Index
Explanation of the Disad ....................................................................................................................... 2
Glossary ................................................................................................................................................ 3
Negative ............................................................................................................................... 4
1nc & Overview ........................................................................................................................................ 5
1nc.........................................................................................................................................................................6
Impact Overview................................................................................................................................................. 10
Uniqueness .............................................................................................................................................. 13
Nationalization Rising ........................................................................................................................................ 14
Fight Coming ...................................................................................................................................................... 15
Now is key – Need Credibility ............................................................................................................................ 16
Links ....................................................................................................................................................... 19
Fear  Nationalization ....................................................................................................................................... 20
Hurts Credibility ................................................................................................................................................. 21
Surveillance Hurts Local Efforts......................................................................................................................... 23
Reversible ........................................................................................................................................................... 24
NSA Link ............................................................................................................................................................ 25
Surveillance Fears ............................................................................................................................................... 27
PRISM link ......................................................................................................................................................... 28
Impacts .................................................................................................................................................... 30
Cyber Terror Likely ............................................................................................................................................ 31
Cyber Terror Kills the Economy ......................................................................................................................... 32
Nationalization Avoids Attacks .......................................................................................................................... 33
Gov’t Control Prevents Attacks .......................................................................................................................... 35
Answer To – “internet good” .............................................................................................................................. 36
Chinese Control Good......................................................................................................................................... 37
Russian Control Good ......................................................................................................................................... 38
Fixes Privacy Issues – Facebook ........................................................................................................................ 40
Prevents Uprisings .............................................................................................................................................. 41
Affirmative ........................................................................................................................ 42
2ac to Nationalization ......................................................................................................................................... 43
Bad for Economy ................................................................................................................................................ 46
Cyber Terror Impact Answer .............................................................................................................................. 49
Hurts the Internet ................................................................................................................................................ 52
Internet Good ...................................................................................................................................................... 54
Russia Controls ................................................................................................................................................... 55
Explanation of the Disad
There is a global fight going on about who should control the internet. The United States has been a
strong supporter of a totally free and open internet that has no government involvement or control. Other
countries, led by China and Russia, think that the government should be able to control the internet.
The U.S. is losing the fight globally now because no one trusts us. They think our government just uses
access to the internet to spy on people and secretly control it. So, other countries are making moves to
nationalize their internets. The plan improves US credibility – and allows us to stop other countries from
nationalizing the internet.
What does “control of the internet” mean? The Chinese government has a block on certain websites. The
Russian government wants to own the cables and networks that provide access to the internet. The
Brazilian government wants to own the hard drives and servers where things are stored. Essentially, they
want to treat the internet like it is electricity or water – regulated heavily by the government. The U.S.
prefers that it be totally unregulated and free.
The disad argues that Nationalizing the Internet is good. Government control prevents cyber attacks from
happening and allows each country to control their own systems. So, a person in China couldn’t attack
the U.S. system without the U.S. knowing who was responsible because of strict government controls –
and vice versa – no one in the US could hack into a Russian system.
So, to break the disad down into jargon –
Uniqueness – governments controlling the internet is coming now.
Link – decreasing domestic surveillance improves US credibility – allows us to stop government control.
Impact – government control stops cyber attacks. Cyber attacks bad.
How does nationalized internet solve cyberterror?
If the Russian government controls the access point for all internet access in the country then it is able to
monitor and control that internet access. It would be harder, if not impossible, for a single hacker or
group of hackers to attack a website, power plant, financial institution, or other group from outside of
Russia since it would be detectible. The current system is an open free for all that makes it more difficult
to control who is looking into what anywhere in the world.
Isn’t a free and open internet a good thing?
Probably. But, the disad says the opposite. The internet is probably going to remain free and open for
information. The disad assumes that a level of government control would make it more secure.
Glossary
Balkanize – to separate into groups or categories. In this instance, it refers to breaking the internet up
into country-by-country sections. It is a common phrase used to describe the breaking up of something.
It is a historical reference to the Balkans region of the world. Several countries were broken up from the
larger Soviet Union. It is usually used by people to refer to breaking the internet up into groups. Each
country would control their own internet services and access.
Cyber – A prefix used to describe anything that happens online. Usually reserved for aggression online.
A Cyber crime would be a crime that is done online. Cyber Gambling would be gambling done online. If
you read it, it is talking about the internets.
Cyberterror – committing an act of terror online. Any attack on a government website, an attempt to
gain access to a power plant, or to just generally be violent and destructive is considered cyberterror. The
phrase is very broad as the Department of Defense says they experience 60,000 or more cyberterror
attempts a day. That obviously would have to include everyone just trying to get onto the websites of the
DOD.
Cyberwar – use of an attack on someone’s internet access or services during a time of war. Estonia is
usually the example. During an invasion, Russia hacked into the Estonians internets and shut them down.
This act is often called cyberwar. There are also instances of people saying “cyberwar” to reference
fighting and hacking that is going on between countries.
DOD – Department of Defense – the cabinet of the United States that is in charge of the military branches
and answers to the President. Referenced in a few cards.
ICANN – the group that is in charge of maintain all domain names on the internet. Established by the
U.S., ICANN is a not-for-profit public-benefit corporation with participants from all over the world
dedicated to keeping the Internet secure, stable and interoperable
https://www.icann.org/
ITU - International Telecommunication Union – the United Nations specialized agency for information
and communication technologies. It is the group that would be given control over the internet
internationally – http://www.itu.int/en/Pages/default.aspx
Multi-stakeholder – the ICANN and US supported model fro the internet. Everygroup can control and
contribute to the internet without government interference. The idea is that Internet governance should
mimic the structure of the Internet itself- borderless and open to all
Nationalize – when the government takes over something it is nationalized. Health care literature will
often reference ‘nationalizing health care.’ This disad will use it to discuss the internet. When the
government regulates, controls, and is in charge of something it is said to be nationalized.
Partitioned – separated into parts. When a room is partitioned it is divided into parts. If the internet
were nationalized it would be partitioned between countries.
Negative
1nc & Overview
1nc
Nationalization of the internet is coming now
Wall Street Journal 6-27-14
[Steve Rosenbush, The Morning Download: Nationalization of Internet Continues as Germany Hangs Up
on Verizon, http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2014/06/27/the-morning-download-nationalization-of-internetcontinues-as-germany-hangs-up-on-verizon/]
Good morning. The
nationalization of the Internet continues apace. The German government said on Thursday it
would end a contract with Verizon Communications Inc. because of concerns that the U.S. National Security
Agency had access to customer data maintained by U.S. telecommunications firms, the WSJ’s Anton Troianovski
reports. Verizon has provided Internet access and other telecom services to government agencies in Germany. Those contracts will be transferred
to Deutsche Telekom AG by 2015, the Interior Ministry said.
As the WSJ reports, the move underscores the continuing political headaches for U.S. technology businesses
operating abroad, more than a year after former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden started revealing the reach of
America’s electronic surveillance programs and the alleged cooperation with some U.S. firms.
CIOs are on the front lines of the dilemma. To the extent that more businesses are
pressured to aid in government
surveillance, CIOs should at the very least have a say in how those efforts will work. While those decisions will
be made at the CEO and board level, the CIO can help frame the issues by engaging directly with a company’s senior leadership. Their
perspective is critical in an area where technology, business and global politics converge.
Fears of NSA surveillance is the driving force for nationalizing – only the aff
restores US credibility to prevent it
Kehl et al 14
[Danielle Kehl et al, July 2014. Policy Analyst at New America’s Open Technology Institute (OTI);
Kevin Bankston is the Policy Director at OTI; Robyn Greene is a Policy Counsel at OTI; and Robert
Morgus is a Research Associate at OTI. “Surveillance Costs: The NSA’s Impact on the Economy,
Internet Freedom & Cybersecurity,”
http://oti.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Surveilance_Costs_Final.pdf]
Although there were questions from the beginning about whether the United States would hold itself to the
same high standards domestically that it holds others to internationally, 178 the American government has
successfully built up a policy and programming agenda in the past few years based on promoting an open
Internet. 179 These efforts include raising concerns over Internet repression in bilateral dialogues with countries such as
Vietnam and China, 180 supporting initiatives including the Freedom Online Coalition, and providing over $120 million in
funding for “groups working to advance Internet freedom – supporting counter-censorship and secure communications
technology, digital safety training, and policy and research programs for people facing Internet repression.” 181 However, the
legitimacy of these efforts has been thrown into question since the NSA disclosures began. “Trust has
been the principal casualty in this unfortunate affair,” wrote Ben FitzGerald and Richard Butler in
December 2013. “The American public, our nation’s allies, leading businesses and Internet users around the
world are losing faith in the U.S. government’s role as the leading proponent of a free, open and
integrated global Internet.” 182
Prior to the NSA revelations, the United States was already facing an increasingly challenging political
climate as it promoted the Internet Freedom agenda in global Internet governance conversations. At the
2012 World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT), the U.S. and diverse group of other
countries refused to sign the updated International Telecommunications Regulations based on concerns
that the document pushed for greater governmental control of the Internet and would ultimately harm Internet
Freedom. 183 Many observers noted that the split hardened the division between two opposing camps in the
Internet governance debate: proponents of a status quo multistakeholder Internet governance model, like the
United States, who argued that the existing system was the best way to preserve key online freedoms, and those
seeking to
disrupt or challenge that multistakeholder model for a variety of political and economic reasons, including
governments like Russia and China pushing for greater national sovereignty over the Internet. 184 Many of
the proposals for more governmental control over the network could be understood as attempts by
authoritarian countries to more effectively monitor and censor their citizens, which allowed the U.S. to
reasonably maintain some moral high ground as its delegates walked out of the treaty conference. 185 Although few
stakeholders seemed particularly pleased by the outcome of the WCIT, reports indicate that by the middle of 2013 the tone had
shifted in a more collaborative and positive direction following the meetings of the 2013 World Telecommunications/ICT Policy
Forum (WTPF) and the World Summit on Information Society + 10 (WSIS+10) review. 186
However, the Internet governance conversation took a dramatic turn after the Snowden disclosures .
The annual meeting of the Freedom Online Coalition occurred in Tunis in June 2013, just a few weeks after the initial leaks.
Unsurprisingly, surveillance dominated the conference even though the agenda covered a wide range of topics from Internet
access and affordability to cybersecurity. 187 Throughout the two-day event, representatives from civil society used the platform
to confront and criticize governments about their monitoring practices. 188 NSA surveillance would continue to be the
focus of international convenings on Internet Freedom and Internet governance for months to come,
making civil society representatives and foreign governments far less willing to embrace the United
States’ Internet Freedom agenda or to accept its defense of the multistakeholder model of Internet
governance as a anything other than self-serving. “One can come up with all kinds of excuses for why US surveillance
is not hypocrisy. For example, one might argue that US policies are more benevolent than those of many other regimes… And
one might recognize that in several cases, some branches of government don’t know what other branches are doing… and
therefore US policy is not so much hypocritical as it is inadvertently contradictory,” wrote Eli Dourado, a researcher from the
Mercatus Center at George Mason University in August 2013. “But the fact is that the NSA is galvanizing
opposition to America’s internet freedom agenda.” 189 The scandal revived proposals from both Russia
and Brazil for global management of technical standards and domain names, whether through the ITU or
other avenues. Even developing countries, many of whom have traditionally aligned with the U.S. and
prioritize access and affordability as top issues, “don’t want US assistance because they assume the
equipment comes with a backdoor for the NSA. They are walking straight into the arms of Russia,
China, and the ITU.” 190
Consequently, NSA surveillance has shifted the dynamics of the Internet governance debate in a potentially destabilizing manner.
The Snowden revelations “have also been well-received by those who seek to discredit existing approaches to Internet
governance,” wrote the Center for Democracy & Technology’s Matthew Shears. “There has been a long-running
antipathy among a number of stakeholders to the United States government’s perceived control of the
Internet and the dominance of US Internet companies. There has also been a long-running antipathy,
particularly among some governments, to the distributed and open management of the Internet.” 191 Shears
points out that evidence of the NSA’s wide-ranging capabilities has fueled general concerns about the current
Internet governance system, bolstering the arguments of those calling for a new government-centric
governance order. At the UN Human Rights Council in September 2013, the representative from Pakistan—speaking on
behalf of Cuba, Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Ecuador, Russia, Indonesia, Bolivia, Iran, and China—explicitly linked the
revelations about surveillance programs to the need for reforming Internet governance processes and institutions to give
governments a larger role. 192 Surveillance issues continued to dominate the conversation at the 2013 Internet Governance
Forum in Bali as well, where “debates on child protection, education and infrastructure were overshadowed by widespread
concerns from delegates who said the public’s trust in the internet was being undermined by reports of US and British
government surveillance.” 193
Further complicating these conversations is the fact that several of the institutions that govern the technical functions of the
Internet are either tied to the American government or are located in the United States. Internet governance scholar Milton
Mueller has described how the reaction to the NSA disclosures has become entangled in an already contentious
Internet governance landscape. Mueller argues that, in addition to revealing the scale and scope of state surveillance and
the preeminent role of the United States and its partners, the NSA disclosures may push other states toward a
more nationally partitioned Internet and “threaten… in a very fundamental way the claim that the US
had a special status as neutral steward of Internet governance.” 194 These concerns were publicly voiced in October
2013 by the heads of a number of key organizations, including the President of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN) and the chair of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), in the Montevideo Statement on the Future of
Internet Cooperation. Their statement expressed “strong concern over the undermining of the trust and confidence of Internet
users globally due to recent revelations of pervasive monitoring and surveillance” and “called for accelerating the globalization
of ICANN and Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions, towards an environment in which all stakeholders,
including 22 all governments, participate on an equal footing.” 195 In particular, the process of internationalizing ICANN—
which has had a contractual relationship with the Commerce Department’s National Telecommunications and Information
Association (NTIA) since 1998—has progressed in recent months. 196
Cyber threats are real and happening – government control is key to prevent
attacks that could crush the international system
Renda, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2013
[Andrea Renda, Cybersecurity and Internet Governance, May 3, 2013,
http://www.cfr.org/councilofcouncils/global_memos/p32414]
Cybersecurity is now a leading concern for major economies. Reports indicate that hackers can target the U.S.
Department of Justice or Iranian nuclear facilities just as easily as they can mine credit card data. Threats have
risen as the Internet has become a critical infrastructure for the global economy, with thousands of operations
migrating onto it. For example, the innocuous practice of bring-your-own-device to work presents mounting dangers due to malware attacks-software intended to corrupt computers.
Between April and December 2012, the types of threats detected on the Google Android platform increased by more than thirty times from
11,000 to 350,000, and are expected to reach one million in 2003, according to security company Trend Micro (See Figure 1).
Put simply, as the global economy relies more on the Internet, the latter becomes increasingly insidious.
There is no doubt that the Internet is efficient. But it now needs a more concerted global effort to preserve its best aspects
and guard against abuses.
The rise of the digital cold war
Cyber threats and cyberattacks also reveal an escalating digital cold war. For years the United States government has
claimed that cyberattacks are mainly state-sponsored, initiated predominantly by China, Iran, and Russia. The penetration of the
U.S. Internet technology market by corporations such as Huawei, subsidized by the Chinese government, has led to more fears that sensitive
information is vulnerable. After an explicit exchange of views between President Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping in February 2013, the
United States passed a new spending law that included a cyber espionage review process limiting U.S. government procurement of Chinese
hardware.
U.S. suspicions intensified when Mandiant, a private information security firm, released a report detailing cyber espionage by a covert Chinese
military unit against 100 U.S. companies and organizations. In March 2013, the U.S. government announced the creation of thirteen new teams of
computer experts capable to retaliate if the United States were hit by a major attack.
On the other hand, Chinese experts claim to be the primary target of state-sponsored attacks, largely originating from
the United States. But in reality the situation is more complex. Table 1 shows that cyberattacks in March 2013 were most frequently launched
from Russia and Germany, followed by Taiwan and the United States.
What is happening to the Internet?
Created as a decentralized network, the Internet has been a difficult place for policymakers seeking to
enforce the laws of the real world. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks—consisting of virus infected systems (Botnet)
targeting a single website leading to a Denial of Service for the end user—became a harsh reality by 2000, when companies such as Amazon,
eBay, and Yahoo! had been affected. These costs stem from the direct financial damage caused by loss of revenue during an attack, disaster
recovery costs associated with restoring a company's services, a loss of customers following an attack, and compensation payments to customers
in the event of a violation of their service level agreements.
As the Internet permeates everyday life, the stakes are becoming even higher. In a few years, society could delegate every
aspect of life to information technology imagine driverless cars, machine-to-machine communications, and other trends that will
lead to the interconnection of buildings to trains, and dishwashers to smartphones. This could open up these societies to
previously unimaginable disruptive cyber events. What is as concerning is that in cyberspace, attacks seem to have a structural
lead over defense capabilities: it can be prohibitively difficult to foresee where, how, and when attackers will strike.
Confronted with this challenge, the global community faces a dilemma. The neutrality of the Internet has proven to be a
formidable ally of democracy, but the cost of protecting users' freedom is skyrocketing. Critical services, such as e-commerce or e-health, might
never develop if users are not able to operate in a more secure environment. Moreover, some governments simply do not like ideas to circulate
freely.
Besides the "giant cage" built by China to insulate its Internet users, countries like Pakistan have created national
firewalls to monitor and filter the flow of information on the network. And even the Obama administration, which has
most recently championed Internet freedom initiatives abroad, is said to be cooperating with private telecoms operators on Internet surveillance,
and Congress is discussing a new law imposing information sharing between companies and government on end-user behavior, which violates
user privacy.
The question becomes more urgent every day: Should the Internet remain an end-to-end, neutral environment, or should we sacrifice Internet
freedom on the altar of enhanced security? The answer requires a brief explanation of how the Internet is governed, and what might change.
The end of the Web as we know it?
Since its early days, the Internet has been largely unregulated by public authorities, becoming a matter for private selfregulation by engineers and experts, who for years have taken major decisions through unstructured procedures. No doubt, this has worked in the
past. But as cyberspace started to expand, the stakes began to rise.
Informal bodies such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)—a private, U.S.-based multi-stakeholder
association that rules on domain names and other major aspects of the Internet have been increasingly put under the spotlight. Recent
ICANN rulings have exacerbated the debate over the need for more government involvement in Internet
governance, either through a dedicated United Nations agency or through the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), an existing UN
body that ensures international communication and facilitates deployment of telecom infrastructure. But many experts fear that if a multistakeholder model is abandoned, the World Wide Web would cease to exist as we know it.
Last year's World Conference on International Telecommunications, held in Dubai, hosted a heated debate on the future of cyberspace. Every
stakeholder was looking for a different outcome. The ITU looked to expand its authority over the Internet; European telecoms operators wanted
to secure more revenues by changing the rules for exchanging information between networks; China, Russia, and India wanted stronger
government control over the Internet; the United States and Europe stood to protect the multi-stakeholder model of ICANN; and a group of
smaller countries sought to have Internet access declared a human right.
When a new treaty was finally put to vote, unsurprisingly, as many as fifty-five countries (including the United States and many EU member
states) decided not to sign. Since then, the question on how the Internet will be governed remains unresolved.
Cyber attacks between states results in great power war
GABLE 10 Adjunct Professor of Public International Law, Drexel University Earle
Mack School of Law [Kelly A. Gable, Cyber-Apocalypse Now: Securing the Internet Against
Cyberterrorism and Using Universal Jurisdiction as a Deterrent, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law,
January, 2010, 43 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 57]
Spoofing attacks are concentrated on impersonating a particular user or computer, usually in order to
launch other types of attacks. n122 Spoofing is often committed in connection with password sniffing; after obtaining a user's log-in
and password, the spoofer will log in to the computer and masquerade as the legitimate user. The cyberterrorist typically does not stop there,
instead using that computer as a bridge to another, hopping in this fashion from computer to computer. This process, called "looping," effectively
conceals the spoofer's identity, especially because he or she may have jumped back and forth across various national boundaries. n123
Even more disturbing is the possibility of misleading entire governments into believing that another,
potentially hostile government is attempting to infiltrate its networks. Imagine that a cyberterrorist
perpetrates an attack on the network maintained by the U.S. Treasury and steals millions of dollars,
transferring the money to his own account to be used for funding further terrorist activities. n124 He has
used the spoofing technique, however, which causes the U.S. government to believe the Russian government to be
behind the attack and to accuse them of the attack. The Russian government denies the accusation and is
insulted at the seemingly unprovoked hostility. Tensions between the governments escalate and boil over, potentially
resulting in war . Though this may be only a hypothetical example, it is frighteningly plausible . In fact, it may have
been used in the attacks on U.S. and South Korean websites - the South Korean government initially was so
certain that North Korea was behind the attack that it publicly accused the North Korean government, despite already tense
relations. n125 Similarly, in the 2007 attack on Estonia, Estonian authorities were so certain that the Russian
government was behind the attack that they not only publicly accused them but requested military assistance from
NATO in responding to the attack. n126 It was later determined that Russia was not behind the attack and that at least
some of the attackers were located in Brazil and Vietnam. n127
Impact Overview
Government control prevents cyber attacks – allows them to create bottlenecks and
detection devices that prevent attacks from occurring. And cyber attacks between
states risk global nuclear wars – our evidence cites the U.S. and Russia as likely to
be attacked and escalate.
A successful attack would take milliseconds, couldn’t be stopped, and escalates.
WALL 11 Senior Associate with Alston & Bird LLP; former senior legal advisor for
U.S. Special Operations Command Central [Andru E. Wall, Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50
Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, Intelligence Activities & Covert Action, Harvard National
Security Journal]
Cyberwarfare differs from other forms of warfare in that the skills or tools necessary to collect intelligence in
cyberspace are often the same skills or tools required to conduct cyber attack. Furthermore, the time lag between
collecting information and the need to act upon that information may be compressed to milliseconds. Unlike
the traditional warfighting construct where intelligence officers collect and analyze information before
passing that information on to military officers who take direct action, cyber attack may require nearly simultaneous
collection, analysis, and action. The same government hacker may identify an enemy computer network,
[*122] determine its strategic import, and degrade its capabilities all in a matter of seconds.
This is precisely why President Obama put the same man in charge of cyber intelligence activities and
military cyber operations. This is also the reason Congress evidenced considerable apprehension and asked many questions about
authorities and oversight. After all, congressional oversight retains its antiquated, stovepiped organizational structure and presumes a strict
separation between intelligence activities and military operations even when no such separation is legally required.
Cyber apocalypse will happen if the structure of the internet isn’t made safer
Gable, Adjunct Professor of Public International Law, Drexel University Earle
Mack School of Law, 2010
[Kelly A. Gable, Cyber-Apocalypse Now: Securing the Internet Against Cyberterrorism and Using
Universal Jurisdiction as a Deterrent, VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW, Vol.
43:57]
VI. CONCLUSION
Cyberterrorism poses perhaps the greatest threat to national and international security since the creation
of weapons of mass destruction. As states and their economies become increasingly intertwined, largely due
to the Internet and the international financial system of global trade, the effects of a cyberterrorist attack will
be greater. Similarly, as cyberterrorists gain experience in disrupting national governments and shutting
down critical infrastructure, their attacks likely will become increasingly successful. Although states, private
industry, and international organizations have made significant efforts to increase international cooperation, much more needs to be
done. In taking action, however, it must be understood that, due to the fundamental weakness of the structure of the
Internet,
those additional
efforts will not completely prevent cyberterrorism. As a result, further efforts at
international cooperation and international standards must be part of a layered approach to cyberterrorism that also includes
deterrence. As a result of the realities inherent to cyberspace, the most feasible way to deter cyberterrorism is through the international law
principle of universal jurisdiction. This is not to say that territorial jurisdiction (or nationality, passive personality, or protective jurisdiction)
could not be used to prosecute cyberterrorists, should there be sufficient information and state willingness to exercise other forms of jurisdiction.
It is merely to say that universal jurisdiction is likely to be the most feasible manner of prosecution and, therefore, deterrence. A layered approach
of mitigation and deterrence can reduce the threat of cyberterrorism substantially. Unless and until states are willing to exercise universal
jurisdiction over cyberterrorist acts as part of that layered approach, however, it is only a matter of time before cyberterrorists
are able to unleash a cyber-apocalypse.
Cyber war causes extinction.
Rothkopf 11 (David, Visiting Scholar at Carnegie, “Where Fukushima meets Stuxnet: The growing threat of cyber war”, 3/17/11,
http://rothkopf.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/03/17/where_fukushima_meets_stuxnet_the_growing_threat_of_cyber_war)
The Japanese nuclear crisis, though still unfolding, may, in a way, already be yesterday's news. For a peek at tomorrow's, review the testimony of
General Keith Alexander, head of U.S. Cyber Command. Testifying before Congress this week and seeking support to pump up
his agency budget, the general argued
that all future conflicts would involve cyber warfare tactics and that the
U.S. was ill-equipped to defend itself against them.
do not have the capacity to do everything we need to accomplish. To put it
bluntly, we are very thin, and a crisis would quickly stress our cyber forces . ... This is not a hypothetical danger."
Alexander said, "We are finding that we
The way to look at this story is to link in your mind the Stuxnet revelations about the reportedly U.S. and Israeli-led cyber attacks on the Iranian
nuclear enrichment facility at Natanz and the calamities at the Fukushima power facilities over the past week. While seemingly unconnected, the
stories together speak to the before and after of what cyber conflict may look like.
Enemies will be able to target one
another's critical infrastructure as was done by the U.S. and Israeli team (likely working with British and German
assistance) targeting the Iranian program and burrowing into their operating systems, they will seek to produce malfunctions that
bring economies to their knees, put societies in the dark, or undercut national defenses.
Those infrastructures might well be nuclear power systems and the results could be akin to what we
are seeing in Japan. (Although one power company executive yesterday joked to me that many plants in the U.S. would be safe because
the technology they use is so old that software hardly plays any role in it at all. This hints at a bit of a blessing and a curse in the fractured U.S.
power system: it's decentralized which makes it hard to target overall but security is left to many power companies that lack the sophistication or
resources to anticipate, prepare for or manage the growing threats.)
Importantly, not only does the apparent success of the Stuxnet worm demonstrate that such approaches are now in
play but it may just be the tip of the iceberg . I remember over a decade ago speaking to one of the top U.S. cyber defenders
who noted that even during the late 90s banks were losing millions and millions every year to cyber theft -- only they didn't want to report it
because they felt it would spook customers. (Yes.) Recently, we have seen significant market glitches worldwide that
could easily have been caused by interventions rather than just malfunctions. A couple years back I participated in a
scenario at Davos in which just such a manipulation of market data was simulated and the conclusion was it wouldn't take much to
undermine confidence in the markets and perhaps even force traders to move to paper trading or other
venues until it was restored. It wouldn't even have to be a real cyber intrusion -- just the perception
that one might have happened.
What makes the nuclear threat so unsettling to many is that it is invisible . It shares this with the cyber
threat. But the cyber attacks have other dimensions that suggest that General Alexander is not just trying to beef up his
agency's bank accounts with his description of how future warfare will always involve a cyber component. Not only are they invisible
but it is hard to detect who has launched them, so hard, in fact, that one can imagine future tense
international relationships in which opposing sides were constantly, quietly, engaging in an
undeclared but damaging "non-war," something cooler than a Cold War because it is stripped of
rhetoric and cloaked in deniability, but which might be much more damaging. While there is still ongoing debate
about the exact definition of cyber warfare there is a growing consensus that the threats posed by both state-sponsored and non-state actors to
power grids, telecom systems, water supplies, transport systems and computer networks are reaching critical levels. This is the deeply
unsettling situation effectively framed by General Alexander in his testimony and rather than having been
obscured by this week's news it should only have been amplified by it.
Uniqueness
Nationalization Rising
Nationalization is the trend
Blankenhorn, business journalist & Seeking Alpha Contributor, 2015
[Dana Blankenhorn, The Big Threat To Google Is Nationalizing The Internet,
http://seekingalpha.com/article/3072296-the-big-threat-to-google-is-nationalizing-the-internet]
Every national government has no-go zones, and Google goes there as part of its basic mission.
As national governments clamp down on, or seek to control the resource, they go against Google.
It's an age of Information War, and Google is in the crosshairs.
The biggest trend of the last five years , whether we're talking about business, politics, or society, has been the
nationalization of the Internet.
The Internet was designed as an international medium. It was designed to be open and free. But nearly every national government
has no-go zones, things they don't want covered, debated, or even discussed. Being a journalist has never been so
hazardous for this reason - information is now a weapon.
Fight Coming
Fight over internet control coming and real
Goldstein, Writer for the Atlantic, 2014
[Gordon M. Goldstein, The End of the Internet?,
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/07/the-end-of-the-internet/372301/]
The World Wide Web celebrated its 25th birthday recently. Today the global network serves almost 3 billion people, and hundreds of thousands
more join each day. If the Internet were a country, its economy would be among the five largest in the world.
In 2011, according to the World Economic Forum, growth in the digital economy created 6 million new jobs. The McKinsey Global Institute
estimates that transborder online traffic grew 18-fold between 2005 and 2012 and that the global flow of goods, services, and investments—
which reached $26 trillion in 2012—could more than triple by 2025. Facebook has launched a major initiative, in partnership
with tech giants including Samsung and Qualcomm, dedicated to making the Internet available to the
approximately two-thirds of the world’s population not yet connected. Cisco forecasts that between 2013 and 2022, the
so-called Internet of Things will generate $14.4 trillion in value for global enterprises.
Yet all of this growth and increasing connectedness, which can seem both effortless and unstoppable, is
now creating enormous friction, as yet largely invisible to the average surfer. It might not remain that way for much longer. Fierce
and rising geopolitical conflict over control of the global network threatens to create a balkanized
system—what some technorati, including Google’s executive chairman, Eric Schmidt, have called “the splinternet.” “I’m the most optimistic
person I know on almost every topic,” the Internet entrepreneur Marc Andreessen recently said in a public interview, and “I’m incredibly
concerned.” Andreessen said it is an “open question” whether the Internet five years from now “will still work the way that it does today.”
Now is key – Need Credibility
Firm US commitment to Internet freedom at Busan vital to curb global regulations
that will cause Internet fragmentation
McDowell, Chair-FCC, 13
[2/15, “Commissioner McDowell Congressional Testimony,”
http://www.fcc.gov/document/commissioner-mcdowell-congressional-testimony]
Thank you Chairman Upton, Ranking Member Waxman, Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, Chairman Walden, Ranking Member Eshoo,
Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Sherman, Chairman Smith and Ranking Member Bass. It is an honor to be before you during this rare joint
hearing. Thank you for inviting me. It is a privilege to testify before such a rare meeting of three subcommittees and beside such a distinguished
group on this panel. Ladies and gentlemen, the
Internet is under assault. As a result, freedom, prosperity and the
potential to improve the human condition across the globe are at risk. Any questions regarding these assertions
are now settled. Last year’s allegations that these claims are exaggerated no longer have credibility. In my testimony today, I will make five
fundamental points: 1) Proponents of multilateral intergovernmental control of the Internet are patient and persistent incrementalists who will
never relent until their ends are achieved; 2) The recently concluded World Conference on International Telecommunications (“WCIT”) ended
the era of an international consensus to keep intergovernmental hands off of the Internet in dramatic fashion, thus radically twisting the one-way
ratchet of even more government regulation in this space; 3) Those who cherish Internet freedom must immediately
redouble their efforts to prevent further expansions of government control of the Internet as the pivotal
2014 Plenipotentiary meeting of the International Telecommunication Union (“ITU”)1 quickly draws nearer; 4) Merely saying
“no” to any changes is – quite obviously – a losing proposition; therefore we should work to offer alternate proposals such as improving the
longstanding and highly successful, non-governmental, multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance to include those who may feel
disenfranchised; and 5) Last year’s bipartisan and unanimous Congressional resolutions clearly opposing expansions of international powers over
the Internet reverberated throughout the world and had a positive and constructive effect. I. Proponents of multilateral intergovernmental control
of the Internet are patient and persistent incrementalists who will never relent until their ends are achieved. First, it is important to note that as far
back as 2003 during the U.N.’s Summit on the Information Society (“WSIS”), the U.S. found itself in the lonely position of fending off efforts by
other countries to exert U.N. and other multilateral control over the Internet. In both 2003 and 2005, due to the highly effective leadership of my
friend Ambassador David Gross – and his stellar team at the Department of State – champions of Internet freedom were able to avert this crisis by
enhancing the private sector multi-stakeholder governance model through the creation of entities such as the Internet Governance Forum (“IGF”)
where all stakeholders, including governments, could meet to resolve challenges. Solutions should be found through consensus rather than
regulation, as had always been the case with the Internet’s affairs since it was opened up for public use in the early 1990’s.2 Nonetheless,
countries such as China, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and scores of their allies never gave up their
regulatory quest. They continued to push the ITU, and the U.N. itself, to regulate both the operations,
economics and content of the Net. Some proposals were obvious and specific while others were insidious and initially appeared
innocuous or insignificant. Many defenders of Internet freedom did not take these proposals seriously at first, even though some plans explicitly
called for: • Changing basic definitions contained in treaty text so the ITU would have unrestricted jurisdiction over the Internet;3 • Allowing
foreign phone companies to charge global content and application providers internationally mandated fees (ultimately to be paid by all Internet
consumers) with the goal of generating revenue for foreign government treasuries;4 • Subjecting cyber security and data privacy to international
control, including the creation of an international “registry” of Internet addresses that could track every Internet-connected device in the world;5 •
Imposing unprecedented economic regulations of rates, terms and conditions for currently unregulated Internet traffic swapping agreements
known as “peering;”6 • Establishing ITU dominion over important non-profit, private sector, multistakeholder functions, such as administering
domain names like the .org and .com Web addresses of the world;7 • Subsuming into the ITU the functions of multi-stakeholder Internet
engineering groups that set technical standards to allow the Net to work;8 • Centralizing under international regulation Internet content under the
guise of controlling “congestion,” or other false pretexts; and many more.9 Despite these repeated efforts, the unanimously adopted 1988 treaty
text that helped insulate the Internet from international regulation, and make it the greatest deregulatory success story of all time, remained in
place. Starting in 2006, however, the ITU’s member states (including the U.S.) laid the groundwork for convening the WCIT.10 The purpose of
the WCIT was to renegotiate the 1988 treaty. As such, it became the perfect opportunity for proponents of expanded regulation to extend the
ITU’s reach into the Internet’s affairs. In fact, in 2011, thenRussian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin summed it up best when he declared that his
goal, and that of his allies, was to establish “international control over the Internet” through the ITU.11 Last month in Dubai, Mr. Putin largely
achieved his goal. II. December’s WCIT ended the era of international consensus to keep intergovernmental hands off of the Internet in dramatic
fashion. Before the WCIT, ITU leadership made three key promises: 1) No votes would be taken at the WCIT; 2) A new treaty would be adopted
only through “unanimous consensus;” and 3) Any new treaty would not touch the Internet.12 All three promises were resoundingly broken.13 As
a result of an 89-55 vote, the ITU now has unprecedented authority over the economics and content of key aspects of the Internet.14 Although the
U.S. was ultimately joined by 54 other countries in opposition to the new treaty language, that figure is misleading. Many countries, including
otherwise close allies in Europe, were willing to vote to ensnare the Internet in the tangle of intergovernmental control until Iran complicated the
picture with an unacceptable amendment. In short, the U.S. experienced a rude awakening regarding the stark reality of
the situation: when push comes to shove, even countries that purport to cherish Internet freedom are
willing to surrender. Our experience in Dubai is a chilling foreshadow of how international Internet
regulatory policy could expand at an accelerating pace. Specifically, the explicit terms of the new treaty language give the
ITU policing powers over “SPAM,” and attempt to legitimize under international law foreign government inspections of the content of Internet
The bottom
line is, countries have given the ITU jurisdiction over the Internet’s operations and content. Many more
were close to joining them. More broadly, pro-regulation forces succeeded in upending decades of
consensus on the meaning of crucial treaty definitions that were universally understood to insulate
Internet service providers, as well as Internet content and application providers, from intergovernmental
control by changing the treaty’s definitions.16 Many of the same countries, as well as the ITU itself,17 brazenly argued that the
old treaty text from 1988 gave the ITU broad jurisdiction over the Internet.18 If these regulatory expansionists are willing to
conjure ITU authority where clearly none existed, their control-hungry imaginations will see no limits to
the ITU’s authority over the Internet’s affairs under the new treaty language. Their appetite for regulatory
expansionism is insatiable as they envision the omniscience of regulators able to replace the billions of
daily decisions that allow the Internet to blossom and transform the human condition like no other
technology in human history. At the same time, worldwide consumer demand is driving technological
convergence. As a result, companies such as Verizon, Google, AT&T, Amazon, Microsoft, Netflix, and many more in the U.S. and
in other countries, are building across borders thousands of miles of fiber optics to connect sophisticated
routers that bring voice, video and data services more quickly to consumers tucked into every corner of
the globe. From an engineering perspective, the technical architecture and service offerings of these companies look the same. Despite this
communications to assess whether they should be censored by governments under flimsy pretexts such as network congestion.15
wonderful convergence, an international movement is growing to foist 19th Century regulations designed for railroads, telegraphs and vanishing
analog voice phone monopolies onto new market players that are much different from the monoliths of yore. To be blunt, these
dynamic new wonders of the early 21st Century are inches away from being smothered by innovationcrushing old rules designed for a different time. The practical effect of expanded rules would be to
politicize engineering and business decisions inside sclerotic intergovernmental bureaucracies. If this
trend continues, Internet growth would be most severely impaired in the developing world. But even here, as
brilliant and daring technologists work to transform the world, they could be forced to seek bureaucratic permission to innovate and invest. In
sum, the
dramatic encroachments on Internet freedom secured in Dubai will serve as a stepping
stone to more international regulation of the Internet in the very near future. The result will be devastating
even if the United States does not ratify these toxic new treaties. We must waste no time fighting to prevent further
governmental expansion into the Internet’s affairs at the upcoming ITU Plenipotentiary in 2014. Time
is of the essence. While we debate what to do next, Internet freedom’s foes around the globe are working
hard to exploit a treaty negotiation that dwarfs the importance of the WCIT by orders of magnitude. In
2014, the ITU will conduct what is literally a constitutional convention, called a “plenipotentiary”
meeting, which will define the ITU’s mission for years to come. Its constitution will be rewritten and a new Secretary
General will be elected. This scenario poses both a threat and an opportunity for Internet freedom. The outcome
of this massive treaty negotiation is uncertain, but the momentum favors those pushing for more Internet
regulation. More immediately, the World Telecommunications Policy/ICT Forum (“WTPF”), which convenes in Geneva this May, will focus
squarely on Internet governance and will shape the 2014 Plenipotentiary. Accordingly, the highest levels of the U.S. Government must make this
cause a top priority and recruit allies in civil society, the private sector and diplomatic circles around the world. The effort should start with the
President immediately making appointments to fill crucial vacancies in our diplomatic ranks. The recent departures of my distinguished friend,
Ambassador Phil Verveer, his legendary deputy Dick Beaird, as well as WCIT Ambassador Terry Kramer, have left a hole in the United States’
ability to advocate for a constructive – rather than destructive – Plenipot. America and Internet freedom’s allies simply cannot dither again. If we
do, we will fail, and global freedom and prosperity will suffer. We should work to offer constructive alternative proposals, such as improving the
highly successful multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance to include those who feel disenfranchised. As I warned a year ago, merely
saying “no” to any changes to the multi-stakeholder Internet governance model has recently proven to be a losing proposition.19 Ambassador
Gross can speak to this approach far better than can I, but using the creation of the IGF as a model, we should immediately engage with all
countries to encourage a dialogue among all interested parties, including governments, civil society, the private sector, non-profits and the ITU, to
broaden the multi-stakeholder umbrella to provide those who feel disenfranchised from the current structure with a meaningful role in shaping the
evolution of the Internet. Primarily due to economic and logistical reasons, many developing world countries are not able to play a role in the
multi-stakeholder process. This is unacceptable and should change immediately. Developing nations stand to gain the most
from unfettered Internet connectivity, and they will be injured the most by centralized multilateral control
of its operations and content. V. Last year’s bipartisan and unanimous Congressional resolutions clearly opposing
expansions of international powers over the Internet reverberated around the world and had a positive and
constructive effect, but Congress must do more. In my nearly seven years of service on the FCC, I have been amazed by how
closely every government and communications provider on the globe studies the latest developments
in American communications policy. In fact, we can be confident that this hearing is streaming live in some countries, and is
being blocked by government censors in others. Every detail of our actions is scrutinized. It is truly humbling to learn that even my statements
have been read in Thailand and Taiwan, as well as translated into Polish and Italian. And when
Congress speaks, especially
when it speaks with one loud and clear voice, as it did last year with the unanimous and bipartisan resolutions concerning the
WCIT, an uncountable number of global policymakers pause to think. Time and again, I have been told by
international legislators, ministers, regulators and business leaders that last year’s resolutions had a positive effect on the outcome of the WCIT.
Although Internet freedom suffered as a result of the WCIT, many even more corrosive proposals did not become international law in part due to
your actions.20 IV. Conclusion. And so, I ask you in the strongest terms possible, to take action and take action now. Two years
Let us tell the world that
we will be resolute and stand strong for Internet freedom. All nations should join us. Thank you for having me appear before
hence, let us not look back at this moment and lament how we did not do enough. We have but one chance.
you today. I look forward to your questions.
Links
Fear  Nationalization
Fear of U.S. surveillance directly causes Internet nationalization.
WSJ, 6/27/2014. Steve Rosenbush, Editor. “The Morning Download: Nationalization of Internet Continues as Germany
Hangs Up on Verizon,” Wall Street Journal, http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2014/06/27/the-morning-download-nationalization-ofinternet-continues-as-germany-hangs-up-on-verizon/.
Good morning. The nationalization
of the Internet continues apace. The German government said on
Thursday it would end a contract with Verizon Communications Inc. because of concerns that the U.S.
National Security Agency had access to customer data maintained by U.S. telecommunications firms ,
the WSJ’s Anton Troianovski reports. Verizon has provided Internet access and other telecom services to government agencies in
Germany. Those contracts will be transferred to Deutsche Telekom AG by 2015, the Interior Ministry said.
As the WSJ reports, the move underscores the continuing political headaches for U.S. technology businesses
operating abroad, more than a year after former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden
started revealing the reach of America’s electronic surveillance programs and the alleged cooperation
with some U.S. firms.
Hurts Credibility
It’s specifically wrecked our global negotiating position on Internet freedom.
Adam Bender, 7/23/2013. “Has PRISM surveillance undermined Internet freedom advocates?” Computer World,
http://www.computerworld.com.au/article/521619/has_prism_surveillance_undermined_internet_freedom_advocates_/.
The US surveillance program PRISM has severely threatened the continued freedom of Internet advocates,
according to Internet Society (ISOC) regional bureau director for Asia-Pacific, Rajnesh Singh.
Recent reports have revealed the NSA, under a program called PRISM, is collecting metadata about US phone calls, which
includes information about a call—including time, duration and location—but not the content of the call itself. Also, the NSA is
collecting data on Internet traffic from major Internet companies including Google and Microsoft.
“What’s happened with PRISM and the fallout we’ve seen is probably the greatest threat we have seen
to the Internet in recent times,” Singh said at an ISOC-AU event last night in Sydney.
Singh, who said he was speaking for himself and not necessarily ISOC as a whole, claimed that the spying program
has undermined the positions of Internet advocates in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada
and Australia, which historically have been “bastions of Internet freedom”.
“What’s happened with PRISM is these four or five countries are suddenly the enemy within,” he said. “The
argument [for Internet freedom] doesn’t hold water any more and that’s really made work difficult
for us.”
At last year’s World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT) treaty talks, countries
including Russia, China and Iran made proposals to regulate Internet content that could have had “very
bad implications for the Internet going forward”, Singh said.
Many of the proposals were defeated through talks leading up to the treaty, he said. “But what happened of
course was that the countries at the forefront were Australia, US, UK [and] Canada.”
After news about PRISM broke, a delegate from another country who had supported the four countries in
walking out on the treaty told Singh that they now regretted the decision.
According to Singh, the delegate said, “My government is sorry that we didn’t sign the [WCIT treaty] because
now we realise what the real agenda was for the US and Australia and the UK and Canada. It wasn’t to
protect the Internet; it was to protect their own surveillance interests.”
Undermines our leverage for international negotiations --- countries turning to
Russia and China.
Megan Gates, 7/29/2014. “NSA's Actions Threaten U.S. Economy and Internet Security, New Report Suggests,” Security
Management, http://www.securitymanagement.com/news/nsas-actions-threaten-us-economy-and-internet-security-new-reportsuggests-0013601.
The report’s authors also suggested that the
NSA disclosures have “undermined American credibility” when
it comes to the Internet Freedom Agenda. In 2010, the United States began promoting a policy of an
open and free Internet, but the recent disclosures about the NSA have “led many to question the
legitimacy of these efforts in the past year.”
“Concrete evidence of U.S. surveillance hardened the positions of authoritarian governments pushing
for greater national control over the Internet and revived proposals from both Russia and Brazil for
multilateral management of technical standards and domain names, whether through the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) or other avenues,” according to the report. Many developing nations are
now declining to work with the United States and are instead embracing assistance from Russia,
China, and the ITU when it comes to Internet availability and control for their citizens.
Seriously harmed our leverage in international debates.
Danielle Kehl et al, July 2014. Policy Analyst at New America’s Open Technology Institute (OTI); Kevin Bankston is the
Policy Director at OTI; Robyn Greene is a Policy Counsel at OTI; and Robert Morgus is a Research Associate at OTI.
“Surveillance Costs: The NSA’s Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom & Cybersecurity,”
http://oti.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Surveilance_Costs_Final.pdf.
Mandatory data localization proposals are just one of a number of ways that foreign governments have reacted to NSA
surveillance in a manner that threatens U.S. foreign policy interests, particularly with regard to Internet
Freedom. There has been a quiet tension between how the U.S. approaches freedom of expression online
in its foreign policy and its domestic laws ever since Secretary of State Hillary Clinton effectively
launched the Internet Freedom agenda in January 2010. 170 But the NSA disclosures shined a bright spotlight on the
contradiction: the U.S. government promotes free expression abroad and aims to prevent repressive governments from
monitoring and censoring their citizens while simultaneously supporting domestic laws that authorize surveillance and bulk data
collection. As cybersecurity expert and Internet governance scholar Ron Deibert wrote a few days after the
first revelations: “There are unintended consequences of the NSA scandal that will undermine U.S.
foreign policy interests – in particular, the ‘Internet Freedom’ agenda espoused by the U.S. State Department and
its allies.” 171 Deibert accurately predicted that the news would trigger reactions from both policymakers and ordinary citizens
abroad, who would begin to question their dependence on American technologies and the hidden motivations behind the United
States’ promotion of Internet Freedom. In some countries, the scandal would be used as an excuse to revive
dormant debates about dropping American companies from official contracts, score political points at the
expense of the United States, and even justify local monitoring and surveillance. Deibert’s speculation has so far
proven quite prescient. As we will describe in this section, the ongoing revelations have done significant damage
to the credibility of the U.S. Internet Freedom agenda and further jeopardized the United States’
position in the global Internet governance debates.
Surveillance Hurts Local Efforts
NSA surveillance also crushed the leverage of international civil society groups --prevents them from lobbying their governments for open Internet.
Danielle Kehl et al, July 2014. Policy Analyst at New America’s Open Technology Institute (OTI); Kevin Bankston is the
Policy Director at OTI; Robyn Greene is a Policy Counsel at OTI; and Robert Morgus is a Research Associate at OTI.
“Surveillance Costs: The NSA’s Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom & Cybersecurity,”
http://oti.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Surveilance_Costs_Final.pdf.
The effects of the NSA disclosures on the Internet Freedom agenda go beyond the realm of Internet
governance. The loss of the United States as a model on Internet Freedom issues has made it harder for
local civil society groups around the world—including the groups that the State Department’s Internet Freedom
programs typically support 203 —to advocate for Internet Freedom within their own governments. 204 The
Committee to Protect Journalists, for example, reports that in Pakistan, “where freedom of expression is largely perceived as a
Western notion, the Snowden revelations have had a damaging effect. The deeply polarized narrative has become starker as the
corridors of power push back on attempts to curb government surveillance.” 205 For some of these groups, in fact, even
the appearance of collaboration with or support from the U.S. government can diminish credibility,
making it harder for them to achieve local goals that align with U.S. foreign policy interests. 206 The gap in
trust is particularly significant for individuals and organizations that receive funding from the U.S. government for free
expression activities or circumvention tools. Technology supported by or exported from the United States is, in some cases,
inherently suspect due to the revelations about the NSA’s surveillance dragnet and the agency’s attempts to covertly influence
product development. Moreover, revelations of what the NSA has been doing in the past decade are eroding
the moral high ground that the United States has often relied upon when putting public pressure on
authoritarian countries like China, Russia, and Iran to change their behavior. In 2014, Reporters Without
Borders added the United States to its “Enemies of the Internet” list for the first time, explicitly linking
the inclusion to NSA surveillance. “The main player in [the United States’] vast surveillance operation is the highly
secretive National Security Agency (NSA) which, in the light of Snowden’s revelations, has come to symbolize the abuses by the
world’s intelligence agencies,” noted the 2014 report. 207 The damaged perception of the United States 208 as a
leader on Internet Freedom and its diminished ability to legitimately criticize other countries for
censorship and surveillance opens the door for foreign leaders to justify—and even expand— their
own efforts. 209 For example, the Egyptian government recently announced plans to monitor social media for potential
terrorist activity, prompting backlash from a number of advocates for free expression and privacy. 210 When a spokesman for the
Egyptian Interior Ministry, Abdel Fatah Uthman, appeared on television to explain the policy, one justification that he offered in
response to privacy concerns was that “the US listens in to phone calls, and supervises anyone who could threaten its national
security.” 211 This type of rhetoric makes it difficult for the U.S. to effectively criticize such a policy. Similarly, India’s
comparatively mild response to allegations of NSA surveillance have been seen by some critics “as a reflection of India’s own
aspirations in the world of surveillance,” a further indication that U.S. spying may now make it easier for foreign governments to
quietly defend their own behavior. 212 It is even more difficult for the United States to credibly indict Chinese hackers for
breaking into U.S. government and commercial targets without fear of retribution in light of the NSA revelations. 213 These
challenges reflect an overall decline in U.S. soft power on free expression issues.
Reversible
It is reversible
Gelb, 10
(Prof-Business & Economic-UH, “Getting Digital Statecraft Right,” Foreign Affairs, 7/28,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66502/betsy-gelb-and-emmanuel-yujuico/getting-digital-statecraftright)
All these cases share the same fallacy -- that U.S.-directed methods can spur development in other
nations. But U.S. policies seeking to extend freedom through technology can be successful -- if the United
States refrains from acting in ways that seem less than sincere, and if it adopts a gradual, rather than
transformative, approach. U.S. protests against censorship would seem more convincing if it were
not for its own policies restricting Internet freedom. Consider, for example, the United States'
questionable prohibition of cross-border trade in Internet gambling. In 2004, the World Trade
Organization ruled in favor of Antigua and Barbuda against the United States when the United States
banned online gambling services emanating from the twin-island nation. The United States appealed the
case and lost, but in the meantime, Antigua's online gambling industry was virtually destroyed. The
United States still has not yet satisfactorily resolved this ruling and should do so by conforming to it.
NSA Link
Pressure to nationalize is coming & real – NSA fears are driving it
Goldstein, Writer for the Atlantic, 2014
[Gordon M. Goldstein, The End of the Internet?,
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/07/the-end-of-the-internet/372301/]
If the long history of international commerce tells us anything, it is this: free trade is neither a natural nor
an inevitable condition. Typically, trade has flourished when a single, dominant country has provided the
security and will to sustain it. In the absence of a strong liberal ethos, promoted and enforced by a global leader,
states seem drawn, as if by some spell, toward a variety of machinations (tariffs, quotas, arcane product requirements)
that provide immediate advantages to a few domestic companies or industries—and that lead to collective
immiseration over time.
The U.S. has played a special role in the development of the Internet. The Department of Defense fostered ARPANET,
the precursor to the Internet. As the network evolved, American companies were quick to exploit its growth, gaining a first-mover advantage that
has in many cases grown into global dominance. A vast proportion of the world’s Web traffic passes through American
servers.
Laura DeNardis, a scholar of Internet governance at American University, argues that the Internet’s character is inherently commercial and
private today. “The Internet is a collection of independent systems,” she writes, “operated by mostly private companies,” including large
telecommunications providers like AT&T and giant content companies such as Google and Facebook. All of these players make the Internet
function through private economic agreements governing the transmission of data among their respective networks. While the U.S.
government plays a role—the world’s central repository for domain names, for instance, is a private nonprofit organization created at the
United States’ urging in 1998, and operating under a contract administered by the Department of Commerce—it has applied a light
touch. And why wouldn’t it? The Web’s growth has been broadly congenial to American interests, and a
large boon to the American economy.
That brings us to Edward Snowden and the U.S. National Security Agency. Snowden’s disclosures of the NSA’s surveillance of
international Web traffic have provoked worldwide outrage and a growing counterreaction. Brazil and the European Union recently announced
plans to lay a $185 million undersea fiber-optic communications cable between them to thwart U.S. surveillance. In February, German
Chancellor Angela Merkel called for the European Union to create its own regional Internet, walled off from the United States. “We’ll talk to
France about how we can maintain a high level of data protection,” Merkel said. “Above all, we’ll talk about European providers that offer
security for our citizens, so that one shouldn’t have to send e-mails and other information across the Atlantic.”
Merkel’s exploration of a closed, pan-European cloud-computing network is simply the latest example of what the analyst Daniel Castro of the
Information Technology and Innovation Foundation calls “data nationalism,” a phenomenon gathering momentum whereby countries require that
certain types of information be stored on servers within a state’s physical borders. The nations that have already implemented a patchwork of
data-localization requirements range from Australia, France, South Korea, and India to Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, and Vietnam, according
to Anupam Chander and Uyen P. Le, two legal scholars at the University of California at Davis. “Anxieties over surveillance … are justifying
governmental measures that break apart the World Wide Web,” they wrote in a recent white paper. As a result, “the era of a global Internet may
be passing.”
Security concerns have catalyzed data-nationalization efforts , yet Castro, Chander, and Le all question the benefits,
arguing that the security of data depends not on their location but on the sophistication of the defenses built around them. Another motive appears
to be in play: the Web’s fragmentation would enable local Internet businesses in France or Malaysia to carve out
roles for themselves, at the expense of globally dominant companies, based disproportionately in the United States.
Castro estimates that the U.S. cloud-computing industry alone could lose $22 billion to $35 billion in revenue by 2016.
The Snowden affair has brought to a boil geopolitical tensions that were already simmering. Autocracies,
of course, have long regulated the flow of Internet data, with China being the most famous example . But today
such states are being joined by countries across Asia, the Middle East, and Europe in calling for dramatic changes in the way the Web operates,
even beyond the question of where data are stored.
NSA fears spur internet balkanization efforts – fear the U.S.
Ray, Security Analyst at 21CT, 2014
[Tim ray, The Balkanization of the Internet, http://www.21ct.com/blog/the-revolution-will-not-betweeted-the-balkanization-of-the-internet-part-2/]
NSA SURVEILLANCE STIRS THE POT (AND PROVIDES COVER)
While countries are struggling with their own versions of this scenario and with how
to spin this frightening picture of the
new Balkanized Internet, they were handed a great gift: Edward Snowden’s tales of NSA’s global
surveillance operations.
Suddenly, there’s a common enemy: America. Globally adventurous, the Americans (it seems) are also watching everyone they
can, sometimes without permission. Snowden’s revelations alone will not be enough to force through the kinds of national controls we’re
talking about, but they are a great start, a unifying force.
Sound farfetched? Maybe. Are there other answers? Perhaps. Brazil is moving forward with nationalizing its email
services as well as plans to store all data within the country’s borders. The idea there is the same as the example above:
take essential services in-country in order to prevent the U.S. from spying on them and (as a side effect)
control them too. These proposals seem to be receiving some popular support; many see it as akin to
nationalizing their oil, or another resource. Taking local control of formerly global services is the
beginning of Balkanization for countries that choose that path.
Surveillance Fears
Surveillance fears drive nationalized internets
NPR 10 – 16 – 13
[Are We Moving To A World With More Online Surveillance?,
http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2013/10/16/232181204/are-we-moving-to-a-world-with-moreonline-surveillance]
Suspicion Of American Surveillance
But McLaughlin sees that record now in jeopardy.
"We've kind of blown it," he says. "The global
fear and suspicion about American surveillance is pushing countries
to centralize their [Internet] infrastructures and get the U.S. out of the picture. Ultimately, I think that will have negative
consequences for free speech as well as for protection of privacy."
Some of the countries pushing for more international control over the Internet were
never all that supportive of Internet
freedom, like Russia and China. But they've now been joined by countries like Brazil, whose president, Dilma
Rousseff, was furious when she read reports that she was herself an NSA target.
Speaking at the United Nations last month, Rousseff called for a new "multilateral framework" for Internet governance and new measures "to
ensure the effective protection of data that travel through the Web."
At home, Rousseff has suggested that Brazil partially disconnect from U.S.-based parts of the Internet and take
steps to keep Brazilians' online data stored in Brazil, supposedly out of the NSA's reach.
But Schneier says such moves would lead to "increased Balkanization" of the Internet.
PRISM link
PRISM revelations crushed our credibility on Internet freedom. We’re perceived
like the CCP even if our Internet is actually still relatively free.
Abraham Riesman, 6/7/2013. Journalist and documentary filmmaker living in Manhattan. “Renowned Rights Watchdog to
Downgrade United States in Freedom Rankings,” Slate, Future Tense,
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/06/07/prism_hurts_us_internet_freedom_rankings_freedom_house_to_downgrade
_america.html.
If you thought the astounding (and ongoing) revelations about the NSA’s PRISM regime were going to hurt
America’s reputation, it appears you were right. Freedom House just made it official.
In an exclusive statement to Future Tense, the internationally renowned rights watchdog said it’s going to downgrade the U.S. in
its annual Internet freedom rankings.
“The revelation of this program will weaken the United States’ score on the survey,” the organization told me in an email.
The project director for Freedom House’s Freedom on the Net initiative, Sanja Tatic Kelly, elaborated further in another email
(emphasis added):
“[S]ome of the recent revelations were already known to the internet freedom community, albeit perhaps
not the full scope of them. Consequently, the United States already has a pretty poor rating on our
methodology when it comes to surveillance issues. However, with this week's revelations, as well as the
recently uncovered surveillance of AP journalists, that rating is going to drop even further.”
Kelly went on to emphasize that, compared with other countries around the world, the U.S. “does still have pretty well
functioning political institutions and free press.” However, she added that PRISM poses “unique” challenges to
freedom. In her words:
“What makes the situation in the U.S. unique, however, is that our government is more technologically
sophisticated than most others and many major internet companies are based in the United States,
allowing the government to conduct surveillance of much greater magnitude.”
The official Freedom House statement made a point of saying America’s online freedom ranking probably won’t plummet,
noting, “the effect will likely be fairly modest, as the current score takes into consideration what was already known about the
government’s extensive electronic surveillance activities.”
As of September, Freedom House listed the United States as the second-most “free” country in terms of Internet freedoms (within
a 47-country sample), outranked only by Estonia. The rankings were based on three general criteria: “Obstacles to Access” (e.g.
keeping citizens from being able to access computers or specific applications), “Limits on Content” (e.g. blocking, censoring, or
altering online content), and “Violations of User Rights” (e.g. surveillance or jailing of online dissidents). The PRISM revelations
have nothing to do with the first two criteria, but definitely deal a huge blow on the third.
The Obama administration is already being compared to the Chinese Communist Party—arguably
the world’s most infamous limiter of online freedoms. No doubt, PRISM makes the U.S. government (as
well as the government of the U.K., which seems to have been in on the action) look like an opponent of the open
Web, snooping through files and communications. But as massive as this digital espionage effort is, can we really call the U.S.
an “Enemy of the Internet,” to use the terminology of Reporters Without Borders?
Not exactly—but PRISM does to an extent resemble the surveillance programs
of Internet enemies like
China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia. What’s new here is that we can even mention America in the same
sentence as those countries now, when it comes to online freedom—something that was almost unthinkable just a
few days ago.
For some perspective, let’s take a look at how the U.S. government now stacks up against some of the world’s best-known online
oppressors (Note: in an attempt to avoid too many apples-and-oranges comparisons, I’ve tried to focus mostly on countries with
high Internet penetration and a substantial middle class):
China: One big similarity here: the relationship between the central government and private companies. Chinese netizens live in
the shadow of restrictions that are collectively referred to as the “Great Firewall of China.” As of 2010, a law has been in
place that requires all telecom operators and Internet service providers to take orders from the government during investigations
about the leaking of state secrets. PRISM appears to have functioned largely via some level of cooperation from major online
firms like Microsoft, Google, Facebook, and Apple (though many of them have issued official denials of involvement). If you’re
online in China, unless you use a VPN or some other kind of workaround, there is an extremely high chance that you’re being
tracked. If PRISM is as widespread as is alleged, that could very easily be true here, too.
Of course, China’s online repression is far more extreme than America’s on almost every other count (if we jailed bloggers here
like the CCP does there, Glenn Greenwald would be serving hard time, not getting on the front page of theGuardian). And the
U.S. doesn’t appear to have been looking for anything beyond national-security information, as opposed to touchy political
speech. But the combination of a huge Internet user base and cooperation between corporations and the government to spy on
that user base—well, that seems a little too familiar now.
Russia: It’s actually possible that Russian netizens are under less surveillance than we are here in the United States. Despite its
best efforts, the Russian government doesn’t appear to have any coherent infrastructure for massive surveillance. ISPs are
required to install software that allows the police to monitor Internet traffic, but there have been no reported uses of the software.
Government technology to find and flag “extremist” sites has been faulty and remains unimplemented. Legislation passed in
2007 gave the government permission to intercept online data without a warrant, but actual use of that law has largely been
absent in major population centers like Moscow and St. Petersburg.
That doesn’t mean Russia doesn’t attack online freedoms, of course. Bloggers are regularly intimidated, the state demands that
ISPs provide user data for dissidents, and so on. But what’s interesting to see here is that the U.S. appears to have a surveillance
system that is so streamlined and efficient as to be the stuff of dreams for the Putin regime.
Iran: Luckily, PRISM doesn't get anywhere near the aggressive attacks on user rights that Iranian netizens face. That said, Iran
has a relatively high Internet usership for the Middle East—users just can't surf freely. The mullahs make no secret of their
contempt for free speech, enforcing laws against any material opposing state interests or Islam. Surveillance is widespread, too:
The regime reportedly keeps connection speeds deliberately low, so as to make it easier to monitor and filter content. Indeed, Iran
is in the process of completing a so-called "clean Internet"—a self-contained, state-controlled intranet that will be used as an
alternative to the Internet. We're still a far way off from anything like that.
Bahrain: The U.S. doesn’t go nearly as far as this tumultuous monarchy, but it has a similar philosophy of keeping its fingers in
as many online pies as possible. Bahrain’s Internet usership is possibly the highest of any Arab state, but virtually no user is safe
from the government’s watchful eye. As Reporters Without Borders puts it, “The royal family is represented in all areas of
Internet management and has sophisticated tools at its disposal for spying on its subjects.” Not only that, but the government
makes no secret of its iron fist: It regularly hacks dissidents’ Twitter and Facebook accounts, demands online passwords during
interrogations, and uses malware to trawl every corner of the Bahraini Web. America is nowhere near that, thank goodness.
South Korea: User liberties are severely curtailed in this otherwise pretty liberal democracy, but not through a PRISM-like
surveillance regime. Instead, the government in Seoul keeps tabs on netizens through what's known as Resident Registration
Numbers. They're serial numbers assigned to every citizen born in Korea, and users are required to use them while using almost
all online services. They're not spied upon, per se, but if someone does something Seoul doesn't like, he or she can face arrests,
raids, or other unpleasantness. (See the case of Park Jung-geun, indicted for retweeting the official North Korean Twitter
account.) We don't have anything resembling RNNs in the U.S.
North Korea: Even the most paranoid civil libertarian can take some comfort in knowing we're light years away from the Hermit
Kingdom. We may be under watch, but at least we have the Internet, instead of a weird national intranet filled withsanitized
information and happy-birthday messages.
So the U.S. is still one of the freer places to be an Internet user. But we’re apparently much closer to these
authoritarian states than many of us had imagined—and the scary thing is, we’re really good at what we do. Our
days as a respected beacon of near-total online liberty are probably at an end.
Impacts
Cyber Terror Likely
Cyberwar likely & will be huge – civilians are fair ground
KESAN & HAYES 12 * Professor, H. Ross & Helen Workman Research Scholar,
and Director of the Program in Intellectual Property & Technology Law, University
of Illinois College of Law. ** Research Fellow, University of Illinois College of Law
[Jay P. Kesan* and Carol M. Hayes**, MITIGATIVE COUNTERSTRIKING: SELF-DEFENSE AND
DETERRENCE IN CYBERSPACE, Spring, 2012, Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, 25 Harv. J.
Law & Tec 415]
Many academics and political figures have weighed in on the potential for cyberwarfare. Nikolai Kuryanovich, a Russian politician, wrote in
2006 he expects that in the near future many conflicts will take place in cyberspace instead of traditional war environments. n171 [*443] Some
commentators have asserted that cyberspace provides potential asymmetric advantages, which may be utilized by
less powerful nations to exploit the reliance of the United States on information infrastructure. n172
Specifically, China recognizes the value of cyberwarfare, n173 and its military includes "information warfare units." n174
Meanwhile, Russia has a cyberwarfare doctrine that views cyberattacks as force multipliers, and North Korea's Unit 121 focuses solely on
cyberwarfare. n175 Many suspect that the Russian government conducted the cyberattacks against Estonia,
Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan, though the Russian government's involvement has not been proven. n176 Estimates suggest there are
currently 140 nations that either have or are developing cyberwarfare capabilities. n177
It is fair to say that preparations are underway to make cyberwarfare a
viable alternative to physical warfare, and
are recognizing the applicability of the laws of war to the cyber context. n178 The effects of
these changes on the private sector cannot be ignored. The line between the government and the private sector on
cyberwar matters is blurred. Dycus notes that the federal government has at times delegated to private companies the task of operating
that policymakers
cyber technology for the purpose of collecting and analyzing intelligence. n179 Because of the degree to which the private sector is involved with
cyber infrastructure, many commentators have observed that the private sector will likely be heavily implicated by future cyberwars. n180
[*444] This overlap between civilian and military roles may prove problematic. Some commentators express concerns that
cyberwarfare may erode the distinction between combatants and noncombatants under international law, which currently protects noncombatants.
n181 The degree to which conventional war doctrine applies to cyberwar is not yet clear. Some commentators argue that because of this
uncertainty, aggressive countries may have carte blanche to launch cyberattacks against civilian targets in
a manner that would be impermissible under the laws of kinetic war. n182 Given the importance of civilian targets in
the cyberwar context, Brenner and Clarke suggest using a form of conscription to create a Cyberwar National Guard consisting of technologically
savvy citizens to better protect CNI. n183 Indeed, one of the focuses of any national cybersecurity program should be on protecting CNI -- the
topic to which we now turn.
Cyber Terror Kills the Economy
Cyber threat could collapse the financial system
Holmes, former assistant secretary of state & distinguished fellow at the Heritage
Foundation, 2013
[Kim R. Holmes, Washington Times, April 17, 2013,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/apr/17/holmes-staying-one-step-ahead-of-cyberattacks/]
The threats to America’s cybersecurity are serious and growing. They range from private hackers of
individuals to state-sponsored cyberattacks on companies and government agencies and networks.
Cyberthreats endanger the entire American financial and security system , including the flow of money
in banks and the electrical grid. The federal government already has experienced at least 65 cybersecurity
breaches and failures.
Collapses US economic growth – major attack on infrastructure
OPDERBECK 12 Professor of Law, Seton Hall University Law School [David W.
Opderbeck, Cybersecurity and Executive Power, Washington University Law Review, 89 Wash. U. L.
Rev. 795]
In fact, cyberspace was in many ways the front line of the Egyptian revolution. Although Mubarak apparently lacked the support among the
Egyptian military for sustained attacks on civilians, he waged a desperate last-gasp battle to shut down access to the Internet so that organizers
could not effectively communicate with each other, the public, or the outside world. n5
Could a similar battle over cyberspace be waged in developed democracies, such as the United States? Policymakers in the West are
justifiably concerned about cyberattacks, cyberterrorism, and the possibility of cyberwar . The raging question is
whether a democratic state governed by constitutional principles and committed to free speech and private property rights can promote
cybersecurity without destroying the Internet's unique capacity to foster civil liberties.
Cyberspace is as vulnerable as it is vital. The threat is real. President Obama recently declared that "cyber
threat is one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face as a nation" and that
" America's economic prosperity in the 21st century will depend on cybersecurity ." n6 Cybersecurity has been
described as "a major national security problem for the United States." n7 Private and public cyber-infrastructure in the United States falls under
nearly constant attack, often from shadowy sources connected to terrorist groups, organized crime syndicates, or foreign governments. n8 These
attacks bear the potential to disrupt not only e-mail and other online communications networks, but also the national
energy grid, military-defense ground and satellite facilities, transportation systems, financial markets, and
other essential [*798] facilities. n9 In short, a substantial cyberattack could take down the nation's entire
security and economic infrastructure. n10
U.S. policymakers are justifiably concerned by this threat. Existing U.S. law is not equipped to handle the
problem. The United States currently relies on a patchwork of laws and regulations designed primarily to address the "computer crime" of a
decade ago, as well as controversial antiterrorism legislation passed after the September 11 attacks, and some general (and equally controversial)
principles of executive power in times of emergency.
Nationalization Avoids Attacks
Russia wants control for national security purposes – avoids attacks
Moscow Times 10 – 23 – 14
[Alexey Eremenko, Russia Wants State Control of Root Internet Infrastructure,
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russia-wants-state-control-of-root-internetinfrastructure/509989.html]
Russia has mounted an effort in recent weeks to bring the root infrastructure of the Internet under control of
state-affiliated bureaucracies, both internationally and at home.
The global push is likely to fizzle out, industry experts said — but at home, the plan has every chance of succeeding.
Backers of the Kremlin line say bigger state control of the Internet is mandatory for national security , hinting that the
U.S. could disconnect Russia from the Web.
But critics say that Russia, which already censors the Internet, simply wants to expand its means of political censorship.
"Russia wants state control of the global network … instead of public control," said Artem Kozlyuk, a freedom of information activist with
Rublacklist.net, an independent Internet freedom watchdog.
The latest wave-generating proposal came from Russian Communications and Mass Media Minister Nikolai Nikiforov, who urged the launch of a
reform at the United Nations to give control of the Internet to national governments.
The move would prevent deliberate disconnections of national segments of the Internet, Nikiforov said earlier
this week in South Korea at a session of the International Telecommunications Union, a UN body.
He identified the United States as a possible threat to other nations' Internet access, according to a transcript on the
ministry's website.
Government Domain
Nikiforov's proposal comes hot on the heels of the Kremlin's attempt to take over the domestic system of domain name assignment, currently
overseen by the non-profit organization Coordination Center for TLD RU.
The government wants the Coordination Center's job transferred to a state agency, several prominent media outlets, including business daily
Vedomosti, said last month.
The issue was discussed at the now-famous Security Council meeting of Oct. 1, when top Russian officials reportedly gathered to discuss the
possibility of Russia's disconnection from the Internet.
Nikiforov said last month that it was only contingency planning in case Russia's Western opponents pull the plug, possibly as further sanctions
for Moscow's annexation of Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula in March.
However, Kozlyuk of Rublacklist.net said that so far, most cases of a country going off the grid were the work of domestic governments trying to
suppress dissent, such as — most famously — Egypt in 2011 during the Arab Spring.
The proposal for a takeover of the Coordination Center has been stalled, but the government could follow through with it at any time simply by
pushing the group to amend its charter to recognize state superiority, said Ilya Massukh, head of the state-affiliated Information Democracy
Foundation.
ICANN vs. Autocrats
The key role in managing the global Internet is currently played by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which
oversees domain name assignment throughout the world.
ICANN is a California-based non-profit organization that operates under an agreement with the U.S. Department of Commerce.
The U.S. role in Internet policing has caused much grumbling in recent years as the Internet has spread
across the globe, and prompted calls to move to a so-called "multi-stakeholder governance model" that
would give other players a greater say in managing the World Wide Web.
Russia had previously staged a campaign to give root control of the Internet to the UN at an earlier International Telecommunications Union
conference in Dubai in 2012.
Its proposal gathered a handful of backers at the time — mostly authoritarian countries such as China, Iran, Sudan and Saudi Arabia — but was
torpedoed by Western powers.
But this time, China withdrew its support, which makes Nikiforov's initiative even less likely to succeed, said Karen Kazaryan, chief analyst for
the lobby group the Russian Association of Electronic Communications.
"China has a working censorship system, and it is not going to antagonize the world, and the other backers don't have enough geopolitical clout to
push it through," Kazaryan said by telephone Wednesday.
Kozlyuk of Rublacklist.net claimed that Russia was courting European Parliament members for lobbying support. The claim could not be
independently verified.
RuNet Regulated
President Vladimir Putin famously pledged to leave the Internet alone at a meeting with industry representatives at his ascension to the Kremlin
in 2000.
Free from state intervention, the Russian segment of the Internet — the RuNet — blossomed, now counting 58 million daily users in Russia,
according to the state-run Public Opinion Foundation, and spawning highly successful companies such as Yandex and Mail.ru.
But things began to change in late 2011, when Russian netizens, many of them educated young urbanites, became the driving force of record antiPutin protests.
Since then, the government has been so busy imposing new regulations that it is now routinely accused of building the "Great Russian Firewall"
of censorship.
The state now has the power to blacklist websites without court order for a variety of reasons, including political ones.
Separate legislation ramps up state control over popular blogs and online news aggregators, making it easier to shut down any of them.
And another Kremlin-penned law under review in the State Duma would oblige most organizations handling the personal data of Russians —
including the likes of Facebook, Twitter and Booking.com — to store them solely on Russia-based servers, easily accessible to secret services.
Bureaucrats and Utopias
Russia is not unique in its push to give control of the Internet to traditional bureaucratic structures, said Massukh, a former deputy
communications minister.
The Internet is finally big enough for governments to take it seriously and consider possible online threats
to national security, such as disruption of domestic banking systems, Massukh said.
He compared the push for state control of national segments of the Internet to the introduction of country
calling codes, each of which is unique and sovereign to a specific country.
Gov’t Control Prevents Attacks
Government control over the internet key to prevent and mitigate cyber disasters
Baldor, AP writer, 09
[Lolita C. Baldor, How much government control in cybercrisis?,
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/33038143/ns/technology_and_science-security/t/how-much-governmentcontrol-cybercrisis/#.VWXbAvlViko]
There's no kill switch for the Internet, no secret on-off button in an Oval Office drawer.
Yet when a Senate committee was exploring ways to secure computer networks, a provision to give the president the power to shut down Internet
traffic to compromised Web sites in an emergency set off alarms.
Corporate leaders and privacy advocates quickly objected, saying the government must not seize control of the Internet.
Lawmakers dropped it, but the debate rages on. How much control should federal authorities have over the Web in a
crisis? How much should be left to the private sector? It does own and operate at least 80 percent of the Internet and argues it can do a better
job.
"We
need to prepare for that digital disaster," said Melissa Hathaway, the former White House cybersecurity
adviser. "We need a system to identify, isolate and respond to cyberattacks at the speed of light."
So far at least 18 bills have been introduced as Congress works carefully to give federal authorities the power to
protect the country in the event of a massive cyberattack. Lawmakers do not want to violate personal and corporate privacy
or squelching innovation. All involved acknowledge it isn't going to be easy.
For most people, the Internet is a public haven for free thought and enterprise. Over
time it has become the electronic
control panel for much of the world's critical infrastructure. Computer networks today hold government
secrets, military weapons specifications, sensitive corporate data, and vast amounts of personal
information.
Millions of times a day, hackers, cybercriminals and mercenaries working for governments and private entities are scanning those networks,
looking to defraud, disrupt or even destroy.
Just eight years ago, the government ordered planes from the sky in the hours after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.
Could or should the president have the same power over the Internet in a digital disaster?
If hackers take over a nuclear plant's control system, should the president order the computer networks
shut down? If there's a terrorist attack, should the government knock users off other computer networks to ensure that critical systems stay
online? And should the government be able to dictate who companies can hire and what they must do to secure the networks that affect
Americans' daily life.
Answer To – “internet good”
Nationalization doesn’t “end the Internet.”
Gordon M. Goldstein, 6/25/2014. Served as a member of the American delegation to the World Conference on
International Telecommunications. “The End of the Internet?” The Atlantic,
http://m.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/07/the-end-of-the-internet/372301/.
Some experts anticipate a future with a Brazilian Internet, a European Internet, an Iranian Internet, an
Egyptian Internet—all with different content regulations and trade rules, and perhaps with contrasting standards and
operational protocols. Eli Noam, a professor of economics and finance at Columbia Business School, believes
that such a progressive fracturing of the global Internet is inevitable. “We must get used to the idea that
the standardised internet is the past but not the future,” he wrote last fall. “And that the future is a federated
internet, not a uniform one.” Noam thinks that can be managed, in part through the development of new
intermediary technologies that would essentially allow the different Internets to talk to each other, and
allow users to navigate the different legal and regulatory environments.
Chinese Control Good
Chinese control key to security
CNN 12 – 30 – 14
[The Great Firewall of China is nearly complete, http://money.cnn.com/2014/12/30/technology/chinainternet-firewall-google/]
For U.S. companies hoping to do business in the world's second largest economy, Beijing's approach presents a series of tough choices.
Companies that resist Beijing's censorship -- as Google has done -- are often punished as a result. Of major U.S. social media platforms, only
LinkedIn (LNKD, Tech30) has been allowed to operate in China -- and only after it agreed to block content. For example, it took down posts
earlier this year related to the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown.
China is unlikely to ease its restrictions in the near-term. Beijing often describes what is known colloquially as the "Great
Firewall" as a critical national security tool.
"I can choose who will be a guest in my home," China's top Internet regulator Lu Wei said earlier this year.
The nationalist-leaning Global Times offered the security justification in an editorial published Tuesday.
"If the China side indeed blocked Gmail, the decision must have been prompted by newly emerged
security reasons," the paper said. "If that is the case, Gmail users need to accept the reality of Gmail being
suspended in China."
Russian Control Good
Russia is nationalizing to control in the case of emergency
New York Times 10 – 1 – 14
[Putin Supports Project to ‘Secure’ Russia Internet,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/02/world/europe/russia-vladimir-putin-internet.html?_r=0]
President Vladimir V. Putin
appeared on Wednesday to throw his support behind a plan to isolate the Internet in
Russia from the rest of the World Wide Web, but said the Russian government was “not even considering” censoring Internet
sites.
In a speech to the Russian National Security Council, Mr. Putin
said the plan was intended to build a backup system to
keep websites in the Russian domains — those ending in .ru and .rf — online in a national emergency.
Mr. Putin said other countries had taken to using the Internet “for not only economic, but military and political goals” and said
information security was a priority for the country.
The Russian news media has labeled the plan, some details of which were reported last month by Vedomosti, a Russian daily, a “kill switch” for
the Internet, or Russia’s answer to the “Great Firewall” put up by the Chinese.
President Vladimir V. Putin has moved to prop up Bank Rossiya, owned by close friends, in the face of Western sanctions.Putin’s Way: Private
Bank Fuels Fortunes of Putin’s Inner CircleSEPT. 27, 2014
“It’s important to secure the Russian segment of the Internet,” Mr. Putin said, according to a transcript posted on the Kremlin website. “We do
not intend to limit access to the Internet, to put it under total control, to nationalize the Internet.
“We need to greatly improve the security of domestic communications networks and information
resources, primarily those used by state structures,” he added.
The Russian goals appear for now distinct from those of the Chinese, experts on Internet policy say, and inspired partly by a revelation this
summer in Wired magazine by the former National Security Agency contractor Edward J. Snowden, who lives in Moscow, that United States
government hackers inadvertently crashed the Syrian web in 2012.
Russia has recently promulgated policies to censor the Internet through laws banning extremist content
and requiring social networking and financial companies to base their data servers in Russia. The goal of the
new system, however, appears not to block foreign content, but rather to keep Russia’s own news and
information machine online in times of crisis.
Oleg Demidov, an authority on Russian Internet policies at the PIR center in Moscow, said that Russia wanted to create a “double channel” for
the Internet. The backup channel would of course be under government control.
“In normal times, it would work like it does now,” he said of this Russian vision of the Internet. “But in an emergency, the reserve system would
come alive.”
Nationalized internet is a fight between the US and Russia
Daily Mail 6 – 22 – 12
[Eddie Wrenn, The battle for internet freedom: Russia tells U.N. during secret talks that it wants to be
able to censor the web to repress political opposition, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article2163165/The-battle-internet-freedom-Russia-tells-U-N-wants-able-censor-web-repress-politicalopposition.html]
Russia wants the ability to censor the internet - but the U.S. plans to stonewall the plans at a U.N. conference
later this year.
Russia says it wants the right to block access where it is used for 'interfering in the internal affairs , or
undermining the sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and public safety of other states, or to divulge
information of a sensitive nature'.
The member nations of the United Nations will gather this December to create a treaty for the World Conference on International
Telecommunications - and Russia has already made it clear which way it wants the internet to develop.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has long called for a centralised control of the internet .
The U.S. delegation has vowed to block any proposals from Russia and other countries that they believe threaten the
internet's current governing structure or give tacit approval to online censorship.
But those assurances have failed to ease fears that bureaucratic tinkering with the treaty could damage the world's most powerful engine for
exchanging information, creating jobs and even launching revolutions.
Examples of where the internet has acted as a voice for change include when social networks played a key role in the Arab Spring uprisings that
last year upended regimes in Egypt and Tunisia.
The wording of Russia's provision for the treaty allow a country to repress political opposition while citing a U.N. treaty as the basis for doing so.
Fixes Privacy Issues – Facebook
Nationalizing fixes the problems with facebook – solves privacy concerns
Howard, professor of communication, information, and international studies at the
University of Washington, 2012
[Philip N. Howard, Let’s Nationalize Facebook,
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2012/08/facebook_should_be_nationalized_to_pro
tect_user_rights_.single.html]
Over the last several years, Facebook has become a public good and an important social resource. But as a company, it is
behaving
badly, and long term, that may cost it: A spring survey found that almost half of Americans believe that Facebook will eventually
fade away. Even the business side has been a bit of a disaster lately, with earnings lower than expected and the news that a significant portion of
Facebook profiles are fake. If neither users nor investors can be confident in the company, it’s time we start discussing an idea that
might seem crazy: nationalizing Facebook.
By “nationalizing Facebook,” I mean public ownership and at least a majority share at first. When nationalizing the company restores the public
trust, that controlling interest could be reduced. There are three very good reasons for this drastic step: It could fix the company’s
woeful privacy practices, allow the social network to fulfill its true potential for providing social good,
and force it to put its valuable data to work on significant social problems.
Let’s start with privacy. Right now, the company violates everybody’s privacy expectations, not to mention privacy laws. It also struggles to
respond properly to regulatory requests in different countries. In part, this is because its services are designed to meet the bare minimum of legal
expectations in each jurisdiction. When users in Europe request copies of the data Facebook keeps on them, they are sent huge volumes of
records. But not every user lives in a jurisdiction that requires such responsiveness from Facebook—U.S. users are out of luck because their
regulators don’t ask as many questions as those in the European Union and Canada. Privacy watchdogs consistently complain that the company
uses user data in ways they didn't agree to or anticipate. There are suspicions that the company creates shadow profiles of people who aren’t even
users but whose names get mentioned by people who are Facebook users.
Few of us fully understand Facebook’s privacy policy, much less keep track of changes. People are sharing more personal information on
Facebook than they think they are. And for every dozen Facebook users in the United States, one does not use privacy settings—either because
that person doesn’t care or doesn’t know enough about how the privacy settings can be used. True, Facebook recently provided an opportunity for
users to vote on changes to the interface. But the program seemed more like a gimmick designed to placate the most opinionated and tech-savvy
users: It was not heavily promoted and not a serious effort to educate the public and survey opinion. Indeed, few people voted.
It would be better to have a national privacy commissioner with real authority, some stringent privacy
standards set at the federal level, and programs for making good use of some of the socially valuable data
mining that firms like Facebook do. But in the United States, such sweeping innovations are probably too difficult to actually pull
off, and nationalization would almost get us there. Facebook would have to rise to First Amendment standards rather than their own terms of
service. The company could be regulated the way public utilities often are.
With 80 percent of market share, Facebook is already a monopoly, and being publicly traded hasn’t made it more
socially responsible. The map of its global market dominance is impressive, though some might say this is a map of colonization. In its
recent SEC filing, Facebook declared its goal of connecting all Internet users. The company actually wants to be public information
infrastructure, and to that end its tools have been used for a lot of good, like encouraging organ donations and helping activists build social
movements in countries run by tough dictators.
But Facebook can also make mistakes with political consequences. The company has come under fire for missteps like prohibiting photos of
women breast-feeding and suddenly banning “Palestinian” pages at one point. Facebook communications are an important tool for democracy
advocates, including those who helped organize the Arab Spring. Yet the user policy of requiring that democratic activists in authoritarian
regimes maintain “real” profiles puts activist leaders at risk. And dictators have figured out how they can use Facebook to monitor activist
networks and entrap democracy advocates.
But since the security services in Syria, Iran, and China now use Facebook to monitor and entrap activists,
public trust in Facebook may be misplaced. Rather than allow Facebook to serve authoritarian interests, if nationalized in
the United States, we could make Facebook change its identity policy to allow democracy activists living
in dictatorships to use pseudonyms.
Prevents Uprisings
Nationalizing the internet prevents populist uprisings
Ray, Security Analyst at 21CT, 2014
[Tim ray, The Balkanization of the Internet, http://www.21ct.com/blog/the-revolution-will-not-betweeted-the-balkanization-of-the-internet-part-2/]
The string of uprisings in Eastern Europe and Asia beginning in 2010 that came to be known as the Arab
Spring was a defining moment for social media. Suddenly Twitter was much more than a fad. It was a communication method
for the downtrodden. Anonymous service providers were the lifeblood of the movement. Tor-bridged connections were essential to the early
organization and success enjoyed by the youth of the Arab Spring.
This success caused government entities to take notice. Egypt, for instance, turned off their connections to the
Internet (as much as they could anyway). That lasted as long as business didn’t complain, then it was turned back on. Other regimes turned
frantically to their intelligence services and attempted to lure and honeypot the radical elements of society with varying degrees of success.
Mostly, they began to plan what to do against future eventualities.
As a leader in one of these tumultuous nations what would you do? Without getting into the moral or ethical questions involved (it’s enough to
ask the technical questions for now) let’s role-play for a bit. You’re Minister in charge of the Information Directorate in an
emerging economic nation. Your country has weathered a popular uprising, and some changes were
made, promises of elections, and so forth. The radical elements are appeased enough (for now), but it would only take one charismatic
firebrand to boil it over again. You need to allow your country’s economy to grow, keeping your population employed (and thus off the streets)
while at the same time keeping an eye on the fringe elements of your world, who are even now planning their next wave of protests. It’s a tough
problem, and it’s a life or death one in some parts of the world.
You grudgingly admit that you need to give the people access to the Internet. It’s the single largest facilitator of small business and innovation for
your growing economy. The people also expect privacy. Yet, at the same time, privacy is where the radicals hide. They use encryption tech to
keep plans secret, and your intelligence resources can’t keep up. You need to bring all essential Internet services ‘in house’ somehow.
Your best course of action is to force all your Internet traffic through one choke point, and watch that very
carefully. Make sure you have good pipes to your major trading partners, and make sure you can man-in-themiddle all encrypted traffic. That means no more private security certs; the State holds them all. It will likely mean ID coded
transmission of information, where a user’s ID is appended to everything they do online. This would essentially eliminate the possibility of
maintaining anonymity (and thus privacy) online and hiding activity from the State.
So your ministerial proposal looks pretty good:
Nationalize your citizens’ data, (which looks good to the populace as we’re seeing with Brazil’s efforts describe below)
A single firewall for your country for efficient monitoring of Internet traffic
The state owns the infrastructure, so there’s no expectation of privacy, the same as for a business or office (that’s the legal tool to get control of
the certificates)
The best part: it’s not that expensive. In fact, centralizing everything like that would give your country great bargaining power with the undersea
cable networks and other global entities.
This scenario of nationalizing their bit of the Internet could be quite compelling to policy makers in
response to the fear of a popular revolt.
Affirmative
2ac to Nationalization
1. Nationalization is inevitable
Goldstein, Writer for the Atlantic, 2014
[Gordon M. Goldstein, The End of the Internet?,
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/07/the-end-of-the-internet/372301/]
Some experts anticipate a future with a Brazilian Internet, a European Internet, an Iranian Internet, an
Egyptian Internet—all with different content regulations and trade rules, and perhaps with contrasting standards and operational protocols.
Eli Noam, a professor of economics and finance at Columbia Business School, believes that such a progressive
fracturing of the global Internet is inevitable. “We must get used to the idea that the standardised internet is the
past but not the future,” he wrote last fall. “And that the future is a federated internet, not a uniform one.” Noam
thinks that can be managed, in part through the development of new intermediary technologies that would essentially allow the different Internets
to talk to each other, and allow users to navigate the different legal and regulatory environments.
Perhaps. But at a minimum, this patchwork solution would be disruptive to American companies like Google, Facebook, Amazon, and eBay,
which would see their global reach diminished. And it would make international communications and commerce more costly. The U.S.
government is resisting this transformation. But the Internet is simply too consequential—socially,
politically, and economically—for states to readily forgo control of it, and America, as Marc Andreessen observes, has
lost “the moral high ground” in the debate. Perhaps it was never realistic to expect the World Wide Web to last.
2. Not reverse causal – people are pushing for nationalization because of NSA fears
– that does NOT mean they will stop if the NSA does the plan.
3. Greed will determine internet decisions
Wagner, Commentator for Information Week, 08
[Mitch Wagner, Should The U.S. Nationalize The Internet?,
http://www.informationweek.com/software/information-management/should-the-us-nationalize-theinternet/d/d-id/1069315?]
The Internet faces many problems from companies looking to maximize profits at the expense of the
public good. Greedy businesses threaten innovation by trying to put an end to net neutrality, media
companies want to control every Internet-connected device in an effort to lock down distribution channels,
and spammers and other fraudsters have pretty much taken over e-mail. Now, TechCrunch is reporting that Vint Cerf, the so-called "father of
the Internet," says maybe we should think of the Internet as being like the highway system -- a public good
that should be nationalized. Erick Schonfeld at TechCrunch writes:
The
Should the Internet be owned and maintained by the government, just like the highways? Vint Cerf, the "father of the Internet" and
Google's Internet evangelist, made this radical suggestion while he was sitting next to me on a panel yesterday about national tech
policy at the Personal Democracy Forum. Maybe he was inspired by the presence of one of the other panelists, Claudio Prado, from
Brazil's Ministry of Culture, who kept on talking about the importance of embracing Internet "peeracy." (Although, I should note that
Mr. Cerf frowned upon that ill-advised coinage). But I think (or hope, rather) that he was really trying to spark a debate about whether
the Internet should be treated more like the public resource that it is.
His comment was in the context of a bigger discussion about the threat to net neutrality posed by the cable and phone companies, who
are making moves to control the amount and types of bits that can go through their pipes. It was made almost in passing and the
discussion quickly moved to other topics.
case for letting the government run the Internet is tempting. Rather than letting telcos, media companies, and
spammers fight to control the Internet, we
could just let the government run the pipe to ensure its continued fairness.
4. Timeframe for the disad is long – no idea when nationalized internet control will
actually occur – it is decades away before private businesses would be willing to give
up control.
5. Government control won’t stop cyber-terror
Holmes, former assistant secretary of state & distinguished fellow at the Heritage
Foundation, 2013
[Kim R. Holmes, Washington Times, April 17, 2013,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/apr/17/holmes-staying-one-step-ahead-of-cyberattacks/]
Imposing an old-fashioned, top-down regulatory solution as the Obama administration and some in Congress want to do is
tempting. After a proposed Senate cybersecurity act failed to pass, the administration issued an executive order that reflects this regulatory
approach.
But heavy-handed regulation is a 19th-century solution to a 21st-century problem. Federal regulations are
slow to implement, cumbersome to manage and unable to keep up with the rapid advances of hackers and
cyberwarriors, who continually change their lines of attack. This approach ushers in a clumsy bureaucratic regime that
undoubtedly will become even slower and more cumbersome over time. That is the nature of regulatory bureaucracy.
There is a better way. The rule of thumb for policymakers should be to encourage companies and other entities to find methods to better protect
themselves from cyberattacks. They need to be able to share information voluntarily and protect themselves from liabilities associated with doing
that, while ensuring that their proprietary information is safeguarded.
Companies sharing information on cyberattacks need to know that they will not be put at a competitive disadvantage in the marketplace. All
shared information should be exempted from Freedom of Information Act requests and regulatory use. Moreover, private-public partnerships
should be established so information could be shared fully and in a timely manner.
Developing a cybersecurity liability and insurance system would be another step in the right direction. As explained in the Heritage report, “such
a system returns cyber-security liability to those who are largely responsible for cyber-security losses” i.e., not the consumer but the software
manufacturers who, through negligence or other reasons, fail to offer safeguards against cyberincursions and companies that do little about
security weaknesses in their cybersystems.
The Heritage report contains another innovative recommendation: Create a nonprofit organization that can assess the surety of an organization’s
supply chain, similar to the way Underwriters Laboratories Inc. assesses the safety of various commercial products. Once a company is given a
grade, consumers of software and technical equipment can decide for themselves how safe a purchase would be.
Finally, there is the critical issue of cyberattacks by states, terrorists and criminals. A model to pursue is the one used by the former Soviet state
of Georgia in response to cyberattacks from Russia in 2012. The Georgian government planted a malware booby trap in a file that Russian
intelligence hacked, foiling that attempt at espionage and, more importantly, identifying the perpetrator. U.S. companies should be allowed to
execute similar operations, either in cooperation with law enforcement or on their own.
Cybersecurity is a complex problem. That is why a one-size-fits-all, top-down regulatory regime run by
the federal government is unwise. To stay a step ahead of hackers, Americans need a system that
empowers them to protect themselves.
6. Cyber-terror is all hype
Singer, Director, 21st Century Defense Initiative, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy @
Brookings Institute, 2012
[Peter W. Singer, The Cyber Terror Bogeyman, Armed Forces Journal, November 2012,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2012/11/cyber-terror-singer]
We have let our fears obscure how terrorists really use the Internet.
About 31,300. That is roughly the number of magazine and journal articles written so far that discuss the phenomenon of cyber terrorism.
Zero. That is the number of people that who been hurt or killed by cyber terrorism at the time this went to press.
terrorism is like the Discovery Channel’s “Shark Week,” when we obsess about shark attacks despite
the fact that you are roughly 15,000 times more likely to be hurt or killed in an accident involving a toilet.
In many ways, cyber
But by looking at how terror groups actually use the Internet, rather than fixating on nightmare scenarios, we can properly prioritize and focus our
efforts.
Part of the problem is the way we talk about the issue. The FBI defines cyber terrorism as a “premeditated, politically
motivated attack against information, computer systems, computer programs and data which results in violence against non-combatant targets by
subnational groups or clandestine agents.” A key word there is “violence,” yet many discussions sweep all sorts of nonviolent
online mischief into the “terror” bin. Various reports lump together everything from Defense Secretary Leon Panetta’s recent
statements that a terror group might launch a “digital Pearl Harbor” to Stuxnet-like sabotage (ahem, committed by state forces) to hacktivism,
WikiLeaks and credit card fraud. As one congressional staffer put it, the way we use a term like cyber terrorism “has as much clarity as
cybersecurity — that is, none at all.”
Another part of the problem is that we often mix up our fears with the actual state of affairs. Last year, Deputy Defense
Secretary William Lynn, the Pentagon’s lead official for cybersecurity, spoke to the top experts in the field at the RSA Conference in San
Francisco. “It is possible for a terrorist group to develop cyber-attack tools on their own or to buy them on the black market,” Lynn warned. “A
couple dozen talented programmers wearing flip-flops and drinking Red Bull can do a lot of damage.”
The deputy defense secretary was conflating fear and reality, not just about what stimulant-drinking programmers are actually hired to
do, but also what is needed to pull off an attack that causes meaningful violence. The requirements go well beyond finding top cyber experts.
Taking down hydroelectric generators, or designing malware like Stuxnet that causes nuclear centrifuges to spin out of sequence doesn’t just
require the skills and means to get into a computer system. It’s also knowing what to do once you are in. To cause true damage requires an
understanding of the devices themselves and how they run, the engineering and physics behind the target.
The Stuxnet case, for example, involved not just cyber experts well beyond a few wearing flip-flops, but also experts in
areas that ranged from intelligence and surveillance to nuclear physics to the engineering of a specific
kind of Siemens-brand industrial equipment. It also required expensive tests, not only of the software, but on working versions of
the target hardware as well.
As George R. Lucas Jr., a professor
at the U.S. Naval Academy, put it, conducting a truly mass-scale action
using cyber means “simply outstrips the intellectual, organizational and personnel capacities of even the
most well-funded and well-organized terrorist organization, as well as those of even the most sophisticated international
criminal enterprises.”
Lucas said the threat of cyber terrorism has been vastly overblown.
“To be blunt, neither the 14-year-old hacker in your next-door neighbor’s upstairs bedroom, nor the two- or three-person al-Qaida cell holed up in
some apartment in Hamburg are going to bring down the Glen Canyon and Hoover dams,” he said.
We should be crystal clear: This is not to say that terrorist groups are uninterested in using the technology of cyberspace to carry out acts of
violence. In 2001, al-Qaida computers seized in Afghanistan were found to contain models of a dam, plus engineering software that simulated the
catastrophic failure of controls. Five years later, jihadist websites were urging cyber attacks on the U.S. financial industry to retaliate for abuses at
Guantanamo Bay.
Nor does it mean that cyber terrorism, particularly attacks on critical infrastructure, is of no concern. In 2007, Idaho National Lab researchers
experimented with cyber attacks on their own facility; they learned that remotely changing the operating cycle of a power generator could make it
catch fire. Four years later, the Los Angeles Times reported that white-hat hackers hired by a water provider in California broke into the system in
less than a week. Policymakers must worry that real-world versions of such attacks might have a ripple effect that could, for example, knock out
parts of the national power grid or shut down a municipal or even regional water supply.
But so far, what terrorists have accomplished in the cyber realm doesn’t match our fears, their dreams or
even what they have managed through traditional means.
Bad for Economy
Nationalized internet would collapse global growth
McDowell, FCC Chair, 2012
[5/31/31, Comm'r. McDowell's Congressional Testimony, http://www.fcc.gov/document/commrmcdowells-congressional-testimony-5-31-2012]
It is a pleasure and an honor to testify beside my friend, Ambassador Phil Verveer. First, please allow me to dispense quickly and emphatically
any doubts about the bipartisan resolve of the United States’ to resist efforts to expand the International Telecommunication Union’s (“ITU”)
authority over Internet matters. Some ITU officials have dismissed our concern over this issue as mere “election year politics.” Nothing could be
further from the truth as evidenced by Ambassador Verveer’s testimony today as well as recent statements from the White House, Executive
Branch agencies, Democratic and Republican Members of Congress and my friend and colleague, FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski. We are
unified on the substantive arguments and have always been so. Second, it is important to define the challenge before us. The
threats are real and not imagined, although they admittedly sound like works of fiction at times. For many
years now, scores of countries led by China, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and many others, have pushed
for, as then-Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said almost a year ago, “international control of the Internet” through the
ITU.1 I have tried to find a more concise way to express this issue, but I can’t seem to improve upon now-President Putin’s crystallization of the
effort that has been afoot for quite some time. More importantly, I think we should take President Putin very seriously. 1 Vladimir Putin, Prime
Minister of the Russian Federation, Working Day, GOV’T OF THE RUSSIAN FED’N, http://premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/15601/ (June 15,
2011) (last visited May 14, 2012). Six months separate us from the renegotiation of the 1988 treaty that led to insulating the Internet from
economic and technical regulation. What proponents of Internet freedom do or don’t do between now and then will
determine the fate of the Net, affect global economic growth and determine whether political liberty can
proliferate. During the treaty negotiations, the most lethal threat to Internet freedom may not come from a full frontal
assault, but through insidious and seemingly innocuous expansions of intergovernmental powers. This
subterranean effort is already under way. While influential ITU Member States have put forth proposals calling for overt legal expansions of
United Nations’ or ITU authority over the Net, ITU officials have publicly declared that the ITU does not intend to regulate Internet governance
while also saying that any regulations should be of the “light-touch” variety.2 But which is it? It is not possible to insulate the Internet from new
rules while also establishing a new “light touch” regulatory regime. Either a new legal paradigm will emerge in December or it won’t. The choice
is binary. Additionally, as a threshold matter, it is curious that ITU officials have been opining on the outcome of the treaty negotiation. The
ITU’s Member States determine the fate of any new rules, not ITU leadership and staff. I remain hopeful that the diplomatic process will not be
subverted in this regard. As a matter of process and substance, patient and persistent incrementalism is the Net’s most dangerous enemy and it is
the hallmark of many countries that are pushing the proregulation agenda. Specifically, some ITU officials and Member States have been
discussing an alleged worldwide phone numbering “crisis.” It seems that the world may be running out of phone numbers, over which the ITU
does have some jurisdiction. 2 Speech by ITU Secretary-General Touré, The Challenges of Extending the Benefits of Mobile (May 1,
2012),http://www.itu.int/net/pressoffice/press_releases/index.aspx?lang=en (last visited May 29, 2012). 2 Today, many phone numbers are used
for voice over Internet protocol services such as Skype or Google Voice. To function properly, the software supporting these services translate
traditional phone numbers into IP addresses. The Russian Federation has proposed that the ITU be given jurisdiction over IP addresses to remedy
the phone number shortage.3 What is left unsaid, however, is that potential ITU jurisdiction over IP addresses would enable it to regulate Internet
services and devices with abandon. IP addresses are a fundamental and essential component to the inner workings of the Net. Taking their
administration away from the bottomup, non-governmental, multi-stakeholder model and placing it into the hands of international bureaucrats
would be a grave mistake. Other efforts to expand the ITU’s reach into the Internet are seemingly small but are tectonic in scope. Take for
example the Arab States’ submission from February that would change the rules’ definition of “telecommunications” to include “processing” or
computer functions.4 This change would essentially swallow the Internet’s functions with only a tiny edit to existing rules.5 When ITU
leadership claims that no Member States have proposed absorbing Internet governance into the ITU or other intergovernmental entities, the Arab
States’ submission demonstrates that nothing could be further from the truth. An infinite number of avenues exist to 3 Further Directions for
Revision of the ITRs, Russian Federation, CWG-WCIT12 Contribution 40, at 3 (2011), http://www.itu.int/md/T09-CWG.WCIT12-C-0040/en
(last visited May 29, 2012) (“To oblige ITU to allocate/distribute some part of IPv6 addresses (as same way/principle as for telephone numbering,
simultaneously existing of many operators/numbers distributors inside unified numbers space for both fixed and mobile phone services) and
determination of necessary requirements.”). 4 Proposed Revisions, Arab States, CWG-WCIT12 Contribution 67, at 3 (2012),
http://www.itu.int/md/T09CWG.WCIT12-C-0067/en (last visited May 29, 2012). 5 And Iran argues that the current definition already includes
the Internet. Contribution from Iran, The Islamic Republic of Iran, CWG-WCIT12 Contribution 48, Attachment 2 (2011),
http://www.itu.int/md/T09-CWG.WCIT12C-0048/en (last visited May 29, 2012). 3 accomplish the same goal and it is camouflaged subterfuge
that proponents of Internet freedom should watch for most vigilantly. Other examples come from China. China would like to see the creation of a
system whereby Internet users are registered using their IP addresses. In fact, last year, China teamed up with Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan
to propose to the UN General Assembly that it create an “International Code of Conduct for Information Security” to mandate “international
norms and rules standardizing the behavior of countries concerning information and cyberspace.”6 Does anyone here today believe that these
countries’ proposals would encourage the continued proliferation of an open and freedom-enhancing Internet? Or would such constructs make it
easier for authoritarian regimes to identify and silence political dissidents? These proposals may not technically be part of the WCIT negotiations,
but they give a sense of where some of the ITU’s Member States would like to go. Still other proposals that have been made personally to me by
foreign government officials include the creation of an international universal service fund of sorts whereby foreign – usually state-owned –
telecom companies would use international mandates to charge certain Web destinations on a “per-click” basis to fund the build-out of broadband
infrastructure across the globe. Google, iTunes, Facebook and Netflix are mentioned most often as prime sources of funding. In short, the
U.S.
and like-minded proponents of Internet freedom and prosperity across the globe should resist efforts to
expand the powers of intergovernmental bodies over the Internet 6 Letter dated 12 September 2011 from the Permanent
Representatives of China, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, Item 93
of the provisional agenda - Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security, 66th Session
of the United Nations General Assembly, Annex (Sep. 14, 2011),
http://www.cs.brown.edu/courses/csci1800/sources/2012_UN_Russia_and_China_Code_o_Conduct.pdf (last visited May 29, 2012). even in the
smallest of ways. As my supplemental statement and analysis explains in more detail below, such
a scenario would be
devastating to global economic activity, but it would hurt the developing world the most. Thank you for
the opportunity to appear before you today and I look forward to your questions. Thank you, Chairman Walden and Ranking Member Eshoo, for
holding this hearing. Its topic is among the most important public policy issues affecting global commerce and political freedom: namely,
whether the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), or any other intergovernmental body, should be allowed to expand its jurisdiction
into the operational and economic affairs of the Internet. As we head toward the treaty negotiations at the World Conference on International
Telecommunications (WCIT) in Dubai in December, I urge governments around the world to avoid the temptation to tamper with the Internet.
Since its privatization in the early 1990s, the Internet has flourished across the world under the current deregulatory
framework. In fact, the long-standing international consensus has been to keep governments from
regulating core functions of the Internet’s ecosystem. Yet, some nations, such as China, Russia, India, Iran and Saudi
Arabia, have been pushing to reverse this course by giving the ITU or the United Nations itself, regulatory
jurisdiction over Internet governance. The ITU is a treaty-based organization under the auspices of the United Nations.1 Don’t take
my word for it, however. As Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said almost one year ago, the goal of this well-organized and energetic effort
is to establish “international control over the Internet using the monitoring and supervisory capabilities of the [ITU].”2 Motivations of some ITU
Member states vary. Some of the arguments in support of such actions may stem from frustrations with the operations of Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). Any concerns regarding ICANN, however, should not be used as a pretext to end the multi-stakeholder
model that has served all nations – especially the developing world – so well. Any reforms to ICANN should take place through the bottom-up
multi-stakeholder process and should not arise through the WCIT’s examination of the International Telecommunication Regulations (ITR)s.
Constructive reform of the ITRs may be needed. If so, the scope of any review should be limited to traditional telecommunications services and
not expanded to include information services or any form of Internet services. Modification of the current multistakeholder Internet governance
model may be necessary as well, but we should all work together to ensure no intergovernmental regulatory overlays are placed into this sphere.
Not only would nations surrender some of their national sovereignty in such a pursuit, but they would suffocate their own economies as well,
while politically paralyzing engineering and business decisions within a global regulatory body. 1 History,
IThttp://www.itu.int/en/about/Pages/history.aspx">U, http://www.itu.int/en/about/Pages/history.aspx (last visited May 14, 2012). 2 Vladimir
Putin, Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Working Day, GOV’T OF THE RUSSIAN FED’N,
http://premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/15601/ (June 15, 2011) (last visited May 14, 2012). Every day headlines tell us about industrialized and
developing nations alike that are awash in debt, facing flat growth curves, or worse, shrinking GDPs. Not only must governments,
including our own, tighten their fiscal belts, but they must also spur economic expansion. An unfettered
Internet offers the brightest ray of hope for growth during this dark time of economic uncertainty,
not more regulation. Indeed, we are at a crossroads for the Internet’s future. One path holds great promise,
while the other path is fraught with peril. The promise, of course, lies with keeping what works, namely
maintaining a freedom-enhancing and open Internet while insulating it from legacy regulations. The peril
lies with changes that would ultimately sweep up Internet services into decades-old ITU paradigms. If
successful, these efforts would merely imprison the future in the regulatory dungeon of the past. The
future of global growth and political freedom lies with an unfettered Internet. Shortly after the Internet was
privatized in 1995, a mere 16 million people were online worldwide.3 As of early 2012, approximately 2.3 billion people were using the Net.4
Internet connectivity quickly evolved from being a novelty in industrialized countries to becoming an
essential tool for commerce – and sometimes even basic survival – in all nations, but especially in the
developing world. Such explosive growth was helped, not hindered, by a deregulatory construct.
Developing nations stand to gain the most from the rapid pace of deployment and adoption of Internet
technologies brought forth by an Internet free from intergovernmental regulation. By way of illustration, a
McKinsey report released in January examined the Net’s effect on the developing world, or “aspiring countries.”5 In 30 specific aspiring
countries studied, including Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Turkey and Vietnam,6 Internet penetration has grown 25 percent per year for
the past five years, compared to only five percent per year in developed nations.7 Obviously, broadband penetration is lower in aspiring countries
than in the developed world, but that is quickly changing thanks to mobile Internet access technologies. Mobile subscriptions in developing
countries have risen from 53 percent of the global market in 2005 to 73 percent in 2010.8 In fact, Cisco estimates that the number of mobileconnected devices will exceed the world’s population sometime this year.9 Increasingly, Internet users in these countries use only mobile devices
for their Internet access.10 This trend has resulted in developing countries growing their global share of Internet users from 33 percent in 2005, to
52 percent in 2010, with a projected 61 percent share by 2015.11 The 30 aspiring countries discussed earlier are home to one billion Internet
users, half of all global Internet users. The effect that rapidly growing Internet connectivity is having on aspiring
countries’ economies is tremendous. The Net is an economic growth accelerator. It contributed an average
1.9 percent of GDP growth in aspiring countries for an estimated total of $366 billion in 2010.13 In some developing
economies, Internet connectivity has contributed up to 13 percent of GDP growth over the past five years.14 In
six aspiring countries alone, 1.9 million jobs were associated with the Internet.15 And in other countries, the Internet creates 2.6 new jobs for
each job it disrupts.16 I expect that we would all agree that these positive trends must continue. The best path forward is the one
that has served the global economy so well, that of a multi-stakeholder governed Internet. One potential
outcome that could develop if pro-regulation nations are successful in granting the ITU authority over
Internet governance would be a partitioned Internet. In particular, fault lines could be drawn between countries that will
choose to continue to live under the current successful model and those Member States who decide to opt out to place themselves under an
intergovernmental regulatory regime. A balkanized Internet would not promote global free trade or increase living
standards. At a minimum, it would create extreme uncertainty and raise costs for all users across the globe
by rendering an engineering, operational and financial morass. For instance, Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT) recently announced placing many of their courses online for free – for anyone to use. The uncertainty and
economic and engineering chaos associated with a newly politicized intergovernmental legal regime
would inevitably drive up costs as cross border traffic and cloud computing become more complicated
and vulnerable to regulatory arbitrage. Such costs are always passed on to the end user consumers and may very well negate
the ability of content and application providers such as Harvard and MIT to offer first-rate educational content for free. Nations that
value freedom and prosperity should draw a line in the sand against new regulations while
welcoming reform that could include a non-regulatory role for the ITU. Venturing into the
uncertainty of a new regulatory quagmire will only undermine developing nations the most.
Cyber Terror Impact Answer
Cyberwar isn’t a big threat—best studies prove
Jason HEALEY, Director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council, 13 [“No,
Cyberwarfare Isn't as Dangerous as Nuclear War,” March 20, 2013,
www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/03/20/cyber-attacks-not-yet-an-existential-threat-tothe-us]
America does not face an existential cyberthreat today, despite
undoubtedly grave and the
recent
warnings . Our cybervulnerabilities are
threats we face are severe but far from comparable to nuclear war .
The most recent alarms come in a Defense Science Board report on how to make military cybersystems more resilient against advanced threats
(in short, Russia or China). It warned that the "cyber threat is serious, with potential consequences similar in some ways to the nuclear threat of
the Cold War." Such fears were also expressed by Adm. Mike Mullen, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 2011. He called cyber "The
single biggest existential threat that's out there" because "cyber actually more than theoretically, can attack our infrastructure, our financial
systems."
While it is true that cyber attacks might do these things, it is also true they have not only never
happened but are far more difficult to accomplish than mainstream thinking believes . The consequences
from cyber threats may be similar in some ways to nuclear, as the Science Board concluded, but mostly, they are incredibly dissimilar.
Eighty years ago, the generals of the U.S. Army Air Corps were sure that their bombers would easily topple other countries and cause their
study of the 25-year history of cyber conflict, by the
Atlantic Council and Cyber Conflict Studies Association, has shown a similar dynamic where the impact of
disruptive cyberattacks has been consistently overestimated .
populations to panic, claims which did not stand up to reality. A
Rather than theorizing about future cyberwars or extrapolating from today's concerns, the history of cyberconflict that have actually been fought,
shows that cyber incidents have so far tended to have effects that are either widespread but fleeting or persistent but narrowly focused. No
attacks, so far, have been both widespread and persistent. There have been no authenticated cases of
anyone dying from a cyber attack. Any widespread disruptions, even the 2007 disruption against Estonia, have been
short-lived causing no significant GDP loss.
Moreover, as with conflict in other domains, cyberattacks can take down many targets but keeping them down over time in the face of determined
defenses has so far been out of the range of all but the most dangerous adversaries such as Russia and China. Of course, if the United States is in
a conflict with those nations, cyber will be the least important of the existential threats policymakers should be worrying about. Plutonium
trumps bytes in a shooting war.
This is not all good news. Policymakers have recognized the problems since at least 1998 with little significant progress. Worse, the threats and
vulnerabilities are getting steadily more worrying. Still,
experts have been warning of a cyber Pearl Harbor for 20 of
the 70 years since the actual Pearl Harbor .
espionage could someday accumulate into an existential threat.
But it doesn't seem so seem just yet, with only handwaving estimates of annual losses of 0.1 to 0.5 percent to the total U.S. GDP of
around $15 trillion. That's bad, but it doesn't add up to an existential crisis or "economic cyberwar."
The transfer of U.S. trade secrets through Chinese cyber
Cyber threats are hype
The Economist, 12/8/2012. “Hype and fear,” http://www.economist.com/news/international/21567886-america-leading-waydeveloping-doctrines-cyber-warfare-other-countries-may.
EVEN as anxiety about jihadi terrorist threats has eased, thanks to the efforts of intelligence agencies and drone attacks’ disruption of the
militants’ sanctuaries, fears over Western societies’ vulnerability to cyber-assaults have grown. Political and military
Panetta, talks of a “cyber-Pearl
Harbour”. A senior official says privately that a cyber-attack on America that “would make 9/11 look like a tea party” is only a matter of time.
leaders miss no chance to declare that cyberwar is already upon us. America’s defence secretary, Leon
The nightmares are of mouseclicks exploding fuel refineries, frying power grids or blinding air-traffic
controllers. The reality is already of countless anonymous attacks on governments and businesses. These seek
to disrupt out of malice, or to steal swathes of valuable commercial or security-related data. Some experts believe that such thefts have cost
hundreds of billions of dollars in stolen R&D.
Many of these attacks are purely criminal. But the most sophisticated are more often the work of states, carried out either directly or by proxies.
Attribution—detecting an enemy’s fingerprints on a cyber-attack—is still tricky, so officials are reluctant to point the finger of blame publicly.
But China is by far the most active transgressor. It employs thousands of gifted software engineers who systematically target technically
advanced Fortune 100 companies. The other biggest offenders are Russia and, recently, Iran (the suspected source of the Shamoon virus that
crippled thousands of computers at Saudi Arabia’s Aramco and Qatar’s RasGas in August).
America and its allies are by no means passive victims. Either America, Israel or the two working together almost certainly hatched the Stuxnet
worm, found in 2010, that was designed to paralyse centrifuges at Iran’s Natanz uranium-enrichment plant. The Flame virus, identified by
Russian and Hungarian experts this year, apparently came from the same source. It was designed to strike at Iran by infecting computers in its oil
ministry and at targets in the West Bank, Syria and Sudan.
Boring, not lurid
For all the hype, policies on cyber-warfare remain confused and secretive. The American government is bringing in new rules and a clearer
strategy for dealing with cyber-threats. Barack Obama is said to have signed in October a still-secret directive containing new guidelines for
federal agencies carrying out cyber-operations. It sets out how they should help private firms, particularly those responsible for critical national
infrastructure, to defend themselves against cyber-threats by sharing information and setting standards.
The directive is partly a response to the stalling of cyber-legislation in the Senate. Republican senators argue that it imposes too great a regulatory
burden on industry, which is already obliged to disclose when it is subject to a cyber-attack. It is also meant to govern how far such bodies as the
Department of Homeland Security can go in their defence of domestic networks against malware attacks.
The Pentagon is also working on more permissive rules of engagement for offensive cyber-warfare, for example to close down a foreign server
from which an attack was thought to be emanating. General Keith Alexander heads both Cyber Command (which has a budget of $3.4 billion for
next year) and the National Security Agency. He has often called for greater flexibility in taking the attack to the “enemy”. The emergence of new
cyber-warfare doctrines in America is being watched closely by allies who may follow where America leads—as well as by potential adversaries.
However, Jarno Limnell of Stonesoft, a big computer security firm, says that all levels of government in the West lack strategic understanding on
cyber-warfare. So, although questions abound, answers are few. For example, it is not clear how much sensitive information about threats or
vulnerabilities government agencies should share even with private-sector firms that are crucial to national security. Often the weakest link is
their professional advisers, such as law firms or bankers who have access to sensitive data.
Almost all (roughly 98%) of the vulnerabilities in commonly used computer programmes that hackers exploit are in software created in America.
Making private-sector companies more secure might involve a controversial degree of intrusion by government agencies, for example the
permanent monitoring of e-mail traffic to make sure that every employee is sticking to security rules. Government hackers may also like to hoard
such vulnerabilities rather than expose them. That way they can later create “backdoors” in the software for offensive purposes.
Also controversial is the balance between defence and attack. General Alexander stresses that in cyber-warfare, the attacker has the advantage.
Mr Limnell says that, although America has better offensive cyber-capabilities than almost anybody, its defences get only three out of ten.
Setting rules for offensive cyber-warfare is exceptionally tricky. When it comes to real, physical war, the capability may become as important as
air superiority has been for the past 70 years: though it cannot alone bring victory, you probably can’t win if the other side has it.
China has long regarded the network-centric warfare that was developed by America in the late-1980s and copied by its allies as a weakness it
might target, particularly as military networks share many of the same underpinnings as their civilian equivalents. The People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) talks about “informationisation” in war, “weakening the information superiority of the enemy and operational effectiveness of the enemy’s
computer equipment”. China’s planning assumes an opening salvo of attacks on the enemy’s information centres by cyber, electronic and kinetic
means to create blind spots that its armed forces would then be able to exploit. Yet as the PLA comes to rely more on its own information
networks it will no longer enjoy an asymmetric advantage. Few doubt the importance of being able to defend your own
military networks from cyber-attacks (and to operate effectively when under attack), while threatening those of your adversaries.
But to conclude that future wars will be conducted largely in cyberspace is an exaggeration. Martin
Libicki of the RAND Corporation, a think-tank, argues that with some exceptions cyber-warfare neither
directly harms people nor destroys equipment. At best it “can confuse and frustrate…and then only
temporarily”. In short, “cyber-warfare can only be a support function” for other forms of war.
Four horsemen
Besides the cyber element of physical warfare, four
other worries are: strategic cyberwar (direct attacks on an enemy’s civilian
cyber-disruption, such as the distributed denial-of-service attacks that briefly overwhelmed
Estonian state, banking and media websites in 2007; and cyber-terrorism. Gauging an appropriate response to each of these is hard. Mr
infrastructure); cyber-espionage;
Limnell calls for a “triad” of capabilities: resilience under severe attack; reasonable assurance of attribution so that attackers cannot assume
anonymity; and the means to hit back hard enough to deter an unprovoked attack.
Few would argue against improving resilience, particularly of critical national infrastructure such as power
grids, sewerage and transport systems. But
such targets are not as vulnerable as is now often suggested. Cyberattacks on physical assets are most likely to use what Mr Libicki calls “one-shot weapons” aimed at
industrial control systems. Stuxnet was an example: it destroyed perhaps a tenth of the Iranian centrifuges
at Natanz and delayed some uranium enrichment for a few months, but the vulnerabilities it exposed were
soon repaired. Its limited and fleeting success will also have led Iran to take measures to hinder future attacks. If that is the best that
two first-rate cyber-powers can do against a third-rate industrial power, notes Mr Libicki, it puts into
perspective the more alarmist predictions of impending cyber-attacks on infrastructure in the West.
Moreover, anyone
contemplating a cyber-attack on physical infrastructure has little idea how much actual damage it will cause, and
know if they are crossing an adversary’s red line and in doing so would trigger a violent
“kinetic” response (involving real weapons). Whether or not America has effective cyber-weapons, it has more than
enough conventional ones to make any potential aggressor think twice.
if people will die. They cannot
For that reason, improving attribution of cyber-attacks is a high priority. Nigel Inkster, a former British intelligence officer now at the
International Institute for Strategic Studies, highlights the huge risk to the perpetrator of carrying out an infrastructure attack given the
consequences if it is detected. In October Mr Panetta said that “potential aggressors should be aware that the United States has the capacity to
locate them and hold them accountable for actions that harm America or its interests.”
He may be over-claiming. Given that cyber-attacks can be launched from almost anywhere, attribution is likely to remain tricky and to rely on
context, motive and an assessment of capabilities as much as technology. That is one reason why countries on the receiving end of cyber attacks
want to respond in kind—ambiguity cuts both ways. But poor or authoritarian countries attacking rich democratic ones may not have the sorts of
assets that are vulnerable to a retaliatory cyber-attack.
The difficulty is even greater when it comes to the theft (or “exfiltration”, as it is known) of data. For China and Russia, ransacking Western firms
for high-tech research and other intellectual property is tempting. The other way round offers thinner pickings. In 2009 hackers from an unnamed
“foreign intelligence agency” made off with some 24,000 confidential files from Lockheed Martin, a big American defence contractor. As a result
they could eavesdrop on online meetings and technical discussions, and gather information about the sensors, computer systems and “stealth”
technology of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. This may have added to the delays of an already troubled programme as engineers tried to fix
vulnerabilities that had been exposed in the plane’s design. Investigators traced the penetrations with a “high level of certainty” to known Chinese
IP addresses and digital fingerprints that had been used for attacks in the past. Less than two years later, China unveiled its first stealth fighter, the
J-20.
Theft from thieves
As Mr Libicki asks, “what can we do back to a China that is stealing our data?” Espionage is carried out by both sides and is traditionally not
regarded as an act of war. But the massive theft of data and the speed with which it can be exploited is something new. Responding with violence
would be disproportionate, which leaves diplomacy and sanctions. But America and China have many other big items on their agenda, while
trade is a very blunt instrument. It may be possible to identify products that China exports which compete only because of stolen data, but it
would be hard and could risk a trade war that would damage both sides.
Cyber-disruption has nuisance value and may be costly to repair, but it can be mitigated by decent
defences. Cyber-terrorism has remained largely in the imagination of film-makers, but would be worth worrying
about if it became a reality. Stonesoft’s Mr Limnell reckons that, though al-Qaeda and its offshoots show little sign of acquiring the necessary
skills, they could buy them. Mr Libicki is more sceptical. Big teams of highly qualified people are needed to produce
Stuxnet-type effects, which may be beyond even sophisticated terrorist groups. Also, the larger the team
that is needed, the more likely it is to be penetrated.
Hurts the Internet
Balkanization would destroy the internet – crushes trade & economic growth
McDowell, Commission of the FCC, 2012
[Robert M. McDowell, The U.N. Threat to Internet Freedom,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204792404577229074023195322]
Merely saying "no" to any changes to the current structure of Internet governance is likely to be a losing proposition. A more successful strategy
would be for proponents of Internet freedom and prosperity within every nation to encourage a dialogue among all interested parties, including
governments and the ITU, to broaden the multi-stakeholder umbrella with the goal of reaching consensus to address reasonable concerns. As part
of this conversation, we should underscore the tremendous benefits that the Internet has yielded for the developing world through the multistakeholder model.
Upending this model with a new regulatory treaty is likely to partition the Internet as some countries would
inevitably choose to opt out.
A balkanized Internet would be devastating to global free trade and national
sovereignty. It would impair Internet growth most severely in the developing world but also globally as
technologists are forced to seek bureaucratic permission to innovate and invest. This would also undermine the
proliferation of new cross-border technologies, such as cloud computing.
A top-down, centralized, international regulatory overlay is antithetical to the architecture of the Net,
which is a global network of networks without borders. No government, let alone an intergovernmental body, can
make engineering and economic decisions in lightning-fast Internet time. Productivity, rising living
standards and the spread of freedom everywhere, but especially in the developing world, would grind to a
halt as engineering and business decisions become politically paralyzed within a global regulatory body.
Any attempts to expand intergovernmental powers over the Internet—no matter how incremental or seemingly
innocuous—should be turned back. Modernization and reform can be constructive, but not if the end result is a new global bureaucracy
that departs from the multi-stakeholder model. Enlightened nations should draw a line in the sand against new
regulations while welcoming reform that could include a nonregulatory role for the ITU.
State control destroys the value of the internet
Alford, Senior Program Officer, Internet Freedom, Freedom House, 2014
[Gigi Alford, State Partitioning of the Internet Harms Users Everywhere,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/freedom-house/state-partitioning-of-the_b_5843162.html]
For as long as the global internet has withstood attempts by states to subjugate its cables, servers, and protocols, the virtual world has been a
refuge for users who are deprived of their fundamental freedoms offline. This boon of technology is what led UN experts to declare the internet
“an indispensable tool for realizing a range of human rights” and to debate whether access to such an engine of human progress constitutes a right
in itself.
However, since Edward Snowden disclosed documents on secret U.S. and British data-collection programs, the internet
has faced intensified challenges from all sides—some genuine and others opportunistic—that could lead states to
partition the digital commons into national and regional demesnes.
An internet that is fragmented by political, legal, and technical boundaries would throttle the animating purpose of
the International Bill of Human Rights, while an indivisible and global internet is able to facilitate such goals. As states fully
fathom the internet’s disruptive power and rush to impose choke points in the name of national
sovereignty, the digital world increasingly mirrors the analog world’s human rights deficiencies, which it
once transcended. The virtual refuge is being dismantled, and for individuals on the wrong side of the new borders, it has been replaced with
separate and unequal “splinternets.”
Such digital apartheid flies in the face of the universality of human rights, and it contradicts international
jurisprudence that rejects separate-but-equal regimes. As the UN Human Rights Council has affirmed, “the same rights that
people have offline must also be protected online.”
Champions of a unified internet are putting forth strong economic and geopolitical arguments to counter these challenges—including earlier this
month at the ninth annual Internet Governance Forum (IGF) in Istanbul, Turkey, and next month at the International Telecommunications Union
(ITU) plenipotentiary meeting in Busan, South Korea. But stakeholders often miss the bigger picture when they overlook the human rights case
against a “Westphalian web” model of internet governance.
Internet Good
Internet solves everything – access is key
Genachowski 13
[Chair-FCC, 4/16, "The Plot to Block Internet Freedom",
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/16/plot_block_internet_freedom?page=full]
The Internet has created an extraordinary new democratic forum for people around the world to express their opinions. It is revolutionizing global
access to information: Today, more than 1 billion people worldwide have access to the Internet, and at current growth rates, 5 billion people -about 70 percent of the world's population -- will be connected in five years. But this growth trajectory is not inevitable, and threats are
mounting to the global spread of an open and truly "worldwide" web. The expansion of the open Internet
must be allowed to continue: The mobile and social media revolutions are critical not only for
democratic institutions' ability to solve the collective problems of a shrinking world, but also to a
dynamic and innovative global economy that depends on financial transparency and the free flow of
information. The threats to the open Internet were on stark display at last December's World Conference on International
Telecommunications in Dubai, where the United States fought attempts by a number of countries -- including Russia, China, and Saudi Arabia -to give a U.N. organization, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), new regulatory authority over the Internet. Ultimately, over the
objection of the United States and many others, 89 countries voted to approve a treaty that could strengthen the power of governments to control
online content and deter broadband deployment. In Dubai, two deeply worrisome trends came to a head. First, we see that the Arab Spring and
similar events have awakened nondemocratic governments to the danger that the Internet poses to their
regimes. In Dubai, they pushed for a treaty that would give the ITU's imprimatur to governments'
blocking or favoring of online content under the guise of preventing spam and increasing network
security. Authoritarian countries' real goal is to legitimize content regulation, opening the door for
governments to block any content they do not like, such as political speech. Second, the basic commercial
model underlying the open Internet is also under threat. In particular, some proposals, like the one made last year by major
European network operators, would change the ground rules for payments for transferring Internet content. One species of these proposals is
called "sender pays" or "sending party pays." Since the beginning of the Internet, content creators -- individuals, news outlets, search engines,
social media sites -- have been able to make their content available to Internet users without paying a fee to Internet service providers. A senderpays rule would change that, empowering governments to require Internet content creators to pay a fee to connect with an end user in that
country. Sender pays may look merely like a commercial issue, a different way to divide the pie. And proponents of sender pays and similar
changes claim they would benefit Internet deployment and Internet users. But the opposite is true: If a country imposed a payment requirement,
content creators would be less likely to serve that country. The loss of content would make the Internet less attractive and would lessen demand
for the deployment of Internet infrastructure in that country. Repeat the process in a few more countries, and the growth of global
connectivity -- as well as its attendant benefits for democracy -- would slow dramatically. So too would
the benefits accruing to the global economy. Without continuing improvements in transparency and information sharing, the
innovation that springs from new commercial ideas and creative breakthroughs is sure to be severely
inhibited. To their credit, American Internet service providers have joined with the broader U.S.
technology industry, civil society, and others in opposing these changes. Together, we were able to win
the battle in Dubai over sender pays, but we have not yet won the war. Issues affecting global Internet
openness, broadband deployment, and free speech will return in upcoming international forums, including an
important meeting in Geneva in May, the World Telecommunication/ICT Policy Forum. The massive investment in wired and wireless
broadband infrastructure in the United States demonstrates that preserving an open Internet is completely compatible with broadband deployment.
According to a recent UBS report, annual wireless capital investment in the United States increased 40 percent from 2009 to 2012, while
investment in the rest of the world has barely inched upward. And according to the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, more
fiber-optic cable was laid in the United States in 2011 and 2012 than in any year since 2000, and 15 percent more than in Europe. All Internet
users lose something when some countries are cut off from the World Wide Web. Each person who is unable to connect to the Internet diminishes
our own access to information. We become less able to understand the world and formulate policies to respond to our shrinking planet.
Conversely, we gain a richer understanding of global events as more people connect around the world, and those societies nurturing nascent
democracy movements become more familiar with America's traditions of free speech and pluralism. That's why we believe that the Internet
should remain free of gatekeepers and that no entity -- public or private -- should be able to pick and choose the information web users can
receive. That is a principle the United States adopted in the Federal Communications Commission's 2010 Open Internet Order. And it's why we
are deeply concerned about arguments by some in the United States that broadband providers should be able to block, edit, or favor Internet
traffic that travels over their networks, or adopt economic models similar to international sender pays. We must preserve the Internet
as the most open and robust platform for the free exchange of information ever devised. Keeping the Internet
open is perhaps the most important free speech issue of our time.
Russia Controls
Russia controlling the internet
Bloomberg 5 – 1 – 14
[Ilya Khrennikov and Anastasia Ustinova, Putin's Next Invasion? The Russian Web,
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-05-01/russia-moves-toward-china-style-internet-censorship]
warned last year that Russia was “on the path” toward Chinese-style
Internet censorship. Vladimir Putin is proving him right. At a meeting with media executives in St. Petersburg on April 24, the
Google (GOOG) Executive Chairman Eric Schmidt
Russian president said his government will impose greater control over information flowing through the Internet, which the former KGB
lieutenant colonel has called a creation of U.S. spy agencies.
Russia’s Parliament has approved a law similar to China’s that would require Internet companies such as
Google to locate servers handling Russian traffic inside the country and store user data locally for six
months. The legislation, which is scheduled to take effect on Aug. 1, also classifies the roughly 30,000 Russian bloggers who have 3,000 or
more readers as media outlets, making them and the companies that host them subject to regulation. “This law is a step toward
segmenting and nationalizing the Internet and putting it under the Kremlin’s control,” says Matthew Schaaf,
a program officer at Freedom House, a research group in Washington. “It could have a serious chilling effect on online
expression in Russia, making users stop to think how their Google searches and Facebook posts could be
used against them.”