U.S. Department of State
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
Improving Biosafety and Biosecurity in
Africa
Annual Meeting of the
African Science Academy Development Initiative
UNCLASSIFIED November 4, 2008
United States Department of State
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN)
Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
Engagement Programs
ISN/CTR
Russia- Former Soviet Union
Iraq
Libya
Historic Role: Nunn-Lugar,
WMD scientist engagement
in the former Soviet Union,
Iraq and Libya
10M for G-8 Global Partner
2002-2012
U.S. interested to renew
and expand (+ 10B/10yrs)
Today: Global programs,
combating emerging
bioterrorism threat
Global
Security
Bio
Security
combating the threat
U.S. National/Homeland Security
Presidential Directive
Biodefense for the 21st Century, April 2004:
“Biological weapons in the possession of hostile states or terrorists pose unique
and grave threats to the safety and security of the United States and our allies.”
Essential pillars of national biodefense program
• Threat Awareness
 Risk assessment and international engagement
• Prevention and Protection
 Pathogen security and sustainable lab capacity building
• Surveillance and Detection
 Strengthen international systems and connectivity
• Response and Recovery
 Mitigation and outbreak control
spectrum of bio-risk
Addressing dual-use bio threat should be dual-benefit
Chronic
Disease
Emerging
Disease
Misuse of
Dual use
Technology
Working together to build global public health capacity will:
1) Reduce the impact of the left end of the spectrum,
2) Reduce the likelihood of the right half of the spectrum,
3) Provide some transparency regarding capabilities and intent, and
4) Undermine the popular support for terrorism.
.
Bio
Terror
Bio
War
global biological threats

Global outbreaks of
emerging and reemerging
infectious disease
Recent
Emerging Infectious Disease
in Africa
•Monkeypox virus
•Ebola/Marburg
hemorrhagic fever viruses
•Rift Valley Fever virus
•Highly Pathogenic Avian
Influenza
•Novel Arenavirus
Morens, DM et. al. Nature. 8 Jul 2004
modern global biological threat
• Global outbreaks of infectious disease
– Natural outbreaks represent unpredictable sources of
dangerous pathogens
• Radical/Terrorist threat
– Terrorist groups have established intent to do harm;
use of BW represents a potential threat
• Dual-use biotechnology
– Increasing vulnerability of the legitimate bioscience
sector for accidental release or intentional misuse
combating the threat
International Biodefense Goals:
• Raise awareness of biological threats
• Promote cooperation across human and animal
health, research, scientific, and security
communities
• Reduce impact of biological threats
• Strengthen global security
DOS-CTR Biological Engagement Worldwide
DOS-CTR global biological engagement
Historic Engagement
(Russia, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia,
Ukraine, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Moldova)
Initial Engagement (Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, Turkmenistan,
Afghanistan, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, India, S. Africa, Sudan,
Morocco, Yemen, Libya, Kenya, Brazil )
In-depth Engagement
Preliminary Engagements
(Indonesia, Pakistan, Thailand, Philippines, Iraq, Egypt)
(Malaysia, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Djibouti, Columbia,
Argentina )
Assessments for Future Planning (Africa, Middle East, South America )
$26M in partnerships for bio threat reduction
partnership
types:
12% Universities
and NAS
17% NGOs
71% USG Agencies
International Foundation for Technology and
IFTI:
$1.0M
Investment
U.S. Civilian$2.6M
Research and Development Foundation
CRDF:
International
Science and Technology Center
ISTC:
$880K
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant
USDA:
$2.0M
Inspection Service
U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services
HHS:
$3.5M
U.S. Environmental
EPA:
$1.0M Protection Agency
Massachusetts General Hospital Center for Public
CIMIT:
$500Kand Response
Health Preparedness
Sandia National
Laboratories
SNL:
$1.0M
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural
USDA:
$1.8M
Research Service
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, U.S. Armed
Walter
Reed:
$1.6M
Forces Research
Institute
for Medical Sciences
Navy Medical$3.6M
Research Center
NMRC:
Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention
CDC:
$3.0M
U.S. Geological
Survey
USGS:
$1.0M
Emory University Center for Public Health
Emory:
Preparedness$350K
and Response
Johns Hopkins University Program for International
Johns
Hopkins: $250K
Development
The National
Academies
NAS:
$2.0M
areas of assistance
Biosafety & Biosecurity Projects
Risk assessments, safety and security consultation, design
and implementation, pathogen surveys, support for creation
of national and regional biosafety associations
Training in Best Practices
Biosafety, biosecurity, lab management, bioethics
Molecular Diagnostics & Surveillance
Lab and human capacity building, research collaboration,
integrated disease surveillance
Other Areas
Drafting legislation, national guidelines, S&T collaboration,
forensic epidemiology and first responder preparedness
value of local input
Critical importance of local expertise and
insight
Opportunities:
•Identification of needs and gaps
•Risk Assessments
•Program implementation
•Logistical support
•Program monitoring and evaluation
Challenges:
•Limited funding - prioritization key
•Sustainability
•Culture of Responsibility
sub-saharan africa
Institutional Capacity Building Efforts
• Biosafety/Biosecurity workshop held through
Ugandan National Academy of Sciences (UNAS)
• UNAS “Good Laboratory Practices” workshop
planned for January 2009
• Support for development of the African
Biosafety/Biosecurity Association (Af-BSA)
• WHO-led biosafety/biosecurity awareness
raising meetings
• Dual Anglophone and Francophone
workshops held
sub-saharan africa
Technical Support
•Viral diagnostics workshop in Senegal
•Assistance for laboratory strengthening in South
Africa; ‘sister lab’ relationship
•Planned technical support for BSL-3 construction
in Nigeria
•Global Disease Detection & Response Center –
Kenya – to develop biosafety/biosecurity capacity
through support for trainings and equipment
north africa
Yemeni researcher
• Enhancing disease detection
and control
• Technical assistance for safer lab
construction
• Biosafety/biosecurity workshops
• First survey to assess capacity
and identify needs in Yemen
Contaminated cow
carcass awaiting
necropsy
Laboratory facility under construction
conclusion






Dual-use science… Dual-benefit assistance
Scientific engagement will reduce threat; build
collaborations
Strengthen international security and global
health
Challenges: evolving threat, limited funding
Exploring partnership opportunities in Africa
BEP Support:



Linking academies to public health stakeholders
that require technical assistance
Research and Development collaborations
Trainings and capacity building opportunities
contact information
www.BEPstate.net
Dan Schar, VMD
Biosecurity Engagement Program
Africa Regional Coordinator
U.S. Department of State
ScharDL@state.gov