Heartland Theory
Heartland theory is a theory of geopolitics proposed by Halford J. Mackinder at the beginning of the 20th century.
Mackinder taught geography at Oxford University and served in the British parliament for 12 years, and was well
connected to the policymakers and strategic thinkers of his time. The United Kingdom was still the world's foremost
power when Mackinder put forth his ideas, and it is clear that he viewed British imperialism as the most moral and just
among the European empires. It is likely that he was deeply influenced by notions of the "Great Game" between Russia
and the United Kingdom that had motivated British policy in South Asia during the second half of the 19th century.
Mackinder believed that the heartland theory was in reality a roadmap to global domination, in an age when the United
Kingdom's preeminent position in international affairs was being challenged by such emerging powers as Germany and
Russia. His ideas are firmly rooted in territoriality, as he held that control of a key geographic space was essential to
political power.
Mackinder first publicly presented his theory to the Royal Geographical Society (RGS) in 1904. The title of his paper was
"The Geographical Pivot of History," which was published later the same year. In this discussion Mackinder analyzed the
distinction between, and relative merits of, "land power" versus "sea power." Moreover, he sought to identify a larger
geographical relationship to historical events, postulating a "geographical causation in universal history." He suggested
that the Eurasian landmass was the key to global political power, represented by a core "pivot region" that encompassed
much of Eastern Europe and Central Asia and extended across northern Russia. This "geographical pivot" region,
according to the theory, had been the key to territorial control of greater Eurasia from ancient times, although during the
"Columbian epoch," as Mackinder termed the previous 400 years, the importance of dominating the pivot region had
temporarily been overshadowed by the rise of sea power.
Mackinder acknowledged that the dominance of the high seas by the English navy had been vital to the construction of
the British Empire, but argued that the development of extensive railway networks in Asia would offset the advantages
of controlling the world's sea lanes and choke points. The Russian empire had begun construction of the Trans-Siberian
Railroad about a decade earlier, and this development very likely convinced Mackinder that the vast expanses of Asia
could be connected via rail. His thesis also was influenced by organic theory, as he spoke of history and physical
geography as being "organically connected," and there are clear undertones of environmental determinism in his ideas
regarding the relationship of history and physical geography.
Mackinder conceived of world geography as being composed of "natural seats of power," with the pivot region being
supreme and representing dominant land power. Arranged in two bands surrounding the pivot area were regional arcs
of power, the "inner crescent," or sometimes referred to as the "marginal" crescent, and the "outer crescent," or "insular"
crescent. The inner crescent was controlled for the most part by the European colonial powers, and swept from western
Europe toward the southeast, including India and the entire eastern coastline of Asia, all the way to eastern Siberia. The
inner crescent completely enveloped the pivot region, except on the northern coast, and was controlled by a
combination of land and sea power. The outer crescent consisted of the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, southern
Africa, North America, and South America. The countries of this zone, all maritime nations, were completely dependant
on sea power to protect their political interests and commerce. Interestingly, Mackinder did not view the United States
as a vital player in the dynamic between the inner crescent and the pivot region, and believed that the construction of
the Panama Canal would direct American interests toward the Pacific Basin and away from the Eurasian landmass. The
United Kingdom, as part of the outer crescent, was compelled to cultivate political alliances with countries in the inner
crescent, so as to establish "bridge heads" there that would prevent the expansion of any power controlling the pivot
region. The rise of the British Empire in the previous centuries, noted Mackinder, was "a short rotation of marginal
power round the southwestern and western edge of the pivotal area" which only temporarily obscured the preeminence
of the pivot area.
Although Mackinder did not use the term "heartland" during the initial reading before the RGS, he would later introduce
that term in a revision of the theory, using it to replace "pivot region." In 1919, in the aftermath of World War I, he
reformulated the theory in a book-length study, Democratic Ideals and Reality (1919). In this work, Mackinder
introduced several new regional terms into his original thesis. The "pivot region" became the "heartland," with some
slight modifications of the original boundaries—the heartland was somewhat larger, as it included western China and
more of Siberia. Mackinder now referred to the "World Island," a vast territory that was composed of most of Europe,
Asia, and Africa. In the revised theory, the World Island represented a huge repository of resources that could be
exploited by an aggressive power bent on world domination. The key to controlling the World Island was control of the
heartland's gateway region, Eastern Europe. Thus, Mackinder articulated the famous encapsulation of his argument:
"Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland;
who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island;
who rules the World-Island controls the world."
The heartland theory unquestionably had a profound impact on geopolitical thinking in the wake of World War I.
Eastern Europe's strategic importance as a shatterbelt was now reinforced by the heartland theory, and German
scholars like Karl Haushofer and other members of the geopolitik school certainly considered Mackinder's theory to be a
major contribution. Even Mackinder's critics, most notably Nicholas Spykman and his rimland theory, employed a
similar core-periphery theoretical framework in constructing alternatives to the heartland concept. It is a testimony to
the tenacity of Mackinder's ideas that the heartland theory remains the subject of debate among political geographers
today.
Rimland Theory
Rimland theory is a perspective on geopolitics and international relations presented as a critical response to the
Heartland theory proposed by British geographer Halford J. MacKinder. Rimland theory was the brainchild of Nicholas
Spykman, a political theorist and professor of international relations at Yale University. Spykman was a proponent of
realism in international relations, a view which holds that political states act solely to promote their own interests and
agendas. Writing in the 1940s at the height of World War II, he suggested that the Heartland theory put forth by
MacKinder several decades earlier was flawed, in that it overemphasized the role of the Heartland in determining the
balance of power in global relations. Spykman also drew heavily on the writings of the U.S. naval strategist Alfred Mahan
in constructing his theory. Although his academic training was not specifically in geography, Spykman considered the
discipline to be of the utmost importance in analyzing and understanding international relations and the dynamics of
global power.
The Rimland theory appeared in Spykman's 1944 book The Geography of the Peace, published posthumously the year
following his untimely death. He adopted the basic spatial framework of the Heartland theory, but made some changes
in terminology. Spykman retains the concept of the Eurasian landmass representing a "Heartland," but calls the region
that MacKinder labeled the "inner" or "marginal" crescent the "Rimland." He rejects MacKinder's characterization of
North America, South America, Australia, Japan, and the British Isles as lying in the "outer" or "insular" crescent, and
instead simply terms this region the "off-shore islands and continents," although he agrees with MacKinder's view that
for these countries sea power is of paramount importance, and represents the main means of projecting power. In
Rimland theory, the Heartland does not represent the pre-eminent seat of power that it symbolizes in Heartland theory.
Rather, it is the Rimland that is the foremost seat of power, and is the key to dominating the Heartland. Paraphrasing
MacKinder's summary of the Heartland theory,
Spykman offered his own summary:
"Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia;
Who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world."
Rimland theory differs from the Heartland theory in two major aspects. First, Spykman believed that MacKinder had
greatly exaggerated the prospects of the Heartland as a base of power. Having the advantage of writing four decades
after MacKinder's original thesis appeared as The Geographical Pivot of History in 1904, Spykman noted that the
development of railway infrastructure in the Eurasian core area had not progressed in the way that MacKinder had
expected in his original thesis. Indeed, the quality and quantity of transportation linkages in MacKinder's Heartland,
especially in Siberia and western China, had remained at quite a low level, and could not compete with the sea transport
of the inner and outer crescents. In addition, Spykman criticized MacKinder's conceptualization of the Heartland as a
repository of vital resources, especially since its agricultural potential was much less than in the surrounding regions.
Secondly, Spykman pointed out that Heartland theory oversimplified the historical relationship between sea power and
land power in regard to controlling the Heartland. Spykman admitted that the location of the Heartland provided a
defensive depth, and presented daunting challenges to an invading adversary. But this was well-known from a cursory
review of Russian history (Russia being the country occupying most of the Heartland), and this seemed to be almost the
only real geographical advantage the location enjoyed vis-à-vis the Rimland. Spykman revealed that in fact the history
between the Heartland and what he called the Rimland was not based exclusively on the sea power of the Rimland
versus the land power of the Heartland. He cogently pointed out that various alliances involving the Heartland power
(he used Russia as an example) and countries in the Rimland had emerged over the course of modern international
relations, and that in fact Russia had on occasion joined with one or more Rimland powers to counter the ambition of an
aggressive Rimland country—World War I itself was a case in point.
For Spykman, the key region for global control was the Rimland. This was because the Rimland had to function as both a
land power and a sea power, and also functioned as a buffer zone between the powers of the Heartland and the naval
powers of the outer islands and continents. It is strategically more important than the Heartland due to its greater
population and more advanced economy, two geographic factors that he believed MacKinder had completely failed to
consider. Furthermore, the history of the balance of power on the Eurasian landmass, and the numerous conflicts
associated with maintaining that balance, were about limiting control of the Rimland, not about controlling the
Heartland.
Spykman's revision of the Heartland theory, appearing in the last year of World War II, had a deep influence on post-war
geopolitical strategy in the United States. His argument that the power of the Heartland could be held in check by
controlling the Rimland attracted the attention of western policymakers in the late 1940s, who were concerned about
the possibly of Soviet expansion. Spykman advocated reconstructing Germany as a counterweight to Soviet ambitions in
the region, a strategy realized in the Marshall Plan and other efforts to rebuild Europe. The formation of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949, an organization consisting primarily of U.S. allies located in the Rimland, may also
be regarded as an outgrowth of Spykman's influence. Even more influential was the notion of limiting the expansion of
power from the Heartland by using the Rimland as a barrier—this was the basis of the western policy of containment,
pursued in response to the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe and the spreading of Soviet influence via "wars of
liberation" in other parts of the world. Containment policy guided the foreign relations of the United States and its allies
for the second half of the 20th century, until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. In spite of what his critics suggest
is an inflated estimation of the strategic role of the Rimland in global power politics, Spykman's theory continues to
influence the debate over foreign policy in the United States and elsewhere.
Organic Theory
The term geopolitics (Geopolitik in German) was developed by Rudolf Kjéllen, a Swedish political scientist in 1905. As a
subbranch of political geography, geopolitics focused on the spatial development and needs of the State. It combined
Friedrich Ratzel's theory on the organic nature of the State along with Sir Halford J. Mackinder's Heartland Theory to
justify expansionistic practices of countries.
In the 1920s, German geographer Karl Haushofer used Geopolitik to support German expansion. Haushofer felt that
densely populated countries like Germany should be allowed and entitled to expand and acquire the territory of less
populated countries (such as Czechoslovakia and Poland.) This concept, known as Lebensraum (living space) was
actually developed by Ratzel, who is often called the founder of political geography. Haushofer twisted Ratzel's theories
to develop the pseudo-science of Geopolitik. Haushofer's Lebensraum permitted the expulsion of "lesser" peoples to
further the goals of the growing State.
Haushofer founded and edited the journal Zeitschrift für Geopolitik in 1924 and then became a professor of geopolitics
once the Nazis came to power in Germany in 1933. The journal, and Haushofer's career, only lasted until 1944.
While Haushofer was an acquaintance of Rudolf Hess, Hitler's deputy, his ideas were only of limited influence on Hitler.
For Hitler had his own concept of geography and the expansion of the state.
In his autobiography Mein Kampf, Hitler explained that Germany had the "moral right to acquire [the] foreign land and
soil" of "lesser" races. Haushofer primarily provided the academic and scientific support for the expansion of the Third
Reich.
Outside of Germany, only the Japanese geographical community supported the work of Haushofer and the ideas of
geopolitics as a weapon of conquest.
Haushofer's son Albrecht was indicted in the July 20, 1944 plot to assassinate Hitler so the elder Haushofer was
imprisoned in a concentration camp. Following the war, Haushofer was interrogated by the allies and in 1946,
distraught over the death of this son, Haushofer committed suicide.
Thus, a dark period in the history of geography came to a close.
http://geography.about.com/od/politicalgeography/a/geopolitics.htm
Domino Theory
The domino theory, which governed much of U.S. foreign policy beginning in the early 1950s, held that a communist
victory in one nation would quickly lead to a chain reaction of communist takeovers in neighboring states. In Southeast
Asia, the United States government used the domino theory to justify its support of a non-communist regime in South
Vietnam against the communist government of North Vietnam, and ultimately its increasing involvement in the longrunning Vietnam War (1954-75). In fact, the American failure to prevent a communist victory in Vietnam had much less
of a global impact than had been assumed by the domino theory. Though communist regimes did arise in Laos and
Cambodia after 1975, communism failed to spread throughout the rest of Southeast Asia.
ORIGINS OF THE DOMINO THEORY
In September 1945, the Vietnamese nationalist leader Ho Chi Minh proclaimed Vietnam’s independence from France,
beginning a war that pitted Ho’s communist-led Viet Minh regime in Hanoi (North Vietnam) against a French-backed
regime in Saigon (South Vietnam). Under President Harry S. Truman, the U.S. government provided covert military and
financial aid to the French; the rationale was that a communist victory in Indochina would precipitate the spread of
communism throughout Southeast Asia. Using this same logic, Truman would also give aid to Greece and Turkey during
the late 1940s to help contain communism in Europe and the Middle East.
Did You Know?
In an interview with the press in September 1963, President John F. Kennedy expressed his belief in the domino theory,
stating that "We should use our influence in as effective a way as we can, but we should not withdraw [from Vietnam]."
By early 1950, makers of U.S. foreign policy had firmly embraced the idea that the fall of Indochina to communism would
lead rapidly to the collapse of other nations in Southeast Asia. The National Security Council included the theory in a
1952 report on Indochina, and in April 1954, during the decisive battle between Viet Minh and French forces at Dien
Bien Phu, President Dwight D. Eisenhower articulated it as the “falling domino” principle. In Eisenhower’s view, the loss
of Vietnam to communist control would lead to similar communist victories in neighboring countries in Southeast Asia
(including Laos, Cambodia and Thailand) and elsewhere (India, Japan, the Philippines, Indonesia, and even Australia and
New Zealand). “The possible consequences of the loss [of Indochina],” Eisenhower said, “are just incalculable to the free
world.”
THE DOMINO THEORY AND GROWING U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM
After Eisenhower’s speech, the phrase “domino theory” began to be used as a shorthand expression of the strategic
importance of South Vietnam to the United States, as well as the need to contain the spread of communism throughout
the world. After the Geneva Conference ended the French-Viet Minh war and split Vietnam along the latitude known as
the 17th parallel, the United States spearheaded the organization of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), a
loose alliance of nations committed to taking action against “security threats” in the region.
John F. Kennedy, Eisenhower’s successor in the White House, would increase the commitment of U.S. resources in
support of the Ngo Dinh Diem regime in South Vietnam and of non-communist forces fighting a civil war in Laos in 196162. In the fall of 1963, after serious domestic opposition to Diem arose, Kennedy backed away from support of Diem
himself but publicly reaffirmed belief in the domino theory and the importance of containing communism in Southeast
Asia. Three weeks after Diem was murdered in a military coup in early November 1963, Kennedy was assassinated in
Dallas; his successor Lyndon B. Johnson would continue to use the domino theory to justify the escalation of the U.S.
military presence in Vietnam from a few thousand soldiers to more than 500,000 over the next five years.
THE DOMINO THEORY IN HINDSIGHT
In hindsight, the domino theory failed to take into account the character of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong struggle
in the Vietnam War. By assuming Ho Chi Minh was a pawn of the communist giants Russia and China, American
policymakers failed to see that the goal of Ho and his supporters was limited to Vietnamese independence, rather than
the spread of global communism.
In the end, even though the American effort to block a communist takeover failed, and North Vietnamese forces marched
into Saigon in 1975, communism did not spread throughout the rest of Southeast Asia. With the exception of Laos and
Cambodia, the nations of the region remained out of communist control.
http://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/domino-theory
Heartland Theory – also see pg. 246 8th edition
Heartland theory is a theory of geopolitics proposed by Halford J. Mackinder at the beginning of the 20th
century. Mackinder taught geography at Oxford University and served in the British parliament for 12
years, and was well connected to the policymakers and strategic thinkers of his time. The United
Kingdom was still the world's foremost power when Mackinder put forth his ideas, and it is clear that he
viewed British imperialism as the most moral and just among the European empires. It is likely that he
was deeply influenced by notions of the "Great Game" between Russia and the United Kingdom that had
motivated British policy in South Asia during the second half of the 19th century. Mackinder believed that
the heartland theory was in reality a roadmap to global domination, in an age when the United Kingdom's
preeminent position in international affairs was being challenged by such emerging powers as Germany
and Russia. His ideas are firmly rooted in territoriality, as he held that control of a key geographic space
was essential to political power.
Mackinder first publicly presented his theory to the Royal Geographical Society (RGS) in 1904. The title of
his paper was "The Geographical Pivot of History," which was published later the same year. In this
discussion Mackinder analyzed the distinction between, and relative merits of, "land power" versus "sea
power." Moreover, he sought to identify a larger geographical relationship to historical events,
postulating a "geographical causation in universal history." He suggested that the Eurasian landmass was
the key to global political power, represented by a core "pivot region" that encompassed much of Eastern
Europe and Central Asia and extended across northern Russia. This "geographical pivot" region,
according to the theory, had been the key to territorial control of greater Eurasia from ancient times,
although during the "Columbian epoch," as Mackinder termed the previous 400 years, the importance of
dominating the pivot region had temporarily been overshadowed by the rise of sea power.
Mackinder acknowledged that the dominance of the high seas by the English navy had been vital to the
construction of the British Empire, but argued that the development of extensive railway networks in
Asia would offset the advantages of controlling the world's sea lanes and choke points. The Russian
empire had begun construction of the Trans-Siberian Railroad about a decade earlier, and this
development very likely convinced Mackinder that the vast expanses of Asia could be connected via rail.
His thesis also was influenced by organic theory, as he spoke of history and physical geography as being
"organically connected," and there are clear undertones of environmental determinism in his ideas
regarding the relationship of history and physical geography.
Mackinder conceived of world geography as being composed of "natural seats of power," with the pivot
region being supreme and representing dominant land power. Arranged in two bands surrounding the
pivot area were regional arcs of power, the "inner crescent," or sometimes referred to as the "marginal"
crescent, and the "outer crescent," or "insular" crescent. The inner crescent was controlled for the most
part by the European colonial powers, and swept from western Europe toward the southeast, including
India and the entire eastern coastline of Asia, all the way to eastern Siberia. The inner crescent
completely enveloped the pivot region, except on the northern coast, and was controlled by a
combination of land and sea power. The outer crescent consisted of the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan,
southern Africa, North America, and South America. The countries of this zone, all maritime nations, were
completely dependant on sea power to protect their political interests and commerce. Interestingly,
Mackinder did not view the United States as a vital player in the dynamic between the inner crescent and
the pivot region, and believed that the construction of the Panama Canal would direct American interests
toward the Pacific Basin and away from the Eurasian landmass. The United Kingdom, as part of the outer
crescent, was compelled to cultivate political alliances with countries in the inner crescent, so as to
establish "bridge heads" there that would prevent the expansion of any power controlling the pivot
region. The rise of the British Empire in the previous centuries, noted Mackinder, was "a short rotation of
marginal power round the southwestern and western edge of the pivotal area" which only temporarily
obscured the preeminence of the pivot area.
Although Mackinder did not use the term "heartland" during the initial reading before the RGS, he would
later introduce that term in a revision of the theory, using it to replace "pivot region." In 1919, in the
aftermath of World War I, he reformulated the theory in a book-length study, Democratic Ideals and
Reality (1919). In this work, Mackinder introduced several new regional terms into his original thesis.
The "pivot region" became the "heartland," with some slight modifications of the original boundaries—
the heartland was somewhat larger, as it included western China and more of Siberia. Mackinder now
referred to the "World Island," a vast territory that was composed of most of Europe, Asia, and Africa. In
the revised theory, the World Island represented a huge repository of resources that could be exploited
by an aggressive power bent on world domination. The key to controlling the World Island was control of
the heartland's gateway region, Eastern Europe. Thus, Mackinder articulated the famous encapsulation of
his argument:
"Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland;
who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island;
who rules the World-Island controls the world."
The heartland theory unquestionably had a profound impact on geopolitical thinking in the wake of
World War I. Eastern Europe's strategic importance as a shatterbelt was now reinforced by the heartland
theory, and German scholars like Karl Haushofer and other members of the geopolitik school certainly
considered Mackinder's theory to be a major contribution. Even Mackinder's critics, most notably
Nicholas Spykman and his rimland theory, employed a similar core-periphery theoretical framework in
constructing alternatives to the heartland concept. It is a testimony to the tenacity of Mackinder's ideas
that the heartland theory remains the subject of debate among political geographers today.
Rimland Theory - also see pg. 246 8th edition
Rimland theory is a perspective on geopolitics and international relations presented as a critical response
to the Heartland theory proposed by British geographer Halford J. MacKinder. Rimland theory was the
brainchild of Nicholas Spykman, a political theorist and professor of international relations at Yale
University. Spykman was a proponent of realism in international relations, a view which holds that
political states act solely to promote their own interests and agendas. Writing in the 1940s at the height
of World War II, he suggested that the Heartland theory put forth by MacKinder several decades earlier
was flawed, in that it overemphasized the role of the Heartland in determining the balance of power in
global relations. Spykman also drew heavily on the writings of the U.S. naval strategist Alfred Mahan in
constructing his theory. Although his academic training was not specifically in geography, Spykman
considered the discipline to be of the utmost importance in analyzing and understanding international
relations and the dynamics of global power.
The Rimland theory appeared in Spykman's 1944 book The Geography of the Peace, published
posthumously the year following his untimely death. He adopted the basic spatial framework of the
Heartland theory, but made some changes in terminology. Spykman retains the concept of the Eurasian
landmass representing a "Heartland," but calls the region that MacKinder labeled the "inner" or
"marginal" crescent the "Rimland." He rejects MacKinder's characterization of North America, South
America, Australia, Japan, and the British Isles as lying in the "outer" or "insular" crescent, and instead
simply terms this region the "off-shore islands and continents," although he agrees with MacKinder's
view that for these countries sea power is of paramount importance, and represents the main means of
projecting power. In Rimland theory, the Heartland does not represent the pre-eminent seat of power
that it symbolizes in Heartland theory. Rather, it is the Rimland that is the foremost seat of power, and is
the key to dominating the Heartland. Paraphrasing MacKinder's summary of the Heartland theory,
Spykman offered his own summary:
"Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia;
Who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world."
Rimland theory differs from the Heartland theory in two major aspects. First, Spykman believed that
MacKinder had greatly exaggerated the prospects of the Heartland as a base of power. Having the
advantage of writing four decades after MacKinder's original thesis appeared as The Geographical Pivot of
History in 1904, Spykman noted that the development of railway infrastructure in the Eurasian core area
had not progressed in the way that MacKinder had expected in his original thesis. Indeed, the quality and
quantity of transportation linkages in MacKinder's Heartland, especially in Siberia and western China,
had remained at quite a low level, and could not compete with the sea transport of the inner and outer
crescents. In addition, Spykman criticized MacKinder's conceptualization of the Heartland as a repository
of vital resources, especially since its agricultural potential was much less than in the surrounding
regions.
Secondly, Spykman pointed out that Heartland theory oversimplified the historical relationship between
sea power and land power in regard to controlling the Heartland. Spykman admitted that the location of
the Heartland provided a defensive depth, and presented daunting challenges to an invading adversary.
But this was well-known from a cursory review of Russian history (Russia being the country occupying
most of the Heartland), and this seemed to be almost the only real geographical advantage the location
enjoyed vis-à-vis the Rimland. Spykman revealed that in fact the history between the Heartland and what
he called the Rimland was not based exclusively on the sea power of the Rimland versus the land power
of the Heartland. He cogently pointed out that various alliances involving the Heartland power (he used
Russia as an example) and countries in the Rimland had emerged over the course of modern
international relations, and that in fact Russia had on occasion joined with one or more Rimland powers
to counter the ambition of an aggressive Rimland country—World War I itself was a case in point.
For Spykman, the key region for global control was the Rimland. This was because the Rimland had to
function as both a land power and a sea power, and also functioned as a buffer zone between the powers
of the Heartland and the naval powers of the outer islands and continents. It is strategically more
important than the Heartland due to its greater population and more advanced economy, two geographic
factors that he believed MacKinder had completely failed to consider. Furthermore, the history of the
balance of power on the Eurasian landmass, and the numerous conflicts associated with maintaining that
balance, were about limiting control of the Rimland, not about controlling the Heartland.
Spykman's revision of the Heartland theory, appearing in the last year of World War II, had a deep
influence on post-war geopolitical strategy in the United States. His argument that the power of the
Heartland could be held in check by controlling the Rimland attracted the attention of western
policymakers in the late 1940s, who were concerned about the possibly of Soviet expansion. Spykman
advocated reconstructing Germany as a counterweight to Soviet ambitions in the region, a strategy
realized in the Marshall Plan and other efforts to rebuild Europe. The formation of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization in 1949, an organization consisting primarily of U.S. allies located in the Rimland,
may also be regarded as an outgrowth of Spykman's influence. Even more influential was the notion of
limiting the expansion of power from the Heartland by using the Rimland as a barrier—this was the basis
of the western policy of containment, pursued in response to the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe and
the spreading of Soviet influence via "wars of liberation" in other parts of the world. Containment policy
guided the foreign relations of the United States and its allies for the second half of the 20th century, until
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. In spite of what his critics suggest is an inflated estimation of the
strategic role of the Rimland in global power politics, Spykman's theory continues to influence the debate
over foreign policy in the United States and elsewhere.
Organic Theory - also see pg. 245 8th edition
The term geopolitics (Geopolitik in German) was developed by Rudolf Kjéllen, a Swedish political
scientist in 1905. As a subbranch of political geography, geopolitics focused on the spatial development
and needs of the State. It combined Friedrich Ratzel's theory on the organic nature of the State along with
Sir Halford J. Mackinder's Heartland Theory to justify expansionistic practices of countries.
In the 1920s, German geographer Karl Haushofer used Geopolitik to support German expansion.
Haushofer felt that densely populated countries like Germany should be allowed and entitled to expand
and acquire the territory of less populated countries (such as Czechoslovakia and Poland.) This concept,
known as Lebensraum (living space) was actually developed by Ratzel, who is often called the founder of
political geography. Haushofer twisted Ratzel's theories to develop the pseudo-science of Geopolitik.
Haushofer's Lebensraum permitted the expulsion of "lesser" peoples to further the goals of the growing
State.
Haushofer founded and edited the journal Zeitschrift für Geopolitik in 1924 and then became a professor
of geopolitics once the Nazis came to power in Germany in 1933. The journal, and Haushofer's career,
only lasted until 1944.
While Haushofer was an acquaintance of Rudolf Hess, Hitler's deputy, his ideas were only of limited
influence on Hitler. For Hitler had his own concept of geography and the expansion of the state.
In his autobiography Mein Kampf, Hitler explained that Germany had the "moral right to acquire [the]
foreign land and soil" of "lesser" races. Haushofer primarily provided the academic and scientific support
for the expansion of the Third Reich.
Outside of Germany, only the Japanese geographical community supported the work of Haushofer and
the ideas of geopolitics as a weapon of conquest.
Haushofer's son Albrecht was indicted in the July 20, 1944 plot to assassinate Hitler so the elder
Haushofer was imprisoned in a concentration camp. Following the war, Haushofer was interrogated by
the allies and in 1946, distraught over the death of this son, Haushofer committed suicide.
Thus, a dark period in the history of geography came to a close.
http://geography.about.com/od/politicalgeography/a/geopolitics.htm
Domino Theory
The domino theory, which governed much of U.S. foreign policy beginning in the early 1950s, held that a
communist victory in one nation would quickly lead to a chain reaction of communist takeovers in
neighboring states. In Southeast Asia, the United States government used the domino theory to justify its
support of a non-communist regime in South Vietnam against the communist government of North
Vietnam, and ultimately its increasing involvement in the long-running Vietnam War (1954-75). In fact,
the American failure to prevent a communist victory in Vietnam had much less of a global impact than
had been assumed by the domino theory. Though communist regimes did arise in Laos and Cambodia
after 1975, communism failed to spread throughout the rest of Southeast Asia.
ORIGINS OF THE DOMINO THEORY
In September 1945, the Vietnamese nationalist leader Ho Chi Minh proclaimed Vietnam’s independence
from France, beginning a war that pitted Ho’s communist-led Viet Minh regime in Hanoi (North Vietnam)
against a French-backed regime in Saigon (South Vietnam). Under President Harry S. Truman, the U.S.
government provided covert military and financial aid to the French; the rationale was that a communist
victory in Indochina would precipitate the spread of communism throughout Southeast Asia. Using this
same logic, Truman would also give aid to Greece and Turkey during the late 1940s to help contain
communism in Europe and the Middle East.
Did You Know?
In an interview with the press in September 1963, President John F. Kennedy expressed his belief in the
domino theory, stating that "We should use our influence in as effective a way as we can, but we should not
withdraw [from Vietnam]."
By early 1950, makers of U.S. foreign policy had firmly embraced the idea that the fall of Indochina to
communism would lead rapidly to the collapse of other nations in Southeast Asia. The National Security
Council included the theory in a 1952 report on Indochina, and in April 1954, during the decisive battle
between Viet Minh and French forces at Dien Bien Phu, President Dwight D. Eisenhower articulated it as
the “falling domino” principle. In Eisenhower’s view, the loss of Vietnam to communist control would lead
to similar communist victories in neighboring countries in Southeast Asia (including Laos, Cambodia and
Thailand) and elsewhere (India, Japan, the Philippines, Indonesia, and even Australia and New Zealand).
“The possible consequences of the loss [of Indochina],” Eisenhower said, “are just incalculable to the free
world.”
THE DOMINO THEORY AND GROWING U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM
After Eisenhower’s speech, the phrase “domino theory” began to be used as a shorthand expression of the
strategic importance of South Vietnam to the United States, as well as the need to contain the spread of
communism throughout the world. After the Geneva Conference ended the French-Viet Minh war and
split Vietnam along the latitude known as the 17th parallel, the United States spearheaded the
organization of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), a loose alliance of nations committed to
taking action against “security threats” in the region.
John F. Kennedy, Eisenhower’s successor in the White House, would increase the commitment of U.S.
resources in support of the Ngo Dinh Diem regime in South Vietnam and of non-communist forces
fighting a civil war in Laos in 1961-62. In the fall of 1963, after serious domestic opposition to Diem
arose, Kennedy backed away from support of Diem himself but publicly reaffirmed belief in the domino
theory and the importance of containing communism in Southeast Asia. Three weeks after Diem was
murdered in a military coup in early November 1963, Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas; his successor
Lyndon B. Johnson would continue to use the domino theory to justify the escalation of the U.S. military
presence in Vietnam from a few thousand soldiers to more than 500,000 over the next five years.
THE DOMINO THEORY IN HINDSIGHT
In hindsight, the domino theory failed to take into account the character of the North Vietnamese and Viet
Cong struggle in the Vietnam War. By assuming Ho Chi Minh was a pawn of the communist giants Russia
and China, American policymakers failed to see that the goal of Ho and his supporters was limited to
Vietnamese independence, rather than the spread of global communism.
In the end, even though the American effort to block a communist takeover failed, and North Vietnamese
forces marched into Saigon in 1975, communism did not spread throughout the rest of Southeast Asia.
With the exception of Laos and Cambodia, the nations of the region remained out of communist control.
http://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/domino-theory