Nationalized Internet Disadvantage
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Nationalized Internet Disadvantage – Table of Contents
Summary.............................................................................................................................................. 2
Glossary............................................................................................................................................... 3
First Negative Constructive (1NC) Shell .......................................................................................... 4
Uniqueness Extensions
AT: Uniqueness Overwhelms Link – NSA is Proxy ............................................................................... 8
AT: Uniqueness Overwhelms Link – Nationalization Inevitable ............................................................ 9
Impact Extensions
AT: No Impact – Cyber-Terror Overblown........................................................................................... 10
AT: Impact Turn – Democracy ............................................................................................................ 11
AT: Impact Turn – Destroys Economic Growth ................................................................................... 12
AT: Impact Turn – Destroys Internet ................................................................................................... 13
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Nationalized Internet Disadvantage
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Summary
There is a global fight going on about who should control the internet. The United States has been a
strong supporter of a totally free and open internet that has no government involvement or control.
Other countries, led by China and Russia, think that the government should be able to control the
internet.
The U.S. is losing the fight globally now because no one trusts us. They think our government just
uses access to the internet to spy on people and secretly control it. Think about foreign governments’
reactions to the revelations that U.S. intelligence agencies were spying on other heads of state. So,
other countries are making moves to nationalize their internets. The plan improves US credibility –
and allows us to stop other countries from nationalizing the internet.
What does “control of the internet” mean? The Chinese government has a block on certain websites.
The Russian government wants to own the cables and networks that provide access to the internet.
The Brazilian government wants to own the hard drives and servers where things are stored.
Essentially, they want to treat the internet like it is electricity or water – regulated heavily by the
government. The U.S. prefers that it be totally unregulated and free.
The disadvantage argues that nationalizing the Internet is a good thing. This disadvantage claims
that the democratization advantages we would receive as a human race from a free and open internet
are actually outweighed by long-term cyber-terrorism concerns. Government control prevents cyberattacks from happening and allows each country to control their own systems. So, a person in China
couldn’t attack the U.S. system without the U.S. knowing who was responsible because of strict
government controls – and vice versa – no one in the US could hack into a Russian system.
How does nationalized internet solve cyber-terrorism? If the Russian government controls the access
point for all internet access in the country then it is able to monitor and control that internet access. It
would be harder, if not impossible, for a single hacker or group of hackers to attack a website, power
plant, financial institution, or other group from outside of Russia since it would be detectible. The
current system is an open free-for-all that makes it more difficult to control who is looking into what
anywhere in the world.
Finally, everyone receiving access to the Internet is probably a good thing for the world overall. The
central clash point for this disadvantage is over the trade-off between open access for all and
security.
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Glossary
Balkanize – to separate into groups or categories. In this instance, it refers to breaking the internet
up into country-by-country sections. It is a common phrase used to describe the breaking up of
something. It is a historical reference to the Balkans region of the world. Several countries were
broken up from the larger Soviet Union. It is usually used by people to refer to breaking the internet
up into groups. Each country would control their own internet services and access.
Cyber – A prefix used to describe anything that happens online. A Cyber crime would be a crime that
is done online. Cyber Gambling would be gambling done online. If you read it, it is talking about the
internet.
Cyber-terror – committing an act of terror online. Any attack on a government website, an attempt to
gain access to a power plant, or to just generally be violent and destructive is considered cyber-terror.
The phrase is very broad as the Department of Defense says they experience 60,000 or more cyberterror attempts a day.
Cyberwar – use of an attack on someone’s internet access or services during a time of war. Estonia
is usually the example. During an invasion, Russia hacked into the Estonians internets and shut
them down. This act is often called cyberwar. There are also instances of people saying “cyberwar”
to reference fighting and hacking that is going on between countries.
DOD – Department of Defense – the cabinet of the United States that is in charge of the military
branches and answers to the President. Referenced in a few cards.
ICANN – the group that is in charge of maintaining all domain names on the internet. Established by
the U.S., ICANN is a not-for-profit public-benefit corporation with participants from all over the world
dedicated to keeping the Internet secure, stable and interoperable
https://www.icann.org/
ITU - International Telecommunication Union – the United Nations specialized agency for information
and communication technologies. It is the group that would be given control over the internet
internationally – http://www.itu.int/en/Pages/default.aspx
Multi-stakeholder – the ICANN and US supported model for the internet. Every group can control
and contribute to the internet without government interference. The idea is that Internet governance
should mimic the structure of the Internet itself- borderless and open to all.
Nationalize – when the government takes over something it is nationalized. Health care literature will
often reference ‘nationalizing health care.’ This disadvantage will use it to discuss the internet. When
the government regulates, controls, and is in charge of something it is said to be nationalized.
Partitioned – separated into parts. When a room is partitioned it is divided into parts. If the internet
were nationalized it would be partitioned between countries.
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1NC Shell (1/4)
A. Uniqueness – Nationalization of the internet is coming now.
Wall Street Journal, 2014
(Steve Rosenbush, The Morning Download: Nationalization of Internet Continues as Germany Hangs
Up on Verizon, http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2014/06/27/the-morning-download-nationalization-of-internetcontinues-as-germany-hangs-up-on-verizon/)
Good morning. The nationalization of the Internet continues apace. The German government said on
Thursday it would end a contract with Verizon Communications Inc. because of concerns that the
U.S. National Security Agency had access to customer data maintained by U.S. telecommunications
firms, the WSJ’s Anton Troianovski reports. Verizon has provided Internet access and other telecom
services to government agencies in Germany. Those contracts will be transferred to Deutsche
Telekom AG by 2015, the Interior Ministry said. As the WSJ reports, the move underscores the
continuing political headaches for U.S. technology businesses operating abroad, more than a year
after former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden started revealing the reach of
America’s electronic surveillance programs and the alleged cooperation with some U.S. firms. CIOs
are on the front lines of the dilemma. To the extent that more businesses are pressured to aid in
government surveillance, CIOs should at the very least have a say in how those efforts will work.
While those decisions will be made at the CEO and board level, the CIO can help frame the issues by
engaging directly with a company’s senior leadership. Their perspective is critical in an area where
technology, business and global politics converge.
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1NC Shell (2/4)
B. Link – NSA surveillance is the key reason that will derail the US Internet Freedom agenda.
The plan reverses that and resumes the agenda.
Kehl, 2014
(Policy Analyst at New America’s Open Technology Institute (Danielle, “Surveillance Costs: The
NSA’s Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom & Cybersecurity” July,
https://www.newamerica.org/oti/surveillance-costs-the-nsas-impact-on-the-economy-internetfreedom-cybersecurity/)
Mandatory data localization proposals are just one of a number of ways that foreign governments
have reacted to NSA surveillance in a manner that threatens U.S. foreign policy interests, particularly
with regard to Internet Freedom. There has been a quiet tension between how the U.S. approaches
freedom of expression online in its foreign policy and its domestic laws ever since Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton effectively launched the Internet Freedom agenda in January 2010.170 But the NSA
disclosures shined a bright spotlight on the contradiction: the U.S. government promotes free
expression abroad and aims to prevent repressive governments from monitoring and censoring their
citizens while simultaneously supporting domestic laws that authorize surveillance and bulk data
collection. As cybersecurity expert and Internet governance scholar Ron Deibert wrote a few days
after the first revelations: “There are unintended consequences of the NSA scandal that will
undermine U.S. foreign policy interests – in particular, the ‘Internet Freedom’ agenda espoused by
the U.S. State Department and its allies.”171 Deibert accurately predicted that the news would trigger
reactions from both policymakers and ordinary citizens abroad, who would begin to question their
dependence on American technologies and the hidden motivations behind the United States’
promotion of Internet Freedom. In some countries, the scandal would be used as an excuse to revive
dormant debates about dropping American companies from official contracts, score political points at
the expense of the United States, and even justify local monitoring and surveillance. Deibert’s
speculation has so far proven quite prescient. As we will describe in this section, the ongoing
revelations have done significant damage to the credibility of the U.S. Internet Freedom agenda and
further jeopardized the United States’ position in the global Internet governance debates. Moreover,
the repercussions from NSA spying have bled over from the Internet policy realm to impact broader
U.S. foreign policy goals and relationships with government officials and a range of other important
stakeholders abroad. In an essay entitled, “The End of Hypocrisy: American Foreign Policy in the Age
of Leaks,” international relations scholars Henry Farrell and Martha Finnemore argue that a critical,
lasting impact of information provided by leakers like Edward Snowden is “the documented
confirmation they provide of what the United States is actually doing and why. When these deeds turn
out to clash with the government’s public rhetoric, as they so often do, it becomes harder for U.S.
allies to overlook Washington’s covert behavior and easier for U.S. adversaries to justify their
own.”172 Toward the end of the essay, Farrell and Finnemore suggest, “The U.S. government, its
friends, and its foes can no longer plausibly deny the dark side of U.S. foreign policy and will have to
address it head-on.” Indeed, the U.S. is currently working to repair damaged bilateral and multilateral
relations with countries from Germany and France to Russia and Israel,173 and it is likely that the
effects of the NSA disclosures will be felt for years in fields far beyond Internet policy.174
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1NC Shell (3/4)
C. Internal Link – This is not a good thing. Without government control over the Internet, there
would be no way to prevent and mitigate cyber-terrorism.
Baldor, Associated Press writer, 2009
(Lolita C. Baldor, How much government control in cybercrisis?,
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/33038143/ns/technology_and_science-security/t/how-much-governmentcontrol-cybercrisis/#.VWXbAvlViko)
There's no kill switch for the Internet, no secret on-off button in an Oval Office drawer. Yet when a
Senate committee was exploring ways to secure computer networks, a provision to give the president
the power to shut down Internet traffic to compromised Web sites in an emergency set off alarms.
Corporate leaders and privacy advocates quickly objected, saying the government must not seize
control of the Internet. Lawmakers dropped it, but the debate rages on. How much control should
federal authorities have over the Web in a crisis? How much should be left to the private sector? It
does own and operate at least 80 percent of the Internet and argues it can do a better job. "We need
to prepare for that digital disaster," said Melissa Hathaway, the former White House cybersecurity
adviser. "We need a system to identify, isolate and respond to cyberattacks at the speed of light." So
far at least 18 bills have been introduced as Congress works carefully to give federal authorities the
power to protect the country in the event of a massive cyberattack. Lawmakers do not want to violate
personal and corporate privacy or squelching innovation. All involved acknowledge it isn't going to be
easy. For most people, the Internet is a public haven for free thought and enterprise. Over time it has
become the electronic control panel for much of the world's critical infrastructure. Computer networks
today hold government secrets, military weapons specifications, sensitive corporate data, and vast
amounts of personal information. Millions of times a day, hackers, cybercriminals and mercenaries
working for governments and private entities are scanning those networks, looking to defraud, disrupt
or even destroy. Just eight years ago, the government ordered planes from the sky in the hours after
the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. Could or should the president have the same power over the Internet in
a digital disaster? If hackers take over a nuclear plant's control system, should the president order the
computer networks shut down? If there's a terrorist attack, should the government knock users off
other computer networks to ensure that critical systems stay online? And should the government be
able to dictate who companies can hire and what they must do to secure the networks that affect
Americans' daily life.
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D. Impact – Cyber-attacks between states would result in great power wars.
Gable, 2010
(Adjunct Professor of Public International Law, Drexel University Earle Mack School of Law, Kelly A.
Gable, Cyber-Apocalypse Now: Securing the Internet Against Cyberterrorism and Using Universal
Jurisdiction as a Deterrent, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, January, 2010, 43 Vand. J.
Transnat'l L. 57)
Spoofing attacks are concentrated on impersonating a particular user or computer, usually in order to
launch other types of attacks. n122 Spoofing is often committed in connection with password sniffing;
after obtaining a user's log-in and password, the spoofer will log in to the computer and masquerade
as the legitimate user. The cyberterrorist typically does not stop there, instead using that computer as
a bridge to another, hopping in this fashion from computer to computer. This process, called
"looping," effectively conceals the spoofer's identity, especially because he or she may have jumped
back and forth across various national boundaries. n123 Even more disturbing is the possibility of
misleading entire governments into believing that another, potentially hostile government is
attempting to infiltrate its networks. Imagine that a cyberterrorist perpetrates an attack on the network
maintained by the U.S. Treasury and steals millions of dollars, transferring the money to his own
account to be used for funding further terrorist activities. n124 He has used the spoofing technique,
however, which causes the U.S. government to believe the Russian government to be behind the
attack and to accuse them of the attack. The Russian government denies the accusation and is
insulted at the seemingly unprovoked hostility. Tensions between the governments escalate and boil
over, potentially resulting in war. Though this may be only a hypothetical example, it is frighteningly
plausible. In fact, it may have been used in the attacks on U.S. and South Korean websites - the
South Korean government initially was so certain that North Korea was behind the attack that it
publicly accused the North Korean government, despite already tense relations. n125 Similarly, in the
2007 attack on Estonia, Estonian authorities were so certain that the Russian government was behind
the attack that they not only publicly accused them but requested military assistance from NATO in
responding to the attack. n126 It was later determined that Russia was not behind the attack and that
at least some of the attackers were located in Brazil and Vietnam. n127
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AT: Uniqueness Overwhelms Link – NSA is Proxy
[___]
[___] The plan draws a sharp distinction between domestic and national security surveillance.
This is key to the US Internet Freedom agenda’s credibility.
Fontaine, President of the Center for a New American Security, 2014
(foreign policy advisor to Senator John McCain for more than five years; Worked at the State
Department, the National Security Council and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; was
associate director for near Eastern affairs at the National Security Council; B.A. in International
Relations from Tulan University (Richard, “Bringing Liberty Online; Reenergizing the Internet
Freedom Agenda in a Post-Snowden Era”, Center for a New American Security, September 18, 2014,
http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_BringingLibertyOnline_Fontaine.pdf)
The 2013 revelations of mass surveillance by the U.S. government transformed the global debate
about Internet freedom. Where once Washington routinely chided foreign governments and their
corporate collaborators for engaging in online censorship, monitoring and other forms of Internet
repression, the tables have turned. Edward Snowden, a former National Security Agency (NSA)
contractor, leaked thousands of documents revealing America’s most secret electronic surveillance
programs, unleashing a tidal wave of criticism and charges of hypocrisy, many directed at some of
the very U.S. officials who have championed online freedom. America’s Internet freedom agenda –
the effort to preserve and extend the free flow of information online – hangs in the balance.1 Already
a contested space, the Internet after the Snowden revelations has become even more politically
charged, with deep international divisions about its governance and heated battles over its use as a
tool of political change. With 2.8 billion Internet users today, and several billion more expected over
the next decade, the contest over online freedom grows more important by the day.2 As an evergreater proportion of human activity is mediated through Internet-based technologies, the extent of
online rights and restrictions takes on an increasingly vital role in political, economic and social life.3
Despite the many complications arising from the Snowden disclosures, America still needs a
comprehensive Internet freedom strategy, one that tilts the balance in favor of those who would use
the Internet to advance tolerance and free expression, and away from those who would employ it for
repression or violence.4 It will need to pursue this strategy while drawing a sharp distinction between
surveillance for national security purposes (in which all governments engage) and monitoring as a
means of political repression (which democracies oppose). This is not an easy task, but it is an
important one. More than a year after the first Snowden revelations emerged, now is the time to
reenergize the Internet freedom agenda.
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AT: Uniqueness Overwhelms Link – Nationalization Inevitable
[___]
[___] The nationalization going on now is reversible.
Gelb, 2010
(Prof-Business & Economic-UH, “Getting Digital Statecraft Right,” Foreign Affairs, 7/28,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66502/betsy-gelb-and-emmanuel-yujuico/getting-digitalstatecraft-right)
All these cases share the same fallacy -- that U.S.-directed methods can spur development in other
nations. But U.S. policies seeking to extend freedom through technology can be successful -- if the
United States refrains from acting in ways that seem less than sincere, and if it adopts a gradual,
rather than transformative, approach. U.S. protests against censorship would seem more convincing
if it were not for its own policies restricting Internet freedom. Consider, for example, the United States'
questionable prohibition of cross-border trade in Internet gambling. In 2004, the World Trade
Organization ruled in favor of Antigua and Barbuda against the United States when the United States
banned online gambling services emanating from the twin-island nation. The United States appealed
the case and lost, but in the meantime, Antigua's online gambling industry was virtually destroyed.
The United States still has not yet satisfactorily resolved this ruling and should do so by conforming to
it.
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AT: No Impact – Cyber-Terror Overblown
[___]
[___] Cyberwar is likely & will be huge—civilians are fair ground.
Kesan & Hayes 2012
(Professor, H. Ross & Helen Workman Research Scholar, and Director of the Program in Intellectual
Property & Technology Law, University of Illinois College of Law. ** Research Fellow, University of
Illinois College of Law [Jay P. Kesan* and Carol M. Hayes**, MITIGATIVE COUNTERSTRIKING:
SELF-DEFENSE AND DETERRENCE IN CYBERSPACE, Spring, 2012, Harvard Journal of Law &
Technology, 25 Harv. J. Law & Tec 415)
Many academics and political figures have weighed in on the potential for cyberwarfare. Nikolai
Kuryanovich, a Russian politician, wrote in 2006 he expects that in the near future many conflicts will
take place in cyberspace instead of traditional war environments. n171 [*443] Some commentators
have asserted that cyberspace provides potential asymmetric advantages, which may be utilized by
less powerful nations to exploit the reliance of the United States on information infrastructure. n172
Specifically, China recognizes the value of cyberwarfare, n173 and its military includes "information
warfare units." n174 Meanwhile, Russia has a cyberwarfare doctrine that views cyberattacks as force
multipliers, and North Korea's Unit 121 focuses solely on cyberwarfare. n175 Many suspect that the
Russian government conducted the cyberattacks against Estonia, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan, though
the Russian government's involvement has not been proven. n176 Estimates suggest there are
currently 140 nations that either have or are developing cyberwarfare capabilities. n177 It is fair to
say that preparations are underway to make cyberwarfare a viable alternative to physical warfare,
and that policymakers are recognizing the applicability of the laws of war to the cyber context. n178
The effects of these changes on the private sector cannot be ignored. The line between the
government and the private sector on cyberwar matters is blurred. Dycus notes that the federal
government has at times delegated to private companies the task of operating cyber technology for
the purpose of collecting and analyzing intelligence. n179 Because of the degree to which the private
sector is involved with cyber infrastructure, many commentators have observed that the private sector
will likely be heavily implicated by future cyberwars. n180 [*444] This overlap between civilian and
military roles may prove problematic. Some commentators express concerns that cyberwarfare may
erode the distinction between combatants and noncombatants under international law, which
currently protects noncombatants. n181 The degree to which conventional war doctrine applies to
cyberwar is not yet clear. Some commentators argue that because of this uncertainty, aggressive
countries may have carte blanche to launch cyberattacks against civilian targets in a manner that
would be impermissible under the laws of kinetic war. n182 Given the importance of civilian targets in
the cyberwar context, Brenner and Clarke suggest using a form of conscription to create a Cyberwar
National Guard consisting of technologically savvy citizens to better protect CNI. n183 Indeed, one of
the focuses of any national cybersecurity program should be on protecting CNI -- the topic to which
we now turn.
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AT: Impact Turn – Democracy
[___]
[___] Internet freedom wrecks democracy and information overload prevents stable
transitions.
Morozov, 2012
(Contributing editor at The New Republic and author of two books ; has written for The New York
Times, The Economist, The Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, London Review of Books, Times
Literary Supplement (Evgeny, The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom, p. 271)
It may be that what we gain in the ability to network and communicate, we lose in the inevitable
empowerment of angry online mobs, who are well-trained to throw “data grenades” at their victims.
This may be an acceptable consequence of promoting Internet freedom, but we’d better plan ahead
and think of ways in which we can protect the victims. It’s irresponsible to put people’s lives on the
line while hoping we can deal at some later point with the consequences of opening up all the
networks and databases. That the excess of data can pose a danger to freedom and democracy as
significant as (if not more significant than) the lack of data has mostly been lost on those cheerleading
for Internet freedom. This is hardly surprising, for this may not be such an acute problem in liberal
democracies, where the dominant pluralist ideology, growing multiculturalism, and a strong rule of law
mitigate the consequences of the data deluge. But most authoritarian or even transitional states do
not have that luxury. Hoping that simply opening up all the networks and uploading all the documents
would make a transition to democracy easier or more likely is just an illusion. If the sad experience of
the 1990s has taught us anything, it’s that successful transitions require a strong state and a relatively
orderly public life. The Internet, so far, has posed a major threat to both.
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AT: Impact Turn – Destroys Economic Growth
[___]
[___] Collapses US economic growth – major attack on infrastructure.
Opderbeck, Professor of Law, Seton Hall University Law School, 2012
(David W. Opderbeck, Cybersecurity and Executive Power, Washington University Law Review, 89
Wash. U. L. Rev. 795)
In fact, cyberspace was in many ways the front line of the Egyptian revolution. Although Mubarak
apparently lacked the support among the Egyptian military for sustained attacks on civilians, he
waged a desperate last-gasp battle to shut down access to the Internet so that organizers could not
effectively communicate with each other, the public, or the outside world. n5 Could a similar battle
over cyberspace be waged in developed democracies, such as the United States? Policymakers in
the West are justifiably concerned about cyberattacks, cyberterrorism, and the possibility of cyberwar.
The raging question is whether a democratic state governed by constitutional principles and
committed to free speech and private property rights can promote cybersecurity without destroying
the Internet's unique capacity to foster civil liberties. Cyberspace is as vulnerable as it is vital. The
threat is real. President Obama recently declared that "cyber threat is one of the most serious
economic and national security challenges we face as a nation" and that "America's economic
prosperity in the 21st century will depend on cybersecurity." n6 Cybersecurity has been described as
"a major national security problem for the United States." n7 Private and public cyber-infrastructure in
the United States falls under nearly constant attack, often from shadowy sources connected to
terrorist groups, organized crime syndicates, or foreign governments. n8 These attacks bear the
potential to disrupt not only e-mail and other online communications networks, but also the national
energy grid, military-defense ground and satellite facilities, transportation systems, financial markets,
and other essential [*798] facilities. n9 In short, a substantial cyberattack could take down the
nation's entire security and economic infrastructure. n10 U.S. policymakers are justifiably concerned
by this threat. Existing U.S. law is not equipped to handle the problem. The United States currently
relies on a patchwork of laws and regulations designed primarily to address the "computer crime" of a
decade ago, as well as controversial antiterrorism legislation passed after the September 11 attacks,
and some general (and equally controversial) principles of executive power in times of emergency.
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AT: Impact Turn – Destroys Internet
[___]
[___] Nationalization doesn’t “end the Internet.”
Goldstein, 2014
(Gordon M. Goldstein, 6/25/2014. Served as a member of the American delegation to the World
Conference on International Telecommunications. “The End of the Internet?” The Atlantic,
http://m.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/07/the-end-of-the-internet/372301/)
Some experts anticipate a future with a Brazilian Internet, a European Internet, an Iranian Internet, an
Egyptian Internet—all with different content regulations and trade rules, and perhaps with contrasting
standards and operational protocols. Eli Noam, a professor of economics and finance at Columbia
Business School, believes that such a progressive fracturing of the global Internet is inevitable. “We
must get used to the idea that the standardised internet is the past but not the future,” he wrote last
fall. “And that the future is a federated internet, not a uniform one.” Noam thinks that can be
managed, in part through the development of new intermediary technologies that would essentially
allow the different Internets to talk to each other, and allow users to navigate the different legal and
regulatory environments.
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