Week 6: Notes
D. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model", 1970
Intro
Goes over common explanations for dem
- modernisation theory
- consensus, civic participation
- conflict and reconciliation
Scholars seem to agree on two prevailing points
- question is usually how dem can be best preserved or enhanced
- information used is usually contemporary
and sometimes
- idea of problem or puzzle (e.g. Why northern Europe more dem than
southern)
Rustow wants to move from a functional to a genetic inquiry. A genetic theory
should note a two-way flow of causality (he is critical of correlation in
modernisation theory acting as causation) between socio-economic background
and political background
Psychological aspects are important, reciprocal influences of beliefs and actions,
circumstances may trick non-dems into thinking democratically.
Rustow states that dem is not uniform world-wide process but diverse and does
not have temporal continuity.
He sums this up on p346 stating:
1.
The factors that keep a democracy stable may not be the ones that
brought it into existence: explanations of democracy must distinguish between
function and genesis.
2.
Correlationis not the same as causation: a genetic theory must
concentrate on the latter.
3.
Not all causal links run from social and economic to politi- cal factors.
4.
Not all causal links run from beliefs and attitudes to actions.
5.
The genesis of democracy need not be geographically uni- form: there
may be many roads to democracy.
6.
The genesis of democracy need not be temporally uni- form: different
factors may become crucial during successive
phases.
7.
The genesis of democracy need not be socially uniform: even in the same
place and time the attitudes that promote it may not be the same for politicians
and for common citizens.
Theory of transition
-
Empirical data should cover period just before transition and after
-
Study should focus on dem within states and leave out foreign
influence
Ideal model can be deduced from 2/3 cases (he chooses Sweden and
Turkey) and then tested
Transition follows in 4 steps.
1. Background condition of national unity/consciousness
2. Preparatory phase set off my political struggle and polarisation. Largely
economic in Swe and Tur
3. Decision phase where important players with different motives (not
necessarily democratic) make agreement on political structure
4. Habituation phase- due to the competitive nature of dem, it becomes in
interest of parties to play the game in order to gain advantage
Conclusion
Three broad ideas re transition
- Certain ingredients indispensible to genesis of dem
- Each step happens separately with (usually) different protagonists
- Each step happens in sequence (gives Tur as a deviant example)
NB- Rustow is not explicitly clear on what he means by genetic. I personally see it
as a mixture of Nietzschean genealogy, our concept of ‘agency’ and genesis (as in
beginning), but that is purely objective!
S. Levitsky and L. Way, "International Linkages and Democratization"
International western influence can be divided into:
- leverage: governments vulnerability to external pressure
- linkage: density of ties between government and western actors
Leverage of west determined by:
- states raw size, military and economic strength
- reliance of west on state i.e. important western economic/security
interests
- potential of alternative regional power support e.g. Belarus and Russia
However, western pressure often inconsistent and ineffective
Linkages to west can be:
- economic
- geopolitical
- social e.g. migration, tourism, elites education in west
- communication e.g. media penetration, internet
- transnational civil society e.g. NGOs, churches
Overarching key is geographical proximity
Linkage works through 4 channels:
1. international salience of govt abuse
2. probability of govt response
3. creating domestic stakeholders in dem
4. reshaping domestic balance of power
Competitive authoritarian regimes (i.e. regimes which have formal elections but
not democratic core) with extensive linkages to the west were exposed to certain
dem pressure after cold war e.g. Peru and Slovakia
High linkage and leverage found in C America and C Europe. EU especially
powerful given conditionality of membership but OAS less institutionalised
Leverage without linkage found in Sub-Saharan Africa and Caucasus. This means
that elections take place but not completely democratic nature to politics.
Low leverage and linkage found in ME, former USSR and East Asia
Goal of article to highlight effect of linkage. Leverage is most commonly studied
factor and therefore intl dimension to demsation is poorly understood. The
variable of linkage improves effectiveness of leverage
Linkage is medium-to-long run factor, it is not as amenable to foreign policy
manipulation.
Key conclusion: broad engagement with non-dem governments is more effective
than isolation and sanctions