DETENTE AND
FINLAND
THE UNITED STATES AND
THE ONSET OF EUROPEAN
DETENTE
OUTLINE
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GLOBAL CONTEXT OF U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY
SOVIET-AMERICAN DETENTE AND
TRIANGULAR DIPLOMACY
UNITED STATES AND EUROPE
• JOHNSON AND DE GAULLE
• NIXON AND OSTPOLITIK
• CSCE
GLOBAL CONTEXT
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Cold War
Conundrums
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Regional Conflicts
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Relative Decline
JOHNSON’S DETENTE
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“Each time I
mentioned
missiles, Kosygin
talked about Arabs
and Israelis.”
“The Cold War is
not over.”
NIXON, DETENTE AND CHINA
”You’ve got three for
three Mr. President.”
-- Kissinger, October 12,
1972
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JOHNSON vs. DE GAULLE
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“we’ve really
got no control
over their
(France’s)
foreign policy.”
HARMEL REPORT, 1967
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Military security and a policy of détente
are not contradictory but complementary.
Collective defence is a stabilizing factor in
world politics. It is the necessary condition
for effective policies directed towards a
greater relaxation of tensions. The way to
peace and stability in Europe rests in
particular on the use of the Alliance
constructively in the interest of détente.
The participation of the USSR and the USA
will be necessary to achieve a settlement
of the political problems in Europe.
NIXON & OSTPOLITIK
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“[there is] a danger that as Brandt pursues the
quest for normalization, his advisers and supporters
will eventually succeed in leading him to jeopardize
Germany’s entire international position… assuming
Brandt achieves a degree of normalization, he or
his successor may discover before long that the
hoped-for benefits fail to develop. Instead of
ameliorating the division of Germany, recognition of
the G[erman] D[emocratic] R[epublic] may boost
its status and strengthen the Communist regime….
More fundamentally, the Soviets having achieved
their first set of objectives may then confront the
FRG with the proposition that a real and lasting
improvement in the FRG’s relations with the GDR
and other Eastern countries can only be achieved if
Bonn loosens its Western ties.”
-- Kissinger to Nixon, February 1970
“This meant that Washington wanted to have the
last word.”
-- Brandt
YEAR OF EUROPE
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"The United States has
global interests and
responsibilities. Our
European allies have
regional interests."
“For Kissinger to announce
a Year of Europe was like
for me to stand on
Trafalgar Square and
announce that we were
embarking on a year to
save America!”
-- Edward Heath
CSCE
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«They can write it in Swahili.» Kissinger
Assessment, 1975
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The CSCE has given the Russians something that
they had long wanted very much, perhaps even
come to over-value. But the Western
Governments have gained also - in limiting and
qualifying their endorsement of a situation they
do not intend to change, in forcing the Russians
to do battle on ground hitherto taboo and, not
least, in cohesion and the practice of cooperation. Elsewhere too - in the Quadripartite
Agreement on Berlin and in the development of
Western exports to CMEA countries - the Soviet
peace policy has been shown to carry advantages
for the West as well.
Assessment, 1975
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Mishandled by the West, the pursuit of détente
could lead to a Soviet walkover in Europe. But if
Western countries continue, negotiation by
negotiation, to stick together, to keep their guard
up and to settle for nothing less than a fair
balance of concrete advantage, they need not
shrink from it. Détente of that kind would differ
widely from the Soviet prospectus. And, in the
longer perspective, the practice of détente may
foster developments in Soviet policies which
ultimately make the USSR a less intractable, even
a more reliable, partner.
THOMAS GARVEY, BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO FINLAND
A BALANCE SHEET
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«In any case, what Europe thinks is
basically irrelevant.» Kissinger
EUROPEAN INFLUENCE ON
AMERICAN POLICY
GERMAN TREATIES, CSCE
SOVIET-AMERICAN VS. EUROPEAN
DETENTE