1NC
CP text: The 50 States and all relevant Territories should enter into a compact
on:
__________________________________________________________________
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_______________________________________________.
The Compact should collect revenue via a Clean Energy Community Finance
Initiative.
Compacts solve faster than the federal government
Mountjoy ‘01
John is a policy analyst with the council of State Governments, “Interstate Compacts Make a Comeback,”
Spring http://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/ncic/Comeback.pdf
Some may question the need for interstate compacts to address multi-state
policy issues. Why ¶ not leave such regulation to the feds? ¶ “Interstate
compacts help us maintain state control,” said Gary McConnell, director of the ¶ Georgia Emergency
Management Agency. ¶ During his 10 years as GEMA director, McConnell has played an instrumental role in developing ¶ and promoting a
successful interstate compact —the Emergency Management Assistance ¶ Compact, or EMAC. EMAC allows state emergency management
We can go to the federal
government for all kinds of help when natural disasters strike, but the ¶ states
[cooperating under an interstate compact] can provide specific resources quicker, which ¶ are
likely to be problem specific,” McConnell said. “It’s less bureaucratic, and it’s
far cheaper. ¶ It’s easier for us under EMAC to obtain resources from surrounding states than it is to use ¶ federal assistance, which
we’d end up having to pay more for anyway. I suspect this is the case ¶ with many other interstate
compacts as well.” ¶ “States are rediscovering that they have the power to
address their own problems better than the ¶ federal government,” said Rick Masters, The
agencies to cooperate and ¶ share resources in the event of natural and man-made disasters. ¶ “
Council of State Governments’ legal counsel and ¶ special counsel for interstate compacts. ¶ CSG, which has tracked interstate compacts for more
than 40 years, maintains a clearinghouse of ¶ compact information. More recently, CSG helps administer EMAC and is facilitating the update ¶ of
the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision and the Interstate Compact on ¶ Juveniles. Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 of the U.S.
Constitution laid the legal foundation for interstate ¶ compacts: “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep
¶ Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another ¶ State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War,
unless actually invaded, or in such imminent ¶ Danger as will not admit of delay.” Compacts actually preceded the Constitution, having been ¶
used in colonial times to resolve boundary disputes between colonies. ¶ Prior to the 1920s, interstate compacts were typically bi-state agreements,
addressing boundary ¶ disputes and territorial claims. In fact, only 36 interstate compacts were formed between 1783 ¶ and 1920. It is only in this
century that states have turned to interstate compacts to facilitate ¶ cooperative solutions to multi-state problems. ¶ After a lull in the late 1970s
and early 1980s, interstate compacts are beginning to enjoy a ¶ resurgence. Since the early 1990s, states have initiated or updated several highprofile compacts. ¶ Examples include EMAC, the Interstate Compact on Industrialized/Modular Buildings and the ¶ Interstate Insurance
Receivership Compact. Interstate compacts can set the framework for cooperative solutions to today’s cross-state ¶ challenges, from policing
drugs to supplying energy or controlling sprawl. ¶ “Issues within the states are becoming more complex and aren’t confined by state boundaries.
As ¶ a result, solutions are becoming multi-state as well. Compacts are the only tool that is truly ¶ adequate for addressing these multi-state
issues,” said Bill Voit, senior project director at The ¶ Council of State Governments. ¶ An example is an interstate compact being considered to
facilitate taxation of e-commerce. ¶ Opponents of Internet taxation claim that it would be virtually impossible for online vendors to ¶ comply with
the complex, often confusing system of state and local sales and use taxes. Since ¶ Internet sales are expected to reach $184 billion annually by
2004, states have a vested interest in ¶ breaking down this and other barriers to taxing online transactions. ¶ Congress currently is considering the
Internet Tax Moratorium Equity Act (S. 512) to help states ¶ simplify their sales and use taxes, in part by authorizing states to enter into an
Interstate Sales ¶ and Use Tax Compact. The compact would create a “uniform, streamlined sales and use tax ¶ system,” convenient to remote
1
sales. ¶ At least 18 states are considering the model streamlined sales tax legislation in 2001. Kentucky, ¶ South Dakota, Utah and Wyoming
already have signed bills into law. ¶ Existing interstate compacts, many drafted in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, are ripe for ¶ amendment and
revision. Technology and the Internet now make the sharing of information ¶ seamless and immediate, yet several interstate compacts are plagued
by inadequate ¶ administration. ¶ “Not only do we see the development of new compacts, but we are seeing the re-examination of ¶ existing
compacts…revising them to keep pace with our changing world,” Masters said. ¶ Developed in 1937, the Interstate Compact for the Supervision
of Parolees and Probationers is ¶ one example of a compact in need of update. Adopted by all 50 states, the compact regulates the ¶ movement of
parolees and probationers across state lines. The burgeoning offender population ¶ and the ease with which offenders now can travel have created
several problems for the compact, ¶ including: frequent violations of compact rules, inability to enforce compliance, difficulty in ¶ creating new
rules and slow, unreliable exchange of case information. ¶ The antiquated compact needed a replacement that would provide states the authority, ¶
enforcement tools and resources to adequately track and ensure supervision of parolees and ¶ probationers. ¶ The new interstate compact, the
Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision, provides ¶ these solutions. The new compact includes mechanisms for enforcement,
accountability, resource provision, information sharing and state-to-state cooperation. Currently, the compact ¶ has been introduced in 39 states
and enacted in 18. ¶ Just as technology can smooth the operation of interstate compacts, alternative dispute resolution ¶ techniques can increase
their self-sufficiency. Enforcement tools within interstate compacts need ¶ to utilize more of the mediation and arbitration services that have
proven successful throughout ¶ state government. By developing additional self-contained enforcement mechanisms, compact ¶ members would
States should further utilize
interstate compacts to address new problems and create new ¶ methods of
interstate cooperation. If not, federal preemption in certain policy areas is a
distinct ¶ possibility.
not need to rely solely on the crowded docket of the U.S. Supreme Court. ¶
2
States Solve
3
Generic
Interstate Compacts solve best for ocean policy
Fletcher ‘06
(Kristen M. Fletcher Director, Marine Affairs Institute and Rhode Island Sea Grant Legal Program, Roger Williams University. Special thanks to
Ingrid Nugent, Mark Hill, and Sarah Doverspike who thoughtfully organized the Regional Ocean Governance Symposium in 2005 and this
journal issue. This article is based on a talk given at Duke Law School in October 2005 and is dedicated to Professor Conrad Kellenberg who
celebrated 50 years of teaching in 2005, including three inspiring years during which he was instrumental in the professional and personal
development of the author. “OCEANIC ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR REGIONAL OCEAN
GOVERNANCE: ARTICLE: REGIONAL OCEAN GOVERNANCE: THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE” Duke
Environmental Law & Policy Forum Spring 2006 16 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol'y F. 187, Lexis, TSW)
Interstate compacts represent a more formal approach for states to join
together on common issues and have served a major role in governing natural
resources. n46 The basis for negotiating interstate compacts is found in the U.S. Constitution, which states that "no state shall, without
the consent of Congress, enter into any agreement or compact with another state or with a foreign power." n47 This compact clause implicitly
recognizes state power to negotiate and enter into agreements subject to congressional consent. Formation of an interstate compact typically has
three stages: (1) Congress authorizes negotiation of the compact, usually with a federal representative as part of the negotiations, (2) states enter
into compact negotiations, and (3) Congress consents to the negotiated compact. n48 The resulting interstate compact is a legal instrument that
Interstate
compacts are useful in that they can address regional problems of concern to
particular states which are transboundary but too localized to be a national
issue. A key example is the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Compact. n49 In 1942,
binds states to formal cooperation. There is no limit to the number of states which may be involved in an interstate compact.
Congress approved an interstate compact and created the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission ("ASMFC"), which served as an advisory
board with the power to make legislative recommendations regarding common fish species in the state waters of 15 coastal Atlantic States. n50 In
1993, Congress enacted the Atlantic [*197] Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act expanding the Commission's authority to include the
creation of coastal management plans and findings of state noncompliance. n51 The Atlantic States were to use the ASMFC as a vehicle for joint
management of important coastal fisheries with other member states, rather than continuing to promulgate varying state-by-state regulations. n52
The Commission views the rebound of the striped bass population as one of its
greatest successes but notes that the success was based on common values
implemented among the member states. n53 These values include respect of
state sovereignty, transparency in programs and actions, and flexibility within
conservation parameters. n54 The rationale for member states is to provide collective, cooperative management and to
make decisions that are "good for all versus best for one." n55 With fifteen member states, members can pool their scientific resources and, in
some cases, streamline data collection. Ultimately, the Commission hopes to provide states with incentives to act but has access to action forcing
The benefits of an interstate compact include greater efficiency
than a federal regulatory response because states in a region are generally
more familiar with a problem and can be more responsive to local and
regional needs . n57 Unlike informal interstate cooperation, a compact is binding to the citizens of the member
mechanisms. n56
states and provides a formal mechanism for states to reduce jurisdictional hurdles associated with transboundary problems. n58 The process of
political adjustment required to negotiate a compact allows the parties to specify decisionmaking procedures and standards.
State action is better responds at the regional level
Christie ‘06
(Donna R. Christie Elizabeth C. & Clyde W. Atkinson Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law; B.S. Chem. 1969, University
of Georgia; J.D. 1978, University of Georgia; Post Doc. 1978-1980, Marine Policy and Ocean Management Program, Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institution. “OCEANIC ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR REGIONAL OCEAN
GOVERNANCE: ARTICLE: IMPLEMENTING AN ECOSYSTEM APPROACH TO OCEAN MANAGEMENT: AN ASSESSMENT OF
CURRENT REGIONAL GOVERNANCE MODELS” Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum Spring 2006 16 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol'y F. 117,
Lexis, TSW)
D. Implementation Issues An interesting aspect of the USCOP recommendations is that the structuring of governance to promote a regional,
ecosystem-based approach to ocean management can largely be accomplished without congressional action. For example,
4
by
recommending the reorganization of federal agencies along common regional
lines and better coordination of agency activities within those regions , n82 USCOP
provides initial, functional steps toward an ecosystem-based approach to management at the federal level that are relatively easily implemented
regional ocean councils may eventually be
formalized through interstate compacts , no legislation is necessary for the creation of voluntary regional
and do not require legislative authority to initiate. While
councils or for the extension of existing regional efforts. USCOP's recommendations concerning regional ocean and coastal approaches to
State participation in
development of regional approaches to ecosystem-based management of the
oceans is voluntary, and national standards or regional ocean governance
plans that are enforceable against the states are not required. n83 Participants in voluntary
management also avoid many of the issues raised by the Pew Commission governance proposals:
regional councils can identify problems and responses that are best addressed at the regional level. Because they are not constrained by a
councils can address the priorities
they identify for the regions and have the flexibility to adopt adaptive
management approaches to respond to the dynamic nature of ecosystems.
legislative mandate to take a particular approach or meet particular goals, the
5
Ocean Terminals
State Compact solve Ocean terminals
Mayle ‘09
(Mary Carr Mayle, Savannah Morning News, Ga. “Marchand: Encouraging signs at Savannah's port” June 30, 2009 Tuesday Lexis,TSW)
While May numbers at Georgia Ports Authority continue to reflect double-digit declines almost across the board, there may be a light at the end
of the tunnel, GPA Executive Director Doug Marchand told his board Monday. "Economic data through May tends to show signs of a bottom
forming," Marchand said. "New unemployment claims have stopped rising and consumers are spending on homes and other durable items. The
consumer expectations index reached a six-month high in May." At ports across the globe, the shipping industry saw the fleet of laid-up vessels
start to decline as carriers began to respond to improving demand in the Intra-Asia trades as well as among developing economies such as Brazil,
Russia, India and China, he said. Locally, the volume of empty containers increased by nearly 12 percent last month as carriers positioned those
boxes in Savannah for new services beginning in May and June -- another encouraging sign, Marchand said. Curtis Foltz, GPA's chief operating
officer, also was cautiously optimistic. While container volumes declined by 13 percent last month, the encouraging sign is that further
percentage decreases have not occurred, and the decreases experienced in April and May have improved over the first three months of the
calendar year, he said. "(GPA's) vessel calls during May were up 8.3 percent, despite continued trade decline as owners position their networks
into new service trade routes and posture for economic recovery," Foltz said. Georgia Ports is well-positioned with these expanded services to
respond strongly once the U.S. and global economic recovery begins, he said. Indeed, Savannah's continued commitment to capital improvements
and growing capacity has made it a pivotal port as ocean carriers develop strategies to consolidate or eliminate redundant routes to better serve
their customers while cutting costs. One simple statistic tells the tale: This time last year, a total of 38 services called at Savannah's port. Today,
that number stands at 48. "Improving our facilities and expanding our services and market share at our deepwater ports is critical to Georgia's
economic recovery," said Savannah businessman Stephen S. Green, elected Monday to an unprecedented third term as chairman of the Ports
Authority board. "The deepening of the Savannah Harbor from 42 to 48 feet, the continued expansion of our existing facilities and the Jasper Port
Terminal are projects that will provide our customers and our region with the resources they need to realize new economic opportunities," Green
said. Also elected Monday were Alec Poitevint of Bainbridge, vice chairman, and Jim Lientz of Atlanta, secretary/treasurer. Also on Monday the
board: -- Approved a $2.3 million contract for the Cross Terminal Road and Bridge at the Garden City Terminal that will provide direct access
from the north to the south end of the terminal. The project also includes a five-lane roadway corridor and a new bridge structure crossing
Pipemaker's Canal. The project is expected to be complete in March 2010. -- Approved a $1 million contract for the upgrade of Ocean Terminal
The project consists of the removal of an existing section of the dock and
construction of a new, deeper deck section to accommodate increased material
handling equipment. Benchmarks set for Jasper Ocean Terminal The board of directors of the Jasper Ocean Terminal Joint
Berth 18.
Project Office, meeting in Savannah on Monday, approved an amendment to the agreement between Georgia and South Carolina, establishing
benchmarks for the project. "This action will help to ensure that the Jasper Ocean Terminal development proceeds in an orderly and timely
next major step is to develop the
Interstate Compact language for introduction in the next session." The amendment was
manner," said William L. Bethea Jr., chairman of the project office. "The
first approved by the boards of the South Carolina State Ports Authority on Friday and the Georgia Ports Authority in an earlier meeting Monday.
In addition to clarifying language from the original agreement signed in January 2008, the amendment lays out a schedule for next steps, such as
finalizing a dredged materials management plan to facilitate removal of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers easement on the site. Also on Monday,
the joint project office approved goals and objectives for the project,
establishing a framework for the group's work. The joint project office was
formed by the South Carolina and Georgia ports authorities and the Georgia
Department of Transportation to initiate and advance work on the Jasper
Ocean Terminal project. Its work will eventually result in an Interstate
Compact for consideration by both states' general assemblies and the U.S. Congress. The Interstate Compact will
cover the financing and operation of the project, as well as other issues.
6
Thermal Ocean Energy
Compacts solve thermal Ocean energy
Palay ‘09
(J.D. Candidate 2009, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A. 2004, Medieval and Early Modern Studies, University of
Michigan. She would like to thank Professors Noah Hall and John Leshy for their comments; Nadim Hegazi and the staff of Hastings
Constitutional Law Quarterly for an outstanding year; and especially Andrew Ziaja, for his love, encouragement and ciphers. Sonya F. Pala
“Muddy Waters: Congressional Consent and the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact” Hastings Constitutional Law
Quarterly Summer, 2009 Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 36 Hastings Const. L.Q. 717, Lexis, TSW)
II. Introduction to the Compact Clause of the U.S. Constitution In order to better understand whether the GLC already had the consent of
Congress through the 2000 WRDA, or if it was necessary for Congress to take some further action, it is useful to begin with a brief introduction
the Compact Clause of the United States Constitution, including an investigation of its purposes. The Compact Clause prohibits states from
entering into interstate compacts without the consent of Congress. n71 The full text of Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution
provides: No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into
any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger
as will not admit of delay. n72 The Compact Clause of the U.S. Constitution was modeled closely after a similar clause in the Articles of
Confederation, n73 and it is generally accepted that the primary purpose of the clause at the time of its naissance was to resolve border disputes
interstate compacts have come to cover a much
broader subject range than border disputes. n75 In addition to being used for
managing interstate bodies of water, compacts have been used for everything ranging from
interstate dairy agreements, n76 to air pollution prevention, n77 and managing ocean thermal energy
conservation facilities. n78 [*727] Interstate compacts are particularly useful
because they provide benefits beyond what "ordinary state regulation" allows.
n79 The primary benefit is that interstate compacts that have the consent of
Congress are treated as federal law, and so preempt contrary state laws. n80
between states. n74 Since that time, however,
7
Fish Conservation Efforts
Interstate compacts solve regional fish conservation – Pacific Salmon prove
Hanna ‘06
( Susan Steele Hanna Professor, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics. This paper was funded by the NOAA Office of Sea Grant
and Extramural Programs, U.S. Department of Commerce “CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR REGIONAL OCEAN
GOVERNANCE: ARTICLE: IMPLEMENTING EFFECTIVE REGIONAL OCEAN GOVERNANCE: PERSPECTIVES FROM
ECONOMICS” Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum Spring 2006 16 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol'y F. 205, Lexis, TSW)
Pacific Salmon are a good example of the complex
requirements of regional ocean governance and the institutional incentive
problems that plague governance systems. Anadromous salmon traverse a wide range of ecosystems in the
III. The Pacific Salmon Example
course of their life histories as they migrate from watersheds to rivers to oceans and then back to freshwater natal streams to spawn. n23 In
. In larger economic and social
terms, however, salmon are polarizers, creating economic and political
conflict through actions taken for their protection and restoration. Problems
of biodiversity protection in salmon illustrate complexities facing the
realignment of rights and responsibilities in the coastal zone. n24 Salmon
management takes place over multiple jurisdictions using complex rules
designed to protect wild stocks in an environment of controversy over wildhatchery stock interactions and conflicts among various users. Salmon
management is coordinated through interstate compacts, a U.S.-Canada treaty, state agencies,
ecological terms, they serve as integrators of riverine and coastal ecosystems
regional fishery management councils, the National Marine Fisheries Service, judicial authorities, and protective statutes that require extensive
consultation on actions affecting protected species. n25
8
Fishing Regulations
Interstate compacts solve fishing regulation – Oregon and Washington proves
Sperling ‘84
(Lawrence I. Sperling “ IDAHO EX REL. EVANS V. OREGON: CONSERVATION AND THE NONCONSUMPTIVE STATE RIGHT IN
SHARED LIVING RESOURCES.” University of Pittsburgh Law Review SUMMER, 1984 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 949, Lexis, TSW)
V. THE FACTS AND HOLDINGS OF IDAHO The Snake River begins in northwest Wyoming, flows westward across Idaho, then flows
northward along the border between Idaho and Oregon for approximately 165 miles. It then follows the border of Idaho and Washington for
about thirty miles, and turns west to join the Columbia River which runs along the Oregon-Washington border and empties into the Pacific
Ocean. n58 The runs of spring and summer chinook salmon and steelhead trout in the river system begin at spawning grounds in the shallow
fish initially travel downstream into
the Columbia and then into the ocean where they remain for several years. Near
upper reaches of the Snake and the other tributaries of the Columbia. The
the end of their life cycle, the fish return upstream to their point of origin and spawn a new generation. n59 Thus, a significant portion of these
three fish runs originates in and returns to the state of Idaho. n60 The runs are the target of sport and commercial fishing in Washington, Oregon,
Each state subjects the
exploitation of the runs to regulation. In addition, Oregon and Washington have
formed an interstate compact, ratified by Congress in 1918, that attempts to ensure uniformity
in these two states' fishing regulations by requiring one state to secure the
consent of the other before changing its regulations. n62 Idaho has attempted several times to become
and Idaho and are harvested by several Indian tribes along the Columbia River. n61
a party to the compact between Oregon and Washington, but its efforts have been consistently rebuffed. n63
9
Offshore Wind
Interstate compact solves offshore wind- reduces costs 51% even absent
federal incentives and guarantees investment and cooperation
Dhanju et al ’11
Amardeep is at the University of Delaware’s Center for Carbon-Free Power Integration as are Jeremy
Firestone and Willet Kempton the other authors of the paper, “Potential Role of Power Authorities in
Offshore Wind Power Development in the U.S.,”
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421511005994
interstate power authorities are rare (and currently specific to nuclear or energy efficiency sectors),
they have been suggested to develop interstate transmission for locationally
constrained energy resources such as wind power (National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL),
Although
October 2, 2009). In the past, federal government has actively created regional power authorities such as Bonneville Power Administration (BPA)
and Tennessee Valley Power Authority (TVA) to build and manage hydroelectric resources, and construct transmission to move that power.
The focus has now shifted to wind power development and its transmission to
load centers3, but no one is calling for a new federal authority for this purpose. Interstate transmission is traditionally a federal
subject, managed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). A regional power authority framework
offers states the opportunity of constructing and managing interstate
transmission infrastructure, without the peril of federal preemption.17 This
discussion on interstate transmission can be readily applied to offshore wind resources.¶ A
regional power authority provides the benefits which were discussed in detail
earlier with a single-state power authority, with the added capability to
develop resources across state boundaries. In creating an interstate power
authority, the participating states surrender a part or all of their authority on shared
resources in exchange for shared sovereignty over the entire resource by the
interstate public authority, of which it is a member. In turn, the authority would provide
a dedicated administrative setup to develop and manage the resource on a
regional scale. It is important to note that states would agree to a regional arrangement when the perceived benefits of collaboration in
their assessment would out-weigh the cost of surrendering authority over a resource.¶ The coastal states could create
an interstate authority dedicated to offshore wind power in two ways: by
creating a new authority or by modifying an existing one. The process for creating a new one
was described above. Precedence for modification of interstate compacts exists, with the Delaware River and Bay Authority (DRBA), being one
such example. DBRA is a bi-state government agency that was created in 1962 to manage the shared road, air and waterway transportation
infrastructure in New Jersey and Delaware. Revision of the compact in 1990 by the 101st Congress empowered the authority to participate in
economic development ventures in Delaware and southern part of New Jersey (Delaware River and Bay Authority (DRBA), 1990). ¶ A related
option is for the states to expand the mandate of an existing interstate compact. For example, DRBA could be expanded to cover offshore wind
A dedicated regional power
authority would facilitate offshore wind development in three ways. First, a
power authority acting on behalf of the participating coastal states could
prepare a regional resource management plan in coordination with BOEMRE
and other concerned federal agencies. A regional plan could identify potential
conflicts with other ocean and coastal uses and the natural environment, and
devise strategies to resolve potential conflicts. An important part of this effort could be a regional marine
power development, transmission and/or development of offshore wind manufacturing. ¶
10
spatial plan to guide and facilitate resource development. This planning effort could compliment the ongoing national Coastal and Marine Spatial
Planning (CMSP) initiative (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), n.d.) and inform the broader ecosystem management
practices for ocean resources.¶ Second, since state jurisdictional waters only extend three nautical miles on the Atlantic coast, areas where there is
greater potential for visual and environmental effects, more offshore wind power development is likely to occur in federal waters. BOEMRE is
If
participating states in a regional authority choose so, the authority could work
with BOEMRE to suggest optimal resource development strategies and
coordinate on permitting issues.¶ Third, there is a shared energy economy at the regional level in terms of developing
the lead agency for the leasing process, although federal leases will have to be consistent with the costal state regulations.
and using electric generation and transmission infrastructure. MARCO states with the exception of New York are part of the PJM18 Regional
Transmission Organization (RTO), which manages a shared generation and transmission pool, and operates a unified regional wholesale market.
Further, each state has a Public Service Commission (PSC) that makes state decisions about power plant development and siting. A regional
power authority could make agreements about state PSC regulatory priorities, and would have more influence than any one state at PJM
Offshore
wind power development in the US currently stands where hydroelectricity
was in 1930s. In much the way power authorities facilitated hydroelectric
power generation, they could now be used to facilitate offshore wind power
development. A potential drawback of power authority structure is that it requires legislative action by
one or more state legislatures, and requires setting up a new institution, or adapting
an old one. Among the several advantages discussed above, including planning and
coordination functions, the most important may be that it can lower the cost
of power by as much as 51% and preserve the ability to pursue more costcompetitive development even if the current federal incentives are removed.
(however, PJM decisions are largely driven by member companies, not by constituent state governments).¶ 6. Conclusion¶
State offshore wind push sends a signal that revitalizes the industry
Gordon, 12
(VP for Energy Policy at American Progress, April, Taking Action on Clean Energy and Climate Protection in 2012
http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2012/04/pdf/energy_solutions.pdf)
Expedite permitting processes for offshore wind development in state waters
Why it matters: Offshore wind is a commercially scalable source of renewable energy. Some of the best wind resources in the world exist in close
In Maine, Rhode
Island, New Jersey, and Maryland, legislatures and governors are eager to tap
into this resource for its potential clean energy contribution and the
opportunity to establish a beachhead in their state for an industry with the
potential to create hundreds of thousands of jobs, according to “Untapped Wealth: Offshore Wind Can
proximity to some of the most densely populated regions in America, such as the northeast and Mid-Atlantic.
Deliver Cleaner, More Affordable Energy and More Jobs Than Offshore Oil,” a 2010 study by the ocean protection nonprofit organization
States only control ocean space out to three miles from their shoreline,
which limits the potential size of wind farms in state waters. Yet the immense
value of these installations as pilot projects is compounded by the relative ease
of permitting—taking the federal government out of the process eliminates
numerous hurdles. A concerted push from a state government to expedite its
permitting process will allow that state to stake an early claim to “first in the
nation” status for a demonstration project and provide a launching pad for a
renewable energy industry with tremendous economic promise.
Oceana.
11
Environmental Leadership
State action solves environmental leadership
Northrop, 8
(Program Director for Sustainable Development-Rockefeller Brothers Fund, 6/3, “States Take the Lead on Climate”
http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2015)
The leadership of states such as California, Arizona, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Florida is crucial not only
because it provides a template for federal climate legislation that will no doubt be
adopted under the next presidential administration. State action is also vital because among the top
75 emitters of greenhouse gases worldwide, half are U.S. states. Individually, the size of many of these state economies rivals those of most
State climate policy initiatives — though not yet implemented on a national scale — are collectively among
the most advanced anywhere in the world. They provide a profound but largely unrecognized platform for
national action, and for a potential reassertion of global environmental
leadership by the United States. Indeed, state climate initiatives have provided hope to
those in the global community who have waited patiently for the United States
to engage meaningfully in international climate efforts.
countries.
12
Pollution/CWA
Interstate Compacts have the authority to carry out CWA/Pollution
regulation
Gaffney ‘07
(Brian P. Gaffney J.D. Candidate, The University of Texas School of Law. M.A., Sociology, Stanford University. B.A., Political Science with
Honors, Stanford University. “A Divided Duty: The EPA's Dilemma Under the Endangered Species Act and Clean Water Act Concerning the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System” The Review of Litigation Spring, 2007 26 Rev. Litig. 487, Lexis, TSW)
III. Clean Water Act - Nation Pollutant Discharge Elimination System A. Basics In 1972, one year before the enactment of the ESA, Congress
passed the CWA n60 to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." n61 In order to achieve
these aspirations, section 301(a) of the CWA makes unlawful the discharge of any pollutant into navigable waters except as authorized by
specified sections the CWA. n62 At the outset, Congress delegated the responsibility for administering the provisions of the CWA to the EPA.
n63 The CWA requires any "person" n64 to obtain a permit in order to discharge a pollutant. n65 All permitting authority under the NPDES n66
was initially vested in the [*499] EPA. n67 Even though the NPDES was originally placed under federal jurisdiction, Congress intended to
"recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of states to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution ... ." n68
Additionally, the CWA specifically states, "it is the policy of Congress that the States ... implement the permit programs under sections [402] and
[404]." n69 The Federal Pollution Control Act "evidences that the federal program is not intended to preempt authority of the state to issue
permits for discharges into waters within a state, but rather to induce cooperation of the states in the establishment of a program to be
administered by the states within certain federal guidelines with regard to uniform national standards." n70 Furthermore, "Congress clearly
intended that the states would eventually assume the major role in the operation of the NPDES program." n71 In
accordance with
Congress's express desire to have the states involved with water pollution control, the CWA
provides that a state may apply to the EPA in order to administer the federal pollution permitting
program regarding the waters within their borders. n72 The CWA instructs the Administrator to promulgate guidelines
establishing "the minimum procedural and other elements" of a satisfactory state program. n73 The CWA specifies that the
governor of the state seeking the transfer is to submit a proposed program together with a
statement from the state's head legal officer "that the laws of such state, or the interstate compact,
as the case may be, provide adequate authority to carry out the described program." n74 The EPA
Administrator must determine whether the state has met nine specific criteria and "shall approve" state applications that satisfy those criteria. n75
The current controversy is directly related to [*500] the phrase "shall approve," because the terms appear to issue a mandatory duty and suggest
that the EPA does not have the discretion to refuse a state the NPDES as long as the state has fulfilled the nine requirements listed in section
402(b). n76 The NPDES program is the primary method of regulating the discharge of pollutants into oceans, lakes, rivers, or creeks. The
NPDES is also a delegable program under the CWA and authorizes the states to assume control of what would otherwise be a federally operated
program. Over the past thirty years, Congress has increasingly relied on delegable programs in environmental regulation. n77 The issue of section
7(a)(2)'s applicability to the NPDES and other delegable federal programs is important because of the critical role that section 7(a)(2) plays in the
protection of listed plant and wildlife species. Therefore, if section 7 cannot be applied to the transfer of NPDES programs, endangered and
threatened species will lose a key protection.
13
Perms
14
A2: Do Both
Links to Politics- Federal action requires Obama push and blame, state action
doesn’t.
Perm links more- lobbies will get involved to get Congress not to preempt
compacts
Every Vote Equal ’11
Every Vote Equal is a policy book advocating for a compact to create a national popular vote for President with chapters on the history of
interstate compacts and written by 15 judges and U.S. Representatives, “Background on Interstate Compacts,” http://www.every-voteequal.com/pdf/EVECh5new_web.pdf
Economic interest groups often encourage the establishment of regulatory
compacts. Such groups typically lobby Congress not to exercise¶ its
preemption powers in a particular area by arguing that coordinated¶ action
by the states, by means of an interstate compact, is sufficient to¶ solve a
problem.¶
What links less should be your decision calculus. Even if perm resolves 99%
of the link preventing the worst outcome is key to understand policymaking
and prevents judge intervention over what is enough to not link.
15
A2: Do CP
Perm Severs out of the Federal Government that is a voting issue to prevent
1AC’s from spiking DA and CP competition making it impossible to be
negative.
16
Theory
17
50 State Fiat Good
1 Fairness- Key to check federal government and provide a core generic.
2 Policy Education- Key distinctions between federal and state action on ocean
projects and discussion over which actor is best.
3 Real World- Representatives have to justify why they are the necessary
actor v. the states. More debaters will become academics who write about
competing actors, we have reasons the States are better than the federal
government.
4 Predictable- Domestic topics and tons of cards about who is best for energy
justify.
5 50 states act together all the time
Mountjoy ‘01
John is a policy analyst with the council of State Governments, “Interstate Compacts Make a Comeback,”
Spring http://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/ncic/Comeback.pdf
Interstate compacts are contracts between states that carry the force and effect of
statutory law. ¶ They are a tool for state governments to address regional or national
policy concerns. Compacts ¶ are not a solution per se, but rather they allow a state to enter into a contract with other states to ¶
perform a certain action, observe a certain standard or to cooperate in a critical policy area. ¶ The law and use of interstate compacts is not
particularly complex. Like any contract, the ¶ language of a compact needs to be identical in intent and context, if not identical in exact ¶ verbiage
between the states. ¶ Although typically overlooked as a state policy option, more than 200 interstate compacts exist ¶ today. Whether large or
small, compacts play a role in everyday state relations and activities. ¶ Most interstate compacts cover rudimentary functions, such as regulating
boundaries and water ¶ rights, and have less then 15 signatories. For example, the Waterfront Commission Compact ¶ between New Jersey and
Several interstate compacts
have 50-state membership, or close to it, and are managed by ¶ administrative or regulatory agencies. The
American Association of Motor Vehicle ¶ Administrators oversees the Drivers’
License Compact, which facilitates recognition of drivers’ ¶ licenses issued in other states. The Interstate Compact for Education,
New York regulates the practices in handling waterfront cargo in the ¶ Port of New York. ¶
administered by the ¶ Education Commission of the States, maintains close cooperation among executive, legislative, ¶ professional and
educational leadership on a nationwide basis at the state and local levels.¶
6 Alternative is worse- Neg’s will begin running CP’s that rely on certainty or
immediacy which are nearly impossible to have aff advantages tied to.
7 Err Negative on Theory- Aff gets to choose the discussion, speak first and
dirth of uniqueness on recent topics means neg’s need what would have been
questionably good for debate 8 years ago.
18
A2: Solvency Deficits
19
Funding Mechanism
Clean energy revenue systems solve
Saha et al ’12
Devasharee is a senior policy analyst at Brooking’s Metropolitan Policy Center and writing with 3 other
analysts on state and environmental policy for a Brookings study, “Leveraging State Clean Energy Funds
for Economic Development,”
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/1/11%20states%20energy%20funds/0111_
states_energy_funds
states without clean energy funds should consider establishing
dedicated clean energy revenue streams to engage in project finance and smart
To act on this promise,
industry support. ¶ These states typically do not have dedicated support for either clean energy projects or clean energyrelated economic
A range of sources for these funds exists and includes ¶ general
revenue bonds, tax or lottery revenues, pollution charges, and renewable
portfolio standard ¶ (RPS) compliance fees. However, experience has shown that electricity
surcharges set on electricity ¶ consumption or “wires charges” tend to be the
most stable and reliable revenue source, as well as the ¶ most fair as they internalize the environmental
development activities.¶ 16¶
consequences of electricity purchases.¶ 17¶ States should ¶ examine these sources as potential bases for the establishment of new clean energy
funds.
20
A2: Links to Politics
Low political visibility
Rabe, 4
(Prof of Public Policy-Ford School at Michigan, Statehouse and Greenhouse, P. 22)
But this is not what occurred in the states examined in this study. Instead, a much quieter process of
policy formation has emerged, even during more recent years, when the pace of innovation has
accelerated and the intent of many policies has been more far-reaching. This is not to suggest that climaterelated episodes have been irrelevant or that leading environmental groups have played no role in state
policy development. Contrary to the kinds of political brawls so common in debates about climate change
policy at national and international venues, however, state-based policymaking has been far less visible
and contentious, often cutting across traditional partisan and interest group fissures. It has, moreover,
been far more productive in terms of generating actual policies with the potential to reduce greenhouse
gas releases.
CP is below the political radar
Celli 01
Chief of the Civil Rights Bureau, New York State Attorney General's Office (Andrew, 64 Alb. L. Rev. 1091, Lexis)
state enforcement officers, like me and like Peter Lehner, with our small and agile offices operating
below the national political radar, that we can use these federal laws in creative and
aggressive ways and perhaps in a way that is insulated from the kinds of political pressure
that, say, the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department faces.
I also saw that
21
A2: Compliance
Fiat Solves- they have to comply.
Compacts will be followed- equivalent of treaties
Every Vote Equal ’11
Every Vote Equal is a policy book advocating for a compact to create a national popular vote for
President with chapters on the history of interstate compacts and written by 15 judges and U.S.
Representatives, “Background on Interstate Compacts,” http://www.every-voteequal.com/pdf/EVECh5new_web.pdf
An interstate compact is, first and foremost, a contract. As the Supreme¶
Court wrote in the 1959 case of Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge¶ Commission:¶ “[a] compact is, after all, a contract.”¶ 7¶ As
contracts, compacts enjoy strong protection from the U.S.¶ Constitution. Article I, section 10, clause 1 of the
Constitution provides: ¶ “No State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the
Obligation¶ of Contracts....”¶ 8¶ The Council of State Governments summarizes the nature of interstate compacts as follows:¶
“Compacts are agreements between two or more states that¶ bind them to the compacts’ provisions, just as a contract¶ binds two or more parties
in a business deal. As such, compacts are subject to the substantive principles of contract law¶ and are protected by the constitutional prohibition
compacting
states are bound to observe the¶ terms of their agreements, even if those terms
are inconsistent with other state laws. In short, compacts between states¶ are
somewhat like treaties between nations. Compacts have¶ the force and effect of
statutory law (whether enacted by¶ statute or not) and they take precedence over conflicting¶
state laws, regardless of when those laws are enacted. ¶ Background on Interstate Compacts | 189¶ 6¶
against¶ laws that impair the obligations of contracts (U.S.¶ Constitution, Article I, Section 10). ¶ “That means that
Id. at 517–518. ¶ 7¶ Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission. 359 U.S. 275 at 285. 1959. ¶ 8¶ See appendix C for the full wording of the
impairments clause.
22
A2: Territories
Territories can do compacts
Every Vote Equal ’11
Every Vote Equal is a policy book advocating for a compact to create a national popular vote for
President with chapters on the history of interstate compacts and written by 15 judges and U.S.
Representatives, “Background on Interstate Compacts,” http://www.every-voteequal.com/pdf/EVECh5new_web.pdf
there are interstate compacts that include as few as two states¶ and compacts that involve all 50
states. Certain interstate compacts¶ include the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, the¶ Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and provinces of Canada. The Interstate¶
Today,
Compact for Education, for example, encompasses 48 states, the District¶ of Columbia, American Samoa, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. In¶
1949, the Northeastern Interstate Forest Fire Compact became the first ¶ interstate compact to include a Canadian province. The Great Lakes ¶
Basin Compact (appendix K) includes Ontario and Quebec.
23
A2: International Signal
State governments are representative of the USFG
Nick Robinson, Yale Law School, J.D, Currently Fox Fellow at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New
Delhi, 2007 Akron Law Review “Citizens Not Subjects: U.S. Foreign Relations Law and the
Decentralization of Foreign Policy” Lexis
State and local governments are arguably seen as representing the U.S. government abroad in
a more official capacity than U.S. non-state actors. The governments of these localities are
democratically elected and so it is more likely that they will be seen as acting
on behalf of the American people. Additionally, the federal government generally has a greater ability to control the
actions of these localities than non-state actors. Therefore, there is a greater chance that nonintervention
by the federal government to stop offensive activity will be seen as federal
endorsement of such activity. Such logic though should caution against court intervention in these cases rather than
encourage it. If localities' actions damage U.S. foreign policy interests, the federal government can easily preempt the state or local policies in
question. Further, with the world's increased interconnectedness, it is more likely that if a foreign government takes offense to a locality's policy it
can discriminate between the policy of the locality and the policy of the federal government. n155
State action spills up, especially in energy policy
Larsen et al 7
Larsen et al, expert on Federal climate and energy policy World Resources Institute, 7¶ (John, Andrew Aulisi, Jonathan Pershing, Paul Posner,
“Climate Policy in the State Laboratory: How States Influence Federal Regulation and the Implications for U.S. Policy,” World Resources
Institute, September, http://pdf.wri.org/climate_policy_in_the_state_laboratory.pdf,
The second most important factor emerging from this ¶ analysis was policy learning. It
appeared as a significant ¶ factor in seven of eleven cases, as a somewhat signifi
cant ¶ factor in the remaining four, and was strong in both environment/energy and
nonenvironment/energy cases. State ¶ policies often demonstrated that a policy could both be ¶ implemented and be
effective, thereby carrying the power ¶ of example. For instance, organic farming standards were ¶ developed
in the absence of any federal action and over ¶ time provided a powerful
example of how best to establish ¶ such standards at the federal level. State gun
control laws ¶ also proved that within their respective state boundaries, ¶ provisions like waiting periods and background checks ¶ not
only were feasible but actually prevented thousands of ¶ illegal gun sales. But as we note later in our discussion
of ¶ state policies that failed to diffuse, the existence of policies ¶ at the state level, even if broadly adopted, does not necessarily guarantee
their adoption by the federal government ¶ without a compelling need for federal action
They’re perceived internationally as the USFG
Blase, 3
Phd-Government-UT Austin, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/etd/d/2003/blasejm039/blasejm039.pdf
Although what the states and cities are doing may not rise to the level of
federal law, many of these policy initiatives are in harmony with domestic
policy goals. Collectively, it can be argued, they serve to shape the foreign relations of the nation
as a whole. Ivo Duchacek sees no difference in relations conducted by federal actors and by
subnational actors. “If by diplomatic negotiation we mean processes by which
24
governments relate their conflicting interest to the common ones, there is,
conceptually, no real difference between the goals of paradiplomacy and
traditional diplomacy: the aim is to negotiate and implement an agreement based on conditional
mutuality.”45 Brian Hocking objects to treating the foreign relations of subnational
governments as if they were something distinct from the federal level . Hocking
studies what happens in federal systems when foreign policy issues become local concerns. He sets his
approach apart from the complex interdependence crowd, such as Duchacek, saying that ideas such as
“paradiplomacy” places subnational activities outside of traditional diplomatic patterns. Hocking sees
non-central governments as integrated into a dense web of diplomatic interactions, in
which they serve more as “allies and agents” in pursuit of national objectives rather than as flies
in the ointment. “The nature of contemporary public policy with its dual
domestic- international features, creates a mutual dependency between the levels of
government and an interest in devising cooperative mechanisms and strategies to
promote the interests of each level.”46 Rather than separating the activities of
non-central governments from those of central governments, Hocking’s goal is
to “locate” subnational governments in the traditional diplomatic and foreign
policy processes initiated and carried through by the federal government.
25
A2: Uniformity DA’s
Compacts are uniform, your evidence is about uniform laws
Every Vote Equal ’11
Every Vote Equal is a policy book advocating for a compact to create a national popular vote for
President with chapters on the history of interstate compacts and written by 15 judges and U.S.
Representatives, “Background on Interstate Compacts,” http://www.every-voteequal.com/pdf/EVECh5new_web.pdf
Third, although the goal of the National Conference of¶ Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is that identical laws be adopted ¶ in all states, it is
very common for individual states to amend the¶ Conference’s recommended statute in response to local pressures. If ¶ the changes are not major,
the Conference’s goal of uniformity may¶ Background on Interstate Compacts | 237nonetheless be substantially (albeit not perfectly) achieved. In
adoption of a compact requires a meeting of minds. Because an
interstate¶ compact is a contract, each party that desires to adhere to an
interstate¶ compact must enact identical wording (except for insubstantial differences such as
numbering and punctuation). Variations in substance are¶ not allowed.¶ Fourth, and most importantly, a
uniform state law does not establish¶ a contractual relationship among the
states involved. When a state enacts¶ a uniform state law, it undertakes no obligations to other states. The¶ enacting state merely
contrast,¶
seeks the benefits associated with uniform treatment of the subject matter at hand. Each state’s legislature may repeal or ¶ amend a uniform state
law at any time, at its own pleasure and convenience. There is no procedure for withdrawal (or advance notice for withdrawal) in a uniform state
In
contrast, an interstate compact establishes a contractual¶ relationship among
its party states. Once a state enters into a compact, it¶ is legally bound to the
compact’s terms, including the compact’s specified¶ restrictions and
procedures for withdrawal and the compact’s specified¶ procedure for
termination of the compact as a whole.
law. A uniform state law does not create any¶ new legal entity, and therefore there is no legal entity from which to¶ withdraw.
26
A2: Congress Overturns
Durable fiat means Congress doesn’t overturn.
Congress can’t overturn compacts
Every Vote Equal ’11
Every Vote Equal is a policy book advocating for a compact to create a national popular vote for
President with chapters on the history of interstate compacts and written by 15 judges and U.S.
Representatives, “Background on Interstate Compacts,” http://www.every-voteequal.com/pdf/EVECh5new_web.pdf
The Constitution (section 10 of Article I) authorizes Congress to¶ revise state statutes
levying import and export duties; however, it does¶ 232 | Chapter 5¶ 100¶ Entergy, Arkansas,
Incorporated v. Nebraska, 68 F.Supp.2d 1093 at 1100 (D.Neb.1999). ¶ 101¶ Entergy, Arkansas, Incorporated v. Nebraska, 241 F.3d 979 at 991–
992 (8th Cir. 2001).¶ 102¶ Lincoln Journal Star. July 15, 2005.
not grant similar authority to revise
interstate compacts. Congress withdrew its consent to a Kentucky–Pennsylvania Interstate Compact that¶ stipulated that the Ohio
River should be kept free of obstructions. In¶ 1855, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and ¶ Belmont Bridge Company
that the compact was constitutional under the¶ Constitution’s Supremacy Clause (Article VI) and that a compact ¶ approved by Congress did not
restrict Congress’s power to regulate an¶ interstate compact.¶ 103¶ In the 1917 case of Louisville Bridge Company v.¶ United States, the Court
ruled that Congress may amend a compact even¶ in the absence of a specific provision reserving to Congress the authority¶ to alter, amend, or
repeal the compact.¶ 104¶ A federal statute terminating a¶ compact is not subject to the due process guarantee of the 5th ¶ Amendment to the
Constitution on the ground that this protection¶ extends only to persons.
Even if they can, they wouldn’t
Pincus ‘09
Matthew is the former editor of the Columbia Law Review, “When Should Interstate Compacts Require
Congressional Consent,” Summer http://www.columbia.edu/cu/jlsp/pdf/Summer2009/02Pincus.42.4.pdf
In addition to legislative bicameralism, the other significant ¶ hurdle to federal
legislation is the
¶ corresponding threat of the executive veto.¶ ¶
presentment requirement, and
the
116 While the
veto ¶ is also exercised by a person who is elected by the people, presidential elections are conducted with different apportionment ¶ schemes than those for members of the legislative branch and ¶ presidents serve for a term different
than either congresswomen ¶ or senators. As a result of this system of bicameralism and presentment, prevailing coalitions in each legislative body and the ¶ executive are able to hinder or even stifle each other’s initiatives. ¶ 117¶
The result of this cumbersome legislative process is that it is ¶ extremely
difficult and time-consuming to pass a federal law. ¶ Lawmaking often involves
numerous compromises from the time ¶ a bill is introduced until the members
of each house finally vote ¶ ¶ ¶ Many proposed laws die in this process
¶
¶
doing nothing is always
easier than ¶ passing a piece of legislation.
upon it. 118
, never coming
a vote or arriving for signature on the desk of the president. These built-in impediments put a “thumb on the scale”
up for
against congressional action:
The federal government was deliberately structured to set obstacles between the will of the popular majority
of the people and passage of laws.¶ 119¶ The architects of ¶ the constitution were more concerned about a government overly ¶ responsive to the people than a constitution that was not responsive enough. ¶ 120¶ ¶ Thus, the
When interstate compacts of wide
impact are allowed to come ¶ into force, this “legislative inertia” has an
unintended effect: the ¶ same forces that typically prevent congressional action
exert ¶ pressure to let the compact remain in place
institutional bias against taking action is a deliberate and important facet of the federal constitutional structure. ¶
. It is true that, because interstate compacts inevitably involve interstate concerns,
Congress is almost always able to override any compact it wishes, ¶ either explicitly (through legislation) or by preempting the field ¶ in which the compact operates.¶ 121¶ Any such legislation, however, ¶ must pass through both
houses and survive any possible veto by ¶ the president. Thus, legislative inertia makes it more difficult for ¶ Congress to pass a law voiding an interstate compact than to ¶ refuse to approve one. As a result, passing an interstate
compact ¶ effectively enhances the power of the enacting states, while diminishing that of Congress. ¶ 122¶ Although the same could be said for ¶ the enactment of any state law in an area where Congress and ¶ the states share
authority, what makes interstate compacts different is that they inherently involve relations between the states ¶ and coordinated action among them. Interstate compacts have ¶ the potential — as demonstrated by the NPV — to have
much ¶ broader impact on the country as a whole than uncoordinated ¶ actions by individual states.
27
A2: Requires Congressional Consent
Congressional consent irrelevant- can come way after, isn’t usually required,
and not contentious
CSG ’12
Council of State Governments, “Understanding Interstate Compacts,”
http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/CompactEducation/Understanding_Interstate_Compacts-CSGNCIC.pdf
Article I, Section 10, Clause III of the U.S. Constitution provides in part that “no state ¶
shall, without the consent of Congress, enter into any agreement or compact
with another ¶ state.” Historically, this clause generally meant all compacts must receive congressional ¶ consent.
However, it has been found in a number of instances, notably the 1893 US ¶
Supreme Court case Virginia v. Tennessee that not all compacts require
congressional ¶ consent. It is well established today that only those compacts
that affect a power ¶ delegated to the federal government or alter the political
balance within the federal ¶ system, require the consent of Congress. ¶ Fortunately,
even though congressional consent may be needed, it is not particularly ¶
burdensome to acquire. Though usually satisfied by means of a congressional resolution ¶ granting the states
the authority to create a compact, the Constitution specifies neither the ¶
means nor the timing of the required consent. Over the years, the Supreme Court has
held ¶ that congressional consent may be expressed or implied and may be
obtained either ¶ before or after a compact is enacted.¶
28
A2: Unconstitutional
Compacts are permissible, most recent decisions
Pincus ‘09
Matthew is the former editor of the Columbia Law Review, “When Should Interstate Compacts Require
Congressional Consent,” Summer http://www.columbia.edu/cu/jlsp/pdf/Summer2009/02Pincus.42.4.pdf
On February 23, 2006, an organization calling itself the “National Popular Vote” held its initial press conference in Washington, D.C. The group,
composed of prominent current and former ¶ elected officials from both the Republican and Democratic parties, as well as the heads of several
public interest organizations,¶ 1¶ proposed a new piece of legislation for states throughout the country: ¶ an interstate compact titled the
Agreement Among the States to ¶ Elect the President by Nationwide Popular Vote.¶ 2¶ This agreement is intended to revolutionize the process by
which the United ¶ States elects its President. Each state in the compact would ¶ pledge to award all of its electoral votes to the presidential
candidate who received the most votes in the 50 states and the District ¶ of Columbia.¶ 3¶ Because each state that joined the compact would ¶
award its electoral votes not based on the winner of the most ¶ votes within its borders but rather on the results of the election ¶ nationwide, this
proposed system would effectively circumvent ¶ the electoral college; it would force Presidential candidates to ¶ shift their resources from the
small number of “battleground” ¶ states to the broader American electorate. This dramatic change ¶ in the method of electing the President, a
federal officer, could be ¶ made without the approval of any branch of the federal government save — in the event of a legal challenge — the
judiciary. As ¶ the organization asserts, because “under the U.S. Constitution, ¶ the states have exclusive and plenary . . . power to allocate their ¶
electoral votes”¶ 4¶ such a change could be accomplished solely by ¶ altering state law, rather than federal law or the Constitution ¶ itself.¶ 5¶ That
a limited number of states could agree to create such a ¶ fundamental shift in the federal political system without the approval of Congress might
the Compact
Clause,” proclaims “No State shall, without ¶ the Consent of Congress . . .
enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State.”¶ 7¶ Read literally,
this provision would ¶ require all agreements between states to be approved by
both ¶ houses of Congress and to be signed by the President before coming into effect.¶ 8¶ The Supreme Court,
however, has held in a series ¶ of decisions beginning with Virginia v.
Tennessee¶ 9¶ in 1893, that ¶ only a small subset of interstate agreements require
congressional assent. In its most recent major case to consider the issue, ¶ U.S. Steel v. Multistate Tax
Commission,¶ 10¶ the Supreme Court ¶ ruled that only those interstate
agreements that “enhance[ ] state ¶ power quoad the National Government” are
strike someone acquainted with the text ¶ of Article I of the Constitution as odd.¶ 6¶ One section of this Article, labeled “
ineffective without ¶ the approval of Congress.¶ 11¶ This test — at least as elaborated in ¶ U.S. Steel — would exempt agreements such as the
“Agreement ¶ Among the States to Elect the President by Nationwide Popular ¶ Vote” (“NPV”) from the congressional consent requirement.¶ 12
29
Aff Answers
30
AFF- Fed better than Compacts
Ocean action is handled better by the fed
Craig ‘08
(Robin Kundis Craig Attorneys' Title Insurance Fund Professor of Law, Florida State University C ollege of Law, Tallahassee, Florida. My
presentation on "Florida Water Law and the Endangered Species Act" at the Water Law Institute's and CLE International's Florida Water Law
CLE, Supply and Quality: Issues, Challenges and Solutions, held May 21-22, 2007, in Tampa, Florida, formed the basis of portions of this article.
“CLIMATE CHANGE, REGULATORY FRAGMENTATION, AND WATER TRIAGE” University of Colorado Law Review Summer, 2008
University of Colorado Law Review 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 825, Lexis, TSW)
B. Expanding the Role of the Federal Government Admittedly, the federal government has not historically promoted an ecosystem-based
approach to water resources management. Indeed, Congress, through directives to the BOR, the Army Corps, and the TVA, among other
agencies, can fairly be charged with significant destruction of ecosystems throughout the United States, especially in the West. n401
While
such large-scale impairment of aquatic ecosystems might be cause for doubting the efficacy of an
increased federal role in water resources management, the evolution of federal management
priorities suggests that a change in substantive outlook would support the structural arguments for
an increased federal presence. Federal irrigation, flood control, navigation, and hydropower projects reflected the political priorities
for water of the 19th and early 20th centuries. The very enactment of many major federal environmental statutes in the 1960s and 1970s signaled
a change in those priorities. Although federal environmental priorities are still evolving (or perhaps more accurately, vacillating between
Republican and Democratic Administrations), my advocacy for a
regulatory structure that increases the federal role in
water management to reduce the impediments of regulatory fragmentation depends on the
concurrent enactment of substantive federal legislation that embraces and promotes ecosystembased management and biodiversity-and marine-ecosystem-preserving goals. With those caveats, if the nation
wishes to create a regulatory structure that effectively includes marine ecosystem considerations in freshwater management, the federal
increased federal
involvement [*907] is necessary to provide a national-level perspective to counterbalance the statelocal interests that currently dominate both water quality and water quantity regulation . Several strands
of jurisprudence and normative theory support such increased federal involvement. First, the federal government has long
acknowledged the need for a federal role in interstate water resources issues. For example, because
the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over interstate conflicts, it has always been the arbitrator of
interstate water disputes, in terms of both interstate water pollution n402 and interstate water
quantity allocation. n403 While Congress's enactment of the federal Clean Water Act displaced federal interstate nuisance law, n404 the
government will probably have to take a more expansive (although certainly not exclusive) role. If nothing else,
Act itself continues to guarantee a substantial federal role in interstate water quality disputes. Moreover, interstate water quality disputes still
prompt regular calls for federal intervention. For example, in October 2007, the National Research Council called for the EPA to take a bigger
role in addressing Mississippi River water pollution, particularly nutrient pollution, both to improve the health of the River itself and to reduce
hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico. n405 As for water quantity, the federal common law of equitable apportionment and the federal constitutional
device of interstate compacts remain not only viable but important tools for resolving interstate disputes. In 2007 alone, the U.S. Supreme Court
agreed to resolve New Jersey's interstate compact dispute with Delaware over rights in the Delaware River, n406 while South Carolina filed an
original equitable apportionment action seeking to restrain North Carolina's use of the Catawba River. n407 [*908] Second,
the oceans
enjoy a particularly federal character. Except in certain parts of the Gulf of Mexico, where state authority extends further out
to sea, the oceans are subject to exclusive federal regulatory authority more than three nautical miles from shore. n408 By congressional grant,
states have extensive jurisdiction over the first three miles of coastal waters, n409 but that regulatory authority is subject to frequent federal
regulation and even preemption for navigation, coastal construction, coastal zone management, national security, and marine pollution n410
purposes. Other federal obligations can also come into play. For example, water delivery from the Colorado River to the Gulf of California/Sea of
Cortez, which is located in Mexican territory, is governed by treaty. n411 Third, the regulatory fragmentation that characterizes water resource
management also counsels for greater federal involvement. For example, at the end of his discussion of the regulatory commons, William Buzbee
suggests that reduction of regulatory fragmentation requires the creation of regulatory hierarchies. n412 Specifically, "in the regulatory commons
setting, recourse to federal authority will generally be a constitutionally palatable option," n413 although some decentralization is generally also
advisable. n414 More expansively, Erin Ryan has argued for the recognition in constitutional federalism jurisprudence of interjurisdictional
regulatory "gray areas" subject to both state and federal regulation n415 and the problem-solving value of federalism. n416 The problem-solving
value of federalism acknowledges that pragmatism has always been a component of American federalism [*909] (Ryan traces this value to James
Madison and The Federalist Papers n417) and hence that governmental capacity is a relevant factor in dividing regulatory authority among
federal, state, and local governments. n418 As such, the "subsidiarity principle" that normally promotes local regulation more generally "directs
that decisionmaking take place at the most local level that can get the job done." n419 Hence, Ryan concludes, "if the most local level of
government lacks the capacity to address [a problem], citizens should be entitled to expect that the next level up with capacity should at least be
authorized to try." n420
31
Aff-A2: Uniform State Law CP
Uniform state laws take 5 years to implement
Ring Jr. ’10
Carlyle is of counsel at Ober, Kaler, Grimes & Shriver. He formerly served on the Virginia Commission
of Uniform State Laws, “A New-Era: Cooperative Federalism through the Uniform State Law Process,”
Hamline Law Review 33 Rev 375 Summer, lexis
Officially,
the Conference produces two types of product: Uniform Acts and Model
Acts. n41 However, in practice, the Conference produces three products: (1) targeted Uniform Acts promoted for universal enactment; (2)
other Uniform Acts that ideally could or should be uniform but have not achieved the consensus and stakeholder support to achieve uniform
adoption in all or most states; and (3) Model Acts where uniform enactment is unlikely but states may benefit from the product developed
through the Conference's open and deliberative process. n42¶ The Conference made significant changes to its legislative enactment program in
1983 under the leadership of the then Legislative Committee [*387] Chairman Dwight Hamilton. n43 A Legislative Council was established,
with each member tasked with assisting five or more states in developing a legislative plan and including in that plan a strategy to enact targeted
acts as promptly as possible after promulgation. Just two years later, in 1985, Dwight Hamilton reported that the targeting program "triples the
Even with the energy of an
evangelical legislative program, products of the Conference take at least five
years, and frequently longer, to be adopted in every state. An act promulgated in July is not
available for consideration by a state until the next calendar year, at the earliest. Some state legislatures meet only
every other year and many have short sessions every other year. Every state considers the
average number of enactments, and doubles our best years over the last decade" n44 ¶
proposals for Uniform Acts with care, involving study and hearings. Thus, acts promulgated by the Conference since 2003 would not, in the
ordinary, course be expected to be enacted by every state by 2009, but may, within a reasonable period of time thereafter, be adopted by all or
nearly all of the states.
32
Aff-A2: Uniform State Laws (Not Implemented)
Only a 50% chance the law gets implemented
Ring Jr. ’10
Carlyle is of counsel at Ober, Kaler, Grimes & Shriver. He formerly served on the Virginia Commission
of Uniform State Laws, “A New-Era: Cooperative Federalism through the Uniform State Law Process,”
Hamline Law Review 33 Rev 375 Summer, lexis
he Conference produces two types of product:
Uniform Acts and Model Acts. n41 However, in practice, the Conference produces three products: (1) targeted Uniform
Successes of the NCCUSL Process¶ Officially, t
Acts promoted for universal enactment; (2) other Uniform Acts that ideally could or should be uniform but have not achieved the consensus and
stakeholder support to achieve uniform adoption in all or most states; and (3) Model Acts where uniform enactment is unlikely but states may
benefit from the product developed through the Conference's open and deliberative process. n42¶ The Conference made significant changes to its
legislative enactment program in 1983 under the leadership of the then Legislative Committee [*387] Chairman Dwight Hamilton. n43 A
Legislative Council was established, with each member tasked with assisting five or more states in developing a legislative plan and including in
that plan a strategy to enact targeted acts as promptly as possible after promulgation. Just two years later, in 1985, Dwight Hamilton reported that
the targeting program "triples the average number of enactments, and doubles our best years over the last decade" n44 ¶ Even with the energy of
an evangelical legislative program, products of the Conference take at least five years, and frequently longer, to be adopted in every state. An act
promulgated in July is not available for consideration by a state until the next calendar year, at the earliest. Some state legislatures meet only
every other year and many have short sessions every other year. Every state considers the proposals for Uniform Acts with care, involving study
and hearings. Thus, acts promulgated by the Conference since 2003 would not, in the ordinary, course be expected to be enacted by every state by
2009, but may, within a reasonable period of time thereafter, be adopted by all or nearly all of the states.Of the 17 acts targeted from 1983 to
1999 (acts having at least ten years to become fully adopted), 13 have been enacted by all or most of the 53 participating states and jurisdictions.
n46 Thus, in that period to date, 80% of the targeted acts have been adopted effectively on a universal basis. Although some targeted acts still
have yet to be enacted in some states, these successful targeted acts are nonetheless effectively the law of the land, since parties under modern
choice of law principles may choose to apply the law of a state that has adopted the uniform act, or the state courts may have embraced the
principles of the uniform act into the common law.¶ From 1999 to the present, designated targeted acts have had only five or up to ten years in
which to receive the consideration of each legislature. Three of the eight targeted acts for the period of 1999 to 2003 have been adopted by most
states, and of the twelve targeted acts for the [*388] most recent five years (2004 to 2009), two acts already have been enacted in most states.¶
For the entire period (1983-2009), 18 of the 37 acts that have been enacted in
most states, representing a 50 percent batting average over all. n47 There remains the
prospect that within a reasonable time the more recent targeted acts will have the opportunity for consideration in the state legislatures and will
therefore become more universally enacted by the states.¶
33