The Problem of "Free Will" and "Determinism": see text pp. 164-68
 the key question is whether the human element in the universe is the "captain of its
own fate" in any meaningful sense
 we experience two opposing features of our behaviour and decisions:
 we are aware of our own freedom, the ability to decide for ourselves; and yet …
 we discover that in many cases what we believed to be a free decision at the time to
have been influenced by various personal & social factors that at least impaired our
freedom, and perhaps vitiated it (upbringing, education, environment, biology, etc.)
 e.g. vocational choices; nullity cases
Complexities:
 most of our judgments about people assume that, in some sense, they freely chose to
do what they did
 we punish, condemn, or blame people for making certain kinds of choices, and insist that
they should have done something else
 much of our legal system is based on this approach
 at the same time, modern psychology is making us more and more aware that this
assumption is often erroneous
 psychiatrists testifying at criminal trials have tried to show that defendants, having been
abused, or victimized by circumstance, or "under the influence" (of propaganda, extreme
emotional stress, alcohol, etc.) cannot be held morally responsible for actions inspired by
factors beyond their control
 this is clearly seen during times of war, when people do all kinds of things they would
not ordinarily do in peacetime because they are subjected to all kinds of pressures that
either force them to perform the actions, or alter their conscious moral framework so
that they "choose" acts previously considered morally wrong
 we are much less inclined to judge harshly when, as in these cases, it can be shown that
someone's actions were involuntary -- this is why we distinguish between types of crime
and degrees of guilt
In view of all this, the metaphysical problem of free will hinges on the question whether a
belief in human freedom is consistent with our experience, our knowledge, and our views
about human nature.
Arguments for Determinism:
 in some religious traditions,
belief in an all-powerful,
all-knowing God has led to
the
conclusion
that
he/she/they can foresee and
control
(predetermine)
everything that takes place any event that God did not
know about in advance, no
matter how small and
insignificant, would imply a
limit on divine power
inconsistent with is believed
to be the nature of God
 if this is the case, God must have known every choice that we would ever make in the
course of human history - everything that anyone has done/is doing/is going to do is
predestined and predetermined and “controlled” by God's prior knowledge and decisions
 Note: this is NOT a Catholic point of view! (cf. Fr. Barron re: “The Adjustment Bureau”)
 there is a metaphysical argument: Every event has a cause. If one accepts this principle,
then everything, including our thoughts, must have been caused by something else.
Even if one is a "soft" determinist and looks for the cause of mental events within the
individual, those events are still being caused
 strongest and most convincing are the arguments from scientific investigation in the
factors that influence or determine human behaviour
 research into psychology, physiology, neurology, pharmacology, biochemistry, biophysics,
etc., allows us to make more and more accurate "profiles" of people to predict their future
behaviours
Arguments for Free Will:
 chaos theory and the Heisenberg uncertainty principle both
assert that there is an irreducible element of unpredictability
in nature -- this doesn't "prove" that free will exists, but it
argues against the predictive certainty of determinism
 our moral and legal judgments only make sense if we are free
agents, at least to some degree -- religion in particular becomes
absurd if we are not free (What's the point of God condemning
us for sin, and then later offering us salvation, if we don't act freely? It's just a puppet
show.)
 William James offered two arguments in his famous essay, "The Dilemma of
Determinism".
 People experience remorse, and regret that they did or believed certain
things, and they wish they had done or believed otherwise. What sense
does this make if all our thoughts and actions are predetermined?
 We attribute responsibility to people, and punish them for not
exercising it properly. This makes no sense if we are not free.
 We don't punish the rock against which we stub our toe, because we
don't think the rock is a responsible, free agent. Why then do we
punish people, if they could not have acted other than they did?
 Finally, there is this point: if determinism is true, then determinists ought simply to
figure out what factors cause philosophical decisions in us, and then employ them
(whether that means hitting people with clubs, getting them drunk, or whatever). But
determinists do not in fact do these things. Instead, they argue their point of view –
which makes no sense unless there is some element of freedom in human behaviour.