Document of
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Report No: 72516
EMERGENCY PROJECT PAPER
ON A
PROPOSED ARTF GRANT
IN THE AMOUNT OF US$85.5 MILLION
TO THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN
FOR A
JUSTICE SERVICE DELIVERY PROJECT
31st May 2012
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the
performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World
Bank authorization.
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(Exchange Rate Effective June 17, 2012)
Currency Unit =
AFN 50.90 = US$1
US$0.6580050000 = SDR 1
FISCAL YEAR
January 1
–
December 31
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AGO
AIBA
AJSRP
ANDS
ARTF
ARDSPU
CBR
CIP
DA
DAB
ESMF
FM
FMA
GoA
HRM
IBRD
ICT
IDA
ILAB
ILF-A
JI
JSDP
LAD
M&E
MoJ
Attorney General’s Office of Afghanistan
Afghanistan Independent Bar Association
Afghanistan Justice Sector Reform Project
Afghanistan National Development Strategy
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
Afghanistan Reconstruction and Development
NPLJA
NPP
ORAF
P&G
PAR
PC
National Program for Law and Justice for All
National Priority Program
Operational Risk Assessment Framework
Pay and Grading
Public Administration Reform
Project Coordinators
Services - Procurement Unit
Capacity Building for Results Facility
Capital Investment Plan
Designated Account
Da Afghanistan Bank (Central Bank)
Environmental and Safeguards Management
Framework
Financial Management
Financial Management Agent
Government of Afghanistan
Human Resource Management
International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development
Information and Communication Technology
International Development Association (or
the Association)
Independent Legal Aid Board
International Legal Foundation – Afghanistan
Justice Institutions
Justice Service Delivery Project
Legal Aid Department
Monitoring and Evaluation
Ministry of Justice of Afghanistan
PFM
PEFA
Public Financial Management
Public Expenditure and Financial
Accountability
Priority Reform and Restructuring program
Project Oversight Committee
Provincial Project Oversight Committee
Reform Implementation Management Unit
Project Support Unit
Project Unit
Special Disbursement Unit
Stakeholder Forums
Support for Programmatic Resource
Growth Corridor Development project
Statement of Expenses
Supreme Court of Afghanistan
Technical Assistance
United Nations Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan
United Nations Development Program
UN Office on Drugs and Crime
United States Agency for International
Development
World Development Report
PRR
POC
PPOC
RIMU
PSU
PU
SDU
SF
SPRGRD
SOE
SC
TA
UNAMA
UNDP
UNODC
USAID
WDR
NGO
MoE
MoF
Non-Governmental Organizations
Ministry of Economy of Afghanistan
Ministry of Finance
Vice President:
Country Director:
Sector Manager:
Task Team Leader:
Isabel Guerrero
Robert J. Saum
Tony Verheijen
Lubomira Z. Beardsley
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN
Justice Service Delivery Project
CONTENTS
Page
A.
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1
B.
Emergency Challenge ......................................................................................................... 1
C.
Bank Response: The Project ............................................................................................... 8
D.
Appraisal of Project Activities .......................................................................................... 17
E.
Implementation Arrangements and Financing Plan .......................................................... 18
F.
Key Risks and Mitigating Measures ................................................................................. 23
G.
Terms and Conditions for Project Financing .................................................................... 25
Annex 1: Detailed Description of Project Components ................................................................ 26
Annex 2: Results Framework and Monitoring.............................................................................. 41
Annex 3: Summary of Estimated Project Costs ............................................................................ 47
Annex 4: Operational Risk Assessment Framework (ORAF) ...................................................... 50
Annex 5: Financial Management Arrangements .......................................................................... 58
Annex 6: Procurement Arrangements ........................................................................................... 71
Annex 7: Implementation Arrangements ...................................................................................... 79
Annex 8: Project Preparation and Appraisal Team Members ...................................................... 83
Annex 9: Environmental and Social Safeguards Framework ....................................................... 85
Annex 10: Economic, Financial and Accountability Analysis ..................................................... 90
Annex 11: Documents in Project Files ......................................................................................... 98
Annex 12: Country at a Glance ..................................................................................................... 99
Annex 13: Maps .......................................................................................................................... 101
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN
JUSTICE SERVICE DELIVERY PROJECT
PROJECT PAPER
SOUTH ASIA REGION
Basic Information
Country Director : Robert J. Saum
Sector Manager: Antonius Verheijen
Team Leader: Lubomira Z.Beardsley
Project ID: P118028
Expected Effectiveness Date: May 31, 2012
Lending Instrument: Specific Investment
Grant
Sectors: Justice (PG)
Themes: Access to law and justice (60%),
Legal institutions for market economy
(30%), administrative and civil service
reform (10%)
Environmental category: B
Expected Closing Date: May 31st, 2017
Joint IFC:
Joint Level:
Project Financing Data
[ ] Loan [ ] Credit
Proposed terms:
[ x] Grant
[ ] Guarantee
[ ] Other:
Financing Plan (US$m)
Source
Total Amount (US $m)
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
85. 5
Client Information
Recipient: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
Responsible Agency: Ministry of Finance
Contact Person: Adris Walli
Telephone No.:
Fax No.:
Email: adris.walli@budgetmof.gov.af
Estimated disbursements (Bank FY/US$m)
FY
Annual
Cumulative
2012
0.5
0.5
2013
11
11.5
2014
17
28.5
2015
19
47.5
2016
19
66.5
2017
19
85.5
Project Development Objective and Description
Project development objective: The Development Objective is to increase the access to and use
of legal services. The project seeks to: to implement the Government’s National Priority Program,
mitigate the impact of the Transition; put the system on a sustainable path for long term results;
and improve service delivery.
Project description: The project consists of four interrelated components: (a) Partnership for
Justice; (b) Legal Empowerment (composed of two subcomponents: Legal Aid and Legal
Outreach); (c) Organization and Capacity of Justice Institutions (composed of two
subcomponents: Effective Organizational Design and Strengthening Capacity of State Justice
Institutions); and (d) Implementation Capacity.
Safeguard and Exception to Policies
Safeguard policies triggered:
Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01)
Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4.04)
Forests (OP/BP 4.36)
Pest Management (OP 4.09)
Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4.11)
Indigenous Peoples (OP/BP 4.10)
Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12)
Safety of Dams (OP/BP 4.37)
Projects on International Waterways (OP/BP 7.50)
Projects in Disputed Areas (OP/BP 7.60)
[x]Yes
[ ]Yes
[ ]Yes
[ ]Yes
[ ]Yes
[ ]Yes
[x]Yes
[ ]Yes
[ ]Yes
[ ]Yes
Does the project require any exceptions from Bank policies?
Have these been approved by Bank management?
[ ]Yes [x] No
[ ]Yes [x] No
[ ] No
[x] No
[x] No
[x] No
[x] No
[x] No
[ ] No
[x] No
[x] No
[x] No
Conditions and Legal Covenants:
Financing Agreement Reference
Description of
Condition/Covenant
Date Due
A. Introduction
1.
This Project Paper seeks the approval of the ARTF Management Committee for a grant in
an amount of US$85.5 million, with an allocation of a first tranche of US$ 40 million to the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GoA) for a Justice Service Delivery Project
(JSDP).
2.
The proposed project will assist the GoA to implement the Government’s National Priority
Program (NPP) in the justice sector, the ‘National Program for Law and Justice for All’
(NPLJA), whose objective is “to restore the faith of Afghans in the ability of the law to protect
and defend their best interests as individuals and as a nation”. The project seeks to: mitigate the
impact of the Transition; put the system on a sustainable path for long term results; and improve
service delivery. The Development Objective is to increase the access to and use of legal
services. The proposed project will finance the costs associated with: (a) building capacity of
front line legal service providers to deliver key legal services; (b) increasing scope and quality of
legal aid; (c) improving access of the people to legal information and civil legal education; (d)
improving management and provision of legal services by central justice institutions; and (e)
building project management capacity. The key outcome indicators for this project include: (a)
scope and quality of legal services increased; (b) productivity of legal service providers
improved; and (c) accountability of legal service providers enhanced. The implementing
agencies are the Supreme Court (SC), the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and the Attorney General's
Office (AGO).
3.
JSDP will be funded by the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF). Several
donors, including European Union, UK, Canada, Italy, Norway, Ireland and the United States of
America (USA) have expressed their intend to support the Project.
B. Emergency Challenge
Country Context
4.
Afghanistan continues to struggle to overcome almost three decades of war and civil strife.
Its political context remains complex and dominated by the cross-border Taliban insurgency,
narcotics production, and weak governance and rule of law. After nine years of state building,
Afghanistan remains a fragile state. The delivery of basic government services has not met the
expectations of citizens, while mechanisms to hold the government accountable for delivery of
such services have been undermined by corruption and lack of capacity.
5.
It is critical that Afghanistan develops an effective justice system with the capacity to
respond to users’ demands in order for the state to provide a stable and secure environment in
which citizens can pursue their goals. It must provide an effective accountability mechanism
through which citizens can pursue peaceful resolution of grievances, and hold the executive
responsible for its actions. As the World Development Report of 2011 on “Conflict, Security and
Development” (the WDR) demonstrated, access to effective justice mechanisms is key to
increasing state legitimacy, something the current Government lacks and which continues to feed
the insurgency. However, as the WDR further demonstrated, investments in building such a
1
system are long term in nature and expectations of results must reflect this. A fifteen year time
horizon is the minimum time frame for results, even in favorable conditions.
6.
While recognizing that outcomes from investments in the justice sector are long term in
nature, the GoA will also face increasing pressure to show rapid progress. The Transition
process, encompassing the transfer of responsibility for security from international forces to
Afghans, is ongoing and due to be completed by 2014. Transition presents a particular challenge
for the justice sector, given the low level of its development to date. Effective justice services are
crucial to the establishment of stable conditions necessary for peace, economic growth and
poverty reduction. However, the expansion of services will have to be undertaken within the
context of decreasing external resources for investment in all areas: from infrastructure, to
equipment, to personnel and operating and maintenance (O&M) capacity. An emphasis on
increased productivity and efficiency gains wherever possible throughout the justice service
network is therefore critical. The project seeks to mitigate the impact of the Transition and put
the system on a sustainable path for long term results.
Sector Context
7.
In Afghanistan there are a multitude of complementary, competing and conflicting spaces
for rule setting and conflict resolution, all with varying degrees of legitimacy and with blurred
and shifting divisions between the spaces. All justice institutions (JI) can and do enforce state
law, Sharia law and/or customary rules. While a plural legal system is simply a fact in many
countries, some crucial pieces of the legal architecture are missing in Afghanistan that would
otherwise allow for such a system to function effectively. Most crucially, there is no mechanism
to preclude parties from recycling disputes through different forums (usually referred to as res
judicata). This compounds the uncertainty of the legal system in all substantive areas of law,
allows for forum shopping and enables conflicting decisions. More generally, this uncertainty
constrains the peaceful contestation of grievances (particularly over land) and the development
of transactions outside of family networks that would form the basis for more robust private
sector growth.
8.
Locally, community organizations (mostly shuras or jirgas, maliks and mullahs) are the
primary sources of societal order. These institutions are powerful players in resolving up to 80
percent of disputes at the community level; especially in the rural areas that make up 85 percent
of Afghanistan. It is clear that community organizations will continue to play a significant role in
delivering some form of justice for many years to come, even as state institutions’ presence,
legitimacy and effectiveness increase. There is also evidence of growing collaboration between
state, and community based resolution actors, which can be attributed to the increasing
consolidation of the central government, the formalization and professionalization of certain
elements within state administrative and judicial systems, and the willingness of state actors to
engage with and respect the legitimacy of local processes.
9.
The factors that motivate individuals to resolve their disputes through community
institutions rather than state institutions must be better understood. There is a strong case to be
made that many community organizations have more local legitimacy, and are faster and cheaper
than state justice institutions. They are also more closely interwoven into the fabric of the rural
communities and the type of justice that is dispensed – particularly in the area of criminal law –
2
tends (as with most rural societies), to be restorative rather than retributive in nature, thus
contributing to local societal cohesion.
10. Poverty undoubtedly has a high impact upon the abilities of individuals to navigate the
legal system, but the extent and nature of the impact needs to be better understood. High
illiteracy rates exacerbate limitations in access to information; consequently, many are unaware
of their rights. This is particularly the case for rural women, 85% of whom are illiterate. Poverty
also precludes many from undertaking the often long journeys to access JI. 100 districts have no
judges, and security and geographic factors make outreach activities in many areas very difficult.
On the criminal justice side, a lack of appropriate forums for the police to take detainees to
results in higher than needed pre-trial detention rates. These detention rates have damaging
knock-on effects, including loss of earnings for families and a high and complex case load for
the courts, prosecutors and public defenders.
11. GoA needs a better understanding of what strategies people employ to navigate the system,
how they may have been successful, and where the key bottlenecks in the system are, in order to
provide more targeted interventions. Linking community organizations with the formal
institutions in a complementary mechanism will be fundamental for the GoA to leverage all the
justice service resources at its potential disposal in order to be able to deliver an effective service
for its citizens.
12. Surveys continually show that citizen perceptions of the JI are negative: a UNODC 2011
report found that both urban and rural respondents most frequently named prosecutors and
judges as the officials that had demanded bribes. Bribes, misuse of funds, and undue influence
remain common complaints, as does the inefficiency and inconsistency (and thus
unpredictability) of state JI.
13. Rule of Law reforms since 2002 have focused on strengthening the formal sector mainly at
the central level (predominantly through capacity building), with the assumption that these
reforms will automatically benefit the people. The reforms have made modest progress, and
remain a government priority, but have not yet yielded tangible results in the form of more
accessible or better legal services. De facto, the state justice system still is a network of rather
loosely connected national and local organizations without fully constituted nationwide functions
and jurisdictions, policies or legal and business practices which are aligned with people’s actual
needs for service.
14. The main recovery strategies as documented by the GoA have revolved around three key
documents: (i) The Justice for All Needs Analysis of 2005; (ii) The Afghanistan National
Development Strategy 2008-2013 (ANDS); and (iii) The 2012 NPLJA.
15. The NPLJA identified (a) Institutional Strengthening ; (b) Increasing Access; (c) Reaching
out to traditional justice systems; and (d) Supporting other key Government programs such as
counter-narcotics, anti-corruption and land tenure issues – as being of the most immediate need
and priority. Similarly the ANDS identified (a) Improved Institutional Capacity to Deliver
Sustainable Justice Services; (b) Improved Coordination and Integration within the justice
system and with other state institutions; and (c) Improved Quality of Justice – as its main goals.
Finally, the NPP identifies the following as key components of its strategy: (a) Increasing Access
3
to Justice; (b) Improved Efficiency of Judicial System (especially the Courts) for Better Service
Delivery; (c) Improving the Technical Capacity of Judicial Staff; (d) Law Reform & Legislative
Effectiveness; and (e) Institutional Strengthening.
16. While the overall direction of the Government’s strategy has therefore been consistent, and
there has been substantial discussion from the international community regarding the importance
of improving the rule of law in Afghanistan, thus far a Government-led, coordinated and
sequenced approach to reform has been lacking.
17. Critically the JI have been unable to deliver on one of their core set of functions – that of
ensuring accountability. At the highest level, the prosecutors and judiciary have been unable to
hold the executive accountable for its actions. This is due to a number of reasons, including a
lack of will and capacity on the part of the courts and the offices of public prosecution,
corruption and a lack of space for the demand from citizens for such accountability to manifest
itself in the courts. Similarly, the courts have been unable to hold individuals accountable to each
other – either in civil law or criminal law through the AGO - in an objective and transparent
manner, thus undermining the legitimacy of their institution. Finally, the SC and AGO have been
unable to make judges within the system accountable for their actions. Without a stronger sense
of accountability, and mechanisms to enforce it both internally and externally (while balancing
against the important notion of judicial independence), the JI will continue to lack legitimacy.
18. The institutions themselves continue to suffer from internal problems that undermine their
capacity to function effectively. In the courts, this is exemplified by the fact that almost 100% of
cases are appealed up to the SC level. This has the consequence that nine SC judges (out of a
total of 1,519 judges in the whole system), have the responsibility for issuing a final decision on
almost 80 percent of all cases. The fact that so many appeals are allowed to the highest court
further undermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of all the lower courts. The appeal system is
also not quick, nor is case management transparent, leaving numerous grievances languishing in
the system and citizens uncertain both how and when their case will be decided. The capacity of
many judges has increased in recent years and could play a more active role in a functioning
system. However, the conflicting nature of laws in Afghanistan, the general lack of independence
and the absence of functional, administrative and managerial support for judges, continue to
undermine the ability of judges to operate effectively.
19. In the court system itself, there has been little systematic attempt to develop a data set
which the SC, MoJ and AGO could use to determine priorities for development. For example, no
reliable court statistics are generally available or published that might indicate the workload of
judges, such as volumes, types or distribution of civil disputes or prosecutions filed with the
courts. There remains very little knowledge or transparency about the levels of court workloads
and productivity or the levels of state resources that sustain the court system. The number and
distribution of operational judicial panels is poorly monitored, other than for purposes of
administering judicial payrolls. It is not possible to relate judge numbers to caseload trends even
if caseload information were available. Although there has been a large amount of investment in
some provinces and by various agencies in infrastructure, modern systems for administration of
courts, such as usable court buildings, landline telephones, electricity supplies and office
equipment are available to only a minority of judges. Even in the SC in Kabul there is very little
use of computerized office equipment. The dominant office technology remains pen and paper.
4
20. The MoJ undertakes a range of functions for the Government including: subsidized legal
defense and civic legal education (the Legal Aid Offices), registration of court civil disputes,
civil legal aid, mediation of disputes and enforcement of judgments (the Hoqooq); drafting and
publication of legislation (the Taqnin); legal protection of government assets (the Government
Cases Department) and licensing of real estate businesses; and overseeing the Juvenile
Rehabilitation Department. It is also responsible for providing legal advice to the government;
registering political parties and social organizations; and licensing real estate agents. Despite
improvements in terms of overall capacity at the MoJ over the last few years, it has suffered from
a lack of support and coordination on the part of other institutions (such as the courts and police
in terms of recognizing and facilitating the work of public defenders). Additionally, as with all
ministries, it has been unable to pay salaries commensurate with the market to attract individuals
of sufficient quality to undertake many of the technical tasks required at the MoJ; notably public
defense and legal drafting. It also does not have a mechanism to be able to respond to surges of
demand in the system, for example through contracting private attorneys.
21. The GoA has also struggled to develop a system of legal services that aids people in
accessing institutions and helps them find appropriate remedies for breaches of their rights.
While there is a Government system of legal aid for those being tried for criminal offences, the
situation is more complex for civil cases. The institution of the Hoqooq, on the face of it, appears
to present a novel approach to assisting litigants with navigating the civil justice system (for
example drafting relevant court documents, assisting in mediating rather than litigating disputes,
and enforcing the decisions of the court). However, the degree of access to the Hoqooq, the level
of control it has over deciding how cases progress and whose interests it represents, the
uncertainty as to how individual offices are actually functioning and the lack of an overall
strategy for development of civil legal aid, currently militate against the institution being utilized
more effectively. Given the large number of possible claims and the evolving nature of the legal
framework in Afghanistan, it is likely that a centralized state run system will not be able to
provide all of the civil and public law and justice needs of citizens. As such, the state will have to
determine, through policy prioritizing and being strategic with regards to resources, which areas
it is going to support and which areas it will encourage and allow space for the private sector to
provide such services (from private lawyers, to Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs),
charities and religious organizations). Working in partnership with the private sector will allow
greater access to justice and also increase the overall quality of the justice, as compared with
what can be achieved via a single delivery mechanism of a state institution.
22. The ability of the AGO to investigate and prosecute crimes has been notoriously
compromised, which has greatly contributed to the atmosphere of impunity and the perception
that public attorneys are an instrument of the interest groups. Limited success with most systemic
reforms caused donors to retreat to more selective and limited interventions, which in many
cases circumvented regular institutions. Though perhaps necessary, this approach has created a
number of tensions. There is a general consensus that very few results have been produced so far.
23. The lack of coordination of civil and military interventions and priorities has also hampered
effectiveness. These interventions have often been focused on providing short term provincial
and regional fixes aimed at promoting “stability”, while not necessarily contributing to the
creation of a nationally durable system. Indeed, incorporating the results of many of these ad hoc
localized interventions will present particular challenges for the GoA: from increased
5
maintenance costs for infrastructure and staff, to regularizing and incorporating new systems
developed to deal with specific problems that may fade over time or move geographically.
24. Overall, the lack of appropriately resourced, predictable and accessible legal services is the
greatest constraint to establishing a justice system that can promote legitimacy and stability of
the state.
Lessons Learned and Reflected in Project Design
25. The low level of success of rule of law reforms in Afghanistan at the level of rural
communities has been linked to the fact that state building demands have not typically included
offers of service that might have made social and governance changes palatable to rural
inhabitants. In response to this challenge the project concentrates on service delivery.
26. The performance of the three JI was uneven under the Phase 1 AJSRP: the MoJ was the
strongest and the AGO the weakest performer. The project seeks to involve all three JI, albeit to
varying extents, in recognition of the added value of bringing the three institutions together
under one program. The flexible ARTF design allows conditioning the release of resources upon
the achievement of the specific performance targets. In this way, the ARTF mechanism clearly
connects the three institutions together, and to the project outcomes, in a more coherent and
incentivized manner.
27. The uneven performance of the JI suggests there is therefore a requirement for a “custom
designed approach” to future reforms. This approach considers the institutions’ individual
absorptive capacity.
28. The organizational structure (roles, responsibilities, structures, information flows,
deliberative processes, management practices) of the JI reflect the influence of different regimes
and do not correspond to current needs. In order to sustain and increase the impact of the
capacity building effort, future reforms need to include structural and organizational changes of
the legal institutions. Capacity building activities are clustered with and conditioned by reforms
of organizational designs of the JI.
29. HR reform has been slow across government, and the Justice Sector has been no exception.
A lack of commitment to certain reforms, e.g. HR reform, has been influenced by less than
optimal communication about the benefits of reforms, an uncoordinated approach by donors
involved, and a lack of incentives to implement reforms. The project has been designed in
consultation with JI. The SC has shown particular leadership in implementing HR reforms. This
will have an impact on AGO. Performance triggers target HR reform and provide additional
incentives to implement them. The timing of such reforms is also appropriate, with MoJ seeking
CBR support, and a cross-governmental vision emerging for improved HR management in line
with a broader strategy for civil service reforms.
30. JI have been more receptive to assistance from countries with an Islamic legal culture.
Cooperation between the MoJ of Egypt and the SC has been tested under the project with
excellent results. The project will support cooperation of JI with their partners in such countries
as Egypt, Turkey and India.
6
31. A functioning implementation structure is critical to the success of the project. A more
decentralized project implementation structure with strong units within the JI encourages project
ownership, and is required for a more complex program of activities. The coordination of the
cross-sector activities can be addressed through a specific joint management structure. Under the
JSDP the PSU maintains more of an oversight and coordinating role, with greater authority over
financial management and procurement handed to the JI PU, in order to encourage ownership
and improve disbursement rates. The second phase benefits from the continued presence of the
Phase 1 PSU and PUs, with some critical changes to improve its functioning: The proposed
implementation structure is more robust than that of the Phase 1 Afghanistan Justice Sector
Reform Project (AJSRP).
32. Effective Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) has been a challenge in the justice sector. To
date, M&E in the sector has suffered from a lack of technical capacity at the implementation
level and limited conceptual capacity at the policy-making level. The lack of an M&E strategy,
including baseline data, to provide information has prevented the GoA from assessing properly
the achievements and changes associated with Phase 1 AJSRP. The Phase 2 project will aim to
provide quantitative and qualitative data collection tools and methods to ensure that project
results are properly assessed within a clear M&E framework and strategy. The project
emphasizes the importance of an effective M&E system: Starting with the collection of baseline
data in the initial months of the project, and extending to training, the presence of dedicated staff
in the PSU, and the hiring of a firm for additional support.
33. Finally, it is important to note that ARTF funding has been shown to encourage
programmatic, cross-sector approaches to reform and promotes cooperation (as opposed to
competition, mainly over resources) among JI. Channeling resources through the budget
increases the JI’s ownership of reforms. However, the original 2-year timetable for Phase 1
AJSRP was unrealistic and a longer timeframe is needed to see tangible results. (See Para 5).
Rationale for Proposed Bank Emergency Project
34. This is the second (Phase 2) ARTF funded operation supporting justice sector reforms.
Phase 1 AJSRP sought to strengthen the centralized state justice system in Afghanistan and to
increase access to justice for the Afghan people. It aimed to do so by enhancing the capacity of
Afghan JI to deliver legal services. Investment and technical assistance (TA) were intended to
strengthen human capital and physical infrastructure management, augment the skills of justice
sector professionals, and enhance physical infrastructure. The project also sought to empower the
Afghan people through legal aid and education on legal rights and obligations. The scope of
activities in Phase 1 AJSRP was deliberately limited, in view of the need to establish the
implementation structure, to build procurement capacity in the institutions, to assemble baseline
data and to operate in an uncertain security environment. It was also intended to overcome the
issue of lack of coordination amongst various actors up to that point.
35. At the Kabul International Conference (July 2010), the GoA articulated a plan for
stabilizing and developing Afghanistan, and international partners renewed their commitment to
support the Government. Both reaffirmed the goals of strong Afghan leadership, and more
effective international partnership. This included channeling at least 50 percent of development
7
aid through the GoA’s core budget and aligning 80 percent of aid with the new plan within two
years subject to the creation of a strong financial management system.
36. Many exogenous factors to the JI themselves, notably the decrease in the overall level of
security, have slowed the pace of implementation of these critical reforms. Moreover, as security
has worsened, the likelihood of rural communities being drawn towards using “insurgent justice”
has increased. The GoA, however, remains committed to leveraging all the potential resources at
its disposal to develop an effective justice system that can deliver core services that are in
demand by its citizens in order to promote stability, increase legitimacy, and provide the space
for economic development. Additionally, the GoA has reaffirmed its commitment to supporting a
pooled financing mechanism with long term aims and objectives to support the development of
the justice sector.
37. As with other sectors, the work is of increasing significance in light of the challenges of
Transition. If Transition is to be successful, citizens must have confidence that the rule of law
can provide physical security for them and their property, together with appropriate means to
realize their rights and enforce remedies peacefully. This matters not just for the small scale
entrepreneur, but will also become increasingly pressing as mining operations begin to scale up
and resource corridors are developed to promote the infrastructure needed to support them and
take advantage of their economic spill-over effects.
38. Phase 2 activities will address complex challenges. While JSDP continues many of the
aspirations of Phase 1 and builds on its work, it has to confront (a) the lessons learned from
Phase 1 and (b) the developments, political processes and the current realities of Afghanistan.
This Project, therefore, takes as its approach a more holistic view of the justice sector by taking
into account: effects of legal diversity; crucial role of legal services in future development of the
country; people’s contemporary needs and preferences for a particular form of legal service visa-vis the potential of JI to respond to people’s needs. Using this approach, the principal goal will
be to improve the capacity of JI to provide access to legal services in ways that will empower
individuals to resolve their disputes satisfactorily and at minimal costs to them or the state. This
incremental approach is intended to enable the swift delivery of tangible benefits that will work
to build trust and confidence in the GoA and the JI, and capitalize on the political momentum,
both domestically and internationally, for justice sector reform.
39. The proposed project interventions fully reflect the lessons learned in Afghanistan. Above
all, the project seeks to provide stability and continuity during the time of transition in order to
support the development of an effective justice system. In particular, significant operational
lessons have been learned in relation to the implementation capacities of the JI from Phase 1 and
these have been incorporated in order to ensure more efficient implementation of more complex
reforms.
C. Bank Response: The Project
40. The JSDP is a 5-year, ARTF funded operation. The estimated cost of the project is US$
85.5 million.
8
41. The project will support the NPLJA namely: (a) Access to Justice: to expand the quality
and the quantity of judicial service delivery to Afghans; (b) Improved Services: to raise the
quantitative and qualitative technical capacities of the institutional service providers; (c)
Improved Technical Capacity: to raise the quantitative and qualitative technical capacities of the
institutional service providers; and (d) Institutional Strengthening: to build the capacity of the JI
through comprehensive, management-oriented organizational development.
42. The project will also align with two other ARTF funded projects: the Afghanistan Capacity
Building for Results Facility (CBR) and the Support for Programmatic Resource Growth
Corridor Development project (SPRGRD). The CBR project is intended to increase the capacity
of government to deliver essential services and implement national priority programs, while
addressing the over-reliance on external technical assistance. CBR will offer support in the form
of TA, training, and the financing of higher than Pay & Grading salaries for staff in key posts.
This will be contingent upon and linked to agreed service delivery and reform targets. The JSDP
will aim to leverage the resources available through CBR to both incentivize and augment the
impact of MoJ reform plans, and sequencing of reforms to departments, personnel management,
human capacity and organizational management will be synchronized with the ministry’s
anticipated CBR proposal. To this end, the JSDP will finance TA to assist in the MoJ with its
application for Tier 2 (which MoJ aims to achieve by mid 2013) and Tier 1 support (which MoJ
aims to achieve by 2016).
43. Reforms at the SC and the AGO will similarly have at their core a focus on sustainability
and fiscal responsibility while maximizing service delivery. They, however, will not formally be
attached to the CBR. SPRGRD is intended to support the creation of a resource corridor
anchored around Aynak and later Hajigak, through analytical work and catalytic investments into
private sector and community development. In order to avoid any potential overlap and to ensure
that all resources are leveraged effectively, the project will complement ongoing interventions in
the justice sector such as those of USAID, UNDP, US State Department and others.
44. In response to the ‘lessons learned’ under Phase 1 AJSRP, the project design has been
tailored to reflect the implementation capacities of the JI. Funding allocations, in contrast to the
previous project, are differentiated based upon the capacity of JI to disburse funds and manage
project implementation activities. Consequently, MoJ is allocated the largest sum of funding,
approximately US$31 million, primarily to fund the development and expansion of critical Legal
Aid services under Component 2, and also for the construction of a new HQ building under
Component 3. The SC is allocated approximately US$21 million for its activities and works, and
the AGO US$11.3 million. A further US$21 million is allocated for activities executed jointly
across the JI. Incentives for stronger performance have also been built into the project design,
with US$15 million of funding being contingent upon results. This is designed to create a clear
and measurable link between effective achievement of critical outputs at mid-term, and the
allocation of subsequent tranches of funding to those institutions. These interim results are
detailed in the Project Outcomes section below.
Project Development Objectives
45. The project seeks to: mitigate the impact of the Transition; put the system on a sustainable
path for long term results; and improve service delivery. The Project Development Objective
9
(PDO) is to increase access to and use of legal services. The following three key project outcome
indicators will be used to track progress toward achieving the PDO: (a) scope and quality of
legal services increased; (b) productivity of legal service providers improved; and (c)
accountability of legal service providers enhanced.
46. The project development objectives will be achieved by balancing demand for and supply
of core legal services and increasing productivity of legal service providers through: (a)
encouraging specialization and close collaboration among various service providers; (b) aligning
structure, organization, processes and capacities of JI to contemporary needs of users; and (c)
easing access to legal information by legal professionals, JI and broader public. The project
intends to benefit the Afghan citizens and users of the legal system, with efforts to provide
additional support to the indigent population, women and the private sector (particularly in
resource corridors) in addition to central JI and front-line justice service providers.
Summary of Project Components
47. The project consists of four interrelated components: (a) Partnership for Justice; (b) Legal
Empowerment; (c) Organization and Capacity of Justice Institutions; and (d) Implementation
Capacity. Further details are in Annex 1.
Component 1: Partnership for Justice (US$ 13.05 million)
48. The objective of this component is to increase the scope and quality of legal services
(mainly but not exclusively, dispute resolution, deed registration, and legal information) in
selected provinces and districts. The ultimate goal of the component is to support business
environment and investment climate. Therefore the project will concentrate on geographical
areas with promising economic activities such as Kabul, Herat, Bamiyan and Logar, and legal
services demanded by small and medium enterprises (mainly land disputes and registrations) or
by the communities impacted by major developmental projects.
49. The goal and objective will be achieved by: (a) improving the collaboration and
strengthening capacity of local JI and; (b) engaging local JI and other legal service providers,
including community organizations and leaders, in community justice partnerships. The courts
and Hoqooqs will be the main focus of the capacity building effort. Based upon the results of the
province-specific demand surveys undertaken under Component 3 and functional reviews of
institutions’ performance, the project will assist JI in developing and implementing a 3-4 year
provincial justice reform strategy, which will include a road map for establishing community
justice partnership. The component will finance technical assistance and investments to: (a)
prepare the strategy; (b) build capacity of state JI to respond to local needs; (c) create a
community justice partnership; and (d) promote users’ involvement with legal institutions
through information centers and new practices (e.g. publishing court decisions, organizing public
hearings, opening telephone legal consultation services and complaint lines). The community
partnership will be based on the commitment of the service providers to mutually beneficial
community outcomes, in particular for restoring and maintaining safety, security and prosperity.
It will comprise joint regular meetings, shared record keeping, data exchange regarding cases,
and, if feasible, task automation.
10
50. The key beneficiaries of these reforms will be: the people of a given province who will
receive more and better legal service and will be better equipped to take advantage of legal
systems; and local JI and other service providers whose capacity will be strengthened and better
aligned to peoples’ contemporary needs. At the end of the project, the residents of these
provinces and/or districts will have access to a higher volume and better quality of legal services;
and they will be better informed about service providers and prepared to monitor their
performance. The courts (mainly civil and commercial departments and land registries) and
Hoqooqs will have stronger capacity and competence to serve their citizens) and together with
other legal service providers and community organization will work in an environment which is
more conducive to service delivery (clearer division of responsibilities and jurisdiction; access to
shared information; more collaborative and transparent procedures, better working conditions,
and improved performance incentives). This component supports section 1 (Increased Access to
Justice) and section 2 (Improved Efficiency of Justice System) of NPLJA.
Component 2: Legal Empowerment (US$ 17.55 million)
51. This component has two subcomponents: (a) Legal Aid; and (b) Legal Awareness. The
overall objective of the component is to increase people’s ability to participate in the public
(state) redress or dispute resolution system.
a) Legal Aid (US$13.8 million)
52. The component will continue the efforts of the AJSRP (Phase 1) to strengthen and expand a
state legal aid system. The objective of this component is to enlarge the existing state legal aid
system while enhancing its effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. The objective will be
achieved through: consolidating existing legal aid sub-systems which are composed of two
distinct models based on in-house lawyers and subcontracting an NGO (International Legal
Foundation- Afghanistan, ILF-A); and (b) building the critical base (policies, procedures and
capacities augmented by TA and automation) for an effective, fiscally sustainable, nationally
coordinated state system of legal aid. The “National Legal Aid Strategy” and “National Legal
Awareness Strategy”, both of 2011, will be a starting point and basis for policy and regulatory
developments under the project. These strategies highlight the importance of a gender sensitive
approach, and the project activities will incorporate this in their implementation.
53. The project will finance TA and investment to the MoJ (Legal Aid and Hoqooq
Department) and an Independent Legal Aid Board (ILAB) to: (a) provide legal aid and expand
the number of legal aid offices by at least five; (b) develop and/or revise a Legal Aid Strategy,
current policies and regulations (for both criminal and civil legal aid) mainly with regard to the
sustainability and affordability of publically funded legal aid; (c) design and implement a
detailed business plan for the consolidation of the state legal aid system; (d) strengthen
management capacity of the MoJ to plan, finance and manage legal aid with enhanced
automation and information systems; (e) develop and implement models of cooperation with
enforcement agencies; and (f) test and roll out low cost culturally sensitive ways of delivering
legal aid.
54. The key beneficiaries of these reforms will be the people of Afghanistan who at the end of
the project will receive more and better legal aid. The MoJ, ILAB and legal aid providers will
11
also benefit from this component. The MoJ together with the ILAB will have stronger capacity
to plan, finance and manage legal aid. The number of legal aid providers will increase; they will
have better skill sets and work in better working conditions (better offices, procedures,
management and incentives) and hence will provide both a higher volume and higher quality of
advice and representation. The sustainability of the system based on in-house lawyers will be
pursued through the creation of a legal aid professional cadre, included in the tashkeel under the
MoJ’s proposed Capacity Building for Results Program (CBRP), which MoJ aims to undertake
by 2016, and contingency plans will also be developed for sustainability without a CBRP. This
subcomponent supports section 1 (Increased Access to Justice) and section 5 (Institutional
Strengthening) of NPLJA.
b) Legal Outreach (US$3.75 million)
55. The Component also continues the efforts of AJSRP Phase 1. It seeks to help the Afghan
people: (a) to acquire and incorporate legal knowledge into their choices and interactions with
the Government and private actors; (b) to improve their ability to monitor and influence legal
service providers; and (c) to secure their support for the proposed reforms. This will be achieved
through strengthening capacities of the MoJ, SC and AGO to plan, finance and manage legal
awareness activities and through the implementation of specific legal awareness activities. The
project will finance TA to the SC and AGO to strengthen their capacity to manage their
relationship with the public and to develop and implement legal awareness programs. The project
will also support the Legal Outreach Office of the MoJ, the GoA’s focal point for civil legal
education and awareness. This support will include mainly: the replication, dissemination and
broadcasting of print-media materials and broadcast media materials and radio, such as TV
shows developed under the AJSRP; development and dissemination of new materials and shows;
and support for up to ten provincial awareness units. The key beneficiaries of this project will be
the people of Afghanistan, who at the end of the project will have easier access to information
about their rights and obligations, and a greater ability to defend their rights and apply legal
remedies. The JI will benefit from the project through the development of a stronger system for
state organized legal awareness activities. This subcomponent supports section 1 (Increased
Access to Justice) and section 5 (Institutional Strengthening) of NPLJA.
Component 3: Organization and Capacity of Justice Institutions (US$ 47.4 million)
56. The objective of this component is to improve the capacity of the state JI to manage and
deliver legal services. The Component has two subcomponents: (a) Effective Organizational
Design; (b) Strengthening Capacity of State Justice Institutions.
a) Effective Organizational Design (US$ 4.5 million)
57. The Effective Organizational Design subcomponent aims to determine and encourage the
sector’s structural reforms. These reforms will help establish the balance between development
of services, delivery of those services, and the fiscal sustainability of delivery over the short,
medium and long term. This objective will be achieved through policies which will: adjust
courts’ and prosecutorial offices’ functions, jurisdictions, size and territorial organization to
current needs; incorporate the independence and accountability safeguards into the
organizational design, operations and processes of courts and offices of public prosecution; and
12
streamline procedural designs. The project will finance TA related to analytical work, periodic
surveys (in the first, third and final year of the project) of users, consultations with stakeholders,
and policy and law development. The component will focus on courts and public prosecutorial
offices. If successful, this component will improve the organization of the legal sector and, by
making it more open and evidence based, it will improve the sector’s policy and regulatory
processes. The key beneficiaries of the reforms will be courts and offices of prosecutors who, by
the end of the project, will have road maps for the reforms which will lead to more affordable,
sustainable and effective institutions. Over time, the people will benefit from these institutions
as they become better organized, hence more capable of delivering improved legal services.
58. In the MoJ the subcomponent will support the development of a Strategic Plan. Since a
valid strategic plan is also a pre-requisite for participation in Tier 2 of CBR, this will also
contribute to accessing CBR support. The Strategic Plan will clarify the mandate and vision of
the MoJ, and establish the strategy for achieving its goals over the next 5 years.
59. The key beneficiaries of these reforms will be Afghan policy makers who will be better
informed about the implications of their decisions, and stakeholders who will be allowed to
participate in and influence policy decision-making. The ultimate beneficiaries should be legal
service providers and citizens of Afghanistan who, if the reforms are implemented, should
receive better legal services. This subcomponent supports all elements of NPLJA.
b) Strengthening Capacity of Justice Institutions (US$ 42.9 million)
60. This subcomponent seeks to improve the capacity of the state JI to plan, finance, and
manage their resources in order to deliver better justice services. The subcomponent is divided
into the following clusters of activities for the three JI: (a) Human Capital; (b) Case Management
(c) Physical Infrastructure.
 Human Capital aims to further strengthen human capacity in the JI. This component will:
(a) finance TA for the completion of Pay and Grading reforms in SC and AGO, (b) assist
with preparation and implementation of human resource (HR) strategy for prosecutors and
judges, (c) finance critical HR reforms including process, information and performance
management for all three JI, (d) finance complimentary support to the HR department in
MoJ to ensure it has adequate capacity to implement the reforms and recruitments required
by CBR participation. This subcomponent will also support the development of legal
libraries, training courses and programs, and professional gatherings of judges, prosecutors,
and their support staff.
 Case Management will finance the development of an automated court case management
system for the SC. The system will also be piloted in the primary and appellate courts in
Kabul under Component 1 Partnership for Justice. This activity will build on the case
filing reforms implemented nationwide by the SC with the support of USAID.
 Physical Infrastructure activities seek to strengthen JI’s infrastructure
capacity and enhance the physical infrastructure used to deliver services.
achieved through the hiring of additional staff; improving the skills of
(mainly skills related to planning, financing and managing construction
13
management
This will be
professionals
projects and
facilities); developing a Capital Investment Plan (CIP) and additional infrastructure Design
Standards for the MoJ and AGO offices; and constructing courts and offices. Equipment,
implementation services, and technical and user staff development will be included to
improve information management systems in the JI. JI and their employees will be the
beneficiaries of the Physical Infrastructure activities. The people of Afghanistan will also
benefit from buildings which are, by their design, more conducive to the better
performance of JI and sensitive to factors such as gender.
61. The key beneficiaries of the activities to be implemented under this subcomponent will be
employees of JI who will, by the end of the project, benefit from merit based hiring; more
predictable career opportunities; possession of stronger professional backgrounds, transparent
and competent HR services and better access to laws and legal materials. Some of them will
benefit from improved working conditions. The productivity of the SC will be enhanced by an
automated case management. The MoJ, with the help of this project, will be able to take
advantage of the CBR including through more qualified and better paid staff. The ultimate
beneficiaries will be Afghan citizens who will receive better services. This subcomponent will
support sections 1 (Increased Access to Justice), 2 (Improved Efficiency of Justice System), 3
(Improved Capacity of Justice Sector Employees) and 5 (Institutional Strengthening) of NPLJA.
Component 4: Implementation Capacity (US$ 7.5 million)
62. The objective of this component is to further strengthen implementation capacity within the
JI so that they will, in time, be able to implement reforms and other activities without significant
additional assistance. The immediate objective of this component is to facilitate implementation
of the project. (See also Section E).
63. The key beneficiaries of this component are the JI which, as a result of this component, will
be able to absorb more aid and support of international development partners. The component
supports section 5 (Institutional Strengthening) of NPLJA.
Consistency with Country Interim Strategy Note
64. The proposed JSDP is fully aligned with the Bank’s Interim Strategy Note FY12-14 (ISN)
for Afghanistan, supporting all the pillars of the ISN. This specifically includes support for the
pillar related to equitable service delivery, where intervention in the justice sector is highlighted.
Expected Outcomes
65. The project will focus on three results: increased scope and quality of selected legal
service; improved productivity of legal service providers; and enhanced accountability of legal
service providers. The project activities under each component are designed to work towards
generating the above outcomes and, in so doing, will ultimately move the project closer towards
achieving the development objective set forth in the project: namely, to increase access to and
use of legal services.
66. The project is expected to produce the following key outputs which would lead to the
above outcomes. These include: (a) improved of capacity of front line service providers to
deliver key legal services; (b) increased scope and quality of legal aid; (c) improved citizen
14
access to legal information and civil legal education; (d) increased citizen participation in
monitoring the performance of service providers; (e) improved management and provision of
legal services by central legal institutions and; (f) improved project management capacity. Each
of these outputs, while seeking to strengthen a particular theme or focus area identified by the
project as heretofore either weak or non-existent, will also work to reinforce other project
outputs thereby improving the likelihood of the project achieving its desired outcomes. Annex 2
lays out the Project’s Results Framework.
PDO
Increase
access to
and use of
legal
services
Project
Intermediate Outcome
Outcome
Indicators Baseline (2012
Indicators
or Latest Estimate)
Scope and quality of legal services increased
Proposed Target (2017)
Provincial reform strategy
based on community
partnership of justice prepared
Legal aid regulatory framework
includes sustainable targeting
and funding mechanisms
Number of legal outreach units
increased by 4
Productivity of legal service providers
improved
Number of cases in primary
pilot courts increased by 30%
Review of JI map for optimal
scale and specialization
completed
Accountability of legal service providers
enhanced
Case management reform in the
SC completed
Number of information centers
and/citizen complaints system
operational
Information about legal aid
framework and providers
available in local JI and in
information centers
Effective performance
management system for judges
and prosecutors operational
67. Project progress will be assessed at mid-term on the basis of established key
outputs/interim results agreed upon with the JI. Each of these key outputs/interim results
15
corresponds to discrete activities that link directly to sectoral reform and are, therefore,
considered critical to the project.
68. The objective of having these criteria in place is to offer the Bank and the JI an opportunity
to conduct a thorough consultative review of project implementation at mid-term, with particular
attention to the attainment of/delivery on the expected key outputs. This list of expected key
outputs/mid-term results is intended to provide clarity for all parties on how the project will be
evaluated.
69. The project funds are separated into three amounts: Tranche 1 funds (US$ 40 million,
Tranche 2 funds (US$ 30.5 million) and Mid-Term-Review (MTR) Conditional funds (US$15
million). Conditional funds will be included in the request for the second tranche (so that a total
of US$ 45.5 million is requested) only if mid-term review targets have been met. These funds are
earmarked for activities that would be included in the project only if progress on the more critical
areas of the project is apparent, as indicated by the completion of certain critical outputs. While
the activities funded through the conditional allocation contribute to the better achievement of
the PDO, the PDO is not contingent upon their completion. Therefore, they are intentionally
designed to be activities that could be omitted without substantively impacting the achievement
of the PDO. If these targets are met, the allocation to the project requested at the mid-term ARTF
MC will be correspondingly increased to US$ 45.5 million.
70. Drawing on the inherent flexibility of ARTF funding, this performance review would also
inform any adjustments to project design or reprogramming of funds, where this is considered
necessary to better achieve the project objectives. The project could be scaled up or down in size
depending on the demonstrated capacities of the JI to meet these critical targets.
Institution MTR Targets
Conditional
Funds in
Tranche 2
Conditional Activities
(US$ Millions)
Vehicles and equipment
(0.5)
Training (0.5)
Legal Outreach (1)
Legal Fund (0.8)
Legal Aid (2)
Construction (1)
Construction (3)
Training (1)
Professional Gathering (0.2)
Commentaries (0.5)
Construction (3.5)
Internet Networking (0.5)
Professional Gathering (0.2)
Training (0.3)
MOJ
Strategic Plan Approved
Regulatory Framework for Legal
Aid Agreed Upon
Capital Investment Plan Completed
US $5.8 million
SC
Facility Design Standards
Completed
HRM Strategy Completed
Judicial Map Review Completed
Facility Design Standards
Completed
HRM Strategy Completed
Capital Investment Plan Completed
US $4.7 million
AGO
US $4.5 million
TOTAL
US $15 million
16
D. Appraisal of Project Activities
Government Ownership
71. The proposed operation supports the NPLJA prepared in a process led by the GoA. Its
approach to reform has been discussed and endorsed by the key sector actors. The Project design
has benefited from lessons learned from previous reforms implemented by other development
partners and the AJSRP, as well as from extensive consultations with the SC, MoJ, AGO, ILEB,
Afghanistan Independent Bar Association, concerned donors, implementing agencies, and
NGOs. It is safe to say that the project and its implementing arrangements reflect the demands
of the GoA and JI, and the project enjoys GoA’s ownership and support.
Environmental and Social
72. OP/BP 4.01 and OP/BP 4.12 are triggered due to rehabilitation and construction activities
and potential land acquisition requirements for the construction of justice institution facilities.
However, the impacts are envisaged to be limited in duration and spatial extent, and the project
has therefore been assigned Category B status. The project will apply the Environmental and
Social Management Framework (ESMF) developed for the proposed operation, and the
Environmental and Social Management Plans developed for each site. The ESMF provides
guidance on the approach to be taken during implementation for the selection and design of
subprojects/proposed investments and the planning of mitigation measures, guidelines and codes
of practice for an environmental mitigation measures to be incorporated in the design,
contracting and monitoring of sub-projects. Consultation, disclosure and due diligence guidelines
are also considered. Impacts from construction works are expected to be minor, and the project is
expected to have a positive impact due to the benefits of increased access to JI, and improved
quality of infrastructure.
Financial, Economic and Governance
73. The project is expected to have a positive economic impact. The project activities are
designed to generate cost savings, improve productivity and reduce opportunities for corruption.
Annex 10 provides a detailed analysis of the financial and economic impact of the project. The
project will identify and implement improved business processes in the JI, as well as
organizational arrangements that improve the cost effectiveness of the justice systems. Improved
collaboration with the local service providers other than JI, including community organizations,
is anticipated to increase the availability and effectiveness of informal and low cost dispute
resolution mechanisms for citizens, and correspondingly reduce the burden of cases for formal
institutions. These reforms are also expected to reduce the opportunities for corruption in the
system, through process simplification, greater transparency and improved access to information
for citizens. Facilitating improved organizational processes, corruption reduction measures and
improved information is expected to impact positively upon the overall investment climate,
which relies upon predictable law enforcement. The focus upon pilot provinces is expected to
facilitate the investments in these areas and enable local communities to harness the correlative
opportunities of these investments. In the context of transition, in which aid flows are expected
17
to fall dramatically over the next decade, the project will contribute to the fiscal sustainability of
the system.
E. Implementation Arrangements and Financing Plan
Implementation Arrangement
74. The project will be implemented by the JI the SC, the MoJ, and the AGO and will follow
the Bank policies and guidelines. The Bank will be responsible for the supervision of the project.
The project implementation structure builds on and expands the structure established under the
Phase 1 AJSRP. A detailed description of the implementation structure and operational
procedures will be included in the project Operations Manual to be issued within four months
from the date of project effectiveness. The implementation structure includes: (a) a Project
Oversight Committee (POC); (b) Stakeholders Forums (SF); (c) a Project Support Unit (PSU);
(d) Project Units (PU) in the implementing institutions – the SC, the MoJ and the AGO; (e) the
Provincial Project Oversight Committees (PPOC) and their secretariats.
 The POC is responsible for the overall policy, strategic planning and management
oversight of the project. It is composed of the Afghan Chief Justice, Minister of Justice,
Attorney General, and the Minister of Finance. The GoA may appoint additional members
of the POC. The POC members select a chairman who serves as the POC’s Executive
Director. The POC meets at least once every two months. It works closely with the SF.
 The SF affects project implementation through its feedback to the project documents and
reports. It is a consultative forum composed of representatives of legal professions,
academia, civil society and NGOs, the business community, religious leaders, local
government and other interest groups. The regular SF will be created to partner with the
POC and the PPOCs; the POC will organize at least one, and the PPOC at least two,
meetings with the SF per year.
 The PSU serves as the POC’s secretariat. Its responsibilities include: day to day project
management (mainly financial management, procurement and M&E); and operating a
project website. The PSU includes a director who reports to the POC and staff which
reports to the project director. The PSU staff includes a group of approximately ten senior
local and/or international and regional experts in fields such as M&E, Information and
Communication Technology (ICT), and project management (including financial and
procurement management). The PSU will be supported by two or three assistants and an
interpreter. The project director, regional procurement specialist, ICT expert, financial
management specialist and two assistants have already been selected under the AJSRP.
Other staff will be hired on a competitive basis by the POC, in accordance with Bank
guidelines. The PSU works closely with the PUs established in the SC, MoJ, and the AGO.
 The PUs are responsible for day to day management of project activities of the SC, MoJ,
and AGO. A PU is led by a deputy principal of a justice organization supported by a PU
Director. The PU Director is charged with leading a team of local and international experts
who will: (a) coordinate specific reforms such as HRM, training, legal aid, legal awareness
and ICT reform efforts; and (b) manage the project (mainly procurement, FM, contract
18
management and M&E of project activities). The PU Director reports to the Deputy
Principal. The team members report to the project coordinator. The PU Directors and some
experts were selected under the AJSRP. The remaining staff will be selected on a
competitive basis. The PUs work closely with the departments leading a particular reform.
The specific responsibilities of each PU include developing concept notes and terms of
reference for project activities; organizing procurement; securing inputs from departments;
overseeing the work of consultants; and monitoring and reporting on project progress.
 The Provincial Project Oversight Committees supported by their small secretariats will
oversee and implement the Partnership for Justice Program in pilot provinces. The PPOC is
the provincial equivalent of the POC. The PPOCs will report to the POC.
75. Monitoring will take place through continuous and timely reviews of project
implementation to assess delivery, identify challenges and bottlenecks, and explore practical
solutions. M&E will primarily be the responsibility of the PSU which in turn will work with the
staff in the PUs of the three JI to coordinate all activities on M&E. The PSU and PUs will
periodically monitor progress against agreed indicators, as described in the Results Framework
and against key outputs/interim results. As part of M&E, the project will generate regular
quarterly reports and a report for funds tranche release, whichever is earlier. Other key reports
will also include those that report on financials as well as reports providing periodic updates on
implementation progress with all activities; the format and template will be in the project’s
financial, procurement and Operations Manual.
76. Building on the lessons of Phase 1 AJSRP, the project will focus from the outset on having
dedicated M&E staff in the JI for periodic monitoring. Lessons learned from M&E
implementation in Phase 1 indicate a need for investment in capacity building for M&E staff.
This effort will foster the institutionalization of M&E culture within the JI and ultimately be an
investment in the longer-term capacity of JI staff beyond the life of the project.
77.
Data Collection: The Justice Sector suffers from a general absence of robust and reliable
data and a lack of credible baselines. The project will work closely with the PSU and JI to
improve data collection practices. With a view to further strengthening the evidence base, the
project will also commission a baseline survey within the first year of project effectiveness to
take stock of baseline data, which will be periodically updated. Overall, the project will reinforce
the message of the need for better data collection procedures to be adopted by staff, particularly
as data collection takes place largely at the sub-national level, with M&E data flowing bottom-up
for consolidation and reporting at the central level.
Financing Plan
Project Cost by Component
1
2
US$ million
Partnership for Justice
Legal Empowerment
13.05
17.55
A Legal Aid
B Legal Outreach
13.8
3.75
19
3 Organizational Design and Capacity of JI
A Effective Organizational Design
B Capacity of JI
47.4
4.5
42.9
4
7.5
85.5
Project Implementation
TOTAL
Financial Management, Disbursement and Audit Arrangements
78. A Public Financial Management (PFM) performance rating system has been recently
developed for Afghanistan by the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA)
multi-agency partnership program, which includes the Bank, International Monetary Fund,
European Commission, and other agencies. Afghanistan’s ratings against the PFM performance
indicators portray a public sector where financial resources are, by and large, being used for their
intended purposes as authorized by a budget that is processed with transparency and has
contributed to aggregate fiscal discipline.
79. At the central level, financial management and audit functions for the proposed project will
be undertaken through agents contracted under the IDA-financed Public Financial Management
Reform Project II. This is the primary instrument for continuing to strengthen the fiduciary
measures put in place for ensuring transparency and accountability of funds provided by the
Bank and other donors. Under these contracts, two advisers - Financial Management and Audit are responsible for working with the government and line ministries to carry out these core
functions. The former, the Financial Management Agent (FMA) is responsible for helping MoF
maintain the accounts for all public expenditures, including IDA-financed projects and for
building capacity within the government offices for these functions. The latter, the Audit Agent
is responsible for providing technical assistance to the Control and Audit office in the
performance of annual audits.
80. At the project level, the PSU already established under the AJSRP will be responsible for
the overall financial management for the project and will perform the overall key FM functions
for the project. The PSU will be staffed with a financial management specialist and a finance
officer, who will be supported by the financial management specialist of the PU in each of the JI.
The PU's finance staff will work closely with the finance staff of the JI to carry out the day to
day FM activities for the project. The PSU and PUs will utilize an Excel based accounting
system to maintain relevant books of records and generate required periodic reports on the
project activities.
81. Consolidated Quarterly Interim Financial Reports (IFRs) will be prepared by the PSU, and
submitted to the Bank within 45 days from the end of the quarter. Consolidated project reports
will be prepared, reviewed, and approved by the MoF, supported by the FMA.
82. A Designated Account (DA) will be opened at Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB, the Central
Bank) on terms and conditions satisfactory to IDA. The DA will be maintained by the MoF.
Withdrawal applications for new advances and expenditure reports will be submitted monthly.
Fund Flows
20
83. Fund management for the project will follow existing procedures. As with all public
expenditure, all payments under the project will be routed through MoF. The FMA will assist
the MoF in executing and recording project payments. In keeping with current practices for
other projects in Afghanistan, the DA will be operated by the Special Disbursement Unit (SDU)
in the Treasury Department, MoF. Requests for payments from DA funds will be made to the
SDU by PSU and the 3 PUs. In addition to payments from DA funds, the PSU/PUs can also
request the SDU to make direct payments to consultants, consulting firms or suppliers, and
special commitments for contracts covered by letters of credit. Such requests will follow Bank
procedures. All withdrawal applications to IDA, including replenishment, reimbursement, and
direct payment applications, will be prepared and submitted by MoF.
Accounting and Reporting
84. The PSU and the PUs will maintain essential project transaction records using an Excel
based accounting system and generate required monthly, quarterly, and annual reports.
85. The AJSRP FM Manual1, to be updated by the PSU, and to be approved by the Bank by
July 31, 2012, will include: (a) financial management arrangements for the proposed project; (b)
roles and responsibilities of PSU/PUs staff and the linkages with the JI finance departments; (c)
documentation and approval procedures for payments; (d) project reporting requirements; and (e)
quality assurance measures to help ensure that adequate internal controls and procedures are in
place and are being followed.
86. The FM Manual will also establish project financial management in accordance with
standard Afghan government policies and procedures including use of the government Chart of
Accounts to record project expenditures. Overall project accounts will be maintained centrally in
SDU, which will be ultimately responsible for recording of all project expenditures and receipts
in the Government’s accounting system. Reconciliation of project expenditure records with MoF
records will be carried out monthly primarily by the PSU, supported by the PUs.
Disbursement Method
87. Disbursements from the grant will be transaction-based, with replenishment,
reimbursement, direct payment, and payments under Special Commitments including full
documentation or against statements of expenditures, as appropriate.
Audit of Project Funds
88. The Auditor General, supported by the Audit Agent, is responsible for auditing the
accounts of all IDA-financed projects; it will also be responsible for this project’s audit. Annual
audited project financial statements will be submitted within six months of the close of GoA’s
fiscal year.
89. The Bank-funded project already implemented or currently being implemented by MoJ, SC
and AGO (Phase 1 AJSRP) have no overdue audit reports, ineligible expenditures or overdue
1
The FM manual will be a part of Operations manual.
21
interim financial reports. Key issues raised in the audit reports have been resolved up to Solar
Year 1388. The issues raised in the solar year 1389 audit report have been communicated to
MoJ, and responses are awaited.
90.
The responsible entities for the audit report are MoJ, SC and AGO.
91.
Detailed financial management arrangements for the project can be found in Annex 5.
Procurement
92. Procurement for the Project will be administrated in accordance with the Bank’s
“Guidelines: Procurement of Goods, Works, and Non-Consulting Services” dated January 2011.
“Guidelines: Selection and Employment of Consultants” dated January 2011 and the provisions
stipulated in the Financing Agreement. In addition, the Bank’s “Guidelines on Preventing and
Combating Corruption in Projects Financed by IBRD Loans and IDA Credits and Grants” dated
October 15, 2006 has been shared with the recipient. The Bank’s Standard Bidding Documents,
Requests for Proposals, and Forms of Consultant Contract will be used. Civil works and goods
following National Competitive Bidding (NCB) procedures shall be procured using the agreed
Standard Bidding Documents (SBDs) for Afghanistan. In case of conflict/contradiction between
the Bank’s procurement procedures and any national rules and regulations, the Bank’s
procurement procedures will take precedence as per the Article 4(2) of the Procurement Law
July 2008 (Amendments in January 2009 incorporated) of the GOA, the IDA
Procurement/Consultant Guidelines shall prevail. The general description of various
procurements under different expenditure categories are described in Annex 6: Procurement
Arrangements. A detailed procurement plan is being prepared for the Project as part of the
Procurement arrangement (See Annex 6).
93. With donor assistance, Afghanistan has made considerable efforts to establish the Legal
and Regulatory Framework for public procurement over the last five years. A Procurement Law,
reflecting international best practice in public procurement was enacted in November 2005
replacing the earlier procurement regulations. While the law provides a very modern legal
system for procurement, effective implementation of the law may encounter difficulties in the
current weak institutional structure and capacity of the Government. A Procurement Policy Unit
(PPU) has now been established under MoF to ensure implementation through the creation of
secondary legislation, standard bidding documents, provision of advice, creation of the necessary
information systems for advertising and data collection. “Rules of Procedure for Public
Procurement,” which details the better implementation of the Procurement Law, has been issued
by MoF as circular number PPU/C005/1386 dated April 12, 2007. The Procurement Appeal and
Review mechanism is in place and the Manual of Procedures for “Procurement Appeal and
Review” has been issued by MoF as circular number PPU/N001/1385 on March 18, 2007. The
Procurement Law was revised in July 2008 and amended in January 2009 and issued as a new
Law by the Ministry of Justice and was published in the Official Gazette Number 957,
29.10.1387 (18 January 2009). The revised “Rules of Procedures for Public Procurement” has
also been issued as circular PPU/C027/1387 of November 18, 2009.
22
94. The Special Procurement Commission (SPC) comprising the MoJ and Ministry of
Economy (MoE), under the chairmanship of MoF, approves high-value contracts. These
approvals will be done according to Article 91 of the Afghan Public Procurement Law.
95. In the absence of adequate capacity to manage procurement activities effectively, some
interim arrangements have been put in place to improve Afghanistan’s procurement
management. Specifically, a central procurement facilitation service, the ARDS Procurement
Unit, has been established under the supervision of MoE.
96. SC, MoJ, and AGO are the implementing agencies and will be responsible for all
procurement to be carried out for the project. However, it has been assessed that the capacity of
these implementing agencies to handle procurement under Bank Guidelines needs to be
strengthened. For all large value procurements, ARDS and PSU will assist MoJ, SC and AGO to
ensure procurement compliance, as and when required. In addition, the Procurement Policy Unit
(PPU) embeds procurement specialists in the line ministries to provide technical assistance,
oversight, capacity building and assistance for complex procurements. Moreover, the PSU will
be strengthened by hiring the services of one International Procurement Consultant financed for
the duration of at minimum two years. A general description of various procurements under
different expenditure categories can be found in Annex 6. A detailed procurement plan has been
prepared for the project.
97.
Project procurement involves the following:
 Consultancy services (firms or individuals);
 Works contract for infrastructure development of MoJ, SC and AGO; and
 Procurement of goods, IT equipment and non-consultant services for the project.
F. Key Risks and Mitigating Measures
98. The project risks and mitigation measures and process are detailed in the Operational Risk
Assessment Framework (ORAF) in Annex 4, and summarized below.
99. The overall risk to achieving the PDO is assessed to be “High”. The risk to successful
implementation of the project is also “High”. Besides the general country level risks (such as
security, political instability, changes in leadership of selected ministries, slower than anticipated
implementation of correlated reforms) which are beyond the project’s control, key risks include:
 Project Stakeholder Risks: Legal pluralism and forum shopping is deeply entrenched
with local community power structures and allegiances and very difficult to change;
accountability structures may be inadequate while incentives may take time to actualize;
weak commitment to reforms in JI exacerbated by uneven engagement across institutions;
transition and the anticipation of decrease of funds may encourage: (i) unhealthy competition
for funds; and (ii) distort the choice of reform; volatile political context may result in
frequent changes in leadership; judicial institutions are highly conservative in nature and
23
often resist change based on arguments of judicial independence; and limited access for
citizens to project information due to high illiteracy rates.
 Implementing Agency Risks: The increased amount of responsibilities to be delegated to
the JI will place a strain on capacity; weak FM capacity may slow project implementation;
overall capacity in the JI for complex tasks is limited; different levels of capacity exist
between the JI but throughout all of them, decision making and business processes remain ad
hoc and not well formalized; decision making processes across all JI remain centralized with
little engagement of provincial and district level authorities
 Governance and Project Monitoring: These include environmental and social risks due to
construction and rehabilitation works; weak implementation capacity in JI; weak governance
in JI for transparency and accountability; and weak supervision and monitoring mechanisms
for implementation.
100. Key mitigation measures include: Triggers and tranches financing mechanism and focus on
results; leveraging of numerous interest groups (businesses, local communities) combined with a
participatory approach (for example in relation to the development of sector-wide strategic plans)
should provide space for consensus building to overcome competitiveness for resources as well
as increase pressure on leaders to implement reforms; linking with other priority Afghan
Government projects (for example the CBR project) will ensure longer term sustainability of the
investments and reforms; implementation of pay and grading reforms throughout the JI will
improve the opportunities for career progression and improve HR management, thereby reducing
incentives for nepotism and corruption in the system; use of an Environmental and Social
Management Framework; strong implementation structure with decentralized project units in JI
and centralized coordination unit; emphasis on transparency in relation to all procurement
processes; and clear M&E framework and development of M&E capacity.
101. For project success the JI will have to work cooperatively together at the macro level. The
POC will provide relevant oversight and guidance in this regard. However, on a day to day basis,
the JI will have to coordinate closely with the central PSU to ensure timeliness and accuracy in
relation to all procurement and implementation functions. The project will provide the necessary
support for capacity to the PSU to be able to deliver the services required to the JI to enable them
to undertake all project activities – including monitoring and supervision – effectively. Close and
constant World Bank supervision will also be required to ensure that this project remains well
coordinate and on track. Donors can also reinforce the need for on-going government
commitment during project implementation.
102. Reform of the justice sector represents a challenge in any environment – not just a fragile
and conflict affected one. The Bank, however, now has substantial experience and numerous
good practice lessons which can be applied to this project in order to ensure that effective results
are achieved. Additionally, the risk of not engaging in the justice sector – particularly at the time
of transition - is even more significant, since without an effective justice system that citizens
have faith in and which is providing services that meet the broad demands of communities, other
development activities (such as the provision of effective health, education and infrastructure
services) may be jeopardized in the medium to long term. While recognizing that political
conditions in Afghanistan remain highly fluid, the relatively long term commitment of this
24
project, together with the focus on results, should provide a relatively stable platform for the
reform and continued effective delivery of basic justice services on a nationwide basis.
G. Terms and Conditions for Project Financing
103. The Project will be US$85.5 million “results-based” grant over a five year period,
supporting the National Priority Program for Rule of Law for All. A first tranche of US$40
million will be requested at the start of the project. At mid-term, an evaluation of the project will
be undertaken according to the mid-term outputs/interim results. Of the second tranche of
US$45.5 million, US$15 million is conditional upon the achievement of agreed mid-term
outcomes, and US$30.5 million is non-conditional. If all targets are achieved, then the total
request for tranche two will be US$45.5. If all targets are not met, then the request for further
allocation to the Project will be reduced accordingly. This is to ensure that there is sufficient
progress in areas critical to the overall project objectives.
25
Annex 1: Detailed Description of Project Components
AFGHANISTAN: JUSTICE SERVICE DELIVERY PROJECT
104. The project has four components. First, Partnership for Justice (US$ 13.05 million),
second, Legal Empowerment (US$ 17.55 million), third, Organization and Capacity of Justice
Institutions (US$47.4 million) and fourth, Implementation Capacity (US$7.5 million).
Component 1: Partnership for Justice (US$ 13.05 million)
105. The immediate objective of this component is to increase the scope and quality of legal
services in selected provinces and districts. Its ultimate goal is to help justice institutions (JI) and
community organizations to play their role in improving the business environment and enhancing
economic growth. The goal and objective will be achieved by: (a) improving collaboration
among local JI; (b) strengthening capacity of courts and Hoqooqs; and (c) engaging other local
legal service providers such as community organizations and leaders in community justice
partnerships with state JI.
106. One of the key strategies for ensuring long term growth in Afghanistan is centered on the
development of “resource corridors” (developed infrastructure zones linked to urban areas which
will be driven by the development of extractive industries). The subcomponent will support this
strategy in two ways. First, it will focus on enforcement of property rights and enforcement of
contracts (mainly on the disputes related to land ownership and land registrations) and legal
services to the communities impacted by these developments (for example, ensuring that citizens
have a means for redress in relation to contractual provisions contained in mining contracts, such
as development of services and infrastructure for citizens, or revenue allocation). Second, it will
focus on geographical locations with more dynamic business communities and/or significant
developmental projects and plans.
107. The Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GoA) has tentatively selected four
pilot provinces, Kabul, Herat, Bamiyan and Logar, as the component pilot sites. A pilot site will
include the provincial but also district institutions in two districts in each province. Pilot districts
will be selected against agreed upon criteria, cooperatively by the central and relevant local
justice and administrative institutions in consultations with the Office of Governor and
Municipalities.
108. The component will target the following legal services and providers: dispute mediation
and arbitration (provided mainly by jirgas, Hoqooqs and courts); publically funded civil legal
advice (provided mainly by Hoqooqs); issuance and registration of land titles (provided by
primary courts and makhzans); and provision of legal information and civic legal education
(provided mainly by Hoqooqs).
109. To ensure desired results, the component will harness the considerable potential of nonstate legal service providers including community based organizations to mediate disputes and
build upon their fast expanding collaboration with the Afghan state dispute resolution actors.
Rather than attempt to reform and strengthen informal institutions the project will seek to: forge
sustainable consensus-based community justice partnerships between JI and other service
providers while strengthening performance of provincial and district courts, Hoqooqs, and if
26
needed, offices of public prosecution and legal aid offices. Improved performance should
increase the competitiveness of state sub-national justice institutions and facilitate their quest to
be the chosen forum for dispute resolution.
110. The community partnership among local organizations will be voluntary and “custom
made”. It will be based on mutually beneficial goals and should lead to such results as: improved
communication and collaboration among institutions; clearer understanding of and consensus on
division of roles and jurisdictions among local institutions (in accordance to Afghan law);
streamlined and uniformly applied processes governing interagency relationships (from the first
application to the execution of a decision); shared record-keeping systems and information
exchange (on individual cases and decisions); and citizen involvement in evaluation and
monitoring of service providers (e.g., through the carrying out of public hearings and trials, the
publishing of decisions, and the increased availability of complaint boxes, hotlines for legal
consultations, and related tools). The reforms of provincial and district institutions will be
closely aligned with the vertical reforms implemented by the central JI (See also: Components 2.
Legal Empowerment and 3. Organization and Capacity of Justice Institutions).
111. The component will finance technical assistance (TA) and investment to the local state
institutions – mainly courts and Hoqooqs. Limited support in the form of TA will be provided to
non-state service providers and stakeholders, mainly to increase their access to information or
involve them in data sharing, and to improve their knowledge about legal framework and state
systems.
112. First, assistance will be provided to prepare a three to four year action plan (the Plan) based
upon an assessment of legal needs and an efficiency review of local JI which will be prepared
under Component 3 a) Effective Organizational Design. The plan will be undertaken by the
provincial and district JI in consultation with all local stakeholders under the leadership of a
Provincial Project Oversight Committee (PPOC). Initially, the Plan will propose only a basic
cooperation framework and a set of prioritized, sequenced, and costed specific reforms. The Plan
will evolve based on the results of additional analytical work, consultations with stakeholders,
and on-going implementation results. The Plan will include a road map for establishing the
community justice partnership and a strategy for involving stakeholders (e.g. the business
community) and the broader public in pursuing the above mentioned social goals. The reform
plans will be carried out in consultation with the relevant central institutions and coordinated
with those institutions’ reform plans.
113. Next, the Project will finance the implementation of this Plan. This will include support
for: (a) developing compatible systems for record keeping, case processing and information
exchange; (b) establishing and operating community information points that can offer readily
available information on service providers and “first aid” consultation and advice; (c) developing
phone based services and complaint systems; (d) consultations and conventional outreach
programs. The majority of resources will be spent to enhance the capacity of courts and
Hoqooqs. These investments will involve minor updates to physical infrastructure (the updates
should not exceed US$ 0.05 million in budget and one year of implementation); reengineering
and streamlining business operations; helping to develop appropriate skills of staff; improving
management practices; and introducing incentives for a more service-oriented culture among
providers. In Kabul the project will assist in developing and testing simple automated case
27
management and case tracking systems in the offices of Hoqooq and primary and appellate
courts, and a digital records management system for Property Deeds Registries in all piloted
courts. The objectives of automation include modest but sustainable improvements in staff
efficiency, records management, public information, and performance data for management
decision-making and M&E. If successful, and subject to the availability of resources, these pilot
systems will be rolled out to other offices and courts.
114. The cooperation among service providers will likely reduce competition among dispute
resolution forums and reduce forum shopping by users. It will result in the specialization of
providers, and consistency and predictability of commonly applied justice processes and their
outcomes. The greater capacity of local JI will allow service providers to process cases quickly
and at lesser cost. Publically available information about rights and service providers will reduce
the information gap between legal professionals and citizens, which in turn will help people to
make wiser choices in their navigation of the legal system. All of the above will make the
system more transparent and will allow for greater accountability of service providers. The key
results indicators for measuring whether or not there have been improvements in the right
direction will include: an agreed upon and tested model of collaboration among local JI for
dispute resolution established and number of information centers and complaints systems
operational.
115. The PPOC will steer the preparation and implementation of the provincial programs and
coordinate implementation of the district programs. The PPOC will be composed of the
principals of the relevant local JI, the provincial governor and at least two representatives of nonstate institutions (if the proposed reforms involve these institutions). A chief justice will chair
the PPOC unless members decide otherwise. The PPOC will report to the Project Oversight
Committee (the POC). The PPOC will be supported by a small secretariat responsible for day to
day management of the projects. The Project Support Unit (PSU) and Project Units (PUs) in the
Supreme Court (SC), Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and the Attorney General’s Office (AGO), will
work closely with the secretariats. They will advise them (along the lines of their
responsibilities) on project management issues; in particular, they will assist with drafting project
documents and advise on procurement and financial management matters.
Component 2: Legal Empowerment (US$ 17.55 million)
116. The objective of this component is to increase people’s ability to participate in public
(state) redress or a dispute resolution system. The objective will be achieved through the supply
of a larger volume and better quality of publically funded legal defense lawyers against criminal
charges (legal aid); through outlining more effective policies for civil legal aid; and through legal
outreach and civic education. If successful as a Capacity Building for Results (CBR) ministry,
the MoJ will leverage CBR assistance in order to institutionalize legal aid providers. The
component has two subcomponents: (a) Legal Aid (US$13.8 million) and (b) Legal Awareness
(US$3.75 million).
a) Legal Aid (US$ 13.8 million)
117. The reform under this subcomponent seeks to enlarge the existing state legal aid while also
enhancing its effectiveness and sustainability. The existing state legal aid system comprises 66
28
lawyers employed by the MoJ in 16 provinces - Badakhshan, Baghlan, Balkh, Farah, Faryab,
Ghazni, Herat, Jawzjan, Kabul, Kandahar, Kapisa, Kunduz, Nangarhar, Paktia, Parwan, Takhar
and 35 “Legal Aid Providers” in 8 provinces (Baghlan, Balkh, Bamiyan, Herat, Kabul, Kunduz,
Nangarhar and Paktika), funded by the Phase 1 Afghanistan Justice Sector Reform Project
(AJSRP).
118. The legal defense system subsidized by the state will expand mainly by opening a few new
legal aid offices, adding legal aid providers and by integrating the International Legal
Foundation-Afghanistan (ILF-A) with 13 offices and 73 lawyers into the state network. The
effectiveness and efficiency of the system will be increased by reforms targeting capacity,
management practices, and performance incentives for the whole system and individual
providers. These reforms will include the cooperation of providers with police and courts to
ensure that the role of defense counsel is properly recognized. The expansion and overall
sustainability of the publically funded legal service will be secured mainly through reforms of
funding mechanisms; better calibration of the system to the needs of the people but also available
funds; efficiency gains; and through the proposed creation of a technical cadre of legal aid
providers with the status of civil servants through Capacity Building for Results Facility (CBR).
119. Civil legal aid, which is provided mainly by the Hoqooq, will be directly supported under
the project only in a limited capacity. The organization, performance and fiscal sustainability of
providing civil legal aid is a key but unknown challenge for the GoA at present. No coherent
Government policy currently exists in this regard. Under this component, an assessment of needs
and potential of Hoqooqs, private sector and other mechanisms to deliver legal service and civil
legal aid would be conducted (within the first year of the project). Thereafter TA will be
provided to implement the recommendations. It is expected that the analytics which the project
will finance coupled with the efficiency gains and increased demand from the citizenry for more
effective institutions, will result in resources being allocated internally more efficiently to meet
the demand for civil legal aid.
120. Under this sub-component the project will finance TA and investment to the Legal Aid
Department (LAD),Hoqooq Department, and Independent Legal Aid Board (ILAB) in support of
the following activities:
 Regulatory framework for legal aid: This will include two activities: (a) operational
support for the ILAB; and (b) revision of a current policy and regulatory framework for legal
aid. The former will seek to enable functioning of ILAB through funding of its day to day
operations. The latter will seek to enable ILAB to perform its main responsibility, which is
to manage the legal aid system as a whole. The project will support research, consultations
and policy, regulation and law drafting in the field of legal service and legal aid. The work
will be concerned with: the market for civil legal aid (from both a demand and supply side
perspective); the cost and price of legal services; the fiscal sustainability of legal aid (funding
alternatives and eligibility criteria will be explored); effective governance and management
of legal aid; and developing options for sustainable civil legal aid.
 Consolidation and expansion of the state legal aid system: This will mean: (a) a
continuation of funding operation and maintenance costs of the legal aid offices and
personnel supported under Phase 1 AJSRP; (b) development of a detailed consolidation plan
29
for a smooth integration of ILF-A and its unification with the LAD; and (c) creation of
additional legal aid offices. The consolidation plan will provide a step by step guide for
integration, an assessment of capacity needs for a unified legal aid system, and development
of a legal aid related strategy for transitioning the MoJ to Tier 2 and 1 under the CBR (See
Component 1 Partnership for Justice) or in other parts of the country). It will also propose
alternative solutions for the sustainability of Legal Aid, should MoJ be unable to enter Tier 1.
 Enhancement of legal aid capacity: Under this activity the project will support mainly:
(a) reorganization of LAD; (b) strengthening its human resource management system
(HRM); (c) development of a basic automated case tracking system to support Legal-Aid
staff, professionals and management in up to 30 provincial offices; and (d) introduction of an
integrated management information system connecting provincial offices to MoJ HQ. The
project will also provide for necessary technology to support the above changes. The HRM
reform will include a reorganization of personnel, the development of a career path and
grading functions within the LAD and legal aid offices (including the development of
necessary technical and administrative positions to support lawyers, and the setting of new
standards both in terms of individuals’ qualifications and abilities and in the expected output
of numbers and types of cases) and developing a simple performance management system.
The purpose here is to ensure consistency between all lawyers employed at the LAD and the
smooth transition of the key staff into the LAD’s tashkeel should the MoJ successfully enter
Tier 1 of CBR. It is expected that the integration of the ILF-A lawyers into the LAD will
allow for a continued increase in capacity and the internalization of abilities and skills more
broadly as the ILF-A lawyers and management train relevant counterparts. Therefore, for
instance, all training needs and associated costs for the LAD will be internalized during this
stage. Similarly, initial information, case and performance management equipment will be
obtained from the ILF-A. The physical assets (including IT equipment) of the ILF-A will
also be fully integrated and absorbed into the functions of the Ministry in line with the needs
of the new business plan and legal aid policies. Thereafter, additional equipment to fill any
gaps (both geographically and technologically) will be funded by the project.
 A Legal Aid Fund will be created to test and roll out innovative and cost effective
methods of delivering legal aid. Three schemes to be piloted include:
a) The expansion of the “sub-contracting private lawyers delivery model”, which was
piloted on “cases in absentia” during the first phase of the project. Under this activity the
project will finance: (a) costs associated with strengthening the capacity of the LAD in
order to improve selection of the best providers; to negotiate and agree on contracts; to
make sure that services are, in fact supplied and that providers are paid based on their
performance; and to manage good relationships with both clients and service providers;
(b) costs of services; and (c) at the end of the project, an assessment of this program,
which will include a cost benefit analysis of this delivery model.
b)
The provision of “on duty” lawyers to assist those arrested at police stations, both
virtually and in person; and in provincial courts to assist those who have not yet been
introduced to a lawyer but are at court for a hearing This will ensure that individuals get
access to a legal representative as swiftly as possible at low costs.
30
c) User reporting system: A direct reporting system will be developed to allow users and
recipients of legal aid services to report on their satisfaction with regard to the services
received. Reporting will be a part of performance M&E system. The pilot schemes will
be first placed in the “pilot regions” and later be rolled out to other provinces. The pilot
schemes will be closely aligned with investments and reforms undertaken as part of
Component 1 Partnership for Justice.
121. The consolidation of the state legal aid system should result in an economy of scale and
specialization which will have a positive impact on the volume of service. Subcontracting of
private lawyers should invigorate the private market and lead to less dependence on legal aid.
The capacity building activities will increase the transparency and productivity of the system.
These activities include incentives for front line providers to perform at more efficient and
effective levels. Testing the most cost effective methods for service delivery should have a
similar effect. In addition, reporting by users will likely increase the accountability of service
providers. The proposed policy reforms and underlining research are intended to reverse current
ineffective policies (such as a cap of seven cases per month per provider). Policy reforms
prioritize more accurate targeting, financing of legal aid and effectiveness and efficacy of
providers.
122. The key results indicators for measuring whether there have been constructive
improvements will include: Legal aid framework includes realistic targeting and funding
mechanism and productivity incentives and collaboration frameworks between legal aid
providers (MoJ and legal aid offices, Afghanistan Independent Bar Association (AIBA), NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs) and enforcement agencies (courts, public prosecution,
police) are operational.
123. The MoJ will be in charge of implementing the majority of the reforms of the state legal aid
system, while the ILAB will be responsible for implementing the projects under its aegis. The
ILAB and MoJ will work closely to ensure a smooth flow of information with regard to the
policies developed by the ILAB and the implementation capacities of the MoJ. This process will
therefore map the intended new policy and regulatory setting functions of the ILAB and MoJ.
b) Legal Outreach (US$ 3.75 million)
124. The objectives of this subcomponent are threefold: (a) to help the Afghan people
internalize an awareness of their rights, entitlements, obligations and responsibilities into their
choices and interactions with the government administration and private actors; (b) to improve
the ability of the users of the justice system to monitor and influence legal service providers; and
(c) to secure the proposed reforms for the stakeholders. The program will therefore work along
three strands: (a) increasing knowledge of citizens’ rights; (b) increasing awareness and
dispelling misconceptions with regard to the operations of state JI; and (c) empowering citizens
by giving them greater knowledge with regard to their options.
125. The proposed reform is a follow up to the legal awareness program implemented under the
Phase 1 AJSRP, which financed predominantly knowledge based empowerment activities
loosely coupled with legal aid. Project activities under the Phase 1 AJSRP have been limited to a
media unit of the Hoqooq Department in the MoJ (previously responsible for state legal outreach
31
programs) and three legal outreach units in Balkh, Kunduz and Nangarhar. The Justice Service
Delivery Project (JSDP) will build on this experience and expand the previous program in terms
of JI involvement, range of activities and geographical outreach. All three JI will be engaged in
this endeavor, thus leveraging the opportunities to promote awareness of rights and obligations.
However, the MoJ will continue to be the lead implementer. The program will spread out to at
least 5 new provinces, four of which will be the pilot sites under Component 1 Partnership for
Justice. The program is aligned with the National Legal Awareness Strategy passed by the
Government in 2011.
126. Under this component the project will finance TA and goods to: (a) the MoJ (the LAD,
which recently took over responsibility for legal outreach from the Hoqooq Department) and the
Publication Department; (b) the MoJ’s provincial units in charge of legal outreach; (c) the SC
(the Publication Department); and (d) the AGO (the Publication Department) in support of the
following activities:
 Developing communication strategies: which will help the JI to identify communication
methods and processes to understand and engage key audiences in support of achieving JI
reform objectives.

Materials and Operational Cost Support: This support will include:
a) Funding operating costs of the existing provincial units and the costs associated with
the expansion of the units to at least five new provinces, including the provision of
necessary Information and Communication Technology (ICT) equipment;
b) Developing, disseminating and broadcasting legal awareness materials including:
production of print-media materials (e.g. pamphlets, posters, newspapers, books);
production of broadcast media (radio and TV shows); and
c) Supporting a range of capacity building activities such as strategic advice and various
forms of trainings.
127. The component will contribute to two project result areas: increased scope and quality of
legal services, and improved accountability of service providers. The scope of services will be
increased indirectly through the strengthened capacity of the MoJ and other JI to manage and
coordinate awareness activities. Increasing the volume of awareness activities (through engaging
all JI, adding new provincial offices and staff and raising the range of activities) provides the
direct contribution of the project to this result area. Legal knowledge will empower people in two
ways: it will allow them to navigate the legal system more effectively and will help to keep legal
service providers accountable for their behavior.
128. The key results indicator for measuring whether there have been improvements in the
above direction will be: 4 legal outreach units created.
Component 3: Organization and Capacity of Justice Institutions (US$47.4 million)
129. The objective of this component is to improve the capacity of the JI to manage and deliver
legal services. This will be achieved by: (a) reforming JI’s organizational designs (functions,
32
jurisdictions, organizations, structures, and procedures); and (b) strengthening the JI’s critical
capacities (focusing on human capital and physical infrastructure).
130. The component has two subcomponents: (a) Effective Organizational Design (US$4.5
million); and (b) Strengthening Capacity of State Justice Institutions (US$42.9 million).
a) Effective Organizational Design (US$ 4.5 million)
131. The subcomponent seeks to align the mandate, functions, and structure of JI to the current
societal needs and people’s demands. The subcomponent will finance TA for data collection and
analytical work; consultations with stakeholders; and policy reforms that are concerned with the
asymmetry between demand and supply of legal services and a lack of fiscal sustainability of
their delivery over the short, medium and long term. This work should increase the knowledge of
Afghan decision makers, legal professionals, and the broader public regarding the key obstacles
to access to legal services and potential solutions and their impacts. In the longer run, it will help
to develop an adequate, evidence based approach to policy response to the problems Afghanistan
face.
132. The project will support the following activities:
 Diagnostic and baseline analysis will involve the initial assessment of the paths to justice
that people and businesses have to “travel” in order to resolve their non-trivial legal problems
and disputes. The assessment will be concerned with: (a) needs and demand for legal
services; (b) people’s response strategies to problems that might have a resolution via legal
means; and (c) comparison of the results across jurisdictions and institutions. The purpose of
the assessments is threefold: (a) to diagnose local legal practices and preferences and inform
reform designs; (b) to lay a foundation for the provincial reform plans under Component 1
Partnership for Justice; and (c) to provide baseline data for measuring improvements
achieved by the project. This work will be closely related to the implementation of the
activities under Component 1 Partnership for Justice; For example, in year 1, the survey will
be started in the four pilot provinces (Logar, Bamiyan, Herat, Kabul) with the results being
subject to immediate analysis to inform the activities under Component 1, while the survey is
completed on a broader scale nationwide. The initial assessment will be followed by at least
two follow up assessments designed to measure the project progress.
 Analysis of institutional response to this demand: This research will be concerned with
the factors which influence JI’s performance, such as costs, capacity, incentives, confidence
and culture. It will include:
a) Organizational preconditions for effective service delivery: This sub-activity will
analyze issues of: functions and jurisdiction (to explain cost and benefits of such
practices as “unlimited appeals”; excessive forum shopping; de novo processes at the
appellate or SC level; and concentration of decision making in the SC); independence and
accountability safeguards (to explain the impact of internal institutional dependence and a
lack of due process or reasoned decisions); and the flexibility of the system to match
demand and supply for services. This will attempt to answer the questions about the
numbers, size and location of courts and other offices. This information will help explain
33
whether courts operate at optimal scale and specialization vis-a-vis current requests for
massive investment in physical assets and human capacity. The analysis will be based in
large part upon the nationwide demand survey conducted above.
b) Analysis of procedures for contract enforcement: This analysis will focus on the
efficiency and effectiveness of commercial and selected civil procedures. The objective
is to identify opportunities for reducing costs, time and procedural formalism while
improving the protection of litigants.
 MoJ’s 5-year Strategic Plan: The Strategic Plan should set out the ministry’s vision, and
thus guide the ministry’s activities. A valid strategic plan is also likely to be a pre-requisite
for participation in CBR, due to its central role in guiding any reform process. The strategic
plan will need to clarify the mandate and goals of the MoJ, and establish the strategy for
achieving its goals over the next 5 years. The subcomponent will finance the costs of TA to
assess ministerial resource needs, including an assessment of donor activities; assist the
ministry to assess and prioritize its strategic objectives; support an assessment of ministry
organizational structures, with scope for de-concentration of activities and responsibility to
sub-national institutions; and enable the development of a costed and prioritized timetable to
implement the Strategic Plan.
133. Related research, consultations and policy discussions will be carried out for publically
subsidized legal aid under Component 2. (a) Legal Aid. Local surveys of demand for legal
services will be carried out in coordination with Component 1, Partnership for Justice.
134. The relevant JI will be responsible for conducting research and organizing consultations
and policy dialogues. In the SC, the Chief Justice with the High Judicial Council will be
responsible for the implementation of this component. Within four months from the beginning of
the project, the SC and AGO will develop and submit to the Project Oversight Committee (POC)
a research plan, which will provide a list of and timetable for research projects, consultations and
policy dialogues.
135. The contribution to the project results here will be: increased knowledge and understanding
by decision makers and stakeholders of factors that influence the performance of JI, subject to
the will of decision makers to implement often complicated reforms. The key result indicator to
assess whether progress has been achieved will be: Organizational map for courts, public
defenders offices and Hoqooqs completed.
b) Strengthening Capacity of State Justice Institutions (US$ 42.9 million)
136. The objective of this component is to enable JI to manage its critical resources: people and
physical assets, for the goal of improved service delivery. This will be achieved by strengthening
management and service delivery practices in the central JI and their sub national branches. The
project activities will to a large extent build on, complement, and/or expand reforms
implemented under the Phase 1 AJSRP (2008-2011), as well as ongoing government and donor
activities.
34
137. HRM reform is particularly critical, because the performance of JI and their service
delivery depends above all upon people’s inputs. In Afghanistan to date, people’s input has been
almost a sole source of JI productivity. HR reforms in MoJ through both JSDP and CBR will
strengthen the link between the additional capacity and resources coming into the ministry, and
the performance results it demonstrates. The additional salaries and support available through
CBR will increase the MoJ’s chances of retaining the best professionals, and improve capacity to
hold staff accountable for outcomes and hence sustain the results of the most important reforms
such as reform of legal aid. MoJ will seek CBR Tier 2 support by mid 2013, and Tier 1 approval
by 2016.
138. Other HR reforms (e.g. performance management reform) will target work force
productivity and accountability. Asset management reform and ICT support are designed to
improve the working environment of legal professionals and increase their productivity and
transparency, hence accountability. The key results indicators against which the progress in
achieving the above results will be measured include: Pay and Grading reform (P&G)
completed; performance system for judges in place; five year training plan developed; number of
buildings constructed; and Capital Investment Plan prepared.
139. The subcomponent includes three clusters of activities: (a) Human Capital (US$ 15.1
million); (b) Case Management Reform (US$1.75 million); and (c) Reform of Physical
Infrastructure (US$ 26.05 million).
Human Capital (US$ 15.1 million)
140. The reforms under this subcomponent seek to: increase alignment of human resource
management (HRM) functions, capacity, and processes with justice sector business needs;
encourage professional affiliations and exchange of information and views on relevant legal
subjects; and intensify learning and training of the workforce in state JI.
141. Under this cluster the project will finance TA to the SC, and AGO and/or MoJ for
following activities:
 Support to Reform Implementation Management Unit (RIMU) units for reform
implementation: Completion of the pay and grading reform (P&G) of civil servants: This
reform will be concerned with the re-grading of positions, re-structuring of the tashkeel, and
recruitment of staff through competitive, merit based P&G processes in the SC and AGO for
all civil servant positions. In AGO, this process is still at the initial stages, and it is expected
that implementation of P&G reform will take up to 2 years. SC will be assisted to continue its
recruitment under P&G reform as required. It is estimated that the SC will need an additional
year to complete the reform. The project will bear the costs associated with operating a
Reform Implementation Management Unit (RIMU) created under the Phase 1 AJSRP.
Additional assistance (in the form of consultant services, training and equipment) may be
necessary to synchronize this reform with the HRM reform for judges and prosecutors.
 Developing and implementing HRM strategies for courts and prosecutorial offices: The
HRM Strategy should be concerned with matching human resources to medium and longer
term business needs as defined through functions and jurisdictions, existing and forecasted
35
workload, procedures and operations and broader planning documents. It will be guided by
two principles: sustainability and affordability. As such it will promote effective use of
human resources while, recognizing, in case of courts, that judicial independence drives court
philosophy, structure, and decisions. The strategy should also be responsive to the particular
issues the current systems face, such as: the challenge of coordinating two tracks of HRM
systems; an aging labor force; younger judges, prosecutors or other employees with different
backgrounds, values and expectations; the need for more women and ethnic minorities to be
represented; safety and security. The call for increased accountability should be of particular
concern for the strategy. The development of the strategy should be followed by broad
consultations and practical reforms, some of which the project may support depending on
their impact and availability of resources. Subsequent activities may include the installation
of HRM software if required. The preparation of the HR Strategy for courts and public
prosecutors has to be closely coordinated with the ongoing P&G reform for support staff and
should include suggestions for how the two HRM systems should be coordinated in the
future.
 MoJ’s analysis and proposal for professional cadres under CBR: To complement the
MoJ’s efforts to draw upon CBR to build capacity for service delivery, an assessment of
ministerial needs would be undertaken. This would include identification of professional
groups, phasing in of staff over time, proposed pay-scales for these cadres, fiscal implication
analysis, and plan for reduced dependency upon externally financed staff. In particular, the
HRM reform for professional cadres will target the Legal Aid Department but will include
other potential professionals groups such as legislative drafters, litigating officers and so on.
This activity will be closely aligned with the activities of Component 2 a) Legal Aid. In
addition to the Strategy, this activity intends to support reforms of selection and appointment
and performance monitoring systems, including technology based solutions such as
acquisition of improved HRM software. This activity will complement ongoing reforms
supported by USAID (mainly in the SC) that focus on developing HR management tools and
the introduction of a new profession of court administrators. These interventions will be
targeted to reduce operating costs, improve staff performance, increase accountability of
legal professionals, and in the case of MoJ to prepare for CBR recruitment should the
ministry enter Tier One. Legal Aid HR reforms in the MoJ will be supported by Component
2 Legal Empowerment.
 Training and management capacity: This activity will be concerned with improving the
capacity of the JI to develop, organize and coordinate education, learning and training
programs. This activity will be concerned with improving job related skills and the
competence of sitting and new professionals. The project will finance trainings under S-S
initiative arrangements (e.g. training prepared in cooperation with partners from Egypt,
Turkey and India) as well as other forms of training. It will also support the Training
Department (TD) for, inter alia: training associated with developing the competence of the
TD staff and the current core trainers from JI; a comprehensive training needs assessment
and 5-year training plan; and developing a system of reviews of skills and competence of
new professionals, including developing individual training plans for their future
development. Specialized training and management capacity for relevant departments – e.g.
IT or Infrastructure Departments– will also be provided.
36
 Expanding and operating legal libraries: This activity will be concerned with improving
access of legal professionals and the broader public to legal books and materials. The project
will finance the operation of the existing 25 provincial libraries created under the Phase 1
AJSRP (and the establishment of new mid-size libraries in courts and offices of public
prosecutors (around 20 in total) with the objective of having at least one library per province.
This subcomponent will also finance printing and disseminating laws and legal materials to
judges, prosecutors and other legal professionals.
 Drafting commentaries to the critical laws: This activity will be concerned with
encouraging more uniform application of state laws by providing judges, prosecutors and
other legal professionals with guidance materials in the form of commentaries. The project
will financially support working groups which include local and international legal
professionals (mostly from Egypt and Turkey) and broad consultations with stakeholders.
The work will be implemented under the leadership of the SC and will include civil and
criminal codes and criminal procedural codes.
 Encouraging professional affiliations: This will be concerned with promoting the
commitment of judges to the rule of law and with improving their work ethic and morale.
The project will support the professional associations of judges and prosecutors and their
meetings and conferences. The support will include nationwide annual conferences of judges
and prosecutors which have been organized with great success under the Phase 1 AJSRP.
142. If successful, this subcomponent will result in the improved capacity of the JI to use their
human resources effectively. More effective management should have a positive effect on scope
and quality of services provided by courts and offices of public prosecution.
Case Management Reform (US$ 1.75 million)
143. Under this activity the project will finance development and implementation of an
automated court case management system for the SC. The system will also be piloted in the
primary and appellate courts in Kabul under Component 1 Partnership for Justice. This activity
will build on and extend the case filing reforms implemented nationwide by the SC with the
support of USAID. Under the reform the SC and most of the provincial courts have improved
their paper-based filing system for all active court cases by use of color-coded file folders with
case summaries and tracking cards. The SC plans to expand this reform to an automated court
case management system by which cases are entered into the court system, classified, prioritized,
calendared and processed. As a result of the reform: electronic case status information will be
available to judges and court staff at a new SC Justice Information Center (constructed in the
second half of 2012 under this project), and will improve the transparency of court operations.
Automation will increase the technical competency of staff, provide tools to carry out their tasks
more efficiently, and result in an increase in judicial productivity and quality of court services
provided to the citizens. More reliable court performance statistics may be readily obtained from
the automated case record database. Statistics will describe changes in judicial workload over
time to suggest appropriate resource allocation and provide analyses to support M&E of reform
efforts.
37
144. Post-transition sustainability of the automated court case management system poses some
risks. Maintenance of the software and the underlying hardware infrastructure will require a
technical support capacity within the SC significantly greater than that demonstrated to date.
Moreover, executive management at the SC is not accustomed to managing the allocation of
court resources on the basis of prospective analyses of caseload and performance trends, since
the requisite data on which to base objective decisions has not been historically available. It is
anticipated, however, that these conditions will be improved in the near term (pre-transition)
through continued technical assistance provided by USAID and other donors. A simple, more
maintainable design of the system will also contribute to its sustainability.
Reform of Physical Infrastructure (US$ 26.05 million)
145. With the investment and technical assistance provided under this activity, the JI will: (a)
strengthen their capacity to plan, finance and manage construction projects and assets; and (b)
prepare and implement the construction and repair of court and office facilities and equip new
and existing courts and offices. Specific activities to be implemented include the following:
 Developing a 5 year Capital Investment Plan (CIP) for all JI: The CIP will be based on
an assessment of the current condition of the facilities and will produce an inventory of
necessary new projects, criteria for prioritizing these projects and an estimate of their costs.
The CIP with Design Facility Standards will create a planning framework for the
management of assets.
 Developing Design Facility Standards (DFS) for the MoJ and AGO facilities: DFS are a
set of guideline design documents, technical specifications, and detailed drawings to be used
by architects, consultants, and contractors in the design and construction of new buildings.
They should guarantee that the buildings meet international standards from the point of view
of security, safety and human rights.
 Hiring additional professional staff: These staff would be responsible for planning,
financing and managing construction projects and assets, in addition to the JI staff.
146. Preparing and implementing construction and rehabilitation projects of court and office
facilities. Some of the construction projects will start immediately after project implementation.
These are mainly projects designed in Phase 1 AJSRP, including the construction of two AGO
buildings (Logar Province), two court buildings (Kabul and Baghrami), the renovation of the
Logar Justice Department office, as well as the preparatory work for the construction of the MoJ
HQs. The rest of the projects will be selected on the basis of the prioritized outcomes of the CIP,
and are expected to cover an estimated 7 building projects in prioritized locations. Construction
work for the MoJ HQ and AGO HQ will also be financed from year two of the project.
Purchasing of office equipment (including plotters, printers, copiers, fax machines) and furniture
for current and to-be-constructed facilities will be included.
 ICT infrastructure: including updates to telephone systems at MoJ headquarters, and
support for network infrastructure at the new AGO headquarters, will also be financed under
this component.
38
147. The results will be measured by the following key results indicators: HR reform strategy
for SC, AGO and MoJ prepared; 250 judges, and 200 prosecutors and other professionals
trained; Case management system in the SC installed.
Component 4: Implementation Capacity (US$ 7.5 million)
148. The objective of this component is to build implementation capacity within the JI so that
they will, in time, be able to implement reforms and other activities without significant additional
assistance. The immediate objective of the component is to facilitate effective implementation of
the project. This component will finance the operation of the implementation structure partially
established under the Phase 1 AJSRP. This will include funds to cover incremental operating
costs, PSU, PUs and PPOC secretariat staff costs, M&E of project activities, and compliance
with Bank fiduciary and safeguard requirements.
149. Establishing an implementation structure with acceptable levels of capacity has been one of
the critical challenges of the Phase 1 AJSRP. Project implementation has suffered from slow
staffing and lack of ownership and leadership. As of today, most of the staffing issues have
already been addressed. Assuming an expansion of project activities, the current implementation
framework will require further strengthening and design changes. The JI do not intend to change
the basic structure which includes, in addition to the POC, the PSU, a Project Unit in each JI, and
Stakeholders Forums (SF). The issue of ownership will be addressed through entrusting more
responsibilities to the units inside of the institutions led by the heads of administration. The units
will be in charge of management of particular programs or their sub-parts (e.g. Legal Aid, Legal
Awareness). They will have oversight functions and hence also the core subject matter technical
expertise necessary for the implementation of project activities. The issue of capacity will be
addressed through establishing a sufficient project management team for each major program
(e.g. legal aid program, legal outreach program, legal libraries program) and through
strengthening procurement and financial management capacity. The project teams will work
mostly under a specific justice institution. The PU of the MoJ will work closely with the PSUs of
MoF and the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission under the CBR.
Component 1. Partnership for Justice will, in addition, establish Provincial Project Oversight
Committees (PPOC) which will be supported by small secretariats.
150. The PSU will continue to perform coordinating responsibilities and will be in charge of
procurement and financial management as well as broader M&E functions. Additional capacity
will be necessary for administrative functions, M&E, procurement, financial management, and
the new activities planned under the JSDP. The PSU will also continue serving as a secretariat
for the POC.
151. If successful, the implementation structure will facilitate timely and effective
implementation of the project according to the World Bank Policies and Guidelines. The success
of the project will be measured against the following key results indicators: Project units fully
operational and POC and SF meet regularly at least once per year. (See also Section E. on
Implementation Structure and Financing of the main document and Annex 4).
Staffing Table
Position
SC
MoJ
AGO
39
PSU
PPOC
TOTAL
Director
Procurement
Specialist
FM Specialist &
Internal Auditor
M&E Specialist
Contract Management
Specialist
Court Management
Specialist
Assistant
Interpreter/translator
TOTAL
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
4
0
8
6
1
1
1
3
0
6
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
4
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
6
0
1
6
0
1
5
1
1
10
4
0
8
5
4
35
40
Annex 2: Results Framework and Monitoring
AFGHANISTAN: JUSTICE SERVICE DELIVERY PROJECT
Results Framework
PDO
Project Outcome Indicators
Increase access to and use of
legal services
Scope and quality of legal
services increased
Use of Project Outcome
Information
To monitor progress towards
achieving the project
development objectives
Productivity of legal service
providers improved
Accountability of legal
service providers enhanced
Intermediate Outcomes
Intermediate Outcome
Indicators
Use of Intermediate
Outcome Monitoring
Component 1: Partnership for Justice
Cooperation among JI
improved and their structured
dialogue with community
organizations and/or other
service providers ongoing
An agreed upon provincial
reform strategy & community
justice partnership approved
To monitor implementation
potential and efficacy of
collaborative model for
dispute resolution
Citizens’ participation in legal
process increased
Number of information
centers operational
To monitor level of outreach
Component 2: Legal Empowerment
Policies on legal aid are
realistic sustainable and easy
to understand
Access to legal aid improved
Subcomponent a. Legal Aid
Legal aid framework includes
practical targeting and funding
mechanism
Collaboration frameworks
between legal aid providers
and enforcement agencies
(courts, public prosecution,
police) operational
41
To monitor quality of policy
and regulatory framework
To monitor degree
productivity of legal aid
providers
Subcomponent b. Legal Outreach
Availability of information
Four legal outreach units
To monitor extent and effects
about obtainable rights and
created
of increased legal outreach
legal service providers
increased
Component 3: Organization and Capacity of State Justice Institutions
Subcomponent a. Organizational Design
Organizational design of state Reviews of JI’s map for
To monitor overall alignment
institutions more conducive to optimal scale (size & location) of organizational structure
effective and efficient delivery and specialization of the
and management with needs
of dispute resolution
system completed
and demand for service
Subcomponent b. Strengthening Capacity of State Justice Institutions
Capacity of state institutions
HR Reform for judges,
To monitor progress in
to manage and deliver legal
prosecutors, legal aid
implementation of HRM
service improved.
providers and Hoqooq officers reform
approved
At least 250 judges and court
To monitor capacity of service
staff, 200 prosecutors and staff providers and quality of
and Hoqooq staff trained
service
Case management system
To monitor productivity of
installed in the SC
judges in SC
Component 4: Implementation Capacity
Build stronger capacity within Project units fully operational Implementation by JI and
JI for effective project
coordination between PSU
implementation
and JI
Improve general preparedness
of JI to take on more complex
implementation in medium to
long-term
POC meets with SF once per
year
42
To monitor cooperation of JI
and SF
Project Outcome
Indicators
Scope and quality
of legal services
increased
Productivity of
legal service
providers improved
Accountability of
legal service
providers enhanced
Intermediate
Outcome
Indicators
Baseline
YR1
TBD 2013
-
TBD 2013
-
TBD 2013
-
Baseline
YR1
Arrangements for Results Monitoring
Target Values
Data Collection and Reporting
YR2
YR3
YR4
YR5
Frequency
Data
Responsibility
and Reports
Collection
for Data
Instruments
Collection
User
survey/data
Annual
JI
collection and
analysis
User
survey/data
Annual
JI
collection and
analysis
User
survey/data
Annual
JI
collection and
analysis
Data
Responsibility
Frequency
YR2
YR3
YR4
YR5
Collection
for Data
and Reports
Instruments
Collection
Component 1: Partnership for Justice
An agreed upon
provincial reform
strategy and
community justice
partnership
approved
0
2
2
4
4
43
4
Annual
Provincial
Survey of
Legal
professionals
and users of
legal services
conducted as
part of survey
under
JI
Component 3
Number of
information centers
operational
0
1
2
4
4
4
Target Values
Intermediate
Outcome
Indicators
Baseline
YR1
YR2
YR3
YR4
YR5
Annual
Reports
JI/PSU
Data Collection and Reporting
Data
Responsibility
Frequency
Collection
for Data
and Reports
Instruments
Collection
Component 2: Legal Empowerment
Subcomponent a: Legal Aid
Legal aid
framework includes
practical targeting
and funding
mechanism
Collaboration
frameworks
between legal aid
providers and
enforcement
agencies ( courts,
public prosecution,
police) operational
0
-
-
prepared
and
approved
-
-
Annual
0
25%
50%
60%
75%
100%
Annual
Reports
JI
Annual
Reports
MoJ
Progress
Reports
MoJ
Subcomponent b: Legal Outreach
Number of legal
outreach units
increased
3
-
5
5
6
44
7
Target Values
Intermediate
Outcome
Indicators
Baseline
YR1
YR2
YR3
YR4
YR5
Data Collection and Reporting
Data
Responsibility
Frequency
Collection
for Data
and Reports
Instruments
Collection
Component 3: Organization and Capacity of State Justice Institutions
Subcomponent a: Organizational Design
Reviews of JI’s map
for optimal scale
(size and location)
and specialization of
the system
completed
0-
-
-
Prepared
and
approved
-
--
Annual
Reports
JI
Reports
SC and AGO
Subcomponent b: Strengthening Capacity of State Justice Institutions
HR Reform for
judges, prosecutors,
legal aid providers
and Hoqooq officers
approved
At least 250 judges
and court staff, 200
prosecutors and
staff and Hoqooq
staff trained
Case management
system installed in
the SC
Prepared
and
approved
0
Annual
Annual
0
100
300
600
800
950
30%
-
50%
20%
100%
100%
45
JI
Reports
Annual
Reports &
Statistics
SC
Component 4: Implementation Capacity
Project units fully
operational
POC meets with SF
once per year
0
50%
100%
-
-
-
Annual
Reports
JI
0%
80%
100%
100%
100%
100%
Annual
Reports
PSU
46
Annex 3: Summary of Estimated Project Costs
AFGHANISTAN: JUSTICE SERVICE DELIVERY PROJECT
Amount in US$
million
Project Cost by Component
1
Partnership for Justice
13.05
2
a
b
Legal Empowerment
Legal Aid
Legal Outreach
17.55
13.8
3.75
3
Organizational Design and Capacity of JI
47.4
a
Effective Organizational Design
4.5
b
4
Capacity of JI
Project Implementation
TOTAL
42.9
7.5
85.5
Detailed Component Costing Break Down
Component
Amount in US$
million
13.05
1
Component 1: Partnership for Justice
a
Diagnostic Analysis
Functional Reviews
Forming Partnership
Implementation Plan, Consultations
Outreach and Information Centers
Establishing Shared Record & Info. Systems
Institutional Capacity of Local Institutions
Modernization of Courts and Land Registries
Modernization of Legal Aid
Modernization of Public Prosecution
Component 2: Legal Empowerment
Legal Aid
0.5
0.5
3.5
1.5
1.0
1.0
9.05
5.25
2.50
1.3
17.55
13.8
Consolidation of State Legal Aid
TA Support for LAD
Legal Fund
Regulatory Framework
Legal Outreach
Communication department and legal outreach in AGO and SC
8.4
2.5
1.6
1.3
3.75
1
b
c
2
a
b
47
a
b
i
ii
iii
Support for LA Units
Expansion of LA Units
Development and dissemination of outreach materials
Component 3: Organization & Capacity of JI
Effective Organizational Design
Demand Surveys
Mapping
Safeguards for Accountability and Independence Review
Procedural Analysis
MoJ's Strategic Plan
Capacity of State JI
Reform of Human Capital
HRM Strategy
HR Reform
Training Management
Support for RIMUs
Legal Libraries & Publications
Commentaries to Critical Laws
Professional Gatherings
SC Training
AGO Training
MoJ Training
Case Management in SC
Support for Physical Infrastructure
Design, Construction or Rehabilitation
SC
AGO
Operating Investment Fund
Buildings SC
Buildings MoJ
Buildings AGO
Design and Construction in Kabul
Design and Construction of AGO Building
Construction of MoJ Headquarters
Construction of SC
Investment Plan and Facility Standards
Staff and support cost
Design standards AGO & MoJ
Capital Investment Plan
Equipment and Furniture
Equipment SC
Equipment MoJ
Equipment AGO
Vehicles
48
1.1
0.15
1.5
47.4
4.5
2.2
1.2
0.3
0.3
0.5
42.9
15.1
1.5
2
1.5
0.6
2
2.5
1
2
1
1
1.75
26.05
6.1
5.0
1.1
0.30
0.10
0.10
0.10
12.95
3.75
8.00
1.20
2.30
1.25
0.40
0.65
1.3
0.5
0.5
0.5
1.8
4
Vehicles SC
Vehicles MoJ
Vehicles AGO
ICT Technology
SC
MoJ
AGO
Component 4: Implementation Capacity
0.8
0.4
0.6
0.7
0.1
0.3
0.7
7.5
POC
PSU
PU SC
PU MoJ
PU AGO
PPOC (including secretariats)
PROJECT TOTAL
0.5
1.8
1.2
1.4
1
1.6
85.5
49
Annex 4: Operational Risk Assessment Framework (ORAF)
AFGHANISTAN: JUSTICE SERVICE DELIVERY PROJECT
Stage: Appraisal
Rating: High
1. Project Stakeholder Risks
Description :
Risk Management:
1. Legal pluralism and forum shopping is deeply 1. The reforms at sub-national level will focus on business environment (land issues
entrenched in culture and hence difficult to
and contract enforcement). They will build on already existing cooperation among
reverse.
critical institution. Legal outreach activities and consultations should also mitigate
this risk.
2. Local leaders may benefit from status quo and not 2. The business community – one of the beneficiaries of the program, should be able
be interested in reforms. There may also be
to influence leaders in favor of reforms. Outreach, consultation and consensus
limited will for increased engagement with the
building activities will be undertaken as part of the process of arriving at the
state institutions.
Component 1 Plans.
3. Leadership of state institutions has little incentive 3. The triggers and tranches (T&T) arrangement should provide leverage for the
to support reforms which produce long terms and
implementation of more difficult reforms. The design also calls for participatory
uncertain benefits.
reform processes which should provide space for consensus building and pressure
on the leaders to implement reforms.
4. Transition and the anticipation of a decrease in 4. This risk will be addressed through the project design and supervision, as well as
funds may: (i) encourage unhealthy competition
through continuous and active donor coordination. Asset management planning is
for funds; and (ii) distort the choice of reform
part of the project, and MOF is now becoming more closely involved in monitoring
(toward those which in the future will not be
the O&M implications of infrastructure budgets to ensure reasonable decisions are
affordable or sufficient to generate desired
made. A further ARTF project is also expected to strengthen O&M management
results, such as construction projects).
capacity.
5. Volatile political context may result in frequent 5. The risk will be mitigated through building support at the mid-level of
changes in leadership which slows and/or
management, across a range of departments, as well as through the development of
redirects reforms.
a strong PU/PSU. Furthermore, the tranching mechanism offers a means to reduce
50
risks to the project funds in the event of mis-direction of reforms.
6. Due in large part to the high levels of poverty and 6. Demand side accountability will be improved though increased dissemination of
illiteracy, there is limited access for citizens to
information to citizens on rights and entitlements under the law (legal outreach
project
information,
and
accountability
program and partnership for justice). Project information will be made available on
mechanisms are limited.
the internet and communities will be engaged in outreach at the provincial and
district levels, particularly through the PPSUs.
Resp: Government
Stage: Continuous Due Date : N/A
Status: In
implementation team
place
supported by WB
advisory support
2. Implementing Agency Risks (including fiduciary)
Rating: Moderate
2.1. Capacity
Description :
Risk Management :
1. The previous project created basic 1. Under the previous project, the project coordinators have been trained on the job.
implementation capacities. The key challenge
As of today they have a proven record of excellent performance. All of them have
of this project will be the implementing
received full or partial training on project management, procurement and FM. They
capacity of JI (through the PUs), as more
will be supported by a team of professionals who will assist in managing individual
responsibilities will be delegated to them.
projects and programs.
2. FM capacity in the JI faces limitations that 2. a) An FM specialist for the PSU was recruited under Phase 1, and has shown the
can slow project implementation down. This
capacity to manage FM processes in compliance with WB requirements. Under
risk becomes particularly acute since Phase 2
Phase 2, the FM capacity of the JI will be strengthened through the hiring of FM
seeks to delegate more responsibilities to the
specialists for each JI to work in coordination with the PSU: the process for these
JI themselves.
recruitments is already underway.
b) Training will be provided to FM staff by the Bank, and the Operations/FM
Manual will be updated to ensure complete guidance is available.
c) A parallel World Bank Project, CBR, also aims to strengthen FM process
management through the provision of high capacity FM managers in selected posts
in line ministries, including MOJ, at managerial levels. It is hoped that this CBR
position will be in place by the end of 2012, thereby providing a strong counterpart
within the Ministry for project staff.
51
3. Capacity for complex tasks such as 3. Firms will be hired to support the Project Units and JI with these tasks. The project
development of strategic plans, the Capital
will capitalize on the ARTF third party monitoring program. The M&E framework
Investment Plan and Monitoring and
will be prepared for each major project activity/program. The sub-frameworks will
Evaluation through the life of the project is
support the result framework of the EPP. Baseline data have been already gathered
weak.
for court performance and legal aid. This work will continue through first phase of
the project. Component 1 builds capacity of users to oversee/monitor service
providers.
2.2. Governance
Description :
1. Overall, JI governance remains weak, but varies,
with MoJ being the strongest and the AGO the
weakest among them. Decision making and
business processes remain ad hoc and not well
formalized, posing risks over transparency; they
are concentrated in hands of a few and not based
on solid evidence.
Stage: completed
Due Date: N/A
Resp:
Status:
Justice institutions
completed
Rating: High
Risk Management :
1. The project aims to improve management of key resources (HR, asset, case
management) which includes decision-making. Component 3 directly targets the
decision-making of courts in civil/commercial matters. MoJ has as its objective to
be a first tier ministry in the Capacity Building for Results Facility, which requires
an overhaul of its management system. A strong political commitment to this
objective has been made. Peer pressure among institutions may push the other
justice institutions to follow suit. The combined impact of this project and CBR
could have a positive impact in terms of risk reduction.
2. Decision processes remain centralized, with little 2. Component 1 will establish provincial focal points in the 4 pilot provinces, and
engagement of provincial and district level
enable establishment of mechanisms for coordination. Better engagement of
authorities.
provincial and district level JI is at the heart of this component, and a Provincial
PSU will also be in place in order to facilitate this. The development of the Plans
will be managed so as to encourage adequate consultation and engagement with the
provincial and district levels, and should inform a more needs and capacity based
approach. Links between centre and provinces will also be encouraged through
professional gatherings and trainings.
52
Resp: Justice
Institutions
Stage: first year of
operation of the
project
Due Date : N/A
Status: planned
Fraud & Corruption (sub-category of Governance
risk)
Risk Management :
1. a) The project will aim to improve both accountability and independence of JI.
Both are at the heart of addressing corruption and the proposed reforms will take
steps to mitigate the problem. However, it is noteworthy that no evidence of
corruption in the implementation structure has come to light during the
implementation of the JSRP.
b) The project also assists JI to streamline procedures and increase their
transparency, hence reduce opportunities for corruption.
2. a) Legal awareness programs should increase people’s willingness and potential to
interact with JI and keep them accountable.
b) Support for implementation of P&G reforms in SC and AGO will increase the
use of merit based recruitment practices, and HR reforms in all three JI should
improve the opportunities for career progression and improve HR management,
thereby reducing incentives for nepotism and corruption in the system.
c) Monitoring and evaluations will be undertaken for project staff and regular
audits will apply to procurement and FM undertaken by the project to minimize
risks.
d) Regular communication with PSU, provision of adequate WB support for
supervision will also act as a safeguard against fraud and corruption within the
project.
3.
a) Transparency: Public bid openings will be used and a complaints mechanism
will be maintained. Procurement of services will be adequately advertised and
records maintained of procurement processes. Regular audits will be conducted, as
well as performance reviews of project staff. Clear Guidelines and Procedures: For
53
work, goods and services financed through the project, Bank procurement
guidelines will be applicable. Operations/Procurement Manual will be provided to
ensure that professional standards and transparent criteria are maintained. Staffing:
The PSU teams are now experienced in meeting World Bank requirements for
such processes, and will have responsibilities for undertaking regular M&E of
project activities. Additional training will also be provided by the International
Procurement Specialist (already in place) and the Bank team as required.
Additional assistance will be provided by the ARDS in the Ministry of Economy.
b) WB has worked closely with JI to ensure packages are well designed. WB will
continue to work with the JI on packaging to maximize competition and
participation by capable contractors.
Resp: Leaders of
justice institutions
Third party
stakeholders
2.3 Procurement
Description:
PDO may be jeopardized by weak procurement
capacity in the JI For large value contracts, timely
completion of these procurement packages is
particularly critical for achieving the PDO.
Stage: throughout
project operation
Due Date: N/A
Status: legal
awareness work
ongoing and to be
deepened during
project
implementation
Rating: High
Risk Management:
It should be noted that a number of procurement packages are already being processed,
therefore the risk of delaying the project is less pronounced.
The risk mitigation activities include the hiring of an international procurement
consultant (for first two years of project implementation) for the PSU and procurement
specialists for each JI. Procurement under the project will also be assisted by ARDS in
the Ministry of Economy. As part of capacity building, international training on public
procurement will be offered to the procurement staff as well as for the senior
management. It should be noted that 90% of staff hired under the Phase 1 JSRP have
already received some form of procurement training.
Resp: PSU
Stage: immediate
Due Date : upon
Status: ongoing
project effectiveness
54
3. Project Risks
3.1. Design
Description :
The success of the project will depend on full
ownership and commitment to reforms such as
organizational reform, legal aid related reforms to
HRM.
In some instances, the ownership and
commitment may not be strong enough, and the
reform process risks being controlled by just a few
powerful figures, or blocked by stakeholders with
vested interests.
Rating: High
Risk Management :
This risk was mitigated through participatory preparation and will be further mitigated
through the design of the reform process. Reform processes will be open and inclusive,
so results will be based on broad consensus. Reforms will also be based on empirical
research. This combination will make reforms less dependent on the decisions of a
few. Further to this, the project is designed to build incentives to complete difficult
reforms before MTR, with some financing conditional upon their completion. This
builds a strong incentive into the project to move forward in these critical areas. The
tranches of the ARTF also provide a mechanism to ensure that the project’s subsequent
funding allocations are based upon adequate performance on meeting project
objectives.
Resp: Leadership of Stage:
Due Date: starting
Status: planned
JI in collaboration
implementation
from effectiveness
with World Bank
team
Rating: Moderate
3.2. Social & Environmental
Description :
Risk Management :
The project has been assigned category B due to the The risk will be mitigated through an environmental safeguards management
construction and rehabilitation work undertaken for framework (ESMF) which will apply to all works and rehabilitation projects
JI. OP/BP 4.01 and 4.12 are triggered.
undertaken through the project. The ESMF provides the principles for preparing the
environmental and social mitigation plans (EMP/RAP etc) which will apply (wherever
relevant) to all works and rehabilitation projects undertaken under this project. The
Mitigation plans will be monitored during implementation phase and consultants are in
place in the PSU and PUs to ensure compliance Engineers are in place in the PSU and
PUs to ensure compliance and additional in house training will be provided to them
through the project.
Status:
Resp:
PSU Stage: complete
Due Date: N/A
complete
Rating: Moderate
3.3. Program & Donor
Description :
Risk Management :
1. Program success is contingent upon donor funding 1. This risk is relatively small. Sufficient resources have been committed by donors
55
and coordination. A number of donors have already thus far and performance of the project will draw the needed remaining resources.
expressed their commitment to contribute to the
program.
2. The project should support the NPP for Rule of 2. The GoA and donors will continue working to finalize the NPP and this is required
Law. So far, donors and the GoA have not been able to be completed by the Tokyo Conference in July 2012. Consultations with government
to agree on the program. A continuing lack of such throughout the development of the project should ensure coherence of objectives.
agreement may undermine project implementation.
Resp: Leaders of JI
together with DP
Stage: continuous Due Date: N/A
Status: ongoing
representatives
Rating: High
3.4. Delivery Monitoring & Sustainability
Description: 1. Weak Monitoring has been endemic Risk Management :
to the justice sector with limited capacity, inadequate 1. Strengthening M&E capacity of JI will be undertaken early on with a focus on
ownership and poor data quality having the potential training/capacity building, and hiring a firm with responsibilities to strengthen overall
of impacting service delivery measurements.
data collection and periodic monitoring. The project will also leverage the capabilities
and knowledge of the ARTF third party monitoring agent.
 The centralised PSU will receive regular reports, maintain a close oversight
function and report regularly to the Project Oversight Committee on
implementation progress.
 The Stakeholder Forums will be a key mechanism for oversight and transparency.
These forums will also be a source of feedback from civil society organisations,
business community, religious and professional representatives among others.
 Provincial and District Project Oversight Committees will provide regular inputs to
the project. The UNAMA and key ARTF Donors will meet with the POC to ensure
that progress is sufficient, review use of ARTF funds and review the efficacy of
M&E mechanisms.
 Triggers and tranches approach will link disbursement to achievement of project
outcomes.
2. For project activities relying heavily on inter-JI 2. The Project will be implemented through three decentralised units in the justice
synergies to generate final output(s)/outcome(s) at institutions, and in collaboration with provincial and district level institutions. On more
the district level, limited inter-institutional complex activities requiring inter-JI collaboration and synergies, the project will aim to
56
coordination and working practices with local justice more closely monitor processes and outputs
institutions could lead to weak monitoring of results.
3. Sustainability will depend on JI commitment to
improving implementation relative to the earlier
operation, Also important is the inherent inclination
and ability of the JI to move away from the status
quo and work consistently towards bringing about
credible sectoral reform for the long term.
3. Demonstration of strong support from the highest authorities in the justice sector
and widespread ownership and sound understanding of project objectives among
project staff is key. Extensive consultations have shown that there is leadership in the JI
and will to move the project forward. The project will work to create sustainable
mechanisms that can be managed by JI through their own capacity, while also boosting
capacity and learning on M&E systems through the involvement of the M&E firm.
Resp:
Leaders of
Justice Institutions and
PSU
57
Stage:
implementation
Due Date: firm to be
hired shortly after
effectiveness
Status: planned
Annex 5: Financial Management Arrangements
AFGHANISTAN: JUSTICE SERVICE DELIVERY PROJECT
Country Context
152. The Bank has gained substantial experience and understanding of the financial
management environment in Afghanistan through the large number of projects carried out over
the past four years. The Public Financial Management Reform Project II (PFMRP II) is the
primary instrument to continue and enhance the fiduciary measures put in place during the past
years to help ensure transparency and accountability for the funding provided by the Bank and
other donors.
153. A PFM performance rating system using 28 high-level indicators was developed by the
Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) multi-agency partnership program and
was applied in Afghanistan in June 2005. PEFA is comprised of the World Bank, IMF, EC, and
several other agencies. The system is structured around six core dimensions of PFM
performance: i) budget credibility, ii) comprehensiveness and transparency, iii) policy-based
budgeting, iv) predictability and control in budget execution, v) accounting, recording, and
reporting, and vi) external scrutiny and audit. Afghanistan’s ratings against the PFM
performance indicators generally portray a public sector where financial resources are, by and
large, being used for their intended purposes. This has been accomplished with very high levels
of support from international firms; this assistance will continue to be needed over the medium
term if these ratings are to be maintained. There is also much room for improvement.
154. In spite of undeniable gains made in reconstruction since the end of 2001, the challenges
facing Afghanistan remain immense; not least because of the tenuous security situation in the
region and continued prevalence of a large illegal and illicit economy. The policy framework
benchmarks have not yet been fully estimated, so various priorities are funded through the
annual budgeting process. The rising costs of the security sector constitute the major constraint
on attainment of fiscal sustainability. With regard to executive oversight, the national assembly
will play an increasingly active role. All in all, the new national strategy has created high
expectations of the executive which could prove to be quite difficult to meet.
155. The public sector, in spite of considerable efforts to reform its core functions, remains
extremely weak outside of Kabul. The lack of qualified staff in the civil service and the absence
of qualified counterparts in the government after 30 years of war and conflicts is a binding
constraint. Delays in reforming the pay structure and grading of civil servants have severely
crippled the public administration of the country. Domestic revenues lag behind expenditures by
a factor of ten to one. Large-scale corruption could emerge to undermine the government’s
efforts to enhance aid flows through national accounts. Capacities to track expenditures and
monitor expenditure outcomes have improved, but they need rapid and substantial strengthening
if progress toward the attainment of national development targets is to be monitored. Currently,
75% of external revenues bypass government appropriation systems.
156. The World Bank is financing a Financial Management Advisor to assist the Ministry of
Finance, an Audit Advisor to assist the Control and Audit Office, and a Procurement Advisor to
58
assist in Procurement-related activities. Also an Internal Audit function is being developed
within the Ministry of Finance with World Bank financing. USAID, and earlier the Indian Aid
Assistance Program, is financing a team of consultants and advisors to assist the Da Afghanistan
Bank in local as well as foreign currency operations. The activities carried out under the existing
Public Financial Management Reform projects have helped the Government to ensure that
appropriate fiduciary standards are maintained for public expenditures, including those supported
by the Bank and the donor community.
157. Progress has been slower than expected in shifting from operations support provided by the
three Advisors to capacity development and knowledge transfer to the civil servants. Given that,
it is expected that the Advisors will continue to be required for the medium term. Challenges
still remain in attaining the agreed upon fiduciary standards and also to further enhance them.
And to make matters more complex, the regulatory environment in Afghanistan has advanced
significantly in the past three years. Unfortunately, even mastery of basic skills in the early
environment does not fully qualify the civil servants to work effectively in the new emerging
environment.
Risk Assessment and Mitigation
158. The table below identifies the key risks that the project may face and indicates how these
risks are to be addressed. The overall FM risk rating is high, while the residual risk rating after
application of the mitigating measures is substantial.
Risk
Risk
Rating
Inherent Risk
Country
Inherent
Risk
Project Financial
Management Risk
Perceived
Corruption
Overall
Risk
Residual
Risk
Condition of
negotiations,
Board or
Effectiveness
(Y/N)
M
Source - PFM study
M
N
H
Ensure Designated Account is not
excessive and remains active with regular
expenditure reporting. Key financial
management functions to be performed by
PSU and PUs finance staff.
Government commitment, internal controls
and internal audit will help to reduce the
high level of perceived corruption.
Strengthening the FM capacity through
staffing of PSU and PUs will also help to
reduce the high level of perceived
corruption
S
N
S
N
H
Inherent
Risk Mitigation Measures
H
S
59
Control Risk
1.Weak
Implementing
Entity
S
2. Funds Flow
S
3. Budgeting
S
Project will be supported by the PSU to be
staffed with international and national
consultants. PSU will be responsible for
overall control and coordination with the
three implementing entities.
POC will be responsible for the overall
policy, strategic planning and management
oversight of the project. The PSU will act
as the Secretariat to the POC.
Payments will be made to contractors,
consultants, and suppliers from the DA by
SDU-MoF. In addition to payments out of
DA funds, the implementing entities can
also request the SDU to make (i) direct
payments from the Grant Account to
contractors, consultants or consulting
firms, and (ii) special commitments for
contracts covered by letters of credit.
These payments would only be made by
SDU after due processes and proper
authorization
from
the
respective
component implementing entities.
Ensure that project funds are allocated in
the annual Government Development
Budget. Ensure approved carried forward
budget is used at the beginning of the new
year, and that disbursements are made
while waiting for the Parliament’s approval
of the new year’s budget.
The JI with assistance from the PUs and
PSU are responsible for the preparation of
annual work plans and the derivation of
annual budget there from for the project.
The PUs and the PSU will coordinate with
MoF to facilitate this process. The PSU
will help maintain the consolidated budget
for the project.
A Project Budget Committee comprising
of representatives from MoJ, SC, AGO,
PSU and the PUs will coordinate the
budget process, and shall report to the
60
M
N
M
N
M
N
4.Accounting
Policies and
Procedures
S
5. Internal Audit
H
6. External Audit
H
7. Reporting and
Monitoring
H
Overall Control Risk
Detection Risk
H
S
POC.
Project will follow international accounting
standards. Project accounting procedures
and details of the FM arrangements will be
documented and incorporated in the
Operations/FM Manual to be updated by
the PSU and to be approved by the Bank
The internal audit units of the 3 JI have
been assessed and found to be of weak
capacity and incapable of performing the
internal audit for the project. Further, the
Internal Audit Directorate of MoF is not
covering donor funded projects currently.
So as an interim measure, the internal audit
will be facilitated through the hiring of an
internal auditor under the project
Will be audited by CAO with support from
Audit Advisor
Strengthening the SDU is a priority under
the FM Advisor contract, to provide
information that will comply with agreed
format of financial reports. This will be
facilitated by the excel-based accounting
system that will be utilized by the
PSU/PUs to maintain records and generate
required reports.
Adequate accounting, recording, and
oversight will be provided in project
procedures.
Accounting/Recording/oversight by SDU –
MoF of all advances/M-16 supported by
Financial Management Advisor.
H
Overall FM Risk
Rating
Risk rating: H=high risk; S=substantial risk; M=modest risk; L-low risk
M
N
S
N
S
N
S
N
S
M
N
S
Strengths and Weaknesses
Strengths
159. The Government provides assurance to the Bank and other donors that the measures in
place to ensure appropriate utilization of funds will not be circumvented. The Government
strongly supports reforms through the Public Financial Management Reform Projects to enhance
financial management in Treasury operations, public procurement, internal audit in the public
sector, and external audit by the Auditor General.
61
160. The justice institutions, MoJ, AGO and SC, have implemented another Bank funded
project, so the agencies have experience in carrying out Bank projects and following Bank
procedures. The JI will also be supported by the Project Support Unit that will be staffed by
international and national consultants; and the PUs.
Weaknesses and Action Plan
161. The main weakness in this project, as in many others in Afghanistan, is the ability to attract
suitably qualified and experienced counterpart staff especially for financial management. The
existence of the PSU, and the staffing of the PSU and the PUs with consultants to be funded by
the project, is expected to strengthen the fiduciary arrangements in the justice institutions.
Action Plan – To be reviewed at ‘Initial Supervision’
Significant
Weaknesses
Shortage of
qualified and
experienced FM
staff
Project internal
controls and
procedures need to
be defined
Weak internal
audit arrangements
Interim reports
need to include
required
information
Action
Responsable
Agent
PSU/JI
Completion
Date
Exists
Hiring of national financial management
specialist in each of the three PUs
PSU/ JI
July 31, 2012
FM Manual to be updated
PSU/JI
July 31, 2012
Hiring of national internal auditor
PSU
December
31, 2012
Before
negotiations
Presence of PSU financial management
specialist and utilization of JI finance
departments
Un-audited interim financial report formats IDA/JI/
for the project to be confirmed
PSU
Implementing Entities
162. The project will be implemented by three justice institutions: the Supreme Court (SC), the
Ministry of Justice (MoJ), and the Attorney General office (AGO). The Project Support Unit
(PSU) that has already been established under the previous project will coordinate and supervise
the implementation of the project and perform the overall key financial management functions.
Project Unit (PU) has also been established in each of the three implementing entities; the PSU
and 3 PUs will work closely together to carry out the project activities. The respective PUs will
coordinate with the relevant departments within the justice institutions to facilitate the day-to-day
operations between the PSU and the JI. There will be secretariats supporting Provincial Project
Oversight Committee set up in each of the 4 pilot provinces that will work closely with the PSU
and the PUs.
62
163. The PSU is already staffed with a national financial management specialist (FMS) to carry
out day-to-day financial management operations of the project. He will be supported by a finance
officer in the PSU and financial management specialist in each of the PUs that will be recruited.
The financial management activities will include preparation of: M-16 forms (payment orders),
project coding sheets, and B27 allotment forms as well as overall contract and project
management. The PU finance staff will be primarily responsible for performing the FM activities
for transactions that originate in the JI, and the PSU finance staff will be primarily responsible
for transactions that originate in the PSU. Until the time PUs finance staff are hired, the PSU
FMS will perform all the FM activities for the project. Detailed working relationships between
the PSU/ PUs/ JI finance departments, FM reporting requirements, staffing, systems, internal
control procedures, and other financial management arrangements will be included in the
updated FM Manual.
Project oversight
164. The Project Oversight Committee (POC) is responsible for the overall policy, strategic
planning and management oversight of the project. It is composed of the Afghan Chief Justice,
Minister of Justice, Attorney General, and the Minister of Finance. The POC will meet at least
every two months. The PSU will act as the secretariat of the POC.
Project coordination and monitoring
165. The PSU has the responsibility for overall project implementation, coordination, and
monitoring. The PSU will work closely with the PUs in the 3 justice institutions and the PPSUs
in the 4 pilot provinces to facilitate this function. The PSU will report to the Project Oversight
Committee on the consolidated progress of the project. The PSU is also responsible for: (a)
assuring steady progress of execution in accordance to an implementation schedule reviewed and
approved by the World Bank; (b) reporting regularly to the POC; and (c) ensuring that
transparency and high ethical standards are maintained throughout the process.
Budgeting
166. The project budget committee that is already established under the earlier project will
coordinate preparation of the annual work plan and the derivation of the annual budget. This
committee will be made of representatives from the PSU, PUs and the justice institutions, and
shall report to the POC. The Budget Committee shall also coordinate quarterly budget reviews to
ensure adequate budget discipline and control. The committee will be responsible for ensuring
that project expenditures for each fiscal year are captured in the Governmental Development
budget of that fiscal year. Project should also ensure that approved carried forward budgets are
used at the beginning of the New Year, and that disbursements are made while waiting for
Parliament approval of the New Year’s budget.
167. The budgeting process and the key role of Budget Committee on periodic budget reviews
will be detailed in the Operations/FM Manual. Annual work plans and annual budgets will be
submitted to the Bank for review and approval, not later than three months before the end of the
fiscal year.
63
Funds Flow
168. The standard funds flow mechanism in Afghanistan, similar to other ongoing projects, will
be followed in this project. Project funds will be advanced in the Designated Account (DA) to be
opened and maintained at the Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB) and operated by the Special
Disbursement Unit (SDU) in the Treasury Department of MoF. Requests for payments from the
DA will be made to the SDU by the project when needed.
169. In addition to payments out of the designated accounts, the project can also request the
SDU to make (a) direct payments from the Grant Account to consultants, consulting firms or
suppliers; and (b) special commitments for contracts covered by letters of credit. These payments
will follow World Bank procedures. All project payments will be made to either international
firms or local firms that have bank accounts in DAB, a local commercial bank, or an overseas
bank. All payments will be made either through bank transfers into the account of such firms or
by check. Expenditures for each component will be paid after relevant approvals from the
component implementing entity and in accordance with the approval mechanisms documented in
the project’s Operations/FM Manual.
64
Funds Flow Chart
World Bank / IDA
Provides SOEs
with supporting
documentation,
reconciliations,
& requests replenishment
transfers to Designated
Account, OR requests Direct
Payments
IDA
Replenishes
Designated
Accounts
SDU (MoF)
Direct
payments
Consultants/ suppliers/
contractors etc
Designated
Accounts
JIs Finance
departments
Invoices
PSU/PUs
Legal requirements for authorized signature
170. The Ministry of Finance has authorization to approve disbursement from the Grant.
Specimen signatures of authorized signatories in MoF are on file with the Bank.
Accounting
171. The SDU will maintain a proper accounting system of all expenditures incurred along with
supporting documents to enable IDA to verify these expenditures. The FM staff of the PSU and
PUs will: (i) supervise preparation of supporting documents for expenditures; (ii) prepare
payment orders (Form M16); (iii) obtain approval for M16s from the relevant authority
depending on the payment amount; and (iv) submit them to the Treasury Department in MoF for
verification and payment. Whilst original copies of required supporting documents are attached
to the Form M16, the project is required to keep photocopies of these documents for records
retention purposes. The FM Advisor in the MoF/SDU will use the government's computerized
65
accounting system, AFMIS, for reporting, generating relevant financial statements, and
exercising controls.
172. The PSU and PUs FM staff will maintain essential project transaction records using Excel
spreadsheets and generate required monthly, quarterly, and annual reports.
173. The Operations/FM Manual, to be updated by the PSU by July 31, 2012, and to be
approved by the Bank, will include: (a) financial management arrangements for the proposed
project; (b) roles and responsibilities of PSU/PUs FM staff and the linkages with the JI finance
departments; (c) documentation and approval procedures for payments, (d) project reporting
requirements, and (e) quality assurance measures to help ensure that adequate internal controls
and procedures are in place and are being followed.
174. The Operations/FM Manual will also establish project financial management in accordance
with standard Afghan government policies and procedures including use of the government
Chart of Accounts to record project expenditures. The use of these procedures will enable
adequate and timely recording and reporting of project expenditures. Overall project accounts
will be maintained centrally in SDU, which will be ultimately responsible for recording all
project expenditures and receipts in the Government’s accounting system. Reconciliation of
project expenditure records with MoF records will be carried out monthly primarily by the PSU,
supported by the PUs.
Internal Control & Internal Auditing
175. The PSU and the PUs will be responsible for coordinating FM activities for the project with
the SDU. Project–specific internal control procedures for requests and approval of funds will be
described in the Operations/FM Manual including segregation of duties, documentation reviews,
physical asset control, asset verification, and cash handling and management.
176. Annual project financial statements will be prepared by SDU/MoF detailing activities
pertaining to the project as separate line items with adequate details to reflect the details of
expenditures within each component.
177. The project financial management systems will be subject to review by the internal audit
departments of the three implementing entities and the Internal Audit Directorate of MoF.
However, due to the weak capacity in the internal audit departments within the JI and the noncoverage of donor funded projects by MoF IAD currently, an internal auditor will be hired under
this project to perform the project internal audit. This internal auditor will be housed in the PSU.
Internal Audit TOR will be reviewed and approved by the Bank. The Internal Audit departments
of the JI have been assessed, and have been found incapable of meeting the needs of this project;
hence the interim mitigating measure of hiring an internal auditor has been adopted.
178. The frequency of the internal audit exercise should be at least every six months. A copy
(English version) of each internal audit report should be provided to the World Bank once
completed.
179. The Bank also reserves the right to conduct an external review of the project activities and
financial flows.
66
External Audit
180. The project accounts will be audited by the Auditor General, with the support of the Audit
Advisor, with terms of reference satisfactory to the Association. The audit of the project accounts
will include an assessment of the: (a) adequacy of the accounting and internal control systems;
(b) ability to maintain adequate documentation for transactions; and (c) eligibility of incurred
expenditures for Association financing. The audited annual project financial statements will be
submitted within six months of the close of fiscal year. All agencies involved in implementation
and maintaining records of expenditures would need to retain these as per the IDA records
retention policy.
181. The following audit reports will be monitored each year in the Audit Reports Compliance
System:
Responsible Agency
MoJ/ SC/ AGO
Audit
Auditors
Date
SOE, Project Accounts and Auditor General June 20
Designated Account
182. The Bank-funded/administered projects already implemented or currently being
implemented by MOJ, AGO and SC (Afghanistan Judicial Reform Project) have no overdue
audit reports, ineligible expenditures or overdue interim financial reports. Key issues raised in
the audit reports have been resolved up to Solar Year 1388. The issues raised in the solar year
1389 audit report have been communicated to the JI, and responses are awaited.
Financial Reporting
183. Financial Statements and Project Reports will be used for project monitoring and
supervision. Based upon the financial management arrangements of this project, consolidated
financial statements and project reports will be prepared monthly, quarterly, and annually by the
PSU. These reports will be produced based on records from three sources: (i) PSU’s and PUs’
accounting system; (ii) expenditure statements from SDU (as recorded in AFMIS) and reconciled
with the PSU/PU records, and iii) bank statements from DAB.
184. The consolidated quarterly Project Interim Financial Reports will show: (a) sources and
uses of funds by project components; and (b) expenditures consolidated and compared to
governmental budget heads of accounts. The project will forward the relevant details to
SDU/DBER with a copy to IDA within 45 days of the end of each quarter. The government and
IDA have agreed on a pro forma report format for all Bank projects; a final customized format
for JSDP will be provided before project negotiations.
185. The annual project accounts to be prepared by SDU from AFMIS after due reconciliation
to records maintained at the PSU, will form part of the consolidated Afghanistan Government
Accounts for all development projects. This is done centrally in the MoF Treasury Department,
supported by the Financial Management Advisor.
67
Disbursement Arrangements
186. The project will be financed 100% by the ARTF Grant inclusive of taxes. Disbursements
procedures will follow the World Bank procedures described in the World Bank Disbursement
Guidelines and the Disbursement Handbook for World Bank Clients (May 2006). Table 1 shows
the allocation of ARTF proceeds in a single, simplified expenditure category. The single
category for "goods, works, consultancy services, training, and operating costs" is defined in the
financing agreement. Project funds will be disbursed over 60 months. The closing date of the
project will be May 31, 2017 with a final disbursement deadline six months after the closing
date.
187. During this additional 6-month grace period, project-related expenditures incurred prior to
the closing date are eligible for disbursement or documentation against advances to the
designated account. Disbursement will follow the World Bank procedures described in the
World Bank Disbursement Guidelines and the Disbursement Handbook for World Bank Clients
(May 2006).
Table 1: ARTF Financing by Category of Expenditure (US$ 85.5 million)
Amount of the Financing
Grant
Percentage
Allocations
(1) Goods, works, consultants’ services, training, and US$ 85.5 M
100 %
Incremental Operating Costs2
Expenditure Category
Total
US$ 85.5 M
-
Summary Reports
188. Summary reports in the form of Statements of Expenditure will be used for expenditures
against contracts for: (a) works valued at less than US$500,000 equivalent per contract; (b)
goods valued at less than US$200,000 equivalent per contract; (c) consulting firm valued at less
than US$100,000 equivalent per contract; and (d) individual consultants valued at less than
US$50,000 equivalent per contract, all training programs and incremental operating costs.
Supporting documents will be required for expenditures against contracts above the above
mentioned thresholds.
Designated Account
189. One segregated Designated Account (DA), to be managed by the Special Disbursement
Unit of the Treasury Department of the Ministry of Finance, will be established at the Da
Afghanistan Bank (central bank of Afghanistan) in USD for the project, with a ceiling of
2
Incremental Operating Costs refers to project-related incremental expenses incurred on account of project implementation
support and management including the rental of office space; the operation, maintenance, rental and insurance of vehicles; fuel;
communications supplies and charges; advertisements; books and periodicals; office administration and maintenance costs;
bank transaction charges; utility charges; domestic travel and per diem but excluding salaries of officials and staff of the
Recipient's civil service.
68
advance up to four (4) months’ worth of expenditures to be paid out of the DA. The SDU will
manage payments from and new advances/ replenishment to the DAs. Petty cash advances for
small day to day operating expenditures may be taken from the Designated Account, and held
and managed by PSU, PUs and/or the PPSUs in the 4 pilot provinces. Each of these units will
have a focal finance (PSU and PUs) and admin (PPSUs) staff who will be responsible for
management and custody of the petty cash, and will report to the head of the respective units.
The overall responsibility and accountability will rest with the PSU. New cash advances will
only be made when all other prior cash advances have been justified through submission of
SOEs to the SDU. Monthly expenditure reporting for payments made from the designated
accounts is required.
Direct Payments.
190. Third-party payments (direct) and Special Commitments will be permitted for amounts
exceeding 20% of advances to the designated accounts. All such payments require supporting
documentation in the form of records (copies of invoices, bills, purchase orders, etc.). Issuance
of SCs is unlikely.
Preparation of Withdrawal Applications
191. PSU will prepare Summary Reports (Statement of Expenditures or Summary sheets) and
forward those reports to the SDU for further processing as a replenishment application. The
SDU will review withdrawal applications for quality and conformity to Treasury procedures, and
then obtain signature. Selected PSU, PU and SDU finance staff will be registered as users of the
World Bank Web-based Client Connection system, and take an active hand in managing the flow
of disbursements.
Financial Management Covenants

MoF shall submit audited financial statements for the project within six months of the
end of each fiscal year. The Project’s audit report will cover the financial statements, the
Designated Account, and SOEs, in accordance with terms of reference agreed with the
Association.

Consolidated project interim financial reports will be submitted by PSU on a quarterly
basis to the World Bank and a copy to SDU-MoF within 45 days after the end of each
quarter.
Special Financial Management Covenant

The justice institutions will ensure that key FM staff of the PSU and the PUs are retained
throughout the duration of the project in order to ensure smooth project implementation.
Regular Supervision Plan
192. During project implementation, the Bank will supervise the project’s financial management
arrangements. The team will:
69




Review the project’s quarterly interim financial reports, internal audit reports as well as
the project’s annual audited financial statements and auditor’s management letter.
Review the project’s financial management and disbursement arrangements (including a
review of a sample of SOEs and movements on the Designated Account and bank
reconciliations) to ensure compliance with the Bank's minimum requirements.
Review PSU’s, PUs’ and JI’ performance in managing project funds to ensure that it is
timely, accurate, and accountable. Particular supervision emphasis will be placed on
asset management and supplies.
Review of financial management risk rating, compliance with all covenants, and follow
up on the action plan.
Conclusion
193. The FM arrangements, including the systems, processes, procedures, and staffing are
adequate to support this project- subject to implementation of the action plan.
70
Annex 6: Procurement Arrangements
AFGHANISTAN: JUSTICE SERVICE DELIVERY PROJECT
Country Context
194. The World Bank (the Bank) has gained substantial experience and understanding of the
procurement environment in Afghanistan through its involvement in the interim procurement
arrangements put in place under the Emergency Public Administration Project (2002) and
through working with the institutions currently responsible for procurement functions, including
the Afghanistan Reconstruction and Development Services. As part of the broader review of
Afghanistan’s Public Finance Management (PFM) system, the Bank carried out two assessments,
in June 2005 and September 2007, of the procurement environment in the country based on
baseline and performance indicators developed by a group of institutions led by the Bank and
OECD/DAC.
195. The first key issue identified through the procurement assessments was a lack of ownership
and the lack of a procurement champion in the Government of Afghanistan (GoA), which is a
serious impediment to reform and to inter-ministerial dialogue. A second, related issue is the
lack of capacity in the line ministries, as evidenced by their inability to define and communicate
effectively their desired functional specifications/terms of reference in their procurements. The
lack of capacity is also evident in the local private sector while the number of bids is reasonably
high; there is a lack of understanding about how to apply public procurement rules.
Government Reforms
196. A new Procurement Law (PL) was adopted in November 2005 that radically transforms the
legal and regulatory framework. In accordance with the law, GOA established a Procurement
Policy Unit (PPU) under the Ministry of Finance to provide oversight for the PL’s
implementation. PPU has issued several circulars regarding implementation of the PL including
“Rules of Procedures for Public Procurement” (Circular: PPU/C005/1386 of April 12, 2007) and
“Procurement Appeal and Review Mechanism” (Circular: PPU/N001/1385 of March 18, 2007).
PPU and MOF have developed several standard bidding documents (SBDs), standard requests
for proposal (SRFPs), standard requests for quotation (RFQs) for national and international
procurement of goods/works and consulting services following national procedures as per the
PL’s Glossary of Procurement Terms in English and Dari. MOF has now mandated the use of: (i)
SBDs for Goods and Works (Circular PPU/C024/1388 of June 10, 2009); (ii) SRFQs (Circular
PP/C026/1388); and (iii) SRFPs (Circular PPU/C029/1388 of January 13, 2010). A Procurement
Management Information System (PMIS) has been developed and is being piloted in three line
ministries. In addition, a PPU website will facilitate publication of procurement notices and
contract awards in addition to similar action being done under the ARDS-website and the
websites of the line ministries, as applicable.
197. In the absence of adequate capacity to manage procurement activities effectively, a central
procurement facilitation unit (ARDS–PU) has been established under the Ministry of Economy
to support line ministries and project implementing agencies. The GoA has agreed on a program
for country-wide procurement reform and capacity building, leading to the transition from
71
centralized to decentralized procurement services. The above was implemented by an
international consultant under the supervision of PPU/MOF and financed under the Public
Administration Capacity Building Project (PACBP) and the Public Finance Management Reform
Project (PFMRP). The consultant has conducted several basic, intermediate, and advanced level
training programs. The implementation of the procurement reform component of the
PACBP/PFMRP should be considered with due priority to ensure that fiduciary standards are
further enhanced and that capacity is developed in the Government to maintain these standards.
198. The Procurement Law has been revised in July 2008 and amended in January 2009 and
issued as a new Law by the Ministry of Justice and was published in the Official Gazette
Number 957, 29.10.1387 (18 January 2009). The revised “Rules of Procedures for Public
Procurement” have been issued as circular PPU/C027/1387 of November 18, 2009.
General Procurement for JSDP
199. Procurement for the project will be administered in accordance with the World Bank’s
Guidelines: Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits dated January 2011 Guidelines:
Selection and Employment of Consultants by World Bank Borrowers dated January 2011, and
the provisions stipulated in the Financing Agreement. In addition, the World Bank’s Guidelines
on Preventing and Combating Corruption in Projects Financed by IBRD Loans and IDA Credits
and Grants dated October 15, 2006 and revised January 2011 has been shared with the recipient.
The World Bank’s Standard Bidding Documents, Requests for Proposals, and Forms of
Consultant Contract will be used. Goods following National Competitive Bidding (NCB)
procedures shall be procured using the agreed Standard Bidding Documents (SBDs) for
Afghanistan. It has been agreed by both parties that in the event of a conflict between IDA
Procurement/Consultant Guidelines, as per Article 4 (2) of the Procurement Law July 2008
(Amendments in January 2009 incorporated) of the GOA, the IDA Procurement/Consultant
Guidelines shall prevail.
Procurement of Works
200. Procurement of Works is estimated to be US$10 million for the first 18 months. The total
allocation for infrastructure is US$26.05 million, out of which procurement of works is estimated
to be US$ 21 million. The major works contracts are site work and construction of an MOJ HQ
Building, two AGO buildings, construction of Administrative and Information Building in the
SC HQ, and construction of a primary court in Bagrami, Kabul. Minor updates to physical
infrastructure are planned under Component 1 in the four pilot provinces. A few contracts will
be awarded for small renovations to physical infrastructure for Legal Awareness units for Legal
Outreach under Component 2.
201. Procurement of the works will be done using Bank’s SBD for Works for all contracts
following International Competitive Bidding (ICB) procedures. National SBDs agreed with IDA,
or satisfactory to IDA, will be used for the procurement of works following National
Competitive Bidding (NCB) procedures. Shopping shall be in accordance with paragraph 3.5 of
the Bank’s Guidelines. Any contract estimated costing more than US$5,000,000 shall be
procured following ICB procedures. Any contract estimated to cost more than US$50,000
equivalent and less than US$5,000,000 may be procured following NCB procedures. Any
72
contract estimated to cost less than US$50,000 equivalent shall be procured following shopping
procedures. Works that meet the requirements of paragraph 3.7 (a) and (e) of the World Bank
Procurement Guidelines may be procured following direct contracting procedures with prior
agreement with IDA. The Procurement Plan shall set forth the specific procurement method and
the requirement of prior review by the Bank depending upon the circumstances, procurement
method used and the threshold.
Selection of Consultants
202. The proposed grant would finance several consultancy assignments for both firms and
individuals.
203. Firms: The following major consultancy assignments are foreseen under the project:
Consultancy to develop business consolidation plan for Legal Aid (Component 2 a), Demand
Supply Survey and Functional Reviews (Component 3a), Institutional Mapping for all JI
(Component 3a).
204. Individual consultants: A substantial number of individual consultants will be hired under
the project. A number of individual consultants are already in place under Project Preparation
Grant (PPG) facility. Those individuals will be hired on single source basis on the justification
that tasks are continuation of previous work that the consultant has carried out and for which the
consultant was selected competitively, and subject to a performance review. For individual
contracts that are to be competitively awarded, the PSU shall facilitate all individual selection
processes in coordination with other JI, while the appropriate implementing agency shall be
responsible for developing the TOR and contract signing. MoJ shall sign the contracts for all
individual consultants hired for the PSU.
205. Short lists of consultants for services estimated to cost less than US$300,000 equivalent per
contract may be composed entirely of national consultants in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph 2.7 of the Consultant Guidelines. The selection methods and processes applicable for
consultants are QCBS, QBS, CQS, LCS, FBS, and SSS for firms; and for individuals as per
Section V of the Bank’s Guidelines. The threshold for CQS will be less than US$200,000
equivalent per contract. Bank shall review all TORs for Firm and Individual Consultant services.
The Procurement Plan shall set forth the specific procurement method and the requirement of
prior review by the Bank depending upon the circumstances, procurement method used and the
threshold.
Procurement of Goods and Non Consulting Services
206. The Project will finance procurement of goods and non-consulting services. This will
include computer equipment, IT software, furniture, vehicles and other printing materials for all
JI.
207. Procurement of the goods will be done using the Bank’s SBD for Goods for all contracts
following International Competitive Bidding (ICB) procedures. National SBDs agreed with IDA,
or satisfactory to IDA, will be used for the procurement of goods following National
Competitive Bidding (NCB) procedures. Shopping shall be in accordance with paragraph 3.5 of
the Bank’s Guidelines. Any contract estimated costing more than US$200,000 shall be procured
73
following ICB procedures. Any contract estimated to cost more than US$50,000 equivalent and
less than US$200,000 shall be procured following NCB procedures. Any contract estimated to
cost less than US$50,000 equivalent shall be procured following shopping procedures. Goods
that meet the requirements of paragraph 3.6 of the World Bank Procurement Guidelines may be
procured following direct contracting procedures with prior agreement with IDA. The
Procurement Plan shall set forth the specific procurement method and the requirement of prior
review by the Bank depending upon the circumstances, procurement method used and the
threshold.
Operating Costs
208. The operating costs financed by the project will be procured using the implementing
agency’s administrative procedures, which will be reviewed by the Bank to determine if they are
acceptable. The operating costs will include operations and maintenance of equipment and
vehicles, hiring of vehicles, office rent, costs of consumable, fuel, office utilities and supplies,
Bank charges, and advertising expenses, training fees for individuals with prior agreement with
the World Bank for professional development.
Assessment of the Agency’s Capacity to Implement Procurement
209. MoJ, AGO and SC will have the responsibility for procurement under the project. An
assessment of the capacity of MoJ, AGO and SC in the context of implementing procurement
actions for the project has been carried out. The assessment reviewed the organizational
structure of the implementation of the project.
210. The preliminary procurement capacity assessment reveals that although some capacity has
been developed within these implementing agencies, the capacity may not be sufficient to handle
procurement under the project. Therefore, the procurement risk is “High”.
211. To mitigate the risk the following measures have been taken. MoJ has already contracted
the services of a competent international procurement consultant from market (having hands-on
experience of public procurement rules as well as procurement rules of the donor agencies).
Also for large value contracts, ARDS will assist MoF to ensure procurement compliance, as and
when required. In addition, the following procurement practices will apply for the duration of the
project: (a) implementing agencies’ officials / staff to be alerted about any fraud and corruption
issues; (b) bidders to be alerted against adopting fraud and corruption practices; (c) award
contracts within the initial bid validity period, and closely monitor the timing; (d) take action
against any corrupt bidder in accordance with law of the Government of Afghanistan; (e)
preserve records and all documents regarding public procurement, in accordance with the PL
provisions; (g) publish contract award information through UNDB online, ARDS’s website and
agencies’ websites within two weeks of contract award; (h) ensure timely payments to the
suppliers/contractors/consultants and impose liquidated damages for delayed completion and, (i)
enforce a procurement filing system.
Procurement Capacity Development
74
212. In consideration of the capacity development in the Line Ministries and Provinces already
being undertaken through the Public Financial Management Reform Project II (PFMRII) under
MoF, close co-ordination between MoJ and MoF is envisaged during the project implementation.
It is expected that by the end of the project, the MoJ will have enough capacity to carry out its
own procurement without reliance on external assistance. A comprehensive procurement
capacity development plan will be developed, leading to the Procurement Accreditation of MoJ
by the Procurement Policy Unit of MoF. The capacity development plan shall take into
consideration the training and procurement assistance provided by PFMRII.
213. Procurement Training: Through PFMRII, Afghanistan Civil Service Institute (ACSI) is
conducting 3 levels of training (Basic, Intermediate and Advanced) on public procurement.
During the project, the procurement staff of the MoJ shall gradually complete all the three levels
of training. Staff who successfully complete the Basic and Intermediate training will be eligible
for appropriate international training on Procurement. However before any international training,
the staff shall also be required to complete English language training.
214. Staffing: Appropriate staffing plan shall be developed along with a Capacity Development
Plan. The PSU will carry out the training program to assist the procurement departments of JI.
Procurement plan
215. The Borrower, at appraisal, developed a Procurement Plan for Project implementation that
provides the basis for the procurement methods. This plan has been agreed between the client
and the Bank Task Team on April 4, 2012 and is available at the MoF offices. It will also be
available in the Project’s database and on the Bank’s external website. The Procurement Plan
will be updated in agreement with the Project Team annually or as required to reflect the actual
Project implementation needs and improvements in institutional capacity.
216. The procurement plan has outlined the contract packages of goods, consultants
(individual/firm), and non-consulting services. Other individuals (operation staff) who are not
consultants will not be part of the procurement plan. Those individuals will be hired in line with
the Operations Manual which will be developed by the project and be agreed by the Bank. All
contracts not prior reviewed by the Bank will be subject to Post Review as per the provisions of
the Procurement and Consultant Guidelines of the Bank.
Frequency of Procurement Supervision
217. In addition to the prior review, supervision shall be carried out from Bank offices. There
will be two Implementation Support Missions per annum.
218. Procurement Audit. In addition to prior review, Bank staff or Bank appointed consultant
shall carry out post procurement audit once per annum.
Procurement Plan
75
General
Project Information:

Country/Borrower: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Project Name: Justice Service Delivery Project

Implementing Agency: Ministry of Justice, Attorney General’s Office, Supreme
Court

Grant No: TF 012533

Bank’s approval Date of the Procurement Plan [Original:] April 4, 2012

Date of General Procurement Notice: Published 26th April 2012

Period covered by this procurement plan: 18 months

A. Goods and Works and Non-Consulting Services
a) List of contract Packages that will be procured following ICB, NCB and direct
contracting:
Procurement Method and Threshold
Procurement Method
1.
2.
3.
4.
ICB (Goods)
NCB (Goods)
Shopping (Goods )
ICB (Non-Consultant Services)
Procurement Method
1.
2.
3.
ICB (Works)
NCB (Works)
Shopping (Works)
Selection Method
1.
2.
3.
QCBS
QBS
FBS, LCS, CQS
Threshold for Methods
(US$)
200,000
200,000
50,000
200,000
Threshold for Methods
(US$)
5,000,000
5,000,000
50,000
Threshold for Methods
(US$)
200,000
200,000
200,000
Comment
Equivalent or more
Equivalent or less
Equivalent or less
Equivalent or more
Comment
Equivalent or more
Less than
Equivalent or less
Comment
Equivalent or more
Equivalent or more
Less than
Prior Review Threshold: Procurement Decisions subject to Prior Review by the Bank as stated
in Appendix 1 to the Guidelines for Procurement:
76
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Procurement & Consultant
Selection Method
ICB (Goods, Works and non
consulting services)
NCB – Goods
NCB – Works and Non consultancy
Prior Review Threshold
in US$
All Contracts
Shopping (Goods and Non
consultancy)
Direct Contracting (Goods)
QCBS, QBS and Single Source
Selection
FBS, LCS, CQS
First contract only
First contract only
Above 500,000
Comments
First contract
regardless of value
and all other
Equivalent or more
than US$ 200,000 per
contract will be prior
reviewed.
All regardless of value
All contracts regardless of
value.
Only the TOR shall be
reviewed by the Bank.
Reference to any Operations/Procurement Manual: The Project will develop an Operations
Manual where the Procurement Manual will be part of the Operations Manual.
77
Procurement Plan (Goods, Works and Services)
Summary
JSI
MOJ
AGO
SC
PSU
Total
Goods
Number of
Funds
Procurement
Required
Packages
(US$)
7
1,215,063
4
650,000
7
1,571,500
9
410,000
27
3,846,563
Services
Number of
Funds
Procurement
Required
Packages
(US$)
36
11,464,360
24
2,349,460
21
5,427,760
18
2,583,900
99
21,825,480
78
Works
Number of
Funds
Procurement
Required
Packages
(US$)
1
7,900,000
1
370,000
1
1,590,350
--3
9,860,350
Total
Number of
Funds
Procurement Required
Packages
(US$)
44
20,579,423
29
3,369,460
29
8,589,610
27
2,993,900
129
35,532,393
Annex 7: Implementation Arrangements
AFGHANISTAN: JUSTICE SERVICE DELIVERY PROJECT
219. The project will be implemented by the Justice Institutions (JI) -the Supreme Court (SC),
the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), and the Attorney General’s Office (AGO) and will follow World
Bank (the Bank) policies and guidelines. The Bank will be responsible for the supervision of the
project. The project implementation structure builds on and expands the structure established
under the previous Phase 1 Afghanistan Justice Sector Reform Project (AJSRP.) A detailed
description of the implementation structure and operational procedures will be included in the
project Operations Manual to be issued within four months of project effectiveness.
220. The implementation structure includes: (a) a Project Oversight Committee (POC); (b)
Stakeholder Forums (SF); (c) a Project Support Unit (PSU); (d) a Project Unit (PU) in the
implementing institutions – the SC, the MoJ and the AGO; (e) the Provincial Project Oversight
Committees (PPOC) and their secretariats.
221. The POC is responsible for the overall policy, strategic planning and management
oversight of the project. It is composed of the Afghan Chief Justice, Minister of Justice,
Attorney General, and the Minister of Finance. The Government of Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan (GoA) may appoint additional members of the POC. The POC members select a
chairman who serves as the POC’s Executive Director. The POC meets at least once every two
months. It works closely with the SF.
222. The SF affects project implementation through its feedback to the project documents and
reports. It is a consultative forum composed of representatives of legal professions, academia,
civic society and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), the business community, religious
leaders, local government and other interest groups. Two types of regular SFs will operate under
the project. The first SF will partner with the POC. The POC will organize at least one meeting
with the SF per year to discuss project progress or more specific matters. The second type of SF
will partner with the PPOC; the PPOC will organize at least two meetings with the SF per year.
223. The PSU serves as the POC’s secretariat. Its responsibilities include: day to day project
management (mainly financial management, procurement and monitoring and evaluation
[M&E]); and operating a project website. The PSU includes a director who reports to the POC
and staff which report to the project director. The PSU staff includes a group of approximately
ten senior local and/or international and regional experts in fields such as public relations, M&E,
Information and Communication Technology (ICT), project management (including financial
and procurement management), and public relations. The PSU will be supported by two or three
assistants and an interpreter. The project director, regional procurement specialist, ICT expert,
financial management specialist and two assistants have already been selected under the Phase 1
AJSRP. Other staff will be hired on a competitive basis by the POC, in accordance with Bank
guidelines. The PSU works closely with the PUs established in the SC, MoJ, and the AGO.
224. The PUs are responsible for day to day management of project activities of the SC, MoJ,
and AGO. A PU is led by a deputy principal of a justice organization supported by a project
coordinator. The project coordinator is charged with leading a team of local and international
79
experts who will: (a) coordinate specific reforms such as HRM, training, legal aid, legal
awareness and ICT experts; (b) manage the project (mainly procurement, FM, contract
management and M&E of project activities); and c) manage junior support staff. The project
coordinator reports to the Deputy Principal. The team members report to the project coordinator.
The project coordinators and some experts were selected under the AJSRP. The remaining staff
will be selected on a competitive basis. The PUs work closely with the departments leading a
particular reform. The specific responsibilities of each PU include developing concept notes and
terms of reference for project activities; organizing procurement; securing inputs from
departments; overseeing work of consultants; and monitoring and reporting on project progress.
The Provincial Project Oversight Committees supported by a small secretariat composed of two
consultants will oversee and implement the Partnership for Justice Program in pilot provinces
and districts. The PPOC is a provincial equivalent to the POC. The PPOCs will report to the
POC.
Monitoring
225. Monitoring will take place through continuous and timely reviews of project
implementation to assess delivery, identify challenges and bottlenecks, and explore practical
solutions. M&E will primarily be the responsibility of the PSU which in turn will work with the
staff in the PUs of the three JI to coordinate all activities on M&E. The PSU and PUs will
periodically monitor progress against agreed indicators, as described in the Results Framework.
As part of M&E, the project will generate regular quarterly reports and a report for funds tranche
release, whichever is earlier. Other key reports will also include those that report on financials as
well as reports providing periodic updates on implementation progress with all activities; the
format and template will be in the project financial, procurement and Operations Manual.
226. Building on the lessons of Phase 1 AJSRP, the project will focus from the outset on having
dedicated M&E staff in the JI for periodic monitoring. Lessons learned from M&E
implementation in Phase 1 indicate a need for investment in capacity building for M&E staff.
This effort will foster the institutionalization of M&E culture within the JI and ultimately be an
investment in the longer-term capacity of JI staff beyond the life of the project.
227. Data Collection: The justice sector suffers from a general absence of robust and reliable
data and a lack of credible baselines. The project will work closely with the PSU and JI to
improve data collection practices. With a view to further strengthening the evidence base, the
project will also commission a baseline survey within the first year of project effectiveness to
take stock of baseline data. Other special targeted user surveys will also be commissioned during
the course of project implementation to gauge level of satisfaction with legal services. Overall,
the project will reinforce the message of the need for better data collection procedures to be
adopted by staff, particularly as data collection takes place largely at the sub-national level, with
M&E data flowing bottom-up for consolidation and reporting at the central level.
228. The Project will close on May 31, 2017.
Implementation Arrangement: Central Level
80
SC
MOJ
AGO
Project Oversight
Committee
reporting
MoF
WB
supervision of
implementation
Project
Support Unit
secretariat for POC/project management – FM,
procurement, M&E / coordination
SC
MoJ
AGO
supervision
PU SC
PU MoJ
PU AGO
81
Implementation Arrangement: Intra-agency Arrangement
High Judicial
Council/Advisory
Committees
Head of Court Admin. /
Deputy Ministers
Project Unit
Department 1
Project Manager &
Team
Department 2
Department 3
Project Manager &
Team
82
Project Manager &
Team
Annex 8: Project Preparation and Appraisal Team Members
AFGHANISTAN: JUSTICE SERVICE DELIVERY PROJECT
NAME
TITLE / FUNCTION
Justice and Public Sector
Lubomira Z. Beardsley
Task Team Leader, Senior Counsel, LEGJR
Richard Hogg
Governance Adviser, SASGP
Richard George Andrew Nash Counsel, LEGJR
John Sherman
Consultant (IT Specialist)
Ravindra Cherukupalli
Consultant (Monitoring and Results Specialist)
Samina Bhatia
Consultant (Governance)
Hikaru Kitai
Consultant (Infrastructure Specialist)
Environmental and Safeguards
Asta Oleson
Senior Social Development Specialist, SASD
Obaidullah Hidayat
Environmental Specialist, SASD
Abdul Mohammed Durrani
Social Development Specialist, SASD
Financial Management and disbursements
Financial Management Specialist, SARFM
Asha Narayan
Senior Finance Officer, CTRLN
Chau-Ching Shen
Procurement
Asif Ali
Senior Procurement Specialist, SARPS
Toufiq Ahmed
Procurement Specialist, SARPS
Rahimullah Wardak
Procurement Specialist, SARPS
Legal
Hanneke Van Tilburg
Senior Counsel, LEGMS
Martin Serrano
Senior Counsel, LEGMS
External Relations
Abdul Raouf Zia
Senior Communications Officer (EXT)
Team Support
Edreess Sahak
Team Assistant, SASGP, Kabul
Parwana Nasiri
Team Assistant, SASFP, Kabul
Jyoti Sriram
Team Assistant, SASGP, New Delhi
Peer Reviewers
Lisa Bhansali
Adviser, LCSOC
Christina Biebesheimer
Chief Counsel, LEGJR
Satyendra Prasad
Senior Governance Specialist, SASGP
Randi Ryterman
Director, WDR
83
Scott Carlson
Scott Guggenheim
US State Department
Consultant, SDV
84
Annex 9: Environmental and Social Safeguards Framework
AFGHANISTAN: JUSTICE SERVICE DELIVERY PROJECT
229. The JSDP will undertake a number of construction, rehabilitation and renovation activities
over the 5 year period. Since the detailed designs of the multiple maintenance and construction
activities will be developed only at the beginning of the project implementation period, a
framework approach has been adopted for safeguards management. The Environmental and
Social Management Framework (ESMF) provides general policies procedures for the
management of environmental and social issues at each site and as such constitutes a set of
guidelines for the development of site-specific Environmental and Social Management Plans
(ESMP). The JSDP maintenance, rehabilitation and construction work does not anticipate
significant and irreversible adverse impacts on the environment or community. The identified
potential adverse impacts are localized in spatial extent and short in duration, and are
manageable by implementing mitigation measures that will be detailed in site specific the
Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP). The project is categorized as
environmental category B in accordance with World Bank operational policy (OP) 4.01
(Environmental Assessment).
General Principles
230. Recognizing the emergency nature of the proposed relief and reconstruction operation, and
the related need for providing immediate assistance, while at the same time ensuring due
diligence in managing potential environmental and social risks, this Framework is based on the
following principles:
231. The project will support multiple maintenance and construction activities, the detailed
designs of which may not be known at appraisal. To ensure the effective application of the
World Bank’s safeguard policies, the Framework provides guidance on the approach to be taken
during implementation for the selection and design of subprojects, and the planning of mitigation
measures;

All proposed subprojects will be screened to ensure that the environmental and social
risks can be adequately addressed through the application of standardized guidelines;

Employment opportunities within the projects will be available on an equal basis to all,
on the basis of professional competence, irrespective of gender, or local minorities.
Purpose of the Environmental and Social Management Framework
232. Social and environmental management in Afghanistan currently suffers from critical
capacity constraints. Since there is potential for adverse environmental impacts, albeit limited,
from the proposed activities under the JSDP, their mitigation and management is key to effective
rehabilitation and development within the justice sector. Hence, keeping in view the existing
management capacity, as well as the flexibility required with investments still to be finalized, a
framework approach is adopted for JSDP. It allows for early identification of potential adverse
impacts, without the requirement of rigorous analysis through quantification, and also provides
general policies and broad guidance for their effective mitigation, along with codes of practice
85
and procedures to be integrated into project implementation. Consistent with existing national
legislation, the objective of the Framework is to help ensure that activities under the proposed
reconstruction operations will:

Protect human health;

Prevent or compensate any loss of livelihood;

Prevent environmental degradation as a result of either individual subprojects or their
cumulative effects;

Enhance positive environmental and social outcomes; and,

Ensure compliance with World Bank safeguard policies.
Safeguard Screening and Mitigation
233. The selection, design, contracting, monitoring and evaluation of subprojects will be
consistent with the following guidelines, codes of practice and requirements:

A negative list of characteristics that would make a proposed subproject ineligible for
support, as indicated in ESMF Attachment 1;

Guidelines for land and asset acquisition, entitlements and compensation, presented in
ESMF Attachment 2 along with guidelines for Abbreviated Resettlement Framework
(Attachment 3);

Relevant elements of the codes of practice for the mitigation of potential environmental
and social impacts, presented in ESMF Attachment 4;

The requirement that confirmation is received through the Regional Mine Action Center
that areas to be accessed during reconstruction and rehabilitation activities have been
demined (see Guidelines in ESMF Attachment 5).

Environmental Guidelines for Contractors are presented in this document (see ESMF
Attachment 6)
234. The ESMF stipulates that contractors hired in the project should:

Minimize negative impacts on local communities and the environment during
construction.

Ensure appropriate restoration of areas affected by construction.

Prevent any long term environmental degradation and deal adequately with
environmental, social, health and safety issues during rehabilitation works.
86
235. Contractors must declare themselves conversant of all relevant national environmental and
social legislation and Bank regulations- as well as of their environmental and social obligations
as stipulated in the ESMF. Further, the contractor shall ensure compliance with the World
Bank/IFC’s General Environmental, Health and Safety Guidelines as applicable to mitigate
construction related impacts. The Project Management team of the central PSU will monitor
implementation of the ESMPs prepared for each site in accordance with the guidelines set out in
the ESMF.
Potential Impacts of Various Components
236. Activities under the project should not entail significant environmental and social impacts,
provided they are designed and implemented with due consideration of environmental and social
issues. Component 3b, Strengthening Capacity of State Justice Institutions will finance the
maintenance and construction of courts and offices facilities. Construction activities may cause
limited, temporary, and localized negative impacts due to depletion or degradation of natural
resources such as stone, earth, water etc. used for Justice Institution (JI) construction if proper
environmental management is not carried out at design, construction and operation stages. This
will be mitigated through the implementation of an appropriate site specific Social and
Environmental Management Plan (ESMP), including environmental checklist to monitor and
plan the work. Capacity building of concerned departments of JI, including physical and
institutional management, is likely to have a positive impact on social and physical environment.
Additionally, water harvesting, energy efficient lighting and air ventilation facilities may be
considered during design stage for new buildings as well as rehabilitation of existing buildings.
237. OP/BP 4.01 is triggered because of JI rehabilitation and construction activities. The project
will apply the Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) developed for the
project. The ESMF provides guidance on the approach to be taken during implementation for the
selection and design of subprojects/proposed investments and the planning of mitigation
measures, guidelines and codes of practice for an environmental and social mitigation measures
to be incorporated in the design, contracting and monitoring of sub-projects. Guidelines for
consultation and disclosure requirements are also included, to ensure due diligence and facilitate
consistent treatment of environmental and social issues by all participating development partners.
238. The adverse social impacts, as anticipated at appraisal, would largely result from land
which may be required in connection with the construction activities and OP 4.12 on involuntary
resettlement is therefore triggered. Wherever possible, the project will utilize land that is already
public property, and avoid or minimize land acquisition. However, documentation is required
that the land is free of encroachments, squatters or other encumbrances, and that the land has
been transferred to the relevant authorities. In the rare cases that land acquisition is unavoidable,
it will be undertaken in accordance with the provisions of Afghanistan’s current Law on Land
Expropriation, enacted in 2009 and Law on Managing Land Affairs 2008 and according to WB
OP/BP 4.12 on Involuntary Resettlement. Guidelines for Land and Asset Acquisition,
Entitlements, and Compensation are attached (Attachment 2) as well as a framework for
Abbreviated Resettlement Action Plan (Attachment 3).
87
239. In case of chance finds of cultural property (archaeological artefacts) during
implementation of sub-projects involving civil works, these will be handled according to
provisions in the “Law on Preservation of Afghanistan's Historical and Cultural Heritage (2004)”
and be reported to the provincial or district governors, who then will inform the Archaeological
Committee.
240. Compliance with the safeguard provisions and the negative list will be ensured through an
environmental, social and risk screening procedure (check lists) required for sub-project
proposals, and by internal input, process, and output monitoring, independent external
monitoring by consultants, and by Bank supervision missions.
Institutional Arrangement and Responsibilities for Safeguard Screening and Mitigation
241. The overall responsibility for project implementation rests with the SC, MoJ and AGO. A
designated Safeguards Officer will be identified with specific responsibility for overseeing the
implementation of the Environmental and Social Management Framework, Site specific
Environmental and Social Management Plans and Abbreviated Resettlement Plan (if any) within
the Project Team. Preparation of site specific ESMPs and abbreviated resettlement plan will be
the responsibility of site engineers in close collaboration with project management team.
Monitoring of ESMF Implementation
242. The Safeguards Officer, in collaboration with PSU director, will be responsible for
monitoring the environment and social performance aspects supported by the JSDP. The
Safeguards Officer will undertake random visits to monitor construction activities and will
provide technical advice to site engineers on social and environment issues if needed. The
Safeguard Officer will collaborate closely with the World Bank Safeguards team and will share
quarterly progress report on safeguards issues in the Project.
243. The cost of implementing and monitoring the ESMF is included in the overall budget of the
AJSDP.
Capacity Building
244. The Safeguards Officer and relevant staff of JI and implementing agencies/Consultants and
contractor will undergo trainings in the application of the ESMF. During supervision of the
project, the World Bank will assess the implementation of the Framework directly or through
third party, and if required, will recommend additional strengthening.
Capacity
building
activities
Training
sessions to
AJSDP staff
Training
Number
Details
Required
budget
3
Training sessions to staff on ESMF
implementation (organized by Safeguards
Officer)
Training sessions on site specific ESMP
US$3000
TBD
88
TBD
sessions to
contractors
implementation
Public Complaints and Grievance Redress
245. All public complaints will be addressed, documented and investigated. All complaints and
grievances should first be negotiated to reach an agreement at the local community/village level.
Resolving complaints will at first be entrusted to the Safeguards Officer, in consultation with the
PSU Director and relevant agencies representatives. Public complaints which cannot be resolved
at the project level will be directed to a provincial committee composed of relevant local
governmental agencies and relevant local CSO representatives for necessary action. The project
will establish an easily accessible system for submission of complaints/grievances, with multiple
intake options (verbal/written/electronic submission) and analysis and monitoring of grievance
resolution. The project will also establish different options for public information/disclosure of
information for communities and relevant stakeholders to be aware of processes to be followed
to register complaints.
Consultation and Disclosure
246. This Environmental and Social Management Framework was developed for the project
on the basis of an overall Framework for World Bank-funded reconstruction operations which
was prepared in consultation with the principal NGOs and development partners participating in
reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. Prior to approval of the project by the World Bank, it
will be disclosed by the Government in Dari and Pashto, as well as English, and it will also be
made available at the World Bank Infoshop. When sub-projects are identified, information will
be disclosed by provincial Justice Department.
89
Annex 10: Economic, Financial and Accountability Analysis
AFGHANISTAN: JUSTICE SERVICE DELIVERY PROJECT
Objective
247. The objective of the Economic, Financial and Accountability Analysis is to a) provide an
overview of the main economic, corruption and governance issues in the sector; b) identify the
main economic and governance benefits of the project for the sector; and c) identify project
specific governance risks and set out mitigation measures. The mitigating measures will be
incorporated into the Operations Manual for the project and implemented through the project
management structures as well as partner organizations.
248. The basis for analysis in this section is composed of a range of inputs including, but not
limited to: outputs and lessons learned of the Phase 1 AJSRP; the World Bank’s analytics and
report on “Transition”; the US Interagency Planning and Implementation Team’s “Courts
Baseline Assessment and Plan”; Supreme Court of Afghanistan Human Resource Department’s
Analysis and Training Plan; USAID “Assessment of Afghanistan Rule of Law Project”;
UNAMA “Quantitative Assessment of Legal Aid”, UNDP and World Bank “Vulnerabilities to
Corruption Assessments”.
Background
Main Economic and Financial Issues Related to the Justice Sector
249. Functioning justice institutions play a critical role in economic development: To date,
however, the justice institutions have played little part in providing a pillar to support the private
sector. Inconsistency and unpredictability in interpretation of laws, crime, theft, disorder,
corruption, lack of access to land, and dysfunctional court system are among the key constraints
to investment climate and private sector development in Afghanistan. Consequently, many
businesses remain small enterprises in the informal sector where they cannot contribute to tax
revenues and opportunities for expansion are limited.
250. One of the key current economic strategies for ensuring future growth in Afghanistan is
centered on the development of “resource corridors” (essentially, developed infrastructure zones
linked to urban areas which will be driven by the development of extractive industries). The
justice institutions (JI) will need to play a supportive role in these developments by providing
relevant services within their purview directly to the business community: for example land
registration procedures, contract enforcement (not only between private sector operators but also
between the private sector and the Government both at central and decentralized level,) and so
forth, but also to the communities impacted by these developments (for example ensuring that
citizens have a means for redress in relation to contractual provisions contained in mining
contracts such as development of services and infrastructure for citizens (schools, recreational
areas, markets etc.) or revenue allocation. In essence the JI will have to play a key role in
ensuring and supporting the equitable development and allocation of revenues from these areas.
90
251. Improving the business environment remains a critical challenge in Afghanistan. According
to a recent World Bank/IFC report on Doing Business, Afghanistan ranks 160 out of 183
economies assessed for ease of doing business: a 6-point deterioration from the previous year.
While business registration processes have been improved by removing the system from the
remit of commercial courts, and establishing a separate agency for this, dealing with legal
disputes once a business is established remains costly, time consuming and high risk. The study
estimates that going to court to enforce a contract through the courts requires 47 procedures, and
takes 1642 business days. It was found to be amongst the hardest places to register property,
ranking 172 globally, with the formal process estimated to take 250 days. The challenge during
Transition will be to improve these processes and reduce costs in the context of declining
resources, but the decline in funding is also an important reason why these reforms must be
prioritized to ensure a more sustainable system.
252. The state justice sector remains highly dependent upon external resources: As is the case
for most sectors in Afghanistan, 90 percent of development activities in the justice sector are
financed through donor funding. However, as Transition progresses, a rapid decline in these
resources can be expected. Compounding this, growth, even under reasonably optimistic
scenarios, is projected to fall from a ten year average of over nine percent to between five and six
percent in 2011-18. This will result in an increasingly constrained budget envelope from which
to deliver services to citizens. In addition, a decrease in Non-Government Organizations’ (NGO)
activities can also be expected, and there may be increased pressure on government to take
ownership of projects and services that were previously delivered outside of the government
systems, thereby increasing further the fiscal burden upon government. The effects of reduced
NGO activity may be particularly acute in the legal aid sector, where NGOs provide at least 60
percent of legal aid for criminal cases. All the NGOs in this area are reliant for their continued
operational existence on external financing from donors and have not managed to generate a
sustainable business model. In addition, through subsidies, NGOs have raised the price of legal
representation to unaffordable levels and thus distorted private market for legal services. As
such, a key challenge for the state sector will be how to fill this service void and vacuum if the
services by NGOs retract during the Transition. The inherent danger of not filling the vacuum is
that more individuals choose to utilize insurgent justice forums instead.
253. State justice systems in Afghanistan are highly inefficient and cost-ineffective: Reliable
data about the workloads and processes of Supreme Court (SC), Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and
Attorney General’s Office (AGO) staff is still very limited. There is little transparency about
case numbers or productivity of support staff in courts. The Afghan local JI are currently too
small to generate benefits of scale or specialization. Infrastructure and technology remain weak
across these institutions. The Kabul SC office has very little computer equipment, meaning most
processes are managed by paper handwritten documents. This contributes to lengthy and
unpredictable processing times for cases, with numerous opportunities for rent seeking and
misuse of funds during case processing. This in turn reduces the number of cases that can be
processed by the given staffing levels, and reduces the quantity and quality of services delivered.
In legal aid, weak criteria for eligibility for assistance place an unmanageable and unpredictable
burden on limited service capacity, with no means through which to prioritize cases. Pre-trial
detention rates are high which again contributes to high costs of managing the system, and has
significant spillover effects for the broader socio-economic condition of numerous families
throughout Afghanistan. Escalation of all cases through repeated appeals causes further direct
91
costs, while the indirect costs in terms of a reduction in the legitimacy of verdicts delivered – and
thereby the ongoing uncertainty with regards to substantive legal issues throughout Afghanistan
– are also substantial.
254. There has been little emphasis on efficiency gains to date: Previous investments in the
sector have not been able to noticeably improve the quantity and quality of justice services
provided. The government has sought to scale up the system by expanding its network of courts
and staff numbers, but this has not been informed by reliable needs assessments in order to
maximize impact. The state and NGOs remain the major providers of legal aid. Therefore the
next five to ten years will pose a clear challenge in terms of improving service delivery scope
and quality, in the context of declining resources. The focus of the Justice Delivery Project is
therefore to improve the productivity of key elements of the justice system, prioritizing critical
frontline services.
Corruption
255. Establishing good governance in Afghanistan is proving to be extremely difficult – While
there have been some encouraging developments such as the passing of the anti-corruption law,
the ratification of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and the
establishment of the High Office of Oversight (HOO) for Anti-Corruption, the overall progress
in improving governance and fighting corruption has been limited. Corruption in Afghanistan
has become more widespread and systemic over the course of the last few years. In 2005,
Afghanistan ranked 117 out of 159 countries covered in Transparency International’s Corruption
Perception Index; by 2009 its rank had dropped to 179 out of 180 countries, while by 2010 its
rank had risen to 176 out of 178 countries3. Available survey evidence and other information
show that a majority of Afghans view the payment of bribes to be a necessity in order to obtain
services from the government4. Corruption is commonly perceived to have become more
organized and entrenched, involving networks at all levels with those at the top reaping large
rewards.
256. The broader institutional context remains weak and political economy pressures upon
public officials are significant. Nepotism and patronage widely affect civil service recruitment.
Compounding this is the continued practice of recruitment of large numbers of national technical
advisers who carry out routine civil service functions, with weak lines of accountability to the
Government. This diverse system is further complicated by the variety of donor approaches to
capacity building and capacity substitution in administrative structures. A World Bank
commissioned study notes that ‘elite’ attachment to the rules of administration remained weak
and uneven. The institutionalization of the rules of public administration faces many barriers.
The state lacks a clear sense of demarcation between political and administrative staff, with the
civil service lacking its own independent top-tier of leadership. Although the Government has
examined various options to clarify the rules, clear policy decisions have not been taken to
demarcate responsibilities and functions. The guardian of civil service ethics and rules, the
Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC), is in need of
strengthening. Major attempts to reform these systems have to some degree been prompted by
3
4
Transparency International: http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010
See “Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan – Summaries of Vulnerabilities to Corruption Assessment,” World Bank, June 2009
92
international initiatives, such as the London and Kabul conferences and also the introduction of a
formal Civil Service Code to provide a stronger benchmarking of formal rules.
257. In a functioning state system, the justice sector - and in particular administrative courts –
acts as a key safeguard in ensuring the accountability to individual citizens of executive action.
Ensuring access to such courts and tribunals is therefore a key pillar in ensuring the
accountability of the executive and its services to users and can be a forum for predictable
enforcement of the broader aims of the social accountability agenda.
258. An independent judiciary, with appropriate accountability mechanisms, can play a critical
part in reducing corrupt practices in the justice system. Afghanistan, however, does not have a
very long history or experience of a truly independent judiciary free from executive interference.
It was not until the Constitution of 1964 that it could be stated that the judiciary of Afghanistan
was in any way truly independent but this independence itself was short lived. The Constitution
of 1973 abolished the SC and transferred the powers of the Chief Justice to the MoJ. Under the
Revolutionary Council of 1977, the powers of the SC were transferred to a Supreme Judicial
Council under the Minister of Justice before the communist Constitution of 1980 re-established
the SC, nominally as independent, but required it to report regularly to the Revolutionary
Council. The SC regained full independence in 1987 but following the collapse of the
Communist system, the civil war of the 1990s and the imposition of a radical Islamic system of
Government by the 1990s, it was never able to exercise such independence again until the
current Constitution of 2004.
259. At the individual judicial level there is little sense of accountability towards the internal
judicial power and authority structures. While a High Judicial Council to govern the judiciary’s
administrative affairs (including appointments) has been established in Afghanistan, it is
perceived as being non-transparent in terms of decision making and thus in important ways
undermines efforts to improve accountability among the judiciary. The lack of collegiality and
inclusiveness amongst the judiciary continues to encourage practices of primary loyalty to tribe,
family and community by judges which leads to the corrupt dispensation of justice.
260. Numerous studies show that citizens perceive corruption in justice institutions to be among
the worst of all state institutions. A 2010 UNODC survey shows that in 2009, judicial and
criminal justice officials were those most frequently reported to have taken a bribe. This applied
equally to both urban and rural respondents. The 2010 Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA)
survey reached a similar conclusion: The survey indicates that Afghans perceive the main
institutions responsible for security and justice as among the most corrupt. In total 50 percent of
respondents named either the courts or the MoJ as the most corrupt public institution (each
respondent could name up to 3 institutions). Moreover, households paid the highest numbers of
bribes for the provision of security and justice by the police and the courts. As such, it is clear
that corruption in these institutions has a daily and damaging impact upon the lives of citizens.
261. The high number of cases being tried in the absence of defendants in criminal courts is
further cause for concern and is indicative of wide spread corruption throughout the justice
institutions and police. Over the past two years, the courts have been processing ever increasing
number of these types of case. The reasons for the absence of the defendant are not always clear
but are commonly referred to as being related to (a) bribes paid for the release of the defendant to
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the detention authorities; (b) bribes paid to “switch files” between defendants/prisoners; (c) a
lack of effort by the police to find the defendant and serve notice of the hearing date on them;
and (d) collusion by the prosecution and the judge to process the case quickly. The incentives for
defendants to bribe their way from court are also very high since in Afghanistan sentencing may
also take place in the absence of the defendant but the time to be served for that sentence
commences immediately, rather than when they are caught (the rationale being that life as a
fugitive is just as bad as being in prison). All these factors combine to delegitimize the system as
a whole and encourage further bribe paying.
262. Some of the most pressing sectoral issues related to corruption in the justice sector are set
out below. These all tend to reinforce the negative dimensions of one another and therefore, in
order to address them, a holistic, multi-pronged and sector wide approach is required:
263. Lack of Accountability. High ranking officials from the justice sector are hardly ever
sanctioned for corruption, demonstrating limited accountability within the sector. Specific
mechanisms for corruption in the justice sector can include delays in processing a case, or
passing a judgment, until a bribe is paid. Case management is weak; there is little accountability
for processing times, little transparency of process and weak information systems to mitigate
these issues. Additionally the issues of legal pluralism, recycling of disputes, forum shopping all
lead to an increased reliance upon judge’s discretion, unpredictability of justice systems
outcomes (jurisprudence), opportunities for corruption and undermining of legitimacy.
264. “Justice” is often for sale to the highest bidder and captured by vested interests. This is a
problem with both internal and external dimensions. While the external dimension has been well
documented (as noted above in relation to the perception surveys), the internal dimensions have
not been well captured. Internal sale of justice usually involves the process of judges “bidding”
for the allocation of particularly “valuable” (value can take a number of forms) cases to be
allocated to them for hearing. This process is of course further swayed by the vested interests
that are able to manipulate such a weak system for their own needs. This form of sale and
capture usually involves active participation by both administrative courts staff as well as the
judiciary and is particularly corrosive to the smooth functioning of the system. Little research has
been undertaken to assess how this operates in the Afghan context, although all the outward
indicators (high cost of access, lengthy case processing times, lack of trust in the system, high
number of cases in absentia in the criminal courts) suggest the practice is rampant.
265. Beneficiaries are vulnerable. The weak and vulnerable position of those seeking to engage
with Justice Institutions exacerbates the opportunities for rent seeking. There are large
information asymmetries about the law in Afghanistan and traditional mitigating features of a
functioning system (lawyers and other repeat users of the system such as insurance companies)
do not exist to a sufficient degree or are also captured within the network of corruption. As with
any system the poverty and high illiteracy rate of the population makes formulating and
understanding a claim and decision without assistance nearly impossible. Moreover, the physical
barriers to access make any decision to undertake a court case a highly risky, expensive and
uncertain one for the majority of the population. The vulnerable are especially at risk in the
criminal justice system, where those who cannot pay may become the “victim” of a switched
file. The high pre-trial detention rates (27 percent of total prison population when last recorded)
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also have a significant socio-economic impact on the livelihoods of numerous families who may
lose an important source of income for an uncertain amount of time.
266. In addition to these factors undermining the very legitimacy and effectiveness of the state
system, they also contribute to “pushing” many individuals into the arms of “insurgent justice”
institutions. Such process, however, is not entirely due to the weakness of the state system. It is
of particular note that enforcing “justice” and “law and order” (although not necessarily the rule
of law) is one of the first acts that the insurgents typically carry out (often presiding over dispute
mechanisms that are in breach of Afghanistan’s constitution as well as numerous treaties to
which it is signatory.) Nevertheless, the “insurgent justice” forums also exhibit a number of
factors that exert a strong “pull” for individuals. Notably, they are perceived as being free from
corruption, they are quick, they exist and are available and they are seen by many to be deeply
rooted in traditional Islamic beliefs and jurisprudence.
267. Despite the high number of judges versed in Sharia law operating within the courts, the
Afghan justice system has been unable to leverage this apparent expertise into providing a
greater legitimacy for the courts – in terms of having the population see that the laws that are
being enforced are part of their Islamic heritage. Indeed, until recently, there was active
promotion from the Government –assisted and encouraged by the donor community – to move
the system away from being too closely aligned with Islamic jurisprudence and principles. This
has been mainly due to the conflation of “Sharia” with only negative aspects of the jurisprudence
and in particular with its implementation by fundamentalist Islamic groups around the world.
There are, however, numerous positives which could be gained from providing a greater degree
of synergies between the justice systems and Sharia values (those that are of course compatible
with the Constitution of Afghanistan, the international conventions to which it is signatory and
so forth).
268. The Judiciary in Afghanistan has started to take tentative steps towards a more transparent
and accountable system. A number of judges have recently been removed from their positions.
More has to be done and the project will assist in this regard. Since there is a rich tradition in
Islamic heritage of high moral standards, ethics, values and norms of behavior, which govern
personal, professional and business life and these values promote commercial fairness and
ethical business as basic standards of economic activities, providing the space for such positive
values to take root within the courts as part of the reform efforts under the project, will be key in
increasing the legitimacy of the courts and combating corruption.
Economic, Financial and Governance Benefits of the Project
269. Due to the nature of the project (including lack of data on the justice system, the long term
nature of seeing results arise from investment in the justice sector and so forth), it is difficult to
carry out a complete and quantified ‘Cost-Benefit Analysis’ and estimate the internal rate of
return of the investment being made. Some limited assessments can be made regarding the
economic and financial benefits of the project, and in particular the “sector benefits” (which are
closely aligned with the expected governance improvements) and “cost-effectiveness” of the
investments under the project can be captured. Set out below are the main examples of the
“sector benefit” the project is expected to have:
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a) Efficiency of Formal Justice Systems increases thereby reducing cost and increasing
productivity.
b) By developing a mechanism for improved collaboration between formal and informal
institutions, resulting in better case management, data exchange, record sharing, and
thereby a reduced caseload for formal institutions as recycled cases are not entertained
and cases which can be more appropriately dealt with away from the formal system are
diverted, costs will be saved and will also become more predictable. The predictability of
caseload and costs will allow for systems of performance based budgeting to be
introduced.
c) Core /common function business process of the JI will be reviewed and augmented as
part of effort to promote internal efficiency gains. Financing business process
improvements in JI (e.g. case management, HRM, procurement) are intended to create
improvements in productivity through process simplification and formalization, but also
to reduce opportunities for corruption through greater transparency of process and
reduced transactions. Trainings will be provided to build the capacity of key justice
officials, including trainings and exchanges that build professional values and ethical
awareness.
d) Additionally, interventions will be made from the demand side to in order to provide
mechanisms that adequately and predictably meet the demands of citizens. Filters on
criteria and eligibility to reduce the burden on the legal aid budget will be introduced
while at the same time the incorporation of the ILF-A will allow for an increase in
productivity, efficiency and resultant service delivery.
e) Finally, the pilot areas (Logar, Bamiyan, Herat, Kabul) are centers of commercial
activity, including large scale mining. It is therefore expected that these interventions will
improve and support the business environment, and facilitate economic activities.
HR Processes
270. Since the project seeks to improve the quality of service delivery outcomes in the Justice
sector, the human capital available to implement this within the JI is of central importance. The
project would be at risk of HR processes being biased towards preferred candidates, in particular
since nepotism is a widely acknowledged practice in the sector.
271. The HR departments will be a focus of key reforms, with the project supporting the
development of performance evaluation processes, the roll out of Pay and Grading reform and
merit based recruitment, and restructuring of departments and clarification of job descriptions to
improve accountability and oversight. Improved recruitment processes should result in reduced
instances of nepotism in JI.
Independence and Accountability
272. While the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed by the constitution (as it is in most
countries) it is still not effectively secured in Afghanistan. One of the primary reasons for this is
the lack of accountability that judges have to respond to, thereby decreasing any need for
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transparency and increasing the incentives for taking bribes as noted earlier. While the SC as an
institution has secured a degree of independence from other public organs, judges within the
institution regularly face pressures that prevent them acting with impartiality. Additionally, the
fact that the SC entertains 100 percent of appeals to it, delegitimizes any decisions taken prior to
the SC. The proposed reforms – particularly in the area of human resource reform and financial
management – will have a catalytic effect on improving the independence and accountability of
the formal justice as a whole.
273. Demand side accountability will be improved though increased dissemination of
information to citizens on rights and entitlements under the law (Legal Awareness program and
Partnership for Justice). The legal outreach program will also specifically focus upon
strengthening capacity of communication departments of the three JI.
Forum Shopping and Recycling of Disputes
274. The ‘Partnership for Justice’ component aims to build a workable model for collaboration
between formal and informal dispute resolution mechanisms, with information sharing in order
to reduce duplication of cases. It will work with local and state institutions to increase the
efficiency and effectiveness of legal service delivery, thereby reducing the incentives for forum
shopping and improving the predictability of outcomes. Improved access to information should
improve demand for more predictable systems and more efficient delivery of services. At the
local level this will ensure that limited community resources are not wasted in continually
pursuing cases and allow such resources to be directed towards more efficient means.
Regulatory Frameworks
275. Missing pieces of the key regulatory framework will be introduced, combined with clearer
policy guidelines and improved lines of accountability and independence of judges/ prosecutors,
improved reporting structures. This will allow for the predictable development on a holistic and
sector-wide basis the development of true access for justice services for the citizenry. The
predictability brought about by the new regulatory framework will also provide the space and
opportunity for the private legal market to develop.
User Complaints Mechanism
276. These will be developed directly through the project and will provide a forum for the users
to provide directly their complaints on the justice system where they feel they have been treated
unfairly. The performance management processes to be introduced will allow for such criticisms
to be actually acted upon where merited.
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Annex 11: Documents in Project Files
AFGHANISTAN: JUSTICE SERVICE DELIVERY PROJECT
PCN Review Package
Minutes of the Project Concept Note Review Meeting
Peer Review Comments and Responses
ESMF
ISDS
Disbursement Letter
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04/03/2012
04/14/2012
04/14/2012
04/25/2012
04/25/2012
06/31/2012
Annex 12: Country at a Glance
AFGHANISTAN: JUSTICE SERVICE DELIVERY PROJECT
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Annex 13: Maps
AFGHANISTAN: JUSTICE SERVICE DELIVERY PROJECT
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