DON’T PANIC!
Crowd behaviour in
emergencies: implications
for professionals
Presentation for the EPC 3/9/2008
Dr Chris Cocking
London Metropolitan University
c.cocking@londonmet.ac.uk
Outline of Presentation



1) Background and aims of research
2) Examples of how behaviour in
emergencies support our theories
3) Implications for emergency planners
Context of research




Crowd behaviour theories have
developed over timea) 19th Century: Le Bon irrationalist approach
b) 1960s - 70s: more rationalist approaches
c) 1980s to present: The Social Identity
Approach- not rational or irrational, but
transformation from individual to collective
Iroquois fire 1903

‘most of the dead were trampled or
smothered, though many jumped or fell to
the floor of the foyer. In places on the
stairways, particularly where a turn caused a
jam, bodies were piled 7 or 8 feet deep.
Fireman and Police confronted a sickening
task in disentangling them.[ ] The heel prints
on the dead faces mutely testified to the cruel
fact that human animals stricken by terror are
as mad and ruthless as stampeding cattle’
(in Latane & Darley 1970) p.53
What is panic?




Difficult to define
Is escaping a potentially fatal threat- panic or
logical flight behaviour?
‘Collective flight based on hysterical belief’
(Smelser, 1963)
‘extreme and groundless fear’ (Quarantelli,
2001) -but debates whether it’s even a useful
concept to describe behaviour in emergencies
The ‘Panic’ model





Part of the irrationalist tradition in crowd
psychology
a) Threat causes emotion to overwhelm reason
b) Collective identity breaks down
c) Selfish behaviours- pushing, trampling
d) Contagion- these behaviours spread
uncritically to crowd as a whole
Implications of the panic
model

Assuming people will panic in disasters can affect
emergency planning

Implications behind Civil Contingencies Act of
potential threat of public gatherings (Drury, 2004)


Counter-terrorism planning in US tends not to trust
public to behave sensibly, assuming that they are
uncooperative and prone to panic (Glass & SchochSpana, 2002)
Over-protective government responses may stunt
public’s own natural resilience (Wessely, 2005)
Problems with the panic model




Mass panic is rare - noticeable by its absence
in many different emergencies, such as;
a) Atomic bombing of Japan during World
War II
b) Kings Cross underground fire (1987)
c) WTC evacuation 9/11
‘classic panic action or people behaving in an
irrational manner was noted in [just] 1/124
(0.8%) cases’ (Blake et al. 2004)
Panic during WWII?




Not simply number of casualties, but intensity
and unpredictability of bombings
80,000 killed in London during Blitz, vs. 3000
in Coventry, but more psychological casualties
in the latter
Children often found it more upsetting to be
separated from parents than air-raid itself
Cf Jones et al (2006), Mawson (2005)
Under-reaction rather than
over-reaction
‘When people die in fires, it’s not
because of panic, it’s more likely to
be the lack of panic’
Neil Townsend, Divisional Officer,
London Fire Rescue Service
Social attachment model





Developed by Mawson (2005)
Uses early psychological theories of maternal
attachment
In times of stress, people seek out
attachment figures- known as affiliative
behaviour
Social norms rarely break down
But these ties can have fatal consequencespeople tend to leave or die as a group
Social attachment model

Improves on panic model, and
supported by evidence from disasters
(Cornwell, 2001)



But problems remain;
a) Implies that panic in a crowd of
strangers is more likely
b) Neglects possibility that strangers
may co-operate with each other
The self-categorisation
approach




Disasters can create a common identity or
sense of ‘we-ness’
This common identity results in orderly,
altruistic behaviour as people escape common
threat
Increased threat can enhance common
identity
Supported by evidence from sociologists
Clarke (2002); Tierney (2002)
Recent research



Project funded by ESRC from 2004-7 at
University of Sussex
Can existing psychological models of
crowd behaviour can be applied to
emergencies?
3 different areas of research:
interviews, room evacuations, and VR
simulations
Interviewing disaster survivors
Sinking of the Jupiter, 1988 & Oceana, 1991
Hillsborough football stadium disaster, 1989
Ghana football stadium ‘stampede’, 2001
Bradford football stadium fire, 1985
Fatboy Slim beach party, 2002
Harrods bomb, 1983
Canary Wharf evacuation, 2001
Results from interviews
Common identity quickly
emerges
 Co-operative rather than selfish
behaviour predominates

Hillsborough 1989
I don’t think people did lose control of their
emotions [ ] they were clearly in control of
their own emotions and their own physical
insecurity, I mean [] you’re being crushed,
you’re beginning to fear for your own
personal safety, and yet they were [ ]
controlling or tempering their emotions to
help try and remedy the situation and help
others who were clearly struggling
‘Fat Boy Slim’ Brighton 2002


‘People were helping people up and helping people
down it was it was a very different atmosphere from
any other gig that I’d ever worked before’
‘It was like a massive rave party where everybody felt
they knew each other where they could go up to
each other hug total strangers and they were in such
close proximity to each other and all you could see
was people sticking their arms round each other and
grinning and you know it was oh God it’s a bit packed
isn’t it that sort of…those conversations were going
on but not complaints about it’
Room evacuation studies



Simulated role-plays of room
evacuations with smoke and time
pressures
Some evidence of common identity
emerging in response to shared fate
But study suffered from lack of realism
VR evacuation programme




Joint project with computing scientists at
Universities of Nottingham & RMIT (Australia)
Many good simulations of crowd flow, but
most don’t consider psychological theories of
crowd behaviour
Evidence for link between sense of groupness
and helping
Discussions with potential users (e.g. Home
Office/SciTech) to market it as a training tool
Research into 7th July, 2005




Press reports and web-logs
Web based questionnaire for eyewitnesses of bombings
Interview study of survivors
Results support our theories
Chronology of events on the
tube on 7/7




Blasts followed by darkness and silence
Screaming- people try to work out what’s
going on
Smoke & soot clear- attempts to help/
comfort others, & escape- some delay
because of fear that tracks are live
Passengers wait approx 30 mins. for rescue,
and walk in orderly fashion along tracks when
directed
Response to 7/7



Individual fear and distress, but no
mass panic
Evacuations characterised by
orderly, calm behaviour
Many reports of altruism, cooperation, and collective spirit of
Londoners/ UK as a whole
Orderly evacuation
The myth of Panic




Many accounts of ‘panic’
But what actually is panic, and what is
logical flight behaviour?
Need to look at what people actually
do, and decide if it is indeed ‘panic’
More than just semantics, as it could
affect emergency evacuation planning
Panic?


‘There was no real panic - just an
overwhelming sense to get out of the
station quickly’
‘Almost straight away our packed
carriage started to fill with smoke, and
people panicked immediately.
Thankfully there were some levelheaded people on the carriage who
managed to calm everyone down’
Unity


‘I felt there was a real sense of unity. We
were all trying our best to find a way out of
there and reassure each other’
‘One of the things which struck me about this
experience is that one minute you are
standing around strangers and the next
minute they become the closest and most
important people in your life. That feeling
was quite extraordinary’
Co-operative behaviour



‘Many people kept calm and tried to
help one another to see if anyone was
injured’
‘I was very aware of people helping
each other out and I was being helped
myself’
‘Passengers with medical experience
were found, I found a tool box and we
smashed a window, allowing the
medical guys to enter the other train’
Wider contexts



Do different nationalities/ cultures respond
differently in emergencies?
Common belief that if panic doesn’t happen,
it’s due to a specific national identity (e.g.
‘British Bulldog spirit’), and panic may happen
elsewhere, but little evidence to support this
We expected some minor cultural variations
at start of project, but the more we looked,
the less differences we found
Panic on 9/11?
Asian Tsunami, Thailand 2004


When tsunami hit, divisions between
local Thais and Western holidaymakers
were forgotten and people co-operated
Reports of fighting between tourists to
get ferries from islands afterwards, but
collective identity could have diminished
by then and less important than desire
to get home
Hurricane Katrina, Sept 2005



Initial reports of mass looting, gang-rapes,
and murders in Superdome, New Orleans
But these reports were later seen to be wildly
exaggerated- very little evidence to support
them: crime rate in period after Katrina
actually dropped
Local Police chief resigned when scale of
exaggeration became clear
Fear of mob has fatal results?
Hajj pilgrimage, Saudi Arabia




Some of largest crowds on earth travel to
Mecca/ Medina for the Hajj each year
Some tragic accidents, but overwhelming
majority of pilgrims unaffected
Fatalities usually due to physical pressure of
crowd rather than any ‘irrational’ behaviour
Need to overcome some fatalistic cultural
beliefs (e.g. ‘it’s God’s will’, & ‘you go straight
to heaven if you die on the pilgrimage)
Different behaviour depending
on perception of threat?




Some evidence that people may be more
fearful/anxious if threat is man-made (e.g.
terrorist attack vs ‘act of God’)
But no evidence that this results in more
overt ‘panicked’ behaviour.
Seems to be largely that people fear that
others may panic if they realise threat is manmade and so don’t say so even if they believe
it is
But common identity appears to emerge in
both situations- no evidence yet of any
difference in strength
General conclusions




Little evidence for mass panic in
emergencies
The ‘panic’ model should not be used in
planning emergency responses
Any selfish behaviour is confined to
individuals and rarely spreads
Risks associated with crowds are usually
due to physical constraints and lack of
info rather than their inherent
‘selfishness’
OK, BUT SO WHAT?
Possible applications of the
research
More info rather than less




Very little evidence that people panic if made aware
of a threat and some shows the opposite (Proulx &
Sime 1991)
Use of radio code words (e.g. Mr Sands etc) good for
keeping professional composure, but no evidence
people stampede if they hear ‘FIRE!’
If info is given in clear ways that people can safely
act upon to escape threat, they usually do
Deliberately withholding info could cause problems in
any future emergencies, as people may not trust
accuracy of messages
Delivery of information is important


Info needs to be clear, unambiguous,
delivered confidently, and come from
believable source that crowd identifies with
(e.g. recent advice to RUSI re CBRN
incidents)
Spokesperson should be appointed with sole
duty to communicate with public (London
Assembly 2006)

This could depend on type of crowd; e.g.
commuters, football fans
Hurricane Gustav
‘You need to be scared,
you need to be concerned,
you need to get your butts
moving out of New
Orleans now! … We are
ordering a mandatory
evacuation of the city of
New Orleans starting in
the morning at 8am on the
West Bank… we give you
4 hours to evacuate’
(Ray Negin, Mayor of New
Orleans. 31st August 2008)
Crowds can be part of the solution
rather than part of the problem
People may delay own evac to help
others
Appeal to the crowds’ common
humanity- ‘We’re in this together’
Don’t address commuters as atomised
‘customers’
Influential leader figures may emerge
from crowd, who can help rescue effort
Spontaneous leaders on 7/7
Plan emergency response





Take the possibility of emergency seriously- don’t
think ‘it won’t happen to us!’
Train staff in knowledge of location, and how to relay
information effectively in emergencies
Don’t say ‘don’t panic’, as it can create expectation of
panic (Durodié & Wessely, 2005)
Practice can make a real difference; e.g. WTC evac
rates- 1993 vs 2001
(99% of those below planes’ impact escaped-USA Today)
Possible problematic
behaviours by individuals





Delaying exit to safety/ finishing mundane
tasks-’freezing’ or ‘disassociation’
People tend to leave by route they entered,
even if closer exits are available
Crowd members can be unaware of physical
pressure that others may suffer
People unwilling to leave area, or passers-by
rubber-necking
Attempts to breach cordons (worried parents,
single-minded commuters, etc)
But…




We don’t make any claims that
everyone behaves like heroes
Some individuals may behave in selfish
or even ‘panicked’ ways
But this is isolated and almost never
spreads
Others usually intervene to calm
situation
Summary



Crowds in emergencies behave in ways
that are consistent with their social
identities and governed by the social
norms of the situation
The ‘panic model’ is largely a myth
Evidence gathered from many different
emergencies supports our theories
Future plans





We’d like to look in more detail at
concept of ‘resilience’
Lot of research on trauma after
emergencies- less on how we cope
(only 25-33% of disaster survivors get PTSD)
Can the common identity that emerges from
disasters help shield people from PTSD?
Open question, but area needs more research
Thank you for listening




Any questions/ comments?
Full Report available at:
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/affiliates/
panic/applications.html
Or e-mail me;
c.cocking@londonmet.ac.uk
References:















Blake et al (2004). Proceedings of Third International Symposium on Human
Behaviour in Fire.
Clarke L (2002). Contexts.
Cornwell B (2001) The Sociological Quarterly, 44, 617-638.
Drury J (2004) The Psychologist.
Durodié B & Wessely S (2002) The Lancet.
Glass T & Schoch-Spana M (2002) Clinical Infectious Diseases
Jones et al (2006) Journal of Risk Research
Latane & Darley (1970) The Unresponsive bystander.
Le Bon G (1968)The crowd: A study of the popular mind
London Assembly (2006) Report of the 7th July Review committee.
Mawson A (2005) Psychiatry
Proulx G & Sime J (1991) Fire Safety Science
Quarantelli E (2001) The Sociology of Panic
Smelser N (1962). Theory of Collective Behaviour.
Tierney K (2002) Strength of a city: A disaster research perspective on the WTC
attack.