ANIMAL RIGHTS
Chaim Soutine, Carcass of Beef, 1926
“A Moral Defense of Vegetarianism”
Paul Cézanne, Still Life with
Basket of Apples, 1890-1894
Paul Cézanne, Still Life
with Apples, 1890-1894
James Rachels (1941-)
THE MORALITY OF EATING MEAT
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For James Rachels “it is morally wrong for us to
eat meat.”
Rachels will argue that it is morally wrong to eat
meat because the animals which we eat are
made to suffer in the meat production industry.
And, for Rachels, making an animal which is
capable of feeling pain suffer needlessly is
morally wrong.
CRUELTY TO ANIMALS
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Some people think that we only ought not to
be cruel to animals because of the effect of
that cruelty on human beings, not because of
the cruelty itself.
Or, the suffering of animals is not itself
wrong, but it becomes wrong in virtue of its
effects on human beings.
This is the Kantian position. And it regards
the treatment of animals in relation to the
effect of that treatment on human beings.
KANT AND ANIMALS I
For Kant and the Kantian tradition, animals
have no moral standing in themselves.
 Kant thinks that we have no duties to
animals other than human beings.
 His categorical imperative only applies to
humans, not to other kinds of animal.
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KANT AND ANIMALS II
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Kant: “Act so that you treat humanity, whether
in your own person or in that of another, always
as an end and never as a means only. But so
far as [other nonhuman] animals are
concerned, we have no direct duties. Animals
are not self-conscious, and are there merely as
means to an end. That end is man.”
For Kant, self-consciousness is a property the
possession of which guarantees moral
protection. And if you are not a self-conscious
being, then you are not deserving of respect or
moral consideration.
KANT AND ANIMALS III
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Nevertheless, Kant held that we should not
be cruel to animals. However, not because of
the effects which that cruelty has on the
animal which is made to suffer, but because
of its effects on us. “He who is cruel to
animals becomes hard in his dealings with
men.”
Thus if we could be cruel to animals without
becoming cruel to one another, then such
cruelty would be acceptable, and there would
be no reason why animals could not be made
to suffer by men.
RACHELS ON THE KANTIAN POSITION I
For Rachels, “this [Kantian position] is
unacceptable.”
 According to Rachels, we ought not to be
cruel to animals not only because of its
adverse effects on us, “but because of the
direct effects on the animals themselves.”
 Namely, that animals themselves suffer as
the result of cruel actions.

THE IMMORALITY OF
SUFFERING
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For Rachels, the primary reason why cruelty to
animals is wrong is that, in being cruel to them,
they are made to suffer.
And it can never be right willingly to make any being
capable of suffering suffer.
The main reason that torturing humans is wrong is
that people suffer when tortured. And the main
reason why torturing any animal is wrong is that the
tortured animal suffers.
For Rachels, if suffering is wrong for the human
animal then it is wrong for any other animal.
JUSTIFIED AND UNJUSTIFIED PAIN
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However, Rachels recognizes that, although torture and
cruelty to animals is wrong, “it does not follow that we
are never justified in inflicting pain on an animal.
However, there must be a good reason for causing the
suffering, and if the suffering is great, the justifying
reason must be correspondingly powerful.”
An example would be the use of animals in certain
medical experiments designed to eliminated disease,
where suffering is an ineliminable by-product of the
experiment. But it is not justified to make animals suffer
to produce perfume, for instance, or to get fur coats.
Rather, “causing suffering is not justified unless there is
a good reason.”
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[Read the treatment of Civet cats p. 859.]
RACHELS ON THE KANTIAN POSITION II
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Rachels says that, just as it is not morally justifiable
to make cats suffer to produce musk, so it is not
morally acceptable to raise and slaughter animals
for food.
Meat production is big business, and “helpless
animals are treated more as machines in a factory
than as living creatures.”
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[READ treatment of veal calves, etc. p. 860-861.]
Rachels says that the cruelty to animals by meat
producers is due to the Kantian view that “animals
are merely means to an end; that end is man.”
RACHELS ON THE KANTIAN POSITION III
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Meat producers want the least costly and most effective
means of producing meat for human consumption. If
that means that animals are made to suffer by that
process, then, because they are not deserving of moral
respect, we need not worry unduly about it.
But for Rachels, “clearly this use of animals is immoral if
anything is.”
And Rachels says that liking the taste of meat is not
moral justification for mistreating the animals we end up
eating.
It might be morally justified to eat meat if that is all we
had to eat, or if meat were the only thing which would
properly nourish us, but neither of these things is the
case.
MEAT PRODUCTION AND MORALITY
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As Rachels realizes, saying that the mistreatment of
animals in the meat production process is immoral is one
thing, saying that eating meat itself is immoral is another.
The idea is that, if we can raise animals for slaughter that
do not suffer, and which are quickly and painlessly killed,
then that would make eating meat morally acceptable.
(Cf. Frey.)
Rachels’ problem with this is “that it would be impossible
to treat the animals [being raised for meat] decently and
still produce meat in sufficient quantities to make it a
normal part of our diets.”
It would cost too much money, and the average person
could not afford meat.
IS EATING MEAT
INTRINSICALLY WRONG?
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Still, Rachels recognizes that it is an
interesting theoretical question whether or
not eating meat is wrong in itself.
The question is, “If meat could be produced
humanely, without mistreating the animals
prior to killing them painlessly, would there be
anything wrong with it?”
One possible response here would be to say
that it would still be wrong because the
animals killed for our tables have a right to
life.
THE MORALITY OF
PAINLESS KILLING
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Rachels wonders, if it is wrong to kill a person
painlessly why it is not also wrong to kill an
animal painlessly?
He recognizes that animals are not as
complex as human beings, but they “live in
communities, communicate with one another,
and have ongoing social relationships.”
In addition, “they suffer, and are capable of
happiness, as well as fear and distress, as we
are.”
THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND PAINLESS KILLING
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Rachels notes that “We assume that humans have a right
to life - It would be wrong to murder a normal, healthy
human even if it were done painlessly - and it is hard to
think of any plausible rationale for granting this right to
humans that does not also apply to other animals.”
Accordingly, Rachels wonders: “So what could be the
rational basis for saying that we have a right to life, but
that they don’t? Or, even more pointedly, what could be
the rational basis for saying that a severely retarded
person, who is inferior in every important respect to an
intelligent animal, has a right to life but the animal
doesn’t?”
For Rachels, considerations such as these, which are
admittedly difficult, should make us skeptical of easy
answers to these questions.
THE HUMAN AND THE
NONHUMAN WORLD
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A second reason for not killing animals for food
even if it can be done humanely is that “it is
important to see the slaughter of animals for food
as part of a larger pattern that characterizes our
whole relationship with the nonhuman world.”
Animals are taken from their natural
environments and put in zoos, circuses, and
rodeos. They are used in laboratories to test
things like shampoos and chemical weapons, and
sometimes they are simply killed for sport or for
wall decorations.
RACHELS ON THE KANTIAN POSITION IV
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Rachels: “This pattern of cruel exploitation flows
naturally from the Kantian attitude that animals are
nothing more than things to be used for our
purposes.”
For Rachels, “it is this whole attitude which must be
opposed.” And, if we reject the Kantian attitude,
then it will not be acceptable to kill animals even
painlessly for our food.
This is essentially a ‘right to life’ attitude again, that
animals have as much right to live their lives apart
from interference from us, as we have a right to live
our lives apart from interference from them.
SUPPORT OF AN IMMORAL
PRACTICE I
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The more immediate practical issue though is
that “the meat at the supermarket was not
produced by humane methods.”
Rather, the animals whose flesh the meat once
was were abused in order for the meat
producers to provide the meat.
For Rachels, one should not buy meat, since
then one is supporting the cruelty to animals
that is part of meat production.
SUPPORT OF AN IMMORAL
PRACTICE II
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Rachels says that, even if one person’s
stopping to eat meat won’t by itself make
much of a dent in meat production, still, if
animals are abused in providing meat for
humans, that in itself is a reason not to eat it.
Rachels: “If one really thinks that a social
practice is immoral, that in itself is sufficient
grounds for a refusal to participate.”
“Pain, Amelioration, and the
Choice of Tactics”
R. G. Frey
THE ARGUMENT FROM PAIN AND SUFFERING
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The argument from pain and suffering for
vegetarianism = df.
a) Pain and suffering are bad.
b) It is wrong to make any being suffer or to feel
pain which is capable of suffering or feeling pain.
c) Animals which we farm for food not only can
suffer and feel pain, but farming practices are
such as to make many animals suffer terribly
before they are killed for human consumption.
d) To end this immoral cruelty we should cease
to eat meat. And if we continue to eat meat
then we are supporting the cruelty.
IMPROVING MEAT PRODUCTION I
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Frey notes that the meat eaters’ response to the
argument from pain and suffering will be to say that
farming can be improved so that food animals are no
longer made to suffer, and that they can be quickly and
painlessly killed.
Frey says that nothing in Peter Singer’s book Animal
Liberation rules out making such improvements. One
cannot say then that the only way to abolish immoral
cruelty to animals in food production is to become a
vegetarian.
Recall that Rachels says “that it would be impossible to
treat the animals [being raised for meat] decently and
still produce meat in sufficient quantities to make it a
normal part of our diets.” It would cost too much money,
and the average person could not afford meat.
FREY’S RESPONSE TO THE ARGUMENT
FROM PAIN AND SUFFERING I
Frey’s responses to the argument from
pain and suffering:
 1) “Even if the argument from pain and
suffering were successful, it would
demand only that we abstain from the
flesh of those creatures leading miserable
lives.”
 2) “The amelioration argument becomes
applicable.”
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THE AMELIORATION ARGUMENT
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The amelioration argument = df. If
animals can be made not to suffer, then they
can be killed (quickly and painlessly) and
eaten.
Frey: “The more animals that can be brought
to lead pleasant lives, the more animals that
escape the argument from pain and suffering
and so may be eaten.”
All the concerned individual need do then, for
Frey, is to look for improvements in factory
farming so that animals no longer suffer.
IMPROVING MEAT PRODUCTION II
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If factory farming can be improved, then the
argument from pain and suffering no longer has
any force, and it can’t be maintained that factory
farming of animals for meat should be abolished.
Some will maintain that the pain and suffering of
animals can never be eliminated, and so factory
farming will remain immoral.
But Frey says that we can’t be sure of this, and
“precisely how high a quality of life must be
reached before animals may be said to be
leading pleasant lives is a contentious and
complex issue.”
FREY’S RESPONSE TO THE ARGUMENT
FROM PAIN AND SUFFERING II
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Frey recognizes two options here in response to
the argument from pain and suffering:
1) Singer’s and Rachels’ advocacy of
vegetarianism.
2) What he calls the response of “the concerned
individual” which is “to seek improvements in
and alternatives to those practices held to be the
source of the pain and suffering in question.”
DEGREES OF SUFFERING
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Frey accuses Singer of talking about the suffering of
animals in two different respects:
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1) factory farming is wrong when animals are made to live
miserable lives; and
2) factory farming is wrong when animals are made to suffer at
all.
The second kind of suffering is a stronger claim against
the morality of eating meat, since if animals suffer at all,
then raising them for food is wrong. Frey calls this “the
single experience view.”
The first kind of suffering makes it immoral only if it rises
to the level of being miserable.
The first claim would make it the case that we could only
morally eat an animal which was never made to suffer at
all.
THE AMBIGUITY OF SINGER’S
POSITION
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Frey thinks that Singer’s position is
ambiguous.
This is because Singer has not made it clear
whether he is arguing for the stronger or
weaker claim about suffering.
And it is unclear whether he applies the
criteria consistently in his writings and applies
different criteria to different animals.
PAIN, SUFFERING, AND A GOOD LIFE
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Frey also notes that experiencing some pain and
suffering is consistent with leading a pleasant life.
In fact, pain “can recur on a daily basis, provided it
falls short of that quantity over that duration
required to tip the balance in the direction of a
miserable life.”
For Frey, unless Singer takes the second view of
suffering, that any pain whatsoever is bad, he
cannot convince you not to buy meat.
This is because “he can be reasonably certain that
the meat on display in supermarkets has come from
animals who have had at least one painful
experience, in being reared for food.”
SINGER’S TWO VIEWS I
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According to Frey, “without this shift [from
miserable suffering to any suffering], Singer has
difficulty in discouraging you from buying meat.”
If the animals whose meat it is did not suffer
terribly, did not lead miserable lives, then there is
no reason not to buy the meat and eat it.
Thus Singer has two views of suffering: the
miserable suffering view, and the any suffering or
the single experience view.
Frey accuses him of sometimes using one view
and sometimes another.
CONSEQUENCES OF SINGER’S
VIEWS
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In addition, the views have different consequences for
any attempt to improve factory farming of animals for
meat.
If it is only wrong to eat meat if the animals suffer
miserably, then if farming can be improved so that
animals do not suffer terribly, then it is not immoral to
eat them.
On the other hand, if any suffering at all is unacceptable
- the single experience view - then chances are farming
cannot be improved to the point where it can be
guaranteed that no animal ever suffers.
If any amount of pain or suffering is unacceptable, then
we either have to become vegetarians or genetically
engineer farm animals so that they become incapable of
feeling pain or suffering.
PAIN AND PETS
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A problem which Frey has with the single
experience view is that it would seem to
follow from it that we ought not to have pets.
This is because “it is extremely unlikely that
any method of rearing and keeping pets could
be entirely without pain and suffering.”
For Frey, if we must give up meat because
animals suffer to produce meat, then it would
seem that we would have to give up pets.
PAIN AND CHILDREN
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Further, Frey says that “if the only acceptable
method of rearing animals, whether for food or
companionship, is one free of all pain and
suffering, then it is hard to see why the same
should not be said of our own children.”
That is because “it is extremely unlikely that any
method of rearing children could be entirely
without pain or suffering.”
SINGER’S TWO VIEWS II
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On the single experience view, it seems to Frey
that we would have to give up both our pets and
our children.
If we find this to be extreme and unacceptable,
since some amount of suffering for pets and
children is acceptable, then we cannot use the
any pain or single experience view to argue for
vegetarianism.
But then we would seem to be left with the
miserable life view. And, on that view, as long as
animals do not lead miserable lives in being
reared for meat, then so rearing them is morally
acceptable.
THE CONCERNED
INDIVIDUAL I
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Frey’s concerned individual is one who is
concerned to eliminate as much pain and
misery as possible for animals being reared for
meat.
The concerned individual can find eating meat
acceptable as long as animals are not made to
lead miserable lives.
For Frey, what Singer and Rachels have proved
is “not that it is wrong to eat meat but that it is
wrong to rear and kill animals by (very) painful
methods.”
THE CONCERNED
INDIVIDUAL II
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Thus vegetarianism does not necessarily follow
from the arguments of thinkers such as Singer
and Rachels, but only that we have a moral
obligation to reduce pain and suffering to the
greatest extent possible in raising animals.
This moral obligation to reduce pain and
suffering Frey calls “the concerned individual’s
response” [to people like Singer and Rachels
who argue for vegetarianism on the miserable
life view].
THE RIGHT TO LIFE
ARGUMENT
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A vegetarian might respond to the concerned
individual by saying that “to deprive animals
of the sort of life proper to their species is a
form of pain or suffering in some broad
sense,” and therefore wrong.
The idea here is that the animal is deprived
“of the sort of life proper to their species.”
Thus vegetarianism could be argued for on
what we might call a right to life argument.
(Cf. Rachels.)
FREY’S RESPONSE TO THE
RIGHT TO LIFE ARGUMENT I
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However, Frey’s problem with “the sort of life
proper to their species” argument is that
“virtually none of our food animals are found in
the wild. Beef, ham, pork, chicken, lamb,
mutton, and veal all come form animals who are
completely our own productions, bred by us in
ways we select to ends we desire.”
The gene pools of these animals are manipulated
by us, and research in this area continues, and
so, for Frey, “it is a mistake to use expressions
like ‘the sort of life proper to the species’ as if
this sort of life were itself immune to
technological advance.”
FREY’S RESPONSE TO THE
RIGHT TO LIFE ARGUMENT II
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Further, Frey points out that these animals are
bred by us to a sort of life to which their bred
species is proper.
Given that the kind of life which is proper to their
species is the kind of life which they have been
bred to have, how could pigs, chickens, and cows
simply be released into the world?
If survival for them would be tough or even
impossible, then would we be sentencing them to
a worse life than the one they have as bred for
meat?
FREY’S RESPONSE TO THE
RIGHT TO LIFE ARGUMENT III
Frey: “What sort of life is proper to
chickens? One cannot appeal to chickens in
the wild or ‘non-developed chickens for an
answer, since there are none; chickens are
developments or productions of our own.”
 We can’t then talk about a life proper to a
chicken other than the one which it has
been bred to have.
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FREY’S CONCLUSIONS
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Frey says that Singer’s view does not depend on
seeing animal life as valuable in itself, but depends
“exclusively on minimizing pain and suffering.”
Frey: “Pain alone is the basis of his case.”
And Frey has already taken himself to have proven
that the single experience view is untenable
because it would rule out our having pets and
children.
And he thinks that he has shown that the miserable
life view does not demand vegetarianism if pain
and suffering are kept to a minimum.