Chapter Nine:
Nontariff Trade Barriers and
the New Protectionism
Voluntary Export Restraint Agreements by Product and Country in 1994
Industry
U.S.
EU
Canada
Total
Textiles
Agriculture
Steel
Footwear
Electronics
Automobiles
Machine tools
Other
13
2
-1
2
1
2
5
10
11
10
7
3
1
1
3
3
1
-2
-1
---
26
14
10
10
5
3
3
8
Total
26
46
7
79
________________________________________________________________
Source: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Trade Policy Review
(Geneva, various issues).
The Pervasiveness of Nontariff Barriers in Small Developed Nations 1996
____________________________________________________________________________
Percent of Tariff Lines Affected
__________________________________________________
Product
Australia
New Zealand Norway Switzerland
Food, beverage and tobacco
Textiles and apparel
Wood and wood products
Paper and paper products
Chemicals, petroleum products
Non-metallic mineral products
Basic metal industries
Fabricated metal products
Other manufacturing
6.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.8
1.2
0.0
0.3
0.0
0.6
2.1
0.0
0.0
1.4
0.7
0.0
0.3
0.2
0.0
14.6
0.0
0.0
1.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.3
1.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Average manufacturing
0.7
0.8
3.0
0.2
_______________________________________________________________________________
Source: WTO, Market Access: Unfinished Business (WTO: Geneva, 2001), p. 21.
Economic Effects of Simulatneously Removing All U.S. Import Restraints in 1999
Employment
Output
Sector
Imports
(in millions of dollars)
Exports
Price
(percent)
Textile and clothing
of which: Apparel
Fabric
-154,950
-70,030
-32,950
-16,515
-9,443
-2,556
13,950
12,361
120
-2,038
-1,219
-240
-10.8
-17.1
-2.2
Agricultural sectors
Of which: Sugar
Cotton
-5,130
-2,350
-2,700
-1,369
-743
-387
765
434
-9
-44
-11
-31
-3.2
-5.8
-0.1
Maritime Transportation
-6,200
-1,237
1,502
155
-0.6
Shipbuilding
-3,100
-390
-7
-26
0.4
High Tariff Sectors
Of which: Footwear
Frozen fruits & veg.
-5,230
-1,340
-1,530
-828
-188
-341
1,687
984
309
-68
-7
-31
-2.9
-6.8
-0.9
Total Import-competing sectors
-176,601
-20,339
17,897
-4,447
-9.1
Rest of the Economy:
Agriculture and food
Mining
Construction
Durable manufactures
Non-durable manufactures
Finance, insurance & real estate
Transport. & communications
Wholesale and retail trade
Other services
2,210
1,710
6,970
46,690
10,910
12,000
10,060
32,010
69,330
47
421
140
9,189
1,368
1,312
406
514
1,320
-131
-171
nts
-3,161
817
-60
-541
nts
-139
159
20
nts
2,188
205
75
165
240
182
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
14,617
-3,386
3,234
0.4
Total Rest of the Economy
191,890
Total Entire Economy
17,280
-5,722
-14,511
1,213
-3.6
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Table: Welfare Gain in the United States by Removing All
Significant Import Restraints in 1999_______________
Welfare Gain
Sector
(millions dollars)
Textiles and apparel
Marine transport
Sugar
Dairy
Footwear
Frozen fruits, juices & vegetables
Ball and roller bearings
Watches, clocks and parts
Table and kitchenware
Costume jewelry
Ceramic wall and floor tiles
$13,040
656
420
109
109
11
10
10
5
3
3
Total
14,376
___________________________________________________
Source: OECD, Market Access: Unfinished Business (OECD: Paris,
2001), p. 17.
9.2 Import Quotas
 A Quota is the most important nontariff trade barrier.
 Definition: it is a direct quantitative restriction on the
amount of a commodity allowed to be imported or
exported.
A. Effects of an Import Quota
 Import quotas have been used by industrial countries
to protect their agriculture and by developing
countries to stimulate import substitution of
manufactured products and for balance-of-payments
reasons.
 In Fig. 9-1, with free trade at PX= $1, the nation
consumes 70X (AB), of which 10X (AC) produced
domestically and the remainder 60X (CB) imported.
 An import quota of 30X (JH) raises price to PX= $2,
exactly as with a 100% ad valorem import tariff.
 Reason: only at PX= $2 does the quantity demanded
of 50X (GH) equals 20X (GJ) produced domestically
plus the 30X (JH) allowed by the import quota.
 Thus, consumption reduced by 20X (BN) and
domestic production increased by 10X (CM).
 If the government auctioned off import licenses to
highest bidder, revenue effect would be $30 (JHNM).
FIGURE 9-1 Partial Equilibrium Effects of an Import Quota.
With an upward shift of DX to D/X:
1. With quota of 30X (J/H/):
 Domestic price rises to PX= $2.5
 Domestic production rises to 25X (G/J/)
 Domestic consumption rises to 55X (G/H/).
2. With a 100% import tariff:
 Price remains unchanged at PX= $2
 Domestic production unchanged at 20X (GJ)
 Domestic consumption rises to 65X (GK)
 Imports rise to 45X (JK).
B. Comparison of an Import Quota to an Import
Tariff
1. With a given import quota, an increase in demand
will result in a higher domestic price and greater
domestic production than with an equivalent import
tariff. However, with a given import tariff, an
increase in demand will leave the domestic price and
domestic production unchanged but will result in
higher consumption and imports than with an
equivalent import quota.
2. The quota involves the distribution of import
licenses. The government does not auction off these
licenses in a competitive market, firms that receive
them will reap monopoly profits. These profits will
make potential importers devote efforts to lobbying
and even bribing to obtain the licenses (rent seeking
activities). Thus import quotas not only replace
market mechanism but also result in waste from the
point of view of the economy as a whole and contain
the seeds of corruption.
3. An import quota limits imports to the specified level
with certainty, while a tariff’s effect is uncertain.
The reason is that the elasticity of supply and
demand often unknown, making it difficult to
estimate the import tariff required to restrict imports
to a desired level. Furthermore, foreign exporters
may absorb all or part of the tariff by increasing
their efficiency or accepting lower profits. Exporters
cannot do this with an import quota since quantity of
imports is clearly specified. For this reason domestic
producers prefer quotas to tariffs. However, since
quotas more restrictive than tariffs, society should
resist these efforts.
9.3 Other Nontariff Barriers and the New
Protectionism
 Recently, nontariff trade barriers (NTBs), or new
protectionism, have become more important than
tariffs as obstructions to the flow of international
trade and represents a major threat to the world
trading system.
A. Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs)
 They refer to the case where an importing country
induces another nation to reduce its exports of a
commodity “voluntarily”, under the threat of higher
all-round trade restrictions, when these exports
threaten an entire domestic industry.
 The VERs were used by developed countries against
other countries (e.g. Japan, Korea) to curtail exports
of textiles, steel, automobiles.
 These industries faced sharp declines in employment
in the industrial countries.
 The VERs have allowed developed nations to save at
least the appearance of continued support for the
principle of free trade.
 The Uruguay Round required the phasing out of all
VERs by the end of 1999 and the prohibition on the
imposition of new VERs.
 VERs have same effect of quotas, except they are
administered by the exporting country and rents are
captured by foreign exporters.
 Examples:
1. US restraints on Japanese cars exports in 1981.
2. US restraints on steel exports in 1982 that limited
imports to 20% of the US steel market.
 VERs are less effective than quotas and exporters
tend to fill their quota with higher-quality and higher
priced units of the product over time.
 As a rule, only major suppliers were involved,
leaving the door open for other nations to replace
part of the exports of the major suppliers and also
from transshipments through third countries.
B. Technical, Administrative, and Other
Regulations
 These include:
 Safety regulations: for automobiles and electronics
 Health regulations: for hygienic production and
packaging of imported food products
 Labeling requirements: showing origin and contents
 While many regulations serve legitimate purposes,
some thinly veiled disguises for restricting imports.
 Other restrictions have resulted from laws requiring
governments to buy from domestic suppliers.
C. International Cartels
 An international cartel is an organization of
suppliers of a commodity located in different nations
that agrees to restrict output and exports of the
commodity with the aim of maximizing profits.
 Examples:
1. OPEC: a cartel of major oil countries which restricts
production and exports of oil.
2. International Air Transport Association: a cartel of
major airlines that set international fares and policies
 Cartels are more successful with fewer members
producing an essential commodity with no close
substitutes.
 Cartels are less successful if there is a large number
of international suppliers and if there are good
substitutes for the commodity.
 This explains the failure of, or inability to set up,
international cartels in minerals other than petroleum
and tin, and agricultural products other than sugar,
coffee, cocoa, and rubber.
 Cartel behaves as a monopolist in maximizing profits
 Since the power of a cartel lies in its ability to restrict
output, there is an incentive for any one supplier to
remain outside the cartel or to cheat on it by
unrestricted sales at slightly below the cartel price.
 Example: high oil prices in the 1980s stimulated
supply by nonmembers and reduced prices sharply.
D. Dumping
 Definition: is the export of a commodity at below
cost or at least the sale of a commodity at a lower
price abroad than domestically.
 Dumping is classified as either:
1) Persistent Dumping (or international price
discrimination): is the continuous tendency of a
domestic monopolist to maximize total profits by
selling the commodity at a higher price in the
domestic market (which is insulted by transportation
costs and trade barriers) than internationally (where
it must meet the competition of foreign producers).
2) Predatory Dumping: is the temporary sale of a
commodity at below cost or at a lower price abroad
in order to drive foreign producers out of business,
after which prices are raised to take advantage of the
newly acquired monopoly power abroad.
3) Sporadic Dumping: is the occasional sale of a
commodity at below cost or at below price abroad
than domestically in order to unload an unforeseen
and temporary surplus of the commodity without
having to reduce domestic prices.
 Trade restriction to counteract predatory dumping
are justified to protect domestic industries from
unfair competition from abroad.
 These restrictions usually take the form of
antidumping duties to offset price differentials, or the
threat to impose such duties.
 Domestic producers demand protection against any
type of dumping, so they discourage imports and
increase their own production and profits (rents).
 Examples: Japan was accused of dumping steel and
TV sets in the US, while European nations were
accused from dumping cars, steel and agricultural
products.
 When dumping is proved, the violating nation or firm
usually choose to raise prices rather than face
dumping duties.
E. Export Subsidies
 Definition: they are direct payments (or the granting
of tax relief and subsidized loans) to the nation’s
exporters or potential exporters and/or low–interest
loans to foreign buyers to stimulate the nation’s
exports.
 Export subsidies can be regarded as a form of
dumping.
 Although export subsidies are illegal by
international agreement, many nations provide them
in disguised (hidden) and not-so-disguised forms.
 Examples:
o All major industrial nations give foreign buyers of the
nation’s export low-interest loans to finance the
purchase through agencies such as the US ExportImport Bank.
o The US “extraterritorial income” or Foreign Sales
Corporations provisions of the US tax code have
been used by US corporations to set up overseas
subsidiaries to enjoy partial exemption from US tax
laws on income earned from exporters.
 Countervailing duties are often imposed on imports to
offset export subsidies by foreign governments.
 Fig. 9-2 shows the effect of export subsidies on the
domestic market of a small nation.
 At the free trade price of PX= $3.50, production is
35X (A/C/), consumption is 20X (A/B/), and exports
15X (B/C/).
 With a subsidy of $0.5 (equal to ad valorem=16.7%)
on each unit exported, PX rises to $4.00 for domestic
producers and consumers.
 At PX= $4, production rises to 40X (G/J/),
consumption falls to 10X (G/H/), and exports rise to
30X (H/J/).
 Consumers lose $7.5 (a/+b/), producers gain $18.75
(a/+b/+c/), and government subsidy is $15 (b/+c/+d/).
FIGURE 9-2 Partial Equilibrium Effect of an Export Subsidy.
 Note that area d/ is not part of the gain in producer
surplus because it represents the rising domestic cost
of producing more units of commodity X.
 Nation 2 incurs protection cost or deadweight loss of
$3.75 (B / H / N / =b / = $2.5 and C / J / M / =d / = $1.25)
 Since producers gain less than the sum of the loss of
consumers and the cost of the subsidy to taxpayers;
 Q: Why would Nation 2 subsidize exports?
 A: producers may successfully lobby for the subsidy
or the government may want to promote industry X.
 Note that foreign consumers gain because they
receive 30X instead of 15X.