SURPRISE, SECRECY, AND
DECEPTION
Topic #12
Preface: Dilbert on Tactical Warning
Surprise Attack
• Nations are often surprised and/or successfully deceived in
international relations.
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German Strike in the West, May 1940
German Strike in East, June 1941 (Operation Barbarossa)
Pearl Harbor, December 1941
Korea War
• North Korean invasion of South, June 1950
• Inchon Landings, September 1950
• Chinese intervention, November 1950
Cuban Missile Crisis
• SU surprised US prior to October 14, 1962
• US surprised SU on October 22, 1962
Israeli pre-emptive attack on Egyptian Air Force, Six-Day Way
Egyptian attack on Israeli forces at Suez Canal, Yom Kippur War
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, August 1990
9/11 attacks on US
“Signals vs. Noise”
• Why do surprise attacks (etc.) so often succeed?
– A few “signals” are buried in a lot of “noise.”
• Signals : in this context, bits of information giving advance
indications about an upcoming attack (or other surprise).
• Noise (or static): the much more numerous bits of information
that are essentially random or meaningless, in any case
– are not advance indications of anything unusual or
threatening.
• Signal are typically (and “naturally”) hidden in or camouflaged
by noise.
Kermit Tyler: RIP 1913-02/24/2010
Signals, Noise, and Expectations
• Because of noise, a variety of expectations about the
immediate future are plausible, and
– usually the most plausible one is that the immediate
future will be the same as the present (and recent past).
• Decision makers usually have premises/predispositions/mind
sets) that lead them to overlook signals inconsistent with the
most plausible expectation.
– It is difficult to “look at evidence with an open mind,”
• contrary to “the doctrine of immaculate perception.”
• “Things must be believed to be seen [quickly].”
Signals, Noise, and Expectations (cont.)
• US before Pearl Harbor: “Japan would be crazy to directly
tangle with the U.S.”
• SU before Barbarosa: “We have a non-aggregation with
Germany – and Germany’s main lesson from WWI was: don’t
get into a two-front war.”
• US before Chinese intervention in Korea: “The Communist
regime needs time to consolidate its rule.”
• US before Missile Crisis: “SU would not run the risk of
stationing nuclear weapons outside of the SU.”
– Also Cuban refugee reports had been “crying wolf” for months.
• Such expectations sometimes work the other way.
– US in Vietnam: “China intervened unexpectedly in Korea – they may
do the same in Vietnam.”
Signals, Noise, and Expectations (cont.)
• The “signals vs. noise” distinction can also work in the
opposite fashion.
– What may be interpreted as signals of hostile intent may really just be
meaningless noise.
• In the middle of the Cuban Missile Crisis, a US U2 spy plane accidently
overflew the Chukotka Peninsula (eastern Siberia).
– This can lead to “self-fulfilling prophecy” of hostile intent.
• “The Spiral Model”
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Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August [origins of WWI]
Rationale for “appeasement” prior to WWII.
Historical controversy regarding origins of the Cold War.
Stable vs. Unstable Nuclear Deterrence.
“War-by-Accident” scenarios: Failsafe, Dr. Strangelove.
Schelling, Arms and Influence, Chapter 6 (“The Dynamics of Mutual
Alarm”)
Warning and Decision
• In summary, it is hard to pick
signals out of noise (to
“connect the dots”) in
advance,
– though it may be easy to
identify and connect
them out later.
• And, on the whole, a false
sense of security is more
prevalent than a false sense
of insecurity.
• To avoid spiral model: “look
ahead and reason back”
thinking of ExCom in Cuban
Missile Crisis.
Secrecy
• We saw earlier that a player may have (though does not
always have) an incentive to keep his strategy (plan of action)
secret from the other player,
– particularly in a non-strictly determined zero-sum game.
– In the D-Day Game, the Allies wanted to deceive the Germans as to
where the invasion would take place and therefore needed to keep
their actual plans secret.
• In a Chicken Game, a player may be ostensibly committed to a
“stand firm” strategy,
– but if this really is a bluff, this fact must be kept secret.
• So while there is tendency toward “natural deception”
resulting from the signal vs. noise distinction, there are also
incentives for “artificial [player-made] deception” as well,
– that is, to “damp down” signals indicative of their intentions.
“Signals vs. Indices”
• Another pair of concepts is relevant to consideration of
secrecy and deception.
– “Signals” vs. “Indices,”
• due to Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in IR.
– Unfortunately, the term “signal” is used here in a
somewhat different sense from in the “signals vs. noise”
distinction.
• Signals and Indices are both means that can be used by a
player (an “actor” in IR) to project an image of itself that
induces preferred perceptions and actions by other players.
Signals
• A signal is conveyed by words, actions, or other communications the meaning of which is established by convention,
i.e.,
– tactic or explicit understandings among players.
• In game theory, signals are now commonly referred to as
“cheap talk,”
– because it is as easy project a false image when using signals as it is to
project a true image.
• Examples of signals in IR include:
– “words” such as public speeches and messages, diplomatic notes,
press releases, confidential messages sent through intermediaries,
etc., and
– “actions” such as expelling diplomatic personnel, extending or
breaking diplomatic relations, good will visits, conspicuous military
maneuvers, etc.
Indices
• An index is a statement or action that carries with it some
inherent evidence that the projected image is a true one,
– because the index is believed to be inextricably linked to
the capabilities and/or intentions of the actor.
• Example of indices in IR include:
– intercepted private messages;
– major actions involving high costs or risk, e.g.,
• putting US soldiers in West Berlin or South Korea,
• putting a US Navy “quarantine” around Cuba.
• Homely examples of signal vs. index:
– In driving, turn signal vs. slowing down/shifting lanes, etc.
– Pitcher’s mannerisms indicating next pitch.
Indices Can Evolve into Signals
• Do “actions speak louder [have more credibility] than words”?
– Deeds/indices may evolve into mere signals,
• e.g., car with hood up;
• expelling diplomatic personnel, etc.
• Using signals, it is as easy to lie as to tell the truth.
• Using indices, it is harder to lie than tell the truth,
– but it is not impossible, and so
– indices may be manipulated.
Signals Can Evolve into Indices
• In some contexts, what would be otherwise be a mere signal
becomes an index,
– especially in the context of “repeated play” of a game: in
particular
• because the actor has an established reputation for telling the truth (even
in awkward circumstances), or
• because the actor would be subject to severe social or other penalties for
being found out as lying.
– This is exemplified within established (and non“dysfunctional”) families, work groups, academic
departments, circles of friends, etc.
Lying vs. Deceiving
• Using signals, it as easy to lie as to tell the truth.
• This does not mean that it easy to deceive using signals,
– precisely because others recognize that you may have an incentive to
lie and it is easy to do so.
• An actor cannot deceive by signals, if he has a reputation for
lying.
– Moreover, an actor cannot tell the truth and be believed by signals ,if
he has a reputation for lying.
• “The boy who cried wolf”:
• Fire alarms, etc.
– If you want to believed in the future, “honesty is the best policy” for
the present.
– Also, if you want to deceive in the future, “honesty is the best policy”
for the present.
Lying vs. Deceiving (cont.)
• Games with “incomplete information”:
– Players don’t know each others payoffs/preferences.
• You suspect someone A is lying and trying to deceive you.
– A may be either of two “types”:
• someone who wants to tell you the truth, or
• someone who is trying deceive you.
– You ask A: “Are you telling the truth?”
• A’s answer is uninformative, because A’s best reply (answer) will be
the same (“yes”) regardless of his type.
– However, asking this question may produce somewhat informative
indices.
• Mannerisms, evident tension or embarrassment, etc.
• polygraph tests.
– “A diplomat is a man who's sent abroad to lie for his country.”
• JFK/Gromyko talks, October 18, 1962
Indices and Intelligence
• Especially good indices of A’s intentions are intercepted and
decoded signals among members of A’s “team.”
– They are playing a zero-conflict coordination game in
which there is no incentive to lie.
• If B can intercept and decode A’s internal signals, B can get a
big advantage.
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Baseball signals (coded vs. uncoded)
MAGIC (disclosed 1960)
Enigma Machine / Ultra-Secret (disclosed 1974)
Venona Project (disclosed 1995).
Radio phones (vs. runners, etc.) on battlefield
• Navajo Code Talkers (disclosed 1985)
Using Secret Intelligence
• Breaking an enemy code
– may seem to present marvelous opportunities, but
– it also generates many paradoxes, dilemmas, and risks requiring strategic
choices.
• Having broken the codes, what do you do?
– Keep the fact that you have broken the code secret.
• The is the purest kind of national security “ultra-secret.”
• What must be kept secret from the enemy is not his decoded messages but the fact
that you are reading them.
• If the enemy discovers you have broken his codes, his most obvious (though not
necessarily best) response is to change his codes.
• So you cannot disclose your achievement publically
– U-571 movie (fictionalized):
• A few weeks before D-Day, US forces capture a U-boat with its Enigma Machine and
codes intact.
• The US forces almost wish they had not done this.
• They have to keep secret from the Germans the fact that the U-Boat was captured,
not sent to the bottom, or else the Germans are likely to change their codes just
before D-Day.
Using Secret Intelligence (cont.)
• You must keep the fact that you have broken the code secret
– and also the intelligence derived,
– not only from the press and public
– but also almost everyone in the government.
• For example, the MAGIC decrypts were distributed
• to only about a dozen people
• only in Washington, and
• they were then shredded and burned.
– This made it hard to see broad patterns and to “connect
the dots.”
Using Secret Intelligence (cont.)
• Even if you do not (deliberately or in advertently) disclose
your intelligence coup,
– if you make “too good” use of the intercepted messages,
– your enemy will conclude that you have broken his code,
and
• therefore will change his code (or generate deceptive messages).
• So you probably should not exploit the intelligence as fully as
you might.
– You need to continue to make “normal mistakes” in order
not to arouse suspicion.
– Down the road, more “Monday morning quarterbacking.”
– Controversy and recriminations regarding bombing of
Coventry, England, November 14, 1940.
– Ditto some Merchant Marine convoys.
– Cuban Missile Crisis: great effort to maintain normal
routines prior to October 22.
Deception: The Man Who Never Was
• After clearing German forces from North Africa, the most obvious next
Allied target was Sicily – a stepping-stone to Italy.
• But the Allies wanted to convince the Germans that Sardinia and Crete
were the next targets,
– so the Germans would defend Sicily less strongly.
• Allied intelligence planted fake documents and identity papers on a body
floated ashore in Spain.
• German found the documents and evidently believed them, and therefore
interpreted Allied preparations to invade Sicily (which could not be hidden)
as an attempted deception.
Deception (cont.)
• The Allies had an intelligence network in occupied Holland.
• The Germans got control of this network.
• The Allies discovered that their network was actually under
German control.
• The Allies put naïve allied agents into Holland,
– with orders to get information about German forces in the
Calais area,
– which the Germans would interpret as more evidence that
the D-Day landings would be in Calais.
Cycles of Deception: Interception
• Suppose your opponent learns that you have broken his codes
and are intercepting his messages and he believes (correctly)
that you don’t know this.
– Now your opponent has his own “ultra-secret.”
– Since you regard intercepted messages as highly credible
indices, your opponent can now turn the tables on you.
• While your opponent can merely change his codes,
• he can also start generating out deceptive coded messages.
– But again they cannot exploit this opportunity “too much,”
because
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you will figure out
that they have found out
that you have broken their codes
and you will therefore no longer believe their coded messages.
Cycles of Deception: Double (etc.) Agents
• A has an agent X spying on B
• B “finds out” that X is an enemy agent
• B can arrest X but also
– B can (try to) “turn” the agent into a “double agent” feeding (partially)
false messages to A through X.
• If A finds out his agent has been turned,
– A will discount all the information coming from X, but
– A should stay in contact with X, because it is useful for A to know what
B wants A to believe.
• But if B finds out that A knows X has been “turned,” B can
feed true information though X, expecting that B will discount
it.
Cycles of Deception: Double (etc.)
Agents (cont.)
• Jervis, Logic of Images: in WWII there was a French colonel in
Algeria working as a German agent.
– The Allied discovered he was a German agent.
– The Allied “turned him” and used him to feed false information to the
Germans.
– After a while, the Germans figured out he had been turned.
– The Germans kept in contact with him, because it was useful for them
to know what the Allies wanted you to believe.
– Shortly before D-Day, the Allies discovered that the Germans knew the
colonel had been turned.
– The Allies had the colonel tell the Germans that the D-Day landings
would take place at Normandy on June 5, 6, or 7.
– To the German, this was conclusive proof that the landings would take
anywhere except Normandy and any time except June 5-7.
– On June 7, the colonel’s credibility shot up with Germans.
– The Allies to resumed feeding false information through the colonel.
The Double-Cross System
• In the early days of WWII, British
(counter) intelligence identified
(many) German agents in Britain.
• Rather than arresting these
agents, the “Twenty Committee”
“turned” and “ran” these agents.
• This had to be very carefully
orchestrated, so the German
would not realize their agents
had been turned.
– The Double-Cross System had to feed
some true and useful information to
the Germans.
– This obviously created difficult
relationships with Allied military
decision makers.
The Double-Cross System (cont.)
• The XX Committee “ran” the system conservatively, because
the expected the Germans to check information from DoubleCross agents against information from other agents not under
British control.
– In fact, after the war it was discovered that the Double-Cross System
controlled all German agents in Britain.
• Once the XX Committee deliberately ran an agent to show
that he was under British control,
– in order the give German intelligence a false impression of how the
British would run double-agents.
– But the Germans continued to regard the agent as reliable.
• The XX Committee “shot its wad” leading up to D-Day, but the
Double-Cross System still didn’t collapse.
The Double-Cross System (cont.)
• Some ironies:
– The success of the Double-Cross System and similar
deception operations gave the Allies a large stake in the
influence of German intelligence on German decision
making.
• But Hitler made the final choices,
• and did so more on the basis of intuition that intelligence.
– The Allies were fearful that defectors from German
intelligence would inform the Allies about German agents
in Britain,
• whom the Germans would then expect to be arrested.
• In war-time, truth is so precious that
she should always be attended by a
bodyguard of lies. Winston Churchill
• Virtually all Allied deception efforts
built up for the great (tactical)
deception for D-Day.
– That it would occur later rather than
sooner.
– That it would be in the Calais area, not
Normandy.
– That after a first attack, the main blow
would be elsewhere.
– Some forces were identified as landing in
Normandy (as they did).
– An entire “phantom” 3rd Army was built up
in southeast England.
A Bodyguard
of Lies