Crisis Decisionmaking,
Disaster/Emergency Response,
and Emergent Networks
Professor Mario Rivera
PADM 524
1
Characteristics Defining a Major Crisis
Disasters like Katrina are by definition major crises. Crises
are situations involving:
 Threats to major values—high organizational and personal
stakes, organizational and personal threats
 Threats to survival (of the nation or community, of cities
and people).
 Time urgency; time pressures.
 Ambiguity or uncertainty.
 Surprise or uniqueness. Cannot be entirely anticipated
and overwhelm cognitive and institutional resources even
when they can be anticipated (as was Katrina
 Insufficient information, insufficiency of resources, and a
sense of human and institutional insufficiency.
1. Jerrold M Post. 1993. “The Impact of Crisis-Induced Stress on Policy Makers,” in
Avoiding Inadvertent War, ed. A. George. Boulder: Westview Press.
2. Irving Janis and Leo Mann. 1977. Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of
Conflict, Choice, and Commitment. New York: The Free Press.
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Information, Novelty, and Crises
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Crisis situations are by definition novel, unstructured
threats, well outside of an organization’s or individual’s
customary operating framework.
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Crises require nonprogrammed decisional responses.
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Crises are highly uncertain and complex situations.
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Crises are characterized by an overload of incomplete,
conflicting information combined with a sense of
insufficiency with regard to critical information.
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The process of perceiving, collecting, selecting, and
processing information is critical to effective crisis
management
Reilly, A.H. 1993. “Preparing for the Worst: The Process of Effective Crisis
Management.” Industrial and Environmental Quarterly. Vol. 7, No. 2. Page 118.
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Characteristics of defective decisionmaking
in crises—decisional dysfunctions
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A truncated and compressed time span, with much more
attention paid to the immediate consequences of action
than to its long-range consequences.
A tendency toward decisional closure—rushed decisions—
which may in turn lead to premature action; or, conversely,
A tendency toward defensive avoidance—putting off
decisionmaking until more information comes in, waiting
for “optimal” moment to act, procrastination.
Cognitive rigidity, a tendency to maintain a fixed mind-set
and not be open to new information; diminished creativity.
A tendency to reduce cognitive complexity and uncertainty
by oversimplifying options, using rules of thumb, reducing
the range of options considered, taking first good option—
i.e., “satisficing.”
“Buyer’s regret.”
Post, Janis & Mann, Simon.
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Defective Decisionmaking
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In considering options, a tendency to “bolster,” that is to
overvalue and overcommit to factors favor the desired
option, or action prescription, and devalue and set aside
factors militating against that desired course of action.
A tendency toward faulty historical analogy.
A tendency toward the fundamental attribution bias: To see
the other’s actions as being precipitated by internal
(psychological) causes rather than external circumstances
(example: my adversary’s actions show that s/he is
malevolently out to destroy us, rather than that s/he
responding to external threats)—demonization, caricature.
With sustained cognitive conflict and increasing value
conflict, there is a tendency toward the emotional loading of
chosen options: Choices are often rationalized by such
statements as “We've run out of options,” when in fact good
options remain to be considered. Groups do not want to
revisit decisions that have been painful to reach.
Alan Dowty, Janis & Mann
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Decisional dysfunction and the Katrina response
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Before Katrina made landfall, Governor Kathleen Blanco had
requested “emergency protective measures, direct Federal
Assistance, Individual and Household Program … assistance,
Special Needs Program assistance, and debris removal.” She was
frustrated that FEMA Director Brown wanted itemized requests.
Blanco told President Bush: “Mr. President, we need your help. We
need everything you've got.” On Friday, August 26, 2005, when
Blanco declared a state of emergency. Look for other examples of
decisional dysfunction.
Attribution bias in the Katrina response
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Saturday, August 27, 2005: Blanco asked President Bush to
declare a federal state of emergency for Louisiana. Bush
quickly complied.
The National Guard remained under state control. Blanco
refused Bush administration requests to federalize the National
Guard. “They wanted to take over my National Guard,” said
Blanco—an attribution of nefarious designs on Bush’s part, on
her prerogatives as Governor .
While Blanco may have over-relied on a federal response that
was slow to come, she also exhibited great reluctance to
federalize the state’s response to Katrina, specifically
federalization of the Louisiana National Guard. Brown seemed
to rely overmuch on the layered and stage-wise response to
major emergencies envisioned in FEMA protocols and in the
National Incident Management System.
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Decisional Patterns
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Vigilance – a good response—f llowing a methodical,
high-quality process to objectively collect available
information, thoroughly consider it, search for other
possible options, and make a well reasoned decision; use
of discernment in both addressing problems and
selecting options
Unconflicted adherence – continuing with the current
situation, most often a sign of inertia, inertial dysfunction
Unconflicted change – following the last advice received.
Defensive avoidance – avoiding decision making
altogether. A form of procrastination.
Hypervigilance – The Inability to distinguish (or discern)
the critical or crucial from the unimportant; equal
attentiveness to all stimuli; undifferentiated scanning—
leads to a vacillating approach.
Source: Fink, Steven. 1986. Crisis Management: Planning for the Inevitable. New
York: Amacom. Pages 133–150.
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“Groupthink”
“a mode of thinking that people engage in when they
are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group…members’
striving for unanimity override their motivation to
realistically appraise alternate courses of action… a
deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and
moral judgment that results from in-group pressures.”
Source: Neck, C.P., and Manz, C.C. 1994. “From Group Think to Teamthink:
Toward the Creation of Constructive Thought Patterns in Self-Managing Work
Teams.” Human Relations. Vol. 47, No. 8. Quote taken from Victims of
Groupthink, by I.L. Janis (Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1972), p. 9.
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Related Symptoms of Defective Crisis
Decisionmaking
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Incomplete survey of alternatives.
Incomplete survey of objectives.
Failure to examine risks associated with
preferred choices.
Failure to reappraise initially rejected alternatives.
Poor information search.
Selective bias in processing information at hand.
Failure to work out contingency plans.
Janis & Mann, Dowty, Neck & Manz
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Responsibilities of the crisis decisionmaker—
overcoming dysfunctional tendencies, pressures
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Define the crucial elements of the crisis situation
Maintain receptivity to new information
Identify and adequately consider the major values and
interests to be addressed, and objectives to be fulfilled
Search for and evaluate alternative courses of action
Estimate the probable costs and risks of alternatives
Seek new information pertinent to assessment of options
Sift relevant/important from irrelevant/trivial information
Consider problems that may arise in implementing options
Assess the situation from the perspective of other parties
Resist pressures toward both defensive avoidance (putting
off a decision) and premature closure (rushing to decision)
Monitor the developing situation and make adjustments as
actions are taken (avoid the decision/action fallacy).
Decisional Limits in Disaster/Emergency Response
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While authority, leadership, and accountability are always needed,
collaboration functions better than over-centralized command-andcontrol approaches in major crises, whether natural or man-made.
Catastrophes (from weather to terror events) require decentralized
decisionmaking structures and collaborative networks of exchange
and support. A decentralized network will often emerge in the postevent environment of a large-scale disaster. The challenge is to
maximize collaboration and communication across that network (the
Boston Marathon bombings have once again raised the question of
‘stovepiping’ across agencies, of lack of intergovernmental
integration). Kettl: organize vertically, and work horizontally.
Disasters disrupt the patterns of what can be absorbed by routine
procedures. These types of events typically require improvisation,
but over-improvisation is dysfunctional. However, emergent
organization can shapes responses based on a synergistic
combination of experience and improvisation.
•Drabek T. E. and D.A. McEntire. 2002. Emergent Phenomena and Multi-organizational
Coordination in Disasters: Lessons from the Research Literature. International Journal of Mass
Emergencies and Disasters. August, 22(2), 197-224.
•Tierney, K.J. 2002. “Lessons Learned from Research on Group and Organizational Responses to
Disasters.” Paper presented at Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Natural and
Technological Disasters. Academy of Sciences, Feb. 28-March 1.
Incident Management Systems (IMS)
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A generic term for the design of ad hoc emergency management
teams that coordinate the efforts of more than one agency under a
unified command
A functional management system that integrates personnel from
different home organizations
IMS involve identification of an incident manager or unified
management team when jurisdictional areas or responsibilities
overlap
IMS entail rules for chain of command, unity of command, and span
of control
Standard terminology is intended to facilitate cooperation (although
some regional variance in terminology still remains)
Protocols for communications and flow of information
Emphasis on logistics planning and centralized resources allocation
Planning should functions on an equal level with operations and
logistics functions
Christen, H., P. Maniscalco, A. Vickery, & F. Winslow. 2001. “An Overview of Incident Management
Systems.” Perspectives on Preparedness. Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness. No. 4 (Sept.).
Emergent Organization in Disaster Response
Even with IMS in place, disasters evoke emergent responses.
“Emergence is likely when members perceive a present threat, when
the social climate is supportive of emergence, when social ties are in
place – at least to some degree – before the mobilization, when the
social setting legitimizes the groups, and when resources are
available.” This is so because disasters involve situations where:
 Most or all of the built structure is heavily impacted, along with the
facilities and operational bases of emergency organizations
themselves
 Local officials are unable to fulfill their usual roles, often well into
recovery periods
 Help from nearby communities is unavailable or insufficient
 Most everyday community functions are interrupted
 The mass media often distorts what has happens, in ways that feed
the politicization of catastrophes and disaster response.
“[Therefore] the level of emergence necessary to contend with these severe
and unanticipated conditions is likely to be greater than would occur in more
typical disaster situations.”
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Quarantelli, E.L., K.E. Green, E. Ireland, S. McCabe, and D.M. Neal. 1983. Emergent Citizen Groups in
Disaster Preparedness and Recovery Activities. Newark, DE.
Emergent Networks in Disaster Response
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Emergent Multi-Organizational Networks:
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The “structure of relationships that form among
organizations, or segments of organizations, that are
focused on a specific [activities or response functions]”
(Drabek, 1996: 21-11)
These typically form during the period of emergency for a
limited time in order to address emerging needs
In catastrophic events, EMONS are often simultaneously
comprised of a range of established, expanding, extending,
and emergent organizations.
Emergent organizational networks are defined as such not
necessarily because they are comprised of emergent
groups, but because the newly-formed relationships between
organizations have an emergent quality.
Drabek, T.E. 1996. The Social Dimensions of Disaster. Washington, DC: FEMA.
Emergent Groups: Benefits and Challenges
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May be able to act more
quickly, since they are
outside of formal
bureaucracies of
government
May have a better sense
of what critical needs are
when they are closer to
problems on they ground,
and if they are connected
in functional ways to
emergent systems and
response networks
May meet needs
unidentified or not being
met by formal systems
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May not be governed by the same
standards or systems of oversight as
formal organizations
May have less of a feel for what critical
needs are, since they not necessarily
part of the formal network where critical
information is directed
May generate overlap, create
redundancy, and compete with existing
systems
May be have unclear definition of
leadership and authority roles
May have unstable definitions of tasks
May introduce more chaos or confusion
into already chaotic situations
Drabek, T.E. & D.A. McEntire. 2003. Emergent Phenomena and the Sociology of Disaster: Lessons,
Trends and Opportunities from the Research Literature. Disaster Prevention and Management, 12(2):
97-112.
Convergence and emergence of networks
Convergence involves the influx of people to areas associated
with a disaster (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003). Convergence is a
prerequisite for emergent groups and networks, and for
emergent links among organizations in the course of disaster
response.
Kendra, James M., and Tricia Wachtendorf, 2003.
Reconsidering Convergence and Converger Legitimacy
in Response to the World Trade Center Disaster.
Terrorism and Disaster:
New Threats, New Ideas
(ed. Lee Clarke).
Network Visibility
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As existing groups take on new roles and other
groups emerge, information about key organizations
is often not known across emergent networks (which
come to include both established and new groups).
In catastrophic events, where convergence and
emergence may play an even larger role than in
typical disasters, network visibility, which allows for
both open and coordinated systems, becomes
paramount. Networks need to take visible form so
that communications and role and task structuring
can begin to take shape as well.
Wachtendorf, T., B. Brown, J. Holguin-Veras, and S. Ukkusuri, and Perez. Network
Visibility in Emergency Supply Chain Management.
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In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, emergent groups—
previously existing agencies taking up new tasks together with
new groups—formed new organizational networks as they
contended with the disaster. Some played more dominant
roles than others in different stages of the response and early
recovery, with respect to different tasks, and in different
communities. Some capacities, such as Coast Guard searchand-rescue, were so pre-programmed and at the same time
well-fitted to the situation at hand, that they were immediately
effective. These immediately-capable agencies often formed
the nucleus for the self-organization of emergent responses.
Katrina Experience—Decisional failures
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Lack of adequate plans for essential things like evacuation
Flawed local planning process
Loss of local command and control facilities
Lack of coordination among organizations of all types:
volunteers, Coast Guard, Red Cross, medical providers
Lack of initiative, as in the waste of city buses which could
have been mobilized for evacuation and instead ended up
under water.
Lack of creativity or resilience, as in the instance of refusal
of Amtrak’s offer to fill its last train out of the city with
evacuees
Lack of expertise
Governor’s refusal to nationalize National Guard; political
pettiness on the part of various key players.
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Statutory Constraints: the Stafford Act
 The
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (1988)
calls for disaster and emergency declarations for events that overwhelm state
and local capability. These trigger statutory authority and access on the part of
FEMA to a Disaster Relief Fund to provide federal direct aid and financial
assistance to render emergency services. Along with the legislation that created
the agency, this Act authorizes FEMA to coordinate the administration of all
disaster relief.
 A Governor must execute the given State’s emergency plan and indicate in
writing that the situation is of such severity and magnitude that effective
response is beyond the capabilities of the State and affected local governments
and supplemental Federal assistance is necessary. A Disaster Declaration made
by the President specifies the types of assistance authorized for that state.
 A Governor’s request is not necessary for the President to issue an emergency
declaration if it involves a “Federal primary responsibility.” Such responsibility
rests with the United States government because the emergency involves a
subject area for which, under the Constitution or federal laws, the United States
exercises exclusive or preeminent responsibility and authority. Examples:
Direct federal action after the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in 1995;
the Pentagon attack in 2001; and the Shuttle Columbia explosion in 2003.
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Statutory Constraints: the Posse Comitatus Act
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Latin: "power or force of the county"
The Posse Comitatus Act was originally enacted in 1878; intended
to ensure military subordination to a strong civil authority
“Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly
authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses
any part of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus or
otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.”
What is “direct assistance”? Active, as opposed to passive, use of
military personnel; or if it pervades/fully subsumes the activities
of civilian law enforcement; or if military personnel subject
citizens to the exercise of military power that is regulatory
(controls or directs), proscriptive (prohibits or condemns), or
compulsory (exerts some coercive force) in nature
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Research Findings
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Early presidential involvement is necessary for a timely, wellcoordinated federal response. And the President must have the
counsel of emergency management professionals in order to
make appropriate and timely decisions.
Former FEMA Director James Lee Witt predicted that “The
emphasis on terrorism preparedness in the aftermath of
September 11th, [and] the transfer of FEMA to the Department
of Homeland Security may result in decreased emphasis on
mitigation and natural hazards” Former President Bill Clinton
argued that it should be “required that any future head of the
Federal Emergency Management Agency have prior experience
in emergency management. When a disaster strikes, that person
[the FEMA director] becomes the most important person in the
federal government.” However, the Directorship became a
patronage job—hence Brown’s appointment.
Kettl, Donald F. (2007). System Under Stress: Homeland Security and American
Politics. 2nd Ed. Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly.
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Research Findings
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When it comes to bureaucracy, bigger is not always better.
Once absorbed into the Department of Homeland Security,
FEMA lost its cabinet level status and budget independence. It
was also the case that its disaster-response mission became
subsumed under the counter-terror mission of DHS. Removing
FEMA from the DHS and re-establishing it as an independent
agency with a cabinet-level Director responsible directly to the
president would position it better and give it the resources to
accomplish its goals and respond to disasters – whether natural
or human-made. Regardless of the location in the federal
government, FEMA’s Director must have a direct reporting
relationship to the President during periods of disaster and
emergency declarations.
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Creation of the DHS post-September 11, 2001
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Post-9/11 assessments revealed that 112 different federal agencies and
departments had some role in protecting the homeland. This underscored
the need for interagency consolidation, cooperation, and solid working
relationships among federal, state, and local governments.
Consolidation of agencies and duties in a new Department of Homeland
Security was considered a requirement for effective homeland defense.
Integration of threat analysis, sharing of information and intelligence
across Federal agencies and down to state and municipal governments
was required, as well as a general increase in scope of Federal law
enforcement role. However, the FBI, CIA, and Defense intelligence
agencies kept themselves out of DHS and resist any exercise of its
jurisdiction.
Subordinating the FEMA disaster-response mission and role to that of
terror-response seriously weakened agency capabilities. Moreover, there
was an exodus of its top-flight officials and much of the agency’s best
talent, as demoralization occurred with the agency’s integration into
DHS.
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Capabilities and Resources
Layered and sequenced response—local to federal
Federal Response
State Response
Regional / Mutual Response Systems
Local Response, Municipal and County
Minimal
Low
Medium
High
Catastrophic
Increasing magnitude and severity
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Strategic View of Disaster Response
Defining, articulating:
What is the nature
and scope of the
emergency? What are
the values involved?
What operational
capabilities
and resources
are required?
Strategic
managerial
leadership:
individual and
systemic
What authorizers &
resources need to be
involved and aligned?
White House, FEMA,
Governor, Mayor,
Red Cross, FBI and
local police, etc.
Creating Public Value—Mark Moore
Three elements must be coherently aligned in strategic
management:
•The change strategy must be substantively valuable in the
sense that the organization or the program produces things of
value to authorizers, stakeholders, clients, & beneficiaries at
relatively low cost with regard to money and authority.
•It must be legitimate and politically sustainable. The
organization or program must be able to continually attract
both authority and funding from the political authorizing
environment to which it is ultimately accountable.
•It must be operationally and administratively feasible in that
projected activities can actually be accomplished by the
existing organization and whatever essential supplemental
resources can be secured.
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Moore’s Strategic Triangle
Politics
(Politically and Legally
Supported?)
Creating Public Value
Operations
Outcomes
(Is it administratively
feasible?)
(Is it operationally
feasible?)
Mark Moore, Creating Public Value; Strategic
Management in Government, 1995, Harvard.
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The Strategic Triangle
Area with greatest
potential for
managerial discretion
and impact
PUBLIC
VALUE
OPERATIONAL
CAPACITY
AUTHORIZING
ENVIRONMENT
Mark Moore: Creating Public Value
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Strategic View of Disaster Response 2
Public Value entails
defining & articulating
the following: What is
the nature & scope of
the emergency? What
values are involved?
Operational
Capacity: What
operational
capabilities
and resources
are required? How
are they to be
mobilized?
Discretionary,
strategic
exercise of
managerial
leadership:
individual and
systemic
Authorizing
Environment: What
authorizers &
resources need to be
involved and aligned?
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Addendum 1: Decisional syndromes and patterns
found in organizations in crisis
From Alan Dowty, "U.S. Decision-Making Under
Stress: 1973," International Political Science
Association, 1979, and Irving Janis and Leo
Mann, Decision Making: A Psychological
Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment
(New York: The Free Press, 1977).
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Addendum 1: Decisional syndromes and patterns
found in organizations in crisis
Decisional conflict is likely to occur in crises-understood to mean situations involving high
organizational and personal stakes, time pressures,
and insufficient information. One form of decisional
conflict, value conflict, occurs when there are
irreconcilable or difficult-to-reconcile values at stake.
Symptoms of cognitive dissonance in
decisionmaking include defensive avoidance,
premature closure, bolstering, and overcommitment
to one option over others.
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Addendum 1
Decisional conflict will remain high if no reconciling values
or other resolution can be found.
Research suggests that, depending on the case, crisis
decisionmaking may be functional or dysfunctional. Janis
& Mann and Dowty found, in their review of recurring
findings in the literature, that the greater the crisis,
1. the greater the conceptual or mental rigidity on the part
of decisionmakers, and the more closed to new
information they become;
2. the greater the use of (often faulty) historical analogy;
3. the greater the felt need for information;
4. the more information that goes to the top of the
organizational and decisional pyramid;
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5. the greater the reliance on improvised channels of
communication and information—the effective flow of
information and effective communications may actually
diminish;
6. the more active, but also more random and less productive
the search for information;
7. the more frequent the consultation with persons outside
the core decisionmaking unit, depending on the amount of
time that is available to decisionmakers;
8. the greater the felt need for face-to-face proximity in
making decisions;
9. the greater the likelihood of interpersonal and group
conflict within decisionmaking units, particularly if the crisis
extends significantly beyond expectations; and
10. the greater and more sustained the group conflict
involved in reaching agreement , the more resistant a
group becomes to rival analyses or conflicting information;
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11. the more improvised--ad hoc--the organization of
decisionmaking units is likely to become;
12. the more likely that decisionmaking will become
unusually centralized (contrary to the best models of
crisis response, which involve emergence and
incorporation of multi-agency and IG response;
13. the more likely that decisionmakers will become overconcerned with the immediate rather than medium- or
long-term consequences of action;
14. the greater the search for alternatives and options,
particularly if there is real consultation;
15. the more costly and time-intensive information search
may become;
16. the greater small group pressures for consensus may
become;
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17. the more likely, with increasing value conflict, that
there will be emotional loading of chosen options—
rationalized by such statements as "We've run out of
options;"
18. the greater the spontaneous regret that may follow a
decision, even before new information arises that calls
the decision into question (similar to “buyer’s remorse”);
19. the greater the likelihood of decisional bolstering, as
regret, continuing uncertainty, and confounding
outcomes keep the decisional process stressful and full
of conflict;
20. the greater the decisional focus, or decisional vigilance
(Janis), resulting in the setting aside of customary
decisional procedures or their selective incorporation into
new decisional processes.
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