Implementing REDD+ in Madagascar: building a national level governance framework
André Rodrigues de Aquinoa, Alison Clausenb, & Julia Randimbisoac
a
World Bank, 1818 H Street, Washington, DC, adeaquino@worldbank.org (corresponding author)
Wildlife Conservation Society, Antananarivo, Madagascar, aliclausen@gmail.com
c
Helvetas Swiss Intercooperation, Lot III L 72 Rue Alidy Ampanjaka, Soanierana, Antananarivo,Madagascar,
Julia.Randimbisoa@helvetas.org
b
Abstract
Like most developing countries with extensive forest cover, Madagascar has been quick to see the potential of
its vast forest carbon stocks to attract significant financing through an international payment mechanism for
environmental services known as REDD+. Through REDD+, state and local communities in Madagascar would
receive international payments (from donors and markets) for reducing greenhouse gas emissions from forest
loss and degradation. These revenues could ultimately facilitate sustainable development in this economically
impoverished, but natural-resource rich country. However REDD+ in Madagascar has evolved differently than
in many other developing countries through NGO’s rapidly developing large-scale REDD+ projects alongside a
slowly emerging national governance framework for REDD+. A national governance framework encompasses
definition of institutional roles and responsibilities for implementing the national REDD+ strategy, rules for
dealing with REDD+ transactions and instruments for managing REDD+ funds, including a mechanism to share
benefits with local communities. In this paper we argue that failings in the emerging national governance
framework may hinder Madagascar’s ability to capitalize on potential REDD+ financing opportunities, both at
the project and at national levels, by significantly contributing to donor and investor risk perceptions. This
paper analyzes the emerging REDD+ governance framework in Madagascar, identifies its major weaknesses,
and provides a series of recommendations for strengthening the framework overall. We find that the valuable
lessons generated by pioneer NGO-lead projects should be generalized into national policies and regulations,
which can address the underlying causes of deforestation. Otherwise Madagascar misses a valuable
opportunity to reap the economic benefits from its forests’ globally important environmental services.
Keywords: REDD+, Madagascar, forest governance, institutions, environmental services, carbon finance
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1.
Introduction
As a natural-resource rich, but economically poor country, Madagascar’s future economic development will be
tied in part to its ability to manage its renewable natural resources in a manner that ensures their long-term
integrity and productivity (World Bank, 2012b). With more than 9 million hectares of native forest cover (DGF,
ONE and CI - Couverture de Forêts naturelles à Madagascar [2005-2010], 2013), a performance-based payment
mechanism for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and the
increase and maintenance of forest carbon stocks, known as REDD+, is potentially one such means of deriving
tangible economic benefits from natural capital. Given the exceptional biodiversity values in Madagascar,
where over 90% of terrestrial species are endemic (Goodman & Benstead, 2005), coupled with poverty that
affects more than 80% of rural households (Instat, 2011), REDD+ activities in Madagascar also have the
potential to generate significant co-benefits in terms of biodiversity conservation and social development in
impoverished rural areas. In recognition of these potential benefits, the Malagasy government and civil society
have developed a strong interest in establishing a future REDD+ mechanism.
The rules that will guide REDD+ are still being negotiated as part of the UN Climate Change Framework
Convention (UNFCCC). This framework will define the broad-scale rules and norms around REDD+, and will put
the responsibility on individual States to transform this framework into national governance frameworks
(Aquino & Guay, 2013). The sources of financing for REDD+ have not yet been decided, but could include
compliance and voluntary markets, as well as international donor funds (Hufty & Haakenstad, 2011; Lederer,
2012). The most appropriate scale of implementation of REDD+ is still under debate, with options including: (i)
national-level implementation where the national government is mandated to account for emission reductions
in its national territory, claim the potential payments for results and redistribute these payments nationally
and sub-nationally, and (ii) sub-national or jurisdictional implementation, where sub-national entities (such as
states, provinces or districts) implement REDD+. There is considerable interest within many developing
countries for a nested approach whereby sub-national activities are gradually embedded into a national
framework (IPAM, 2012). One key challenge to this approach is how to share risks and benefits across scales
(national, sub-national and even project level) in case of national underperformance (Deheza et Bellassen,
2012).
Regardless of the scenario adopted, a sound national governance framework will be an important part of the
overall functioning of REDD+ mechanism within a given country. A robust national REDD+ governance
framework will be needed to define the rules and norms governing the generation and accounting of emission
reductions, and the distribution of associated revenues across multiple stakeholders at different levels (i.e.
national, sub-national and local) and different sectors (e.g. forestry, agriculture, energy, etc.), as well as to
monitor the implementation and social and environmental safeguards from REDD+ activities (Angelsen, 2010).
Despite the importance of national level governance there has been little research or sharing of lessons
regarding the mechanisms that could be implemented to achieve successful REDD+ outcomes (Hufty &
Haakenstad, 2011).
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In this paper we analyze Madagascar’s slowly emerging governance framework for REDD+, that is, the policies,
legislation, institutions and decision-making processes that enable a country to channel resources from the
international level, in the form of funds or market generated revenues, to national and sub-national measures
that act to reduce deforestation and degradation (Vatn & Angelsen, 2009). The paper aims to contribute to the
debate on REDD+ governance at the country level and address the concern by Gregersen et al. (2010) that
‘current writings on REDD+ stress (…) the need to focus on governance issues. Yet most of the available
literature does not get into the subject of government improvement in depth, and particularly not at the
country level’ (emphasis added).
The situation in Madagascar is strongly influenced by the ongoing political instability that has reigned in the
country since 2009 which is driving Madagascar towards fragility with the country experiencing extreme
poverty, persistent social vulnerability and poor economic performance. National level governance issues
associated the REDD+ mechanism are particularly problematic in such fragile states because the State is limited
in its ability to act as a rational economic agent that can make a decision to shift its development pathway on
the basis of anticipated future rewards, and also in its ability to implement and enforce the actions that would
be needed to achieve the desired result (Karsenty & Ongolo, 2011). Thus the lessons learned in Madagascar are
not only of interest for developing countries generally, particularly those that are seeking to generate high
levels of social or ecological co-benefits, but may be of particular relevance to other REDD+ countries that
share elements of fragility.
2.
National-level REDD+ Governance Framework
The literature on REDD+ stress that for REDD+ to be effective and inclusive, serious governance challenges will
need to be addressed such as inter-sectoral policy coordination, avoiding elite capture of benefits and ensuring
transparency in allocation of resources (Corbera et al., 2011). Cobera et al (2011) introduces five dimensions of
REDD+ governance research: architecture, adaptiveness, agency, accountability and allocation and access. This
paper will explore how two of these dimensions, architecture and adaptiveness, are being implemented in
Madagascar.
Architecture refers to the governance meta-level, i.e., the organizations, principles, norms, mechanisms and
decision-making procedures (Biermann et al., 2009). In this paper, we refer to ‘national governance framework’
as the national-level architecture for REDD+ implementation. An important concept related to architecture is
that of interplay, the interaction between two or more institutions which can compromise their effectiveness.
Interplay may happen vertically, between the top-down international norms and procedures, or horizontally,
between existing policies across sectors, property right regimes, organizations’ mandates, etc. This paper
explores the vertical interplay, that is, how international rules and procedures are being translated into
domestic policies and institutions. Although not explored in detail in this paper, horizontal interplay is also
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fundamental to analyze the likely effectiveness of a national REDD+ framework, since deforestation is a
phenomenon whose root and direct causes can only be addressed through inter-sectoral coordination.
REDD+ involves a large number of actors both at the international, national and local levels with different
interests in and discourses about forests, and asymmetrical power to influence decisions and shape the
agenda. REDD+ decisions ‘permeate through multiple spheres of decision-making and organizations, create
contested interests and claims, and translate into multiple implementation actions running ahead of policy
processes and state-driven decisions’. (Cobera et al., 2011). Hence, the national-level governance framework
for REDD+ is shaped by the actions of actors that often act prior to state-driven decisions, and influence those.
This is no different in Madagascar, and we shall discuss this later.
Among the essential elements of a national governance framework are appropriate national and sub-national
institutional arrangements – including the roles and responsibilities of individual State, civil society and
community actors - to manage REDD+, and regulations on the management of emissions reductions
transactions including managing and sharing REDD+ funds across stakeholders. These elements are the focus of
the analysis in this paper.
Another governance element explored in the paper is the adaptativeness of the national framework, that is, its
capacity to change by learning from socio-ecological realities on the ground and from the result of ongoing
policies and projects. Adaptiveness in a complex area such as forest management, which touches upon various
other sectors of the national economy and institutions (property regimes, law enforcement capacity), is
important to increase the national governance framework can respond to the underlying and direct causes of
forest loss and degradation.
3.
Background and current status of REDD+ in Madagascar
The forest carbon activities that became the precursor to current REDD+ activities in Madagascar were
commenced in earnest by two international conservation NGOs in the early 2000s in the country’s northeast.
Since the mid-2000s, a small group of international NGOs have been active in promoting REDD+ at the project
level and have targeted the voluntary market for eventual carbon transactions. Three sub-national projects
that aimed to sell credits on voluntary carbon markets are being implemented in three large protected forest
corridors in the eastern humid forest ecosystems. While at different stages of their implementation, these
projects all follow a similar model, namely reduction of emissions through the creation of large protected areas
by the government made up of a core protected area, user controlled areas and buffer area, support for
community management of forest resources, and implementation of alternative activities to deforestation,
including agriculture intensification, agro-forestry and bushfire control (Ferguson, 2009). These projects are
using methodologies approved by the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) to calculate the emission reductions
being generated by their activities, and to issue these credits through an internationally credible standard.
Some of these projects have conducted transactions in the voluntary market: The Government of Madagascar,
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through its Ministry of Finance and Budget, has signed an Emission Reduction Purchase Agreement with the
BioCarbon Fund managed by the World Bank in 2008 for the sale of a 430,000 Emission Reductions over four
years from the Ankeniheny – Zahamena protected forestry corridor. Two other large REDD+ initiatives in
Madagascar, also led by international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), are testing tools and
methodologies to build reference emission levels and monitoring and reporting systems of emissions, but are
not currently generating emissions reductions aimed at markets.
These NGO led activities have provided a strong technical understanding of the country’s forest carbon stocks
and have allowed testing of approaches to tackle deforestation. Different projects have adopted different
methodologies and different approaches for technical and governance activities including measurement of
carbon stocks, mechanisms for involving communities and benefit sharing, and mechanisms for negotiating
agreements with Government. This diverse array of experience initially allowed Madagascar to become a
leading global ‘REDD+ laboratory’ for implementing REDD+ activities on the ground.
At the national level, Madagascar launched its REDD+ Readiness process in 2008 with the establishment of a
large multi-sector, multi-agency committee known as the Technical Committee for REDD+ (CT-REDD). The CTREDD is led by Government officers but also includes representatives of civil society involved in REDD+ project
activities. The mandate of the CT-REDD is to provide technical assistance to the national Ministry of
Environment and Forests in the preparation, negotiation and implementation of REDD+ in Madagascar, with
the first task being the preparation of a REDD+ Readiness Preparation Proposal (R-PP) (Vahanen et al, 2009). RPP preparation was a necessary step to obtain financing from the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), a
global partnership that assists tropical and subtropical forest countries develop the systems and policies for
REDD+ and provides them with performance-based payments for emission reductions (FCPF, 2012).
Madagascar presented its R-PP unofficially to the FCPF Participants Committee in March and November 2010,
the document was considered to be of a high technical quality although not yet fully consistent with the quality
standards of the FCPF (FCPF XX). The political instability in the country meant that progress on the R-PP has
since stalled and the FCPF Participants Committee, made up of donor and REDD+ countries, would not in any
case be in a position to formally endorse the R-PP.
4.
Analysis of emerging REDD+ governance framework in Madagascar
In contrast with strong operational activities at the project level, the REDD+ national governance framework in
Madagascar is relatively immature. Its promising evolution continues to be stymied by the ongoing political
crisis which has blocked the national REDD+ Readiness process, exacerbated underlying flaws in sector
governance, and resulted in a significant reduction in external financing for REDD+ activities.
4.1 Institutional arrangements
Given the perceived financial stakes involved in future transactions of forest carbon credits, and the current
budgetary constraints within Government agencies resulting from recent donor withdrawal in the sector, there
5
has naturally been a degree of jockeying for position within different Government departments for control of
forest carbon activities. The situation has not been aided by historic conflicts between key agencies. The three
key Government players in forest carbon are currently the Direction-General of Forests, the Direction-General
of Environment within which the Direction of Climate Change is located, and the National Environment Office;
the roles that these organizations play in forest carbon activities are largely self-assigned and there is no overall
vision to set out clear mandates that are complementary rather than overlapping and ultimately conflicting.
Poorly crafted, contradictory regulations on carbon projects and REDD+ have been drafted at different times in
the past year, their current legal status is unclear and they are virtually not implemented.
The CT-REDD, while large and active for years now, has no formal status, and lacks high-level political support
and strong internal leadership. There is no single agency within Government responsible for coordination of
activities and liaison with external and stakeholders. There is little inter-sectoral coordination or involvement
of agencies responsible for related land-use or resource management decisions in the current institutional
setting, despite the historic and repeatedly demonstrated links between deforestation and forest degradation
and other activities such as agriculture or mining (e.g. Green & Sussman, 1990; Sussman et al, 1994, Republic of
Madagascar, 2010). The two R-PP technical reviews underlined that deforestation issues are further discussed
from the point of view of the forest sector and doesn't more take in account year inter-sectorial analysis. The
experience of the Inter-Ministerial Committee for the Environment (CIME) in ensuring cross-sectoral
coordination has not been positive and highlights the challenges that remain to be faced in this regard
(Republic of Madagascar, 2010).
4.2 Management of forest carbon transactions
In the case of a nested REDD+ framework where projects have to fit into a national accounting framework,
such the approach taken in Madagascar, the State needs to adopt policies and legislation on the granting of
permits to third parties (i.e. private sector, NGOs or sub-national government bodies) to develop REDD+
projects and sell credits in the markets. Such a system should be based on a transparent and competitive
process for awarding these permits, and clearly specifying the rights and obligations of the project developer,
including in terms of consultations with landholders, respect of safeguards, and reporting requirements.
Madagascar has not yet adopted such rules, which creates uncertainties for project developers and potential
credit buyers. In addition, Madagascar has not yet established a data management system or registry to record
information on carbon transactions, and information on pre-sales that have occurred is not held centrally nor is
it easily accessible. The development of such a registry will be an important part of the REDD+ national
governance framework as it will avoid double-counting of transactions and facilitate ease of access to
information on transactions.
The contracts accompanying the recent Government decisions that delegate transfer of management of new
protected areas that are under creation from the State to NGOs state that the carbon credits in these
protected areas belong to the Government (Republic of Madagascar 2011a; Republic of Madagascar, 2011b;
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Republic of Madagascar, 2011c). The contracts state that specific case-by-case conventions will be developed
to define the terms of agreements between the Government and the NGOs managing the protected areas and
that delegated managers will assist the Government to develop projects to sell carbon credits from the
protected areas. In the short term, this case-by-case approach has the benefit of allowing different models and
approaches to be tested; however, in the long-term it is not a sustainable approach as protected area
managers will seek certainty and consistency in terms of their rights and responsibilities before agreeing to
take on the management of protected areas.
4.3 Management of REDD-related funds and benefit-sharing arrangements
The potential funds flowing to the country to reward REDD+ results need to be distributed in such a way that
they effectively address the direct and indirect drivers of deforestation and forest degradation. In Madagascar,
these funds should translate into tangible incentives for local communities to adopt alternatives to those
activities leading to deforestation, as well as be used for command and control activities such as combating
illegal logging. Various models of managing these funds are possible including national trust funds, budget
support, or standalone projects, and the choice should be based on national circumstances (Vatn and Vedeld,
2011). Madagascar has not adopted a national-level model yet, nor issued regulations on how benefits are to
be shared amongst project stakeholders. However, this reflection is happening at the project level. Existing
projects are currently testing benefit sharing models, which should feed into the national regulations.
The establishment of clear and equitable benefit sharing mechanisms could overcome the weaknesses of the
legal framework in relation to carbon rights. No national policy for benefits sharing has been adopted yet. The
Makira project in the northeast of the country managed by Wildlife Conservation Society, and the Corridor
Ankeniheny-Zahamena REDD project managed by Conservation International, are arguably the most advanced
projects underway in Madagascar, and the only ones to so far attempt to establish a transparent benefit
sharing mechanism. The mechanism is based on a formula fixing percentages of the total REDD+ revenues to
be allocated to different stakeholders: local communities (50 percent), protected area manager (20 percent),
the Government, with funds theoretically earmarked for forests management and law enforcement in the
project area (20 percent) and marketing and administration expenses (10 percent). Particularly important is to
note that most benefits are allocated to local communities, to cover their opportunity costs in case they face
any forest restrictions and to promote land use activities that do not put pressure on existing forests,
particularly through the intensification of agriculture practices. However, certain fundamental aspects of the
benefit sharing mechanism remain to be determined, including the funds management structure that would
apply to the revenues generated, the means of transferring funds to communities, and the administrative level
at which funds would be distributed. Options for that, however, exist in the country and are currently under
analysis.
5. Discussion
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5.1 Impacts of governance failures
REDD+ activities in Madagascar have raced ahead of the evolution of a national governance framework for
REDD+. The ongoing political crisis has hindered Madagascar from actively participating in many international
forums or gaining access to REDD+ financing sources that could have been used to support evolution of the
governance framework. The result has been that Madagascar has changed from being perceived as a
frontrunner in its preparation for REDD+ opportunities (Ferguson, 2009) to an ‘also-ran’ in recent years. Real
and significant impacts have occurred in terms of lost opportunities for financing, either to support the REDD+
preparation process, from results-based payments from donors, or from sales on the voluntary and compliance
carbon markets.
The immediate effect of the ongoing political crisis was to stall the Readiness Preparation Proposal (R-PP)
validation process due to lack of international recognition of the current transitional government. This in turn
led to progress on REDD+ governance issues in Madagascar being effectively blocked at a critical juncture
without resolution of numerous important elements and continuation of the prevailing, disjointed governance
framework that is poorly adapted for forest carbon finance activities. Simultaneously inter-agency conflicts for
control of forest carbon have intensified as Government agencies search for additional sources of financing.
Coupled with frequent changes of Government Ministers and high-level staff, there has been a damaging
disruption to the momentum of REDD+ preparation and a significant loss of institutional memory; at a time
when negotiations on an international REDD+ mechanism are advancing.
International conservation NGOs have been moving ahead in large part independently of the government and
have been driving REDD+ in Madagascar. There is strong evidence that the formulation and implementation of
effective REDD+ strategies is most challenging when the national government is not in the driver’s seat (Di
Grigorio et al, 2009). The political crisis has however also affected the evolution of NGO projects, particularly
for those projects that aim to sell carbon in the short term on the voluntary carbon market, given buyer’s risk
perception of Madagascar. This has stymied the potential to test different approaches to important elements
of REDD+ governance such as benefit sharing and community based monitoring approaches. Lack of clarity on
the institutional framework for REDD+, along with the recent downturn in the overall carbon market, has
meant that initial pre-sales (in the form of advanced payments on future carbon credits) that took place on the
voluntary market before 2008 have not been repeated in the intervening four years.
Two concrete examples of how the lack of national regulations on REDD+ create confusion over institutional
mandates and reduce the potential of REDD+ revenues being generated are discussed here. In 2012, the
BioCarbon Fund (BioCF) terminated a forest carbon purchase contract signed with the Ministry of Environment
in 2008 to acquire Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) credits from a reforestation project around the
Mantadia National Park. This was the single most advanced CDM project in the country with all plantation
activities completed on the ground. The main reason the BioCF terminated the contract was the Ministry’s
hesitation to formally designate an entity to manage the carbon credits of the project and lead
8
communications with the CDM Board, which in fact made it impossible for the carbon credits to be created
according to the CDM rules. As a result, Madagascar missed an opportunity for generating income from forest
carbon sales, despite a high amount of investment in the design of such projects and even in implementation
on the ground. Still in 2012, the national Malagasy media questioned the nature of a carbon deal between an
international NGO and a private company for a REDD project in one of the country’s protected areas due to a
perceived lack of clarify over the terms of the transaction. Given the lack of national regulations governing
these transactions, in legal terms it was not even clear whether such a transaction was a carbon ‘sale’ or simply
a commitment from the private company to provide financial resources in case emissions reductions could be
verified on the ground.
Financial resources for REDD+, either from donors or markets, are results-based, that is, they are conditional
on the country’s ability to demonstrate third-party verified emissions reductions against internationallyrecognized methodologies. Madagascar is one of many players that will be trying to attract financing.
Undeniably, Madagascar is potentially a highly attractive candidate for donors and buyers. It is very likely that
achieving REDD+ in Madagascar will generate significant co-benefits in terms of biodiversity and social and
poverty reduction. However, risk plays a crucial factor in donors and buyers decisions and future credibility will
be hard-won for Madagascar. A reputation for a cycle of repeated political crises compounds the ambiguity
caused by the lack of a clear institutional and legislative framework around REDD+. This translates into a lack of
certainty for donors and investors, which together with the inherent financial risks within the REDD+
mechanism (e.g. Phelps et al, 2011), will add to concerns related to financial transactions with governments
with a history of corruption, weak capacity and limited transparency and accountability (e.g. Ebeling & Yasue,
2008; Peskett et al, 2008).
Hence, Madagascar is likely to comparatively lose out as other countries move faster and attract investments
and donor financing. With the current global interest from tropical forest countries in generating financing
through REDD+ and the reduced amount of overall financing to REDD+, competition for REDD+ financing will
likely increase. This applies both to funding from multi-donor funds such as the FCPF Carbon Fund, the
Norwegian Initiative for Climate and Forest or Germany’s REDD+ Early Movers 1, and transactions on the
voluntary market, which are undeniably even more risk-sensitive. Even though existing NGO-managed REDD+
projects had been able to carry out some small transactions in the voluntary market prior to 2008, the
substantial amount of emission reductions they are expecting to bring forth in the coming years are unlikely to
be fully absorbed by buyers motivated solely by social corporate responsibility. Donors interested in providing
results-based finance to REDD+ or even buyers looking for pre-compliance assets (which are quite limited at
present, given the market conditions and the prospects of REDD+ credits being allowed into compliance
mechanisms) are unlikely to favor credits from projects in Madagascar given the lack of a clear national
governance framework for carbon transactions, which raises legal questions around these credits and reduces
1
These three are international initiatives to provide financing to tropical forest countries against emissions reductions
verified by third parties.
9
the overall quality of the asset. Governance failings have discouraged donors from providing additional
financial resources to REDD+ in Madagascar, such as the case of the FCPF, of which Madagascar is one of the
first members, but which could not allocate resources to the country.
Not only do governance failures affect relations with external stakeholders, but internally, stakeholder support
for REDD+ also suffers. The political economy characteristics of Madagascar mean that there is a long history of
natural resource rent capture by political elites as demonstrated in the mining sector and more recently in the
forest sector, through the exploitation and exportation of precious timber (World Bank, 2010). With forest
carbon stocks representing another significant potential source of financing, there is a strong likelihood that
unless a clear and consensual governance framework is put in place, this financing is also at risk of capture by
political elites (Lederer, 2012); in fact the significant financial resources that could become available under
REDD+ mechanism could worsen existing trends of political elite capture (Peskett et al, 2008; Sikor et al, 2010).
Such a scenario would cause community and local authority dissatisfaction. It would also potentially undermine
the process in its entirety as these agents that are charged with guardianship of forest resources and essential
to implementation of sustainable forestry management activities (e.g. Ferguson, 2009; Phelps et al, 2010) and
would not see any economic benefit to avoiding deforestation.
5.2 Recommendations for improving the national REDD+ governance framework in Madagascar
Without short-term and convincing improvements to the governance framework for REDD+, Madagascar runs
the risk of losing financing opportunities and the associated co-benefits that a REDD+ mechanism could bring,
which is even more of a concern in the current context of extremely serious budgetary constraints.
Development of a REDD+ governance framework cannot be undertaken in isolation of sector-wide forest
governance issues. In addition, a modular or phased approach that allows continual refinement and adaptation
to a quickly evolving domain is necessary as the international framework governing REDD+ is still under debate
(Wertz-Kanounnikoff & Angelsen, 2009). On the other hand, the prospect of REDD+ financial benefits could be
an incentive for the government of Madagascar to undertake some of the long-protracted governance reforms
needed in the natural resources sector. As stated by Kasrsenty and Ongolo (2011), ‘this increased interest and
the potential financial rewards could be used as an impetus to improving the wider forestry sector governance
reform’.
National ownership of the REDD+ governance framework is fundamental. While REDD+ pilot projects are
relevant to generate knowledge about how REDD+ works on the ground and to generate local understanding of
associated concepts and practices, the ambitious goals of REDD+ at the national level can only be achieved
through national-level policies that address the underlying causes of deforestation, such as land tenure
insecurity or non-coordinated or even conflicting policies over land use. Hence, Madagascar needs to ensure
that lessons from these projects are incorporated into national-level rules and regulations to regulate future
REDD+ activities, which should not be done on a case-by-case basis, but rather through national policies which
are the manifestation of a sovereign state. The National REDD+ Committee should adopt procedures to ensure
10
the knowledge from these pilots are readily available and shared nationally, which would increase the
adpativeness of the national REDD+ framework.
Inter-agency conflicts require resolution through the unambiguous allocation of roles and responsibilities to
different government organizations, and the establishment of formal and informal communication
mechanisms. Addressing underlying causes of deforestation will require coherent policies addressing highly
political topics such as land and property regimes and the division of responsibilities across government levels
(national and decentralized administration), not to mention addressing deeply vested interests around forest
exploration.
The national REDD+ governance framework can allocate roles for non-governmental agents (such as private
sector firms or NGOs) in fulfilling some international requirements, such as monitoring and reporting on
emissions reductions. For example, while project-level carbon transactions (voluntary or regulated) are allowed
nationally, the government should retain the overall responsibility for overseeing these transactions, but
should consider delegating the day-to-day management of the responsibilities associated with the transactions
(such as reporting according to highly technical rules) to professional entities capable of ensuring that rigorous
international standards are followed on a timely manner. This can ensure that REDD+ financing is captured,
while creating capacity at the national level. As REDD+ moves towards financing at sub-national or national
levels, the government should create external structures to manage financing operations. Another example of
potential roles that could be outsourced is the management of a carbon registry which can be entrusted to a
third-party entity that has the technical capacity to guarantee the reliability of the system and the data for
ongoing carbon transactions. This will directly influence the willingness of investors to purchase credits or
provide payments to the country. Collaboration with local and international NGOs must be strengthened
through formal agreements and informal exchanges to capitalize on the technical capacities and experience.
Consistent approaches to negotiation of agreements between Government and NGOs need to be adopted to
create a level playing field and require NGOs to work with Government.
A national cross-sectoral multi-stakeholder body to steer the design of the national REDD+ strategy with a clear
and formalized mandate is a condition for REDD+ readiness and should be implemented as early as possible.
This body should also ensure that ongoing projects are developed in a harmonized fashion, devise and enforce
regulations to that effect, and ensure these projects will be integrated into the national accounting framework
when that is prepared. The recent experience in Madagascar with the development of a common eco-regional
baseline for the emissions from deforestation in the eastern humid forests is a positive sign of the coordination
role the national steering body can have, not only in ensuring knowledge exchange across existing initiatives
but also in steering greater methodological coherence across initiatives. This experience also implicitly
indicates that the Malagasy government recognizes that projects will have to comply with national and subnational accounting procedures and will have to be in line with baselines set at higher levels than the project
itself.
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Inter-sector coordination (‘horizontal interplay’) and consensus will be important for achieving a sound
governance framework for forest carbon transactions and to effectively address the drivers of deforestation
and forest degradation. The Ministries responsible for agriculture, mining, land use, public works, water, and
finance are amongst those that will need to ensure that a sound, cross-cutting enabling policy and legislative
framework exists and that their strategies and activities are aligned with the vision for development of national
forest carbon initiatives. The policy, governance and operational activities of these ministries are also crucial
for effective emission reductions to take place. REDD+ can only become a tool for sustainable development if
other ministries, particularly those involved with agriculture, are active actors in the efforts to address the
causes of deforestation.
Review and improvement of the legislative framework relating to benefit sharing will also be a necessity.
Rather than case-by-case benefit sharing arrangements, a common legal framework needs to be developed,
including in the case of community natural resource based management contracts and delegation of
management for new protected areas. REDD+ offers the possibility to compensate local communities for the
positive externalities they generate by sustainably managing their forests; however, there is a need to develop
benefit-sharing arrangements that effectively reward those communities and individuals providing
environmental services. The national framework should be informed by ongoing practical experiences on the
ground, which have been dealing with this issue. Benefits should be shared with those that produce the asset,
including the communities that incur opportunities costs for conserving forest resources; for example,
conservation use, community development around protected areas, natural resources management or to
further the development of the forest carbon markets development process. In general, Madagascar will need
to put in place legislation and a national-level mechanism that allows REDD+ funds to be allocated in an
efficient manner to those actors that effectively contribute to reducing emissions, thus creating the assets
being paid for.
Once a full-fledged REDD+ system at the national level is in place, as opposed to multiple fragmented projects,
a national-level funds management mechanism will have to allocate resources from the national to the local
level through multiple mechanisms, including payments for ecosystem services (PES). The experiences from the
projects will be very useful to that extent. Recently, the government expressed interest in using the National
Forestry Fund (FFN) (personal comm.), a dedicated account funded by revenues from forestry management
activities (e.g. fees for permits and authorizations) to manage REDD+ generated revenues. However, the ability
for this Fund to effectively manage such revenues is questionable based on its track record and its governance
arrangements, with little participation of beneficiaries in decision making. Hence, other options for the
management of REDD+ funds at the national level should be pursued. Regardless of the structure identified,
funds need to be managed in a transparent and accountable manner and focused on activities that generate
measurable benefits in the sector.
12
In moving forward, the instruments and strategies successfully tested in the projects should be made into
national-level policies to be implemented by the state as part of its national REDD+ strategy. One such case is
the use of PES, conditional payments between voluntary parties for the verified delivery of environmental
services, which can be an important tool for creating local-level incentives to landholders and communities for
the maintenance and even enhancement of forest cover (Karsenty, 2012).
6. Conclusion
A national governance framework for REDD+ is shaped by the actions of various actors, which more often than
not run ahead of state-driven policy processes. However, unless national-level rules and regulations are
adopted to clarify how international rules are translated into policies and institutions with clear mandates at
the country level, the country will miss out on possibilities for attracting results-based financing both from
markets and donors. In the absence of a national governance framework for REDD+, it is unclear how
international funds are to be allocated nationally, and inter-sectoral coordination more unlikely to happen,
which in the end results in the underlying causes of deforestation not being addressed and emissions
reductions not achieved. While pilot REDD+ projects are relevant, as they generate important lessons to feed
into the preparation of national-level regulations, REDD+ can only be achieved at a scale through national-level
policies.
REDD+ has evolved in Madagascar in a distinct way from in other countries: significant and rapid progress in
the design and implementation of large-scale projects has been followed by extremely slow development of
the national governance framework for REDD+ that in its current nascent form relies de-facto on the weak
prevailing forest governance framework. This situation reflects the effects of a weak State that is facing
complex governance issues and lack of international support, and strong international NGOs focused on the
technical and operational aspects of project development and the generation of revenues for individual
protected areas.
This paper suggests concrete elements towards the development of a national REDD+ framework for
Madagascar. The recipe for a successful national governance framework for REDD+ in Madagascar, as
elsewhere, is deceptively simple; the national level governance framework that is adopted and implemented
need to: (i) be able to deliver adequate incentives to the agents of deforestation and degradation at the subnational level; and (ii) provide surety for international investors and donors of REDD+ performance payments.
We argue that currently in Madagascar, this is currently not the case for numerous reasons and urgent action is
required to develop a national governance system that reduces risks for buyers and helps the country fetch
higher prices for transactions, as well as maximizing social and biodiversity co-benefits. Madagascar has the
potential for adopting a solid national REDD+ framework based on years of practical experience on the ground
through REDD+ projects. In addition, clarifying the national governance framework for REDD+ will directly
contribute to the overall forest governance framework in general.
13
There is no single, coherent policy on forest carbon transactions; the institutional arrangements are vague and
weak in terms of capacity and resources; legislation does not treat issues associated with forest carbon in a
robust manner; and there is little transparency in benefit sharing or in the agreements that the Government
has reached with NGOs wishing to exploit forest carbon. The legal framework will require significant work to
ensure that it is consistent and coherent given that its current elements have been adopted at different times
in a relatively ad-hoc manner. There is a strong and active civil society, but in terms of REDD+ activities, their
focus to date has been operational and revenue generation activities, rather than engagement with
Government on governance issues related to carbon finance. Furthermore the challenges facing REDD+
activities are amplified by the ongoing sector-wide governance issues related to forestry management,
protected areas, and land tenure (e.g. Ferguson, 2009; Vahanen, 2009).
REDD+ is unlikely to be the ‘silver bullet’ that solves shortfalls in forest sector financing in Madagascar, or
allows the complete reform of forest sector governance (e.g. Olander et al., 2009) due both to the extent of
current financing shortfalls and the depth and breadth of governance challenges that persist (e.g.
Freudenberger, 2010; Carret et al, 2010). However, we contend that the REDD+ mechanism offers an
important opportunity for the country that could contribute to the achievement of goals related to financial
revenue generation and social and biodiversity co-benefits, and could kick-start selected broader governance
reforms in the forestry sector. The degree to which REDD+ can contribute will evidently be influenced by
international negotiations, but not entirely. National governance and the degree to which a robust, credible
and transparent system can be put into place will also be major factorsin the success of REDD+ in Madagascar.
As pointed out by the Governance of Forests Initiative (2009, p.2), there is both a need and an opportunity for
good forest governance in REDD+: “a REDD+ mechanism that does not address poor governance as a
fundamental driver of deforestation poses a risk of reversing past progress on these issues. At the same time,
the political momentum behind the REDD+ debate has the potential to create new incentives and stronger
support for tackling some of the most entrenched governance problems.” REDD+ is a great opportunity for
Madagascar to address governance issues around forests so that the country can transform its natural wealth
into concrete development opportunities for its population while conserving its natural capital.
14
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