Free will
Am I ever really free?
Determinism: the entire state of the world at
any given time fixes, determines,
necessitates, all the subsequent states
“Man’s life is a line that nature commands him to
describe upon the surface of the earth, without
his ever being able to swerve from it, even for an
instant. He is born without his consent; his
organization does in nowise depend upon
himself; his ideas come to him involuntarily; his
habits are in the control of those who cause him
to contract them; he is unceasingly modified by
causes, whether visible or concealed, over
which he has no control….”
--Paul Holbach,
1770
Determinism vs. Fatalism
Fatalism: some events are predestined: no
matter what happens now, the outcome is
the same---whether I do x or y now, z will
result
 Determinism: if I do x now, z will result; if I
would do y now, w would result. But the
past determines that I will do x now.

Compatibilism: determinism is compatible with
freedom/moral responsibility
Incompatibilism: determinism is incompatible with
freedom/moral responsibility
Argument for incompatibilism:
1. Suppose determinism is true
2. Then my choices are fixed by causes stretching
back to before my birth
3. I have no control over those causes
4. Therefore, I have no control over what I do now
5. Therefore, I cannot be blamed or praised for
what I do now
6. So, if determinism is true, no one is morally
responsible
3 kinds of incompatibilism:
Libertarianism: we are capable of making free and
responsible choices, which are not determined
by the prior state of the world
Hard determinism: Determinism is true, and this
implies that we are never free/responsible
Hard incompatibilism: whether determinism is true
or not, we are never free/responsible
An Argument for Hard
Incompatibilism
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Every event is either caused or random
If my willing is caused, then it’s not free
If my willing is random, then it’s just
something that happens to me and
therefore, not free
Either way, the willing is not free
Therefore, our willing is never free
Resistance to hard
incompatibilism
We feel free
 It’s degrading to think we are mere
automata
 If no one is responsible, then punishment
is pointless
 If we’re not free, there’s no point in trying
to accomplish anything
 If others aren’t free, we can’t have normal
“reactive attitudes” toward them

If we’re not free, then what’s the
point of …..?
1.
2.
3.
4.
If we’re not free, then there’s no point to
….
But there is a point to ….
Therefore, it’s false that we’re not free.
I.e., we are free.
Libertarianism
Can only events cause other events?
Event-causal libertarianism: only events are
causes, but some choices are free
Agent-causal libertarianism: non only events
are causes; agents are also sometimes
causes. An agent-caused choice is free.
Chisholm:
Human Freedom and the Self

What’s crucial is the freedom of the will.
The fact that I could have done otherwise,
had I willed otherwise, is irrelevant.

If the will is determined by character
(beliefs, desires), the choice is not free.

If all causation is event-causation, there is
a regress of causes.

If the self is the start of a new causal
chain, the willing is
Caused, so nonrandom
 The product of the self, so not something that
happens to the agent

Kane:
Free Will: Ancient Dispute, New
Themes

Self-forming actions: even if current action
is determined, freely shaping character in
the past makes current actions free.

Indeterminism is necessary for freedom,
but not sufficient

Assassin with nondeterministic gun is
responsible






Equally balanced conflicting desires:
I want to stop for help, and I want to keep
driving
Which desire produces action is
nondeterministically decided
Whatever I do, I do what I wanted to do
It was not fixed in advance that I would do
this
Therefore, it’s free.
Compatibilism
Freedom/responsibility is compatible with
determinism

Compatibilism + determinism = “soft
determinism”
Arguments for Compatibilism:
Resiliency:
We simply would not give up belief in
freedom upon finding out that causal
determinism is true
 100% instead of 99.9% physical
probabilities

Arguments for Compatibilism:
Commonsense understanding of freedom:

Based on the type of cause, not on the
absence of cause, or indeterminacy of
cause
Run to my arms, you dearest boy, cried his
father in transports, run to my arms; glad
am I, George, that you killed my tree; for
you have paid me for it a thousand fold.
Such an act of heroism in my son, is more
worth than a thousand trees, though
blossomed with silver, and their fruits of
purest gold.
No distinction?
Incompatibilism implies that there is no
difference between actions determined by
agent’s character and those determined by
outside forces
 But clearly, there’s a difference, even if
determinism is true

Conditional Analysis
S was free in doing x iff S could have done
otherwise; i.e., iff S would have done
otherwise, had S chosen to do otherwise
Choice-dependence
Problems with conditional
analysis

Conditional analysis holds that ability to do
otherwise (if so chosen) is both necessary and
sufficient for freedom

However, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for
freedom
Two types of counterexamples:



Agent could have done otherwise but is not free;
Agent is free but couldn’t have done otherwise
Frankfurt-style cases
Fischer
Two kinds of control:

Guidance control: a process of causal
influence, not mere triggering, but ongoing
guidance

Regulative control: ability to do otherwise
Argument for incompatibilism (Consequence
Argument) shows that we don’t have regulative
control: we can’t change the future without
changing the past (and we can’t do that)
But Frankfurt-style cases show that regulative
control is not necessary for freedom, provided
that agent has guidance control
So Consequence Argument does not undermine
freedom