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Hegemony in Asia Good/Bad
Hegemony in Asia Good/Bad ....................................................................................................................................1
Japan Withdraw Good ...............................................................................................................................................2
Japan Withdraw Good ...............................................................................................................................................3
Japan Withdraw Good ...............................................................................................................................................4
Japan Withdraw Good ...............................................................................................................................................5
Heg Good – Asia War................................................................................................................................................6
Heg Good – Asian Stability .......................................................................................................................................7
Heg Good – Asian Economy .....................................................................................................................................9
Heg Good – China ................................................................................................................................................... 10
Heg Good – China ................................................................................................................................................... 11
Heg Good – China ................................................................................................................................................... 12
Heg Good – China/Taiwan ...................................................................................................................................... 13
Heg Good – China/Taiwan – Perception Key.......................................................................................................... 14
Heg Good – Taiwan – Proliferation ......................................................................................................................... 15
Heg Good – Japan.................................................................................................................................................... 16
Heg Good – Japan.................................................................................................................................................... 17
Heg Good – Japan.................................................................................................................................................... 18
Heg Good – Japan – Withdrawal Bad...................................................................................................................... 19
Heg Good – Japan – Rearm ..................................................................................................................................... 20
Heg Good – Japan – Rearm ..................................................................................................................................... 21
Heg Good – Japan – Rearm ..................................................................................................................................... 22
Heg Good – Japan – Deter China ............................................................................................................................ 23
Heg Good – South Korea ......................................................................................................................................... 24
Heg Good – South Korea ......................................................................................................................................... 25
Heg Good – South Korea – Proliferation ................................................................................................................. 27
Heg Good – North Korea ......................................................................................................................................... 28
Heg Good – India-Pakistan ...................................................................................................................................... 29
Heg Bad – China – War ........................................................................................................................................... 31
Heg Bad – China – Containment Fails .................................................................................................................... 32
Heg Bad – China – Nationalism .............................................................................................................................. 33
Heg Bad – China – Relations ................................................................................................................................... 34
Heg Bad – China – A2: Modernization ................................................................................................................... 35
Heg Bad – Japan ...................................................................................................................................................... 36
Heg Bad – South Korea ........................................................................................................................................... 37
Heg Bad – South Korea – Oppression ..................................................................................................................... 38
Heg Bad – South Korea – Colonialism .................................................................................................................... 39
Heg Bad – A2: South Korea .................................................................................................................................... 41
Asia Impacts – Regional War .................................................................................................................................. 42
Asia Impacts – China/Taiwan War .......................................................................................................................... 43
Asia Impacts – China/Taiwan War .......................................................................................................................... 44
Asia Impacts – China/Taiwan War .......................................................................................................................... 45
Asia Impacts – Korea War ....................................................................................................................................... 46
Asia Impacts – North Korea – Bioweapons ............................................................................................................. 47
Asia Impacts – US-China Relations ........................................................................................................................ 48
Asia Impacts – US-Japan Relations ......................................................................................................................... 49
Asia Impact Takeouts – Korea War ......................................................................................................................... 50
Asia Impact Takeouts – North Korea ...................................................................................................................... 51
Asia Impact Takeouts – US-China War .................................................................................................................. 52
Asia Impact Takeouts – China Rise ......................................................................................................................... 53
Asia Impact Takeouts – China/Taiwan War ............................................................................................................ 55
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Heg in Asia
Japan Withdraw Good
Okinawa is the largest threat to the US-Japan alliance – the US refuses to relocate troops
unless a new base is built on Okinawa
Eric Talmadge, writer for the Associated Press, 06-22-2010, “US-Japan security pact turns 50, faces new strains”
Businessweek http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9GG68080.htm
But while the alliance is one of the strongest Washington has anywhere in the world, it has come under
intense pressure lately over a plan to make sweeping reforms that would pull back roughly 8,600 Marines
from Okinawa to the U.S. Pacific territory of Guam. The move was conceived in response to opposition
on Okinawa to the large U.S. military presence there -- more than half of the U.S. troops in Japan are on
Okinawa, which was one of the bloodiest battlefields of World War II. Though welcomed by many at first,
the relocation plan has led to renewed Okinawan protests over the U.S. insistence it cannot be carried
out unless a new base is built on Okinawa to replace one that has been set for closing for more than a
decade. A widening rift between Washington and Tokyo over the future of the Futenma Marine Corps Air
Station was a major factor in the resignation of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama earlier this month. It
could well plague Kan as well.
The Futenma dispute must be solved – failure to resolve it creates a domino effect that would
cripple the alliance in the long term
John Feffer, co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, 03-06-2010, “Okinawa and
the new domino effect” Asia Times http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/LC06Dh01.html
You’d think that, with so many Japanese bases, the United States wouldn’t make a big fuss about closing
one of them. Think again. The current battle over the Marine Corps air base at Futenma on Okinawa -- an
island prefecture almost 1,000 miles south of Tokyo that hosts about three dozen U.S. bases and 75% of
American forces in Japan -- is just revving up. In fact, Washington seems ready to stake its reputation and
its relationship with a new Japanese government on the fate of that base alone, which reveals much
about U.S. anxieties in the age of Obama. What makes this so strange, on the surface, is that Futenma is
an obsolete base. Under an agreement the Bush administration reached with the previous Japanese
government, the U.S. was already planning to move most of the Marines now at Futenma to the island of
Guam. Nonetheless, the Obama administration is insisting, over the protests of Okinawans and the
objections of Tokyo, on completing that agreement by building a new partial replacement base in a less
heavily populated part of Okinawa. The current row between Tokyo and Washington is no mere “Pacific
squall,” as Newsweek dismissively described it. After six decades of saying yes to everything the United
States has demanded, Japan finally seems on the verge of saying no to something that matters greatly to
Washington, and the relationship that Dwight D. Eisenhower once called an “indestructible alliance” is
displaying ever more hairline fractures. Worse yet, from the Pentagon’s perspective, Japan’s resistance
might prove infectious -- one major reason why the United States is putting its alliance on the line over
the closing of a single antiquated military base and the building of another of dubious strategic value.
During the Cold War, the Pentagon worried that countries would fall like dominoes before a relentless
Communist advance. Today, the Pentagon worries about a different kind of domino effect. In Europe,
NATO countries are refusing to throw their full support behind the U.S. war in Afghanistan. In Africa, no
country has stepped forward to host the headquarters of the Pentagon’s new Africa Command. In Latin
America, little Ecuador has kicked the U.S. out of its air base in Manta.
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Heg in Asia
Japan Withdraw Good
Failure to resolve the Futenma dispute causes Japanese backlash, hurting the alliance
John Feffer, co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, 03-06-2010, “Okinawa and
the new domino effect” Asia Times http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/LC06Dh01.html
"The dispute could undermine security in East Asia on the 50th anniversary of an alliance that has served
the region well," intoned The Economist more bluntly. "Tough as it is for Japan's new government, it needs
to do most, though not all, of the caving in." The Hatoyama government is by no means radical, nor is it
anti-American. It isn't preparing to demand that all, or even many, US bases close. It isn't even preparing to
close any of the other three dozen (or so) bases on Okinawa. Its modest pushback is confined to Futenma,
where it finds itself between the rock of Japanese public opinion and the hard place of Pentagon pressure.
Those who prefer to achieve Washington's objectives with Japan in a more roundabout fashion counsel
patience. "If America undercuts the new Japanese government and creates resentment among the
Japanese public, then a victory on Futenma could prove Pyrrhic ," writes Joseph Nye, the architect of US
Asia policy during the Clinton years.
Okinawa protests spillover to undermine the alliance
Michael Auslin, director of Japan Studies at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 06-162010, “The Real Futenma Fallout” Wall Street Journal
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704324304575307471399789704.html
Japanese military officials worry that this year's protests in Okinawa could have spillover effects, inspiring
protesters around Atsugi to demand a reduced American presence, and possibly even agitating against the
government plan to move Japanese planes there. Moreover, Iwakuni's mayor might reject the new burden
of potentially hosting the George Washington's air wing. That, in turn, would embolden antinuclear
protesters in Yokosuka, the U.S. Navy's main base, to step up their ongoing pressure to move the nuclearpowered George Washington, the Navy's only permanently forward deployed aircraft carrier, out of
Japanese waters. This worst-case scenario would be a series of simultaneous, grassroots movements
against the U.S. military presence in Japan that could potentially put fatal stress on the bilateral security
alliance and effectively isolate Japan militarily in the western Pacific. Given Mr. Hatoyama's fate when he
botched this issue, politicians now are more likely to respond to public demands or they will be replaced by
those who do. The resulting political clash would either reaffirm tight ties with Washington or lead to
endemic paralysis in Japan's national security establishment.
Okinawa dispute hurts alliance – rape cases, complaints, and protests prove Japan is
massively opposed to the US’s stance
Xinhua News Agency, 07-09-2010, “News Analysis: U.S. military presence to remain thorn in relations with Japan”
published on newsystocks.com http://newsystocks.com/news/3587183
WASHINGTON, Jul. 9, 2010 (Xinhua News Agency) -- The U.S. military presence in Japan will remain a long
term source of consternation between the two allies, in spite of a recent easing of tensions, some experts
said. "All you need is another rape case and it comes up as a high profile issue," said Rodger Baker,
director of East Asia analysis at global intelligence company Stratfor. Residents of Okinawa, a Japanese
island that hosts about two-thirds of Japan's 40,000 U.S. troops, still recall the 1995 case in which three
U.S. servicemen kidnapped and raped a 12-year-old Japanese girl. They continue to complain about noise
from overhead U.S. aircraft and the island has seen mass demonstrations calling for U.S. forces to leave.
Last year, then Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama sparked a row when he called for a "partnership of
equals" in a relationship dominated by Washington since the end of World War II. When the dust
cleared, Hatoyama resigned because of a broken campaign promise to shutter Futenma, a U.S. air base
located in Okinawa.
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Japan Withdraw Good
Okinawa is a key obstacle to maintaining the US-Japan alliance
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Specialist in Asian Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, and Weston S. Konishi,
Analyst in Asian Affairs at the Congressional Research Service 07-23-2009, “The Changing US-Japan Alliance:
Implications for U.S. Interests” published on fas.org http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33740.pdf
The DPRI review identified friction between the U.S. forces stationed in Okinawa and the local population
as a key obstacle to a durable alliance. In addition to the 1995 rape conviction, complaints about noise
pollution from the air bases and concern about safety issues after the crash of a helicopter in August 2004
convinced alliance managers that the burden on Okinawa’s urban areas needed to be reduced in order to
make the alliance more politically sustainable. As part of the realignment of U.S. bases, U.S. officials
agreed to move most aircraft and crews constituting the Marine Air Station at Futenma (a highly
populated area) to expanded facilities at Camp Schwab, located in a less-congested area of Okinawa. The
challenge of replacing Futenma had dogged alliance managers for years: since 1996, both sides had
worked to implement the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Report, which called for the
return of 12,000 acres of land to the Japanese, provided that appropriate replacement facilities were
arranged. In addition to the Futenma agreement, the United States agreed to relocate the Okinawabased III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF), which includes 8,000 U.S. personnel and their dependents,
to new facilities in Guam. In return, Tokyo promised to pay $6.09 billion of the $10.27 billion estimated
costs associated with the move. With the DPRI review and the revitalized alliance, new momentum led to a
tentative agreement in 2006.
Futenma hurts US-Japan relations – US desire to hold out on Futenma and maintain control
over military decisions will ultimately destroy the alliance
Hamish McDonald, writer for the Sydney Morning Herald 06-05-2010, “Obama policy sees a PM resign, but
Japan’s resentment will stay” accessed on LexisNexis
"Hatoyama did not survive this rebuke by the US and this policy reversal that made him appear dithering
and weak before Japan's voters. But this isn't over. Obama's handling of the Futenma fiasco will have
ongoing consequences - reminding Japan's citizens that they are not really in control of their own
circumstances, that they are to some degree still occupied by the US military and unable to tell America
'no' in the matters that the US doesn't want to accept." To be kind to Obama, he may not be the one
running Washington's policy on Japan. The tone was set on a visit to Tokyo last October by Robert Gates,
the Defence Secretary carried over from the George Bush administration. He bluntly declared the
agreement was fixed, all alternatives considered, and it was "time to move on". Yet during the 15 years of
negotiation that led to the 2006 agreement on Futenma, the Americans never clearly explained why it was
essential for the marines to stay in Okinawa. If they were an essential part of defending Japan or South
Korea, why were they always being sent off somewhere else, to Vietnam, Iraq or Afghanistan? Why can't
their helicopters and tilt-rotor Ospreys be based at one of the other US air force and marine bases in the
main islands? The recent TV series The Pacific gave viewers an idea of the impact of the closing great
amphibious battle of World War II on the Okinawans, whose kingdom and culture came late under
Japanese direct rule, and explains the intense feeling there about having to host 70 per cent of the US
military presence in Japan. Hatoyama's ascendancy last year was the assertion of a new kind of Japanese
identity. He wanted a "more equal" alliance with Washington. Gates clearly doesn't want to entertain
this thought. – Sydney Morning Herald
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Japan Withdraw Good
US-Japan tensions over Futenma spillover to destroy the alliance
The Nikkei Weekly 05-24-2010, “Futenma tying down government” accessed on LexisNexis
A U.S. official recently remarked that Japan's attitude might change if North Korea fired a missile at it. The
comment shows that Japan-U.S. tensions are rising to the point where they threaten the bilateral
alliance. Diplomatic quicksand - Equally worrying, the Futenma mess is hampering Japan's economic
diplomacy. Last summer's DPJ election manifesto said a DPJ government would push for free-trade
agreements with other Asia-Pacific nations, including the U.S. Although FTA talks with South Korea have
begun, they are making little progress. As for the launch of talks with the U.S., a senior official with the
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry said flatly: "This is not the time for that." He cited the Futenma
impasse.
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Heg Good – Asia War
Heg prevents asia wars
Robert Kagan, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 7-19-2007, “End of Dreams,
Return of History,” http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/07/end_of_dreams_return_of_histor.html
Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more
likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is
especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing
and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China 's neighbors. But even China,
which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the
dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan.
Heg solves multiple destabilizing nuclear conflicts in Asia.
Robert J. Lieber, Professor of Government and International Affairs @ Georgetown University. The American Era:
Power and Strategy for the 21st Century. 2005. Pg.174-175.
Taken together, these Asian involvements are not without risk, especially vis-a-vis North Korea, ChinaTaiwan, and the uncertain future of a nuclear-armed Pakistan. Nonetheless, the American engagement
provides both reassurance and deterrence and thus eases the security dilemmas of the key states there,
including countries that are America’s allies but remain suspicious of each other. Given the history of the
region, an American withdrawal would be likely to trigger arms races and the accelerated proliferation of
nuclear weapons. It is thus no exaggeration to describe the American presence as providing the “oxygen”
crucial for the region’s stability and economic prosperity37
American power-projection is vital to Asian stability and prevention of nuclear prolif.
Robert J. Lieber, Professor of Government and International Affairs @ Georgetown University. The American Era:
Power and Strategy for the 21st Century. 2005. Pg. 158.
Parallels between America’s role in East Asia and its involvements in Europe might seem far-fetched. Asia’s
geography and history are enormously different, there is no regional organization in any way comparable to
the European Union, the area is not a zone of peace, conflict among its leading states remains a potential
risk, and there is nothing remotely resembling NATO as a formal multilateral alliance binding the United
States to the region’s security and the regional states to one another. Yet, as in Europe, the United States
plays a unique stabilizing role in Asia that no other country or organization is capable of playing. Far from
being a source of tension or instability, this presence tends to reduce competition among regional powers
and to deter armed conflict. Disengagement, as urged by some critics of American primacy, would
probably lead to more dangerous competition or power-balancing among the principal countries of Asia
as well as to a more unstable security environment and the spread of nuclear weapons. As a
consequence, even China acquiesces in America’s regional role despite the fact that it is the one country
with the long-term potential to emerge as a true major power competitor.
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Heg Good – Asian Stability
Strong presence is key to Asian stability
Robert Kagan, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and senior transatlantic fellow
at the German Marshall Fund, August-September 2007, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Policy
Review, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html
If anything, the most notable balancing over the past decade has been aimed not at the American
superpower but at the two large powers: China and Russia. In Asia and the Pacific, Japan, Australia, and
even South Korea and the nations of Southeast Asia have all engaged in “hedging” against a rising China.
This has led them to seek closer relations with Washington, especially in the case of Japan and Australia.
India has also drawn closer to the United States and is clearly engaged in balancing against China. Russia ’s
efforts to increase its influence over what it regards as its “near abroad,” meanwhile, have produced
tensions and negative reactions in the Baltics and other parts of Eastern Europe. Because these nations are
now members of the European Union, this has also complicated eu-Russian relations. On balance,
traditional allies of the United States in East Asia and in Europe, while their publics may be more antiAmerican than in the past, nevertheless pursue policies that reflect more concern about the powerful states
in their midst than about the United States. 12 This has provided a cushion against hostile public opinion
and offers a foundation on which to strengthen American relations with these countries after the departure
of Bush.
U.S. Military Presence in Asia Prevents East Asian Instability
Thomas Christensen, Professor of Politics at MIT, 1999, International Security, vol 23, no 4, Scholar
If security dilemma theory is applied to East Asia, the chance for spirals of tension in the area seems great,
particularly in the absence of a U.S. military presence in the region. The theory states that, in an uncertain
and anarchic international system, mistrust between two or more potential adversaries can lead each side
to take precautionary and defensively motivated measures that are perceived as offensive threats. This can
lead to countermeasures in kind, thus ratcheting up regional tensions, reducing security, and creating selffulfilling prophecies about the danger of one's security environment. If we look at the variables that might
fuel security dilemma dynamics, East Asia appears quite dangerous. From a standard realist perspective,
not only could dramatic and unpredictable changes in the distribution of capabilities in East Asia increase
uncertainty and mistrust, but the importance of sea-lanes and secure energy supplies to almost all regional
actors could encourage a destabilizing competition to develop power-projection capabilities on the seas
and in the skies. Because they are perceived as offensive threats, power-projection forces are more likely to
spark spirals of tension than weapons that can defend only a nation's homeland. Perhaps even more
important in East Asia than these more commonly considered variables are psychological factors (such as
the historically based mistrust and animosity among regional actors) and political geography issues relating
to the Taiwan question, which make even defensive weapons in the region appear threatening to Chinese
security. One way to ameliorate security dilemmas and prevent spirals of tension is to have an outside
arbiter play a policing role, lessening the perceived need for regional actors to begin destabilizing security
competitions. For this reason, most scholars, regardless of theoretical persuasion, seem to agree with U.S.
officials and local leaders that a major factor in containing potential tensions in East Asia is the continuing
presence of the U.S. military, particularly in Japan.
US troop movements in Asia trigger a vacuum of power that triggers regional war
The Daily Yomiuri, 8/18/2004, pg. n/p
In Asia, 12,500 U.S. troops will be removed from South Korea. Some of the about 40,000 troops stationed in
Japan might also be slashed. It is of utmost importance, however, that the realignment does not lead to a
power vacuum or a decline in deterrence. In East Asia, several regions are potential flashpoints, including
the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Straits. If a power vacuum is created, regional stability will be
threatened. The greatest security threat for Japan is North Korea, which has been developing nuclear arms
and has deployed ballistic missiles that can reach the nation. The reorganization of U.S. forces in this
region must not send Pyongyang the wrong signal. The United States calls the area ranging from
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Northeast Asia to the Middle East the "arc of instability" of the Eurasian Continent. In this arc, India and
China, among others, are rising regional powers. The political and social systems of many of the countries
in the arc are still unstable. China is well on its way to becoming a military superpower.
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Heg in Asia
Heg Good – Asian Economy
Heg prevents Asian economic collapse
Michael Swaine, et al, Senior Associate and Co-Director of the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment For
International Peace. 1998. Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century. Pg. 54-55.
What is finally problematic with this sequence of events is that even the least troublesome of these
possibilities would result in the destruction of the East Asian “miracle.” While such an outcome would
certainly affect the strategic prospects of the East Asian region, the United States would not by any means
be immune to its extended consequences. Since a considerable portion of American growth is directly tied
to the vitality of the international trading system, the enervation of the East Asian economic regime would
eventually lead to a diminution of American growth rates and, by implication, the quality of life enjoyed by
its citizenry. For all these reasons, ensuring the survival of American allies in Asia represents a vital
interest to the United States, an interest grounded less in altruistic considerations than in the hard realities
of self-interest. Promoting this interest requires that the United States pay close attention to the
evolution of the threats facing its allies in Asia and take steps to meet such challenges expeditiously and
after due consultation with the allied states. Ensuring allied security also involves paying requisite attention
to the needs of those other states (mostly in Southeast Asia) that do not have treaty obligations with the United
States but nonetheless rely on the U.S. presence in Asia for security. And, in the most demanding extension
of all, ensuring allied security also requires that the United States be attentive to the prospect of securing
new allies, especially because the imminence of regional power transitions may imply that today’s allies—
formal and informal—may not be friends tomorrow.
That’s key to the global economy
Michael Swaine, et al, Senior Associate and Co-Director of the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment For
International Peace. 1998. Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century. Pg. 54-55.
Such growth rates suggest that by the year 2010, the East Asian region alone will account for over 34
percent of the world’s total output, with Western Europe and North America following with 26 percent and 25 percent
respectively. If the output of the South Asian subregion is added to the East Asian total, the share of Asian output rises even more—
closer to 40 percent—relative to Western Europe and North America. The data for world trade show similar Asian dominance. East
Asia alone is expected to contribute almost 40 percent of the world’s trade, with Western Europe and North
America following with about 37 percent and 20 percent, respectively.12 This high sustained growth will continue to be fueled by high
rates of domestic savings, increased intra-Asian economic integration, increasing investment in infrastructure and human capital, a
decreasing rate of population growth, and continuing export-led growth. Second, the wealth and prosperity of the United States
will remain dependent on continued linkages with the Asian economies. The Asian continent today
represents the most important locus of American economic engagement . The 1993 data for merchandise trade, for
example, show that the United States imports over 42 percent of its goods from the Asia-Pacific region, in contrast to about 20 percent
from Europe, about 19 percent from Canada, about 12 percent from the rest of North America, and about 5 percent from the rest of
the world. The story is similarly revealing where merchandise exports are concerned. The Asia-Pacific region accounts for about 30
percent of American merchandise exports; Europe accounts for about 25 percent, Canada for about 21 percent, the rest of the
Americas for about 16 percent, with the rest of the world accounting for about 5.6 percent of the total. When trade in invisibles and
services is considered, a similar picture emerges: the Asia-Pacific region remains the single most important destination for the United
States, a fact reflected by the data in Tables 5 and 6 below.
The impact is extinction
Phil Kerpen, National Review Online, October 29, 2008, Don't Turn Panic Into Depression,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/10/29/opinion/main4555821.shtml
It’s important that we avoid all these policy errors - not just for the sake of our prosperity, but for our survival. The
Great Depression, after all, didn’t end until the advent of World War II, the most destructive war in the history of the planet. In a
world of nuclear and biological weapons and non-state terrorist organizations that breed on poverty and
despair, another global economic breakdown of such extended duration would risk armed conflicts on an even
greater scale.
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Heg in Asia
Heg Good – China
There is no substitute for physical presence in preventing a belligerent China
Admiral Jay L. Johnson, & General Charles C. Krulak, 8-17-2009, “Forward presence essential to American
interests,” United States Navy, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/navy_legacy_hr.asp?id=274
Prevent: The key to prevention is continuous presence in a region. This lets our friends know we have an interest
and lets potential foes know that we're there to check any move. Both effects occur without any direct action taken.
Although hard to measure, the psychological impact of naval expeditionary forces is undeniable. This regional presence
underwrites political and economic stability. This is forward presence. Deter: Presence does not prevent every crisis. Some rogues
are going to be tempted to strike no matter what the odds, and will require active measures to be deterred. When crises reach
this threshold, there is no substitute for sustained actual presence. Naval expeditionary forces can quickly take on the
role of the very visible fist. Friends and potential enemies recognize naval expeditionary forces as capable of
defending or destroying. This visible fist, free from diplomatic and territorial constraints, forms the bedrock of regional
deterrence. For example, the mere presence of naval expeditionary forces deterred Chinese attempts to derail the
democratic process in Taiwan and countered Iraqi saber-rattling toward Jordan. It's hard to quantify the cost savings of
deterring a crisis before it requires our intervention. But the savings are real — in dollars, and often in blood and human misery.
Independently of Taiwan – Chinese belligerence leads to nuclear war
C. Dale, Walton Lecturer in International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, 2007,
“Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the 21st Century,” p. 49
Obviously, it is of vital importance to the United States that the PRC does not become the hegemon of
Eastern Eurasia. As noted above, however, regardless of what Washington does, China's success in such an
endeavor is not as easily attainable as pessimists might assume. The PRC appears to be on track to be a very
great power indeed, but geopolitical conditions are not favorable for any Chinese effort to establish sole
hegemony; a robust multipolar system should suffice to keep China in check, even with only minimal
American intervention in local squabbles. The more worrisome danger is that Beijing will cooperate with a
great power partner, establishing a very muscular axis. Such an entity would present a critical danger to the
balance of power, thus both necessitating very active American intervention in Eastern Eurasia and creating
the underlying conditions for a massive, and probably nuclear, great power war. Absent such a "superthreat," however, the demands on American leaders will be far more subtle: creating the conditions for
Washington's gentle decline from playing the role of unipolar quasi-hegemon to being "merely" the
greatest of the world's powers, while aiding in the creation of a healthy multipolar system that is not
marked by close great power alliances.
Failure to show strong commitment to Asian allies spurs Chinese belligerence
Ryan Mauro, Geopolitical Analyst, Global Politician, 5-7-2007, http://www.globalpolitician.com/22760-foreigniraq
China’s rise in power would become inevitable and accelerated, as our Asian allies doubted our
commitments, and would decide on appeasement and entering China’s sphere of influence, rather than
relying upon America. The new dynamics in Asia, with allies of America questioning our strength, would
result in a nuclear arms race. Japan would have no option but to develop nuclear weapons (although she may
do so regardless). Two scenarios would arise: China would dominate the Pacific and America’s status as a
superpower would quickly recede, or there would be a region wide nuclear stalemate involving Burma,
China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and possibly Taiwan and Australia.
Lack of clarity over resolve encourages Chinese miscalculation
National Interest 6-25-2010, “Withdrawal Dates,” pg. A7
The Journal believes that Gates’s response demonstrates “the Pentagon thinks it’s time to draw brighter lines around
this kind of misbehavior.” This new stance should please our allies in Taiwan and Japan, who are getting
worried about China’s growing military muscle. And “every country that uses the South China Sea’s busy shipping lanes” is
probably breathing a bit easier as well. “The clearer the U.S. is in responding to Chinese military assertiveness, ” opine
the editors, “the less likely China will miscalculate and become an enemy .”
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Heg in Asia
Heg Good – China
Signal of weakness triggers Chinese aggression
Zalmay Khalilzad, Professor @ Chicago, “Congage China,” 1995, RAND,
http://www.rand.org/publications/IP/IP187/IP187.html
Third, the United States should seek to strengthen its own relative capabilities and those of its friends in East
Asia to deter possible Chinese aggression and deal effectively with a more powerful, potentially hostile China.
China's military leaders are considering the possibility of a conflict with the United States. They recognize
the overall superiority of the U.S. military but believe there are weaknesses that could be exploited while
preventing the United States from bringing its full power to bear in case of a conflict over Taiwan. According to the Chinese, U.S.
weaknesses include vulnerability of U.S. bases to missile attacks, heavy U.S. reliance on space, America's need to rapidly reinforce the
region in times of conflict, susceptibility of U.S. cities to being held hostage, and America's sensitivity to casualties. According to the
emerging Chinese doctrine, the local balance of power in the region will be decisive because in this new era wars are short and
intense. In a possible Taiwan conflict China would seek to create a fait accompli, forcing the United States to risk
major escalation and high levels of violence to reinstate the status quo ante. China might gamble that these risks
would constrain the U.S. response. Such an approach by China would be extremely risky and could lead to a major war.
Dealing with such possible challenges from China both in the near and long term requires many steps. Burden-sharing
and enhanced ties with states in East and Southeast Asia will be important. New formal alliance relationships--which would be the
central element of a containment strategy--are neither necessary nor practical at this time, but it would be prudent to take some
preparatory steps to facilitate the formation of a new alliance or the establishment of new military bases should that become
necessary. They would signal to
China that any attempt on their part to seek regional hegemony would be
costly. The steps we should take now in the region must include enhancing military-to-military relations
between Japan and South Korea, encouraging increased political- military cooperation among the ASEAN states and resolving
overlapping claims to the Spratly Islands and the South China Sea; fostering a Japanese-Russian rapprochement, including a settlement
of the dispute over the "northern territories;" and enhancing military-to-military cooperation between the United States and the
ASEAN states. These steps are important in themselves for deterrence and regional stability but they can also assist in shifting
to a much tougher policy toward China should that become necessary .
Strong presence is key to deterring Chinese aggression
Ralph A. Cossa et al, President of the Pacific Forum @ CSIS, Brad Glosserman, Michael A. McDevitt, Nirav Patel,
James Przystup, Brad Roberts, 2009, “The United States and the Asia-Pacific Region: Security Strategy for the
Obama Administration,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA498204&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf
As China’s capabilities improve, so too have U.S. capabilities in the region. The United States is intent on maintaining the
current advantages that allow it to shape China’s strategic choices and deter any potential aggression. As
Thomas J. Christensen, former Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, noted, U.S.
officials believe a “strong U.S. presence in Asia, backed by regional alliances and security partnerships,
combined with a robust policy of diplomatic engagement, will help maximize the chance that China will make
the right choices moving forward.” This “shaping” must be done transparently and in the context of a
broader Asia-Pacific strategy that reassures allies and friends of Washington’s continued commitment to
the region.
West Coast Publishing
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Heg in Asia
Heg Good – China
Concessions to China encourage a belligerent response
Robert Pfaltzgraff, Professor of Int’l Security, 2009, “China-US Strategic Stability”, Scholar
I conclude on the note that the dynamics of the China-U.S. strategic relationship as I have outlined it are
such that we should obviously seek to avoid crisis miscalculation and do what we can to control escalation
should we ever face a political-military crisis in which China will attempt to shape U.S. responses by working
to ensure and exploit U.S. vulnerabilities. For the United States strategic stability can best be enhanced by
reducing vulnerabilities, including a strategic nuclear posture that includes deterrence by denial. Therefore,
deterrence of China has both offensive and defensive elements. We will need to take seriously China’s
perception of its growing nuclear weapons capability as tools of military power and political intimidation
regardless of whether this is China’s motivation for such modernization or if this is the consequence of
China’s military modernization. This also means rejection of a mutual vulnerability relationship with China
in the mistaken belief that this will lead China to forego modernization options. In fact, if my analysis is
correct, we will only encourage China to exploit those vulnerabilities that we are perpetuating, having
therefore the reverse of the intended effect. Instead, we should work to reduce U.S. vulnerabilities.
Specifically, this would mean placing greater emphasis on missile defense; reinforcing extended deterrence
to allies, especially Japan; and the continued U.S. ability to project power into the Asia-Pacific area – in
order to enhance stability in what will be a dynamic and changing security setting in the years ahead. Not
only is strategic stability not served by offering China an assurance that the United States accepts mutual
vulnerability as the basis for the strategic relationship. To the contrary, such an assurance could have the
reverse effect contributing to miscalculation and undesirable crisis escalation – the opposite of the
definitions of stability set forth at the beginning of my presentation.
Weakness invites challenges – prevents international credibility
John R. Bolton, Former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, 10-18-2009, “The danger of Obama's dithering,”
Los Angeles Times, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/18/opinion/oe-bolton18
Weakness in American foreign policy in one region often invites challenges elsewhere, because our
adversaries carefully follow diminished American resolve. Similarly, presidential indecisiveness, whether
because of uncertainty or internal political struggles, signals that the United States may not respond to
international challenges in clear and coherent ways. Taken together, weakness and indecisiveness have proved
historically to be a toxic combination for America's global interests. That is exactly the combinaton we now see under
President Obama. If anything, his receiving the Nobel Peace Prize only underlines the problem. All of Obama's campaign and inaugural
talk about "extending an open hand" and "engagement," especially the multilateral variety, isn't exactly unfolding according to plan.
Entirely predictably, we see more clearly every day that diplomacy is not a policy but only a technique. Absent presidential
leadership, which at a minimum means clear policy direction and persistence in the face of criticism and adversity,
engagement simply embodies weakness and indecision.
West Coast Publishing
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Heg in Asia
Heg Good – China/Taiwan
Decreased US hegemony in Asia leads to a Chinese attack on Taiwan
Arthur Waldron, Professor of International Relations at the University of Pennsylvania, 2000, “Congressional
Statement,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2000_hr/00-06-21waldron.htm
This is the danger we face with China. It is that a miscalculation of how successful a use of force will be, particularly if
combined with misleading signals from Washington and what looks like American weakness, will lead Beijing to
calculate that a “splendid little war” may in fact be possible—for example over Taiwan. I am certain that an attack on
Taiwan would lead to disaster for China. But there are those in Beijing who imagine that the US could be
scared off and that a series of missile salvoes could bring the island down. Reality would be very different, of course.
Taiwan would strike back; the US would become involved; China’s economy would collapse as exports to the United
States suddenly stopped; unemployment would rise and with it unrest, for Beijing has a tacit agreement with its people assuring rising
living standards in return for obedience. As the scale of the disaster became clear in China, political struggle would begin within the
elite. When the dust finally cleared the achievements of the past thirty years would be gone in China, and her neighbors, thoroughly
awake to their own danger, would be developing their own deterrent capabilities. How can we prevent such a disaster?
Here are some things the United should do. Rebalance our diplomacy . We need to move away from the current
administration’s almost obsessive focus on China to deal with other states as well. We need to strengthen our political and
military ties with other democratic states, and always put our allies first. Make deterrence absolutely clear.
This means speaking clearly and credibly. It was clear to me during the Taiwan election period that even this administration
has learned something and the verbal signals, naval movements, and bits of news that came out, showed a far better concept of
operations than four years ago when Lee Teng-hui was reelected and China fired missiles.
Hegemony is key to deterring China over Taiwan
Admiral Jay L. Johnson, & General Charles C. Krulak, 8-17-2009, “Forward presence essential to American
interests,” United States Navy, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/navy_legacy_hr.asp?id=274
Forward deployed U.S. forces, primarily naval expeditionary forces — the Navy-Marine Corps team — are
vital to regional stability and to keeping these crises from escalating into full-scale wars. To those who argue
that the United States can't afford to have this degree of vigilance anymore, we say: The United States can't
afford not to. These brushfires, whether the result of long-standing ethnic tensions or resurgent
nationalism in the wake of the Cold War will only continue. The Cold War was an anomaly. Never again will
we live in a bipolar world whose nuclear shadow suppressed nationalism and ethnic tensions. We have, in
some respects, reverted back to the world our ancestors knew: A world in disorder. Somalia, Bosnia,
Liberia, Haiti, Rwanda, Iraq and the Taiwan Straits are merely examples of the types of continuing crises we
now face. Some might call this period an age of chaos. The United States and the world cannot afford to
allow any crisis to escalate into threats to the United States', and the world's, vital interests. And while the
skies are not dark with smoke from these brushfires, today's world demands a new approach. The concepts
of choice must be selective and committed engagement, unencumbered global operations and prompt
crisis resolution. There is no better way to maintain and enforce these concepts than with the forward
presence of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps team.
West Coast Publishing
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Heg in Asia
Heg Good – China/Taiwan – Perception Key
Actual military effectiveness is irrelevant – perceived lack of resolve triggers a Chinese attack
on Taiwan
Thomas Christensen, Professor of Politics @ Princeton, 4-2001, “Posing problems without catching up,”
International Security
China is also working to develop antistealth and antisatellite capabilities. Even if the Chinese programs have
only limited effect against more technologically advanced foes, they may still pose a future security
challenge to Taiwan and the United States. If Beijing elites believe that they are in a protracted war of wills
over an issue that they care about much more than do the Americans, such as Taiwan, those elites might
still be emboldened by the perceived capability--however limited--to increase costs to American and
Taiwanese forces and to reduce costs to mainland assets in such a struggle. This problem is only
exacerbated by any perceptions that Chinese elites might have about America's supposed limited
willingness to fight such protracted wars and to suffer casualties. Implications and Prescriptions for U.S.
Strategy If the analysis above is correct, preventing war across the Taiwan Strait and between the United
States and China is much more difficult than a straightforward net assessment of relative military power in
the region might suggest. To deter China from launching attacks against Taiwan and escalating crises and
conflicts by attacking American assets in the region, the United States must do more than demonstrate an
ability to prevail militarily in a conflict; it must also demonstrate American resolve and, perhaps, the ability
to protect its forces not only from defeat but also from significant harm.
If China perceives a lack of resolve they will attack Taiwan
James Woolsey, Former CIA Director, 2-12-1998, FDCH Congressional Testimony, Scholar
The one issue which might cause a major rupture between China and the United States is Taiwan. After we
demonstrated weakness and vacillation for several years, I believe that the Chinese were genuinely surprised nearly two
years ago when they launched ballistic missiles into the waters near Taiwan and the United States responded
by sending two aircraft carriers. It is dangerous to give China reason to doubt our resolve, as we had done
before that incident. Wars can result, and have resulted, from such miscalculations. Beijing must be quite clear
that we insist that there be only a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue. Taiwan's healthy democracy is, in a sense,
an affront to the dictators in Beijing, and the affront will be doubly galling to Beijing if China begins to have severe economic problems
and Taiwan continues to prosper. Taiwan could thus easily become the focus for the nationalistic fervor which Chinese
leaders may be tempted to stir up in order to distract the Chinese people from political oppression and economic disruption. A Chinese
invasion of Taiwan itself is not militarily feasible for many years, but the seizure of one or more of the offshore islands, such as
Quemoy, or a ballistic missile attack against key targets on Taiwan using conventional warheads with high accuracy (e.g. by using GPS
guidance) could bring us into a serious military confrontation with China.
Perception of weakness triggers an attack on Taiwan
John Steward, Congressman, 1998, “Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries,”
http://parl.gc.ca/36/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/fore-e/17eve.htm?Language=E&Parl=36&Ses=1&comm_id=8
The U.S. Defence Department has published a report that says that the views expressed by visiting Chinese
officers and recent Chinese military publications indicate that Beijing holds a number of misconceptions
that may cause political friction or military conflict with the U.S. The report argued that China's belief in the
weakness of U.S. forces could contribute to a decision to attack Taiwan. The report noted that the problem
has worsened despite unprecedented military contact between U.S. and Chinese forces .
West Coast Publishing
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Heg in Asia
Heg Good – Taiwan – Proliferation
Decreased US deterrence credibility leads to Taiwanese proliferation
Derek Mitchell, senior fellow and director for Asia in the CSIS International Security Program, 2004, The Nuclear
Tipping Point, pg. 307
As this military gap widens, Taiwan may feel increasingly vulnerable and unable to count on U.S.
protection during the critical early stages of a conflict. It may decide that it needs its own decisive
weapon to even the balance. Indeed, even short of nuclear weapons, Taiwan strategists today are
increasingly considering the need to develop an "offense defense plan----enrailing deployment of surfaceto-surface missiles capable of striking the mainland-to serve as a partial deterrent (and cocnterstriks force)
to a Chinese attack. The addition of a nuclear component to this strategy is not necessarily an illogical
extension of this independent deterrent concept. Furthermore, as China's economy continues to grow
rapidly and Taiwan's slows, a nuclear weapon may be a more cost-effec- tive (if risky) option when
compared with the expense of the myriad conventional weapons, such as submarines and missile defense,
that Taiwan will need to consider over time. A related scenario would be a perceived reduction in the
overall U.S. defense commitment to the island. As indicated, the United States remains unique in its
commitment to Taiwan's defense. Should such a commitment recede-or be perceived as recedingdramatically, Taiwan authorities, as they have in the past, may feel they have little choice but to consider
drastic options, including the nuclear one.
West Coast Publishing
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Heg in Asia
Heg Good – Japan
Japanese deployments critical to US power projection – necessary to global commitments
and countering China and North Korea.
Michael Auslin, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 4-2-2010, “Three Strikes Against US Global
Presence,” Fox News, http://www.aei.org/article/101869
Decisions by the governments of Japan and Great Britain and the passage of the bankrupting health care
bill in the US spell the coming end of America's overseas basing and ability to project power. Should these
trends continue, the US military will lose its European and Asian strategic anchors, hastening America's
eventual withdrawal from its global commitments and leaving the world a far more uncertain and
unstable place. The first strike comes from Asia. For the past six months, the new government of Japan has
sought to revise a 2006 agreement to relocate a Marine Corps Air Station from one part of Okinawa to a
less populated area. Though the agreement was reached only after a decade of intense negotiations and
with Democratic and Republican Administrations alike, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's government has
instead suggested numerous alternative sites for the base, most of which were rejected during the previous
negotiations and none of which would allow the same type of training and operations necessary for the
Marine Corps' air wing. Now, American officials are privately wondering whether the ruling Democratic
Party of Japan wants to allow the US the same level of access to bases in Japan, without which America
would be incapable of providing regional security guarantees and serving as a force for stability in Asia
amidst the growth of China's military capacity and North Korea's continuing nuclear developments.
Indeed, the former head of the Democratic Party of Japan has publicly mused whether the US 7th Fleet is
sufficient for alliance purposes, thus raising the specter of the withdrawal of US Marines and Air Force from
Japan.
Japanese basing key to US power projection and Asian stability.
James J. Przystup, Senior Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense
University, April 2009, “The United States and the Asia-Pacific Region: National Interests and Strategic
Imperatives,” Strategic Forum, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Strforum/SF239/SF239.pdf
The United States bilateral alliance structure remains the foundation of regional stability and prosperity
and the starting point for U.S. security engagement with the region. The alliances allow the United States
to maintain a significant forward-deployed presence, and the basing structure in Japan and South Korea,
reinforced by access agreements with nonallied Asian friends, makes credible the U.S. security
commitment to the region. Operating from bases in Asia, U.S. forces are able to extend their operational
reach to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. It is noteworthy to recall that the first U.S. forces to reach the
Persian Gulf in 1991 and in Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 were based in Japan. During the Cold
War, the alliance structure stood as a vital link in the U.S. global containment strategy. Success in the Cold
War did not put an end to interstate tensions and rivalries in East Asia. In the decade that followed the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the area experienced a series of challenges to regional stability and
security—the 1994 nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, the 1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis, and North
Korea’s Taepo Dong missile launch over Japan in 1998—that affected the security interests of the United
States, its allies, and friends. Today, Cold War legacy issues in East Asia—China-Taiwan relations and a
divided Korean Peninsula, with North Korea now possessing a demonstrated nuclear capability—continue
to pose challenges to U.S. security interests and commitments. In dealing with the hard security
challenges facing the region, the alliance structure is irreplaceable. This will remain true for the
foreseeable future.
West Coast Publishing
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Heg in Asia
Heg Good – Japan
Forward basing in Japan key to logistical support for key military operations throughout the
Pacific and reassures all allies
Global Security, Think-tank focusing international military issues, 2005, U.S. Army Japan (USARJ),
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/usarj.htm
The strategic geographic location of Japan provides the U.S. an excellent location for forward-basing,
enabling power projection forces in the event of contingencies. Combined with the current agreements
the U.S. has with Japan for basing rights for both air and sea forces, the U.S. Army in Japan is capable of a
greatly expanded logistical support role throughout the Pacific theater. Japan occupies a key strategic
location in the Pacific, which is vitally important to the U.S. both economically and militarily. U.S. forward
presence in Japan is vital to ensuring access to this strategic location. The U.S. Army's forward presence in
Japan enables it to meet U.S. bilateral engagement responsibilities under the Mutual Security Treaty and
the Defense Guidelines to defend Japan from outside aggression in wartime, and to provide deterrence and
stability in peacetime. It also demonstrates the U.S. commitment to other allies and friends in the Pacific.
Being in Japan, approximately 5,000 nautical miles closer to potential trouble spots than the West Coast of
the U.S., means USARJ & 9th TSC can respond to crises and support regional contingencies as a
strategically located base and staging area.
Japanese basing is key to power projection, solving terrorism and ethnic conflict
Daniel Okimoto, Senior Fellow @ Institute for International Studies, 1998, “The Japan America Security
Alliance,” http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/okd02/index.htm
More costly perhaps in terms of power projection would be the withdrawal of U.S. Marines from
Okinawa. If North Korea ceases to pose a threat, political pressures to remove U.S. Marines from Okinawa
will mount in Japan as well as in the United States, because the rationale for their overseas deployment—
namely, early engagement in a war—will have disappeared. Outside of the Korean peninsula, it is hard to
identify a place where U.S. amphibious forces might get involved. Not Taiwan. Not the Spratley Islands. A
land battle in Japan? Far-fetched. To maintain Marines in Okinawa, a new rationale would have to be
found.55 Perhaps that rationale might be to deal with low-intensity conflicts.56 In the post–Cold War
world, a variety of low-level contingencies will arise, such as disaster relief, civilian rescue operations,
citizen evacuation in ethnic wars, and anti-terrorist activities. Such contingencies cannot be handled easily
by traditional forms of naval and air power. Low-intensity conflicts are more likely to happen than high
intensity wars. Indeed, the lower the intensity of conflict, the higher the likelihood of occurrence. U.S.
Marines also have the capacity to play a key role in military-to-military training and joint exercises with
counterpart services throughout Asia. The benefits of such interaction are substantial. They go beyond
operational readiness. What military-to-military contacts provide is an effective means of strengthening
bilateral ties with states outside America’s global alliance network (such as the Philippines, Indonesia,
and Thailand). If the idea of serving new missions is accepted, the U.S. marines might be able to stay in
Okinawa, but probably in smaller numbers and with a contraction in base facilities.
US presence in Japan is key to war-fighting capability
Daniel Okimoto, Senior Fellow @ Institute for International Studies, 1998, “The Japan America Security
Alliance,” http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/okd02/index.htm
JASA was signed in 1951 when the Korean War was raging, and the United States needed to have assurances
that it could continue to stage combat missions and carry on logistical operations from nearby bases in
Japan. In successfully conducting and concluding the Korean War, U.S. bases in Japan were indispensable.
The same holds true today. If a war broke out tomorrow, JASA would be put into operation instantly to
prosecute the war to a swift and decisive conclusion.
West Coast Publishing
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Heg in Asia
Heg Good – Japan
US forward power presence in Japan is key to Asian power projection
Yukio Okamoto, special adviser to Japan’s task force on International Relations, 2002, “Japan and the US,”
Washington Quarterly, pg. np
The alliance between Japan and the United States represents the primary bilateral security relationship for
both governments. For the United States, the alliance anchors U.S. power projection in the region
surrounded by the Indian and western Pacific Oceans. Bilateral ties with other Pacific nations such as the
Republic of Korea (ROK) and Australia, though significant, are national in character, not hemispheric.
Neither involves the permanent stationing of U.S. naval fighting forces within the country. Japan hosts
the only U.S. carrier battle group homeported outside the United States as well as a complete
amphibious attack group, including a full Marine Expeditionary Force. Of the 19 U.S. Navy ships with home
ports between Honolulu and the Mediterranean, 18 called Japanese ports home in August 2001. 1 Japan
plays host to a significant mass of U.S. airpower, including F-15 and F-16 fighter wings. Additionally, Japan
provides facilities support to a vast array of U.S. reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering resources, as
was amply demonstrated when a mid-air collision with a Chinese fighter downed a U.S. Air Force E-3 flying
out of Okinawa.
US basing in Japan is necessary for power projection globally
Christopher Hughes, Senior Research Fellow at the University of Warwick, 2004, “Japan’s Re-emergence as a
Normal Military Power,” p. 147
Japan's decision to lock itself into the US-Japan alliance will have wider effects on global security.
Japanese Support for the Afghan campaign and Iraq has shown that the US -Japan alliance is no longer
just an East Asian or Asia-Pacific alliance, but one that functions to reinforce the US's global military
reach. Japan is crucial to US global military hegemonv not only in the provision of key bases for the
projection of military power from the Asia-Pacific to the Middle Last, but also is a provider of boots on
the ground for militarv coalitions. Finally Japanese devotion to the alliance will affect global security by
adding one more large militarv power to the mix, while lessening Japan’s interest in making a difference
using economic power. As a result Of this trade-off, and Japan’s finl abandonment of it, position as an
exemplar of non-military approaches to security, the world may be he poorer.
Japanese bases are crucial staging grounds for US troops and power projection
Christopher Hughes, Senior Research Fellow at the University of Warwick, 2004, “Japan’s Re-emergence as a
Normal Military Power,” p. 106-107
Whatever the outcome of ongoing Japan-U5 Consultations on the realignment and funding of bases, it
seems certain that facilities in Japan will become ever more central to US regional and global strategy.
The US utilised its bases in Japan to deploy forces in the Gulf War; the carrier Kitty Hawk home-ported in
Japan participated in the current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq; fighter aircraft from Misawa in Aomori
Prefecture and Kadena Air Base in Okinawa participated in the Iraq war; US Marines in Okinawa were
sent as reinforcements to Iraq in January 2004; and Okinawa, in particular, remains crucial as a staging
post for the US to project power across the Pacific to the Indian Ocean and Middle East. Consequently, it
is not surprising that the US 2004 Global Posture Review (GPR) looks set to maintain or even boost the US
presence in Japan, whereas other allies, including South Korea, face sizeable reductions of US forces. In
recent talks, the US appears to have reassured Japan that it intends to preserve current troop levels in
Japan of around 58,00o servicemen (including around 14,000 of the US 7th Fleet). The US is also looking to
strengthen the importance of its bases in Japan, proposing that the command functions of the US Army I
Corps, a rapid-deployment force covering the Asia-Pacific, be relocated from Washington State to Army
Camp Zawa in Kanagawa Prefecture. In addition, the US has proposed that the command operations of the
13th Air Force headquartered in Guam, a key base for long-range bombers and tanker aircraft often
deployed in the Middle East, should be integrated with those of the 5th Air Force Command at Yokota Air
Base in Tokyo." The ramifications of this would be that Japan would essentially serve as a frontline US
command post for the Asia-Pacific and beyond.
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Heg in Asia
Heg Good – Japan – Withdrawal Bad
Withdrawal of US troops triggers a broader abandoning of the US-Japan alliance
Anthony DiFilippo, Sociology Professor at Lincoln University, 2002, The Challenges of the US-Japan Military
Arrangement, pg. 21-22
First, because the bases issue in Okinawa is an ever-present political cauldron linked to the U.S.-Japan
security alliance, it could very quickly become heated to the point where residents are unrelenting in
their demands that American military installations and troops be removed from their prefecture. The
removal of U.S. troops from Okinawa could persuade either Washington or Tokyo or both that major
revisions are needed in the bilateral security alliance. Thus, it is conceivable that without bases in
Okinawa, Washington would abandon the security alliance or Tokyo would decide that without the
presence of American troops it might be better to rely completely on its own forces for defense.
The plan spills over and prevents cooperation in other areas
Tobias Harris, PhD student at MIT, 1/13/2010, A new US-Japan Alliance in the Making,
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/01/13/a-new-us-japan-alliance-in-the-making/
The question for the US and Japan going forward is what role the alliance can play in this more fluid
regional environment. The hope that the US and Japan, along with other democracies, could present a
united front tasked with integrating China peacefully has proven unrealistic. Instead the most salient
division in the region may be that separating the US and China from the region’s middle and small powers.
Accordingly, the security relationship will be scaled back (as discussed here), making the dispute over
Futenma that much more of a distraction. The future of the US-Japan relationship may be a hard security
core linked to the defence of Japan and some form of US forward presence in Japan (in the same way that
Singapore has facilitated the US forward presence in the region), looser political and economic cooperation
in the region, and closer cooperation on global issues like climate change, nuclear non-proliferation, and
the like.
Withdrawing troops freaks out Japan and triggers regional instability
William Cronin, Specialist in Asian Affairs, 2005, Journal of World Affairs 29.1, pg. 51
The U.S. Defense Department’s plan for the “transformation and realignment” of U.S. forces worldwide has
created some nervousness in both Japan and South Korea despite the potential domestic political benefits
of reducing the burden of U.S. bases on local communities. The main concern of Japan, which is shared by
some in the South Korean government, relates to rumors of American force reductions that could signal a
shift of focus away from the longstanding U.S. role of deterring conflict and reinforcing security in
Northeast Asia. U.S. officials and senior military officers insist that any force reductions will be more than
compensated for by increasing the mobility and lethality of remaining forces. Some Japanese officials and
commentators, however, are not completely persuaded by these reassurances. Analysts have noted that
unlike in Europe, where the Pentagon is drawing down and realigning forces that are no longer relevant
in a post-Cold War environment, potential flash points such as the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan
Straits continue to represent active threats to peace. These observers note that given the lack of any
collective security framework in Asia, the U.S. bilateral alliance system remains the lynchpin of regional
stability and security.
Withdrawal from Japan is perceived by all other allies and tanks US credibility
Soyoung Ho, editor of The Washington Monthly, 5/1/2005, Washington Monthly, pg. np
The present drawdown of U.S. troops may be the best ultimate outcome. Although phasing out all the
troops in the far future may make sense, it does not in the near-to mid-term. If the United States
scrapped the 50-year-old alliance and pulled out its troops now, when all Asian nations look to America
for leadership, this would pose a fundamental risk to U.S. credibility; i.e., if you don't support an ally,
there is a grave implication that you will not support other allies, either. An American presence in Korea is
important to balance Chinas growing regional ambition. Moreover, the alliance benefits America, giving it
access to much of Asia while at the same time reducing pressure on other U.S. military bases in the region.
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Heg in Asia
Heg Good – Japan – Rearm
Japan won’t nuclearize now, US withdrawal triggers nuclear rearmament
Yukio Satoh, Former President of the Japan Institute of International Affairs and Permanent Representative of
Japan to the United Nations, 3/5/2009, “Reinforcing American Extended Deterrence for Japan: An Essential Step
for Nuclear Disarmament,” http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/09018Satoh.html.
For obvious reasons, the Japanese are second to none in wishing for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. However, given
Japan's vulnerability to North Korea's progressing nuclear and missile programs and China's growing military
power, ensuring American commitment to deterring threats from nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction is a matter of prior strategic importance for Tokyo . Japan has long been committed to the Three NonNuclear Principles of not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them and not permitting their entry into the country. A prevalent
and strong sentiment against nuclear weapons among the Japanese people lies behind the policy to deny themselves the possession of
nuclear weapons in spite of the country's capabilities to do otherwise. The nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki remain vivid
national memories. Yet, strategically, Japan's adherence to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles depends largely, if
not solely, upon the credibility of the Japan-US Security Treaty, or more specifically, that of the United
States' commitment to defend Japan from any offensive action , including nuclear threats. In response, the US
government has been steadfastly assuring the Japanese in an increasingly clear manner of American
commitment to provide deterrence for Japan by all means, including nuclear. Against this backdrop, the argument
made by the aforementioned four eminent strategists in the tone-setting joint article published in The Wall Street Journal of January 4,
2007, that "the end of the Cold War made the doctrine of mutual Soviet-American deterrence obsolete", was received with mixed
reactions in Japan: welcome for the sake of nuclear disarmament and caution from the perspectives of security and defense. As
depending upon the US' extended nuclear deterrence will continue to be Japan's only strategic option to
neutralize potential or conceivable nuclear and other strategic threats, the Japanese are sensitive to any
sign of increased uncertainties with regard to extended deterrence .
Japanese armament leads to Asian arms races
Shinichi Ogawa, director of the research department of Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies, 2003, “A
Nuclear Japan Revisited”, The National Institute for Defense Studies News, pg. np
One likely consequence of a Japanese decision to go nuclear would be reinforcement of Chinese and
Russian nuclear forces. Even though Japanese development of nuclear weapons would be for the limited
defensive purpose of deterring a nuclear North Korea, Chinese and Russian suspicion of Japan would
undoubtedly increase for historical reasons. This would not only have the effect of providing China and
Russia with an incentive for increasing their retaliatory nuclear forces; it would also provide them with a
clear reason for adopting a nuclear deterrence strategy targeting Japan. Therefore, Japan would have no
choice but to consider Chinese and Russian nuclear arsenals as objects of deterrence. In short, if Japan
were to pursue nuclear weapon development, it would have to develop and deploy a considerable
number of longer-range nuclear delivery systems, a strategic nuclear force, that would enable it to practice
deterrence vis-à-vis China and Russia.
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Heg Good – Japan – Rearm
Perceptions of a weakening US security commitment leads to Japanese proliferation
Michael Swaine, et al, Senior Associate and Co-Director of the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment For
International Peace, Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century, 1998, pg. 54-55
Despite such limitations, Japan nevertheless has the financial, industrial, and technological resources to
become a major military power should its regional security environment worsen, international economic
institutions collapse, and the alliance be abrogated. Japanese hedging against the possibility of a more
hostile regional security environment and abrogation of the alliance can be seen in recent plans: (1) to
improve the intelligence capabilities of the SDF, including the use of satellites; (2) to procure transport
aircraft that can fly greater distances and carry more than existing C-1 and C-130 aircraft; (3) to acquire airrefueling tankers for patrol planes; and (4) to perhaps acquire “defensive” aircraft carriers. Moreover, Japan
possesses stockpiles of near-weapons-grade plutonium. It could, therefore, become a nuclear
superpower quickly, if it had the political will to do so. Choice of the nuclear card will remain unlikely,
however, given the legacy of World War II, the enormous benefits Japan currently derives from
maintenance of the status quo, and the continued willingness of the United States to extend a nuclear
umbrella over Japan.
Removal of US troops cause Japanese and South Korean proliferation
Zalmay Khalilzad et al, Former Professor of Political Science at Columbia and Director of Project Air Force at
RAND, Current US Ambassador to Iraq, “The United States and Asia,” 2001,
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1315/MR1315.ch2.pdf
At the same time, it is not clear whether these policies would in the long run be in China’s interests.
Weakening the U.S.-Japan alliance, for example, could easily lead Japan to pursue a more independent
geopolitical course. If deprived of U.S. support, Korea too could increase its military power, perhaps to
include the acquisition of nuclear weapons. More generally, multipolarity would imply that both India and,
if it recovers, Russia would become potential rivals of China. India has, in fact, already embarked on a
course of pursuing great-power status—and although Chinese observers do not list India among the “poles”
of a future multipolar system, it is hard to see how China could prevent that from occurring. In a similar
manner, the current era of good Sino-Russian relations rests both on Russian weakness and on Russia’s and
China’s common opposition to U.S. “hegemony.” Yet in a multipolar setting, a revived Russia and China
could easily become competitive. The possible risks of a multipolar world thus suggest that the
alternative option of a “strategic partnership” with the United States might have its attractions for
China.19 At the moment, however, China’s preference for multipolarity and hence for bringing the United
States down in power terms from superpower to great-power status appears to remain firm.
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Heg Good – Japan – Rearm
US removal of troops triggers Japanese proliferation
Kurt Campbell, PhD, Chief Executive Officer and Co-Founder of the Center for a New American Security, and
Tsuyoshi Sunohara, Senior Fellow at the International Security Program of the Center for Strategic &
International Studies, 2004, The Nuclear Tipping Point, pg. 218
Japan represents the ultimate contradiction among the potential nuclear aspirants explored in this volume.
Its standing as a non-nuclear nation is a virtual bedrock of the nonproliferation regime, the inspiration and
example of the early era of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Having experienced the horrors of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan's political structures and national psyche have engendered a deeply
enshrined cultural taboo (until very recently) against even public discus- sion of the nuclear option. In
addition, Japanese leaders have repeatedly expressed their confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella
provided by the Japanese-American defense treaty and reinforced by the deployment of substantial U.S.
military forces on japanese territory. Indeed, the Japan- ese case is often seen as the model of how
extended deterrence guarantees serve to curb incentives for nuclear proliferation.
US deterrence credibility is the underlying factor that prevents Japanese proliferation
Kurt Campbell, PhD, Chief Executive Officer and Co-Founder of the Center for a New American Security, and
Tsuyoshi Sunohara, Senior Fellow at the International Security Program of the Center for Strategic &
International Studies, 2004, The Nuclear Tipping Point, pg. 236
Although the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrence guarantee has never been tested (in the form of
actual nuclear use) in the case of Japan, or any other country, it continues to lie at the heart of the
security relationship between the United States and Japan. Indeed, the guarantee, and the japaneseAmerican security alliance in which it is embedded, pro- vides the most important reason why Japan has
not sought to develop an independent nuclear weapons capacity. Thanks to their continued faith in
American foreign and security policy, Successive Japanese administra- tions have refrained from fully
developing the military potential corn- monly associated with a "normal" state (that is, having the
potential to wage war for both offensive and defensive purposes).
Collapse of US deterrence credibility leads to Japanese proliferation – even small issues can
lead to large doubts
Kurt Campbell, PhD, Chief Executive Officer and Co-Founder of the Center for a New American Security, and
Tsuyoshi Sunohara, Senior Fellow at the International Security Program of the Center for Strategic &
International Studies, 2004, The Nuclear Tipping Point, pg. 345
First, American officials must overcome any doubts among the Japanese about the credibility of the U.S.
extended deterrence guarantee. As former japanese prime minister Morihiro Hosokawa observes, "It is in
the interest of the United States, so long as it does not wish to see Japan Withdraw from the NPT and
develop its own nuclear deterrent, to maintain its alliance with Japan and continue to provide a nuclear
umbrealla. U.S. officials should reaffirm at every opportunity Washington's willingness to defend Japan
against external threats.
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Heg in Asia
Heg Good – Japan – Deter China
US-Japan alliance deters conflict over Taiwan
Ted Osius, numerous IR degrees from Harvard and Johns Hopkins, 2002, The US Japan Security Alliance, p. 23
To deter conflict, the United States discourages Taipei from declaring independence and Beijing from
forcibly attempting to unite Taiwan with the mainland. Under the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States
supplies Taiwan with weapons necessary for defense against the mainland.3 Given China's size and
resources, however, Taiwan cannot achieve security based solely on independent militarv capabilities.
Taipei relies on Beijing's fear that the United States would defend it in the event of a cross-strait conflict.
Because U.S. .forward-deployed forces are in Japan, Taiwan also depends on a strong and stable U.S.Japan alliance.
US-Japan coordination over Taiwan is the only way to deter conflict
Declan Hayes, Professor of Finance @ Sophia University, 2001, Japan: The Toothless Tiger, p. 63
In order for an invasion to ultimately succeed, Beijing would have to conduct a multifaceted campaign,
including air assaults, airborne incursions into Taiwanese space, special operations raids behind Taiwanese
lines, amphibious landings, maritime area denial operations, air superiority operations, and conventional
missile strikes. Although the PLA would currently encounter great difficulty in conducting such a
sophisticated campaign, over the next decade, it will improve its capability. Time is, after all, on its side. So
too are the numbers-and the world's diplomatic community. Eventually, only Japan and the United States
could stop the takeover. Taiwan could not hope to survive alone. Taiwan's air force has over 500 combat
aircraft, and these include top of the line U.S. F-16s and French Mirage 2000-5s. Taiwan's air defenses are
so strong that China could not hope to launch an effective air campaign in the near future. Taiwan's 68,000
strong navy has more than thirty-six frigates and destroyers as well as four submarines, and it would wreak
havoc on a Chinese invasion armada under current conditions. Behind Taipei's well-honed forces stands the
awesome armada of the Japanese-based U.S. Seventh Fleet, together with its carrier battle Groups,
which can be quickly deployed into Taiwanese waters. China is currently powerless against the Seventh
Fleet. Therefore, as long as America continues to underwrite Taiwan's security, a direct invasion is not a
credible possibility. However, the continued presence of the Seventh Fleet cannot be taken for granted.
When the Seventh Fleet goes, so too will Taiwan, Asia's key buffer state.
US-Japan security cooperation precludes the rise of challengers in Asia
Christopher Hughes, Senior Research Fellow at the University of Warwick, 2004, “Japan’s Re-emergence as a
Normal Military Power,” p. 146
The tightening of US-Japan security cooperation means that there is unlikely to be any return to a system
of bipolaritv or tripolarity in East Asia.} China, despite its phenomenal economic growth and the continued
upgrading of its military, is highly unlikely to be able to rise to the position of a `counter pole' to the
combined strength of the US and a remilitarising Japan. Japan's continued close attachment to the US in
security terms, despite its economic gravitation towards China, means that it is improbable that Japan
would seek to form a third pole in regional security. Moreover, its continued subordinate and dependent
position on the US in the bilateral alliance rules out a US-Japan joint partnership, or 'bigemony', in
managing security affairs in the region, as 'Japan handlers' in the US would like to argue.
The US-Japan alliance solves Chinese paranoia
Mark Roth, Department of the Air Force, National Defense University, 2000, National War College,
http://www.ndu.edu/library/n2/n005601g.pdf
Alliances with other Asian countries contribute to United States objectives for a non-aggressive China. For
example, the US-Japan security alliance eliminates any need for China to feel threatened by Japan. So
long as the United States maintains its military presence in Japan, Beijing will have no fears about a
revival of Japanese militarism or that Tokyo would acquire nuclear weapons.
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Heg in Asia
Heg Good – South Korea
Korean deployments key to global military reach – it’s at the heart of Pentagon
transformations.
Jae-Jung Suh, Associate professor and director of Korean Studies at the School for Advanced International Studies
at Johns Hopkins University, 3-31-2008, “Korean Bases of Concern,” Foreign Policy in Focus,
http://www.fpif.org/articles/korean_bases_of_concern
Nowhere is the trinity of transformation, realignment, and restructuring more vividly demonstrated than
in South Korea. There U.S. bases are being consolidated to facilitate the “strategic flexibility” of the U.S.
forces. With this flexibility, various U.S. forces can be flown in from outside the region and assembled
into a lethal force, and U.S. forces in Korea can be projected out of Korea and Asia to be parts of a larger
force. According to the Pentagon plan, the new bases will function as lily pads on which new high-tech
forces will land to jump off to far away places. Welcome to the Pentagon’s new world.
Korean deployments have global reach – key to effective military deployments.
Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Spring 2006, "Transforming the U.S. global
defense posture." Naval War College Review, p.27
Our current ground, air, and naval access throughout the Asia-Pacific region serves as a basis for a longterm presence that will be better structured for more effective regional and global action. For example,
the Army's modular transformation will streamline headquarters elements and strengthen joint capabilities.
The forward-deployed Air Force Strike ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) task force in the
Pacific will also enable greater regional and global reach. We also are establishing a network of forward
operating sites and cooperative security locations to support better the war on terror and to provide
multiple avenues of access for contingency operations. Such facilities will serve to expand U.S. and hostnation training opportunities, helping our partners build their own capacities in areas such as
counterterrorism. On the Korean Peninsula, our planned enhancements and realignments are intended
to strengthen our overall military effectiveness for the combined defense of the Republic of Korea.
Stationed forces are relocating away from the increasing congestion and sprawl of the greater Seoul area
and consolidating into two major hubs in the central and southern sections of the country. Rotational and
rapidly deployable combat capabilities such as Stryker units and air expeditionary forces will complement
these permanently stationed units. We seek to retain a robust prepositioned equipment capability in
Korea to support rapid reinforcement.
Removal of troops from South Korea triggers a vacuum of power, arms races, nuclear war and
collapse of Asian democracy
Larry Wortzel, PhD, 1-30-2003, “Why the USA is OK in the ROK,”
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2003/01/Why-the-USA-is-OK-in-the-ROK
Speaking as a former Army officer stationed in Korea, I can say this: It would be a grave error to leave
South Korea. For one thing, our presence there is a major reason why there has been peace in the region
since the end of the Korean War in 1953. If Americans troops left, deep historical animosities and
territorial disputes among Russia, China, Japan and the two Koreas would lead to a major arms race for
territory and military dominance. This is not something to brush off, considering three of the five nations
have nuclear weapons, and, in the case of North Korea, seem willing to use them. But protecting the
peace isn't the only reason the United States is in Korea. We're there to protect the principles of
democracy, too. Thanks largely to an American presence in the Asian region, the democracies of South
Korea and Taiwan are protected from hostile threats by dictatorships in North Korea and China.
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Heg in Asia
Heg Good – South Korea
Pullout of US troops from South Korea leads to a vacuum of power and Asian conflict – Even
North Korea agrees
Jane Perlez, Time Foreign Contributor, 9-11-2000, “South Korean Says North Agrees U.S. Troops Should Stay,” NY
Times, Factiva
The most important outcome of his summit conference with North Korea in June, President Kim Dae Jung
of South Korea says, was a common understanding that American troops must stay in South Korea to
prevent a vacuum on the Korean peninsula that would be inviting to its neighbors. ''We are surrounded
by big powers -- Russia, Japan and China -- so the United States must continue to stay for stability and
peace in East Asia,'' he said. Mr. Kim said he was recounting almost the exact words of his counterpart,
Kim Jong Il, in North Korea during their meetings in Pyongyang. The Communist government in North
Korea, whose hostility has been cited by the Clinton administration as a major reason for pursuing a missile
defense system, wants normal relations with United States, Kim Dae Jung said. ''I believe that North Korea
wants improved relations with the United States,'' Mr. Kim said on Saturday in an interview at his
Manhattan hotel at the end of the gathering of world leaders at the United Nations. ''That is their basic
goal. If it is not their basic goal, there is no reason why they should change their position on American
forces.'' The mantra of Communist propaganda since the end of Korean War has been that American
troops must leave South Korea. So the North Korean leader's support of their staying is a reversal of
position -- albeit one that Pyongyang has not yet acknowledged in public.
US pullout makes North Korean takeover inevitable
TD Flack, Stars and Stripes Staff and Hwang Hae-rym, Foreign Correspondent, 5-13-2006, “Protesters:
Wartime control of ROK forces should stay with U.S.,”
http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=123&article=39294
“This is not the right time” for South Korea to take independent control of its military, said S.K. Ai, who
attended the rally with his daughter. “Maybe after 20 years.” Ai said he joined U.S. Army’s 7th Infantry
Division during the Korean War and took part in Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s Inchon landing. He said he’s
since experienced more than a half-century of tension between the Koreas. Like many of the attendees
who talked to Stripes at the rally, Ai said he believes Roh’s request is part of a bigger Communist plan to get
the U.S. military out of South Korea. Won Kee-chol, 70, said that 36,000 Americans sacrificed their lives
during the Korean War and he doesn’t want to see that effort wasted. The U.S. military “should stay until
unification of the Koreas under a flag of peace,” he said. “If the U.S. troops withdraw from South Korea,
we will be under the North’s control,” he said.
Withdrawal from South Korea emboldens China and encourages adventurism
Stephen J. Kim, M.D.. Education. M.D., John Hopkins University; B.S., Duke University, 2006, “Alternative
Proliferation And Alliance Futures In East Asia”, http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA451273&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf
But what about alternative futures we do not want to see in 2025? It is easier to be a pessimist because one has
selective recourse to the data of history. One remains anxious as to whether the lure of past glory and regional
predominance tugs at the heart of Chinese or Japanese leaders. In their long histories, China has rarely been
democratic; Japan has rarely been pacifistic; Korea has rarely been unhindered by great power conflicts.
The withdrawal of U.S. forces that would accompany the abrogation of our treaty and alliance commitments in East Asia
would likely harbinger a future reeking with the unpleasantness and chauvinism of East Asia’s past. Rather
than serving as a rally point for reform and genuine opening of the society, the 2008 Beijing Olympic games could be used as a bugle
for Chinese nationalism. If the United States and China fail to reach a clear understanding about nuclear proliferation, the
withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea and Japan will only embolden a confident and assertive China.
Chinese nationalists will want to throw their weight around East Asia. In this environment, I believe that as soon as
China achieves domestic stability, it will try to penetrate culturally into neighboring countries. The Chin, Sui,
Tang, and Qing dynasties were not exceptions. As soon as it feels that it has achieved its original target for economic
reforms, and buttressed by its confident nationalistic impulses, China is likely to claim, at a minimum, its
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Heg in Asia
regional power hegemony in East Asia.9 The next generation of Chinese nationalist leaders suffers little in
confidence, panache, or assertiveness.
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Heg in Asia
Heg Good – South Korea – Proliferation
Only force presence can prevent South Korean proliferation
Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institute, 12/18/2005, “Future of U.S.-Seoul
Ties,” Washington Times, pg. np
There are many benefits to an ongoing formal alliance solidified by an ongoing American military presence
on the peninsula. A U.S. military presence there could, as an insurance policy, help deter any untoward
Chinese actions against Korea and damp tensions in the Japan-Korea relationship. More concretely, it
would provide a regional hub for military activities against other threats, such as pirates, terrorists and
possible instability in the waterways of Southeast Asia. In each case, stationing U.S. forces in Korea
would produce a much more credible security commitment than simply retaining a formal alliance
agreement. Only the presence of U.S. forces would guarantee immediate involvement of Americans in
any conflict an outside country might wage against the Republic of Korea; only that would demonstrate
beyond reasonable doubt the seriousness and military readiness of the alliance.
Credible United States assurances are necessary to prevent South Korean nuclear
proliferation and Asian conflict
Christian Jung, Op-ed contributor, 6/24/2009, The Nuclear Non-Option, Korea Times, pg. np
Acquiring a nuclear weapon to balance the ostensible South-North power asymmetry may provide
immediate relief and perhaps a thinly veiled sense of security, but it would nonetheless be devastating to
the South's long-term interests in a number of ways. The most obvious result of the acquisition of
nuclear weapons would be further regional destabilization. It would needlessly flare up tensions between
the South and its neighboring countries, particularly China and Japan. More significantly, a nuclear
South would aggravate tensions with the North, and may culminate in a North-South arms race in a
worst-case scenario. None of these outcomes would be conducive to any of the goals that the South
wishes to achieve, both within the peninsula and throughout the greater Northeast Asian region.
From a
more global perspective, the acquisition of nuclear weapons would undermine the international status
that the South has built as a non-nuclear weapon state.
US credible assurance to South Korea deters war
Christian Jung, Op-ed contributor, 6/24/2009, The Nuclear Non-Option, Korea Times, pg. np
Combined with the assurances of protection under Washington's nuclear umbrella, we can therefore be
reasonably confident that no direct existential threat exists.
Finally, there is always the classic concern
over human error. As history attests, humans are particularly prone to blunders involving judgment on
delicate issues. Obviously, the only way to guarantee that no nuclear mishaps occur is to deny their
possession; once a nation acquires nuclear weapons, there will always be an infinite number of
opportunities for error and misuse.
And this should be at the heart of South's pursuit to dismantle the
North's capabilities ― the potential for error is always too large.
South Korea possesses globally
competitive nuclear power plant construction technology, and the country could easily exploit this
expertise to develop its own nuclear weapons program. To do so would be tragic, however. Such
technology should remain a force for good ― as an invaluable tool to export peaceful nuclear energy use
worldwide, especially in high-risk areas ― and must not be abused as a means to satisfy a myopic desire for
power.
Instead of wringing hands over whether the South should or shouldn't acquire nuclear weapons,
the nuclear acquisition card should be pushed aside in favor of those more in harmony with its long-term
interests. One card off the table will help the South's decision over the North, if even marginally.
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Heg in Asia
Heg Good – North Korea
Credible US deterrent is key to prevent North Korean aggression
Goh Chok, Senior Minister of Singapore, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 6-4-2004, Shangti Keynot
Address from the Prime Minister, http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue2005/2004-speech-archive/keynote-address-prime-minister-goh-chok-tong
In Asia, as in Europe, unease with America’s overwhelming global dominance is high. But Asia is more
keenly aware than Europe of the vital role that the US plays in maintaining global stability. No matter
what their misgivings, only a few Asian countries, and certainly no major US ally, opposed the US on Iraq.
There is a clearer appreciation in Asia than in Europe that the fundamental issue in Iraq now is the
credibility and resolve of the US. This is because Asia still faces many serious security challenges. Kashmir,
North Korea and cross-strait relations between Beijing and Taipei are potential flashpoints. If things go
terribly wrong, the conflicts could even turn nuclear. The US is central to the management of all three
potential flashpoints. All three conflicts also have a direct impact on the global struggle against terrorism.
Let me conclude therefore with a few words on each. Potential Flashpoints in Asia The India-Pakistan
dispute over Kashmir is a longstanding one, difficult to resolve because of religion and history. If a conflict
breaks out, it is not difficult to imagine Kashmir becoming a new theatre for jihad and a fertile ground for
breeding terrorists. But India and Pakistan know that a conflict over Kashmir will have devastating
consequences for each other and the entire South Asian region. The US holds the ring. The desire of both
Islamabad and New Delhi to maintain good relations with the US gives Washington leverage that it
exercised in 2001 to avert a possible nuclear war. North Korea is another potential trouble spot. The
terrorists could try to exploit the situation to acquire materials for WMD. Fortunately, the six-party talks
have lowered tensions and the issue is being managed.
US military option is necessary to deter Jong Il from starting conflict
Goh Chok, Senior Minister of Singapore, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 6-4-2004, Shangti Keynot
Address from the Prime Minister, http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue2005/2004-speech-archive/keynote-address-prime-minister-goh-chok-tong
Whatever their differences, the key actors share a common interest in the peaceful containment of the
issue. I have been told by several leaders who have met Kim Jong Il that he is a rational, well-informed man
who calculates his moves. He must know that an outbreak of conflict with the US will lead to the very
outcome that he fears most: regime change or even the disappearance of North Korea as a sovereign
state. He may go to the brink but not step over the edge. The credibility of the US military option is vital to
maintaining peace.
Military posture is a key variable in determining North Korean aggression – the impact is
short-term conflict
Zalmay Khalilzad et al, Former Professor of Political Science at Columbia and Director of Project Air Force at
RAND, Current US Ambassador to Iraq, 2001, “The United States and Asia,”
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1315/MR1315.sum.pdf
To help shape events in Asia in the interests of ensuring peace and stability, the United States must
successfully manage a number of critical challenges. Among these—the one that must occupy the
immediate attention of the United States—is Korea. The U.S. military posture in Northeast Asia must
continue to deter and defend against North Korea. Over the longer term, however, it is possible that the
North Korean threat will disappear as a result of the political unification of the Korean peninsula, an
accommodation between North and South, or a collapse of the North Korean regime. The June 2000
summit meeting between South Korean president Kim Dae Jung and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il offers
evidence that the political-military situation in Asia may change much more quickly than had once been
thought.
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Heg in Asia
Heg Good – India-Pakistan
Heg solves an India-Pakistan nuclear war.
Goh Chok, Senior Minister of Singapore, International Institute for Strategic Studies. June 4, 2004.
http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2005/2004-speech-archive/keynoteaddress-prime-minister-goh-chok-tong
In Asia, as in Europe, unease with America’s overwhelming global dominance is high. But Asia is more
keenly aware than Europe of the vital role that the US plays in maintaining global stability. No matter
what their misgivings, only a few Asian countries, and certainly no major US ally, opposed the US on Iraq.
There is a clearer appreciation in Asia than in Europe that the fundamental issue in Iraq now is the
credibility and resolve of the US. This is because Asia still faces many serious security challenges. Kashmir,
North Korea and cross-strait relations between Beijing and Taipei are potential flashpoints. If things go
terribly wrong, the conflicts could even turn nuclear. The US is central to the management of all three
potential flashpoints. All three conflicts also have a direct impact on the global struggle against terrorism.
Let me conclude therefore with a few words on each. Potential Flashpoints in Asia The India-Pakistan
dispute over Kashmir is a longstanding one, difficult to resolve because of religion and history. If a conflict
breaks out, it is not difficult to imagine Kashmir becoming a new theatre for jihad and a fertile ground for
breeding terrorists. But India and Pakistan know that a conflict over Kashmir will have devastating
consequences for each other and the entire South Asian region. The US holds the ring. The desire of both
Islamabad and New Delhi to maintain good relations with the US gives Washington leverage that it
exercised in 2001 to avert a possible nuclear war.
The impact is extinction
Ghulam Nabi Fai, Kashmiri American Council, July 8, 2001, Washington Times
The foreign policy of the United States in South Asia should move from the lackadaisical and distant (with
India crowned with a unilateral veto power) to aggressive involvement at the vortex. The most dangerous
place on the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years
and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. It has ignited two wars between the
estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear
winter threatening the entire globe. The United States would enjoy no sanctuary. This apocalyptic vision is
no idiosyncratic view. The director of central intelligence, the Defense Department, and world experts
generally place Kashmir at the peak of their nuclear worries. Both India and Pakistan are racing like
thoroughbreds to bolster their nuclear arsenals and advanced delivery vehicles. Their defense budgets are
climbing despite widespread misery amongst their populations. Neither country has initialed the Nuclear
Non- Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or indicated an inclination to ratify an
impending Fissile Material/Cut-off Convention.
Indo-Pak war kills hundreds of millions – hurts the ozone and kills crops
Alexis Madrigal, Energy Science Tech and Journalist, 4-7-2008, Wired, “Regional Nuclear War Would Cause
Worldwide Destruction,” http://blog.wired.com/wiredscience/2008/04/regional-nuclea.html
Imagine that the long-simmering conflict between India and Pakistan broke out into a war in which each
side deployed 50 nuclear weapons against the other country's megacities . Karachi, Bombay, and dozens of other
South Asian cities catch fire like Hiroshima and Nagasaki did at the end of World War II. Beyond the local human tragedy of
such a situation, a new study looking at the atmospheric chemistry of regional nuclear war finds that the
hot smoke from burning cities would tear holes in the ozone layer of the Earth. The increased UV radiation
resulting from the ozone loss could more than double DNA damage, and increase cancer rates across North America and Eurasia.
"Our research supports that there would be worldwide destruction," said Michael Mills, co-author of the study and a
research scientist at the University of Colorado at Boulder. "It demonstrates that a small-scale regional conflict is
capable of triggering larger ozone losses globally than the ones that were previously predicted for a full-scale nuclear war."
Combined with the climatic impact of a regional nuclear war -- which could reduce crop yields and starve
hundreds of millions -- Mills' modeling shows that the entire globe would feel the repercussions of a hundred nuclear
detonations, a small fraction of just the U.S. stockpile. After decades of Cold War research into the impacts that a full-blown war
between the Soviet Union and the United States would have had on the globe, recent work has focused on regional
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Heg in Asia
nuclear wars, which are seen as more likely than all-out nuclear Armageddon. Incorporating the latest
atmospheric modeling, the scientists are finding that even a small nuclear conflict would wreak havoc on the global environment (.pdf)
-- cooling it twice as much as it's heated over the last century -- and on the structure of the atmosphere itself.
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Heg in Asia
Heg Bad – China – War
Heg causes US china war
Christopher Layne, Professor of International Studies at the University of Miami. 20 07. American Empire: A
Debate. Pg. 75-76
So what should the United States do about China? If the United States persists with its strategy of primacy,
the odds of a Sino—American conflict are high. Current American strategy commits the United States to
maintaining the geopolitical status quo in East Asia, a status quo that reflects American primacy. The United
States’ desire to preserve the status quo, however, clashes with the ambitions of a rising China. As a rising
great power, China has its own ideas about how East Asia’s political and security order should be organized.
Unless U.S. and Chinese interests can be accommodated, the potential for future tension—or worse—
exists. Moreover, as I already have demonstrated, the very fact of American primacy is bound to produce a
geopolitical backlash—with China in the vanguard—in the form of counter-hegemonic balancing.
The impact is global nuclear war
Yossef Bodansky, Senior Editor for Defense & Foreign Affairs' Strategic Policy March, 20 00. “Has Beijing
Resolved To Go To War?”
Under such circumstances, the Haowangjiao article explains, Beijing anticipates the US intervention to
escalate into a nuclear war ultimatum. The PRC is ready for that confrontation as well. For more than 10
years now, the PLA has been working on "a new generation of nuclear weaponry based on a new theory
of nuclear physics" which presently enable the PLA to implement "a step-by-step strategy" in order to
escalate a regional conflict and "threaten America with nuclear war." Among these weapons are "new,
multiple-warhead long-range missiles". At the regional level, the PLA could also strike "US satellites and
military bases in the Pacific". The nuclear war anticipated by the PLA might include "a neutron bomb attack
on Taiwan and a nuclear showdown with the United States. The United States will not sacrifice 200-million
Americans for 20-million Taiwanese." The Haowangjiao article asserted that Beijing might even unilaterally
threaten the United States with a nuclear attack if US troops and presence were not withdrawn from the
straits of Taiwan.
Offshore balancing solves hegemony inspired conflict with China
Christopher Layne, Professor of International Studies at the University of Miami. 20 07. American Empire: A
Debate. Pg. 75-76
Nevertheless, the United States cannot be completely indifferent to China’s rise. The key component of a
new geopolitical approach by the United States would be the adoption of an offshore balancing strategy.
Under this approach, a regional East Asian power balance would become America’s first line of defense
against a rising China and would prevent Beijing from dominating East Asia. The other major powers in
Asia—Japan, Russia, India—have a much more immediate interest in stopping a rising China in their midst
than does the United States, and it is money in the bank that they will step up to the plate and balance
against a powerful, expansionist state in their own neighborhood. It is hardly surprising (indeed, it
parallels in many ways America’s own emergence as a great power) that China—the largest and potentially
most powerful state in Asia—is seeking a more assertive political, military, and economic role in the region,
and even challenging America’s present dominance in East Asia. This poses no direct threat to U.S. security,
however. Doubtless, Japan, India, and Russia (and, perhaps, Korea) may be worried about the implications
of China’s rapid ascendance, because a powerful China potentially would be a direct threat to their security.
This is precisely the point of offshore balancing: because China threatens its neighbors far more than it
threatens the United States, these neighbors—not the United States—should bear the responsibility of
balancing against Chinese power.
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Heg in Asia
Heg Bad – China – Containment Fails
Containment doesn’t prevent aggression – only ensures counterbalancing
Xinbo Wu, Professor @ Center for American Studies and Dean of the School of IR @ Fudan, 2005, “The End of
the Silver Lining: A Chinese View of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance,” CSIS, Scholar
If the alliance opts for engagement and integration, Beijing will likely be willing to live with it and even work
with it on certain issues of common in- terest. For example, the United States and Japan can seek to work
with China to promote peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and ensure the safety of the sea lines of
communication in the western Pacific region. Even on the Taiwan issue, the U.S.-Japanese alliance can play
a constructive role. In the fall of 2003, for example, when Taiwanese leader Chen Shui- bian pushed for a
plebiscite on cross-strait relations in the election cam- paign and sharply raised tensions in the Taiwan
Strait, both Washington and Tokyo urged Chen not to push too far. In the end, the pressure from Beijing,
Washington, and Tokyo helped keep Chen at bay. If the alliance chooses constraint, deterrence, and even
containment, however, China will naturally view it as a major security threat and will en- deavor to
counterbalance it. Efforts to promote a more active Japanese mili- tary posture in order to balance a rising
China and to accelerate U.S.-Japanese involvement in the Taiwan issue are all indicative of this approach.
Current Chinese efforts to strengthen military cooperation with Russia, including the first joint military
exercise between the two countries, held in August 2005, are a reflection of its growing concern over the
U.S.-Japanese alliance.
Containment of China is impossible – other nations won’t bandwagon with the US
Francis Fukuyama, Professor of International Political Economy @ Johns Hopkins, 2005, “Re-envisioning Asia,”
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, Iss. 1
In the meantime, the United States can adopt one of two approaches: either it can seek to isolate China and
mobilize the rest of Asia into a coalition to contain growing Chinese power, or it can try to incorporate
China into a series of international institutions designed to channel Chinese ambitions and elicit cooperation. Despite its
appeal among U.S. conservatives, isolating Beijing is a nonstarter. Even if the United States somehow knew
that China were a long-term strategic threat on a par with the former Soviet Union, no U.S. ally would enlist
in an anti-Chinese coalition any time in the near future. Japan, South Korea, Australia, and ASEAN members
all have complex relationships with China that involve varying degrees of cooperation and conflict; absent
overt Chinese aggression, none is going to be willing to jeopardize those ties.
Attempts at escalation dominance can’t prevent conflict and only ensure reciprocal escalation
Roger Cliff, et al, PhD and Senior China Consultant @ RAND, , Forrest Morgan, Karl Mueller, Evan Medeiros,
Keven Pollpeter, Roger Cliff, 2008, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG614.sum.pdf
Because no nation today can rival U.S. power across the full range of nuclear and conventional military
capabilities, some military and political leaders have concluded that the surest way for U.S. forces to
manage the risks of escalation is to impose escalation dominance on their adversaries. The United States
does, indeed, command a wide range of asymmetric strengths.1 However, cases examined for this study suggest that
escalation dominance is difficult to achieve against a committed adversary, even when the combatant
seeking it enjoys vastly disproportionate strengths. More often, attempts to impose escalation dominance
result in reciprocal escalation, as opponents seek ways to mitigate their enemies’ advantage, prolong the
conflict, and strive for asymmetric strengths of their own. (See pp. 15–17, 34–36.)
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Heg in Asia
Heg Bad – China – Nationalism
Strong US military posturing leads to Chinese nationalism
Stratfor Strategic Forecasting, 11-8-2005, “China’s Obsession with the Zoellick Speech,” Scholar
As Beijing now prepares to tackle the very real problem of internal inequity, it again seeks a respite from U.S.
pressure. China’s leadership has suggested it can only proceed with economic, social and even political reforms
if the United States keeps pressure on China to a minimum. The idea is that “conservative” or “hard-line” forces
are waiting in the wings, seeking an opportunity to undermine Beijing’s new “progressive” policies. Thus, if
U.S. threats and pressures — be they economic, political or military in nature — give these reactionary forces
the opportunity, these forces will curtail the new economic and strategic policies of China’s current
leadership, and perhaps even restore a policy of confrontation instead of cooperation .
Nationalism leads to Asian war
Howard Krawitz, Senior Foreign Service Officer and Distinguished Visiting Research Fellow @ Institute for
National Strategic Studies, 2003, “Modernizing China's Military: A High-Stakes Gamble?,” Strategic Forum, 204,
December, Scholar
The aftereffects of major changes in the historic social contract remain a large and potentially dangerous
unknown. Conceivably, substantive change could create conditions leading to political competition between
civilian and military authorities or wrangling over limited resources. It might promote within the PLA itself a
rise in divisive issues similar to those now plaguing Chinese society in general as a result of two decades of uneven economic reform: intensified urban-rural
distinctions, rifts between haves and have-nots, and increasing divisions between the educated and uneducated, the privileged and unprivileged. For the PLA parent entity, the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), modernization represents a double-edged sword. It promises the party a more effective mechanism for maintaining domestic primacy and
enhancing international prestige. Conversely, the modernization process could equally well create a military increasingly unwilling to be seen as a tool for enforcing party dicta or
The PLA could evolve into a national military with loyalties to the
state as a whole rather than to one specific political element within the state (the CCP), as is the case today. Or the
policing internal security--in effect, working against party interests.
PLA itself could even develop into a distinct political element, brokering power and seeking organizational advantage at other political
entities' expense. Changes wrought through PLA attempts to carry out a revolution in military affairs have
potentially far-reaching implications for the Asia-Pacific region and especially for U.S. security interests. A more
professional PLA could become a safer, less insular military that is cognizant of the need for disciplined action and measured responses, bound by well-understood rules of
enhanced
capability and self-confidence will encourage the PLA to evolve into an aggressive, nationalistic entity fueled
by a radical Chinese militarism that encourages risk-taking and adventurism, both in the region and in
dealings with the United States. In a worst-case domestic scenario--unlikely but not inconceivable--PLA factions could
end up vying for power. The resulting chaos could easily produce a dangerous state of instability, if not
outright anarchy, that would threaten all of Asia.
engagement and, overall, a more potent force for preserving regional stability. But a darker version of this picture also exists: the distinct possibility that
Threats to the CCP cause WMD use
San Renxing, 8-8-2005, “The CCP’s Last-ditch Gamble: Biological and Nuclear War,”
http://english.epochtimes.com/news/5-8-8/30931.html.
Since the Party’s life is “above all else,” it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological, chemical,
and nuclear weapons in its attempt to extend its life. The CCP, which disregards human life, would not hesitate
to kill two hundred million Americans, along with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. These
speeches let the public see the CCP for what it really is. With evil filling its every cell the CCP intends to wage a war against humankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. That
is the main theme of the speeches. This theme is murderous and utterly evil. In China we have seen beggars who coerced people to give them money by threatening to stab
we have never, until now, seen such a gangster who would use
biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons to threaten the world , that all will die together with him. This bloody
confession has confirmed the CCP’s nature: that of a monstrous murderer who has killed 80 million Chinese people
and who now plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives.
themselves with knives or pierce their throats with long nails. But
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Heg in Asia
Heg Bad – China – Relations
Containment collapses US-China relations
James Dorn, Vice President at Cato for International Affairs, Professor of Economics at Towson University in
Maryland, 2005, “How to Improve US-China Relations in the Wake of CNOOC” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis,
Vol XVII No 3
Yes, U.S.- China relations are “complex,” but they have always been so. Allowing Congress to steer those
relations only adds to the uncertainty and complexity. The United States needs a firm commitment to
engagement, and China needs to adhere to “peaceful development.” Little will be gained by constantly treating China
as a threat, on the basis of presumed intentions. At the same time, we must not underestimate the willingness of hardliners in the
Chinese Communist Party—who have little regard for the rule of law and want to retain their monopoly on power—to revert to
military means to achieve their ends, especially in the case of Taiwan. Consequently, we need to be realistic and cautious,
but not unreasonable. The administration appears to be moving in that direction. In a pathbreaking speech to the National
Committee on U.S.-China Relations in New York on September 21, Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick avoided confrontation
and instead called upon the PRC “to become a responsible stakeholder in the international system.”40 At the same time, the United
States must recognize that China is a rising normal power and will pursue its own interests. As Liu Jianfei, a journalist with the China
Daily, recently wrote: “Currently the biggest obstacle in Sino-U.S. ties comes from misgivings held by some
Americans toward China and their Cold War mentality. If such an outdated view is overcome, the two
nations can build a strategic mutual trust and open new cooperation in the future.”41
Treating China as a threat prevents cooperation on important global issues
James Dorn, Vice President at Cato for International Affairs, Professor of Economics at Towson University in
Maryland, 2005, “How to Improve US-China Relations in the Wake of CNOOC” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis,
Vol XVII No 3
It is a grave mistake to use the national security card to deny Chinese firms the right to purchase natural
resources in the open market when there is no credible security risk. Beijing will view such behavior as yet
another attempt by the United States to widen its power at the expense of China’s development, further
increasing anti-American sentiment. China’s thirst for oil and natural gas has driven world demand upward and increased
prices, and that trend is likely to continue. Over time, production and consumption will respond to higher prices as producers search
for new supplies and consumers conserve and switch to cheaper alternatives. If the U.S. government interferes with the
market process, future production will suffer, and U.S. energy companies will find it more difficult to
operate in foreign countries.
Hard-line policies create a self-fulfilling prophecy – collapse relations
Leon Hadar, Scholar @ CATO, 1996, “The Sweet-and-Sour Sino-American Relationship,” CATO Policy Analysis,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-248.html
Hard-line U.S. policies based on the assumption that China poses a strategic, economic, and cultural threat
could create a tragic, self-fulfilling prophecy. The military threat is exaggerated; although China is modernizing its
antiquated forces, military spending remains relatively modest, and Beijing's strategic policies (while sometimes troubling) do
not pose a credible threat to America's security. The notion that China represents an economic or cultural
threat misconstrues the complex roles of trade and culture.
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Heg in Asia
Heg Bad – China – A2: Modernization
Heg doesn’t solve Chinese modernization – too engrained in Chinese doctrine and psyche
Patrick O’Donogue, MA in National Strategy, 2000, TMD in Japan: Implications for the US-China-Japan Strategic
Relationship, Strategic Studies Institute, Scholar
The fourth option calls for no deployment of TMD at all. Proponents stress that this would obviate the Chinese
arguments about arms control and nonproliferation and put real pressure on Beijing to be genuinely
transparent about missile development and deployment. Reconsideration of deployment might also open up an
opportunity to exploit Chinese concerns and encourage Beijing to participate in a formal trilateral security dialogue. In contrast,
the very real and more likely possibility envisions continued Chinese obfuscation on its military affairs. The
overwhelming desire to build, deploy, and maintain the military trappings of a “great power” remains so
engrained in the Chinese leadership’s psyche that any risky attempt at placating Chinese fears with genuine
measures of conciliation would more than likely be fruitless. Given the Taiwan problem and overwhelming
superiority of U.S. military power, China shows the deep-seated desire to develop its missile capability to a
significant degree regardless of U.S.-Japan TMD cooperation.
Change in US posture doesn’t changes China’s strategic motivations
Aaron Friedberg, professor of international affairs @ Princeton, 2009, National Interest,
http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22022
This willful blindness is often closely related to the misleading claim that “if we treat China like an enemy, it
will become one.” Even if this statement is true, it does not follow that its obverse is as well. Despite
America’s fervent embrace in recent years, China’s leaders have shown no inclination whatsoever to slow
their military buildup. They clearly regard the United States as both an economic partner and a strategic competitor. Beijing
has somehow managed to hold these two seemingly contradictory ideas in its collective head for decades
now. If they do not wish to find themselves pushed to the margins in Asia, Americans will have to learn to
do the same.
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Heg in Asia
Heg Bad – Japan
Forward presence in Japan only risks antagonization and US involvement in Asian conflicts
Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, 1997, “Toward
a New Relationship With Japan,” CATO Handbook for Congress, pg. np
The United States has some important East Asian interests and cannot be indifferent to the region's fate.
No reasonable person would suggest that the United States withdraw its forces to Seattle and San Diego
and adopt a Fortress America strategy. But having some interests in the region and being willing to make
a contribution to its stability are a far cry from volunteering to be point man in every crisis. America can
still protect its core interests with a significantly reduced military presence based in Guam, Wake,
Midway, and other locations in the central and west-central Pacific. There is no need to have large
numbers of forward-deployed forces, much less units to serve as automatic tripwires if even a minor
conflict erupts. The United States should be the balancer of last resort, not the intervenor of first resort,
in East Asia's security equation. And the most crucial step in adopting that strategy is to devolve primary
regional security responsibilities to Japan, the region's leading power.
Japanese military basing is strategically unhelpful for war-fighting. They increase
vulnerability
Carlton Meyer, former Marine Corps officer who participated in military operations around the world, 2009,
“Outdated U.S. Military Bases in Japan,” http://www.g2mil.com/Japan-bases.htm
Keeping military families, aircraft, and ships permanently based in Japan is not only extremely expensive,
it is strategically unwise. The USA maintained dozens of aircraft at Clark Field in the Philippines in 1941 to
deter a Japanese attack. They provided an easy target for a surprise attack and all aircraft were destroyed
on the ground. The defense of the Philippines was poorly organized as a key concern for American officers
was the evacuation of military families. The same problem exists today in the unlikely event that war
erupts with North Korea, China, or Russia. Dozens of American aircraft and thousands of American lives
may be lost to surprise missile, bomber, or commando attacks, while officers are distracted with family
concerns. While American servicemen are brave, many would abandon their post after an attack to
ensure the welfare of their family. An attack on Japan may cause panic, and Admirals would face
problems of sailors refusing to abandon their family to set sail. The Navy would be anxious to move its
ships out of port to slip past lurking enemy submarines to the safety of bases in the central Pacific. From a
military standpoint, it is far better to base ships, aircraft, and families far from the Asian mainland.
Decreased United States military presence in Japan is key to US-Japanese relations
Eric Talmadge, writer for the Associated Press, 06-22-2010, “US-Japan security pact turns 50, faces new strains”
Businessweek http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9GG68080.htm
But while the alliance is one of the strongest Washington has anywhere in the world, it has come under
intense pressure lately over a plan to make sweeping reforms that would pull back roughly 8,600
Marines from Okinawa to the U.S. Pacific territory of Guam. The move was conceived in
response to opposition on Okinawa to the large U.S. military presence there -- more than half of
the U.S. troops in Japan are on Okinawa, which was one of the bloodiest battlefields of World War II.
Though welcomed by many at first, the relocation plan has led to renewed Okinawan protests over
the U.S. insistence it cannot be carried out unless a new base is built on Okinawa to replace one
that has been set for closing for more than a decade. A widening rift between Washington and Tokyo
over the future of the Futenma Marine Corps Air Station was a major factor in the resignation
of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama earlier this month. It could well plague Kan as well.
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Heg in Asia
Heg Bad – South Korea
The containment of North Korea acts as a constructed threat that makes pre-emptive military
conflict inevitable
Oliver Richmond, professor in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at
the University of St. Andrews, 2007 The Transformation of Peace, pg. 11
The debate about 'just war' - a phrasal formulation that has been generally accepted without criticism
despite its antithetical nature - provides a further strand from which an understanding of peace can be
identified. This debate has found its most convincing explanation in Michael Walzer's Legalist Paradigm. 31
In this framework Walzer lays out a construction of war that may be used to create or maintain a just
peace. This is mainly aimed at the protection of the norms of sover- eignty and self-determination. The
Legalist Paradigm revolves around the existence of an international society of independent states based
upon an international law that protects the territorial integrity, sover- eignty and self-determination rights
of its members. Any use of force that poses a threat to this is therefore, illegal. Aggression justifies wars of
self-defence and a war of law enforcement. This builds upon the notions of international society found in
the UN Charter, the London Charter of 1945, which established the Nuremburg Tribunal, and the KellogBriand Pact of 1928. It reflects an international system in which security and peace revolve around states
and their inhabitants and the moral discourses therein. Difficulties clearly emerge for this paradigm
once applied to phenomena of war and conflict which fall beyond its inherent predication upon statecentricity, challenges exist- ing states, their boundaries, and their supposed Weberian control of the
means of violence. However, Walzer is clear that his concern lies more with political communities rather
than states, perhaps reflecting this contemporary shift in the various phenomena of violence. This
approach to maintaining order makes the classic move associated with both realist and liberal thought of
empowering states with the protec- tion of political communities despite the fact that it is often states
and their nationalist elites that are in conflict with local or transnational political communities. Walzer's'
later amendments to the Legalist Paradigm moves some way to recognising these problems. 35 In these he
outlines a doctrine of pre-emptive war that allows states to respond to threatened attacks, in which
boundaries may contain more than one political community, in which secessionism or irredentism may
require intervention or even a counter-intervention, and in which the violation of human rights may
possibly justify intervention.
Hegemony is counterproductive in North Korea – withdrawal of US troops is more likely to
promote successful peace talks
Carlton Meyer, former Marine Corps officer who participated in military operations around the world, 2003,
“The Mythical North Korean Threat,” http://www.g2mil.com/korea.htm
Chinese participation is extremely unlikely since China is busy with its free enterprise transformation
while ensuring domestic tranquility. In fact, stopping thousands of starving North Korean refugees from
crossing their border has become a major problem, although the Chinese refuse to spend any of their
billions of dollars in US trade surpluses to purchase food for their old ally. Korea has no natural resources
which interest China, and Chinese support would cause a major war with powerful South Korea, the United
States, and probably Japan and Taiwan. On the other hand, a prosperous Korea provides a buffer against
China’s traditional enemy - Japan. The US Army must adapt to the end of the Cold War in Asia and stop
wasting millions of dollars on new military construction projects in Korea. Second, the North Koreans have
stated that the 37,000 American troops must go before peace talks can progress. (Imagine how
South Korea would feel if 37,000 Russian troops were based in North Korea.) Many South Koreans know
that American troops are no longer needed and anti-American base protests are common.
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Heg in Asia
Heg Bad – South Korea – Oppression
US military presence in South Korea is based on dominance and exploitation – re-establishing
Korean sovereignty is necessary to end identity sub-ordination
Gwyn Kirk, Associate Professor of Women and Gender Studies, 3/14/2008, “Gender and U.S. Bases in AsiaPacific,” Foreign Policy In Focus, http://www.fpif.org/articles/gender_and_us_bases_in_asia-pacific
The power dynamics of militarism in the Asia-Pacific region rely on dominance and subordination. These
hierarchical relationships, shaped by gender, can be seen in U.S. military exploitation of host
communities, its abuse and contamination of land and water, and the exploitation of women and
children through the sex industry, sexual violence, and rape. Women’s bodies, the land, and indigenous
communities are all feminized, treated as dispensable and temporary. What is constructed as “civilized,
white, male, western, and rational” is held superior to what is defined as “primitive, non-white, female,
non-western, and irrational.” Nations and U.S. territories within the Asia-Pacific region are treated as
inferiors with limited sovereignty or agency in relation to U.S. foreign policy interests that go hand-inhand with this racist/sexist ideology. The imbalance of power in gender relations in and around bases is
mirrored at the alliance level as well. The United States controls Hawai’i through statehood; Guam is a
colonial territory; and the United States is the dominant partner in alliances with Japan, South Korea, and
the Philippines. The expansion and restructuring of U.S. bases and military operations in the region
depend on these imbalances of power, which are rooted in histories of annexation, colonization,
exploitation, and war.
The US military has committed over 100,000 crimes – these crimes, often gendered in nature,
have been hidden by the US military to prevent Korean punishment
International Action Center, 6/23/2001, Statistics on Crimes Committed by US Troops in south Korea,
Korean International War Crimes Tribunal, http://www.iacenter.org/Koreafiles/ktc-civilnetwork.htm
Crimes committed by US soldiers were found as early as when US troops were first stationed in south
Korea. According to the south Korean government's official statistics, 50,082 crimes were committed by
US soldiers from 1967 to 1998 (including those by soldiers' families), and 56,904 US soldiers were involved
(including soldiers' families) in these crimes. The statistics imply that the actual figure may be higher if
take into account those cases not handled by the south Korean police. Based on the statistics, the total
number of crimes committed by US soldiers since September 8, 1945 (when they were first stationed in
Korea) is estimated to be around 100,000. Unfortunately the south Korean government does not have
statistics on US soldiers' crimes committed before 1967, because SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement) went
into effect in 1967, allowing the south Korean court jurisdiction over crimes committed by US soldiers with
narrow and limited application. So, from 1945 to 1967, the US had full authority in court. south Koreans
were even subjected to American rulings (of course, in English language). And during 1945-1948, when the
US military government took control over the south Korean government, a judge was an active US
soldier, with no jury system although the court followed American court system. Many problems aroused
including language barrier, lack of cultural understanding and even prejudice on the part of the judge,
unfair practices on the part of interpreters. Study by Ministry of Justice of south Korea shows that among
the 39,452 cases (45,183 US soldiers involved) of crimes committed by US soldiers from 1967 to 1987,
south Korea was able to exercise its jurisdiction only in 234 cases, punishing only 351 US soldiers. Among
them, 84 US soldiers were convicted of rape and 89 US soldiers were convicted of murder and robbery.
Taking into account the fact that rape cases were more common before 1967, and that many rape cases
were intentionally hidden and forgotten, the actual number of rape cases committed by US soldiers will
be much higher than what official figures suggest.
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Heg in Asia
Heg Bad – South Korea – Colonialism
The claim that these forces are “necessary to solve violence” white-washes horrific statesponsored violence of everyday life – this makes all impacts inevitable
Chris Cuomo, Ph.D @ University of Wisconsin, Madison Department of Philosophy, 1996, “War Is Not Just an
Event: Reflections on the Significance of Everyday Violence,” Hypatia, pg. 30
Seeing war as necessarily embedded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that
horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over, all of the time, and that it is perpetrated
by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state. Moving away from crisis-driven politics
and ontologies concerning war and military violence also enables consideration of relationships among
seemingly disparate phenomena, and therefore can shape more nuanced theoretical and practical forms
of resistance. For example, investigating the ways in which war is part of a presence allows consideration
of the relationships among the events of war and the following: how militarism is a foundational trope in
the social and political imagination; how the pervasive presence and symbolism of
soldiers/warriors/patriots shape meanings of gender; the ways in which threats of state-sponsored
violence are a sometimes invisible/sometimes bold agent of racism, nationalism, and corporate interests;
the fact that vast numbers of communities, cities, and nations are currently in the midst of excruciatingly
violent circumstances. It also provides a lens for considering the relationships among the various kinds of
violence that get labeled "war." Given current American obsessions with nationalism, guns, and militias, and
growing hunger for the death penalty, prisons, and a more powerful police state, one cannot underestimate
the need for philosophical and political attention to connections among phenomena like the "war on
drugs," the "war on crime," and other state-funded militaristic campaigns. I propose that the constancy
of militarism and its effects on social reality be reintroduced as a crucial locus of contemporary feminist
attentions, and that feminists emphasize how wars are eruptions and manifestations of omnipresent
militarism that is a product and tool of multiply oppressive, corporate, technocratic states.
Structural violence massively outweighs a military conflict
Dietrich Fischer, Director, European University Center for Peace, 2002, “Twenty Questions for Peace
Economics,” http://www.aug.edu/~sbajmb/paper-DPE.PDF
Galtung coined the notion of “structural violence” (as opposed to direct violence) for social conditions
that cause avoidable human suffering and death, even if there is no specific actor committing the
violence. Köhler and Alcock (1976) have estimated that structural violence causes about one hundred
times as many deaths each year as all international and civil wars combined. It is as if over 200 Hiroshima
bombs were dropped each year on the children of the world, but the media fail to report it because it is
less dramatic than a bomb explosion.
This is specifically true in South Korea – it’s the preparation for war that has devastated
communities
Gwyn Kirk, Associate Professor of Women and Gender Studies, 3/14/2008, “Gender and U.S. Bases in AsiaPacific,” Foreign Policy In Focus, http://www.fpif.org/articles/gender_and_us_bases_in_asia-pacific
Violence against women recurs around U.S. bases in Asia. A particularly brutal rape and murder of a
Korean woman in 1992 led to street demonstrations in Seoul and the formation of a new organization,
the National Campaign for the Eradication of Crime by U.S. Troops in Korea, to document crimes and help
victims claim redress. Activists in Guam are justifiably concerned that such violence will rise in their
communities with the proposed increase in U.S. Marines stationed there. Military personnel are trained to
dehumanize “others” as part of their preparation for war. Their aggressiveness, frustration, and fear spill
over into local communities, for example in acts of violence against girls and women. Although most U.S.
troops do not commit such violations, these incidents happen far too often to be accepted as aberrations.
Racist and sexist stereotypes about Asian women – as exotic, accommodating, and sexually compliant –
are an integral part of such violence. These crimes inflame local hostility and resistance to U.S. military
bases and operations, and have long-lasting effects on victims/survivors. Cases are seriously
underreported due to women’s shame and fear or their belief that perpetrators will not be apprehended.
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Heg in Asia
Heg Bad – A2: South Korea
US troops in South Korea aren’t necessary to deter China
Doug Bandow, senior fellow at The Cato Institute and adjunct scholar for The Future of Freedom Foundation, 21-2003, “Ending the Anachronistic Korean Commitment, Part 2,” http://www.fff.org/freedom/fd0303e.asp
Of course, some people back the U.S. presence in Korea for what Avery Goldstein, director of the Foreign
Policy Research Institute’s Asia Program, calls “dual-use” purposes. That is, North Korea provides a
convenient pretext to maintain troops actually directed at other purposes — containing China,
restraining Japan, and maintaining regional stability. Alas for supporters of American involvement,
Goldstein worries that “rapprochement on the Korean peninsula will eliminate this line of argument and
require the U.S. and its allies, including Japan, to offer new justifications for their post-Cold War military
postures.” Imagine, peace breaking out and ruining the argument for continued U.S. occupation! Poor
Washington. The “dual-use” arguments are outmoded, however. Whatever the future course of ChineseU.S. relations, and Beijing is not an inevitable enemy, the forces in Korea (especially the lone Army
division) would be of little use, since America would hardly be so foolish as to fight a ground war against
China.
US presence in Korea is ineffective
Doug Bandow, senior fellow at The Cato Institute and adjunct scholar for The Future of Freedom Foundation, 21-2003, “Ending the Anachronistic Korean Commitment, Part 2,” http://www.fff.org/freedom/fd0303e.asp
Moreover, Japan is not about to embark upon another imperialist rampage. Finally, the greatest threats
to regional stability are internal — Muslim insurgency and political chaos in the Philippines; democratic
protests and ethnic conflict in Burma; economic, ethnic, nationalistic, and religious division in Indonesia.
There is little that U.S. forces stationed in Korea could do to solve any of these problems even if the
American people had the slightest interest in Washington’s getting involved in such irrelevant troubles.
Other bases in the region check a vacuum of power
Carlton Meyer, former Marine Corps officer who participated in military operations around the world, 2003,
“The Mythical North Korean Threat,” http://www.g2mil.com/korea.htm
It may take many years for the two Koreas to unite, meanwhile the USA can contribute to peace and save
billions of dollars by starting a withdrawal of forces. The US Army can increase its ability to deploy
expeditionary forces in Asia by cutting infrastructure in Korea and forming a solid division at Fort
Lewis. The USA already has a huge logistical infrastructure in Japan, Hawaii and Guam, it doesn't need
bases in Korea. American forces should continue to train with South Korea, but the $5 billion a year
military base subsidy to South Korea must end. Unfortunately, lying about the Korean situation has
become a cornerstone of the Pentagon's effort to boost military spending beyond Cold War levels.
US forces aren’t necessary to deter North Korea or peace in Asia, they are a Cold War artifact
Doug Bandow, senior fellow at The Cato Institute and adjunct scholar for The Future of Freedom Foundation, 21-2003, “Ending the Anachronistic Korean Commitment, Part 1,” http://www.fff.org/freedom/fd0302e.asp
The presence of 37,000 troops in South Korea is a Cold War artifact, resulting from the post-World War II
division of the peninsula and subsequent Chinese and Soviet support for North Korean aggression. Today
the Cold War is over and China and Russia are friendlier with Seoul than with Pyongyang. Moreover, the
South has raced ahead of the North, enjoying 40 times the GDP, twice the population, and a vast
technological edge. The DPRK’s military is large, but decrepit. To the extent that the ROK’s military still
lags behind that of its northern antagonist, it is a matter of choice, not necessity. Although no U.S. forces
are needed to guard against the bankrupt North, they are ubiquitous in South Korea, with some based in
downtown Seoul. Thus occur purposeless violent altercations and tragic traffic deaths. After the acquittal
in military court of two soldiers charged in the accidental deaths of two children, demonstrations
erupted. Americans have been barred from restaurants, jeered, and in a few cases physically attacked.
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Asia Impacts – Regional War
Asian war goes nuclear
Michael May, Engineering-Economic Systems at Stanford, 1997, Washington Quarterly, pg. np
The unpalatable facts, to Europeans and North Americans, are that Asia has about half of the world's
people, that it is growing faster than other parts of the world, and that, by mid-century, it will probably
have more than half the population of the developed world and more than half of its money. Energy
consumption, economic influence, and military power will be distributed in proportion. That is the rosy
scenario. The dark scenario is that of a war that would, in all likelihood -- because nuclear weapons can be
procured and deployed by any of these countries at a fraction of the cost of peaceful development --leave
most of the civilized world devastated.
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Heg in Asia
Asia Impacts – China/Taiwan War
China-Taiwan war is the most probable impact
Columbia University Press, 2005, “Dangerous Strait,” http://cup.columbia.edu/book/978-0-231-135641/dangerous-strait
Today the most dangerous place on earth is arguably the Taiwan Strait, where a war between the United
States and China could erupt out of miscalculation, misunderstanding, or accident. How and to what degree Taiwan
pursues its own national identity will have profound ramifications in its relationship with China as well as in
relations between China and the United States. Events late in 2004 demonstrated the volatility of the situation, as
Taiwan's legislative elections unexpectedly preserved a slim majority for supporters of closer relations with China. Beijing,
nevertheless, threatened to pass an anti-secession law, apt to revitalize pro-independence forces in Taiwan—and make war more
likely. Taking change as a central theme, these essays by prominent scholars and practitioners in the arena of U.S.-Taiwan-Chinese
relations combine historical context with timely analysis of an accelerating crisis. The book clarifies historical developments, examines
myths about past and present policies, and assesses issues facing contemporary policymakers. Moving beyond simplistic explanations
that dominate discussion about the U.S.-Taiwan-China relationship, Dangerous Strait challenges common wisdom and
approaches the political, economic, and strategic aspects of the cross-Strait situation anew. The result is a
collection that provides fresh and much-needed insights into a complex problem and examines the ways in which catastrophe can be
avoided.
US will be drawn in
Robert E Kelly, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science & Diplomacy, Pusan National University, 1218-2009, “Should the US Pull Out of South Korea (2): No,” Asian Security Blog,
http://asiansecurityblog.wordpress.com/2009/12/18/should-the-us-pull-out-of-south-korea-2-no/
If we leave, everyone in Asia will read it as a sign that we are weak and that we are leaving Asia generally.
Yes, this is the credibility argument straight out of the Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan debates. But the
world sees US power today as wavering; we are the tottering giant, especially in Asia. If we leave during the
GWoT, that image will be confirmed, and the Chinese will push hard in Asia. A US departure will touch off
an arms race as regional uncertainty rises. Asia is not where Europe or Latin America are in terms of regional amity. The
US presence is more needed in this region, and it earns the US the friendship of the local democracies. It is hard to see
how a spiraling arms race, as Japan and China openly start competing for regional leadership, plus perhaps
India and China, would help the US. The US could very well be pulled back in later. A US departure from
Korea (and Japan next?) will be read as a clear victory for China in the Sino-US regional competition.
Conflict draws in the US and goes nuclear
Brad Roberts, PhD, Inst. For Defense Analysis, Ashley J. Tellis, senior associate @ Carnegie, and Michael
Swaine, China expert @ Carnegie, 1-26-2005, “The Nuclear Dimension of a Taiwan Crisis,” Carnegie
Endowment, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=740
With U.S. credibility as a security guarantor on the line and with potentially strong domestic pressure for
the U.S. to retaliate, the willingness of U.S. leadership to counter a Chinese nuclear attack could be higher
than what Beijing might expect. But the surprises and miscalculations might not all be on China’s side. The United States
may be surprised by China’s willingness to demonstrate its resolve and pay a high price by prolonging and
exploiting the crisis situation. The United States might also be caught off-guard by China’s likely perception
of an American attack on its command-control capacity as an assault on the regime itself. Finally, the U.S.
may also miscalculate by discounting Taiwan as an independent actor, which could undertake its own acts
of escalation or even choose to quit the conflict even as the U.S. seeks to continue . Roberts concluded his remarks by noting
that the actual risks of a war across the Taiwan Strait, the risks of a nuclear escalation in such a war, and the risks of tit-for-tat nuclear exchange in such a war may all, as
Taiwan remains one of the very few flashpoints between two important powers
that may have a potential nuclear dimension. Ultimately, this fact, along with the very real possibilities of miscalculations and
conventional wisdom holds, be low. But
unexpected behavior, underscores the importance of further.
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Heg in Asia
Asia Impacts – China/Taiwan War
Taiwan war goes nuclear
Jay Taylor, Former Dir of State Dept Analysis, 2002, “Bush Scraps China Policy of Six Presidents,” LA Times
They could be wrong, however. At some point, the Chinese people could feel so strongly about what they
would see as the final violation of the unity of China that they would be willing to go to war. The
revisionists, and those in the upper echelon of the Bush administration who apparently support them,
notably Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, no doubt have thought this
war scenario through. They realize that with only 2% of the mainland's population, no matter how many F16s, submarines, or anti-missile missiles we sell Taiwan, the island would not likely prevail in a prolonged
conflict with China. A Chinese blockade, which few nations would challenge, could quickly devastate the
Taiwan economy. Furthermore, the hawks understand that if the United States intervened in such a
conflict, regardless of how many thousands of smart bombs it rained down on the mainland, China might
outlast the patience of the American people. That brings up the administration's Nuclear Posture Review,
which, for the first time, declared that the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons should take into account
the possibility of a nuclear war with China "over Taiwan. " In other words, to maintain a potential strategic
offshore base for use in a hypothetical conflict with China, we may have to fight a nuclear war with
China. This would be "a self-fulfilling prophecy" of biblical proportions.
It’s the most likely scenario
Chalmers Johnson, President of the Japan Policy Research Institute, 5-14-2001, “Time to Bring the Troops
Home,” The Nation, http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20010514&c=1&s=johnson
China is another matter. No sane figure in the Pentagon wants a war with China, and all serious US militarists
know that China's minuscule nuclear capacity is not offensive but a deterrent against the overwhelming US
power arrayed against it (twenty archaic Chinese warheads versus more than 7,000 US warheads). Taiwan, whose status
constitutes the still incomplete last act of the Chinese civil war, remains the most dangerous place on earth . Much as the
1914 assassination of the Austrian crown prince in Sarajevo led to a war that no one wanted, a misstep in Taiwan by any
side could bring the United Statesand China into a conflict that neither wants. Such a war would bankrupt
the United States, deeply divide Japan and probably end in a Chinese victory, given that China is the world's
most populous country and would be defending itself against a foreign aggressor. More seriously, it could
easily escalate into a nuclear holocaust.
Impossible to control China-Taiwan escalation
Michael D. Swaine, Senior Associate and Co-Director of the China Program @ Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2004, “Trouble in Taiwan”, Foreign Affairs, Scholar
A war with China over Taiwan would, of course, be far more dangerous than any of the United States' postCold War operations. Although not a match for the United States, China is nonetheless a continental power with very
large conventional ground, naval, and air forces, as well as a nuclear weapons arsenal capable of reaching
any target in the United States and beyond. Taiwan's proximity to China, the difficulty involved in
interdicting Chinese attacks without directly striking the Chinese mainland, and the historical inclination of
both sides to display resolve in a crisis through decisive -- and sometimes rapid -- military action suggest
that escalation might prove extremely difficult to control.
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Heg in Asia
Asia Impacts – China/Taiwan War
China-Taiwan war leads to Extinction
Ching Cheong, “No One Gains in War Over Taiwan”, 6-25-2000, Straits Times
THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and
China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a
full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near
and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan
privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China
as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines
and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the
conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world
order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of
power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India
and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a fullscale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US
Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using
nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal
account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy,
Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which
could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China
long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50
years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear
warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option.
A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use"
principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded
Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in
Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from
the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the
country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that
come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While
the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out
entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.
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Asia Impacts – Korea War
War on the Korean peninsula leads to extinction
Africa News, 10-25-1999, “Third World War: Watcth the Koreas,” pg. np
If there is one place today where the much-dreaded Third World War could easily erupt and probably
reduce earth to a huge smouldering cinder it is the Korean Peninsula in Far East Asia. Ever since the end of
the savage three-year Korean war in the early 1950s, military tension between the hard-line communist
north and the American backed South Korea has remained dangerously high. In fact the Koreas are
technically still at war. A foreign visitor to either Pyongyong in the North or Seoul in South Korea will quickly
notice that the divided country is always on maximum alert for any eventuality. North Korea or the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has never forgiven the US for coming to the aid of South
Korea during the Korean war. She still regards the US as an occupation force in South Korea and wholly to
blame for the non-reunification of the country. North Korean media constantly churns out a tirade of
attacks on "imperialist" America and its "running dog" South Korea. The DPRK is one of the most secretive
countries in the world where a visitor is given the impression that the people's hatred for the US is absolute
while the love for their government is total. Whether this is really so, it is extremely difficult to conclude. In
the DPRK, a visitor is never given a chance to speak to ordinary Koreans about the politics of their country.
No visitor moves around alone without government escort. The American government argues that its
presence in South Korea was because of the constant danger of an invasion from the north. America has
vast economic interests in South Korea. She points out that the north has dug numerous tunnels along the
demilitarised zone as part of the invasion plans. She also accuses the north of violating South Korean
territorial waters. Early this year, a small North Korean submarine was caught in South Korean waters after
getting entangled in fishing nets. Both the Americans and South Koreans claim the submarine was on a
military spying mission. However, the intension of the alleged intrusion will probably never be known
because the craft's crew were all found with fatal gunshot wounds to their heads in what has been
described as suicide pact to hide the truth of the mission. The US mistrust of the north's intentions is so
deep that it is no secret that today Washington has the largest concentration of soldiers and weaponry of
all descriptions in south Korea than anywhere else in the World, apart from America itself. Some of the
armada that was deployed in the recent bombing of Iraq and in Operation Desert Storm against the same
country following its invasion of Kuwait was from the fleet permanently stationed on the Korean Peninsula.
It is true too that at the moment the North/South Korean border is the most fortified in the world. The
border line is littered with anti-tank and anti-personnel landmines, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air
missiles and is constantly patrolled by warplanes from both sides. It is common knowledge that America
also keeps an eye on any military movement or build-up in the north through spy satellites. The DPRK is said
to have an estimated one million soldiers and a huge arsenal of various weapons. Although the DPRK
regards herself as a developing country, she can however be classified as a super-power in terms of military
might. The DPRK is capable of producing medium and long-range missiles. Last year, for example, she testfired a medium range missile over Japan, an action that greatly shook and alarmed the US, Japan and South
Korea. The DPRK says the projectile was a satellite. There have also been fears that she was planning to test
another ballistic missile capable of reaching North America. Naturally, the world is anxious that military
tension on the Korean Peninsula must be defused to avoid an apocalypse on earth. It is therefore
significant that the American government announced a few days ago that it was moving towards
normalising relations with North Korea.
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Asia Impacts – North Korea – Bioweapons
North Korea is a threat – they are actively pursuing biological weapons
Simon Cooper, Staff, 2-2007, “North Korea's Biochemical Threat, Popular Mechanics,” pg. np
But, according to intelligence reports, something precious to the North Korean regime may be under
cultivation in Chongju. Beyond the shacks stands an installation suspected of being a component in North
Korea's bioweapons (BW) research and development program. The effort is steeped in a level of secrecy
possible only in a totalitarian state, but it is thought to encompass at least 20 facilities throughout the
country. Another 12 plants churn out chemical weapons. In late November, delegates of the signatory
countries to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) met at the United Nations office in
Geneva for the sixth review of the treaty since its inception in 1972. The meeting took place just weeks
after North Korea publicly added the third prong to its capacity for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by
testing a nuclear device. On day one, the U.S. delegate, Assistant Secretary of State John C. Rood, charged
North Korea, along with Iran and Syria, with violating the ban on researching and developing biology for
war. "We have particular concerns with the activities of North Korea ... in the biological weapons context,
but also because of their ... support for terrorism and their lack of compliance with international
obligations," Rood said. Internationally, it is widely agreed that the country is aggressively developing
several weapons of mass destruction.
North Korea can grow several biological agents that risk mass casualties
Simon Cooper, Staff, 2-2007, “North Korea's Biochemical Threat, Popular Mechanics,” pg. np
Intelligence reports from the United States and South Korea list anthrax, smallpox, pneumonic plague,
cholera and botulism toxins as leading components of North Korea's bioweapons projects. "Information
from U.S. government sources indicates that North Korea is capable of growing several biological agents,"
says Michael Stebbins, head of Biology Policy at the Federation of American Scientists. And, he says, the
country "has the infrastructure to weaponize them." Anthrax is believed to be one of North Korea's
most fully developed biological weapons. Growing anthrax on a large scale is relatively easy: It can be done
with basic brewing equipment. Sources indicate that North Korea also has developed the ability to mill
anthrax (grinding the cake into microscopic powder), and to treat it to form a lethal and durable weapon.
An attack might use a modified missile that cruises at low altitude to spray a fine mist of weaponized
germs over its target area. The resulting deaths and injuries could number in the thousands.
Bioweapon use leads to extinction
John D. Steinbruner, senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, 1997, Foreign Policy, pg. 85
Although human pathogens are often lumped with nuclear explosives and lethal chemicals as potential
weapons of mass destruction, there is an obvious, fundamentally important difference: Pathogens are
alive, weapons are not. Nuclear and chemical weapons do not reproduce themselves and do not
independently engage in adaptive behavior; pathogens do both of these things. That deceptively simple
observation has immense implications. The use of a manufactured weapon is a singular event. Most of the
damage occurs immediately. The aftereffects, whatever they may be, decay rapidly over time and distance
in a reasonably predictable manner. Even before a nuclear warhead is detonated, for instance, it is
possible to estimate the extent of the subsequent damage and the likely level of radioactive fallout. Such
predictability is an essential component for tactical military planning. The use of a pathogen, by contrast,
is an extended process whose scope and timing cannot be precisely controlled. For most potential biological
agents, the predominant drawback is that they would not act swiftly or decisively enough to be an effective
weapon. But for a few pathogens - ones most likely to have a decisive effect and therefore the ones most
likely to be contemplated for deliberately hostile use - the risk runs in the other direction. A lethal
pathogen that could efficiently spread from one victim to another would be capable of initiating an
intensifying cascade of disease that might ultimately threaten the entire world population. The 1918
influenza epidemic demonstrated the potential for a global contagion of this sort but not necessarily its
outer limit.
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Asia Impacts – US-China Relations
US-China Relations solve Taiwan war
Paul Kerr, Research analyst at the Arms Control Association, 1999, “Taiwan: Maintain the Current Ambiguity,”
CSIS Prospectus, Volume 1, Number 1 - Fall, http://www.csis.org/pubs/prospectus/99FallKerr.html
Stable U.S.-China relations can also help prevent Chinese aggression towards Taiwan. The bottom line is whether
or not Beijing can be persuaded to accept the status quo between the two countries. The U.S. commitment to Taiwan
inextricably links relations between Taipei and Beijing to the relationship between Beijing and Washington.
If the PRC perceives other areas of its relationship with the United States to be strong, such as U.S.-China trade and
negotiations over China's membership in the WTO, it has less incentive to disrupt the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.
Provocative U.S. actions may lead Beijing to believe that it has little to gain by maintaining peaceful
relations with the United States.
US-China Relations solve India-Pakistan conflict
William Perry, Former Secretary of Defense, Remarks to the Japan Society, 9-12-1995,
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/1995/b091395_bt498-95.html
There is a lot to gain from engaging with China. Through engagement we can address a broad range of
global and regional security concerns. Our military-to-military contacts put us in touch with the highest
levels of the PLA, who have great influence in China. And by working to improve relations with China, we are also
working to reduce tensions between the three great powers on the Asian continent -- China, India and
Pakistan. The relationship between these three powers has long been one of fear and mistrust. While
India worries about the threat from Pakistan, it also keeps a strong force because it feels threatened by
China. And Pakistan keeps a strong force as a deterrent against India's forces. What makes this
tensiontruly worrisome is the potential for nuclear weapons use in the event of a conflict. Our relations
with China are crucial in reducing tensions between these three regional powers.
Relations are key to solve global warming
Nina Hachigian, Et al, Former Senior Political Scientist at RAND, 2008, “A Global Imperative: A Progressive
Approach to U.S.-China Relations in the 21st Century,” Center for American Progress, August
Without the full engagement of both coun- tries, any global plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and
stabilize atmospheric concentrations at levels that prevent the most se- vere effects of global warming will
be futile. Both the United States and China have to date resisted participation in international efforts to
curb emissions. The negotiating positions of the two nations reflect a variety of political and economic
considerations, but a major factor has been mutual mistrust and a reluctance to step forward without reciprocal action
by the other country. For years, China and the United States have pointed fingers at one another, blaming the
other country for climate change and de- manding its commitment first before signing on to any global
plan. Bridging the gap between the differing needs and perceptions of developed and de- veloping countries is the
central challenge in the international negotiations to develop a post-2012 successor to the Kyoto Pro- tocol.
As a member of the G-77, the bloc of developing nations within the United Nations, China argues that while its annual greenhouse gas
emissions may now be high- er than U.S. emissions, a more meaningful yardstick for apportioning responsibility is cumulative
emissions over the past century.
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Asia Impacts – US-Japan Relations
The US-Japan security alliance is key to solving multiple crises, including terrorism, war and
proliferation
James Leach, representative in Congress, 4/20/2005, Congressional FDCH Testimony, pg. np
At the same time, Japan is becoming ever more important to advancing a panoply of American foreign
policy interests around the globe. From supporting counterterrorism operations in the Indian Ocean to
contributions to humanitarian assistance in Iraq to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and to working with the U.S. and others in seeking a peaceful resolution to the North Korean
nuclear challenge. For many years, Japan has also been deeply engaged with U.S. and other industrialized
democracies as a leader at the United Nations and other multilateral institutions.
Only the US-Japan alliance can ensure Asian stability
Bruce Klinger, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage
Foundation, 8/26/2009, Asia And the Pacific, http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg2308.cfm.
Despite its shortcomings, the alliance is critical to fulfilling current U.S. strategic objectives, including
maintaining peace in the region. The forward deployment of a large U.S. military force in Japan deters
military aggression by North Korea, signals Washington's resolve in defending U.S. allies, and provides an
irreplaceable staging area should military action be necessary. Japan hosts the largest contingent of U.S.
forces in Asia, including the only aircraft carrier home-ported outside the United States and one of three
Marine Expeditionary Forces, as well as paying for a major portion of the cost of stationing U.S. forces
there. Japan is America's principal missile defense partner in the world.
The US-Japan alliance solves a laundry list of global threats
Joseph Nye, Professor @ Harvard, 7/19/2009, Real Clear World,
http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2009/07/19/will_the_us-japan_alliance_survive_96948.html
Third, the US-Japan alliance will have to face a new set of transnational challenges to our vital interests,
such as pandemics, terrorism, and human outflows from failed states. Chief among these challenges is
the threat posed by global warming, with China having surpassed the US as the leading producer of
carbon-dioxide emissions (though not in per capita terms). Fortunately, this is an area that plays to Japan's
strengths. Although some Japanese complain about the unequal nature of the alliance's security
components, owing to the limits that Japan has accepted on the use of force, in these new areas, Japan is a
stronger partner. Japan's overseas development assistance in places ranging from Africa to Afghanistan,
its participation in global health projects, its support of the United Nations, its naval participation in antipiracy operations, and its research and development on energy efficiency place it at the forefront in
dealing with the new transnational challenges.
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Asia Impact Takeouts – Korea War
Korean war is extremely unlikely
Carlton Meyer, former Marine Corps officer who participated in military operations around the world, 2003,
“The Mythical North Korean Threat,” http://www.g2mil.com/korea.htm
The chance of a Korean war is extremely unlikely. North Korean leaders realize they have no hope of
success without major backing from China or Russia. The previous South Korean President, Kim Dae
Jung, encouraged peace and visited North Korea. The two countries are reconnecting rail lines and sent a
combined team to the Olympics. Even the United States is providing $500 million dollars a year in food to
the starving North Koreans. The new South Korean President, Roh-Moo-hyun was elected on a peace
platform and suggested US troops may be gone within ten years.
South Korea would dominate any military conflict with North Korea
Doug Bandow, senior fellow at The Cato Institute and adjunct scholar for The Future of Freedom Foundation, 64-2009, North Korea: Paper Tiger, http://www.campaignforliberty.com/article.php?view=100
In the early years the DPRK was the more fearsome player. The U.S. refused to arm the ROK with heavy
weapons to discourage authoritarian President Syngman Rhee from fulfilling his threat to march north. The
Soviets were not so scrupulous in dealing with the North's Kim Il-sung, who almost conquered the entire
peninsula after invading in June 1950 before U.S. forces turned the tide. After three years of see-saw
warfare, an armistice was agreed near the initial boundary. But no permanent peace was arranged, so
American troops remained. Over the last half century, however, Chinese forces went home, South Korea
raced past the North in economic development, Moscow and Beijing recognized Seoul, and the DPRK
suffered economic collapse and famine. The balance of power of 1950 long ago disappeared. Pyongyang
retains a quantitative military edge, but its equipment is antiquated; North Korean troops are
malnourished and get little training. The North is effectively bankrupt and without allies. With about 40
times the GDP and twice the population of the North, Seoul could outmatch the Kim regime in any way it
chose. With large military reserves, a strong industrial base, abundant allies, and generous access to
international credit markets, South Korea is well-positioned to triumph in any conflict.
US basing isn’t necessary – several factors ensure South Korean dominances over the North
Doug Bandow, senior fellow at The Cato Institute and adjunct scholar for The Future of Freedom Foundation, 21-2003, “Ending the Anachronistic Korean Commitment, Part 2,” http://www.fff.org/freedom/fd0303e.asp
In the aftermath of the 2000 inter-Korean summit, Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon explained, “We
intend to remain a force for stability in that area as long as we are needed.” But U.S. forces weren’t
needed even before the summit. South Korea (the Republic of Korea, or ROK) has upwards of 40 times
the GDP and twice the population of North Korea (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK).
Although the North Korean regime survives, to the surprise of many observers, the economy is thought to
have shrunk every year from 1990 to 1998, dropping almost in half. Even Pyongyang, the capital and
national showcase, is reported to have suffered power outages. As many as two million people are
thought to have died of starvation, with 200,000 or more illegally crossing into China. Seoul has also won
the foreign contest, accumulating the most international recognitions and effectively breaking the
alliance between the North and its onetime communist allies, Beijing and Moscow. Both maintain more
significant economic ties with the ROK. Moscow apparently has refused to commit to the large arms
package the DPRK is reported to have requested; in contrast, Russia has begun shipping arms to the
South to pay off its debts.
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Asia Impact Takeouts – North Korea
Regional powers check North Korean aggression
Doug Bandow, senior fellow at The Cato Institute and adjunct scholar for The Future of Freedom Foundation, 21-2003, “Ending the Anachronistic Korean Commitment, Part 1,” http://www.fff.org/freedom/fd0302e.asp
But America’s policy discussion needs to begin with the ROK. After all, Washington has no intrinsic interest
in what goes on in North Korea. An impoverished distant state surrounded by significant powers (China,
Japan, Russia), the DPRK has no international impact and little regional influence, and it poses a
diminishing danger even to South Korea. Put bluntly, it shouldn’t matter to the United States. The only
reason America cares is that the South is a U.S. protectorate. It’s time for that to change.
Nuclear weapons aren’t an advantage to North Korea – any use would incite devastating
international response – GIs aren’t necessary
Carlton Meyer, former Marine Corps officer who participated in military operations around the world, 2003,
“The Mythical North Korean Threat,” http://www.g2mil.com/korea.htm
Even if North Korea employs a few crude nuclear weapons, using them would be suicidal since it would
invite instant retaliation from the United States. North Korea lacks the technical know-how to build an
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, despite the hopes and lies from the National Missile Defense proponents
in the USA. North Korea's industrial production is almost zero, over two million people have starved in
recent years, and millions of homeless nomads threaten internal revolution. The US military ignores this
reality and retains old plans for the deployment of 450,000 GIs to help defend South Korea, even though
the superior South Korean military can halt any North Korean offensive without help from a single
American soldier. American forces are not even required for a counter-offensive. A North Korean attack
would stall after a few intense days and South Korean forces would soon be in position to overrun North
Korea. American air and naval power along with logistical and intelligence support would ensure the
rapid collapse of the North Korean army.
North Korea does not threaten US allies
Doug Bandow, senior fellow at The Cato Institute and adjunct scholar for The Future of Freedom Foundation, 64-2009, North Korea: Paper Tiger, http://www.campaignforliberty.com/article.php?view=100
It is obvious, then, that the DPRK doesn't pose much of a conventional threat to the South. The Kim
regime could invade the ROK, but doing so would be far more likely to end in the destruction of the North
than the South. And nothing suggests that Kim Jong-il is seeking martyrdom: he wants his virgins in this
life, not the next. Japan worries about threats from Pyongyang, but the former is more than capable of
defending itself. Japan possesses the world's second largest economy, noted for its technological
sophistication. There is little that Tokyo could not build or buy. More than 60 years after the end of World
War II, it is time for Japan to take over responsibility for its own defense. The DPRK has neither the
interest nor the ability to challenge other nations in the region -- Indonesia, Australia, Philippines, et al.
The North possesses an antiquated army and little else, not a globe-spanning military like that of the U.S.
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Asia Impact Takeouts – US-China War
China is deterred from ever starting a conflict
Robert Ross, professor of political science at Boston College, an associate at the John King Fairbank Center for
East Asian Research at Harvard University and senior advisor in the security studies program at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, 2005, “Assessing the China Threat,” National Interest, Scholar
The outcome of any war between the United States and China would be devas- tating for Chinese interests.
As General Zhu Chenghu recently observed, China has "no capability to fight a conventional war against the United
States." Indeed, China would face near inevitable defeat, with the military, political and economic costs far
outweighing any costs incurred by the United States. China would risk losing its entire surface fleet, and it
would expose its coastal territory, including its port facilities and its surface vessels at port, to U.S. air and
missile strikes. The economic costs would also be devastating. China would lose access to Western technologies for many years after the war. It would also lose its peaceful international environment and risk its "peaceful rise" as its
economy shifted to long-term war- footing and its budget contended with a protracted U.S.-Chinese arms race, un- dermining
domestic infrastructure devel- opment and long-term civilian and de- fense technology development. Finally, the political costs
would be prohibitive. A military loss to the United States could well destroy the nationalist credentials of
the Chinese Communist Party and cause its collapse.
China won’t use its military
Zhu Feng, Professor at the International Studies and Deputy Director of Center for International & Strategic
Studies, 5-10-2010, “An Emerging Trend in East Asia: Military Budget Increases and Their Impact,”
http://www.fpif.org/articles/an_emerging_trend_in_east_asia
With its military modernization, China does not seek to undermine the current status quo, regain
historically lost territory, or expand its “sphere of influence.” A small and strong military force, with the selfproclaimed mission of resolving all historic grievances, is a perennial preoccupation of the Chinese
leadership. Additionally, it reflects China’s growing integration into the global economy and its turn seawards.
China will maintain the momentum of modernizing its military—this is a political imperative for the ruling
party—but it will not risk damaging its global links by using the military . As long as there is no dramatic change in
external relations, an arms race is not Beijing’s preference.
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Asia Impact Takeouts – China Rise
China won’t rise- no desire. Even if they do rise it’s a long way off
Dhiraj Nayvar, research Scholar in Political Economy of India, Trinity College, Cambridge 6/9/10, “Will not seek
to be a hegemon: China’s Binggou”, http://www.financialexpress.com/news/Will-not-seek-to-be-a-hegemon-China-s-Binggou/631198/
China made a strong pitch for greater democracy in international relations at the third summit meeting of
the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA). Speaking at the summit,
state councillor Dai Bingguo, who is also responsible for border talks with India, said, “Where we live today,
is a world witnessing growing trends towards pluralism, diversity and multipolarity, a world adapting to
globalised allocation of resources and movement of capital, goods and people. Such a world can no longer
tolerate hegemony of any form or a single value system.” Dai Binggou also sought to allay fears about the
rise of China, particularly its role as a potential hegemon. “China will never seek to be a superpower and will
never seek hegemony in the world. This is not our tradition, not our desire, and still less, our policy,” he
said. The state councillor also pointed out that China is still a developing country—in the process of seeking
revitalisation—and that it still has a long and challenging journey ahead. He said even when China becomes
a developed country, it will remain committed to peace and development in Asia.
Europe will block a China rise
Will Inboden, Ph.D., M.Phil., and M.A. degrees in history from Yale University, and his A.B. from Stanford
University, 6-16-2010, “ The reality of the 'China Fantasy”, Foreign Policy
Is the "China Fantasy" starting to get deflated by reality? Three years ago, Jim Mann's provocative book of
that title identified the "China Fantasy" as the dogmatic belief of many Western political and commercial
elites that China's economic liberalization and growth would lead inevitably to democracy at home and
responsible conduct abroad. The operative word was "inevitably" -- the assumption being that China's
remarkable economic success would automatically produce a middle class that demanded greater political
rights, and that China's growing integration with the global economy would produce benign and responsible
international behavior. Based on this assumption, the corollary policy prescription for the West was to
pursue a policy of engagement and encouragement towards China's rise. This paradigm seems to be
shifting. I recently participated in a conference in Europe on China, attended by a cross-section of policy,
academic, and commercial leaders from Europe, the United States, and China, and came away struck by
palpable attitude changes in at least three dimensions. Taken together, these are signposts that the
previous conventional wisdom on China is coming under question: * European attitudes. Many of the
Europeans present voiced a pronounced skepticism towards China, both for the Chinese Communist Party's
ongoing refusal to liberalize the political system as well as for what they perceive as China's irresponsible
international posture. Various reasons were suggested for this change in European attitudes from even two
years ago, but the most salient one seems to be European ire over China's obstreperous conduct at last
year's Copenhagen climate change conference. If Europe has a litmus test for international good citizenship,
it is climate change. But China's behavior on that front seems to be prompting increased European
frustration with China on other issues as well, including human rights, Iran's nuclear program, and China's
military build-up.
No risk of Chinese arms race – tons of factors deter
Michael Krepon, Founding President @ Stimson Center, 2002, “Missile Defense and the Asian Cascade,” Stimson
Center, Scholar
Beijing has had the good sense to avoid nuclear arms racing in the past, and is not likely to alter this
behavior in the future. A significant increase in nuclear capabilities would not only complicate China’s
relations with India, but also with Japan, Russia, and elsewhere along its periphery. A major buildup in
nuclear forces would also badly undercut Beijing’s diplomatic offensive against missile defenses, while
empowering the missile defense lobby in the United States. Consequently, if future US administrations do
not seek the negation of China’s strategic deterrent, cascade effects on the Subcontinent could be greatly
reduced.
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Asia Impact Takeouts – China/Taiwan War
China won’t ever attack Taiwan
Robert Ross, professor of political science at Boston College, an associate at the John King Fairbank Center for
East Asian Research at Harvard University and senior advisor in the security studies program at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, 2005, “Assessing the China Threat,” National Interest, Scholar
Nowhere is Chinese caution more evident than in the Taiwan Strait . Despite the advances in Chinese capabilities, the
mainland has been exceedingly tolerant of Taiwan's movement toward sovereignty . Over the past five years Chen
Shui-bian's rhetoric has amounted to an informal declaration of independence. Much to the concern of both the Bush Adminis- tration
and Beijing, Chen has frequently suggested his intention to replace the current constitution with a new
constitu- tion that would establish de jure Taiwan- ese independence. In response, China has fulminated,
threatened, deployed its forces and rattled its sabers, but it has refused to use force, despite the leader- ship's
conviction that Chen is determined to move Taiwan toward formal sover- eignty and Chen's apparent disregard for Chinese resolve.
Chinese leaders know that should there be a war in the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. Navy would intervene and
the cost to China would be intoler- able. Only if Taiwan actually declares de jure independence, thus
challenging the Communist Party's domestic survival and leaving Beijing no choice but to retaliate militarily, would China risk war with
the United States over Taiwan.
No risk of conflict over Taiwan – all parties recognize it
Ian Bremmer, President of the Eurasia Group, 8-2010, “Gathering Storm: America and China in 2020,”
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2010-JulyAugust/full-Bremmer-JA-2010.html
In addition, Beijing has no incentive to mount a global military challenge to U.S. power. China will one day
possess a much more substantial military capacity than it has today, but its economy has grown so quickly
over the past two decades, and its living standards improved so dramatically, that it is difficult to imagine
the kind of catastrophic, game-changing event that would push Beijing to risk it all by posing the West a
large-scale military challenge. It has no incentive to allow anything less than the most serious threat to its
sovereignty to trigger a military conflict that might sever its expanding network of commercial ties with
countries all over the world—and with the United States, the European Union, and Japan, in particular. The
more familiar flash points are especially unlikely to spark a hot war: Beijing is well aware that no U.S.
government will support a Taiwanese bid for independence, and China need not invade an island that it has
largely co-opted already, via an offer to much of Taiwan’s business elite of privileged access to investment
opportunities on the mainland.
Taiwan war won’t happen – experts agree
Jonathan Adams, Reporter for the Global Post, 9-2009, “The dragon sharpens its claws,”
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/china-and-its-neighbors/090331/the-dragon-sharpens-its-claws
Taiwan insists it's an independent state. Beijing sees it as Chinese territory that must one day end its
democratic "holiday" and return to the fold. The U.S. has a commitment, albeit an ambiguous one, to help
defend Taiwan's democracy against Chinese aggression. That means U.S. Marines, sailors and pilots could
one day, perhaps suddenly, be sent to take on Asia's most lethal military, all for the sake of a small island
which few Americans can distinguish from Thailand. The good news: most experts agree that conflict will
probably never happen. U.S. diplomacy has helped keep the peace in the Taiwan Strait for 60 years. And
tensions have eased in the past year with the election of a Taiwan president who is forging better relations
with Beijing. Chinese and Taiwanese media reported this week that the two sides' militaries will both
attend a conference in Hawaii this summer.