region and US investment has been largely confined to the energy sector. Growing that
economic relationship will be essential for addressing the fact that the next generation of Arab leaders and citizens have yet to
realize the gains of globalization. Over 50% of the population in Arab countries is under the age of 30, yet they suffer the highest unemployment rate in
the world, breeding discontent and frustration. Their energy needs to be channeled into productive economic opportunities so that they can support
their families and develop a real stake is building and maintaining liberal, democratic societies.
C/I --- Economic engagement means improving relations with the target
country---includes the plan
Haass and O’Sullivan 2k Robert N, Director of Foreign Policy Studies and Meghan L, Fellow with
the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, Brookings, Survival, Vol 42, no. 2,
Summer, p. 114-5
Architects of engagement strategies can choose from a wide variety of incentives. Economic engagement might
offer tangible incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology,
loans and economic aid.3 Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties
such as trade embargoes, investment bans or high tariffs, which have impeded economic
relations between the United States and the target country. Facilitated entry into the economic global arena and the institutions
that govern it rank among the most potent incentives in today’s global market. Similarly, political engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic
recognition, access to regional or international institutions, the scheduling of summits between leaders – or the termination of these benefits. Military
engagement could involve the extension of international military educational training in order both to strengthen respect for civilian authority and
human rights among a country’s armed forces and, more feasibly, to establish relationships between Americans and young foreign military officers.
While these areas of engagement are likely to involve working with state institutions, cultural or civil-society engagement entails building people-topeople contacts. Funding nongovernmental organisations, facilitating the flow of remittances and promoting the exchange of students, tourists and
other non-governmental people between countries are just some of the possible incentives used in the form of engagement.
Prefer our interpretation:
1) Cuban context proves energy investment should be included
Peters 2k Philip, CATO Institute, “A Policy toward Cuba That Serves U.S. Interests”, 11/2,
http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/policy-toward-cuba-serves-us-interests
As Castro remains in control, new conditions have led to a reexamination of U.S. policy. Cuba’s threat to hemispheric security ended when the Soviet
Union dissolved, Soviet military support disappeared, and Cuban support for revolutionary movements in Latin America ended. As American sanctions
have increased, Cuban dissidents and religious authorities have increasingly voiced their opposition to the embargo and to policies that seek to isolate
Cuba. Economic
reforms in Cuba are still incipient, but small enterprise, foreign investment, incentive-based
other changes have had important impacts: they helped the economy survive its post-Soviet crisis, and
Cubans working in those sectors have gained experience with markets and augmented their earnings. Cuban Americans
agriculture, and
have increasingly joined this discussion, as a younger generation of exiles values contact with the island and some first-generation exiles begin to
question the effectiveness of the trade embargo. The Elián González crisis fueled doubts about the embargo when the young boy’s plight captured
American attention and weakened the pro-embargo hard-line position in public and congressional opinion. The wide array of U.S. sanctions has failed
to promote change in Cuba and has allowed Castro to reinforce his arguments that the
United States promotes economic deprivation
in Cuba and seeks to abridge Cuban sovereignty. It is time for the United States to turn to economic engagement.
Whether or not the embargo is lifted completely, a policy that respects the rights of Americans to
trade with, invest in, and travel to Cuba would more effectively serve U.S. interests in post-Soviet Cuba:
defending human rights, helping the Cuban people, and connecting with the generation of Cubans that will govern that country in the early 21st
century.
2) Aff ground – they over limit because pure economic forms of engagement
are too small – they exclude any Cuban embargo aff, Venezuelan energy
engagement, etc.
Reasonability – competing interpretations causes a race to the bottom –
over-incentivizes going for T to arbitrarily limit out the aff
2AC T – Substantial
We meet – allowing US-Cuban oil cooperation is a massive change from
squo policy
C/I – Substantial means a large amount
Dictionary.com 12
sub·stan·tial
[suhb-stan-shuhl] Show IPA adjective 1.
of ample or considerable amount, quantity, size, etc.: a substantial sum of
money.
Prefer our interpretation:
Ground – qualitative substantial increases provide better links to core
generics like the politics DA
Substantial is qualitative not quantitive
H. Beau Baez 6, Assistant Professor of Law, Liberty University School of Law, Seattle University Law
Review Spring, 2006 29 Seattle Univ. L. R. 581
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Commerce Clause to prohibit state actions that discriminate against or unduly burden interstate commerce as part of its Negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
n83 A state's attempt to tax out-of-state companies may be seen as such a burden if, among other things, n84 the tax is applied to a company that does not have "substantial nexus" with the taxing state. n85
Expressly rejecting a facts-and-circumstances test, which would have weighed various factors, the Quill Court instead created a simple bright-line test measured by physical presence in a state. n86 The Quill
Unfortunately, lower courts have
found some ambiguity in Quill, and have struggled to apply the bright-line to the facts of real cases. n88¶
Admittedly, part of the confusion lies in the name given to the legal requirement by the Quill Court: "substantial
nexus." The word "substantial" connotes weighing of factors, yet the Court attached a bright-line test to the legal phrase "substantial nexus."
Court held that the physical presence of a company in the taxing state satisfies the Commerce Clause substantial nexus test. n87
Thus, we have a legal requirement that requires a company to have substantial nexus with a state before it can be subjected to a state's regulatory use tax authority, but [*596] that legal requirement is
This lack of clarity by the Court is not new. Before Quill, the Court referred
to the "substantial nexus" n89 requirement alternatively as "sufficient nexus," n90 "sufficiently
connected," n91 "requisite nexus," n92 "necessary basis," n93 "sufficient relation," n94 "necessary
nexus," n95 "adequate nexus," n96 "obvious nexus," n97 "clear and sufficient nexus ," n98 and Chief Justice Rehnquist's
colorful phrase "nexus aplenty." n99 However, even after Quill -- the seminal nexus case of the last twenty-five years -- the Court has continued describing the
"substantial nexus" requirement in different ways, such as "adequate nexus," n100 "sufficient nexus," n101 "Commerce Clause nexus," n102 "nexus aplenty"
determined by a bright-line physical presence test.¶
n103 (this phrase is apparently just too good for the Justices to let go), and, in one of its most recent state tax cases, "minimal connection." n104 These interchangeable phrases suggest that the phrase
"substantial nexus" in Quill is the Court's shorthand for Commerce Clause nexus -- any substantive meaning of the phrase must be found in the case law and not in the phrase "substantial nexus" itself.
n105¶ The Quill Court likewise lacks clarity when it describes the due process minimum contacts test: "due process nexus analysis requires that we ask whether an individual's connections with a State are
substantial enough to legitimate the State's exercise of power over him." n106 It is curious that the Court describes the due process minimum contacts test as requiring substantial contacts; n107 a threshold
that is easily met by most companies doing business across state lines. Since the Court spent so [*597] much time explaining that there are two separate nexus tests, it would be odd for the Court to then
Examining the legal definition of "substantial" provides some light as to what the Court
meant by "substantial nexus" in Quill. Black's Law Dictionary defines "substantial" as "belonging to substance;
actually existing; real; not seeming or imaginary; not illusive; solid; true; veritable." n108 This legal
definition furnishes evidence that "substantial" is defined qualitatively, not quantitatively.
Webster's Dictionary also lends support to the qualitative nature of the word by defining its primary
meaning as "consisting of or relating to substance; not imaginary or illusory: real, true; important, essential," n109 while the notion of
"substantial" as quantitative is relegated to a secondary meaning of the word. n110¶ Though the phrase "substantial nexus" is amorphous,
define them similarly.¶
Quill does attempt to provide guidance for Commerce Clause nexus by providing a test that examines qualitative contacts that do and do not create nexus (i.e., the bright-line physical presence test).
Specifically, the Quill Court eliminates any room for quantitative nexus speculation because its bright-line test "firmly establishes the boundaries of legitimate state authority." n111 A "substantial nexus" test
that looks primarily at the quantity of contacts ignores both the bright-line test as well as the Court's explicit rejection of "tests with more contextual balancing inquiries." n112 The Court was aware that it
could have established a facts-and-circumstances test (i.e., a test where the number of contacts is weighed); however, the Court refused to do so after extensive discussion of the topic. n113 A brightline test is
"artificial at its edges . . . [however] this artificiality . . . is more than offset by the benefits of a clear rule." n114 If a business has contacts that fall on one side of the state line they have nexus, while if their
contacts are on the other side of the state line there is no nexus. This is a simple and clear rule that does not take into account factors like the number of contacts or the type of contact (e.g., solicitation,
Given the history and context of the phrases used by the Court to describe Commerce
Clause nexus, it is useless to try to discern any substantive meaning from the phrases "substantial
nexus," "sufficient nexus," or "nexus aplenty" themselves. Should state tax jurisdiction debates be relegated to a tit-for-tat where those that want to avoid nexus [*598] use the phrase "substantial
nexus" while those wanting to create nexus rely on the phrases "sufficient nexus" or "minimal contacts?" Only modern-day sophists n115 would
seriously contend that such debate would be useful. n116 In the end it is case law that animates the concept of Commerce Clause nexus;
technical support, or training).¶
out-of-context discussions on "substantial nexus" border on the frivolous and are shibboleths. The poet, admittedly taken out of context, nevertheless captures this debate best: And we are here as on a
darkling plain Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight, Where ignorant armies clash by night. n117
Arbitrary – no scholarly consensus on what a substantial increase is –
allowing self-serving definitions incentivizes negs to go for dumb
procedurals – creates bad debate
Reasonability is uniquely applicable to determining whether an aff is
substantial
Linda Stadler 93 “NOTE: Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA: Asbestos in the Fifth Circuit--A Battle of
Unreasonableness ” Tulane Environmental Law Journal Summer, 1993 6 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 423
n3 Matthew J. McGrath, Note, Convergence of the Substantial Evidence and Arbitrary and Capricious Standards of Review During Informal Rulemaking, 54 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 541, 546 n.30 (1986), (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1945)), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT LEGISLATIVE
The substantial evidence standard does however possess some
ambiguity as to the definition of "substantial." See, e.g., Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 899 F.2d 344, 359 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that
"'substantial' is an inherently imprecise word"). However, 'substantial' is generally held to a
reasonableness standard, i.e., would a reasonable mind accept it as adequate to support a
conclusion. E.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
HISTORY, S. DOC. NO. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, 233, 279 (1945).
CP’s
2AC Cuba Conditions CP (Human Rights)
Perm do both
Latin American countries will say no
Nikandrov 12 (Nil, Journalist and political analyst for the Strategic Culture Foundation, “The U.S.
and Latin America drift apart over Cuba,” http://progreso-weekly.com/ini/index.php/home/neighborsto-the-south/3195-the-us-and-latin-america-drift-apart-over-cuba)
As before, Washington made sure that no invitation on the occasion was sent to Havana. US President Obama, Vice
President J. Biden, and Secretary of State H. Clinton rolled out a standard grievances list - the suppression of free speech and public protests, the
communist party's dictate, and the imprisonment of dissenters in Cuba - to justify shutting the country out of the summit, while a number of US
congressmen threatened to boycott it in case Raul Castro shows up. Thus, the
US diplomacy made a thinly disguised attempt to
intimidate the ALBA leaders who felt very strong about their Cuban peer joining them at the forum.¶ Last
February, Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez expressed resolute opposition to the policy of isolating Havana and,
citing the CELAC [Community of Latin American & Caribbean States] summit which condemned the inhumane US blockade of Cuba, warned that
the US position prompted outrage across Latin America. In fact, the US pressure led ALBA [Bolivarian Alternative
for the Americas] countries to consider shunning the forum in response. For example, Bolivian president Evo Morales said
the US conduct was undemocratic, discriminatory, and even racist as Cuba drives progressive change in the
region and just one country - the US - should not be allowed to impose its approaches on the whole Latin
America.¶ Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos faced an uphill task of preventing a diplomatic escalation, and at the highest point
of the mission, on March 7 he paid a visit to Havana to apologize for so awkwardly conforming to the US demand.
The move was widely seen as a sign of profound transformation in the international relations - in the past
epoch, the countries politically trailing the U.S used to ignore Cuba and displayed no sense of embarrassment. Formally, Santos went to Havana, where
Chavez is getting medical treatment at the moment, to pen a package of trade agreements with Venezuela, but it was an easy guess that the Venezuelan
leader agreed to hold the signing ceremony in Cuba to facilitate an informal contact between Santos and Raul Castro. The meeting opened up an
opportunity to break the stalemate: the Cuban leader made it clear that he understood Santos' concerns and a priori did not plan to attend the summit,
but still remarked that the
situation which the Colombian president described as lack of consensus was owed
entirely to the US unilateralism.¶ In return, Santos promised to Raul Castro that accommodating Cuba in the future forums would be
given a line on the agenda in Cartagena de Indias and thanked him for helping Colombia and the summit route around a serious problem. Cuban
foreign minister Bruno Eduardo Rodriguez said in a reference to the «Latin American consensus» on debarring Cuba from the forums held by the
countries of the US-dominated continent that Cuba's involvement in the upcoming summit «in a remote mode" would nevertheless be impossible to
overlook. He also mentioned that April 14-15 are the dates when Cubans celebrate the anniversary of the collapse of the Playa Giron intervention
organized by the CIA, the point being that Cuba neither was nor is a country to ever crack under pressure. There
is confidence in Havana
that not only the ALBA countries but also the UNASUR [Unión de Naciones Suramericanas] and CELAC members
will throw their support behind it in Cartagena de Indias. In contrast, Washington can realistically expect to be
backed exclusively by Canada, a disciplined minor partner of the US whose partaking in subversive operations against Cuba is an
open secret.¶ Visiting the Cartagena de Indias forum, the US president will have to realize - by no means for the first time - that the
majority of his Latin American colleagues are on Cuba's side. The positions of Argentina's Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner
and Brazil's Dilma Rousseff will draw heightened attention, and it should be borne in mind in the context that the foreign ministers of the two countries
Hector Timerman and Antonio Patriota voiced a shared the view at a March 14 media conference in San Paulo - the forum in Colombia must become
the last one from which Cuba is absent, since the mismatch between the title of the gathering and its actual capacity is becoming impossible to explain
away. There is ample evidence, on the other hand, that US diplomats are working closely with Washington's regional allies - Mexico, Honduras,
Guatemala, Salvador, Costa Rica, Panama, and Chile - to draw them into Washington's camp over Cuba and to coerce them into urging the country to
hastily launch democratic and free-market reforms, which Havana is instead implementing in line with its own carefully calculated schedule. ¶ The
US will be confronted at the summit with an array of pro-Cuban demands upheld by the ALBA, CELAC, and UNASUR
countries and with calls to lift the blockade as required by U.N. resolutions. The theme will no doubt feature prominently at the social forum which will
parallel the presidential part of the meeting. Activists from public, trade-union, student, and native-American groups from across Latin America will
flock to Colombia to air their perspectives on global developments, the US-enforced globalization, the CIA conspiracies aimed at toppling the
continent's populist regimes, and the deployment of US military bases in the region. Unsure that Morales would choose to visit the summit, Santos
invited him to give a concluding talk at the social forum, and Morales accepted the invitation. The Bolivian leader stated during his recent tour of
Austria that his country was in the process of building socialism and therefore could, like Cuba, face US efforts to isolate it. Morales maintained that the
rise of Marxist regimes was a steady Latin American trend and said his country should opt out of the Organization of American States since Cuba's
membership in it had been suspended as a punishment for socialism. Anti-imperialist countries are being falsely accused of terrorism, authoritarian
rule, and drug trafficking, said Morales, adding that history is repeating itself.¶ Ecuadoran
president Rafael Correa announced that
he would skip the VI and all further summits if the US policy of isolating Cuba remains untamed . Correa
criticized the Latin American forums for failing to bring into the spotlight the bulk of the continent's real problems such as the economic blockade of
Cuba or the British occupation of the Falklands, charging that the exclusion of a Latin American country from Latin American summits makes no sense
and that the
outpourings of pro-democracy rhetoric in their framework appear completely unrelated to
reality. Correa's strongly worded statement resonated as a warning issued in concert by the populist
regimes against the policy of sidelining Cuba.¶ Unless extraordinary circumstances arise, Summits of the Americas take place every
three years. The next one is due in 2015, and the current impression is that Washington is determined to go on keeping Cuba under pressure at any
cost. The defiant Freedom Island, though, managed to survive half a century of US aggression, terrorism, and conspiracies. The Castro brothers who
have long deserved a place in the Cuban history boast enviable health and energy and must be credited with the ability to plan long ahead and to
increasingly outplay Cuba's geopolitical opponents, at times causing Washington to sink into downright hysteria. The future is always a mystery but
both Castro brothers will always be remembered as the leaders who defeated the Empire, and Latin
views,
American politicians, regardless of their
are switching to Havana's side in the US-Cuban conflict.
Perm do the CP
Aff prevents Cuban instability that results in democratic backsliding
throughout the region – that’s Gorrell – solves the net benefit
Zero support for conditions
Dade 13 (Carlo, The Globe and Mail, “On Cuba, Canada has no choice but to walk Washington’s
tightrope,” 2/20, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/on-cuba-canada-has-no-choice-but-towalk-washingtons-tightrope/article8878654/)
The importance of Cuba in the rest of the hemisphere is that it serves as a reminder of centuries of
American bullying and degradation. It is hard to overstate the degree of visceral anger that U.S.
policy toward Cuba elicits in the region. It is also a subject with which any Latin American government,
even one of the few right-of-centre governments such as Colombia, earns cheap points at home and with
its neighbours by symbolically kicking the United States.
Links to politics
2AC Cuba Conditions CP (Generic)
Perm do both
Castro says no
Suchlicki 13 – Jaime Suchlicki, professor of History and Director of ICCAS, specializes in Latin
American affairs, with special emphasis on Cuba, Mexico, and U.S. relations with the region. March 4th,
2013, "Why Cuba Will Still be Anti-American After Castro," Inter American Security
Watch,interamericansecuritywatch.com/why-cuba-will-still-be-anti-american-after-castro/
Similarly, any serious overtures to the U.S. do not seem likely in the near future. It would mean
the rejection of one of Fidel Castro’s main legacies: anti-Americanism. It may create uncertainty within
the government, leading to frictions and factionalism. It would require the weakening of Cuba’s antiAmerican alliance with radical regimes in Latin America and elsewhere.¶ Raul is unwilling to
renounce the support and close collaboration of countries like Venezuela, China, Iran and
Russia in exchange for an uncertain relationship with the United States. At a time that antiAmericanism is strong in Latin America and the Middle East, Raul’s policies are more likely to remain closer to
regimes that are not particularly friendly to the United States and that demand little from Cuba in return
for generous aid.¶ Raul does not seem ready to provide meaningful and irreversible
concessions for a U.S. – Cuba normalization. Like his brother in the past, public statements and
speeches are politically motivated and directed at audiences in Cuba, the United States and Europe. Serious negotiations on
important issues are not carried out in speeches from the plaza. They are usually carried out through the normal diplomatic avenues
open to the Cubans in Havana, Washington and the United Nations or other countries, if they wish. These avenues have never been
closed as evidenced by the migration accord and the anti-hijacking agreement between the United States and Cuba.¶ Raul
remains a loyal follower and cheerleader of Fidel’s anti-American policies.¶ The issue between Cuba
and the U.S. is not about negotiations or talking. These are not sufficient. There has to be a
willingness on the part of the Cuban leadership to offer real concessions – in the area of human rights and
political and economic openings as well as cooperation on anti-terrorism and drug interdiction – for the
United States to change it policies.
Perm do the CP
It fails and wrecks relations
Dickerson 10 – Lieutenant Colonel Sergio M. Dickerson, 2010, "United States Security Strategy
Towards Cuba," Strategy Research Project, www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA518053
Another important pitfall is to exploit democracy as a precondition for diplomacy and
economic engagement in Cuba . If democracy is virtuous, then why must we exploit it? It
casts a negative shadow on a positive change in government. There is a common perception that U.S.
policy with regards to security and stability can only exist under the precondition of a “Democratic Cuba”.
It has prevented any real progress in U.S.–Cuba relations because of well placed fears that
we mean to subvert the Cuban government. A popular Cuban American lobby group, The Cuban American
National Foundation summarizes traditional U.S. beliefs towards Cuba . They suggest , “U.S. – Cuba policy should focus on (1)
advancing U.S. interests and security in the region and (2) empowering Cuban people in their quest for democracy and prosperity
...that these are “ intertwined and one cannot be individually accomplished without the other.” 28 The recommendation then focuses
largely on steps to pursue a democratic Cuba . ¶ To separate security and stability from democratic
pursuits in Cuba could benefit both causes. Focusing on better diplomatic relations could further
democracy as a byproduct of increased exposure to open markets, businesses and globalization. China is a
good example. The U.S. has diffused tensions with China by exposing them to open markets. Although
they continue to embrace communism, their version of communism has been somewhat diluted as they
modified their business practices, trade and other aspects to compete in the global marketplace. If you take into account that
Cuba’s Growth National Product (GDP) decreased by 4% since 2006 while their debt grew by 16% to almost $20B in 2008, Cuba
certainly has incentive to do the same . 29 By imposing democracy we jeopardize diplomatic
avenues to our principal security and stability pursuits . To assuage the Cuban America position
on this issue may be simpler today than 10 years ago. Today’s younger Cuban - American
generation is more amenable to closer relations with Cuba. The anger carried by their immigrant
forefathers 14 after 50 years may be passing and perhaps the time is right to leverage this new Cuban American generation to open
dialogue with Cuba without the democratic precondition s tied to negotiations. ¶ Current U.S. - Cuba Policy Analysis ¶ As we
pursue diplomatic relations with Cuba we should not expect full disclosure, immediate results and a
Cuban government anxious to please the U.S. We should expect a cautious and limited first engagement
that appears noticeably weighted in U.S. effort. Let us assume the U.S. makes significant diplomatic and
economic concessions but Cuba is less willing to provide some reciprocal offering . U.S. policy could
conclude that Cuba has no genuine desire to consummate new diplomatic relations and diplomacy could fail. It is imperative to
understand that the U.S. has done most of the “taking” and hence will , at least for the near
future, do most of the “giving”. A steady, patient and continued engagement is needed until
Cuba has the confidence to commit to further diplomatic relations.
Cuba says no and reintrenches the squo—unilateral actions solve the impact
CSG 13 (Cuba Study Group, membership consists primarily of Cuban exiles who are CEOs, lawyers, or
investors, “Restoring Executive Authority Over U.S. Policy Toward Cuba,”
http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=45d8f827-174c-4d43-aa2fef7794831032)
Seventeen years after its enactment, the Helms-Burton Act—which further codified the sanctions framework commonly
referred to as the U.S. embargo against Cuba and conditions its suspension on the existence of a transition or
democratic government in Cuba—has proven to be a counterproductive policy that has failed to achieve its
stated purposes in an increasingly interconnected world.¶ Helms-Burton has failed to advance the cause of freedom and
prosperity for the Cuban people, to encourage free and democratic elections in Cuba, to secure international sanctions against the
Cuban government, or to advance the national security interests of the United States.1 It provides a policy framework for
U.S. support to the Cuban people in response to the formation of a transition government in Cuba ; yet, the
all-or-nothing nature of its conditions for suspension undermine that very framework by effectively
placing control over changes to embargo sanctions in the hands of the current Cuban leadership. Simply
stated, it is an archaic policy that hinders the ability of the United States to respond swiftly, intelligently and in a nuanced way to
developments on the island. ¶ Worst of all, the failures of Helms-Burton have more recently produced a tragic paradox: Policies
once designed to promote democratization through isolation are now stifling civil society, including an
emerging class of private entrepreneurs and democracy advocates whose rise represents the best hope for
a free and open society in Cuba in more than 50 years. ¶ The Cuba Study Group believes that the most effective way to
break the deadlock of “all-or-nothing” conditionality and remedy the ineffectiveness of current
U.S.-Cuba policy is to de-codify the embargo through the repeal of HelmsBurton and related statutory provisions in
Torricelli and TSRA that limit the Executive Branch’s authority over U.S. foreign policy toward the Island (hereinafter collectively
referred to as “Helms-Burton and related statutory provisions”). De-codifying the embargo would allow the Executive
Branch the flexibility to respond strategically to developments in the Island as they take place; using the entire
range of foreign policy tools at its disposal—including diplomatic, economic, legal, political and cultural—to advance
the cause of human rights and incentivize changes in Cuba. ¶ The primary consequences of Helms-Burton and
related statutory provisions have been to isolate the United States from Cuba and to serve as a political
scapegoat for the Cuban government’s many failures. It has become a “Great Crutch” to all sides of the Cuba debate. First, for
ordinary Cubans, their struggle has fallen hostage to an international dispute between their government and the United States,
which they see themselves as powerless to affect. For the Cuban leadership, it has become easier to blame the
embargo than to adopt the difficult reforms needed to fix their economy. Lastly, for defenders of the status-quo
within the Cuban-American community, it has become easier to wait for the United States to solve our national problem
rather than engage in the difficult and necessary processes of reconciliation and reunification.¶ Helms-Burton indiscriminately
impacts all sectors of Cuban society, including democracy advocates and private entrepreneurs, causing disproportionate economic
damage to the most vulnerable segments of the population. Conditioning our policy of resource denial on sweeping
political reforms has only served to strengthen the Cuban government. The scarce resources available in
an authoritarian Cuba have been and continue to be allocated primarily based on political priorities, thereby
increasing the state’s relative power and its ability to control its citizens. ¶ The majority of American voters, CubanAmericans and Cuban democracy advocates in the Island have rejected isolation as an element of U.S. policy toward Cuba and have
called on the U.S. government to implement a policy of greater contact and exchange with Cuban society.ii As Cuba undergoes a slow
and uncertain process of reforms, the continued existence of blanket U.S. sanctions only hinders the types of political reforms that
Helms-Burton demands. ¶ Instead of maintaining a rigid policy that ties our hands and obsesses over hurting
the Cuban leadership, U.S. policymakers should adopt a results-oriented policy that focuses primarily on
empowering the Cuban people while simultaneously pressing the Cuban government to cease its repressive practices
and respect fundamental human rights. Repealing Helms-Burton would also free civil society development and assistance
programs to be implemented outside of a contentious sanctions framework.¶ Furthermore, the Cuba Study Group believes that any
forthcoming congressional review of current legislation relating to Cuba, such as a review of the Cuban Adjustment Act, must require
a review of the totality of the legislative framework codified in Helms-Burton and related statutory provisions so that the United
States may finally develop a coherent policy toward the Island. ¶ While we wait on the U.S. Congress to act, the Executive Branch
should continue to take proactive steps through its limited licensing authority to safeguard and expand the free flow of contacts and
resources to the Island, encourage independent economic and political activity in Cuba, and increase the relative power of Cuban
private actors.¶ The U.S. should pursue these courses of action independent of actions taken by the Cuban
government so as not to place the reigns of U.S. policy in the hands of Cuban proponents of the status
quo.
2AC Spill Cooperation CP
Perm do both
Spill cooperation doesn’t solve spills or relations---joint production key
Helman 11 – Christopher Helman 11, Forbes staff, 12/12/11, “U.S. Should Drop Cuba Embargo For
Oil Exploration,” http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2011/12/12/u-s-should-drop-cubaembargo-for-oil-exploration/print/
In a few months Spanish oil company Repsol will start drilling for oil off the coast of Cuba, in a spot just 70 miles south of Key West.
Soon Repsol–and its JV partners Norway’s Statoil and India’s ONGC–will be joined by rigs from PetroVietnam, Malaysia’s Petronas
and Venezuela’s PDVSA. But you won’t see any U.S. companies there. Inexplicably, the U.S. maintains its economic
embargo against the Castro regime. ¶ This wrong-headed policy represents a dangerous threat to the
environment and a huge missed opportunity to the U.S. oil industry. The U.S. embargo will do nothing to
prevent oil drilling from taking place in Cuban waters. But it will prevent that work from being done
by the most experienced companies with the highest-quality equipment. Norway’s Statoil is a
proven operator with a long history in the North Sea and the Gulf. The rest of those companies are just getting started offshore. ¶ A
group of U.S. lawmakers in September urged Repsol (ticker: REPYY.PK) to call off its Cuba plans or face the threat of U.S. lawsuits.
Repsol wisely called that bluff. ¶ At least the Obama administration is doing something to ensure that Repsol’s drilling rig is up to
snuff. According to an excellent article from Bloomberg today, Repsol’s Chinese-built Scarabeo 9 rig will soon by boarded by four
U.S. inspectors (two from the Coast Guard, two from the Dept. of Interior) who will do what they can to check out the rig and watch
some drills. But, according to the article, there will be real limits to what the inspectors can inspect.
They won’t get to check the rig’s all-important blowout preventor, or the well casing or
drilling fluids that are to be used. Though the U.S. inspectors will discuss any concerns they have
with Repsol, they will have no enforcement authority. ¶ Although the offshore industry’s best service
companies and parts manufacturers are right here on the U.S. Gulf coast, Repsol will have to train its people and
scrounge for spare parts from the rest of the world. ¶ But here’s something that completely blows my mind.
The administration, again, according to the Bloomberg article, has granted some U.S. companies the
license to respond to an oil spill were it to occur in Cuban waters. The government won’t say how many
companies have that license or who they are, but there’s at least two of them: Wild Well Control and Helix
Energy Solutions Group. Helix plans to stage a subsea containment cap on the U.S. coast so it can quickly
respond to any Cuban blowout. ¶ Of course it’s smart and safe for the U.S. government to put defensive
measures in place in the event of a spill, but the message to the industry is clear: we refuse to give superior
U.S. operators the license to drill for oil in Cuba, but we want to make sure you’re ready to clean up any
problems. ¶ And the message to Cuba: we’re not going to let you use our engineers, just our janitors.
Knowing that a top-notch American clean-up crew is on standby in case of a blowout is not
a big incentive for Cuba to keep its own regulators on top of things. ¶ Think about Cuba in relation to
U.S. oil adventures in the rest of the world. Even if Cuba really were a tyrannical threat to U.S. interests, there’s
myriad countries where U.S. oil companies have done business that are no more democratic than Cuba.
They include Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Burma, Libya, Equatorial Guinea and Kazakhstan.¶ The Castros’
days as rulers of Cuba are numbered. The embargo stick hasn’t brought regime change, and has only
forced Cuba into the arms of autocrats like Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez. Better to use the
carrot of capitalism to gradually bring Cuba into the U.S. sphere of influence. The oil
industry is a great place to start.
Links to net benefit
Only joint production and management facilitates effective spill response--have to be able to cross territories
Gable 10 – Dawn Gable 10, Assistant Director at the Center for Democracy in the Americas, 5/28/10,
“Contingency Plans for Cuba Oil Spill,” Havana Times, http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=24484
This is not the first time the topic has been discussed in that nation’s capital. Last year the Brookings Institution sponsored a similar
event in which panelists called on the Obama administration and Congress to recognize the potential danger posed to Florida’s
Atlantic shores by Cuba’s eventual deep water drilling in the Gulf and to begin a dialogue with the island’s government that would
lead to a comprehensive prevention and mitigation plan. Unfortunately, the Administration did not take the issue seriously at the
time. ¶ The oil spewing into the Gulf right now could not underscore more the need to prepare for some
future spill in Cuban waters- that would affect, among other things, US commercial fisheries, since species
such as snapper and tuna spawn in Cuban waters- but also to avert and minimize damage to Cuba by US
accidents. ¶ Cubans Are Receptive to Collaboration¶ Brian Petty of the International Association of Drilling
Contractors (IADC) explained that last fall his group was denied a license to take a delegation of technical experts to Cuba in order to
dialogue on safety with Cuban offshore regulatory authorities. However, in view of the current disaster, they have just been granted a
short-window license. ¶ In particular, the IADC wants to offer the Cubans competence assurance training modules that are currently
in use around the world. Petty noted that the Cubans are receptive to IADC’s programs and recommended practices and have stated
that they will require rigs to undergo an IADC designed safety screening, something that is not currently a requirement in the US. ¶
Jorge Piñon, former President of Amoco Oil Latin America and expert on Cuba’s energy sector, warned that there is no time to
waste. According to Piñon, the Spanish Reposol has a 5-year lease on a semi-submersible rig that it will use for
exploratory drilling in Cuban waters by the fall. The rig contains no US technology or parts and is being
manufactured in China by an Italian company. ¶ Piñon also assured that the BP incident will not stop Cuba
from moving forward given that over 5 billion barrels of undiscovered oil is believed to exist just in Cuba’s
northern basin. That would put Cuba on par with other South American oil producers such as Ecuador,
Colombia and Argentina. In addition, the USGS estimates 9.8 trillion cubic feet of undiscovered natural
gas in the northern basin and Cuba’s oil company Cupet estimates another 20 billion barrels of crude in
what is called the eastern gap, an area in the Gulf where demarcation lines between Mexico, US and Cuba
have not yet been drawn, but where Cuba will own a portion. ¶ Likewise, while there is a moratorium on new
drilling in the US at the moment, projects will soon be underway in the areas Obama just opened up.
Piñon pointed out the logistical problems in the new Gulf block presented by not
cooperating with Cuba. The portion of the block that is expected to contain oil butts up to Cuban
territorial waters. According to him, it will be necessary for boats to be able to cross back and forth
over the line in order to carry out their work. ¶ Hostage to Florida Politics¶ The “worst oil spill in US
history” is what Dan Whittle of the Environmental Defense Fund called the current discharge in the
Hemisphere’s “fish basket” as he ticked off the number of bird and marine species affected by it. He
extolled Cuba’s environmental regulations and the expertise of the island’s scientists while conveying the
Cubans’ fear that the oil will reach their shores and their concern over what the US plans to do about it if
it does. While operational level talks have begun that might be helpful in the current crisis,
what is needed, in the view of all the panelists, is a far-reaching collaborative plan that
involves Mexico, Cuba and the United States.
2AC Change Embargo in Non-Oil Area
Doesn’t solve---oil’s the lynchpin of preventing Cuban dependence on
Venezuela – that’s Pinon
Oil is the only thing that generates support for better Cuban relations
Moise 6 (Hilary, Research associate for the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, “U.S. Embargo against
Cuba under Growing Siege,” http://www.coha.org/cuba-embargo-under-growing-siege/)
The reportedly steadfast intention of the president to veto any legislation containing language weakening the
embargo against Cuba may prove no match for the allure of oil riches; much like the environmental integrity of
the Alaskan wilderness, the ideological hegemony behind the Cuba embargo may be sacrificed to feed
America’s oil hunger. History has shown that human-rights records and democratic failings have not in
any way prevented favorable economic relations—the U.S. buys oil from Saudi Arabia and Russia—and Cuba’s
substantial oil reserves may be the perfect carrot to entice the U.S. government away from its
automatic condemnation of the Cuban government’s actions.
Perm do both
Links to the politics
Oil’s key---lynchpin of Cuban issue
Lewan 6 Todd, AP, "Will Cuban Oil Find Break U.S. Embargo?", July 29,
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/29/AR2006072900407.html
Norsk and ONGC are among a select group of companies with deep-water know-how and technology, so when they signed on with
the Spanish, "everyone else said, 'Maybe we better take a look at Cuba again.'"¶ The U.S. Congress certainly has.¶
In May, with much fanfare, Rep. Jeff Flake, R-Ariz., and Sen. Larry Craig, R-Idaho, introduced twin bills to the House and
Senate that would exempt Big Oil from the embargo.¶ Before introducing his legislation, Craig told a reporter that
"prohibition on trade with Cuba has accomplished just about zero." Ominously, he added: "China, as we
speak, has a drilling rig off the coast of Cuba." (The senator failed to mention that the Chinese are working in shallow
water near Cuba's shore, and possess neither the technology nor the expertise to tap Cuba's promising deep-water reserves.)¶
Regardless, the bills represent the best chance yet to "punch a big hole into the embargo," says
Johannes Werner, editor of Cuba Trade & Investment News, published in Sarasota, Fla.
DA’s
2AC Oil Prices DA
Prices declining---increased production and efficient vehicles
Shauk 6/25 Zain, Fuel Fix, "Oil prices to fall as much as 30%, forecaster says", 2013,
fuelfix.com/blog/2013/06/25/oil-prices-to-fall-as-much-as-30-forecaster-says/
Oil prices will fall as much as 30 percent by 2016 because of rising production and fuel efficient
vehicles, according to a prediction from forecasting group Kiplinger.¶ The group projected that oil prices would fall to between $65 and
$75 per barrel by 2016.¶ Other organizations, including investment banks and and research firms, also have
forecast oil price declines, though other projections have been around $85 as a long-term price.¶ Kiplinger said rising U.S.
production, coupled with lower U.S. consumption of petroleum products would push prices down.¶ “The
U.S. is playing a major role in the shift,” Kiplinger said in its weekly letter published Friday. “Domestic oil use is down
11% from its peak in 2005, thanks to more gas-sipping cars and trucks. Meanwhile, output is up 30% since 2008, the legacy of
tremendous gains in drilling technology that have revitalized the U.S. as a major producer. The net effect
is huge, equal to the infusion of 4 million barrels of newfound oil supplies a day.Ӧ The change would come as
businesses large and small are increasingly turning to natural gas, which is cheap in the United States as a substitute for
petroleum products, Kiplinger said.
Plan doesn’t affect US oil market
Benjamin-Alvadaro 10 (Jonathan, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International
University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the
Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American
Political Science Association, “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation”)
At present Cuba possesses an estimated 4.6 million barrels of oil and 9.3 TFC (total final consumption) of natural gas
in North Cuba Basin.4 This is approximately half of the estimated 10.4 billion barrels of recoverable crude oil
in the Alaska Natural Wildlife Reserve. If viewed in strictly instrumental terms—namely, increasing
the pool of potential imports to the U.S. market by accessing Cuban oil and ethanol holdings —Cuba’s oil
represents little in the way of absolute material gain to the U.S. energy supply. But the possibility
of energy cooperation between the United States and Cuba offers significant relative gains connected to the
potential for developing production-sharing agreements, promoting the transfer of state-of-the art technology and
foreign direct investment, and increasing opportunities for the development of joint-venture partnerships,
and scientific-technical exchanges.
Zero link---global oil market makes plan irrelevant for prices
Fong 12 Jocelyn, Media Matters Blog, "20 Experts Who Say Drilling Won't Lower Gas Prices", March
22, mediamatters.org/blog/2012/03/22/20-experts-who-say-drilling-wont-lower-gas-pric/184040
In a pretty impressive act of journalism, the Associated Press recently conducted a "statistical analysis of 36 years of monthly,
inflation-adjusted gasoline prices and U.S. domestic oil production." The result: "No statistical
correlation between how much oil comes out of U.S. wells and the price at the pump." It's neat to see math cut
through the talking points and get straight to the truth of the matter -- which is that expanding drilling is a fundamentally ineffectual response to gas price spikes.¶ Given that changes in
U.S. oil production don't move gasoline prices, it should be clear that U.S. government policies
related to drilling are of even smaller consequence. Indeed, 92 percent of economists surveyed by the
Chicago Booth School of Business agreed this week that "changes in U.S. gasoline prices over the past 10 years have predominantly been due to market factors rather than
U.S. federal economic or energy policies."¶ Still not convinced? How about another 20 economists and analysts from across the political
spectrum who will tell you the same thing:¶ Ken Green, American Enterprise Institute, "If the U.S. produced more of its own oil, it
would probably reduce imports, but it's not likely that it would reduce prices ... We probably cannot produce so much oil to exert
downward pressure on prices compared to the world market."¶ Peter Van Doren and Jerry Taylor, Cato Institute: "Sure, more domestic oil creates the
possibility of fewer refined imports tied to the price of Brent crude, but given that the price of Brent sets the price for crude generally, the result would be more profit for domestic crude producers rather than
Holtz-Eakin, American Action Forum: "Domestic action to
increase production will not lower gas prices set on a global market."¶ Christopher Knittel, MIT
economist: "There are not many markets where the United States can't impose its will on market outcomes ... This
is one we can't, and it's hard for the average American to understand that and it's easy for politicians to
feed off that."¶ Pinelopi Goldberg, Yale economist: "US domestic policy has only tiny effect on the
world price of oil. US foreign policy is probably more relevant than energy policy."¶ Steve Koonin, Institute for
Defense Analyses: "When you hear the international oil companies advocating for energy independence, it's really
about making money, which isn't a bad thing ... If they produce a million more barrels a day, they're not going to
significantly lower gasoline prices for Americans (not that there's anything wrong with that)."¶ Doug
change the global price much. And since they know the global price is going up, they'll just make more money. There's nothing wrong with that, but it doesn't solve the price problem or the
greenhouse gas problem."¶ Michael Levi, Council on Foreign Relations: "The amount of oil you produce at home doesn't affect the price ... You
can lower your vulnerability to price by lowering your consumption of oil, but not by increasing your production."¶ Severin Borenstein, UC Berkeley economist:
"Producing more oil domestically will enrich the U.S. economy , particularly U.S. oil companies and their workers. With oil so valuable, it may be a
good idea, though the value must be weighed against environmental consequences. But it will have no discernible impact on gas prices , because it will change the
world's supply/demand balance for oil by less than 2 or 3 percent over a decade or more."¶ David Peterson, Duke statistician: "U.S. production and demand have little to do with the price of gasoline in the U.S." ¶
Sandalow, former Brookings fellow:
Drilling offshore to lower oil prices is like walking an extra 20 feet per day to lose weight.
... It's just not going to make much of a difference."¶ Tom Kloza, Oil Price Information Service: "This drill drill drill thing is tired ... It's a simplistic
way of looking for a solution that doesn't exist."¶ Richard Newell, former Administrator of Energy Information Administration: "We do not project
additional volumes of oil that could flow from greater access to oil resources on Federal lands to have a large
impact on prices given the globally integrated nature of the world oil market."¶ Dean Baker, Center for Economic and Policy Research:
"There is almost no disagreement among economists that drilling everywhere all the time
offshore will have almost no impact on the price of gas in the United States. The reason is that we have a world market for
oil. The additional oil that might come from offshore drilling is a drop in the bucket in a
world oil market of almost 90 million barrels a day."¶ Lou Crandall, Wrightson ICAP LLC: "Higher oil prices today are a global phenomenon, and the additional
Edward Melnick, NYU statistician: When U.S. production goes up, the price of gas "is certainly not going down ... The data does not suggest that whatsoever."¶ David
"
supply from increased drilling by the U.S. would not alter the global balance of supply and demand greatly. Gasoline prices at the pump would be higher either way. The only difference is that a somewhat larger
Bledsoe, Bipartisan Policy Center: "The notion that
somehow we can produce so much domestically that we will move the global price is incorrect ."¶ Tom
O'Donnell, The New School: "The amount of extra oil that the U.S. would produce, as far as affecting the world price
of oil, is almost insignificant."'¶ Deborah Gordon, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: "We can drill doggedly in our own backyards, but the price of gasoline will remain
more a matter of speculation over externally-driven factors than tapping new sources of oil at home."¶ Joseph Dukert, energy analyst: "Americans tend to exaggerate the price effects of fluctuations in
domestic production in relation to the total amount of oil in global trade. On the larger stage, the perception of geopolitical risks is more
important."¶ Phyllis Martin, Energy Information Administration: "In 2009, the U.S. produced about 7 percent of what was produced in the entire world, so increasing the oil
production in the U.S. is not going to make much of a difference in world markets and world prices ... It
just gets lost. It's not that much."
share of the revenue would accrue to domestic interests (governmental and private) rather than to foreign suppliers."¶ Paul
XT – Price Crash Inevitable/Shale Revolution
There’s a global glut of overproduction – price crash is inevitable
Maugeri 12 – Leonardo Maugeri is currently a Research Fellow of the Geopolitics of Energy Project
at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Mr. Maugeri has
been a Visiting Scholar at MIT (2009–2010) and a member of MIT's External Energy Advisory Board. He
also serves as an International Counselor of the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(Washington, D.C.) and as a member of the Global Energy Advisory Board of Accenture, and he is a senior
fellow of the Foreign Policy Association (New York). June 2012, "Oil: The Next Revolution"
belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Oil-%20The%20Next%20Revolution.pdf
Contrary to what most people believe, oil supply capacity is growing worldwide at such an unprecedented
level that it might outpace consumption. This could lead to a glut of overproduction and a steep
dip in oil prices.¶ Based on original, bottom-up, field-by-field analysis of most oil exploration and
development projects in the world, this paper suggests that an unrestricted, additional production (the level of
production targeted by each single project, according to its schedule, unadjusted for risk) of more than 49
million barrels per day of oil (crude oil and natural gas liquids, or NGLs) is targeted for 2020, the
equivalent of more than half the current world production capacity of 93 mbd. ¶ After adjusting this substantial
figure considering the risk factors affecting the actual accomplishment of the projects on a country-by-country basis, the
additional production that could come by 2020 is about 29 mbd. Factoring in depletion rates of currently producing
oilfields and their “reserve growth” (the estimated increases in crude oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids that could be added to
existing reserves through extension, revision, improved recovery efficiency, and the discovery of new pools or reservoirs), the net
additional production capacity by 2020 could be 17.6 mbd, yielding a world oil production capacity of
110.6 mbd by that date – as shown in Figure 1. This would represent the most significant increase in
any decade since the 1980s.
Volatility and price crash inevitable
Maugeri 12 – Leonardo Maugeri is currently a Research Fellow of the Geopolitics of Energy Project
at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Mr. Maugeri has
been a Visiting Scholar at MIT (2009–2010) and a member of MIT's External Energy Advisory Board. He
also serves as an International Counselor of the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(Washington, D.C.) and as a member of the Global Energy Advisory Board of Accenture, and he is a senior
fellow of the Foreign Policy Association (New York). June 2012, "Oil: The Next Revolution"
belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Oil-%20The%20Next%20Revolution.pdf
The oil market will remain highly volatile until 2015 and prone to extreme movements in
opposite directions, thus representing a major challenge for investors, in spite of its short and long term
opportunities. After 2015, however, most of the projects considered in this paper will advance significantly and
contribute to a strong build-up of the world’s production capacity. This could provoke a major
phenomenon of overproduction and lead to a significant, stable dip of oil prices, unless oil demand
were to grow at a sustained yearly rate of at least 1.6 percent for the entire decade.
Shale drilling means production rising now
Oil & Gas Financial Journal 12-4 – Oil & Gas Financial Journal, December 4th, 2012, "Shale
drilling boosts US crude oil production to highest level in 15 years" www.ogfj.com/articles/2012/12/shaledrilling.html
US crude oil production (including lease condensate) averaged almost 6.5 million barrels per day in
September 2012, the highest volume in nearly 15 years, according to the US Energy Information
Administration. The last time the United States produced 6.5 million barrels per day or more of crude oil was in January 1998.¶
Since September 2011, US production has increased by more than 900,000 barrels per day. Most of
that increase is due to production from oil-bearing rocks with very low permeability through the use of
horizontal drilling technology combined with hydraulic fracturing. The states with the largest increases are
Texas and North Dakota.¶ From September 2011 to September 2012, Texas production increased by more than 500,000 barrels per
day, and North Dakota production increased by more than 250,000 barrels per day. Texas’s increase in production is largely from
the Eagle Ford shale formation in South Texas and the Permian Basin in West Texas.¶ North Dakota’s increase in oil production
comes from the Bakken shale formation in the Williston Basin. Increased production from smaller-volume producing
states, such as Oklahoma, New Mexico, Wyoming, Colorado, and Utah, is also contributing to the rise in
domestic crude oil production.
US oil production increasing now
Flintoff 12 (Corey Flintoff is a foreign correspondent for NPR, “Where Does America Get Oil? You
May Be Surprised”, April 12, 2012, http://www.npr.org/2012/04/11/150444802/where-does-americaget-oil-you-may-be-surprised)
U.S. Is Producing More Oil¶ Analysts also point out that the U.S. is producing more oil domestically while reducing its
dependence on oil in general.¶ The recent recession and the slow economic recovery have dampened demand for oil products. But
"the big story is that the U.S. has really expanded production over the past several years," says Crane, citing
the production of oil from shale in North Dakota and other states.
XT – Cuba Doesn’t Affect Oil Market
Drilling in the Gulf has no impact on world oil prices
CCPP 10 – Collins Center for Public Policy, April 2010, "Potential Impacts of Oil & Gas Explorations in
the Gulf," A Report to the Century Commission for a Sustainable Florida,
www.mote.org/clientuploads/MPI/offshore oil drilling report_lr.pdf
An important distinction to make between oil and natural gas markets is that prices for oil are largely
determined through world markets while prices for natural gas are largely determined
through regional markets. Even the most optimistic amounts of potential oil production from Florida
state submerged lands and/or the Eastern Gulf of Mexico would be inconsequential for world
market prices, which are dictated by more than 80 million barrels of oil consumed per day.
AT: Russian Oil – Econ/Production Collapsing Now
Russia economy low now---multiple alt causes
Businessweek 13 – Scott Rose AND*** Olga Tanas, January 31st, 2013, "Russian Economy
Probably Slowed to Three-Year Low in 2012" www.businessweek.com/news/2013-01-30/russianeconomy-probably-slowed-to-three-year-low-in-2012
Russia’s economy probably grew last year at the weakest pace since a contraction in 2009 and is set to
slow further, casting doubt on President Vladimir Putin’s drive for an investment-led acceleration in
output.¶ Gross domestic product expanded 3.6 percent in 2012, down from 4.3 percent the previous two
years, according to the median of 18 estimates in a Bloomberg survey. The Economy Ministry estimated
growth at 3.5 percent. The Federal Statistics Service in Moscow will report the data this week.¶ The slowdown
highlights the challenges facing the world’s largest energy exporter as oil prices are
forecast to stagnate this year and Europe’s stumbling economy saps demand for Russian
commodity exports. The government began an open campaign this month to push the central bank to lower rates, a step the
regulator is resisting because of concerns the economy is already growing near its potential.¶ “We need a government that is
more proactive on the reform side,” Peter Westin, chief strategist at Aton Capital in Moscow, said by phone. “The central
bank is doing a good job, but the government is definitely behind the curve when it comes to what
needs to be done to stimulate the economy.Ӧ Russian stocks lagged behind other emerging
markets, with the MSCI Russia Index advancing 9.6 percent in 2012, trailing a 15 percent jump in the MSCI Emerging Markets
Index. The Micex Index (INDEXCF) of 50 stocks was little changed, trading 0.1 percent lower at 1,542.73 at 2:32 p.m. The rubledenominated gauge trades at 5.7 times projected earnings, making it the cheapest of 21 emerging markets tracked by Bloomberg.¶
‘Critically Important’¶ Russia faces a “critically important” period over the next five years as the government targets “steady
economic growth” of at least 5 percent a year, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said at a government meeting in Moscow today.
Speaking at the same event, Putin pointed to the economy’s “slowdown” over the last two quarters and said high interest
rates are affecting bank lending.¶ “The main risks aren’t external, but domestic,” Medvedev
said. “The potential of development in the context of a traditional export-oriented model has practically
been exhausted.”¶ Economy Slumps¶ GDP probably expanded 2.4 percent in the final three months of last year compared with
the same period a year earlier, according to the median of 17 estimates in a Bloomberg survey. Growth reached an estimated 2.2
percent, Deputy Economy Minister Andrei Klepach told reporters Jan. 29.¶ The deceleration is likely to continue
well into next year, according to Evgeny Nadorshin, chief economist at AFK Sistema, a Russian investment company with
assets ranging from telecommunications to oil.¶ “Russia’s economy is hitting the brakes, and the December data
show growth slowing in the very important areas” of investment and consumer demand, Nadorshin said. “Economic growth is not
only at its potential, but the room to increase output is exhausted. We’re close to the point of
overheating that we neared before the crisis.”¶ ‘Achilles Heel’¶ Fixed-capital investment contracted in annual
terms in December for the second time in four months, the Federal Statistics Service in Moscow said in a report last week.
Sluggish spending by companies to boost output has become the “Achilles heel” of the
economy, according to Klepach.¶ “Interest rates for companies today are at a level that is really
stifling investment,” Economy Minister Andrei Belousov told reporters yesterday in Moscow.¶ The central bank raised
borrowing costs in September, becoming the largest emerging market to do so last year. First Deputy Chairman Alexei Ulyukayev
said this month he doesn’t see any potential gains from reducing interest rates.¶ The joblessness rate fell to 5.3 percent in December,
putting it below the full employment rate of about 6 percent, according to Aton’s Westin. That means competition for workers may
start to push up wages, stoking inflation that overshot the central bank’s 6 percent target last year.¶ The government is looking to
investment as a source for growth amid signs that household consumption, which accounts for about half
the economy, is stumbling. Real wages advanced at the slowest pace in more than three years in December, which may
sap buying power.
Collapse of Russia oil/gas production inevitable---decreased Europe use
and US shale revolution
Rapoza 12 – Kenneth Rapoza, writer for Forbes, October 3rd, 2012, "Is Russia Ready For Life After
Oil?" www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2012/10/03/is-russia-ready-for-life-after-oil/
Earlier this year, as in April 2012, major oil producers had their worst month in a year. Oil production is flat
to declining for companies like Rosneft and Lukoil. All told, for the roughly 10 companies drilling for oil and gas in Russia,
production rose 0.9 percent on the year back in April. It’s not much better now.¶ Oil exports are in decline, as are gas exports to
Europe. Oil production at traditional fields is in decline. Same with gas. New fields won’t make up
for it with their average one to two percent growth rate, said Maxim Oreshkin, chief Russian economist at
VTB Capital in Moscow.¶ “We clearly see that in the government,” said Andrey Belousov, Minister of Economic Development.
”There is a deteriorating situation in Europe and that impacts natural gas sales for us. In the
not so distant future, we see natural gas playing a tiny role in Russia, and maybe even a
Europe.”¶ Moreover, the U.S. doesn’t need Russian natural gas anymore. We
negative one because of
have our own. As the
world also looks for sources of renewable energy and transport, such as electric cars, demand will
stabilize. Russia needs to figure out what to do with itself before time runs out.¶ Last year, oil production in Russia
reached 511.3 million tons, or 10.26 million barrels per day. It was the highest level since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
highest in the world together with Saudi Arabia. Russia’s declared goal in its oil policy is to maintain annual output at around 505
million tons over the next few years and increase it to 535 million tons by 2030.¶ However, despite the fact that proven
Russian oil reserves are still vast, and that Russia probably has very large undiscovered deposits, it will be
practically impossible to achieve this goal because of structural deficiencies in the market structure
(taxation on revenue instead of profit).¶ A significant fall of Russian oil production is inevitable.
The degree of the decline will depend on the actions the government takes in its fiscal policy and the
investment climate in general.
AT: Russian Oil – No Econ Collapse
Plan doesn’t collapse Russian oil – doesn’t get close to the $13 threshold
IHT 4 (1/7, Lexis)
a steep decline in oil prices would pose a threat to the economy, analysts say.
Russia can withstand a serious crisis as long as oil remains above $13.50, according to
one economist. After oil prices averaged $28.80 a barrel in 2003, Russia's GDP could still grow a healthy 5.5 percent even if the
price of Brent crude falls to $23 a barrel this year.
Given its dependence on oil revenue,
Oil no longer key to Russian econ
Devyatov 11 – URALSIB Capital's chief economist (15 June 2011, Alexey, Reduced Impact of Oil on Russian Economic Growth,
http://www.bne.eu/story2735/Reduced_Impact_of_Oil_on_Russian_Economic_Growth)
The recent rally in oil prices has shown that the impact of high oil prices on the Russian economy has
been reduced, and the economy has become more sensitive to government policy. The social security
tax increase at the start of the year led to a contraction of capital investment and real incomes, which have still not recovered to their
former level. The tax increase resulted in a deceleration of GDP and industry growth in 1Q11, which was aggravated by the appreciation of the ruble in real terms and
Given these factors, we have revised down our previous macroeconomic forecast
rather than upgraded it based on a higher oil price outlook. Nonetheless, we maintain our fundamental view that the Russian
attainment of full capacity utilization after the crisis.
economy will grow 2-4% over the next several years, which is above the DM average. ¶ Given the oil price rally, we expect a stronger ruble and a smaller budget deficit in
2011. Ruble appreciation has forced the Central Bank to purchase foreign currencies, creating additional short-term inflation risks. However, now it appears that the bank
has finally shifted its policy towards lowering inflation. Additional downward pressure on inflation will come from the adoption of a 6% regulated tariff growth cap for all
users instead of the currently projected cap of 10-15%. We expect inflation in 2012 to reach 8.4% and in 2013 to come in line with our 6-7% long-term inflation target. ¶
Reduced impact of oil on the economy ¶ After remaining flat at about $75/bbl in 3Q10, oil prices started to climb in 4Q10, fueled by inflationary expectations and large
volumes of free liquidity. The unrest in the Middle East and North Africa in 1Q11 pushed oil prices to above $120/bbl, which was followed by a correction to about
an increase of over 40% in the oil price within a few months appears not to have
supported the Russian economy to the extent it had in the past. According to the preliminary Rosstat estimate,
1Q11 GDP growth came to 4.1% YoY after growth of 4.5% YoY in 4Q10. The main reasons for the increasing insensitivity of the
Russian economy to rising oil prices are related to ruble appreciation and inflation, which have eroded the
purchasing power of oil. In the past, the Russian economy was supported by the volume of crude oil
exports doubling between 2000 and 2005 and by a sharp increase in oil prices in 2007-1H08, which caused a temporary spike in both nominal and real oil revenues.
However, since 2006, the volume of oil exports has stagnated, largely due to production constraints. ¶ The purchasing power of oil is a
$110/bbl. Nevertheless,
combination of the nominal oil price, the nominal exchange rate and inflation. It is more meaningful for the real economy than the nominal price because it shows directly
the amount of goods and services oil exporters receive in return for a barrel of oil. Surprisingly, despite its high volatility, the purchasing power of oil has not increased in
the last decade. Moreover, in real terms oil at $26- 28/bbl in 2000 was more expensive than it is at $110-120 in 2011. Over the past decade, inflation has eaten away the
Russia has
needed constantly increasing oil prices. Given the stagnant volumes of oil exports and the high inflation, we
expect a gradual contraction in the purchasing power of oil, as well as the real revenues from oil
exports. ¶ The implications seem to be clear: the impact of high oil prices on the Russian
economy will remain moderate, unless prices reach $200/bbl in the next couple of years. Even though the risks of further
escalation of civil unrest in the Middle East could lead to such a scenario unfolding, we do not believe this will happen. Consequently, Russia will have to gradually
learn to manage without primary dependence on oil and find alternative growth sources. Therefore, it is not
surprising to hear calls for the drastic need to improve the investment climate and to attract foreign direct investment, as
both state officials and the private sector share the same concerns.
four-fold increase in the oil price. This is also the reason why in order to both maintain the real value of budget expenditure and to balance the budget,
Oil not key – consensus of experts
Bondar and Reznikova 11 [writers for RBC Daily [Russia], 2011, Natalia and Anna, "Oil Out of
Favor," RBC daily, No.194, Lexis]
The weak GDP growth in the first half-year and the low level of domestic demand make HSBC analysts lower their estimate of economic growth from 5.5% to 4.2%
The rise in oil prices has a much smaller effect on the domestic demand than it
did before the crisis, and at a longer time lag," says Alexander Morozov, chief economist of HSBC for Russia and CIS. The trend reduces the
speed of development of the national economy, but makes it stable. However, " a possible fall in oil prices by $10-20 per barrel
will not result in such negative consequences as we had in 2008," he says. At the same time, it will be difficult to
in 2011 and from 4% to 3% in 2012. "
prevent falling into stagnation without restoring a positive, although weak, growth of export. "A fall or stagnation of the external demand develops into stagnation of
industrial production and good traffic in Russia and undermines the domestic demand in the end," explains Alexander Morozov. The trend may be explained by the fact
the rise in oil prices didn't result in an increase of income, says Professor Ruben Yenikolopov
that
at the New
Economic School. However, the theory has an underside: the fall of income in 2011 may be due to the fact that people started "withdrawing into the shadows" after the
increase of social taxes, he says. "Oil cannot increase in price endlessly. Moreover, the volatility of oil prices has intensified over the past few years" which
induces the population to create "a safety cushion", says the economist. Besides, the domestic demand soared last year. This year is unlikely to see a significant rise of the
demand as the income of the population fell 7%. The situation is hard for the business, too. "The demand for products manufactured by local companies is falling. An even
deeper fall of demand was prevented by the reduction of prices for some types of products," says Sergey Tsukhlo, Head of Market Survey Laboratory at the Institute for the
Economy in Transition. Companies are pessimistic about the future. "In July, only 22% of respondents believed that the launch of investment programmes was hampered
by the uncertainty. In October, their number increased to 43%," says Sergey Tsukhlo. "We are entering the stage of "new normality".
The cooling-off of the
economy affects all macroeconomic processes," explains Valery Mironov, chief economist of the Center
for Development at the Higher School of Economics. The growth of consumption had been boosted by
loans before. After the 2008 crisis, both households and the business became more careful about
stepping up the debt load. The bulk of the population was never guided by the value of oil, says Georgy
Ostapkovich, Director of the Center for Innovation Commercialization at the National Research
Institute The Higher School of Economics. The index of consumer confidence is rising, the segment of consumer lending expanding, real cash income of the
population growing, although the growth rate of saving is falling, he says. The retail goods turnover increased 9% over the period January-September 2011, agrees Igor
Nikolaev, Director of Strategic Analysis at FBK Company.
AT: Russian Oil – No Econ Impact
No impact – won’t alter their foreign policy
Blackwill 9 – former associate dean of the Kennedy School of Government and Deputy Assistant to
the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Planning (Robert, RAND, “The
Geopolitical Consequences of the World Economic Recession—A Caution”,
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP275.pdf)
Now on to Russia. Again, five years from today. Did the global recession and Russia’s present serious economic problems
substantially modify Russian foreign policy? No. (President Obama is beginning his early July visit to Moscow as
this paper goes to press; nothing fundamental will result from that visit). Did it produce a serious weakening of Vladimir
Putin’s power and authority in Russia? No, as recent polls in Russia make clear. Did it reduce Russian worries and
capacities to oppose NATO enlargement and defense measures eastward? No. Did it affect Russia’s willingness to accept much
tougher sanctions against Iran? No. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov has said there is no evidence that Iran intends to make a
nuclear weapon.25 In sum, Russian foreign policy is today on a steady, consistent path that can be characterized
as follows: to resurrect Russia’s standing as a great power; to reestablish Russian primary influence over the space of the former
Soviet Union; to resist Western eff orts to encroach on the space of the former Soviet Union; to revive Russia’s military might
and power projection; to extend the reach of Russian diplomacy in Europe, Asia, and beyond; and to oppose American global
primacy. For Moscow, these foreign policy first principles are here to stay, as they have existed in Russia for centuries. 26 None
of these enduring objectives of Russian foreign policy are likely to be changed in any serious way by the
economic crisis.
Russian stability does not depend on its economy
Goodrich and Zeihan 9 [Lauren Goodrich, Stratfor's Director of Analysis and Senior Eurasia
analyst, and Peter Zeihan, Vice President of Analysis at Stratfor, “The Financial Crisis and the Six Pillars
of Russian Strength,” March 3 2009,
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090302_financial_crisis_and_six_pillars_russian_strength]
Politics: It is no secret that the Kremlin uses an iron fist to maintain domestic control. There are
few domestic forces the government cannot control or balance. The Kremlin understands the
revolutions (1917 in particular) and collapses (1991 in particular) of the past, and it has control mechanisms in
place to prevent a repeat. This control is seen in every aspect of Russian life, from one main political party
ruling the country to the lack of diversified media, limits on public demonstrations and the infiltration of the
security services into nearly every aspect of the Russian system. This domination was fortified under Stalin and has
been re-established under the reign of former President and now-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. This
political strength is based on neither financial nor economic foundations. Instead, it is based
within the political institutions and parties, on the lack of a meaningful opposition, and with the backing of the
military and security services. Russia's neighbors, especially in Europe, cannot count on the same political strength because their
systems are simply not set up the same way. The stability of the Russian government and lack of stability in the former Soviet
states and much of Central Europe have also allowed the Kremlin to reach beyond Russia and influence its neighbors to the east.
Now as before, when some of its former Soviet subjects -- such as Ukraine -- become destabilized, Russia sweeps in as a source
of stability and authority, regardless of whether this benefits the recipient of Moscow's attention
AT: Russian Oil – Diversification Turn
Low oil prices key to the Russian economy – prompts diversification
Glazov et al 4 (Jamie, Frontpage Magazine’s Managing Editor and Ph.D. in History with a specialty
in Soviet Studies, with Ion Mihai Pacepa, the former acting chief of Communist Romania’s espionage
service, James Woolsey, director of the CIA from 1993-95, Vladimir Bukovsky, a former leading Soviet
dissident who spent twelve years in Soviet prisons, “Symposium: KGB Resurrection,” 4/30,
http://www.frontpagemag.com/articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=13210)
Our oil dependence is an even more salient issue than when our percentage of imports was much less during the two oil shocks of the 1970's. The Russian
economy is heavily influenced by the price of oil. Saudis, controlling at least half of the world's swing production capacity,
dropped the bottom out of the oil market in 1985 and the Soviets never really recovered. We will never have that kind of control, but we can to a great
extent reduce our dependence, give ourselves more leverage over the oil market , make it more
difficult for the Saudis and others to raise prices to our economic and political disadvantage, and lead the Russian regime to realize
that it may need to re-assess its direction. I used to believe that anything, including a strong oil market,
that bolstered the Russian economy and produced prosperity would be likely to cause the growth of a middle class and, in time, more
pressure for economic and political liberalization. The events of the last eighteen months or so have convinced me that
such is not correct. Putin has used the economic prosperity produced by a strong oil
market to consolidate his power and lead Russia toward a form of fascism -- oil prices
have given him the idea that he can do anything he wants . Oil can tend to centralize power in any society except in a
mature democracy such as Norway. It now seems to me that it is in our interest both in terms of our dealings with
Russia and with the Middle East to do as much as possible to reduce our reliance on oil. To do this we would
need to move toward alternative fuels, especially those produced from waste, that can be used in the existing infrastructure and toward more fuel efficient vehicles, such as
hybrids, that are available now -- not wait on the hydrogen economy. In spite of their very high levels of oil production the Russians can't bring new production on- and offline quickly as the Saudis can due to weather, location, etc. So
if the Russians see us moving steadily toward reducing our oil use
they may become far more reasonable than they are
and thus their ability to make money from their high-cost production
now. Today they have the bit in their teeth and, to mix a metaphor, they feel as if they have the world by the tail more and more firmly with each dollar the price of oil
increases. They need to be shown that their prosperity is not assured without some
fundamental changes and that it would be good for their economy and society if they
diversified their economy. For more reasons than one it is in our interest for them to be worried about the possibility that oil prices could fall.
Diversification solves aggression and political reforms
Cohen & Ericson 9 – Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom
Davis Institute for International Studies, AND*** Richard Ericson, Ph.D., Chair of the Department of
Economics at the East Carolina University and former Director of the Harriman Institute at Columbia
University, November 2nd, 2009, The Heritage Foundation, “Russia's Economic Crisis and U.S.-Russia
Relations: Troubled Times Ahead,” http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/11/russiaseconomic-crisis-and-us-russia-relations-troubled-times-ahead
An economic model based on natural resources would tend to perpetuate authoritarianism,
nationalism, and corruption, and it would require Russia to follow a neo-imperial policy throughout the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to support Russian domination of the pipeline system. In a way, the
petrostate model and the associated militarized foreign policy require Russia to label the U.S. as an
enemy. A more open and diversified economy would be more compatible with democratization and the
rule of law. Russia's falling economic performance has dampened some aspects of the revisionist rhetoric, but has not drastically
changed Russia's foreign policy narrative, which remains decidedly anti-status quo and implicitly anti-American. Recent increases in
oil prices ensure the continuation of this policy. Even during the current crisis, Russia has continued to voice strong
grievances against the West and made revisionist demands to change key international economic and
European security institutions for its benefit. Unless the Kremlin significantly reorients its foreign and security policy
priorities, the Obama Administration's attempt to "reset" U.S.-Russian relations may fail. Only a coherent policy by the Obama
Administration and Congress can force the Russian leadership to realize that they would be better served by cooperating with the
U.S. and the West than by subverting it. The Russian Petrostate Rollercoaster In the 1990s, the Russian economy struggled with a
difficult transition from central planning to a market economy under Boris Yeltsin. In the current decade, wealth from raw
materials has fueled an increasingly revisionist foreign policy. Yet while the Russian elite views Russia as a great
energy and military power, its economic productivity is only one-third of U.S. productivity,[4] and its gross domestic product (GDP)
is between $1.1 trillion and $1.8 trillion, depending on oil prices, and is smaller than the GDPs of France, Italy, and the U.K. From
2000 to 2008, the Kremlin benefited from rising oil prices. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's popularity soared as Russia entered a
period of intense economic growth. By 2008, Russia had become one of the 10 largest economies in the world. In only 10 years, its
GDP had increased by more than eightfold (measured in U.S. dollars), having grown at an average annual rate of around 7 percent in
constant rubles.[5] Real wages increased significantly, from $62 in 1999 to $529 in 2007.[6] Russia had the best stock market
performance of any emerging markets during this time.[7] This economic growth occurred despite the Kremlin's efforts, beginning
in 2003, to renationalize much of Russia's natural resources and other strategic sectors of the economy. In 2003, the Kremlin took
control of YUKOS, the largest publicly traded Russian oil company, and jailed its owner Mikhail Khodorkovsky. During Putin's
second presidential term, the Kremlin's international rhetoric and actions became increasingly assertive, even
aggressive. The euphoria surrounding Russia as the "hottest new emerging market" and the considerable increase in
living standards have obscured the fact that the economy lacks a diversified base and heavily depends on
energy exports. (See Table 2.) Russia suffers from desperately weak rule of law, including property rights and corporate and state
governance.[8] Its economy is not technologically competitive, labor costs are high, productivity is low, and foreign direct
investment is stunted by state corruption and the lack of the rule of law.
Political reforms solve stability
Freeland and Gutterman 12 – Chrystia Freeland and Steve Gutterman, writers for Reuters,
January 17, 2012, “Russia faces violent revolution if it doesn’t embrace democracy, billionaire Putin
challenger declares”, http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/01/17/russia-faces-violent-revolution-if-itdoesnt-embrace-democracy-billionaire-putin-challenger-declares/
MOSCOW — Mikhail Prokhorov, a super-rich tycoon challenging Vladimir Putin for Russia’s presidency in March, said his
country faced the danger of violent revolution if it did not break conservative resistance and move quickly
to democracy.¶ Prokhorov, a billionaire bachelor long seen more as playboy than politician, told The Freeland File on
reuters.com Russians had shaken off a post-Soviet apathy and were now “just crazy about politics.” He denied accusations he was a
Kremlin tool, let into the race to split the opposition and lend democratic legitimacy to a vote Putin seems almost certain to win.¶
Putin is seeking to return to the Kremlin and rule until at least 2018, but protests against alleged fraud in a December 4
parliamentary vote have exposed growing discontent with the system he has dominated for 12 years.¶ “What worked before
does not work now. Look in the streets. People are not happy,” Prokhorov, 46, said in the interview beneath the
windowed dome that soars above his spacious office on a central Moscow boulevard close to the Kremlin.¶ “It is time to change,”
said Prokhorov, ranked by Forbes magazine as Russia’s third-richest person, with an $18-billion metals-to-banking empire that
includes the New Jersey Nets basketball team in the United States.¶ “Stability at any price is no longer acceptable for
Russians.Ӧ But Prokhorov made clear he considers revolution equally unacceptable for a country with grim memories of a century
of hardship, war and upheaval starting with Vladimir Lenin’s 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, instead calling for “very fast evolution.”¶ “I
am against any revolution, because I know the history of Russia. Every time we have revolution, it was a very bloody period,” he
said.¶ The son of a Soviet sports official, Prokhorov has a basketball player’s 204-cm (6-foot-8) frame, a narrow face and a head of
short-cut hair graying around the edges. In a dark suit and blue shirt that looked modest for a¶ Russian tycoon, he sat straight and
spoke in English.¶ Public political consciousness is on the rise after years of apathy . The Soviet mentality is fading as
a generation of Russians who “don’t know who Lenin was” grows up, he said. The country was finally ripe for change.¶
“We now have all the pieces in place to move very fast to being a real democracy,” Prokhorov said.¶ But he
suggested there was a mounting battle in the ruling elite between liberals like himself and conservatives “ready to pay any price” to
maintain the status quo. Russia, he said, could face a bloody revolution if opponents of reform prevail .¶
“If there are no changes in Russia, from day to day this risk will increase,” Prokhorov said. “Because 15, 20 percent
of the population, the most active ones living in the big cities, want to live in a democratic country.”
XT – Diversification Turn
Low prices cause diversification
Moiseev 12 Alexey Moiseev is head of macroeconomic analysis at VTB Capital, July 6, 2012,
“Modernisation is Russia's cure for 'Dutch disease'”,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/russianow/business/9382538/russia-dutch-disease.html
Russia has experienced the full effects of the de-industrialisation syndrome known as “Dutch disease”.¶
Any country trying to diversify will always face major challenges if it tries to do so when commodity
prices are high. In such an environment, return on capital in the commodity sectors will typically be much
higher than elsewhere in the economy, causing capital to drift away from manufacturing sectors towards
commodity production and trading. This de-industrialisation is known as “Dutch disease” and was named
after a similar trend noted in the Netherlands after natural gas was discovered in the North Sea.¶ Russia has
experienced the full effects of this well-known syndrome. The government made every effort to prevent, or at the very
least to slow, the decline in other sectors of the economy brought about by the loss of capital. The main
technique used was the imposition of extremely high mineral resource extraction taxes and export tariffs on the
oil sector.¶ This worked for a short period, but became far less successful when the government started increasing social spending
significantly in the run-up to the 2007-08 election. Higher spending resulted in higher inflation, which put vastly
increased wage pressures on the non-resource orientated private sector, dramatically eroding its
competitiveness.
Diversification leads to stability
VOA 11 Voice of America, November 7, 2011, “IMF: Russia Must Reduce Oil Dependence, Diversify”,
http://www.voanews.com/content/imf-russia-must-reduce-oil-dependence-133449298/169363.html
The head of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) says that Russia, the world's largest oil producer, needs to reduce
its reliance on oil revenues and diversify its economy to keep it stable.¶ The IMF's managing director,
Christine Lagarde, said Tuesday in Moscow that even though Russia has enacted fiscal reforms in recent years, it
still faces "important vulnerabilities." She said the country's budget deficit, excluding oil revenues, has more
than tripled, and that Russia needs to move "toward a more vibrant and diversified economy ."
2AC Environment/Spills DA
Current regs solve
DOI 11 U.S. Department of the Interior, November 2011, “Proposed Outer Continental Shelf Oil & Gas
Leasing Program 2012-2017”,
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/Proposed_OCS_Oil_Gas_Lease_Program_2012-2017.pdf
In developing this Proposed Program, BOEM carefully considered the risks associated with oil spills; the measures needed to reduce the
likelihood of their occurrence and mitigate damage in the unlikely event of a blowout; and the significant safety and environmental
improvements that have resulted from the reforms that BOEM and BSEE implemented since the
Deepwater Horizon event, as well as improved industry capabilities such as the development of subsea
containment systems. The Draft EIS includes extensive consideration of these reforms, as well as discussion of how the current standards compare with what
regulations previously required. It concludes that the new measures create a more robust regulatory system that strikes the
right balance to ensure that energy development is conducted safely and in an environmentally
responsible manner, while also being more efficient, transparent, and responsive . For a more detailed description of the
regulatory, policy, and procedural actions taken since the Deepwater Horizon event in order to mitigate risks, see Section IV.A of the Draft EIS for the 2012-2017 Program.
Cuban drilling is inevitable—only the plan allows for safe drilling that
prevents spills
Stephens et al 11 (Sarah, Executive Director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas, “As Cuba
plans to drill in the Gulf of Mexico, U.S. policy poses needless risks to our national interest,”
http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/Cuba_Drilling_and_US_Policy.pdf)
This year Cuba and its foreign partners will begin drilling for oil in the Gulf of Mexico. Drilling will take place
as close as 50 miles from Florida and in sites deeper than BP’s Macondo well, where an explosion in April 2010 killed 11
workers and created the largest oil spill ever in American waters. Undiscovered reserves of approximately 5 billion
barrels of oil and 9 trillion cubic feet of natural gas lie beneath the Gulf of Mexico in land belonging to Cuba,
according to the U.S. Geological Survey, although Cuba’s estimates contain higher figures. The amount actually recoverable remains
to be seen.¶ Finding oil in commercially viable amounts would be transformative for Cuba. Revenues from
natural resource wealth have the potential to provide long-sought stability for Cuba’s economy and are likely to
significantly alter its relations with Venezuela and the rest of Latin America, Asia and other leading energy producing
and consuming nations. Discoveries of commercially viable resources would also have an enormous
impact upon the Gulf environment shared by Cuba and the United States. ¶ The U.S. embargo against Cuba, a
remnant of the Cold War, is an obstacle to realizing and protecting our interests in the region. Not
only does it prohibit U.S. firms from joining Cuba in efforts to extract its offshore resources, thus giving the
competitive advantage to other foreign firms, but it also denies Cuba access to U.S. equipment for drilling
and environmental protection—an especially troubling outcome in the wake of the disastrous BP
spill. The embargo compels Cuba’s foreign partners to go through contortions—such as ordering a state of the art
drilling rig built in China and sailing it roughly 10,000 miles to Cuban waters—to avoid violating the content limitations
imposed by U.S. law. ¶ Most important, due to the failed policy of isolating Cuba, the United States cannot
engage in meaningful environmental cooperation with Cuba while it develops its own energy resources. Our
government cannot even address the threat of potential spills in advance from the frequent hurricane activity in the
Gulf or from technological failures, either of which could put precious and environmentally sensitive U.S.
coastal assets—our waters, our fisheries, our beaches—at great peril. ¶ The risks begin the moment the first drill bit
pierces the seabed, and increase from there. Yet, our policy leaves the Obama administration with limited options: ¶ • It could do
nothing. ¶ • It could try to stop Cuba from developing its oil and natural gas, an alternative most likely to fail in an energy-hungry
world, or¶ • It could agree to dialogue and cooperation with Cuba to ensure that drilling in the Gulf protects our mutual interests. ¶
Since the 1990s, Cuba has demonstrated a serious commitment to protecting the environment , building an array
of environmental policies, some based on U.S. and Spanish law. But it has no experience responding to major marinebased spills and, like our country, Cuba has to balance economic and environmental interests. In this contest, the
environmental side will not always prevail. ¶ Against this backdrop, cooperation and engagement between Cuba and the
United States is the right approach, and there is already precedent for it.¶ During the BP crisis, the U.S. shared
information with Cuba about the spill. The administration publicly declared its willingness to provide limited licenses for
U.S. firms to respond to a catastrophe that threatened Cuba. It also provided visas for Cuban scientists and
environmental officials to attend an important environmental conference in Florida. For its part, Cuba permitted a vessel
from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to look for damage in Cuban waters. But these modest
measures, however welcome, are not sufficient, especially in light of Cuba’s imminent plans to drill. ¶
Under the guise of environmental protection, Reps. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Vern Buchanan, Members of the U.S. Congress from
Florida, introduced bills to impose sanctions on foreign oil companies and U.S. firms that help Cuba drill for oil, and
to punish those foreign firms by denying them the right to drill in U.S. waters. This legislation would penalize
U.S. firms and anger our allies, but not stop Cuba from drilling, and will make the cooperation to protect our
mutual coastal environment more difficult should problems occur.¶ Energy policy and environmental
protection are classic examples of how the embargo is an abiding threat to U.S. interests. It should no longer
be acceptable to base U.S. foreign policy on the illusion that sanctions will cause Cuba’s government to collapse, or to try to stop
Cuba from developing its oil resources. Nor should this policy or the political dynamic that sustains it prevent the U.S. from
addressing both the challenges and benefits of Cuba finding meaningful amounts of oil in the Gulf of Mexico. ¶ The path forward
is clear. The Obama administration should use its executive authority to guarantee that firms with the best
equipment and greatest expertise are licensed in advance to fight the effects of an oil spill. The Treasury
Department, which enforces Cuba sanctions, should make clear to the private sector that efforts to protect
drilling safety will not be met with adverse regulatory actions. The U.S. government should commit to vigorous
information sharing with Cuba, and open direct negotiations with the Cuban government for environmental agreements modeled on
cooperation that already exists with our Canadian and Mexican neighbors.¶ Most of all, the administration should replace a
policy predicated on Cuba failing with a diplomatic approach that recognizes Cuba’s sovereignty. Only
then will our nation be able to respond effectively to what could become a new chapter in Cuba’s history and ours.¶
There is little time and much to do before the drilling begins.
No impact to the environment
Holly Doremus 2k Professor of Law at UC Davis, "The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New
Discourse," Winter 2000 Washington & Lee Law Review 57 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 11, lexis
Reluctant to concede such losses, tellers of the ecological horror story highlight how close a catastrophe might be, and how little
we know about what actions might trigger one. But the apocalyptic vision is less credible today than it
seemed in the 1970s. Although it is clear that the earth is experiencing a mass wave of extinctions, n213
the complete elimination of life on earth seems unlikely. n214 Life is remarkably robust.
Nor is human extinction probable any time soon. Homo sapiens is adaptable to nearly any
environment . Even if the world of the future includes far fewer species, it likely will hold people. n215
One response to this credibility problem tones the story down a bit, arguing not that humans will go
extinct but that ecological disruption will bring economies, and consequently civilizations, to their
knees. n216 But this too may be overstating the case. Most ecosystem functions are performed by
multiple species. This functional redundancy means that a high proportion of species can
be lost without precipitating a collapse . n217 Another response drops the horrific ending and returns to a
more measured discourse of the many material benefits nature provides humanity. Even these more plausible tales,
though, suffer from an important limitation. They call for nature protection only at a high level of
generality. For example, human-induced increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide levels may cause rapid
changes in global temperatures in the near future, with drastic consequences for sea levels, weather patterns, and
ecosystem services. n218 Similarly, the loss of large numbers of species undoubtedly reduces the genetic library from which we
might in the future draw useful resources. n219 But it is difficult to translate these insights into convincing
arguments against any one of the small local decisions that contribute to the problems of global
warming or biodiversity loss. n220 It is easy to argue that the material impact of any individual decision
to increase carbon emissions slightly or to destroy a small amount of habitat will be small.
It is difficult to identify the specific straw that will break the camel's back. Furthermore, no
unilateral action at the local or even national level can solve these global problems. Local
decisionmakers may feel paralyzed by the scope of the problems, or may conclude that any sacrifices they might make will go
unrewarded if others do not restrain their actions. In sum, at the local level at which most decisions affecting nature are made,
the material discourse provides little reason to save nature. Short of the ultimate catastrophe, the material benefits of destructive
decisions frequently will exceed their identifiable material costs. n221
XT – Squo Solves Spills
Squo solves regulatory problems – prevents spills
Smith 10 Eric R.A.N. Smith is professor of political science at the University of California, Santa
Barbara, August 30, 2010,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/08/30/think_again_offshore_drilling
"We Shouldn't Drill Until the Government Gets Its Act Together."¶ No. A retooling of the U.S. Minerals Management Service (MMS), which oversees offshore drilling, is
waiting for a perfect world makes no sense. The regulatory problems are well on their way to
being solved. The blitz of publicity given to oil-industry regulation after the spill and the first round of
bureaucratic reforms announced by Interior Secretary Ken Salazar in May are already having a huge impact. The people in
charge of safety and environmental protection are now in a separate agency, which no longer reports to
the administrators who are under pressure to increase oil revenues. They are also getting more money for
inspections and more time to conduct them. Their work is also being monitored by reporters looking for a sensational story. Together,
these changes will make offshore oil a lot safer.¶ Before the blowout, MMS actually seemed to be doing a pretty good job. There had been no major
certainly in order, but
oil spill from an offshore platform in U.S. waters since 1969. Both the number of spills and the amount of oil spilled into the ocean had been declining decade by decade since the
1970s. Offshore drilling was getting safer even as more oil was being produced. The result was that both government regulators and oil companies let complacency and
overconfidence set in. MMS became a captured agency.¶ When outsiders do not carefully watch government agencies, bureaucrats often fall into the trap of wanting to help the
only people who do pay attention to them -- the people the bureaucrats are supposed to regulate. MMS lost sight of the public interest and began caring too much about the oil
industry. Inspections were skipped; environmental-impact reviews were waived; and MMS regulators accepted the assurances of oil companies that equipment such as blowout
preventers worked, rather than testing it themselves. After all, the oil industry was focusing its money and attention on the regulators, and everyone else was ignoring them
The fact that MMS did BP favors by not conducting enough safety
inspections and not following up on problems it found is hardly surprising .¶ But all that ended when the
Deepwater Horizon rig exploded and collapsed into the Gulf of Mexico . The world started watching MMS,
Congress held hearings, and Obama reorganized the agency. The attention did the trick. There will be no more skipped
inspections, waived reviews, or delayed repairs. In the aftermath of the disaster, both the oil companies
and the newly reorganized and renamed Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and
Enforcement will do anything they can to avoid another major spill. Just as with airline security after the
9/11 terrorist attacks, the Gulf waters became a lot safer the day after catastrophe struck.¶ There will no doubt be
more reform of the rules and agencies regulating offshore oil drilling, including in the energy bill coming out of Congress. Given the first response from the
White House and the close attention from the news media, however, there is little safety gain to be had from
maintaining the moratorium on offshore drilling.
because there were no disasters to generate newspaper headlines.
XT – Plan Net Better For Spills
Plan is net better for the environment
Smith 10 Eric R.A.N. Smith is professor of political science at the University of California, Santa
Barbara, August 30, 2010,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/08/30/think_again_offshore_drilling
"Stopping Offshore Drilling Is Good for the Environment." ¶ Not in the United States, it isn't. When BP's Deepwater
Horizon oil rig exploded in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20, it began what is certainly the biggest environmental disaster in U.S. history. Four months later, the spill has finally
been contained, but the political fallout has not, and many Americans would like President Barack Obama's six-month moratorium on offshore drilling in the gulf made
such a move would actually do more harm than good. If U.S. fields
closed down, oil companies would simply take their business elsewhere, mostly to countries with much
weaker environmental standards. Of course, the harm wouldn't be as visible to Americans. But protecting
the U.S. coastline at the expense of other countries is hardly environmentally friendly .¶ With the
exception of Canada, the major oil suppliers to the United States -- Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Venezuela, Mexico, and Russia -- all have
autocratic governments that can get away with damaging their environment without any political
repercussions. And they know that protecting the environment costs money and reduces profits. So, by and large, they
don't do it.¶ Some of the resulting disasters remain local. Take Nigeria, which has about 2,000 active oil spills and spills an
amount of crude equal to the Exxon Valdez each year. Oil fouls fields, rivers, and Nigeria's coast. It destroys ecosystems and sickens
people, but it doesn't affect Americans.¶ Other environmental injuries have worldwide effects . Methane, a common byproduct of oil
production, is a powerful greenhouse gas. In the United States, methane is typically captured and pumped into the natural
gas system or reinjected into oil wells. Relatively little escapes. In many other countries, however, methane is
simply vented into the air, where it contributes to global warming . Mexico produces less than
half the oil the United States does every year, but it vents six times more methane into the atmosphere .¶
Finally, shipping oil has environmental costs. Oil tankers consume the equivalent of 1 to 3 percent of their oil
on their voyages, which contributes to air pollution and global warming . Even worse, some tankers don't
make it. The Amoco Cadiz broke up off the coast of France. The Atlantic Empress and the Aegean Captain collided off Trinidad and Tobago, and many others went down
as well (the Castillo de Bellver off South Africa, the Irenes Serenade off Greece, the Torrey Canyon off Britain, the Urquiola off Spain, etc.).¶ From 1971 through
2009, tankers spilled more than 40 million barrels of oil worldwide (not counting oil that was
spilled because of wars, sabotage, and terrorist attacks) . Exactly how much was headed for the United States is not clear, but because
Americans consume one-quarter of the world's oil, they are probably responsible for about a quarter of those spills. That amount dwarfs the 200,000
barrels spilled by the U.S. offshore oil industry during those years . The Exxon Valdez alone lost more
oil than the offshore oil industry did in 30 years. Oil tankers are far safer than they used to be, but importing oil remains a risky
permanent.¶ Yet bad as the spill certainly was,
business.
2AC Keystone Good DA
No Keystone approval---recent Obama speech
Webster 6/25 Stephen C., "Obama hints that Keystone XL may be rejected", 2013,
www.rawstory.com/rs/2013/06/25/obama-hints-that-keystone-xl-may-be-rejected/
Speaking Tuesday morning about his plans to tackle climate change, President Barack Obama said that the controversial Keystone
XL pipeline will only be approved if the State Department concludes that it “does not significantly exacerbate the climate
problem.”¶ The president’s comments at Georgetown University on Tuesday are the first he’s made in months about plans for the continentspanning pipeline that’s already under construction in some southern states. His administration has long been expected to approve the plans, much to
the chagrin of his supporters and leading environmentalists. Obama also announced a series of executive actions Tuesday geared toward addressing
climate change, which environmentalists largely panned as “modest” half measures that fall short of the minimum requirements to stifle the most
severe changes in Earth’s climate.¶ “I do want to be clear,” Obama said. “Allowing
the Keystone pipeline to be built requires a
finding that doing so will be in our nation’s interest. And our national interest will be served only if this
project does not significantly exacerbate the problem of carbon pollution . The net effects of the pipeline’s impact on our
climate will be absolutely critical to determining whether this project is allowed to go forward. It’s relevant.” ¶ Speaking to Raw Story, climate activism
group 350.org spokesperson Daniel Kessler said Obama’s comments Tuesday reached “11″ on a one-to-ten scale measuring his level of surprise.
“Based
on the president’s own criteria, it’s very unlikely that he could approve the premise of this
pipeline,” he said. “His criteria seems to be if it leads to a net increase of emissions, and everybody —
including the industry — thinks this will lead to an increase in emissions.”¶ Rachel Wolf, a spokesperson for
the anti-Keystone group All Risk, No Reward Coalition, reacted similarly. “With this promise to the American people to
reject the pipeline if it will increase climate pollution, the President has taken a huge step towards
rejecting Keystone XL, given that evidence has already shown that the pipeline will increase GHG emissions
and have serious climate consequences,” she told Raw Story in a prepared statement.¶ The oil this pipeline is meant to carry is
Canadian tar sands, which requires a much more energy-intensive process to mine, liquify and transport. It all adds
up to about 14 percent more greenhouse gas emissions than average light, sweet crude, according to
Scientific American.
DA’s not intrinsic---it’s within the agential ambit of the USFG to do the plan
and pass Keystone
Backlash inevitable---horse-trading angers both parties
Restuccia 13 – Andrew Restuccia, Politico energy reporter, former energy and environmental
reporter for The Hill, 2/8/13, “Can Obama pair Keystone, climate action?,” Politico,
http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=4F387968-2B0B-43D8-9A84-C55EB3FC76E0
One of the world’s leading scientific journals, Nature, has also advocated a package deal, writing in a late-January editorial
that going ahead with both the pipeline and tough greenhouse gas rules would “give Obama an early
opportunity to build some goodwill across the political spectrum.” ¶ One problem: People with hard
positions on each issue are already making it clear Obama can’t have it both ways. ¶ Some top officials at
environmental groups say they are on the lookout for any attempt by the president to use his climate agenda
to distract them from the Keystone issue. ¶ “Given that the Arctic melted last summer, we’re not really in a place where
we get to try and ‘please both sides’ anymore,” said climate activist and 350.org founder Bill McKibben, who helped
organize massive White House sit-ins against Keystone in 2011 and is planning protests with the Sierra Club on Feb. 17. ¶ If Obama
approves the pipeline, McKibben said, “it would not please the tens of thousands who have come out into the streets about Keystone
in the last 18 months — the first environmental issue to draw that kind of mass attention in many years.” ¶ “Talking about
power plant rules would not quench the fire of opposition from approving KXL ,” one top environmentalist
said. ¶ Similarly, some lawmakers on both sides of the aisle signaled this week that they have no intention of
giving Obama a pass. ¶ “If you do something that adds to the climate problem and then you do
something to reduce the climate problem, does that cancel out? ” asked Rep. Henry Waxman, the top Democrat on
the House Energy and Commerce Committee. “It just seems to me that we’ve got to do everything that we can to reduce the carbon
emissions that are causing the climate issue.” ¶ Waxman, who has formed a Bicameral Task Force on Climate Change with Sen.
Sheldon Whitehouse (D-R.I.), worried that approval of the pipeline would spur increased Canadian oil sands production, releasing
stored-up carbon dioxide that would wreak havoc on the climate. ¶ Meanwhile, Republicans warned Obama not to expect
them to go easy on him over EPA regulations , even if he were to approve Keystone . ¶ “I don’t think you can
ever appease both sides of this debate ,” said Rep. John Shimkus (R-Ill.), chairman of the Energy and Commerce
Environment and the Economy Subcommittee. “If he approves Keystone, he’ll tick off the environmental left. If he does aggressive
greenhouse gas regulations, he’s going to tick off the right. He’s going to tick people off either way.”
Environmental opposition to drilling is an aff warrant
Richard Sadowski 11, J.D., Hofstra University School of Law, Fall 2011, “IN THIS ISSUE: NATURAL
RESOURCE CONFLICT: CUBAN OFFSHORE DRILLING: PREPARATION AND PREVENTION WITHIN
THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED STATES' EMBARGO,” Sustainable Development Law & Policy, 12
Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol'y 37, p. lexis
Further pressure on the embargo comes from those voicing environmental concerns about
Cuba's drilling plans. n43 These concerns are undoubtedly more poignant in the wake of British Petroleum's ("BP")
historically tragic Deepwater Horizon oil spill. n44 Currently, there is no agreement between the United States and
Cuba to deal with oil spills. n45 The embargo would prevent, or at least hamper, any efforts by U.S.
companies to aid any cleanup efforts. n46 In addition, the embargo bans U.S. technologies designed to
prevent or contain oil spills from being sold to Cuba. n47¶ David Guggenheim, a senior fellow at the Washington
Ocean Foundation punctuated the United States' concerns over the potential impacts of Cuba's drilling by
remarking that "the Gulf isn't going to respect any boundaries when it comes to oil spills ." n48 This statement
was recently exemplified by Cuba's own expressed fears that oil from the BP disaster would reach its shores. n49 The Deep Horizon
oil spill's threat was enough that several Cuban leaders called for the reexamination of Cuba's own plan to
extract oil off its shores. n50 Nonetheless, Cuba's oil exploration plans seem unfazed. n51
Even if it passes it’ll get held up by lawsuits – no implementation
Tomasky 4/24 Michael, Newsweek/Daily Beast special correspondent Michael Tomasky is also editor of Democracy: A
Journal of Ideas, 2013, Republicans: An Immovable Wall of Nays, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/04/24/republicansan-immovable-wall-of-nays.html
Today, nine of the 10 slots are empty. Nine of the 10. The one that is occupied, HR 3, is taken up by a bill calling on President
Obama to approve the Keystone XL pipeline. Even this, insiders will tell you in an honest moment, is completely
symbolic and empty: the general expectation among Democrats and Republicans is that Obama will approve the
pipeline sometime in this term, but that eleventy-jillion lawsuits will immediately be filed, and the thing
won’t be built for years if at all, and nothing about this short and general bill can or is designed to change
that. One other slot, HR 1, is provisionally reserved for a tax-reform bill, so at least they have settled on a subject matter, but if you
click on HR 1, you will learn that “the text of HR 1 has not yet been received.”
No decision until next year
Harder 6/20 Amy, "Obama Campaign Aides to Obama: Reject Keystone XL Pipeline", 2013,
www.nationaljournal.com/energy/obama-campaign-aides-to-obama-reject-keystone-xl-pipeline-20130620
The State Department is reviewing an environmental assessment on the pipeline , the second such review since
Obama rejected the project last year in the face of a Congress-imposed deadline. A final decision on the pipeline likely
won’t come until at least this fall, but possibly not until early next year.
XT – Won’t Pass
Won’t pass---green backlash
Lehr 4/1 Jay is science director and senior fellow at The Heartland Institute, a free-market think tank
based in Chicago. He earned the first PhD. in groundwater hydrology in the nation, from the University of
Arizona, "WHY OBAMA WILL PROBABLY KILL THE KEYSTONE PIPELINE",
.www.humanevents.com/2013/04/01/why-obama-may-kill-keystone-xl-pipeline/
The drumbeat has failed so far. In mid-March, 17 Democrats voted with 45 Republicans in the Senate for a budget amendment supporting the pipeline, up from 11 Democrats voting for a similar amendment last
year. That is good news, as is a recent Fox News poll reported in the Wall Street Journal on March 27, in which 70 percent of registered voters expressed support for construction of the pipeline.¶ Meanwhile, the
So how can the pipeline lose? Easily.¶ Recently the
environmental activists staged a demonstration in Washington urging President Obama to stand his
ground. Few showed up and some were arrested, but they made their point. Environment expert Daryl
Hannah, best known for her movie role as a mermaid, said the State Department report was “totally wrong, flat out totally
wrong.” Can the president resist that siren’s call? I doubt it. His office is a wholly owned subsidiary of
both Hollywood and the green movement, with the administration having already spent billions and
billions of dollars on failed green projects.
labor unions, longtime Democrat supporters, are four-square in favor of the pipeline for the jobs it will bring.
Obama won’t pass Keystone---legacy
Solomon 3/13 Lawrence is a columnist for The Globe and Mail, a contributor to the Wall Street
Journal, the editor and publisher of the award-winning The Next City magazine, former advisor to
President Jimmy Carter's Task Force on the Global Environmen. Obama will block keystone, Financial
Post, opinion.financialpost.com/2013/03/14/lawrence-solomon-obama-will-block-keystone/
Maybe so, but maybe not. The pipelines face a gamut of opposition from environmentalists, native
communities, provincial interests and regulators, making their completion anything but a done deal. Even if
the regulatory hurdles could be overcome and the pipeline economics be made to work, years of delay could be in the offing. In that
interim, the economics of energy production itself could change, as it so often does, rendering new tar sands projects uneconomic to
develop. Or the governments of the world could finally act on their climate change rhetoric and impose
carbon taxes or other measures whose effect would be the demise of tar sands. Even if the Canadian
pipeline projects are eventually built and additional tar sands are eventually developed, the delays
necessitated by disallowing Keystone would spare the planet years of emissions from what many see as
the world’s dirtiest plants — no small accomplishment.¶ President Obama does have a political reason to approve
Keystone — most unions want the pipeline jobs, and he owes them big time. But Obama also owes the environmental
community and Hollywood, major backers both. To them, much more than to the unions, Keystone is a
matter of principle, a litmus test of fitness. Obama will be able to make good with the unions in any
number of ways; Keystone may be his only meaningful way to secure his climate change bona fides to
environmentalists, and to posterity.¶ In their second terms, presidents consider their legacy. Approving a
pipeline from Canada that will do little for employment while raising oil prices for Americans and
threatening the planet, as Obama sees it, can only sully his reputation with those that most count to him
— his ardent Democratic supporters. The logic for refusing Keystone for a man of his temperament is near
-irresistible.
XT – No Implementation
Even if Keystone passes, new regs prevent implementation
Hayward 6/16 Steven, Powerline, "What is Obama Up To On Keystone?", 2013,
www.powerlineblog.com/archives/2013/06/what-is-obama-up-to-on-keystone.php
Last month I predicted:¶ What Obama may do is tentatively approve Keystone along with a major policy shift
that will please environmentalists and subject Keystone to further and perhaps fatal delays. There is talk that the
administration may expand the scope of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) to require that proposed projects like
Keystone document their impact on global warming in the permit approval process.¶ About two weeks ago the Obama
administration quietly and without fanfare took a step that might accomplish the double game of “approving”
Keystone subject to conditions that mean it cannot be built. Last week, the news dribbled out that the
Obama administration, as a part of a seemingly minor rule-making about energy standards for microwave ovens, slipped in a
recalculation of the “social cost of carbon” that could potentially tip the scales heavily against the Keystone
pipeline—among other energy-intensive developments—in the course of the required cost-benefit analysis that subsequent rulemakings have to conduct.¶ Here’s how Bloomberg reported the story last week:¶ Buried in a little-noticed rule on microwave ovens is
a change in the U.S. government’s accounting for carbon emissions that could have wide-ranging implications for everything from
power plants to the Keystone XL pipeline.¶ The increase of the so-called social cost of carbon, to $38 a metric ton in
2015 from $23.80, adjusts the calculation the government uses to weigh costs and benefits of proposed
regulations. The figure is meant to approximate losses from global warming such as flood damage and diminished crops.¶ With
the change, government actions that lead to cuts in emissions — anything from new mileage standards to cleanenergy loans — will appear more valuable in its cost-benefit analyses. On the flip side, environmentalists urge that
it be used to judge projects that could lead to more carbon pollution, such as TransCanada Corp. (TRP)’s Keystone pipeline or
coal-mining by companies such as Peabody Energy Corp. (BTU) on public lands, which would be viewed as more costly.¶
Combine this with stories, such as this one from Politico, that say Obama is getting ready to roll out some strong
executive-based climate policies in July, and you can begin to connect the dots here. Obama will be able
to “approve” Keystone subject to further cost-benefit review, which will subsequently kill
the project on cost-benefit grounds, or will impose such onerous “mitigation” costs on TransCanada that they
have to withdraw their application. Obama will be able to say he “let the process” go forward.
AT: Keystone – No Canada Relations Impact
Keystone rejection doesn’t impact the US-Canada relationship
Ben German 3-6, “Canadian official: Keystone rejection wouldn’t harm US-Canada relationship,” 3-613, http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/286637-canadian-official-keystone-rejection-wouldntharm-us-canada-relationship
HOUSTON – Canadian Minister of Natural Resources Joe Oliver predicted Wednesday that the U.S. will
approve the proposed Keystone XL oil sands pipeline, but added that rejection would not harm the relationship between the
two allies.¶ “I am not anticipating a rejection,” he told reporters at a major energy conference here.¶ But he said the U.S.Canada relationship is far too deep to be changed by the pipeline decision .¶ “We have the
most important commercial bilateral relationship in the world, and certainly one of the closest
diplomatic ones, we are not going to let anything happen to jeopardize that relationship,
irrespective of the decision the government takes in this regard,” Oliver said when asked about
the effect of a potential White House rejection of Keystone.
AT: Keystone – No Jobs Impact
Won’t be a major job creator
Noah Greenwald 1-13, Endangered species program director, Center for Biological Diversity,
Keystone XL in the 'National Interest'? No Way., Huffington Post, 1-13-12,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/noah-greenwald/keystone-xl-pipeline_b_1204861.html
5. It won't be a major job producer. The State Department estimates that Keystone XL will result in
only 20 permanent, operational jobs in the U.S and 2,500 to 4,650 temporary jobs. Our economy needs
long-term sustainable jobs that a clean energy economy would provide. And by the way, after Keystone XL oil makes it to Texas,
much of it will be exported beyond U.S. borders without paying U.S. taxes. It also won't increase our net oil imports. According
to the Department of Energy, the U.S. will import the same amount of crude from Canada through 2030 regardless of whether
Keystone XL is built.
Even the highest jobs figure is a drop in the bucket
Lawrence Solomon 3-15, executive director of Toronto-based Energy Probe, “Lawrence Solomon:
Obama will block Keystone,” Financial Post, http://opinion.financialpost.com/2013/03/14/lawrencesolomon-obama-will-block-keystone/
If not energy, then should Keystone be approved to create jobs? Yes, if you don’t see pipelines as technologies of yesterday that
will only prolong the fossil fuel era. No, if you want to usher in a new era based on modern renewable energy technologies, and
don’t want to see fossil fuel jobs created at the expense of manufacturing jobs in high-tech wind turbines and solar arrays.
Besides, as Obama noted just this week, the pipeline jobs are exaggerated — his experts tell him they
might number but 5,000. Even if Keystone would produce jobs at the claimed figure of 20,000, so
what? According to the Labor Department, the U.S. created 236,000 additional jobs last month alone.
Why stain a presidency for job numbers that wouldn’t move the unemployment rate by so much as one-tenth of 1%?
As low as FIFTY jobs
TAGL 11 Through a Green Lens, Keystone XL Pipeline: Facts and Myths, (Updated 9-04-11.),
http://throughagreenlens.com/2011/08/24/keystone-xl-myths-and-facts-tar-sands/
Myth: We need the Keystone XL because it would create jobs. Yes, building a 2,000-mile-long pipeline would create jobs. So
would a high-speed railway, a wind farm, or a solar array. In fact, green industries account for more jobs than do oil and gas
production. And don’t forget that TransCanada’s job estimates were greatly exaggerated. A Cornell University report
found the pipeline would create far fewer jobs than TransCanada claims, according to the company’s
own data. Most of these jobs would not be local and many would not even be American. Furthermore, the
number permanent American jobs could be as low as 50, based on TransCanada’s figures of
operating costs.
AT: Keystone – No Oil Dependence Impact
Keystone doesn’t solve oil dependence
Peter Lehner 11, Executive Director, Natural Resources Defense Council, 9-1-11,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-lehner/keystone-pipeline-tar-san_b_943550.html
Because that's what the Keystone XL pipeline would entail. It isn't designed to benefit America; it is designed to
benefit tar sands operators.¶ Oil companies acknowledge they plan to use the pipeline to
export their product. Operators in Alberta's tar sand fields often refer to themselves as landlocked. That wouldn't be a
problem is your major market were the enormous land mass to the south. But if you want to export to Asia and if British
Columbia hasn't let you build a pipeline to its ports because of safety concerns, then you pursue a pipeline to the closest
deepwater port: Port Arthur, Texas.¶ Once the tar sands oil hits the transportation network in Port Arthur, it can go anywhere in
the world. TransCanada, the company behind the Keystone XL pipeline, told regulators that 90 percent of the pipeline's initial
capacity would go to six shippers. Those shippers include Shell, Total, and Valero -- the largest fuel exporter in the United
States. Their statements to investors and regulators leave no doubt they plan to use tar sands oil to produce diesel fuel for
export.¶ The Keystone XL's tar sands oil will be exported, because America doesn't need it. Our nation is
already a net exporter of finished petroleum products. That's why a good deal of Keystone's capacity will end up on
the international market.
Status quo solves --- Keystone’s irrelevant
Lawrence Solomon 3-15, executive director of Toronto-based Energy Probe, “Lawrence Solomon:
Obama will block Keystone,” Financial Post, http://opinion.financialpost.com/2013/03/14/lawrencesolomon-obama-will-block-keystone/
So what’s the case for turning his back on his climate change concerns and approving Keystone? Not
energy security. The U.S. has been going gang-busters in expanding production, despite Obama’s
success in restricting drilling off-shore and on government lands. The latest projections have the U.S. a
net energy exporter in five years and oil self-sufficient by 2035. If Obama wanted to speed the energy security
timetable he could do it by spurring production at home, rather than relying on Canada’s tar sands. Besides, the main reason
Canada wants and needs Keystone is to fetch higher prices for its oil, which is now bottled in and sold at a discount — the
Keystone pipeline would allow Canadian oil to flow through to the Gulf Coast, from where it could be exported to Asia at higher
prices than now paid by Americans. Was Obama elected to serve the interests of the Canadian oil industry, when doing so would
also raise prices for U.S. consumers?
Won’t reduce gas prices or solve oil dependence
TAGL 11 --- Through a Green Lens, Keystone XL Pipeline: Facts and Myths, (Updated 9-04-11.),
http://throughagreenlens.com/2011/08/24/keystone-xl-myths-and-facts-tar-sands/
Myth : The Keystone XL would lower gas prices. The Energy Department says the pipeline
would have a minimal effect on national gas prices, and may even lead to an increase in oil and
gas prices in the Midwest.¶ Myth : The Keystone XL would enhance our energy security. Nobody thinks
it’s a great idea to rely on Saudi Arabia and Venezuela for our oil supply. That’s why the oil industry and its
cheerleaders are spinning the KXL as an energy security issue. But, according to a report commissioned by TransCanada itself,
building the pipeline would not reduce oil imports from “unfriendly” countries.¶ How is that? The Keystone XL is an
export pipeline. As Oil Change International reported,¶ The Port Arthur, Texas, refiners at the end of its route are focused on
expanding exports to Europe, and Latin America. Much of the fuel refined from the pipeline’s heavy crude oil will never reach
U.S. drivers’ tanks.¶ If we want to achieve energy independence, we should start by promoting renewable
fuels in the U.S., not by playing middleman in the Canadian oil market .
Keystone fails to reduce oil dependence
CBP 11 --- Checks and Balances Project 3 Security Concerns with the Keystone XL Pipeline 8-31-11,
http://checksandbalancesproject.org/?s=pipeline+accident
2-The Keystone makes the United States no less dependent on foreign oil¶ Image: Oil Change International¶ Proponents of
the Keystone XL have argued that the pipeline will make the United States less dependent on oil that comes
from unfriendly parts of the world. While this claim is designed to resonate with those concerned about our foreign
relations, the facts are that the Keystone XL will not lessen U.S. dependence on foreign oil,
but instead transport Canadian oil in American refineries for export to overseas markets.¶ As reported this week, the Keystone
XL is an export pipeline. “The Port Arthur, Texas, refiners at the end of its route is focused on expanding exports to Europe,
and Latin America. Much of the fuel refined from the pipeline’s heavy crude oil will never reach U.S.
drivers’ tanks.” Furthermore, information obtained from the U.S. Energy Information Administration and the Canadian
National Energy Board points out that Valero, the customer for crude from the Keystone XL has developed a strategy to refine
the Canadian crude in the United States and export it to foreign markets without paying taxes in the U.S. “Because Valero’s Port
Arthur refinery is in a Foreign Trade Zone, the company can carry out its strategy tax-free.”
AT: Keystone – No Arctic Impact
Zero chance of Arctic war---experts
Mahony 3/19 Honor, EU Observer, "Fear of Arctic conflict are 'overblown'", 2013,
euobserver.com/foreign/119479
The Arctic has become a new frontier in international relations, but fear of potential conflict in the
region is overblown, say experts ¶
resource-rich
.
For long a mystery because of its general impenetrability, melting ice caps are revealing more and more of the Arctic region to scientists, researchers and
industry.¶ Climate change experts can take a more precise look at a what global warming is doing to the planet, shipping trade routes once considered unthinkable are now possible, and governments and businesses are in thrall to the potential exploitation of coal,
iron, rare earths and oil.¶ The interest is reflected in the growing list of those wanting to have a foot in the Arctic council, a forum of eight countries with territory in the polar region.¶ While the US, Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Russia and Canada
form the council, the EU commission, China, India, South Korea and Japan have all expressed an interest in having a permanent observer status.¶ "
America, Europe and the Asia Pacific
The Arctic has become a new meeting place for
," says Damien Degeorges, founder of the Arctic Policy and Economic Forum. ¶ During a recent conference on Arctic shipping routes in the European Parliament, Degeorges
noted that "China has been the most active by far in the last years."¶ He points to its red-carpet treatment of politicians from Greenland, a territory that recently got full control over its wealth of natural resources. Bejing also cosied up to Iceland after the island's
financial meltdown. The two undertook a joint expedition to the North Pole and the Chinese have the largest foreign embassy in Reykjavik. ¶ Meanwhile, South Korea's president visited Greenland last year and shipping hubs like Singapore are holding Arctic
conferences.¶ The interest is being spurred by melting icebergs.¶ Last year saw a record low of multi-year ice - permanent ice - in the polar sea. This means greater shipping and mineral exploitation potential. There were 37 transits of the North East Pa ssage (NEP),
running from the Atlantic to the Pacific along the top of Russia, in 2011. This rose to 47 in 2012. ¶ For a ship travelling from the Netherlands to China, the route around 40 percent shorter than using the traditional Suez Canal. A huge saving for China, where 50
percent of its GDP is connected to shipping. Russia is also keen to exploit the route as the rise in temperatures is melting the permafrost in its northern territory, playing havoc with its roads and railways. ¶ According to Jan Fritz Hansen, deputy director of the
Danish shipowners’ association, the real breakthrough will come when there is a cross polar route. At the moment there are are two options - the North East Passge for which Russia asks high fees for transiting ships - or the much-less developed North West Passage
along Canada.¶ His chief concern is that "trade up there is free. We don't want protectionism. Everyone should be allowed to compete up there."¶ And he believes the biggest story of the Arctic is not how it is traversed but what will be taken out of it. According to
the US Geological Survey (2009), the Arctic holds 13 percent of undiscovered oil and 30 percent of undiscovered gas supplies. ¶ Greenland is already at the centre of political tussle between the EU and China over future exploitation of its rare earths - used in a range
This resource potential although tempered by the fact that much of it is not economically viable to exploit - has led to fears that
the Arctic region is ripe for conflict ¶ But this is nonsense, says Nil Wang, a former Danish
admiral and Arctic expert ¶
¶ There is a general public perception that the Arctic region
holds great potential for conflict because it is an ungoverned region where all these resources are waiting
to be picked
That is completely false
¶ He notes that it is an "extremely wellregulated region," with international rules saying that coastal states have territorial jurisdiction up to
12 nautical miles off their coast ¶
a further 200 nautical miles of exclusive economic zone "where you
own every value in the water and under the seabed ¶ 97 percent of energy resources actually
belong to someone already
¶
the actors in the region all want to create a business
environment, which requires stable politics and security.
of technologies such as hybrid cars or smart phones. ¶ "The biggest adventure will be the Arctic destination. There is a lot of valuable goods that should be taken out of nature up there," he said.¶
.
.
Most resources have an owner
"
up by the one who gets there first.
," he said.
.
On top of that is
."
ing
," says Wang.
"Up to
is
He suggest
Zero chance of escalation
Jonas Grätz 12, researcher at the Center for Security Studies, July 2012, “The Geopolitics of the Arctic
Commons,” http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Articles/SpecialFeature/Detail/?lng=en&id=157901&tabid=1453469894&contextid774=157901&contextid775=157922
Against the background of the changes in the Arctic, this region is occasionally identified as a potential area of future conflict .
However, it is important first to point out that there is much scope for cooperation . This is particularly apparent when
considering “soft” security concerns such as environmental pollution resulting from the extraction of raw materials. The threats that arise for humans
from the exceptional
climatic situations are pushing actors towards cooperative approaches, too. Many of
these issues are taken on by the Arctic Council. Founded in 1996, the Council is a forum to promote coordination among the eight
Arctic countries. Representatives of indigenous peoples have a consultative role. One concrete result of the Arctic Council is a binding agreement on
maritime search and rescue activities. For 2013, an
agreement on standards for oil spill preparedness and response is expected, which
will reinforce the current non-binding offshore oil and gas guidelines.¶ Cooperation among the littoral states is also
advancing in the sensitive area of national sovereign rights . The 2010 border treaty between Russia and
Norway indicates that bilateral agreements are possible – even though the power asymmetry between the two countries is
reflected in a deal advantageous to Russia. International maritime law and the pressure of non-Arctic countries are also
fostering multilateral cooperation, at least in areas where all parties can still gain further sovereign rights. The United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) allows for the extension of the continental shelf towards the North Pole, which would extend the mining
privileges of the coastal states at the expense of the interests of non-Arctic states. The water column and the animals living in it, by contrast, would
continue to enjoy international status. In the Ilulissat Declaration adopted in 2008, the
coastal states declared their intention to
settle any territorial conflicts within the framework of UNCLOS. By signing the declaration, the US – which
has not ratified UNCLO S – has signalled its willingness to observe it within the Arctic . What is more, the coastal states
have been collaborating for a long time in the exploration of the sea bed . Provided that there are no major conflicts
among these countries, non- Arctic players will hardly be able to assert themselves in this context. Potential for conflict The scope of sovereign rights in
the maritime area around the Svalbard archipelago, believed to be rich in oil and gas, is a question that is not easy to resolve. On the one hand, the
archipelago and the surrounding 200-mile zone are an undisputed part of Norwegian territory. On the other hand, Norwegian sovereignty over the
archipelago is substantially limited by the Svalbard Treaty of 1920. All 40 signatory countries have the right to exploit natural resources and to conduct
research. The treaty also states that the archipelago must not be used for offensive military purposes. Likewise, the right to levy taxes is limited to the
administrative requirements of Svalbard. It was only later under UNCLO S that the EEZ emerged as an institution. Hence, it remains unclear whether
the Svalbard Treaty also applies to this zone. Countries such as Russia, Iceland, and the UK assume this to be the case. Norway takes the opposite view.
Nevertheless, Oslo has not declared a full EEZ in this area, but established a fisheries protection zone instead. It concedes fishing privileges to Russia,
Iceland, and other nations. This has never been explicitly acknowledged by these countries, but is usually accepted in practice. ¶ The
modus
vivendi has so far provided stability as it has served Russian interests too, with the fisheries protection zone granting
privileges to Russian fishing interests over other signatory states. Moreover, Russia has sufficient oil and gas reserves at its
disposal on its own territory. Norway, by contrast, has a strong interest in opening up the area for oil and gas exploration. Such an opening,
however, would undermine the current fragile balance and encourage other signatory states to question openly the scope of the Treaty. Even if Norway
were to take no action, other nations could try to push for an opening of the area for exploration with reference to the Treaty. Due to the variety of the
players concerned and the absence of international rules, the issue can ultimately only be resolved at a political level. ¶ Interests and positions diverge
concerning the issue of sovereignty over the new sea routes as well. Again, even the Arctic coastal states do not agree on the legal status: Russia and
Canada regard the routes as internal waterways in what is a very broad interpretation of UNCLO S. This implies that ships flying foreign flags must
request permission for transit. Other coastal nations, such as the US, and non-Arctic players like the EU and presumably China, however, consider
these to be international waterways for which no authorisation for transit is necessary. ¶ For
the time being, no escalation of this
conflict is to be expected , since the commercial navigation routes are competing with non-Arctic sea routes and the use of these routes will
correlate with the extent of their opening and the stability of the agreed arrangements. In addition, Russia and Canada depend on the
cooperation of foreign non-state and state-owned players in order to attract investments in their
inadequate coastal infrastructures. Also, the International Maritime Organisation is working on a binding Polar Code, which will
establish clear rules for polar navigation. This will weaken the case for additional national regulations and approval procedures.
AT: Keystone – No Cyber Impact
No impact to cyber-terror---won’t cause military conflict
Thomas P.M. Barnett 13, special assistant for strategic futures in the U.S. Defense Department's
Office of Force Transformation from 2001 to 2003, is chief analyst for Wikistrat, March/April 2013,
“Think Again: The Pentagon,” Foreign Policy,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/04/the_pentagon?page=full
As for cyber serving as a stand-alone war-fighting domain, there you'll find the debates no less theological in their
intensity. After serving as senior managing director for half a dozen years at a software firm that specializes in securing supply
chains, I'm deeply skeptical . Given the uncontrollable nature of cyberweapons (see: Stuxnet's many permutations), I
view them as the 21st century's version of chemical weapons -- nice to have, but hard to use . Another way to look
at it is to simply call a spade a spade: Cyberwarfare is nothing more than espionage and sabotage updated for the digital era.
Whatever cyberwar turns out to be in the national security realm, it will always be dwarfed by the
industrial variants -- think cyberthieves, not cyberwarriors. But you wouldn't know it from the panicky warnings
from former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and the generals about the imminent threat of a "cyber Pearl Harbor."¶ Please
remember amid all this frenetic scaremongering that the Pentagon is never more frightened about our collective future than when
it's desperately uncertain about its own. Given the rising health-care costs associated with America's aging population and the neverending dysfunction in Washington, we should expect to be bombarded with frightening scenarios of planetary doom for the next
decade or two. None of this bureaucratic chattering will bear any resemblance to global trends , which
demonstrate that wars have grown increasingly infrequent, shorter in duration, and diminished in lethality. But you
won't hear that from the next-warriors on the Potomac.
Their impacts are all hype
Walt 10 – Stephen M. Walt 10 is the Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of international relations at
Harvard University "Is the cyber threat overblown?" March 30
walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/03/30/is_the_cyber_threat_overblown
Am I the only person -- well, besides Glenn Greenwald and Kevin Poulson -- who thinks the "cyber-warfare" business may be overblown? It’s clear the U.S.
national security establishment is paying a lot more attention to the issue, and colleagues of mine -- including some pretty serious and level-headed people -- are
looks to me like a classic opportunity
for threat-inflation.¶ Mind you, I'm not saying that there aren't a lot of shenanigans going on in cyber-space, or that various forms of cyber-warfare don't
have military potential. So I'm not arguing for complete head-in-the-sand complacency. But here’s what makes me worry that the threat is being
overstated.¶ First, the whole issue is highly esoteric -- you really need to know a great deal about computer networks, software,
encryption, etc., to know how serious the danger might be. Unfortunately, details about a number of the alleged incidents that are
being invoked to demonstrate the risk of a "cyber-Katrina," or a cyber-9/11, remain classified, which makes it hard for us
lay-persons to gauge just how serious the problem really was or is. Moreover, even when we hear about computers
being penetrated by hackers, or parts of the internet crashing, etc., it’s hard to know how much valuable information
was stolen or how much actual damage was done. And as with other specialized areas of technology and/or military affairs, a lot of
the experts have a clear vested interest in hyping the threat, so as to create greater demand for
their services. Plus, we already seem to have politicians leaping on the issue as a way to grab some pork for their
states.¶ Second, there are lots of different problems being lumped under a single banner , whether the label is "cyberincreasingly worried by the danger of some sort of "cyber-Katrina." I don't dismiss it entirely, but this sure
terror" or "cyber-war." One issue is the use of various computer tools to degrade an enemy’s military capabilities (e.g., by disrupting communications nets, spoofing
sensors, etc.). A second issue is the alleged threat that bad guys would penetrate computer networks and shut down power grids, air traffic control, traffic lights, and other
important elements of infrastructure, the way that internet terrorists (led by a disgruntled computer expert) did in the movie Live Free and Die Hard. A third problem is
web-based criminal activity, including identity theft or simple fraud (e.g., those emails we all get from someone in Nigeria announcing that they have millions to give us
once we send them some account information). A fourth potential threat is “cyber-espionage”; i.e., clever foreign hackers penetrate Pentagon or defense contractors’
computers and download valuable classified information. And then there are annoying activities like viruses, denial-of-service attacks, and other things that affect the
This sounds like a rich menu of potential
trouble, and putting the phrase "cyber" in front of almost any noun makes it sound trendy and a bit
more frightening. But notice too that these are all somewhat different problems of quite different importance, and the appropriate response to each is likely to
be different too. Some issues -- such as the danger of cyber-espionage -- may not require elaborate technical
fixes but simply more rigorous security procedures to isolate classified material from the web. Other problems may not
require big federal programs to address, in part because both individuals and the private sector
have incentives to protect themselves (e.g., via firewalls or by backing up critical data). And as Greenwald warns, there may be real costs
stability of web-based activities and disrupt commerce (and my ability to send posts into FP).¶
to civil liberties if concerns about vague cyber dangers lead us to grant the NSA or some other government agency greater control over the Internet. ¶ Third, this is another
Is the danger that some malign hacker crashes a power grid
greater than the likelihood that a blizzard would do the same thing? Is the risk of cyber-espionage
greater than the potential danger from more traditional forms of spying? Without a comparative assessment of different
issue that cries out for some comparative cost-benefit analysis.
risks and the costs of mitigating each one, we will allocate resources on the basis of hype rather than analysis. In short, my fear is not that we won't take reasonable
precautions against a potential set of dangers; my concern is that we will spend tens of billions of dollars protecting ourselves against a set of threats that are not as
dangerous as we are currently being told they are.
Keystone Bad---Extinction
Keystone causes extinction
Michael Klare 13, professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College, 2/10/13, “A
Presidential Decision That Could Change the World,” http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175648/
Presidential decisions often turn out to be far less significant than imagined, but every now and then what a president decides
actually determines how the world turns. Such is the case with the Keystone XL pipeline, which, if built, is slated to bring
some of the “dirtiest,” carbon-rich oil on the planet from Alberta, Canada, to refineries on the U.S. Gulf Coast. In the
near future, President Obama is expected to give its construction a definitive thumbs up or thumbs down , and
the decision he makes could prove far more important than anyone imagines. It could determine the fate of the
Canadian tar-sands industry and, with it, the future well-being of the planet . If that sounds overly dramatic, let me
explain. ¶ Sometimes, what starts out as a minor skirmish can wind up determining the outcome of a war -- and that seems to be the
case when it comes to the mounting battle over the Keystone XL pipeline. If given the go-ahead by President Obama, it will daily
carry more than 700,000 barrels of tar-sands oil to those Gulf Coast refineries, providing a desperately needed boost to the
Canadian energy industry. If Obama says no, the Canadians (and their American backers) will encounter possibly
insuperable difficulties in exporting their heavy crude oil, discouraging further investment and putting the
industry’s future in doubt. ¶ The battle over Keystone XL was initially joined in the summer of 2011, when environmental
writer and climate activist Bill McKibben and 350.org, which he helped found, organized a series of non-violent anti-pipeline
protests in front of the White House to highlight the links between tar sands production and the accelerating pace of climate change.
At the same time, farmers and politicians in Nebraska, through which the pipeline is set to pass, expressed grave concern about its
threat to that state’s crucial aquifers. After all, tar-sands crude is highly corrosive, and leaks are a notable risk. ¶ In mid-January
2012, in response to those concerns, other worries about the pipeline, and perhaps a looming presidential campaign season, Obama
postponed a decision on completing the controversial project. (He, not Congress, has the final say, since it will cross an international
boundary.) Now, he must decide on a suggested new route that will, supposedly, take Keystone XL around those aquifers and so
reduce the threat to Nebraska’s water supplies. ¶ Ever since the president postponed the decision on whether to proceed, powerful
forces in the energy industry and government have been mobilizing to press ever harder for its approval. Its supporters argue
vociferously that the pipeline will bring jobs to America and enhance the nation’s “energy security” by lessening its reliance on
Middle Eastern oil suppliers. Their true aim, however, is far simpler: to save the tar-sands industry (and many billions of dollars in
U.S. investments) from possible disaster. ¶ Just how critical the fight over Keystone has become in the eyes of the industry is
suggested by a recent pro-pipeline editorial in the trade publication Oil & Gas Journal: ¶ “Controversy over the Keystone XL project
leaves no room for compromise. Fundamental views about the future of energy are in conflict. Approval of the project would
acknowledge the rich potential of the next generation of fossil energy and encourage its development. Rejection would foreclose
much of that potential in deference to an energy utopia few Americans support when they learn how much it costs.” ¶ Opponents of
Keystone XL, who are planning a mass demonstration at the White House on February 17th, have also come to view the pipeline
battle in epic terms. “Alberta’s tar sands are the continent’s biggest carbon bomb ,” McKibben wrote at TomDispatch.
“If you could burn all the oil in those tar sands, you’d run the atmosphere’s concentration of carbon dioxide
from its current 390 parts per million (enough to cause the climate havoc we’re currently seeing) to nearly 600 parts per
million, which would mean if not hell , then at least a world with a similar temperature.” Halting Keystone would not by
itself prevent those high concentrations, he argued, but would impede the production of tar sands, stop that “carbon bomb”
from further heating the atmosphere, and create space for a transition to renewables . “Stopping Keystone will
buy time,” he says, “and hopefully that time will be used for the planet to come to its senses around climate change.” ¶ A Pipeline
With Nowhere to Go? ¶ Why has the fight over a pipeline, which, if completed, would provide only 4% of the U.S. petroleum supply,
assumed such strategic significance? As in any major conflict, the answer lies in three factors: logistics, geography, and timing. ¶
Start with logistics and consider the tar sands themselves or, as the industry and its supporters in government prefer to call them,
“oil sands.” Neither tar nor oil, the substance in question is a sludge-like mixture of sand, clay, water, and bitumen (a degraded,
carbon-rich form of petroleum). Alberta has a colossal supply of the stuff -- at least a trillion barrels in known reserves, or the
equivalent of all the conventional oil burned by humans since the onset of commercial drilling in 1859. Even if you count only the
reserves that are deemed extractible by existing technology, its tar sands reportedly are the equivalent of 170 billion barrels of
conventional petroleum -- more than the reserves of any nation except Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. The availability of so much
untapped energy in a country like Canada, which is private-enterprise-friendly and where the political dangers are few, has been a
magnet for major international energy firms. Not surprisingly, many of them, including ExxonMobil, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, and
Royal Dutch Shell, have invested heavily in tar-sands operations. ¶ Tar sands, however, bear little resemblance to the conventional
oil fields which these companies have long exploited. They must be treated in various energy-intensive ways to be converted into a
transportable liquid and then processed even further into usable products. Some tar sands can be strip-mined like coal and then
“upgraded” through chemical processing into a synthetic crude oil -- SCO, or “syncrude.” Alternatively, the bitumen can be pumped
from the ground after the sands are exposed to steam, which liquefies the bitumen and allows its extraction with conventional oil
pumps. The latter process, known as steam-assisted gravity drainage (SAGD), produces a heavy crude oil. It must, in turn, be diluted
with lighter crudes for transportation by pipeline to specialized refineries equipped to process such oil, most of which are located on
the Gulf Coast. ¶ Extracting and processing tar sands is an extraordinarily expensive undertaking , far more so
than most conventional oil drilling operations. Considerable energy is needed to dig the sludge out of the ground or heat
the water into steam for underground injection; then, additional energy is needed for the various upgrading processes. The
environmental risks involved are enormous (even leaving aside the vast amounts of greenhouse gases that the whole process will
pump into the atmosphere). The massive quantities of water needed for SAGD and those upgrading processes, for example, become
contaminated with toxic substances. Once used, they cannot be returned to any water source that might end up in human drinking
supplies -- something environmentalists say is already occurring. All of this and the expenses involved mean that the
multibillion-dollar investments needed to launch a tar-sands operation can only pay off if the final
product fetches a healthy price in the marketplace. ¶ And that’s where geography enters the picture. Alberta is theoretically
capable of producing five to six million barrels of tar-sands oil per day. In 2011, however, Canada itself consumed only 2.3 million
barrels of oil per day, much of it supplied by conventional (and cheaper) oil from fields in Saskatchewan and Newfoundland. That
number is not expected to rise appreciably in the foreseeable future. No less significant, Canada’s refining capacity for all
kinds of oil is limited to 1.9 million barrels per day, and few of its refineries are equipped to process tar sands-style heavy
crude. This leaves the producers with one strategic option: exporting the stuff. ¶ And that’s where the problems really
begin. Alberta is an interior province and so cannot export its crude by sea. Given the geography, this leaves only three
export options: pipelines heading east across Canada to ports on the Atlantic, pipelines heading west across the Rockies to ports in
British Columbia, or pipelines heading south to refineries in the United States. ¶ Alberta’s preferred option is to send the
preponderance of its tar-sands oil to its biggest natural market, the United States. At present, Canadian pipeline companies do
operate a number of conduits that deliver some of this oil to the U.S., notably the original Keystone conduit extending from
Hardisty, Alberta, to Illinois and then southward to Cushing, Oklahoma. But these lines can carry less than one million barrels of
crude per day, and so will not permit the massive expansion of output the industry is planning for the next decade or so. ¶ In other
words, the only pipeline now under development that would significantly expand Albertan tar-sands exports is
Keystone XL . It is vitally important to the tar-sands producers because it offers the sole short-term -- or possibly even
long-term -- option for the export and sale of the crude output now coming on line at dozens of projects being
developed across northern Alberta. Without it, these projects will languish and Albertan production will have to be sold at
a deep discount -- at, that is, a per-barrel price that could fall below production costs, making further investment in tar
sands unattractive . In January, Canadian tar-sands oil was already selling for $30-$40 less than West Texas Intermediate
(WTI), the standard U.S. blend. ¶ The Pipelines That Weren’t¶ Like an army bottled up geographically and increasingly at the mercy
of enemy forces, the tar-sands producers see the completion of Keystone XL as their sole realistic escape route to
survival . “Our biggest problem is that Alberta is landlocked,” the province’s finance minister Doug Horner said in January. “In
fact, of the world’s major oil-producing jurisdictions, Alberta is the only one with no direct access to the ocean. And until we solve
this problem... the [price] differential will remain large.” ¶ Logistics, geography, and finally timing. A presidential stamp of approval
on the building of Keystone XL will save the tar-sands industry , ensuring them enough return to justify their
massive investments. It would also undoubtedly prompt additional investments in tar-sands projects and
further production increases by an industry that assumed opposition to future pipelines had been
weakened by this victory . ¶ A presidential thumbs-down and resulting failure to build Keystone XL, however, could
have lasting and severe consequences for tar-sands production . After all, no other export link is likely to be
completed in the near-term. The other three most widely discussed options -- the Northern Gateway pipeline to
Kitimat, British Columbia, an expansion of the existing Trans Mountain pipeline to Vancouver, British Columbia, and a plan to use
existing, conventional-oil conduits to carry tar-sands oil across Quebec, Vermont, and New Hampshire to Portland, Maine -already face intense opposition, with initial construction at best still years in the future. ¶ The Northern Gateway project,
proposed by Canadian pipeline company Enbridge, would stretch from Bruderheim in northern Alberta to Kitimat, a port on
Charlotte Sound and the Pacific. If completed, it would allow the export of tar-sands oil to Asia, where Canadian Prime Minister
Stephen Harper sees a significant future market (even though few Asian refineries could now process the stuff). But unlike oilfriendly Alberta, British Columbia has a strong pro-environmental bias and many senior provincial officials have expressed fierce
opposition to the project. Moreover, under the country’s constitution, native peoples over whose land the pipeline would have to
travel must be consulted on the project -- and most tribal communities are adamantly opposed to its construction. ¶ Another
proposed conduit -- an expansion of the existing Trans Mountain pipeline from Edmonton to Vancouver -- presents the same set of
obstacles and, like the Northern Gateway project, has aroused strong opposition in Vancouver. ¶ This leaves the third option, a plan
to pump tar-sands oil to Ontario and Quebec and then employ an existing pipeline now used for oil imports. It connects to a
terminal in Casco Bay, near Portland, Maine, where the Albertan crude would begin the long trip by ship to those refineries on the
Gulf Coast. Although no official action has yet been taken to allow the use of the U.S. conduit for this purpose, anti-pipeline protests
have already erupted in Portland, including one on January 26th that attracted more than 1,400 people. ¶ With no other pipelines in
the offing, tar sands producers are increasing their reliance on deliveries by rail. This is producing boom times for some long-haul
freight carriiers, but will never prove sufficient to move the millions of barrels in added daily output expected from projects now
coming on line. ¶ The conclusion is obvious: without Keystone XL, the price of tar-sands oil will remain
substantially lower than conventional oil (as well as unconventional oil extracted from shale formations in the United
States), discouraging future investment and dimming the prospects for increased output. In other words, as Bill McKibben
hopes, much of it will stay in the ground . ¶ Industry officials are painfully aware of their predicament. In an Annual
Information Form released at the end of 2011, Canadian Oil Sands Limited, owner of the largest share of Syncrude Canada (one of
the leading producers of tar-sands oil) noted: ¶ “A prolonged period of low crude oil prices could affect the value of our crude oil
properties and the level of spending on growth projects and could result in curtailment of production... Any substantial and extended
decline in the price of oil or an extended negative differential for SCO compared to either WTI or European Brent Crude would have
an adverse effect on the revenues, profitability, and cash flow of Canadian Oil Sands and likely affect the ability of Canadian Oil
Sands to pay dividends and repay its debt obligations.Ӧ The stakes in this battle could not be higher . If Keystone XL fails to
win the president’s approval, the industry will certainly grow at a far slower pace than forecast and possibly witness the failure of
costly ventures, resulting in an industry-wide contraction. If approved, however, production will soar and global
warming will occur at an even faster rate than previously projected . In this way, a presidential decision will have an
unexpectedly decisive and lasting impact on all our lives.
Keystone Bad---Biodiversity
Keystone causes massive biodiversity loss
Kari Birdseye 1-18, More Than Cranes Are Whooping Over the Keystone Pipeline XL Decision, 1-
18-12, http://earthjustice.org/blog/2012-january/more-than-cranes-are-whooping-over-the-keystonepipeline-xl-decision
The President made the right decision on the Keystone pipeline XL today. House Republicans forced the arbitrary
deadline of February 21 and there was really only one legal way to answer. Since the State Department hasn’t finished its
environmental review of the pipeline and requests for alternative routes that bypass sensitive lands and habitats are not on the
table yet—that would be a NO.¶ Many organizations have done great work in educating the public about the dangers of the
proposed 1700-mile pipeline and it has paid off. Earthjustice has been working to protect the vulnerable habitats and
endangered creatures that are being harmed right now at the open pit mines of the tar sands in Alberta, the source of the fossil
fuel that currently courses through two existing pipelines that crisscross our country.¶ Earthjustice filed a Pelly petition in
September of 2011 with the U.S. Department of the Interior, asking Secretary Ken Salazar to investigate Canada’s destructive tar
sands mining and examine how the mining is hampering international efforts to protect endangered and threatened species. The
petition documents how tar sands mining and drilling in Alberta are harming threatened woodland caribou
and at least 130 migratory bird species, including endangered whooping cranes.¶ The Pelly petition called for
the Interior Department to promptly investigate and determine whether tar sands activities are violating treaties that protect
endangered and threatened species. The response so far has been silence.¶ Earthjustice is concerned because tar sands
activities are destroying critical wildlife habitat in Alberta, and killing birds that land in toxic wastewater
pits, mistaking them for freshwater ponds. Endangered whooping cranes are particularly vulnerable to
the risk of landing in a tailings pond, as the entire global population of wild, migratory whooping
cranes migrates through the tar sands region twice annually.¶ The herds of the tar sands region have
already declined more than 50 percent over their last three generations. Habitat disruption and
fragmentation—due in large part to tar sands activities—are the driving forces of the population’s
decline.¶ But let’s get back to today’s good news. “Another pipeline will only accelerate destruction of
this habitat by increasing pressure to suck more tar sands out of the ground,” according to
Martin Wagner, managing attorney of Earthjustice’s international program. “This delay is an opportunity for the
Obama administration to take up the issues raised in the Pelly petition and to work with Canada to avoid these irreversible
harms. The administration should not approve ANY new tar sands pipeline until the two countries can find a way to address
these and other threats posed by the tar sands."
Extinction
Charles W. Fowler 8, National Marine Mammal Laboratory, Alaska Fisheries Science Center,
National Marine Fisheries Service, Biodiversity and Conservation, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2008,
http://www.springerlink.com/content/au8m1p2754108g50/
This study responds to world-wide concern by scientists, policy makers and the public about the variety of observed global
changes, including lost biodiversity and anthropogenic extinction (e.g., Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005a, b).
Many of these changes are seen as degradation that leads to risk, not only for other species, ecosystems,
and the biosphere, but also for humans (including the risk of human extinction; Boulter 2002).
Such observations justify taking management action to account for ecosystems, the biosphere and the
Earth. Management at the level of the biosphere cannot be ignored (Lubchenco et al. 1991; Mangel et al. 1996; Fowler and
Hobbs 2002, 2003; Fowler 2003); the inherent complexity of nature cannot be ignored.
Keystone Bad---Environment
Keystone wrecks the environment, fails to produce jobs, and accelerates
global warming
Noah Greenwald 1-13, Endangered species program director, Center for Biological Diversity,
Keystone XL in the 'National Interest'? No Way., Huffington Post, 1-13-12,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/noah-greenwald/keystone-xl-pipeline_b_1204861.html
The decision should be a no-brainer. Here are five reasons why Keystone XL is not in the national interest:¶ 1. It will
dramatically deepen our addiction to climate-killing fossil fuels. Greenhouse gas emissions from tarsands development are two to three times higher than those from conventional oil and gas operations.
That's exactly the wrong direction for reversing global warming. Scientists tell us we must reduce atmospheric
levels of carbon dioxide to 350 parts per million or less. Today, it's 391 ppm -- and Keystone XL
would certainly drive that up and worsen the devastating effects of global warming -- from
rising oceans to melting glaciers to extreme and dangerous weather events -- that we're already seeing around the world.¶ 2. It
will spill. The State Department's review of the project clearly says Keystone XL will spill oil. Not may, but will. It could be
as often as the existing Keystone pipeline, which has already leaked 14 times since it began operating in
June 2010, including one leak that dumped 21,000 gallons of tar-sands crude. Other pipelines have spilled too recently,
including one in the Kalamazoo River in 2010 that leaked 800,000 gallons and another in the Yellowstone River in 2011 that
dumped more than 40,000 gallons. Keystone XL would carry up to 35 million gallons of oil every day -- so any leak has the
potential to be massive.¶ 3. It will threaten vast pristine landscapes, rivers and wildlife. Running
between Alberta, Canada and the Gulf Coast of Texas, Keystone XL will cross nearly 1,750 water bodies, like rivers and steams,
and risk contaminating the Ogalla Aquifer (the drinking water source for millions of people). It would also cut through the heart
of prime wildlife habitat, including homes for at least 20 imperiled species, including the whooping crane, pallid sturgeon,
woodland caribou, American burying beetle, interior least tern and western prairie fringed orchid.¶ 4. It will expand the
destruction of Canada's boreal forests. Tar sands oil is the dirtiest oil on Earth. Producing oil from
sand has terrible impacts on the environment, including the destruction of tens of thousands of acres of boreal forest in Alberta,
pollution of hundreds of millions of gallons of water from the Athabasca River -- each barrel of oil from tar sands requires three
barrels of water to produce.
Keystone Bad---Terrorism
Keystone will encourage terrorist attacks against it --- it’s a huge target
CBP 11 --- Checks and Balances Project 3 Security Concerns with the Keystone XL Pipeline 8-31-11,
http://checksandbalancesproject.org/?s=pipeline+accident
1-The Keystone XL as a terrorist target¶ It’s hard to think of a larger target for our enemies to take
aim at than a 1,661-mile pipeline measuring 36-inches thick and filled with flammable
crude oil. To put this in perspective, consider that the entire length of the border between the United States and Mexico
spans 1,989 miles. To guard the border, the United States government spends the money to arm, train, support and employ
more than 20,000 border patrol agents. Whether this government program is able to effectively prevent illegal immigrants and
contraband from coming into the United States has been hotly contested for decades.¶ The Keystone, which is just 300-miles
shorter than the border, will travel through or near several of the United States’ major population centers. New
Orleans, Houston, Oklahoma City and Lincoln, Nebraska all have populations of more than a million and are near the proposed
pipeline. These population centers, along with Austin, Texas, Topeka, Kansas, Cushing Oklahoma and those living in
North and South Dakota, would each be vulnerable to attacks if the wrong people decided to mess with
enormous pipeline.¶ In 2005 Gal Luft, the Executive Director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global
Security (IAGS) proclaimed that pipeline sabotage is becoming a “weapon of choice” for
terrorists. Luft explained that the ease and large impact of messing with pipelines was behind attacks in India, Turkey and
Colombia. The threat of terrorist attacks on pipelines has become so strong that Luft has said there are clear economic
implications for consumers. Whether perpetuated for political or criminal reasons, assaults on oil infrastructure have added a
“fear premium” of roughly $10 per barrel of oil.
Keystone Bad---Ogallala/Food Security
Keystone wrecks the Ogallala aquifer --- causes a global food crisis
CBP 11 --- Checks and Balances Project 3 Security Concerns with the Keystone XL Pipeline 8-31-11,
http://checksandbalancesproject.org/?s=pipeline+accident
3-The Keystone XL is a threat to water and food security¶ Beyond the concerns protecting the Keystone XL from terrorists and
allowing it to pump oil to countries friendly to them, there are fundamental concerns about what could happen to our domestic
security if the Keystone XL is developed.¶ The Keystone XL pipeline will travel directly over the Ogallala
Aquifer, which has been vital to the United States’ as well as global food supplies since the
1950’s. Scientific America has already said serious damage to the aquifer would damage “one fifth of
the total annual U.S. agricultural harvest.” Losing the Ogallala, according to that investigation would mean
that, “more than $20 billion worth of food and fiber will vanish from the world’s markets.”¶
This damage is not something that is out of the realm of possibility. Heavy taping of the Ogallala has lead
many to say the supply is already threatened. Moreover, the fact that the giant water supply to America’s
breadbasket is remarkably shallow (anywhere between zero and 400 feet according to the USGS) means the level of
exposure to a crude leak is only heightened.¶ Pipeline leaks have become more abundant in the United
States in recent years. Before the well-documented failure of an Exxon pipeline in Montana sent tens of
thousands of gallons of crude into the Yellowstone River this summer the U.S. had already been seeing
a steady dose of pipeline issues. Between January 2010 and February 2011, there were nine major pipeline explosions
that resulted in 18 deaths, 13 injuries and 85 destroyed homes in the United States. One of those accidents included the spilling
of 800,000 gallons of oil into the Kalamazoo River. If a similar accident, or a series of them were to compromise
the Ogallala the damage would be catastrophic according to a report in the Telegraph. “If it does, the impact
on the world’s food supply will be far greater. The irrigated Plains grow 20 per cent of American grain
and corn (maize), and America’s ‘industrial’ agriculture dominates international markets. A collapse
of those markets would lead to starvation in Africa and anywhere else where a meal depends on cheap
American exports.”
Causes global instability
Jacquelyn S. Porth 8, USIA Security Affairs Correspondent, Africa: Widespread Hunger Poses National
Security Threat, 9-30-08, http://allafrica.com/stories/200810010103.html
The director of the U.N. World Food Programme (WFP) warns that the burgeoning global food crisis is “a silent
tsunami striking the most vulnerable” wherever they are located. Josette Sheeran, the 11th director of WFP, told
the Women's Foreign Policy Group in Washington on September 29 that hunger "can have a profound impact on
national security." The problem of staving off hunger is a critical one for fragile and economically unstable
nations, she said. In the past year and a half, 34 nations have experienced food riots and protests. Political strife tied to
climbing food prices has occurred in Liberia, Cameroon, Haiti, Afghanistan, Mexico, Pakistan, Indonesia and elsewhere. "So
often these nations are neighbors, friends and allies of the U nited S tates whose prosperity, stability and
success are so critical to America's own national security," Sheeran said. "Without food, societies
become breeding grounds for instability, civil unrest, terrorism and demagogues," the WFP
director said. Her organization is striving to help as many hungry individuals as possible. It expects to aid 90 million people this
year, including an estimated 20 million schoolchildren, many of whose daily diets will be supplemented with a hearty cup of
enriched porridge, she said. However, that cup is at risk of being reduced by as much as 40 percent in places such as Rwanda as
the result of soaring commodity prices. Sometimes, Sheeran said, the WFP faces the grim choice of cutting the number of
calories packed into the offering or reducing the number of people who are on the distribution list. The price of rice has soared
recently, she said, rising from $780 a metric ton in March to more than $1,000 a metric ton in Haiti at the end of September.
This statistic is especially devastating for Haiti, which lost 50 percent of its planned harvest in the wake of a pounding succession
of four hurricanes. Haiti is suffering from what Sheeran described as "a perfect storm within a perfect storm -- in fact, four
storms." Sheeran just returned from Gonaïves, the area hardest hit by Hurricane Ike. It is entombed in a landslide of mud, she
reported, with many Haitians still hungry, thirsty and trapped on their roofs or marooned in makeshift shelters. Aid from the
United States, Canada and the United Nations has begun to flow into the flood zone, but Sheeran said the situation in Gonaïves
is still "desperate." She thanked the United States for its $7 million donation in September and acknowledged Yum Brands Chief
Executive Officer David Novak's pledge of 4 million school meals for Haitians. Canada and Switzerland have pitched in several
million dollars in food aid and logistical support, Sheeran added. But hunger should not be viewed simply as a humanitarian
challenge, Sheeran said, because it is also "a vital national security issue for the United States and, indeed, for the
world." Combatants, she said, frequently use hunger as a weapon and hijack food aid. Sheeran appealed to the world's navies to
provide consistent escort for ships stocked with WFP food aid so the cargo and crew will not fall prey to pirate attacks. "There
are pirates off the coast of Somalia threatening our supply line," she said. It is far too dangerous to send in ships without escort
now, Sheeran said. Sporadic escorts have been provided, she said, and Canada, most recently, is escorting ships. But the WFP
director said it is unclear who will provide escort service when Canada's turn is over in three weeks. Sheeran reminded her
audience that the
pursuit of food security "has been at the core of the rise and fall of
civilizations." It has toppled governments, allowed dictators to prevail, and spawned mass
migration. "When food security is in question, we must pull together and act," she said, because "there is no other option."
Hunger is not only about providing compassion, she added, but it also "is about global stability and security."
AT: Keystone Impacts Inevitable
Not inev---rejection leaves it in the ground
Frances Beinecke 13, President, Natural Resources Defense Council, 2/27/13, “Dirty Tar Sands
Running Out of Options,” http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2013/02/what-does-the-keystone-xlpipe.php
Oil companies would like us to believe tar sands expansion is a foregone conclusion, but economic and political realities reveal the
future of the industry hinges on the Keystone XL. They need to haul their land-locked product through America’s breadbasket to the
Gulf of Mexico for export in order to escape the low prices and supply glut in their current Canadian and US markets.¶ Numerous
financial analysts and oil executives agree that the current opposition to Keystone XL is already slowing
expansion. In a January report, Standard & Poor’s forecast that delays in approving new pipelines are
putting future tar sands production growth at risk. TD Economics, part of a major Canadian Bank, came
to a similar conclusion, calling pipeline capacity constraints “a serious challenge to its long-term
growth.”¶ Tar sands companies can’t simply choose another route if Keystone XL gets
blocked; no other viable alternatives exist right now. CIBC, a major Canadian financial services firm,
recently concluded the pipelines proposals for hauling tar sands oil to Canada’s West Coast have a less than 50 percent chance of
being built. The Northern Gateway pipeline to the British Columbia Coast, for instance, is highly unpopular in that province, where
60 percent of residents oppose the project and aboriginal communities have refused to grant necessary easements.¶ In light of
pipeline opposition—and competition from new oil fields—some companies are starting to
shift investments out of tar sands. Canadian Natural Resources Ltd cut capital spending by $680 million from its
Horizon tar sands project last year.¶ If President Obama rejects the Keystone XL pipeline he could help
keep this dangerous fuel where it belongs: in the ground. The production of tar sands oil
generates three times as many greenhouse gases as the production of conventional crude.
The EPA estimates that building the Keystone XL pipeline will increase carbon pollution by the equivalent of
adding 6.2 million cars to the road for 50 years. Rejecting the pipeline would prevent an even
larger amount of carbon pollution from entering our air, because as market analysts are
reporting, tar sands expansion without the pipeline would not be economically feasible.
Not inevitable
Lawrence Solomon 3-15, executive director of Toronto-based Energy Probe, “Lawrence Solomon:
Obama will block Keystone,” Financial Post, http://opinion.financialpost.com/2013/03/14/lawrencesolomon-obama-will-block-keystone/
Many claim that Keystone wouldn’t adversely affect the environment since Canada isn’t going to allow
its tar sands oil to sit in the ground — if the U.S. doesn’t approve Keystone, they say, Canada will build
a pipeline to British Columbia and then ship its oil to China, or else Canada will reverse an existing
pipeline in Central Canada and then send its tar sands oil east.¶ Maybe so, but maybe not. The pipelines
face a gamut of opposition from environmentalists, native communities, provincial interests and
regulators, making their completion anything but a done deal. Even if the regulatory hurdles could be
overcome and the pipeline economics be made to work, years of delay could be in the offing. In that
interim, the economics of energy production itself could change, as it so often does, rendering new tar
sands projects uneconomic to develop. Or the governments of the world could finally act on their climate
change rhetoric and impose carbon taxes or other measures whose effect would be the demise of tar sands. Even if
the Canadian pipeline projects are eventually built and additional tar sands are eventually developed,
the delays necessitated by disallowing Keystone would spare the planet years of emissions from what
many see as the world’s dirtiest plants — no small accomplishment.
Plan Shields Blame
Normal means is Secretary of Treasury action---shields the link
Pascual and Huddleston 9 Carlos, Vice president and Director of Foreign policy, the Brookings
Institution, and Vicki, Visiting Fellow, “CUBA: A New policy of Critical and Constructive Engagement”,
April, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413_cuba.pdf
Given the strong sentiments and expectations that Cuba engenders, it would be preferable for the Executive
Branch to proceed discreetly. The president might first announce the principles he hopes to achieve in Cuba through a policy of en gagement that promotes human rights, the well- being of the Cuban people, and the growth of civil society. To carry out the president’s
vision, the Secretary of the Treasury will then have the responsibility to write and publish the changes
to the Cuban Assets Control regulations by licensing activities designed to achieve these ends. The
Secretary of State can quietly accomplish many diplomatic initiatives on a reciprocal basis without any need to
publicize them. This quiet diplomacy might be complemented by a refusal to engage in what some refer to as megaphone diplomacy, in which
our governments trade in - sults across the Straits of Florida, and which only contributes to making the United States appear to be a bully.
Plan Popular – Oil Lobby
Oil companies massively support the plan and lobby for it---determines
Congressional sentiment
Sadowski 11 – Richard Sadowski 11, J.D., Hofstra University School of Law, Fall 2011, “IN THIS
ISSUE: NATURAL RESOURCE CONFLICT: CUBAN OFFSHORE DRILLING: PREPARATION AND
PREVENTION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED STATES' EMBARGO,” Sustainable
Development Law & Policy, 12 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol'y 37, p. lexis
A U.S. Geological Survey estimates that Cuba's offshore oil fields hold at least four and a half billion barrels of recoverable oil and ten
trillion cubic feet of natural gas. n29 Cupet, the state-owned Cuban energy company, insists that actual reserves are double that of
the U.S. estimate. n30 One estimate indicates that Cuba could be producing 525,000 barrels of oil per day. n31 Given this vast
resource, Cuba has already leased offshore oil exploration blocks to operators from Spain, Norway, and India. n32 Offshore oil
discoveries in Cuba are placing increasing pressure for the United States to end the embargo. First, U.S.
energy companies are eager to compete for access to Cuban oil reserves. n33 [*38] Secondly, fears of a Cuban oil
spill are argued to warrant U.S. investment and technology. n34 Finally, the concern over Cuban offshore drilling
renews cries that the embargo is largely a failure and harms human rights.¶ ECONOMICS: U.S. COMPANIES WANT IN¶ For U.S.
companies, the embargo creates concern that they will lose out on an opportunity to develop a nearby
resource. n35 Oil companies have a long history of utilizing political pressure for self-serving purposes . n36
American politicians, ever fearful of high energy costs , are especially susceptible to oil-lobby pressures . n37
This dynamic was exemplified in 2008, when then-Vice President Dick Cheney told the board of directors of the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce that "oil is being drilled right now sixty miles off the coast of Florida. But we're not doing it,
the Chinese are , in cooperation with the Cuban government. Even the communists have figured out that a good
answer to high prices is more supply" n38¶ This pressure for U.S. investment in oil is exacerbated by
America's expected increase in consumption rates. n39 Oil company stocks are valued in large part on
access to reserves. n40 Thus, more leases, including those in Cuban waters , equal higher stock valuation. n41
"The last thing that American energy companies want is to be trapped on the sidelines by sanctions while
European, Canadian and Latin American rivals are free to develop new oil resources on the doorstep of the
United States." n42
XT – Oil Lobby Link Turn
Oil’s a game-changer for all their links
Politico 11, “Cuba drilling next hurdle for U.S.,” 9/27/11,
http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=EB87536A-A6D9-4ED2-9D07-6800848DF150
Administration officials have already upgraded drilling standards for operations off the U.S. coast and have
established a partnership with Mexico to set higher bilateral standards in the Gulf of Mexico since last year’s historic spill. And
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement Director Michael Bromwich said last week that “the issue of
drilling offshore Cuba has been on our screen for many months.” ¶ “I can say that this issue has been focused on and
discussed in very high levels of the government,” Bromwich said. ¶ The Spanish company Repsol is expected
by January to begin drilling a deepwater exploratory oil well off Cuba in waters about 60 miles south of
Key West and slightly deeper than BP’s doomed Macondo exploration well. Other exploratory wells from
the same Chinese-built semi-submersible rig owned by the Italian company Saipem would follow in
subsequent months — involving companies such as Russia’s Gazprom. ¶ “Politicians don’t like to take
the risk with Cuba unless they see a clear positive payback of some sort,” said Bill Reilly, a former
EPA administrator under President George H.W. Bush. “Now that we see the rig approaching Cuban waters,
the political calculus will change.”
Big oil loves the plan
Sadowski 12 (Richard, J.D. candidate, at Hofstra University School of Law, NY. Mr. Sadowski is also
the Managing Editor of Production of the Journal of International Business and Law Vol. XI. “Cuban
offshore drilling: Preparation and prevention within the framework of the United States’ embargo,”
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1497&context=sdlp)
For U.S. companies, the embargo creates concern that they will lose out on an opportunity to develop a
nearby resource.35 Oil companies have a long history of utilizing political pressure for self-serving
purposes.36 American politicians, ever fearful of high energy costs, are especially susceptible to oil-lobby
pressures.37 This dynamic was exemplified in 2008, when then-Vice President Dick Cheney told the board of
directors of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce that “oil is being drilled right now sixty miles off the coast of Florida.
But we’re not doing it, the Chinese are, in cooperation with the Cuban government. Even the communists have figured out
that a good answer to high prices is more supply.”38¶ This pressure for U.S. investment in oil is exacerbated by
America’s expected increase in consumption rates.39 Oil company stocks are valued in large part on access to
reserves.40 Thus, more leases, including those in Cuban waters, equal higher stock valuation.41 “The last thing that
American energy companies want is to be trapped on the sidelines by sanctions while European, Canadian and
Latin American rivals are free to develop new oil resources on the doorstep of the United States.”42
Plan Popular – Olive Branch
Obama PC fails now---action on OCS drilling’s a key olive branch that
generates GOP support for other priorities like immigration
CSM 1-20 – Christian Science Monitor, 1/20/13, “Obama’s second term: Can he work with Congress?
(+video),” http://www.csmonitor.com/layout/set/print/USA/DC-Decoder/2013/0120/Obama-s-secondterm-Can-he-work-with-Congress-video
“The president has been criticized by many people for his inability or unwillingness to spend a lot of time stroking
members of Congress ,” says Ross Baker, a congressional historian at Rutgers University who is writing a book on bipartisanship in the US Senate. “I think a lot of this is based upon the
widely-accepted theory [that the] power of a presidency is the power to persuade – which is perfectly plausible, and it was certainly plausible in the 1950s.... The problem is, there are no persuadables" today. ¶
But by focusing on issues of common ground with the GOP, Washington could generate some bipartisan
successes in the next four years. ¶ Immigration and Energy¶ For one, the president could team up with Republican moderates and much of the party’s leadership on immigration reform.
¶ “We believe that immigration reform is different in that it has a past, present, and future of bipartisan support,” said Ali Noorani, executive director of the National Immigration Forum. “What we’ve seen over
the president could perhaps turn
down the bellicosity on the Hill by working with some of his loudest critics (though risking the ire of environmentalists in his political base) in
one area that the deeply-red right and the president could agree: energy policy . ¶ “We were encouraged by President Obama’s 2012 campaign comments supporting an all-of-the-above agenda on
the last two years is conservatives, moderates, and liberals want this president and this Congress to act, and that’s different from any other issue.” ¶ And
energy, and his statements outlining support for oil and natural gas,” said Jack Gerard, president of the American Petroleum Institute, the oil and gas industry’s powerful trade association, in his annual State of
Republicans rage about a disconnect between what the president and members
say they favor and what Republicans say is foot-dragging in building the Keystone XL pipeline, exporting natural gas, or
freeing up more offshore areas for energy exploration . If the president were to get behind any of these
initiatives he’d likely have plenty of GOP support – but that remains a large “if.”
American Energy address in Washington earlier this month. ¶ But
of his administration
AT: Democrats Backlash Link
Dems won’t backlash or drain PC
Hughes 2/6 Brian, "Obama's base increasingly wary of drone program", 2013,
washingtonexaminer.com/obamas-base-increasingly-wary-of-drone-program/article/2520787
"Democrats, they're going to want the president to succeed on domestic priorities and
don't want to do anything to erode his political capital," said Christopher Preble, vice president for
defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. "It's just so partisan right now. An awful lot of
[lawmakers] think the president should be able to do whatever he wants."
Winner’s Win – 2AC
Winner’s win
Hirsh 2/7 Michael, chief correspondent for National Journal; citing Ornstein, a political scientist and
scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and Bensel, gov’t prof at Cornell, "There's No Such Thing as
Political Capital", 2013, www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital20130207
But the abrupt emergence of the immigration and gun-control issues illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood
can occur and how political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of political capital
masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you
try. Or as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “Winning wins.” In theory, and in practice, depending on
Obama’s handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term
goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such
as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote.¶ Some political scientists who
study the elusive calculus of how to pass legislation and run successful presidencies say that political capital is, at best, an empty
concept, and that almost nothing in the academic literature successfully quantifies or even defines it. “It can
refer to a very abstract thing, like a president’s popularity, but there’s no mechanism there. That makes
it kind of useless,” says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the
calculus is far more complex than the term suggests. Winning on one issue often changes the
calculation for the next issue; there is never any known amount of capital. “The idea here is, if an
issue comes up where the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants, and he
gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the other actors” Ornstein says. “If they think
he’s going to win, they may change positions to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect.”
Winner’s Win – 1AR
Energy breaks gridlock and builds momentum
Izadi 12 Elahe is a writer for the National Journal. “Former Sen. Trent Lott, Ex-Rep. Jim Davis
Bemoan Partisanship on Energy Issues,” 8/29, http://www.nationaljournal.com/2012-election/formermembers-bemoan-partisanship-on-energy-issues-20120829
In a climate where everything from transportation issues to the farm bill have gotten caught in political gridlock, it will
take serious willingness to compromise to get formerly bipartisan energy issues moving from the current
partisan standstill.¶ “If we get the right political leadership and the willingness to put everything on the
table, I don’t think this has to be a partisan issue,” former Rep. Jim Davis, D-Fla., said during a Republican National Convention
event on Wednesday in Tampa hosted by National Journal and the American Petroleum Institute. ¶ Former Senate Republican Leader Trent Lott of
Mississippi said that “Republicans
who want to produce more of everything have to also be willing to give a little
on the conservation side.Ӧ The event focused on the future of energy issues and how they are playing out in the presidential and
congressional races. Four years ago, the major presidential candidates both agreed that climate change needed to be addressed. However, since then,
the science behind global warming has come into question by more and more Republicans. ¶ But casting
energy as a defense or
jobs issue, in the current political climate, will allow debates between lawmakers to gain some steam, Lott
and Davis agreed.¶ The export of coal and natural gas, hydraulic fracturing, and how tax reform will affect the energy industries are all issues that will
have to be dealt with by the next president and Congress.¶ “The
job of the next president is critical on energy and many of
these issues, and the job is very simple: adult supervision of the Congress,” Davis said.
Prefer qualifications
Green 10 David Michael, professor of political science at Hofstra University, 6/11, "The Do-Nothing
44th President", http://www.opednews.com/articles/The-Do-Nothing-44th-Presid-by-David-MichaelGree-100611-648.html
Moreover, there is a continuously evolving and reciprocal relationship between presidential boldness and achievement. In the same way that nothing breeds
success like success, nothing sets the president up for achieving his or her next goal
better than succeeding dramatically on the last go around. This is absolutely a matter of
perception, and you can see it best in the way that Congress and especially the Washington press corps
fawn over bold and intimidating presidents like Reagan and George W. Bush. The political teams surrounding these presidents understood the
psychology of power all too well. They knew that by simultaneously creating a steamroller effect and feigning a clubby atmosphere for Congress and the press, they could
By jumping on board the freight train, they
could be given the illusion of being next to power, of being part of the winning team . And so, with virtually the sole
leave such hapless hangers-on with only one remaining way to pretend to preserve their dignities.
exception of the now retired Helen Thomas, this is precisely what they did.
True for Obama’s second term
Hirsh 2/7 Michael, chief correspondent for National Journal, previously served as the senior editor
and national economics correspondent for Newsweek, has appeared many times as a commentator on Fox
News, CNN, MSNBC, and National Public Radio, has written for the Associated Press, The New York
Times, The Washington Post, Foreign Affairs, Harper’s, and Washington Monthly, and authored two
books, "There's No Such Thing as Political Capital", 2013, www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-sno-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207
In terms of Obama’s second-term agenda, what all these shifting tides of momentum and political
calculation mean is this: Anything goes. Obama has no more elections to win, and he needs to worry only about the support he will have in the House
and Senate after 2014. But if he picks issues that the country’s mood will support—such as, perhaps, immigration reform and gun control—there is no reason to think he can’t
win far more victories than any of the careful calculators of political capital now believe is possible, including battles over tax reform and deficit reduction.¶ Amid today’s
atmosphere of Republican self-doubt, a new, more mature Obama seems to be emerging, one who has his agenda clearly in mind and will ride the mood of the country more
If he can get some early wins—as he already has, apparently, on the fiscal cliff and the
upper-income tax increase—that will create momentum, and one win may well lead to
others. “Winning wins.”
adroitly.
PC Not Real – 2AC
Low PC inevitable and not key
Schier 11 Steven E. Schier is the Dorothy H. and Edward C. Congdon professor of political science at
Carleton College, The contemporary presidency: the presidential authority problem and the political
power trap. Presidential Studies Quarterly December 1, 2011 lexis
Implications of the Evidence¶ The evidence presented here depicts a decline in presidential political capital
after 1965. Since that time, presidents have had lower job approval, fewer fellow partisans and less
voting support in Congress, less approval of their party, and have usually encountered an increasingly adverse public
policy mood as they governed.¶ Specifically, average job approval dropped. Net job approval plummeted, reflecting greater polarization about presidential
performance.The proportion of fellow partisans in the public dropped and became less volatile. Congressional voting support became lower and varied more. The number
of fellow partisans in the House and Senate fell and became less volatile. Public issue mood usually moved against presidents as they governed. All of these measures, with
the exception of public mood, correlate positively with each other, suggesting they are part of a broader phenomenon.¶ That "phenomenon" is political authority. The
decline in politicalcapital has produced great difficulties for presidential political authority in recent decades. It is difficult to claim warrants for leadership in an era when
job approval, congressional support, and partisan affiliation provide less backing for a president than in times past.¶ Because of the uncertainties of political authority,
recent presidents have adopted a governing style that is personalized, preemptive,and, at times, isolated. Given the entrenched autonomy of other elite actors and the
impermanence of public opinion, presidents have had to "sell themselves" in order to sell their governance. Samuel Kernell (1997) first highlighted the presidential
proclivity to "go public"in the 1980s as a response to these conditions. Through leveraging public support, presidents have at times been able to overcome institutional
resistance to their policy agendas. Brandice Canes-Wrone (2001) discovered that presidents tend to help themselves with public opinion by highlighting issues the public
Despite shrinking political
capital , presidents at times have effectively pursued such strategies, particularly since 1995.
Clinton's centrist "triangulation" and George W. Bush's careful issue selection early in his presidency allowed them to secure
important policy changes --in Clinton's case, welfare reform and budget balance, in Bush's tax cuts
and education reform--that at the time received popular approval. This may explain the slight recovery in some presidential political capital measures since
supports and that boosts their congressional success--an effective strategy when political capital is questionable.¶
1993. Clinton accomplished much with a GOPCongress, and Bush's first term included strong support from a Congress ruled by friendly Republican majorities. David
Mayhew finds that from 1995 to 2004, both highly important and important policy changeswere passed by Congress into law at higher rates than during the 1947-1994
A trend of declining political capital thus does not preclude significant policy change ,
Short-term legislative
strategies can win policy success for a president but do not serve as an antidote to declining
political capital over time, as the final years of both the Clinton and George W. Bush presidencies demonstrate.
period. (2)
but a record of major policy accomplishment has not reversed the decline in presidential political capital in recent years, either.
PC Not Real – 1AR
Reject journalists’ issue specific internals
Dickinson 9 (Matthew, professor of political science at Middlebury College and taught previously at
Harvard University where he worked under the supervision of presidential scholar Richard Neustadt,
5/26, Presidential Power: A NonPartisan Analysis of Presidential Politics, “Sotomayor, Obama and
Presidential Power,” http://blogs.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2009/05/26/sotamayor-obamaand-presidential-power/)
What is of more interest to me, however, is what her selection reveals about the basis of presidential power. Political scientists, like baseball writers evaluating hitters, have
devised numerous means of measuring a president’s influence in Congress . I will devote a separate post to discussing these, but in brief,
they often center on the creation of legislative “box scores” designed to measure how many times a president’s preferred piece of legislation, or nominee to the executive branch or the
courts, is approved by Congress. That is, how many pieces of legislation that the president supports actually pass Congress? How often do members of Congress vote with the president’s
These measures, however, are a misleading gauge of
presidential power – they are a better indicator of congressional power . This is because how members of Congress
vote on a nominee or legislative item is rarely influenced by anything a president does . Although journalists (and
political scientists) often focus on the legislative “endgame” to gauge presidential influence – will the President swing enough votes to get
his preferred legislation enacted? – this mistakes an outcome with actual evidence of presidential influence . Once we
control for other factors – a member of Congress’ ideological and partisan leanings, the political leanings of her constituency, whether
she’s up for reelection or not – we can usually predict how she will vote without needing to know much of anything about what the
president wants. (I am ignoring the importance of a president’s veto power for the moment.) Despite the much publicized and celebrated instances of presidential arm-twisting
during the legislative endgame, then, most legislative outcomes don’t depend on presidential lobbying. But this is not to say that presidents lack influence. Instead, the primary
means by which presidents influence what Congress does is through their ability to determine the alternatives
from which Congress must choose. That is, presidential power is largely an exercise in agenda-setting – not arm-twisting.
preferences? How often is a president’s policy position supported by roll call outcomes?
And we see this in the Sotomayer nomination. Barring a major scandal, she will almost certainly be confirmed to the Supreme Court whether Obama spends the confirmation hearings
calling every Senator or instead spends the next few weeks ignoring the Senate debate in order to play Halo III on his Xbox. That is, how senators decide to vote on Sotomayor will have
almost nothing to do with Obama’s lobbying from here on in (or lack thereof).
Sotomayor as
His real influence has already occurred, in the decision to present
his nominee.
PC theory’s false---not finite
Hirsh 2/7 Michael, chief correspondent for National Journal, previously served as the senior editor
and national economics correspondent for Newsweek, has appeared many times as a commentator on Fox
News, CNN, MSNBC, and National Public Radio, has written for the Associated Press, The New York
Times, The Washington Post, Foreign Affairs, Harper’s, and Washington Monthly, and authored two
books, "There's No Such Thing as Political Capital", 2013, www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-sno-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207
The real problem is that the idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that
presidents and pundits often get it wrong. “Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards,
a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind of political capital—some sense of an electoral mandate to
do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason, political
capital is a concept that misleads far more than it enlightens. It is distortionary. It conveys the idea
that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusive concept of political power, and it discounts the
way unforeseen events can suddenly change everything. Instead, it suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a
concrete amount of political capital to invest, just as someone might have real investment capital—that a particular leader can bank
his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history.¶ Naturally, any president
has practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress and a cohesive coalition behind him? Obama has neither at
present. And unless a surge in the economy—at the moment, still stuck—or some other great victory gives him more momentum, it is inevitable that the
closer Obama gets to the 2014 election, the less he will be able to get done. Going into the midterms, Republicans
any concessions that make him (and the Democrats) stronger.
will increasingly avoid
K’s
2AC Neolib K
The role of the ballot is political engagement with Latin American policy—
nebulous frameworks destroy politics and are infinite which kills 2AC
offense
Trade eliminates the only rational incentives for war—proves sustainability
Gartzke 11 Erik Gartzke is an associate Professor of political science at the University of California,
San Diego PhD from Iowa and B.A. from UCSF "SECURITY IN AN INSECURE WORLD" www.catounbound.org/2011/02/09/erik-gartzke/security-in-an-insecure-world/
Almost as informative as the decline in warfare has been where this decline is occurring. Traditionally,
nations were constrained by opportunity. Most nations did not fight most others because they could
not physically do so. Powerful nations, in contrast, tended to fight more often, and particularly to fight with other powerful states. Modern “zones
of peace” are dominated by powerful, militarily capable countries. These countries could
fight each other, but are not inclined to do so. At the same time, weaker developing nations that continue
to exercise force in traditional ways are incapable of projecting power against the developed world, with the exception of
unconventional methods, such as terrorism.¶ The world is thus divided between those who could use force but prefer not to (at least not against each other) and those who
Warfare in the modern world has thus become an
activity involving weak (usually neighboring) nations, with intervention by powerful (geographically distant) states in a
policing capacity. So, the riddle of peace boils down to why capable nations are not fighting each other. There are several explanations, as Mack has pointed
out.¶ The easiest, and I think the best, explanation has to do with an absence of motive. Modern states
find little incentive to bicker over tangible property, since armies are expensive and the goods that can
be looted are no longer of considerable value. Ironically, this is exactly the explanation that Norman Angell famously supplied
before the World Wars. Yet, today the evidence is abundant that the most prosperous, capable nations
prefer to buy rather than take . Decolonization, for example, divested European powers of territories
that were increasingly expensive to administer and which contained tangible assets of limited value.¶ Of
comparable importance is the move to substantial consensus among powerful nations about how
international affairs should be conducted. The great rivalries of the twentieth century were ideological rather
than territorial. These have been substantially resolved, as Francis Fukuyama has pointed out. The fact that remaining
differences are moderate, while the benefits of acting in concert are large (due to economic
interdependence in particular ) means that nations prefer to deliberate rather than fight.
Differences remain, but for the most part the capable countries of the world have been in consensus ,
while the disgruntled developing world is incapable of acting on respective nations’ dissatisfaction.¶ While this version of events explains the
partial peace bestowed on the developed world, it also poses challenges in terms of the future. The
rising nations of Asia in particular have not been equal beneficiaries in the world political system. These nations
have benefited from economic integration, and this has proved sufficient in the past to pacify
them . The question for the future is whether the benefits of tangible resources through markets are sufficient to compensate the rising powers for their lack of
would be willing to fight but lack the material means to fight far from home.
influence in the policy sphere. The danger is that established powers may be slow to accommodate or give way to the demands of rising powers from Asia and elsewhere,
these nations are rising in power,
their domestic situations are evolving in a way that makes their interests more similar to the West.
Consumerism, democracy, and a market orientation all help to draw the rising powers in as fellow
travelers in an expanding zone of peace among the developed nations. Pessimists argue instead that capabilities among the rising powers are
leading to divisions over the intangible domain of policy and politics. Optimists argue that at the same time that
growing faster than their affinity for western values, or even that fundamental differences exist among the interests of first- and second-wave powers that cannot be
If the peace observed among western, developed nations
is to prove durable, it must be because warfare proves futile as nations transition to
prosperity . Whether this will happen depends on the rate of change in interests and capabilities, a difficult thing to judge. We must hope that the optimistic view
is correct, that what ended war in Europe can be exported globally . Prosperity has made war
expensive, while the fruits of conflict, both in terms of tangible and intangible spoils have declined
in value. These forces are not guaranteed to prevail indefinitely. Already, research on robotic warfare promises to lower the cost of conquest. If in addition,
fundamental differences among capable communities arise, then warfare over ideology or policy can also be resurrected. We must all hope that the
consolidating forces of prosperity prevail, that war becomes a durable anachronism.
bridged by the presence of market mechanisms or McDonald’s restaurants.¶
Perm do both
Neolib is sustainable and inevitable---no alt
Jones 11—Owen, Masters at Oxford, named one of the Daily Telegraph's 'Top 100 Most Influential
People on the Left' for 2011, author of "Chavs: The Demonization of the Working Class", The
Independent, UK, "Owen Jones: Protest without politics will change nothing", 2011,
www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/owen-jones-protest-without-politics-will-changenothing-2373612.html
My first experience of police kettling was aged 16. It was May Day 2001, and the anti-globalisation movement was at its peak. The turn-of-the-century anti-capitalist
movement feels largely forgotten today, but it was a big deal at the time. To a left-wing teenager growing up in an age of unchallenged neo-liberal triumphalism, just to
have "anti-capitalism" flash up in the headlines was thrilling. Thousands of apparently unstoppable protesters chased the world's rulers from IMF to World Bank summits
Today, as protesters in nearly a thousand cities across the
world follow the example set by the Occupy Wall Street protests, it's worth pondering what happened to the antiglobalisation movement. Its activists did not lack passion or determination. But they did lack a
coherent alternative to the neo-liberal project. With no clear political direction, the
movement was easily swept away by the jingoism and turmoil that followed 9/11, just two months after
– from Seattle to Prague to Genoa – and the authorities were rattled.¶
Genoa.¶ Don't get me wrong: the Occupy movement is a glimmer of sanity amid today's economic madness. By descending on the West's financial epicentres, it reminds us
of how a crisis caused by the banks (a sentence that needs to be repeated until it becomes a cliché) has been cynically transformed into a crisis of public spending. The
founding statement of Occupy London puts it succinctly: "We refuse to pay for the banks' crisis." The Occupiers direct their fire at the top 1 per cent, and rightly so – as US
billionaire Warren Buffett confessed: "There's class warfare, all right, but it's my class, the rich class, that's making war, and we're winning."¶ The Occupy movement has
provoked fury from senior US Republicans such as Presidential contender Herman Cain who – predictably – labelled it "anti-American". They're right to be worried: those
But a coherent alternative to
the tottering global economic order remains, it seems, as distant as ever. Neo-liberalism
crashes around, half-dead, with no-one to administer the killer blow.¶ There's always a presumption that
camping outside banks threaten to refocus attention on the real villains, and to act as a catalyst for wider dissent.
a crisis of capitalism is good news for the left. Yet in the Great Depression, fascism consumed much of Europe. The economic crisis of the 1970s did lead to a resurgence of
This time
round, there doesn't even seem to be an alternative for the right to defeat. That's not the fault of the protesters. In truth,
the left has never recovered from being virtually smothered out of existence . It was the victim of a
perfect storm: the rise of the New Right; neo-liberal globalisation; and the repeated defeats suffered by the
trade union movement.¶ But, above all, it was the aftermath of the collapse of Communism that did for the left. As US neo-conservative
Midge Decter triumphantly put it: "It's time to say: We've won. Goodbye ." From the British Labour Party to the African
National Congress, left-wing movements across the world hurtled to the right in an almost synchronised fashion. It was as though the left wing of
the global political spectrum had been sliced off. That's why , although we live in an age of revolt,
there remains no left to give it direction and purpose.
radicalism on both left and right. But, spearheaded by Thatcherism and Reaganism, the New Right definitively crushed its opposition in the 1980s.
Case outweighs--No impact
Larrivee 10— PF ECONOMICS AT MOUNT ST MARY’S UNIVERSITY – MASTERS FROM THE
HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL AND PHD IN ECONOMICS FROM WISCONSIN, 10 [JOHN, A
FRAMEWORK FOR THE MORAL ANALYSIS OF MARKETS, 10/1,
http://www.teacheconomicfreedom.org/files/larrivee-paper-1.pdf]
The Second Focal Point: Moral, Social, and Cultural Issues of Capitalism Logical errors abound in critical commentary on
capitalism. Some critics observe a problem and conclude: “I see X in our society. We have a capitalist
economy. Therefore capitalism causes X.” They draw their conclusion by looking at a phenomenon as it appears only in one system. Others
merely follow a host of popular theories according to which capitalism is particularly bad. 6 The solution to such flawed reasoning is to be
comprehensive, to look at the good and bad, in market and non-market systems. Thus the following section considers a number of issues—
greed, selfishness and human relationships, honesty and truth, alienation and work satisfaction, moral decay, and religious participation—that have
often been associated with capitalism, but have also been problematic in other systems and usually in more extreme
form. I conclude with some evidence for the view that markets foster (at least some) virtues rather than undermining them. My purpose is not to smear communism or
to make the simplistic argument that “capitalism isn’t so bad because other systems have problems too.” The critical point is that certain
people thought various social ills resulted from capitalism, and on this basis they took
action to establish alternative economic systems to solve the problems they had identified.
That they failed to solve the problems, and in fact exacerbated them while also creating new
problems, implies that capitalism itself wasn’t the cause of the problems in the first place, at least not to the
degree theorized.
The squo is structurally improving
Goklany 9—Worked with federal and state governments, think tanks, and the private sector for over 35 years. Worked with IPCC before its inception as an
author, delegate and reviewer. Negotiated UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Managed the emissions trading program for the EPA. Julian Simon Fellow at the
Property and Environment Research Center, visiting fellow at AEI, winner of the Julian Simon Prize and Award. PhD, MS, electrical engineering, MSU. B.Tech in electrical
engineering, Indian Institute of Tech. (Indur, “Have increases in population, affluence and technology worsened human and environmental well-being?” 2009,
http://www.ejsd.org/docs/HAVE_INCREASES_IN_POPULATION_AFFLUENCE_AND_TECHNOLOGY_WORSENED_HUMAN_AND_ENVIRONMENTAL_WELLBEING.pdf)
population
has quadrupled
Although global
is no longer growing exponentially, it
since 1900. Concurrently, affluence (or GDP per capita) has sextupled,
global economic product (a measure of aggregate consumption) has increased 23-fold and carbon dioxide has increased over 15-fold (Maddison 2003; GGDC 2008; World
But contrary to Neo- Malthusian fears, average human well-being, measured by any objective
has never been higher. Food supplies, Malthus’ original concern, are up worldwide. Global food supplies per capita increased
from 2,254 Cals/day in 1961 to 2,810 in 2003 (FAOSTAT 2008). This helped reduce hunger and malnutrition worldwide . The
proportion of the population in the developing world, suffering from chronic hunger declined from 37
percent to 17 percent between 1969–71 and 2001–2003 despite an 87 percent population increase (Goklany 2007a; FAO 2006). The
reduction in hunger and malnutrition, along with improvements in basic hygiene, improved access to safer
water and sanitation, broad adoption of vaccinations, antibiotics, pasteurization and other public
health measures, helped reduce mortality and increase life expectancies. These improvements first became evident in
today’s developed countries in the mid- to late-1800s and started to spread in earnest to developing countries from the 1950s. The infant mortality rate in
developing countries was 180 per 1,000 live births in the early 1950s; today it is 57. Consequently, global life expectancy, perhaps the
single most important measure of human well-being, increased from 31 years in 1900 to 47 years in the early 1950s to 67 years today (Goklany 2007a).
Globally, average annual per capita incomes tripled since 1950. The proportion of the world’s population
outside of high-income OECD countries living in absolute poverty ( average consumption of less than $1 per day in 1985
International dollars adjusted for purchasing power parity), fell from 84 percent in 1820 to 40 percent in 1981 to 20 percent in 2007 (Goklany 2007a;
WRI 2008; World Bank 2007). Equally important, the world is more literate and better educated . Child labor in low income
countries declined from 30 to 18 percent between 1960 and 2003. In most countries, people are freer politically,
economically and socially to pursue their goals as they see fit. More people choose their own rulers, and
have freedom of expression. They are more likely to live under rule of law, and less likely to be
arbitrarily deprived of life, limb and property. Social and professional mobility has never been greater.
It is easier to transcend the bonds of caste, place, gender, and other accidents of birth in the lottery of life. People work
fewer hours, and have more money and better health to enjoy their leisure time (Goklany 2007a). Figure 3 summarizes
Bank 2008a; Marland et al. 2007).4
indicator,
the U.S. experience over the 20th century with respect to growth of population, affluence, material, fossil fuel energy and chemical consumption, and life expectancy. It
indicates that population has multiplied 3.7-fold; income, 6.9-fold; carbon dioxide emissions, 8.5-fold; material use, 26.5-fold; and organic chemical use, 101-fold. Yet its
life expectancy increased from 47 years to 77 years and infant mortality (not shown) declined from over 100 per 1,000
live births to 7 per 1,000. It is also important to note that not only are people living longer, they are healthier . The
disability rate for seniors declined 28 percent between 1982 and 2004/2005 and, despite better diagnostic tools, major diseases
(e.g., cancer, and heart and respiratory diseases) occur 8–11 years later now than a century ago (Fogel 2003; Manton et al. 2006). If similar figures could be
constructed for other countries, most would indicate qualitatively similar trends, especially after 1950, except Sub-Saharan Africa and the erstwhile members of the Soviet
Union. In the latter two cases, life expectancy, which had increased following World War II, declined after the late 1980s to the early 2000s, possibly due poor economic
performance compounded, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, by AIDS, resurgence of malaria, and tuberculosis due mainly to poor governance (breakdown of public health
services) and other manmade causes (Goklany 2007a, pp.66–69, pp.178–181, and references therein). However,
there are signs of a turnaround,
related to increased economic growth
perhaps
since the early 2000s, although this could, of course, be a temporary blip (Goklany 2007a; World
Bank 2008a). Notably, in most areas of the world, the healthadjusted life expectancy (HALE), that is, life expectancy adjusted downward for the severity and length of time
spent by the average individual in a less-than-healthy condition, is greater now than the unadjusted life expectancy was 30 years ago. HALE for the China and India in
2002, for instance, were 64.1 and 53.5 years, which exceeded their unadjusted life expectancy of 63.2 and 50.7 years in 1970–1975 (WRI 2008). Figure 4, based on cross
both life expectancy and infant mortality improve with the level of
(economic development) and time, a surrogate for technological change (Goklany 2007a). Other indicators of human
well-being that improve over time and as affluence rises are: access to safe water and sanitation (see below), literacy, level of education, food
country data, indicates that contrary to Neo-Malthusian fears,
affluence
supplies per capita, and the prevalence of malnutrition (Goklany 2007a, 2007b).
Alt fails---rejection doesn’t change the system
No environment impact
Ben Ridder 8, Phd School of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Tasmania,
“Questioning the ecosystem services argument for biodiversity conservation” Biodiversity and
conservation yr:2008 vol:17 iss:4 pg:781
*ES = environmental services
‘low
resilience assumption’ gives rise to, and is reinforced by the almost ubiquitous claim
within the conservation literature that ES depend on biodiversity.¶ An extreme example
of this claim is made by the Ehrlichs in Extinction. They state that “all [ecosystem
services] will be threatened if the rate of extinctions continues to increase ” then observe that attempts
The low resilience assumption ¶ Advocates of the conservation of biodiversity tend not to acknowledge the distinction between resilient and sensitive ES. This
to artificially replicate natural processes “are no more than partially successful in most cases. Nature nearly always does it better. When society sacrifices natural services
This assertion—that the only
alternative to protecting every species is a world in which all ES have been substituted
by artificial alternatives—is an extreme example of the ‘low resilience assumption’ . Paul
Ehrlich revisits this flawed logic in 1997 i nhis response (with four co-authors) to doubts expressed by Mark Sagoff regarding economic
arguments for species conservation (Ehrlich et al. 1997, p. 101).¶ The claim that ES depend on biodiversity is also
notably present in the controversial Issues in Ecology paper on biodiversity and ecosystem functioning (Naeem et
for some other gain… it must pay the costs of substitution” (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1982, pp. 95–96).
al. 1999) that sparked the debate mentioned in the introduction. This appears to reflect a general tendency among authors in this field (e.g., Hector et al. 2001; Lawler et al.
2002; Lyons et al. 2005). Although such authors may not actually articulate the low resilience assumption, presenting such claims in the absence of any clarification
That the low resilience assumption is largely false is apparent in the
number of examples of species extinctions that have not brought about catastrophic
ecosystem collapse and decline in ES, and in the generally limited ecosystem influence
of species on the cusp of extinction. These issues have been raised by numerous authors, although given the absence of systematic
attempts to verify propositions of this sort, the evidence assembled is usually anecdotal and we are forced to
trust that an unbiased account of the situation has been presented . Fortunately a number of
highly respected people have discussed this topic, not least being the prominent
conservation biologist David Ehrenfeld. In 1978 he described the ‘conservation dilemma’,
which “arises on the increasingly frequent occasions when we encounter a threatened
part of Nature but can find no rational reason for keeping it” (Ehrenfeld 1981, p. 177).
He continued with the following observation:¶ Have there been permanent and
significant ‘resource’ effects of the extinction, in the wild, of John Bartram’s great
discovery, the beautiful tree Franklinia alatamaha, which had almost vanished from the earth when Bartram first set eyes
upon it? Or a thousand species of tiny beetles that we never knew existed before or after
their probable extermination? Can we even be certain than the eastern forests of the
United States suffer the loss of their passenger pigeons and chestnuts in some tangible
way that affects their vitality or permanence, their value to us? (p. 192)¶ Later, at the first conference on
biodiversity, Ehrenfeld (1988) reflected that most species “do not seem to have any conventional value at all”
and that the rarest species are “the ones least likely to be missed… by no stretch of the
imagination can we make them out to be vital cogs in the ecological machine” (p. 215). The
indicates its influence.¶
appearance of comments within the environmental literature that are consistent with Ehrenfeld’s—and from authors whose academic standing is also worthy of respect—is
The low resilience assumption
is also undermined by the overwhelming tendency for the protection of specific
endangered species to be justified by moral or aesthetic arguments, or a basic appeal to
the necessity of conserving biodiversity, rather than by emphasising the actual ES these
species provide or might be able to provide humanity . Often the only services that can be promoted in this regard relate
to the ‘scientific’ or ‘cultural’ value of conserving a particular species, and the tourism revenue that might be associated with its continued existence. The
preservation of such services is of an entirely different order compared with the
collapse of human civilization predicted by the more pessimistic environmental
authors.¶ The popularity of the low resilience assumption is in part explained by the
increased rhetorical force of arguments that highlight connections between the
conservation of biodiversity, human survival and economic profit. However, it needs to
be acknowledged by those who employ this approach that a number of negative
implications are associated with any use of economic arguments to justify the
conservation of biodiversity.
uncommon but not unheard of (e.g., Tudge 1989; Ghilarov 1996; Sagoff 1997; Slobodkin 2001; Western 2001).¶
1AR XT – Transition Wars
Alt causes backlash and transition wars
Anderson 84 Perry, professor of sociology at UCLA, In the tracks of historical materialism, p.102-103
That background also indicates, however, what is essentially missing from his work. How are we to get from where we are today to where he point us to tomorrow? There is no
answer to this question in Nove. His halting discussion of “transition” tails away into apprehensive admonitions to moderation to the British Labor Party, and pleas for proper
compensation to capitalist owners of major industries, if these are to be nationalized. Nowhere is there any sense of what a titanic political change would have to occur, with
what fierceness of social struggle, for the economic model of socialism he advocates ever to materialize. Between the radicalism of the future end-state he envisages, and the
conservatism of the present measures he is prepared to countenance, there is an unbridgeable abyss. How could private ownership of the means of production ever be abolished
by policies less disrespectful of capital than those of Allende or a Benn, which he reproves? What has disappeared from the pages of The Economics of Feasible Socialism is
If
capital could visit such destruction on even so poor and small an outlying province of its empire in
Vietnam, to prevent its loss, is it likely that it would suffer its extinction meekly in its own homeland? The
lessons of the past sixty-five years or so are in this respect without ambiguity or exception, there is no
case, from Russia to China, from Vietnam to Cuba, from Chile to Nicaragua, where the existence of
capitalism has been challenged, and the furies of intervention, blockade and civil strife have not
descended in response. Any viable transition to socialism in the West must seek to curtail that pattern:
but to shrink from or to ignore it is to depart from the world of the possible altogether. In the same way, to construct an
virtually all attention to the historical dynamics of any serious conflict over the control of the means of production, as the record of the 20th century demonstrates them.
economic model of socialism in one advanced country is a legitimate exercise: but to extract it from any computable relationship with a surrounding, and necessarily opposing,
capitalist environment—as this work does—is to locate it in thin air.
That causes extinction
Kothari 82 (Rajni, Professor of political science at University of Delhi, Towards a Just Social Order,
Alternatives, p. 571)
Attempts at global economic reform could also lead to a world racked by increasing turbulence, a
greater sense of insecurity among the major centres of power -- and hence to a further tightening of the
structures of domination and domestic repression – producing in their wake an intensification of the
old arms race and militarization of regimes, encouraging regional conflagrations and setting the stage
for eventual global holocaust.
1AR XT – Neolib Inevitable
Neolib inevitable and solves poverty
Pipe 11--Nicholas, The South Australia Globalist, "The Global Financial Crisis", 2011,
www.perspectivist.com/business/the-global-financial-crisis
When assisted by the other neo-liberal views of globalisation and foreign investment, this economic growth leads to
other social benefits; it “trickles down” to marginalised populations , while open borders ensure the most efficient distributions of goods
worldwide. As a result, closing the gap between affluent and marginalised populations is encouraged. Ergas summarises the
effects of this phenomenon as: “(liberalism) works, while the interventionist prescription doesn’t. Ask
the hundreds of millions of Chinese, Indians and Vietnamese whom liberalisation has lifted out of
poverty.Ӧ The benefits of neo-liberalism are clear, and it is fallacious to overlook them when judging the
system itself in the wake of the GFC. Yet there is something else that any critic of neo-liberalism must consider – the
fact that, like it or not, neo-liberalism is here to stay. As Chris Brown notes, the system has become
hegemonic and so deeply entrenched in society that its ideals are now part of how things really are. You
only have to look at the US Government’s need to bail out and protect several corporations at the height of the GFC to
see how deep rooted the neo-liberalism system is, and how its influence lives on.
1AR XT – No Impact
No crisis of ideology
Rose 12 (Gideon, Editor of Foreign Affairs, “Making Modernity Work”, Foreign Affairs,
January/February, Online)
We are living, so we are told, through an ideological crisis. The United States is trapped in political
deadlock and dysfunction, Europe is broke and breaking, authoritarian China is on the rise. Protesters
take to the streets across the advanced industrial democracies; the high and mighty meet in Davos to search for "new models" as sober commentators ponder
who and what will shape the future. In historical perspective, however, the true narrative of the era is actually the
reverse--not ideological upheaval but stability. Today's troubles are real enough, but they relate more to
policies than to principles. The major battles about how to structure modern politics and economics were
fought in the first half of the last century, and they ended with the emergence of the most successful system the world has
ever seen. Nine decades ago, in one of the first issues of this magazine, the political scientist Harold Laski noted that with "the mass of men" having come to political
power, the challenge of modern democratic government was providing enough "solid benefit" to ordinary citizens "to make its preservation a matter of urgency to
themselves." A generation and a half later, with the creation of the postwar order of mutually supporting liberal democracies with mixed economies, that challenge was
more people in more places have lived longer, richer, freer lives than ever before. In
ideological terms, at least, all the rest is commentary.
being met, and as a result,