HOW NATIONAL GOVERNANCE FAILINGS ARE COMPROMISING
MADAGASCAR’S REDD+ POTENTIAL
Andre Aquino
Robert Griffin
March, 2014
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this presentation are those
of the authors and not of the World Bank
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REDD+ AND LAND & POVERTY ISSUES?
• REDD+ is a financial mechanism that gives land value
1. Carbon Benefits: payments for emissions reductions
2. Non-Carbon Benefits: Biodiversity, wildlife, training & education, opportunities for
women, opportunities for indigenous peoples, governance improvement
REDD+ is a good opportunity to clarify national-level policies that address land use and
deforestation (Ex. land tenure insecurity or uncoordinated or even conflicting policies
over land use)
• Who holds claim to the value that REDD+ adds?
– In most cases, REDD+ is designed to share benefits with local populations in
developing countries
– Through REDD+ benefit sharing mechanisms local populations and community
groups receive funds that sponsor income generating activities
Therefore REDD+ is both a catalyst for improving land governance and for alleviating
poverty
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QUESTION OF APPROACH TO REDD+ DEVELOPMENT
‘Nested / Bottom Up Approach’
Scale-up influence
REDD+
Pilot
Projects
NGOs argue…
?
Pass down influence
National
Governance
Framework
Multilaterals argue…
‘Top Down Approach’
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But when it comes to developing REDD+ nationally, is REDD+ still the catalyst to governance, or is it
the other way around?
Vertical Interplay – ‘chicken or the egg’ dilemma with REDD+ development under debate
Architecture component of REDD+ governance – organizations, principles, norms, mechanisms, and
decision making procedures
Difficult for researchers to answer question of vertical interplay because most countries have
followed the top down approach
The exception is Madagascar, where REDD+ evolved much differently
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BACKGROUND ON MADAGASCAR
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Quick Facts
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The Importance of Conservation
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Amongst the 22 million inhabitants over 92% live on less than 2$ a
day (World Bank, 2013), with the most impoverished in rural regions
Madagascar has had a long history of political and economic hardship
dating back to the 1960s
In March of 2009 there was coup d’état and the economy has been
more or less in recession since
80% of the fauna and 90% of the flora are endemic
Forestland estimated to cover 15.88% of the surface area of the
country in 2009, is diminished every year.
Drivers of deforestation:
• slash-and-burn agriculture
• wood collection from natural forests to provide firewood and
charcoal
Madagascar considered good candidate For REDD+
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Madagascar was originally considered a good candidate for REDD+
(High poverty, deforestation, co- benefits associated with biodiversity
protection)
The threats facing this small island has attracted attention from
conservation organizations since the mid-1980s drew in substantial
amounts of funding for conservation
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EVOLUTION OF REDD+ IN MADAGASCAR
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Project level
– Early 2000’s: 4 large sub-national projects
– Most targeted the voluntary market and were implemented in the forest corridors in the
eastern humid forest ecosystems in Madagascar
– Signed Emissions Reductions Purchase Agreements based on strong transparency
conditions
– Pilots Model- namely reduction of emissions through the creation of large protected
areas by the government made up of a core protected area, user controlled areas and
buffer area, support for community management of forest resources, and implementation
of alternative activities to deforestation, including agricultural intensification, agroforestry and bushfire control
– Projects were fairly sophisticated and contributed greatly to how REDD+ can be achieved
in the country
– This diverse array of experience initially allowed Madagascar to become a leading global
‘REDD+ laboratory’
– Example: Ankeniheny – Zahamena Corridor (CAZ) project – CI/BioCF/DGF - 430,000 ERs
over four years
• Established local governance: Regional Directorates of Forests and Environment
(DREFTs)
• VOI’s (Local Community Groups)
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CAZ PROJECT – BENEFIT SHARING MECHANISM
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EVOLUTION OF REDD+
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National Level
– 2008
• REDD+ readiness with the World Bank’s FCPF carbon fund
• CT- REDD: a large multi-sector, multi-agency committee that gives technical
assistance to the national Ministry of Environment and Forests
• Involved Government Players: key players were established to handle carbon
transactions
1. General Director for Forests.
2. National Environment Office
3. General Director of Environment
• Because of the high financial stakes from active NGO pilots…
– there was a jockeying of power for control of the carbon funds
– these groups did not work or collaborate together well
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GOVERNANCE FAILINGS
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2009 political Crisis
– The political instability in the country stalled R-PP development
– R-PP preparation was a necessary step to obtain financing from the World Bank’s
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF
– The CT-REDD, lost formal recognition because it lacked high-level political support
and strong internal leadership
The effects were devastating for pilot projects in Madagascar
– Nearly all donors pulled out of their purchase agreements citing lack of clarity over
national regulations governing the transactions
• Example: BioCarbon Fund – Matinda Park
– BioCF terminated a forest carbon purchase to acquire CDM credits from a
reforestation project
– This was significant as it was the single most advanced CDM project in the country at
this time
– Main reason BioCF pulled out was the Government failed to appoint an entity to
manage the carbon credits of the project and lead communication with the CDM
board (which made it impossible for credits to be created according to CDM rules)
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LOST OPPORTUNITY
Madagascar missed out on key income generating opportunity from REDD+
It is likely that Madagascar will continue to lose out on forest carbon market
opportunities as along as it has a poor national governance framework
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What does this example show us?
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Shows how sensitive investors are to weaknesses governance frameworks
Shows our hypothesis that ultimately investors prefer projects in countries with stronger
governance capabilities and lower carbon values over projects in countries with high carbon
values and low governance
Shows us that not only do governance failures affect relations with external stakeholders, but
internally REDD+ also suffers
Weak governance structures make it difficult to pass on benefits to local communities who
support conservation initiatives
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Thank you!
Andre Aquino
Email: adeaquino@worldbank.org
Robert Griffin
Email: rgriffin@worldbank.org
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