2015 NDI 6WS – Exports Aff &
Case Neg – Wave 1
AFFIRMATIVE
1AC – Plan
The President of the United States should issue an Executive Order
curtailing government surveillance of exports from the United States
by:
-Consolidating authority under a new Coordinating Center for Export
Controls
-Establishing an economic competitiveness exemption
-Minimizing export control lists through a sunset principled review
process
1AC– Dual-Use v1
1AC – Exports
Contention One is Exports:
The US surveillance export controls regime is nothing more than an
outdated relic that only serves to hamper US competitiveness
US Chamber of Commerce 15 (US Chamber of Commerce- representational voice of
US businesses, “Modernize Export Controls,” USChamber.com, 5/19/15,
https://www.uschamber.com/issue-brief/modernize-export-controls
America's high-tech and defense industries contribute to our global competitiveness and economic
security in crucial ways. Approximately 3.5 million workers are employed in these sectors, and they
accounted for roughly one-third of U.S. merchandise exports. These same industries are particularly
affected by U.S. export controls, which have not kept pace with changes in global security and
the international marketplace. In this context, the U.S. Chamber has applauded the Obama Administration's initiative to
modernize export controls. The goal of this initiative is to enhance U.S. national security and economic competiveness at the same
time. The general principles are simple. National security must come first, and sensitive technologies with military applications must
be protected. Stronger controls may be warranted for the critical military technologies former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has
referred to as the "crown jewels." However, the
U.S. export controls regime has long covered too many
products that lack a significant military application or are readily available from other countries.
The United States should eliminate controls that serve no real security purpose. At root, the U.S.
export controls regime has not been optimized to support either effective defense cooperation
with America's allies or our continued technological competitiveness. For years, licenses have been
required not only for the export of goods and services, but also for the sharing of technical data
with overseas partners and allies. In addressing defense trade issues, both the Administration and Congress must
ensure that the United States can identify and safeguard sensitive and militarily critical technologies, facilitate deployment of
technologies to support cooperation and interoperability with allies, and maintain U.S. technological leadership. Only
by
injecting greater efficiency, transparency and predictability into the U.S. export controls system
can the U.S. government ensure that critical technologies are truly protected, innovation is
fostered, and the United States' national security and economic imperatives of the 21st century
are secured. Tens of thousands of U.S. jobs are at stake. In January 2010 the Milken Institute and the
National Association of Manufacturers issued a study entitled Jobs for America: Investments and policies for
economic growth and competitiveness. It found that "modernizing U.S. export controls could increase
exports in high-value areas. By 2019, these policy adjustments could enhance real GDP by $64.2
billion (0.4 percent), create 160,000 manufacturing jobs, and heighten total employment by
340,000."
Export Controls are the single largest obstacle to economic
competitiveness globally – compliance costs, uncertainties, and
delays
NRC 9 The National Research Council (NRC) is the working arm of the United States National Academies, which
produces reports that shape policies, inform public opinion, and advance the pursuit of science, engineering, and
medicine, 2009, “Beyond ‘Fortress America’: National Security Controls on Science and Technology in a Globalized
World”, http://documents.library.nsf.gov/edocs/T10.5.C6-2009-PDF-Beyond-Fortress-America- National-SecurityControls-on-Science-and-Technology-in-a-globalized-World.pdf //OF
Harm to U.S. economic competitiveness. The artificial limitations on trade imposed by lists
of controlled technologies have had predictable results with respect to the U.S. position in global
markets. With U.S. companies prevented by export controls from competing in certain markets, foreign competitors,
often sponsored by their governments, spring to fill these competitive gaps. As these
competitors have proliferated, U.S.
companies have suffered challenges in the marketplace
that would not have been present but for export controls. The biggest risk to U.S. jobs
is a lack of economic competitiveness, and U.S. export control policy directly undermines
that competitiveness.16 Even if a U.S. company is licensed to export a controlled product, a
foreign buyer may be reluctant to use it because of the fear that a separate export license will be
required to make repairs, or even to honor a request for additional information about the
product.
As U.S. companies have evolved to compete in global markets and have become multinational corporations with a substantial
presence in numerous countries, the
cost of complying with U.S. list-based export controls has
risen dramatically. This additional burden on U.S.-based companies makes them less
competitive.
The regulatory limits on providing controlled information to foreign scientists and students now
affect the research and development capacity of U.S. corporate laboratories. This is especially
true as U.S.-based firms establish laboratories overseas, and even as they staff their U.S. laboratories with
graduates of U.S. science and engineering programs, an ever-increasing share of whom are foreign nationals. Failure to “run
faster” by developing qualitatively better products and services with the best talent available is a
serious threat to U.S. economic competitiveness.
Similarly, export controls and “deemed export” rules make U.S. universities less able to attract
the most capable foreign researchers or to retain some of the most creative faculty members.17
Important discoveries may be hindered, or may simply occur elsewhere. The rapid and
dynamic nature of leading-edge fundamental research makes it almost impossible to predict with any precision the disciplines in
which a researcher will work, the colleagues or laboratories with whom he or she will collaborate, the equipment needed, and the
possible modifications that may have to be made to that equipment. All of these factors would need to be tracked so that a research
institution could, with assurance, know when to apply for an export license for its foreign scientists and students.
Licensing requirements inevitably lead to delays, and they may deter or even eliminate
the spontaneous discoveries that arise from serendipitous interactions and spur-of-the-moment
collaborations, most of which are impossible under “deemed export” rules. For example, during a conversation at a conference
or research seminar, a researcher may realize that his or her laboratory apparatus is well configured to help solve a colleague’s
problem. If
export licenses are required to use that apparatus, or even to share technical data about
the possible application, the opportunity to help will be delayed by a month or more, and will
therefore likely be lost.18
Its reverse causal – reforming export controls is key to increasing US
competitiveness in the high tech manufacturing sector
Kennedy 15 (Joseph-senior Fellow with ITIF and president of Kennedy Research,
“Reforming Regulation to Drive International Competitiveness,” Information and Technology
and Innovation Foundation, 3/15/15, http://www2.itif.org/2015-reforming-regulation-driveinternational.pdf)
The United States, usually in coordination with other allies, tries to control the export of technology that
could be used by our adversaries for military purposes. In both theory and practice, export controls protect the
nation’s security and help it accomplish important diplomatic goals. However, the implementation of these controls is
often confused and ineffective. Some tension in the implementation of these rules is inevitable. A study by the
Congressional Research Service noted that “the balance between national security and export competitiveness has made the subject
of export controls controversial for decades.34 But the
problems with the program go well beyond this,
unnecessarily increasing cost and reducing exports. Rather than narrowly targeting a limited set of technologies
with the highest military significance, export controls involve an often confusing set of technologies,
international agreements, and domestic agencies in an effort that often exposes American
companies to great risk and uncertainty while denying them the ability to export products that
targeted nations can readily get from other countries.
itary
technology that is denied to nations that are not allies.
Virtually all technology in the case of broad export controls to nations like Cuba, North Korea, and Iran. In addition to unilateral
controls, U.S. policy is governed by a number of international agreements, each involving different countries and covering different
THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION FOUNDATION | MARCH 2015 PAGE 13 Finally, within the United States, a
ment
of Investigation GAO put the nation’s export control regime on its High-Risk Series in 2007, concluding that “each program has had
its own set of challenges, which are largely attributable to poor coordination within complex interagency processes, inefficiencies in
program operations, and a lack of systematic evaluations of program effectiveness.”35 The 2007 report cited poor coordination
among agencies, disagreements over jurisdiction between the Departments of State and Commerce, unnecessary problems in
obtaining export licenses, and a lack of mechanisms to evaluate the effectiveness of export controls.36 It concluded that:
“[g]overment programs established decades ago to protect critical technologies are illequipped
to weigh competing U.S. interests as these forces continue to evolve in the 21st century.”37 As one
example of failure, GAO noted that the Department of Defense had stopped maintaining the Military Critical Technologies List in
2011 because of a lack of funds.38 To make matters worse, the Export Administration Act, which partially governs export control
laws, has expired. As a result, dual-use controls are being enforced through the president’s residual powers under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act. Administrators of the export control act face a dilemma. High-technology
goods and
to earn U.S.
companies the highest margins and be the most important to maintaining U.S. international
competitiveness. Moreover, in many cases, if U.S. companies do not make the sale their direct
competitors will, strengthening their competitiveness position while ours is weaken
services are likely to be more sensitive from a security perspective. But these exports are also likely
That prevents great power war
Taylor 4 (Mark- Department of Political Science at MIT, “The Politics of Technological
Change: International Relations versus Domestic Institutions,”
https://www.scribd.com/doc/46554792/Taylor)
Technological innovation is of central importance to the study of international relations (IR), affecting almost
every aspect of the sub-field. 2 First and foremost, a nation’s technological capability has a significant effect on
its economic growth, industrial might, and military prowess; therefore relative national technological
capabilities necessarily influence the balance of power between states, and hence have a role in calculations of
war and alliance formation. Second, technology and innovative capacity also determine a nation’s trade profile, affecting which
products it will import and export, as well as where multinational corporations will base their production facilities. 3 Third, insofar
as innovation-driven economic growth both attracts investment and produces surplus capital,
a nation’s technological
ability will also affect international financial flows and who has power over them. 4 Thus, in broad
theoretical terms, technological change is important to the study of IR because of its overall implications for both the relative and
absolute power of states. And if theory alone does not convince, then history
also tells us that nations on the
technological ascent generally experience a corresponding and dramatic change in their global
stature and influence, such as Britain during the first industrial revolution, the United States and Germany during the
second industrial revolution, and Japan during the twentieth century. 5 Conversely, great powers which fail to maintain
their place at the technological frontier generally drift and fade from influence on international scene.
6 This is not to suggest that technological innovation alone determines international politics, but rather that shifts in both
relative and absolute technological capability have a major impact on international relations, and
therefore need to be better understood by IR scholars. Indeed, the importance of technological innovation to
international relations is seldom disputed by IR theorists. Technology is rarely the sole or overriding causal
variable in any given IR theory, but a broad overview of the major theoretical debates reveals the ubiquity of technological causality.
For example, from Waltz to Posen, almost all Realists have a place for technology in their explanations of international politics. 7 At
the very least, they describe it as an essential part of the distribution of material capabilities across nations, or an indirect source of
military doctrine. And for some, like Gilpin quoted above, technology
is the very cornerstone of great power
domination, and its transfer the main vehicle by which war and change occur in world politics. 8
Jervis tells us that the balance of offensive and defensive military technology affects the incentives for war. 9
Walt agrees, arguing that technological change can alter a state’s aggregate power, and thereby affect
both alliance formation and the international balance of threats. 10 Liberals are less directly concerned with
technological change, but they must admit that by raising or lowering the costs of using force, technological progress affects the
rational attractiveness of international cooperation and regimes. 11 Technology also lowers
information &
transactions costs and thus increases the applicability of international institutions, a cornerstone of
Liberal IR theory. 12 And in fostering flows of trade, finance, and information, technological change can lead to Keohane’s
interdependence 13 or Thomas Friedman et al’s globalization. 14 Meanwhile, over at the “third debate”, Constructivists cover the
causal spectrum on the issue, from Katzenstein’s “cultural norms” which shape security concerns and thereby affect technological
innovation; 15 to Wendt’s “stripped down technological determinism” in which technology inevitably drives
nations to
form a world state. 16 However most Constructivists seem to favor Wendt, arguing that new technology changes
people’s identities within society, and sometimes even creates new cross-national constituencies, thereby affecting
international politics. 17 Of course, Marxists tend to see technology as determining all social
relations and the entire course of history, though they describe mankind’s major fault lines as running between
economic classes rather than nation-states. 18 Finally, Buzan & Little remind us that without advances in the technologies of
transportation, communication, production, and war, international systems would not exist in the first place
Specifically, export controls wreck competiveness of the aerospace
industry- inability to have a strong industrial base hurts airpower
capabilities
AIAA 14 (American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics-world's largest technical society
dedicated to the global aerospace profession, “The Impact of Export Controls on the Domestic
Aerospace Industry,” AIAA, 2014,
https://www.aiaa.org/uploadedFiles/Issues_and_Advocacy/Policy_Papers/Information_Paper
s/2013_Information_Papers/Export%20Controls%20FINAL%20030713.pdf
ABSTRACT Maintaining
a strong industrial and supplier base for the U.S. aerospace industry is, in itself, a
significant national security issue. Ensuring that this sector is able to effectively compete
internationally will become increasingly important as government spending is further
constrained. Modernizing the export control system will result in a healthier aerospace
industrial base – allowing the nation to better focus on sensitive technologies and safeguard national security while creating
high wage, high skill jobs. Promotion of aerospace exports should rank among the most viable options
to aid the economy, reinforcing U.S. preeminence in space and ensuring the U.S. aerospace industrial
base remains second to none. ISSUE BACKGROUND Balancing national security and economic interests during the Cold
War was not complicated. Initially, the space domain was developed by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, which competed in terms of
national security and space exploration. National security interests were at the fore, and initially commercial interests played only a
minor role. With the collapse of the Soviet Empire, globalization and robust multibillion-dollar international commercial space
markets emerged. In this new environment, striking a balance between national security and economic interests proved increasingly
difficult, and the export control regime did not evolve to respond to the new paradigm. U.S. export control policies were developed
decades ago. The U.S. Department of State began to regulate munitions trade in 1935. Its regulators sought to ensure that strategic
exports support both national security and foreign policy prerogatives. With the Space Age, its technologies were treated as
munitions; as a result, State initially controlled their export, and continued to do so throughout the Cold War. The Department of
State regulated exports of technologies and services under the Arms Export Control Act, its International Traffic in Arms
Regulations (ITAR), and the ITAR’s United States Munitions List (USML). In 1992, with the Cold War over, responsibility for the
export of some “dual-use” commercial communication satellites (comsats) was transferred from State to the U.S. Department of
Commerce. They were placed on the Commerce Control List (CCL) within the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), which were
issued pursuant to the Export Administration Act (EAA). All comsats were placed on the CCL from 1996 to 1999. The presumption
under the EAR was to approve proposed exports of commercial satellites, components, and related services. This presumption was
aligned with Commerce’s charter to promote U.S. economic interests at home and abroad. A “dual-use” comsat can still be used for
nonmilitary purposes such as imaging the Earth for commercial purposes; but it can also support military purposes such as imaging
an adversary’s military installations. In the mid-1990s, it was argued that some transfers of comsat and launch technologies
improved the capabilities of China’s intercontinental ballistic missile systems. In other words, while the chances of a successful
Chinese launch of global commercial satellites were greatly improved, significant U.S. national security interests were damaged in
return. After the Cox Committee examined the failures, Congress passed the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 1999, which transferred regulatory responsibility for comsats and related components back to State. Once
again designated as munitions, these items were strictly regulated. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013, signed into law on January 3 of
this year, once again removes comsats from the USML, and places them back on the dual-use CCL. However, the NDAA for FY2013
did not provide an overarching solution across technology systems and capabilities. U.S. strategic export controls have been under
fire for decades. Critics argue that in attempting to bolster national security by
limiting the transfer of space
technologies to adversaries and potential adversaries, the United States has unintentionally and
paradoxically harmed its national security by undermining its aerospace industrial base and the
international partnerships that help drive scientific and technological advancement. The U.S. export controls have been
described as “broken,” “anachronistic,” “selfdefeating,” “pernicious,” “toxic,” “regulation run
amok,” “obsolete, arrogant, and counterproductive,” and a “byzantine amalgam” of
bureaucracies. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has designated export controls as a “high-risk area” that
“warrants a strategic re-examination of existing programs to identify needed changes and ensure the advancement of U.S. interests.”
The Department of Defense (DOD) 2010 Defense Quadrennial Review Report indicated the present export control regime “poses a
national security risk” for being overly complicated and excessively redundant, and for attempting to protect too much. A 2009
National Research Council report, Beyond Fortress America, concludes that the U.S. export control system has not been updated to
reflect post-Cold War conditions. Unfortunately, the
current U.S. export control system is not optimized to
protect sensitive technologies while maximizing the economic and national security benefits of
international trade. Export controls have had disturbing and insidious effects. The shift of comsat
technologies from Commerce to State, intended to protect sensitive technologies and preserve
U.S. preeminence, contributed to a substantial decline of U.S. commercial satellite market share
and fostered the competitiveness and capabilities of U.S. competitors abroad. The Aerospace Industries
Association (AIA) asserted that “we have legislated away our nation’s dominance in space.” This is disturbing
because technologies that underpin the domestic aerospace industrial base provided the
capabilities and services that fueled the nation’s economy and ensured U.S. technological
dominance for generations. Economic and technological leadership enabled the U.S. to prevail in the Cold War and set the
stage for global leadership in the late 20th century. Failure to revise and update export controls could result in
a loss of critical industrial base suppliers and present an increasing risk to national security. International
technology trade also helps aerospace and defense companies create jobs and fuel economic growth. The
aerospace industry directly supports more than 625,000 American jobs, and according to the U.S.
Department of Commerce, contributed more than $85 billion in export sales to the U.S. economy and fostered a $44.1 billion
aerospace trade surplus in 2010. The Aerospace Industry Association’s preliminary numbers for 2012 indicate that the aerospace
industry contributed more than $95.4 billion in export sales and maintained a trade surplus of $63.5 billion. Global trade also
strengthens U.S. alliances and improves the U.S. security posture by providing allies and friendly nations with the capabilities they
need to work jointly or unilaterally in support of shared security goals. However, export
controls close off business
opportunities with foreign customers and increase costs for U.S. industry and small businesses.
This ultimately weakens the industrial base and its ability to support the nation’s security and economic interests. These
challenges are particularly acute in the aerospace sector. Numerous studies have highlighted the
negative impact of excessive export controls on the American aerospace industrial base. If the
U.S. continues on its current path, without implementing the right reforms, the nation risks the
scenario of a weakened aerospace industrial base that is unable to fully meet U.S. national
security needs or sustain our technological edge against foreign competitors.
Airpower is necessary to prevent Iran from closing the strait of
Hormuz
Boynton 9 (Colin- LCDR in US Navy, “OPERATIONS TO DEFEAT IRANIAN MARITIME TRADE INTERDICTION,” Naval
War College, 4/5/09, DTIC, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA502907)
This is not to say that the U.S. military should do nothing if
Iran begins attacking oil tankers in the Strait of
Hormuz. It (the US) should simply utilize its most advantageous military strength to first
substantially decrease Iran’s sea denial capabilities before attempting to gain even the temporary sea control in
the Strait of Hormuz required for convoy escort. This
strength is massive airpower. Iran has very little to
counter this, as it is lacking credible fighter aircraft and surface to air defenses (by western
standards).33 The U.S. should keep its warships outside the reach of the synergistic coastal Iranian threat and instead utilize
airpower and economic effects to defeat the Iranian strategy of drawing the U.S. into a littoral fight. It
may seem that the patience required by this proposed operational design could become unhinged by the pressure of public opinion,
in that the United States could be seen to be shying away from a fight while civilians died in droves. The reality would likely be
somewhat different. VLCCs are in some critical ways far less susceptible to the damage mechanisms utilized by the Iranians than are
warships. It is likely the Iranians could carry out attacks on VLCCs at will; but in practice, such attacks are unlikely to prevent the
tankers from completing their transits. VLCCs are huge vessels that displace 200,000 to 325,000 tons; they have thick double hulls
and modern fire suppression systems and when laden are filled with a compartmentalized and relatively “inert, buoyant substance.”
34 This can be compared to an aircraft carrier’s 97,000 tons of displacement or a cruiser’s 9,600 tons of displacement and the
generally single hull construction of warships. 35 “Of the 239 tankers attacked 16 during the tanker wars, only 55 (23 percent) were
lost,” and these were mostly much smaller vessels than VLCCs and single hulled. 36 Due to economic factors, the U.S. seems to have
time on its side. For the Iranian gambit to work, it must force the U.S. Navy to attempt to penetrate an intact Iranian sea denial
effort with warships before the maritime trade interruption reduces the Iranian economy to shambles. The United States does not
need to immediately respond with warships in the Strait and national interests are best served if it does not. CONCLUSIONS The
Strait of Hormuz is the perfect physical environment for the execution of sea denial. Its confined waters allow for even relatively
short-range weapons systems to reach the entirety of area being denied. The shallow and relatively calm waters allow for great mine
lethality and the unfettered use of FIAC. The geo-strategic position Iran enjoys along the length of the Strait of Hormuz provides it
with a variety of options for surveillance, fires, and the basing of forces. The
world is dependent on the oil which
tankers carry through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s economy depends not only on revenues from oil exports but all of
its imported goods and resources. If Iran were to interdict the Strait, the United States must recognize that economically Iran cannot
sustain this action for long without untenable national trade and industry disruption. Iran’s entire economy and even the morale of
its populace are heavily dependent on maritime trade passing through the Strait. America and much of the world has short-term
strategic options to reduce the economic effects of a Straits of Hormuz closure. Iran does not. These effects could 17 be hastened
through the destruction of resource stockpiles and certain key industrial facilities such as refineries. Tehran
has developed a
potent littoral force tailor made for sea denial in a chokepoint. A large number of FAC and FIAC combined with mines and
ASCMs provide them a survivable force which possesses numerous advantages in confined waters over the
warships of a blue water navy. Iran does not, however, have any means of challenging the U.S.
for air superiority. This is Iran’s critical vulnerability and should be exploited to destroy those
systems conducting sea denial.
Iran closing the strait incites a US-Iran conflict that goes nuclear
Glaser 13 (Charles-Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the
Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs, at George
Washington University, “How Oil Influences U.S. National Security,” 2013, International
Security, Vol. 38, No. 2, EBSCO)
Strait of hormuz Given
the geographical distribution of oil, a disruption large enough to warrant U.S.
military intervention, if one exists at all, is most likely to occur in the Persian Gulf. During 2011, the
daily flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz was 17 million barrels, which was the vast majority of Persian Gulf oil and almost
20 percent of global production.38 The greatest danger is now posed by Iran, which in 2011 threatened to
close the Strait of Hormuz in retaliation for U.S. and European sanctions designed to severely reduce Iran’s oil revenue;39 the
sanctions are intended to convince Iran to forgo its nuclear weapons program. Although concerns about Iran possibly closing the
strait are long-standing, estimating the probability that it would actually do this is difªcult. Analysts have offered reasons for
expecting the probability to be low: Iran would lose the oil revenue from its own exports; and Iran would likely be deterred by the
probable costs of U.S. intervention, which could include the destruction of key military bases and occupation of some of its territory.
There are, however, plausible scenarios in which Iran blocks the strait, for example, as retaliation for an attack
against its nuclear weapons program or as a coercive measure if it were losing a conventional war.40 And, of course, if sanctions are
highly effective at cutting Iran’s oil revenue, Iran has less to lose by disrupting the flow of oil. Because so much oil flows through the
strait, the United States, at least given its current policies, would almost certainly respond to keep it open. In
early 2012, the United States communicated to Iran that closing the strait is a “red line that would provoke an American response,”
and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey publicly stated that the United States would “take action and reopen
the strait.”41 Careful analysis suggests that the United States would succeed in reopening the strait, but that a successful campaign
could take many weeks or more, and that oil prices would increase significantly during this period.42 Iran would likely be unable to
entirely close the strait, among other reasons because exporters would adapt, employing tactics that would enable them to continue
to transit the strait. One estimate suggests that reducing the flow by one-third would likely be beyond Iran’s reach.43 Nevertheless,
reductions of this size would be significant, and uncertainty in the oil market, which would add to price increases, would be even
larger. Although a war to regain control of the strait would require substantial U.S. naval and air forces, the fighting costs of this
conventional war would likely not be large (at least compared to recent U.S. ground wars), because the U.S. military would be able to
dominate the fighting and would not need to employ ground troops. In contrast, future
Iranian acquisition of nuclear
weapons would increase the risk of this scenario in two basic ways. First, Iran might believe that its
ability to escalate to the use of nuclear weapons would deter the United States from responding,
making Iran more willing to interrupt tanker traffic44—this is the basic emboldenment logic of
nuclear proliferation. The United States might nevertheless intervene, questioning Iran’s
willingness to escalate to nuclear use because America’s far more capable nuclear forces would
pose a formidable retaliatory threat. In addition, the United States might intervene because it believed that this would
help to preserve its ability to deter other emerging nuclear powers.45 Second, U.S. conventional operations, which
would likely involve sustained attacks against land-based Iranian forces,46 could increase the
probability nuclear war. A number of paths are possible, including accidental Iranian attacks
fueled by concern about the survivability of Iran’s forces, U.S. attacks fueled by concern that Iran was preparing
to use nuclear weapons,47 and inadvertent Iran escalation fueled by U.S. attacks against its
command and control systems.48
Export controls destroy military effectiveness – uncertainty drives
out innovation, wrecks allied cooperation, and prevents effective intel
NRC 9 The National Research Council (NRC) is the working arm of the United States National Academies, which
produces reports that shape policies, inform public opinion, and advance the pursuit of science, engineering, and
medicine, 2009, “Beyond ‘Fortress America’: National Security Controls on Science and Technology in a Globalized
World”, http://documents.library.nsf.gov/edocs/T10.5.C6-2009-PDF-Beyond-Fortress-America- National-SecurityControls-on-Science-and-Technology-in-a-globalized-World.pdf //OF
Harm to U.S. military capability. Over time, the harm to the U.S. military capability
caused by export controls has expanded and has now reached substantial
proportions. In response to export controls, decisions of U.S. corporations actually prevent full
utilization of American technology for defense purposes. Some U.S.-based companies that
have developed valuable new technology choose to stay out of military markets
because they believe (often erroneously) that if they do not sell to the military, then export controls would not apply to
them. Other companies opt not to enter fields in which controls may apply and direct their
investment capital elsewhere.12 Such decisions deprive the military of the benefits of new scientific
and technological developments that otherwise might be available for incorporation into new
military systems. Companies with significant commercial markets that continue to sell to the military may suboptimize
military systems to minimize the impact of the export controls. As foreign companies and governments fill the competitive gaps left
by U.S.-based companies that are not permitted—or choose not—to export, valuable
technical developments occur
outside the United States to which the U.S. military and intelligence agencies then have no
access. The additional financial costs to companies for compliance with export licensing are
particularly difficult for smaller, innovative suppliers to absorb, and they are thus deterred from
working with the military to solve critical defense problems.13
Export controls also constrain the contribution that allied military forces can
make to U.S. military operations. For example, in an overseas military operation, some allies
may be cleared to repair U.S. equipment and others may not; this can prevent repair at facilities
closest to the theater of operation. Allied military equipment returned to the United States for
repair may need to be cleared for “export” (before shipment back) by determining that nothing has
changed to affect the equipment’s compliance with U.S. export law. The military thus faces difficulties in
outsourcing maintenance and other services to take advantage of lowercost foreign commercial sources for functions traditionally
performed by military personnel.
Foreign manufacturers increasingly refuse to install U.S. equipment in systems
they produce. If non-U.S. equipment is used, U.S. export controls do not apply. If U.S. equipment is used, then export
controls do apply, and the systems may not be shipped or re-exported without approvals that involve a lengthy bureaucratic process.
Foreign defense contractors also avoid using U.S. subsystems to avoid U.S. controls that would restrict third-country transfer and
other commercial uses.14
Finally, these
controls may actually hamper the U.S. government’s own
understanding of foreign military capabilities and foreign scientific developments.
When components or products are available from many sources around the world, U.S. export
controls cannot prevent foreign militaries from acquiring them. Allowing foreign military
services to buy such components from U.S. sources can improve U.S. awareness of the
characteristics of their systems, which might otherwise be just as capable but less well understood.
Given the globalization of science and technology,
it is particularly important to monitor technological
developments overseas, not only to ensure that U.S. military systems use the world’s best
technologies, but also to understand what capabilities might become available to U.S.
adversaries. Constraints on interactions between U.S. and foreign researchers will handicap
hinder this country’s ability to track global technical developments that might have relevance to national
security. As the CSIS Commission on Scientific Communication and National Security put it, “In a world of globalized
science and technology, security comes from windows, not walls.”15
Heg solves war – rising powers make the impact unique
Kagan 15 Robert Kagan is a senior fellow with the Project on International Order and Strategy in the Foreign
Policy program at Brookings. His most recent book is the New York Times bestseller, The World America Made.
Kagan also serves as a member of the secretary of state’s foreign affairs policy board and is co-chairman of the
bipartisan working group on Egypt, “The United States must resist a return to spheres of interest in the international
system”, 2/19/15, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/02/19-united-states-must-resistreturn-to-spheres-of-interest-international-system-kagan//OF
Great power competition has returned. Or rather, it has reminded us that it was always lurking in the
background. This is not a minor development in international affairs, but it need not mean the end of the world
order as we know it.
The real impact of the return of great power competition will depend on how the United States
responds to these changes. America needs to recognize its central role in maintaining the present liberal
international order and muster the will to use its still formidable power and influence to support that
order against its inevitable challengers.
Competition in international affairs is natural. Great
powers by their very nature seek regional dominance
and spheres of influence. They do so in the first instance because influence over others is what defines a great power.
They are, as a rule, countries imbued with national pride and imperial ambition. But, living in a
Hobbesian world of other great powers, they are also nervous about their security and seek defense-indepth through the establishment of buffer states on their periphery.
Historically, great
power wars often begin as arguments over buffer states where spheres of
influence intersect—the Balkans before World War I, for instance, where the ambitions of Russia and Austria-Hungary
clashed. But today’s great powers are rising in a very different international environment, largely
because of the unique role the United States has played since the end of the Second World War.
The United States has been not simply a regional power, but rather a regional power in every
strategic region. It has served as the maintainer of regional balances in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. The result has been
that, in marked contrast to past eras,
today’s great powers do not face fundamental threats to their
physical security.
So, for example, Russia objectively has never enjoyed greater security in its history than it has since 1989. In the 20th century,
Russia was invaded twice by Germany, and in the aftermath of the second war could plausibly claim to fear another invasion unless
adequately protected. (France, after all, had the same fear.) In the 19th century, Russia was invaded by Napoleon, and before that
Catherine the Great is supposed to have uttered that quintessentially Russian observation, “I have no way to defend my borders but
to extend them.” Today that is not true. Russia faces no threat of invasion from the West. Who would launch such an invasion?
Germany, Estonia, Ukraine? If Russia faces threats, they are from the south, in the form of militant Islamists, or from the east, in the
form of a billion Chinese standing across the border from an empty Siberia. But for the first time in Russia’s long history, it does not
face a strategic threat on its western flank.
Much the same can be said of China, which enjoys far greater security than it has at any time in the last three centuries. The
American role in East Asia protects it from invasion by its historic adversary, Japan, while none of the other great powers around
China’s periphery have the strength or desire now or in the foreseeable future to launch an attack on Chinese territory.
Therefore, neither
Chinese nor Russians can claim that a sphere of influence is necessary for their
defense. They may feel it necessary for their sense of pride. They may feel it is necessary as a way of restoring their wounded
honor. They may seek an expanded sphere of influence to fulfill their ambition to become more
formidable powers on the international stage. And they may have concerns that free, nations on their periphery
may pass the liberal infection onto their own populaces and thus undermine their autocratic power.
The question for the United States, and its allies in Asia and Europe, is whether we should
tolerate a return to sphere of influence behavior among regional powers that are not seeking
security but are in search of status, powers that are acting less out of fear than out of ambition.
This question, in the end, is not about idealism, our commitment to a “rules-based” international order, or our principled opposition
to territorial aggression. Yes, there are important principles at stake: neighbors shouldn’t invade their neighbors to seize their
territory. But before we get to issues of principle, we
need to understand how such behavior affects the world
in terms of basic stability
On that score, the
historical record is very clear. To return to a world of spheres of
influence—the world that existed prior to the era of American predominance—is to return to the great power
conflicts of past centuries. Revisionist great powers are never satisfied. Their sphere of
influence is never quite large enough to satisfy their pride or their expanding need for security.
The “satiated” power that Bismarck spoke of is rare—even his Germany, in the end, could not be satiated. Of course, rising great
powers always express some historical grievance. Every people, except perhaps for the fortunate Americans, have
reason for resentment at ancient injustices, nurse grudges against old adversaries, seek to return to a glorious past that was stolen
from them by military or political defeat. The world’s supply of grievances is inexhaustible.
These grievances, however, are rarely solved by minor border changes. Japan, the aggrieved “have-not”
nation of the 1930s, did not satisfy itself by swallowing Manchuria in 1931. Germany, the aggrieved victim of Versailles, did not
satisfy itself by bringing the Germans of the Sudetenland back into the fold. And, of course, Russia’s historical sphere of influence
does not end in Ukraine. It begins in Ukraine. It extends to the Balts, to the Balkans, and to heart of Central Europe.
The tragic irony is that, in the process of carving out these spheres of influence, the
ambitious rising powers
invariably create the very threats they use to justify their actions. Japan did exactly that in
the 30s. In the 1920s, following the Washington Naval Treaty, Japan was a relatively secure country that through a combination of
ambition and paranoia launched itself on a quest for an expanded sphere of influence, thus inspiring the great power enmity that the
Japanese had originally feared. One sees a similar dynamic in Russia’s behavior today. No
one in the West was thinking
about containing Russia until Russia made itself into a power that needed to be contained.
If history is any lesson, such
behavior only ends when other great powers decide they have
had enough. We know those moments as major power wars.
The best and easiest time to stop such a dynamic is at the beginning. If the United
States wants to maintain a benevolent world order, it must not permit spheres of influence to
serve as a pretext for aggression. The United States needs to make clear now—before things get out of hand—that this is
not a world order that it will accept.
And we need to be clear what that response entails. Great
powers of course compete across multiple spheres—
economic, ideological, and political, as well as military. Competition in most spheres is necessary and even
healthy. Within the liberal order, China can compete economically and successfully
with the United States; Russia can thrive in the international economic order
uphold by the liberal powers, even if it is not itself liberal.
But security
competition is different. It is specifically because Russia could not
compete with the West ideologically or economically that Putin resorted to
military means. In so doing, he attacked the underlying security and stability at the core of the liberal order. The
security situation undergirds everything—without it nothing else functions. Democracy
and prosperity cannot flourish without security.
It remains true today as it has since the Second World War that only the United States has the capacity and the unique geographical
advantages to provide this security. There is no stable balance of power in Europe or Asia without the United States. And
while
we can talk about soft power and smart power, they have been and always will be
of limited value when confronting raw military power. Despite all of the loose talk of American
decline, it is in the military realm where U.S. advantages remain clearest . Even in other great
power’s backyards, the United States retains the capacity, along with its powerful allies, to
deter challenges to the security order. But without a U.S. willingness to use military power
to establish balance in far-flung regions of the world, the system will buckle under the
unrestrained military competition of regional powers.
1AC – China
Contention Two is China:
The export control surveillance regime decks exports to China
Bin and Xiao 13 [Li Bin is professor of International Relations at the Department of
International Relations, Tsinghua University, and senior associate at Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace.Yang Xiao is a researcher at China Institute of Contemporary International
Relations. 2013, “Measuring Political Barriers in US Exports to China”
http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/6/2/133.full//jweideman]
Institutional Barrier: exports
are abandoned over concerns related to the export control regime
including various regulations, acts, and control lists. In this area, the US Congress adopts legislative
measures to constrain high-tech exports to China. For example, ‘The President shall certify to the Congress at least
15 days in advance of any export to the People’s Republic of China of missile equipment or technology that: (1) such export is not detrimental to the
United States space launch industry; and (2) the missile equipment or technology, including any indirect technical benefit that could be derived from
such export, will not measurably improve the missile or space launch capabilities of the People’s Republic of China’ (Strom Thurmond National Defence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 SEC. 1512.). The US administration also promulgates export regulations and imposes sanction lists to control
certain exports to China. For example, according to current export regimes, China
is listed in Group D and hence subject to a level of
export regulations almost as strict as those reserved for US-hostile nations like Cuba, Iran,
North Korea, and Syria.26 In addition, besides the general export regulations, specific acts and lists have been designed for China and are
currently in force. Understanding as they do that there is likely no hope of receiving export licenses
given the control regimes, some potential exporters tend to abandon applications and give up
their exports. Many companies have also established Internal Control Programmes that abort any export plans that are at
odds with export control regulations. Therefore, many US potential exports to China never enter
the process of export applications and abandon the export process. Other potential exporters
may worry about the cost, time, and uncertainties of license applications and in end-use
monitoring if their products are on control lists. For example, certain American manufacturers
complained that ‘the time taken to get a license has increased from 104 to 150 days’.27 So the
institutional barrier may stop a large scope of potential exports, but only a small portion of cases actually enter
the license process, and these tend to encounter the administrative export barrier. Thus, the calculation the US government has made on the impact of
its control on exports to China fails to include potential exports that are abandoned before entering the licensing process.
Scenario 1 is Relations –
High tech export reform is key to the the broader US-China
relationship
Paulson and Rubin 15 Henry M. Paulson Jr. is the chairman of the Paulson Institute at the University
of Chicago and served as the secretary of the Treasury in the Bush administration, and Robert E. Rubin is a cochairman of the Council on Foreign Relations and served as the secretary of the Treasury in the Clinton
administration, “Why the U.S. Needs to Listen to China”, June 2015, The Atlantic,
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/06/the-blame-trap/392081//OF
The relationship between the United States and China involves cooperation and competition,
but recently the latter has received more attention. Much of the mistrust between the two countries has its roots
in geopolitical tensions—China’s assertive behavior in the East and South China Seas, for instance, or U.S. naval surveillance off
China’s coasts. But economic tensions have played a large role as well. Discussions of the U.S.-China
economic relationship too often begin with a recital of each country’s grievances against the other. The usual litany of American
criticisms includes China’s management of its exchange rate, subsidies that benefit state-owned enterprises, and barriers to
American companies seeking to operate in China. Another prominent critique involves Chinese cyber-hacking of U.S. businesses’
intellectual property, and China’s failure to protect intellectual property more generally. For its part, China
castigates the
U.S. for its irresponsible fiscal trajectory, its political opposition to Chinese investment in American companies and
infrastructure, and its export-control laws, especially those restricting the export of
technologies with potential military applications. We believe it’s time to turn the typical
exchange of economic critiques on its head. The two countries have largely been engaged in a dialogue of the deaf,
each blaming the other for its own failings, exerting pressure on the other to accede to its demands, and too often waiting for the
other to act first. In fact, it
is in each country’s self-interest to meaningfully address the criticisms made
by the other. The greatest American threat to China’s economic future is the possibility that America’s economic success could
come to an end; the greatest economic danger China poses to the U.S. is the chance that China’s economy fails to grow. By contrast,
if each country gets its own house in order and thus succeeds economically, that should
diminish economic insecurity, which generates friction, and increase confidence about the
future, which fosters a constructive relationship. As former U.S. Treasury secretaries with long experience
working with China, we believe each country should undertake significant reforms. Seriously considering each other’s criticisms is a
good way to begin.
Economic relation building is key to mutual trust and stability—US
export policy is the biggest issue
Xinbo 11 [Wu Xinbo, a 2006–07 Jennings Randolph senior fellow at the United States
Institute of Peace, is currently professor and deputy director at the Center for American Studies
and associate dean at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University.
2011. “China and the United States Core Interests, Common Interests, and Partnership”
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR277.pdf//jweideman]
The financial crisis originated in the United States in the fall of 2008 and revealed many shortcomings in the current world economy at both the
microeconomic and macroeconomic levels, from the slack financial oversight in the United States and the dereliction of duty by international financial
institutions to the American public’s overspending and China’s oversaving of foreign currency. Since the crisis, the greatest challenge has been in
securing strong, sustainable, and balanced global economic growth—a key goal agreed upon at the third Group of Twenty (G-20) financial summit, held
in Pittsburgh in September 2009. China and the United States must act cooperatively to advance this goal, and both countries can play important and
unique roles in the process. They are the world’s two largest economies. In 2010, they together contributed over 40 percent to the growth of the global
economy.11 Moreover, as the largest developed and developing countries, the development models of the United States and China, respectively, affect
countries in their own categories. Finally,
it is in both Chinese and U.S. interests to secure strong, sustainable,
and balanced global growth, given the two economies’ high degree of interdependence as well as
their deep integration with the world economy generally. Sino-U.S. economic cooperation must
occur unilaterally, bilaterally, and multilaterally. Unilaterally, China—as it already started to do during the financial crisis—should further boost its
domestic consumption to adjust its long-pursued export-oriented development model. It also should base its economic growth more on technological
progress and gradually reduce its dependence on low-end manufacturing industries, which have consumed too many resources and heavily polluted the
environment. For its part, perhaps obviously, the United States must get its public to save more and borrow less—a task that is as important as it is
difficult. As the Obama administration has realized, it is also necessary to emphasize the real economy (such as the manufacturing industry, dealing
with material products) and reduce reliance on the virtual economy (such as finance, dealing with nonmaterial products). Bilaterally,
both
China and the United States should resist the temptation of trade protectionism. Since President Obama’s
first year in office, trade frictions between China and the United States have risen remarkably,12 and with
high unemployment rates as well as the Obama administration’s political ties to trade unions, protectionist pressure is felt strongly and acutely.
However, a trade war with China would hurt the U.S. economy in many ways, from reducing the import of products of U.S. companies that have
relocated their production bases to China to suspending China’s buying and holding of U.S. treasury bonds. Sino-U.S.
trade has been
largely complementary and generally does not threaten major domestic industries on both sides.
These should not be sacrificed in trying to alleviate domestic economic problems, particularly on
the U.S. side. Robust bilateral trade is crucial to the healthy development of Sino-U.S. economic
relations and underpins bilateral political relations as well. Direct investment is an important part of bilateral
economic ties. U.S. investment in China started in 1980 and reached $59.65 billion by 2008 in accumulative terms. Despite the financial crisis, U.S.
companies invested in 1,530 projects in China in 2009, with an actual utilization of about $2.56 billion.13 However, starting in 2009, U.S. companies
began to complain loudly about the changing investment environment in China.14 Given the importance of foreign direct investment (FDI) to China’s
economic development, it is essential that their legitimate concerns are addressed seriously. Meanwhile, fueled by the world’s largest foreign currency
reserve and endorsed by the government’s go-abroad strategy, Chinese firms recently have sought opportunities for overseas investment more actively.
In 2009, Chinese direct investment in the United States reached $620 million,15 a figure that is relatively small compared with U.S. direct investment
in China, but increasing rapidly, as one recent research pointed out, “FDI from China to the United States is now more than doubling annually.”16 Yet
Chinese investors do not regard the investment environment in the United States as encouraging. After the passage of the Foreign Investment and
National Security Act of 2007, the U.S. Department of the Treasury promulgated its rules of implementation in November 2008, involving regulations
pertaining to mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers by foreign persons. It has subjected to review transactions involving infrastructure, energy, and
crucial technologies affecting U.S. national security, and has also set strict rules on foreign investment. In the eyes of Chinese companies, the new
regulations create many obstacles to foreign investors.17 More generally, from the failed bidding of the China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC)
for U.S. oil company Unocal in 200518 to the recent controversy over Chinese steel company Anshan Iron and Steel Group’s investment plan in a U.S.
steel plant,19 Chinese
investors are increasingly concerned about the political and security influences
on the U.S. opposition to Chinese investment. Given the real and potential benefits of Chinese FDI in the United States, such
as creating more job opportunities and reducing bilateral trade imbalances, Chinese investors should not be deterred by investment protectionism in
the United States, institutionally or culturally. U.S.
export control to China is another area for improvement. Since
has been a main target of U.S. export control. However, since the improvements in Sino-U.S. ties
starting in the 1970s, U.S. export control policy toward China has been adjusted many times. The issue became more salient in
recent years due partly to the George W. Bush administration’s stepped-up export control
measures against China and partly to the growing trade imbalance between the two countries.
China deems strengthened U.S. export control as unfair, since it is probably the only major
U.S. trading partner to be brought under such strict restrictions. Beijing complains that it usually
takes three months to half a year and sometimes even eighteen months to obtain a license for
exports to China, much more lengthy than in other countries, such as Germany and Japan, where two or three weeks to a month is enough.
the 1950s, China
Besides, in the process of obtaining an export license, reviews will be carried out by the U.S. concerned authorities whenever necessary, and additional
clauses on end-user are attached in commercial contracts.20
Absent mutual understanding, US-China war is inevitable and goes
nuclear
Fisher 11 [Max Fisher is a former writer and editor at The Atlantic. Currently a journalist at
VOX. 10/31/11, “5 Most Likely Ways the U.S. and China Could Spark Accidental Nuclear War”
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/10/5-most-likely-ways-the-us-andchina-could-spark-accidental-nuclear-war/247616///jweideman]
After 10 years of close but unproductive talks, the
U.S. and China still fail to understand one another's nuclear
weapons policies, according to a disturbing report by Global Security Newswire. In other words, neither the U.S. nor
China knows when the other will or will not use a nuclear weapon against the other. That's not
due to hostility, secrecy, or deliberate foreign policy -- it's a combination of mistrust between individual
negotiators and poor communication; at times, something as simple as a shoddy translation has prevented the two major
powers from coming together. Though nuclear war between the U.S. and China is still extremely unlikely, because the two countries do
not fully understand when the other will and will not deploy nuclear weapons, the odds of
starting an accidental nuclear conflict are much higher. Neither the U.S. nor China has any interest in any kind
of war with one other, nuclear or non-nuclear. The greater risk is an accident. Here's how it would happen. First, an
unforeseen event that sparks a small conflict or threat of conflict. Second, a rapid escalation that
moves too fast for either side to defuse. And, third, a mutual misunderstanding of one another's
intentions. This three-part process can move so quickly that the best way to avert a nuclear war is for
both sides to have absolute confidence that they understand when the other will and will not use a nuclear weapon. Without
this, U.S. and Chinese policy-makers would have to guess -- perhaps with only a few minutes -- if and when the other side
would go nuclear. This is especially scary because both sides have good reason to err on the side of
assuming nuclear war. If you think there's a 50-50 chance that someone is about to lob a nuclear
bomb at you, your incentive is to launch a preventative strike, just to be safe. This is especially true because
you know the other side is thinking the exact same thing. In fact, even if you think the other side probably won't launch an ICBM your way, they actually
might if they fear that you're misreading their intentions or if they fear that you might over-react; this means they have a greater incentive to launch a
preemptive strike, which means that you have a greater incentive to launch a preemptive strike, in turn raising their incentives, and on and on until one
tiny kernel of doubt can lead to a full-fledged war that nobody wants. The
U.S. and the Soviet Union faced similar
problems, with one important difference: speed. During the first decades of the Cold War,
nuclear bombs had to be delivered by sluggish bombers that could take hours to reach their
targets and be recalled at any time. Escalation was much slower and the risks of it spiraling out
of control were much lower. By the time that both countries developed the ICBMs that made global annihilation something that could
happen within a matter of minutes, they'd also had a generation to sort out an extremely clear understanding of one another's nuclear policies. But
the U.S. and China have no such luxury -- we inherited a world where total mutual destruction
can happen as quickly as the time it takes to turn a key and push a button. The U.S. has the world's secondlargest nuclear arsenal with around 5,000 warheads (first-ranked Russia has more warheads but less capability for flinging them around the globe);
China has only about 200, so the danger of accidental war would seem to disproportionately threaten China. But the greatest risk is probably to the
states on China's periphery. The borders of East Asia are still not entirely settled; there are a number of small, disputed territories, many of them
bordering China. But the biggest potential conflict points are on water: disputed naval borders, disputed islands, disputed shipping lanes, and disputed
underwater energy reserves. These regional disputes have already led to a handful of small-scale naval skirmishes and diplomatic stand-offs. It's not
difficult to foresee one of them spiraling out of control. But what if the country squaring off with China happens to have a defense treaty with the U.S.?
There's a near-infinite number of small-scale conflicts that could come up between the U.S. and China, and though none of them should escalate any
higher than a few tough words between diplomats, it's the unpredictable events that are the most dangerous. In 1983 alone, the U.S. and Soviet Union
almost went to war twice over bizarre and unforeseeable events. In September, the Soviet Union shot down a Korean airliner it mistook for a spy plane;
first Soviet officials feared the U.S. had manufactured the incident as an excuse to start a war, then they refused to admit their error, nearly pushing the
U.S. to actually start war. Two months later, Soviet spies misread an elaborate U.S. wargame (which the U.S. had unwisely kept secret) as preparations
for an unannounced nuclear hit on Moscow, nearly leading them to launch a preemptive strike. In both cases, one of the things that ultimately diverted
disaster was the fact that both sides clearly understood the others' red lines -- as long as they didn't cross them, they could remain confident there
would be no nuclear war.
Scenario 2 is Satellites –
The Satellite component exports ban destroys trust and curbs USChina space coop
Richburg 11 [Keith, Washington post staffwriter and correspondent in asia. Masters from the
London school of economics. 1/22/11, “Mistrust stalls U.S.-China space cooperation”
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/01/21/AR2011012104480.html//jweideman]
BEIJING - China's grand ambitions extend literally to the moon, with the country now embarked on a multi-pronged program to establish its own
global navigational system, launch a space laboratory and put a Chinese astronaut on the moon within the next decade.
The Obama
administration views space as ripe territory for cooperation with China. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates
has called it one of four potential areas of "strategic dialogue," along with cybersecurity, missile defense and
nuclear weapons. And President Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao vowed after their White House summit last week to "deepen dialogue and
exchanges" in the field. But
as China ramps up its space initiatives, the diplomatic talk of cooperation has
so far found little traction. The Chinese leadership has shown scant interest in opening up the most sensitive details of its program, much
of which is controlled by the People's Liberation Army (PLA). At the same time, Chinese scientists and space officials say that
Washington's wariness of China's intentions in space, as well as U.S. bans on some hightechnology exports, makes cooperation problematic. For now, the U.S.-China relationship in space appears to mirror
the one on Earth - a still-dominant but fading superpower facing a new and ambitious rival, with suspicion on both sides. "What you have are two
major powers, both of whom use space for military, civilian and commercial purposes," said Dean Cheng, a researcher with the Washington-based
Heritage Foundation and an expert on the Chinese military and space program. ad_icon NASA's human spaceflight program has been in flux in recent
years, fueling particular concern among some U.S. observers about the challenge posed by China's initiatives in that area. There is "a lot of very wary,
careful, mutual watching," Cheng said. Song
Xiaojun, a military expert and commentator on China's CCTV,
said that substantial cooperation in the space field is impossible without mutual trust. Achieving
that, he said, "depends on whether the U.S. can put away its pride and treat China as a partner to
cooperate on equal terms. But I don't see that happening in the near future, since the U.S. is experiencing menopause while China is
going through puberty." But while China may still be an adolescent in terms of space exploration - launching its first astronaut in 2003 - it has made
some notable strides in recent months and years, and plans seem on track for some major breakthroughs. On the day Hu left for his U.S. trip, Chinese
news media reported the inauguration of a new program to train astronauts - called taikonauts here - for eventual deployment to the first Chinese space
station, planned for 2015. As part of the project, two launches are planned for this year, that of an unmanned space module, called Tiangong-1, or
"Heavenly Palace," by summer, and later an unmanned Shenzhou spacecraft that will attempt to dock with it. On a separate track, China is also working
through a three-stage process for carrying out its first manned moon landing. The first stage was completed in October with the successful launch of a
Chang'e-2 lunar orbiter. In 2012 or 2013, an unmanned landing craft is scheduled to take a rover to the moon to collect rock and soil samples. By 2020,
according to the plan, a taikonaut could land on the moon.
Commercial space cooperation spills over to every space security
threat--- norms, debris, space mil etc.
Cossa and santoro 13 [Ralph Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu,
Hawaii. He is also senior editor of the Forum's triannual electronic journal. David Santoro is a
senior fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS, where he specializes in nonproliferation and nuclear
security, disarmament, and arms control. November 4-5, 2013 Paving the Way for a “New Type
of Major Country Relations”
http://csis.org/files/publication/issuesinsights_vol14no9.pdf//jweideman]
Our US speaker argued that US-China
cooperation in space is essential because both countries have shared
interests and problems in this domain and because international space rules and norms need to
be expanded. When it began to be exploited in the mid-1950s, space was not governed by any rules. Steps toward the development of space
governance mechanisms were only established in the early/mid-1960s, with the notable conclusion of the Outer Space Treaty (1967). No major
space security agreement has been concluded since 1975, however. With the exception of the 2007 UN Debris
Mitigation Guidelines, major powers have failed to close the gaps and limitations in existing treaties. This is problematic because the
space domain is becoming more important in strategic relations: new actors include the European Space Agency,
Japan, Israel, India, Iran, North Korea, and South Korea. Several commercial actors are also becoming active, such as
SpaceX or Virgin Galactic. Meanwhile, orbital debris and traffic are increasingly difficult to manage
and positioning, navigation, and timing systems are more vulnerable. Actors are also
expanding military activities in space: there is growing interest in kinetic/laser anti-satellite
(ASAT) capabilities and jamming, growing concerns about the development of action-reaction
dynamics, and no effective forum for negotiations. Finally, the legal framework governing the
moon and celestial bodies does not include provisions on mining and could be a theater for
future conflicts. Our US speaker argued that it is in the interest of humankind to maintain safe access to space and promote its peaceful use.
Also critical is preventing interference with critical space infrastructure such as navigation and communication
systems, to improve international space situational awareness for safety, collision avoidance, and
verification, and to reduce international military tensions, harmful weapons test, and arms
race pressures. In recent years (even months), several space governance efforts have been initiated: Russia and China proposed the PPWT
(2008), the Europeans crafted the “International Code of Conduct” for space (2012), the UN Group of Governmental Experts concluded its work,
proposing that states adopt several transparency and confidence-building measures (2013), and the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS) is conducting a sustainability initiative, which is expected to conclude in 2014. US space policy is guided by the 2010 National Space Policy
US departments
of Defense and State have made outreach efforts to Beijing on space security since 2010. The
hope is to increase transparency and confidence-building measures to encourage responsible behavior in space.
and the 2011 National Security Space Strategy, both of which strongly support international cooperation. In this spirit, the
A longer-term possibility is the conclusion of verifiable treaties that promote security and stability. 15 Our US speaker argued that there are numerous
benefits to expanded US-China space talks: they would help reduce mistrust and promote better understanding of each other’s space interests, create
new rules/norms for safeguarding space utilities, provide a forum to defuse problems and avoid inadvertent military escalation, prevent further debrisproducing events and other actions of mutual concern, and improve peacetime and crisis stability. Specific ideas for US-China space initiatives could
include mutual noninterference pledges for space assets, exchanges of visits for space-launch observation, closer cooperation in debris-tracking and
collision avoidance, discussions about further developing the Code of Conduct, bilateral/multilateral talks on kinetic ASAT tests (leading to a ban with
international verification), and talks on concerns raised by space-based weapons (leading to a test ban, NFU, or no-first-deployment agreements). Of
course, there are political obstacles to such developments. For starters, high-level attention to space issues remains limited. Hardliners in both capitals
oppose greater cooperation and verification mechanisms to support new treaties are weak. Finally, China
wants
civil/commercial cooperation to come first, while the United States prioritizes military restraint and greater
transparency. Our Chinese speaker agreed that China and the United States have important shared interests and goals in space and that dialogue is
important, especially as threats are increasing. The question is how to frame this dialogue. According to Beijing, it should be based on equality and
mutual trust and take into account political considerations. In this regard, Washington needs to remember that Beijing’s activities in space are
essential. Progress in space cooperation is urgent because it has become a strategic issue but, as our speaker put it, “we need to find the right
atmospherics now.”
Space mil causes nuclear war
Cynamon 9 [Charles H. Cynamon, Colonel, USAF. “AIR WAR COLLEGE AIR UNIVERSITY
DEFENDING AMERICA’S INTERESTS IN SPACE.” //jweideman]
The near-peer nation represents the most complex adversary the United States could potentially
encounter. Major spacefaring nations, such as China and Russia, pursue space for economic
prosperity in the globalized world, national security, and the prestige associated with scientific
research.18 These nations have vested interests in unfettered access to and viability of a space environment free of purposeful interference as well
as harmful debris. It’s debatable whether these nations will militarize19 space to the degree of the United States. If they do choose to
compete with extra-regional, expeditionary militaries, China and Russia are likely to become as
dependent on space as the United States, consequently accepting many of the same
vulnerabilities. In a limited war with a near-peer, nuclear weapons would still figure
prominently in the calculus for either side to engage in space attacks, especially those assets
used for indications and early warning. The complexity in devising a space defense strategy against a 8 near-peer nation resides
in the need to simultaneously synchronize all instruments of national power toward a common objective. In concert, all elements of power
need to assure these nearpeer nations that US intentions are peaceful, dissuade them from
deploying anti-satellite capabilities, deter the use of space weapons, and defeat use of space weapons. While nearpeers are the most complex possible adversary, some non-peer spacefaring nations (aka rogue nations) present
perhaps the most dangerous adversary. Nations such as Iran and North Korea have access to
space by virtue of their ballistic missile programs, giving them launch capability for kinetic,
direct ascent anti-satellite or electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons. Furthermore, ground-based radio
frequency and directed energy capabilities could impair or damage US satellites. These nations are less likely to be deterred from using such capabilities
should conflict erupt. For the United States, a conflict with a rogue nation will likely be a limited war. If the US objective is regime change, our
adversary would likely view the conflict as unlimited--providing the incentive needed to escalate the hostilities against the United States’ decisive
advantage derived from space assets. For this reason, a space defense strategy against non-peer spacefaring nations must focus on a means to dissuade
acquisition of space weapons as well as to defeat an attack on US space assets
Space debris causes nuclear miscalc
Tyson 7 — Program Officer of the Global Security Institute (Rhianna, “Advancing a Cooperative
Security Regime in Outer Space”, Global Security Institute, May
2007, http://www.gsinstitute.org/gsi/pubs/05_07_space_brief.pdf)
Threats to space assets grow with our ever-increasing uses of outer space. At present, there are
over 800 commercially used satellites in orbit.2 Orbital paths are further cluttered by deserted
spacecraft, discarded rocket debris and other “space junk” shed from hardware. A piece of space
debris, with an average impact speed of 36,000 kilometers per hour,3 could destroy a satellite.
While a collision of two operating satellites is predictable (yet nonetheless worrisome), the overcrowding of orbital paths
heightens the risk of radio frequency interference, causing harmful disruptions in
communication. Beyond the severe economic repercussions resulting from disrupted
commercial satellite communications, hostile actions in space can result in grave security threats, especially in times of war.
Militaries rely on satellites for monitoring of and communication with troops on the ground. If a
military satellite was deceived, disrupted, denied, degraded or destroyed, commanders lose their
communication capabilities, resulting in mounting tensions and an escalation of conflict. A worstcase scenario could involve inadvertent use of nuclear weapons; without satellite-enabled
monitoring capability in a time of tension, or, if early warning systems give a false reading of
an attack, governments may resort to using nuclear weapons.
1AC – Solvency
Contention Three is Solvency:
The plan is necessary and sufficient to solve – the President has
statutory authority to do the plan
NRC 09 (Committee on Science, Security, and Prosperity; Committee on Scientific Communication and National
Security; National Research Council , “Beyond "Fortress America" National Security Controls on Science and
Technology in a Globalized World, 2009, This PDF is available from the National Academies Press at:
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12567.html)
In the committee’s view, it is important to act immediately, within the boundaries of the
President’s executive authority, to make the changes that will stem a serious decline affecting
broad areas of the nation’s security and economy. Recommendation 1 The President should
restructure the export control process within the federal government so that the balancing of
interests can be achieved more efficiently, and to prevent harm to the nation’s security and
technology base; as well as promote U.S. economic competitiveness. A. Recognize the
interdependence of national security and economic competitiveness factors in making export
control decisions with respect to individual requests for licenses through a principle-based
system. B. Apply “sunset” requirements to all items on export control lists that are
controlled unilaterally by the U.S., and require findings to be made every 12 months that
removing controls on an item would present a substantial risk to national security. C.
Establish as a new administrative entity, a coordinating center for export controls, with
responsibilities for coordinating all interfaces with persons or entities seeking export licenses
and expediting agency processes with respect to the granting or denial of export licenses. D.
Establish an independent export license appeals panel to hear and decide disputes about whether export licenses are required,
whether particular decisions to grant or deny licenses were made properly, and whether sunset requirements have been carried out
properly. It is necessary to ameliorate the policy logjam that is the unintended consequence of Congress’s inaction over dual-use
export controls. The new President needs to resolve the long-standing clash between the Cabinet departments that are the guardians
of national and homeland security interests, broadly defined, and the Cabinet departments that are the promoters of national
economic interests. It
is only at the presidential level that the competing bureaucratic
interests of these two areas can be weighed and the current system reformed, so as to
stem the decline that so urgently needs attention. This approach is not an attempt to do an “end
run” around one of the branches of government, or to shortcircuit political debate, but
responds to the marked inability of recent Congresses to address this issue.71 In the
absence of legislation, the International Economic Emergency Powers Act of 1977
gives authority to the President to structure the regulatory framework of the dualuse export controls system.
Establishing and consolidating authority under one agency creates a
‘one-stop shop’ for licensing that reduces duplicated license
requirements, bureaucratic infighting, and delays
NRC 9 The National Research Council (NRC) is the working arm of the United States National Academies, which
produces reports that shape policies, inform public opinion, and advance the pursuit of science, engineering, and
medicine, 2009, “Beyond ‘Fortress America’: National Security Controls on Science and Technology in a Globalized
World”, http://documents.library.nsf.gov/edocs/T10.5.C6-2009-PDF-Beyond-Fortress-America- National-SecurityControls-on-Science-and-Technology-in-a-globalized-World.pdf //OF
The Coordinating Center for Export Controls The
decision-making authority on export control licenses rests
with the Department of Commerce and the Department of State. The Department of State’s interests
cover weapons-related aspects of national security policy, such as non-proliferation and arms control generally,
as well as more traditional foreign policy concerns. The Department of Commerce’s
role focuses on the tradeoffs
between national economic performance and security. Both of these departments have
responsibility for interfacing with those seeking export licenses. As a result, the public can receive
conflicting advice and direction from the two, whose jurisdictions technically do not overlap, but whose
practices in implementing their control regimes frequently lead to conflicts. The
committee recommends a “one-stop shop” for export control licensing as far as interacting with the public
is concerned. A new administrative entity, the Coordinating Center for Export Controls,
would be established.
This small coordinating entity would be responsible for: • Receiving all applications for export
licenses; • Determining whether the Department of Commerce or the Department of State should
handle the license application and dispatch the application to the appropriate place for decision; • Maintaining
timetables for decision making on license applications so that applications do not languish; • Receiving
decisions on applications from the designated agencies and distributing these decisions to
applicants; • Receiving appeals of licensing decisions and petitions for review of sunset decisions ,
and delivering these to the appellate panel (see description below); • Maintaining timetables for decisions on
appeal; • Receiving decisions on appeals and distributing these decisions to the applicants; •
Providing administrative support to the appellate panel (see description below); and • Monitoring and
oversight of the sunset process.
The President’s Order would give the director of the Coordinating Center for Export Controls
signature authority binding on government civil servants supervising the export control entities within the Departments of
Commerce and State. Under this mandate, the signature of the director on an order determining
which agency—Commerce or State—should handle a particular application would be binding on both
agencies. The Coordinating Center would use existing statutory criteria in making its
determination as to the agency to which an application should be assigned. The current statutory
criteria are sufficient—they are just interpreted differently by the different agencies. With a single
Coordinating Center, the determinations under the statutory criteria would be consistent. The
President’s Order would provide that no agency could deal with an export control
application without first having obtained the signature of the director on such a
determination. The decision of the Coordinating Center, with respect to which agency handles the application, would not be
appealable until the licensing decision is made. At that time, the “losing” agency could, if it wished, appeal on the grounds that,
under existing statutory criteria, it should have had the assignment. At that time, it can also argue how it would have decided the
case had it been given the assignment. The
President’s Order would give the director the authority to
establish default-to-decision orders with respect to timetables for decisions on licensing applications. Thus, for
example, the director could establish that if the timetable is not met, the license will be granted
automatically on the terms set out in the application. Similarly, the director would have the
authority to establish a default-to-decision timetable under which an item would be removed
from the control list if the “sunset” process were not completed in a timely manner by the agency.
Under a default-to-decision system, the applicant obtains an order that is enforceable (by general order of the President) unless the
agency appeals and succeeds before the Appeals Panel.
The agencies that make decisions on licensing applications have established consultative processes with other agencies that may
have an interest in the subject matter. Those consultative
relationships would remain in place. The
President’s Executive Order would facilitate the consultative process by providing for additional
transparency. The Coordinating Center would publish, on an appropriate website, the receipt
and assignment for decision of all applications, the agency decision, and any appeals filed. Matters
that require protection with respect to national security concerns would be made known to agencies with relevant jurisdiction
through alternative methods established by the director. Transparency in the assignment process will give researchers, corporations,
and agencies with ancillary or subject-matter concerns an opportunity to take part in the initial decision-making process of the
Departments of Commerce and State. Similarly, transparency in the appeals process will allow persons and agencies that have not
been consulted for some reason, or that oppose a particular decision, an efficient forum in which to be heard.
In this way, the
current competition between export control-related units of the Department of
State and the Department of Commerce can be mitigated by consolidating all public interface
into a single entity external to the two operating departments. The new Coordinating Center
for Export Controls will serve as a single entry point for all licensing requests. It
would then determine the appropriate agency to handle the licensing request, and would pass it on accordingly. The department to
which the request has been submitted would give its decision to the center, which would provide the response to the license seeker.
The center would coordinate the appeals process if objections are raised by interested persons or agencies.
The best organizational home for the Coordinating Center would be within the National Security
Council (NSC) structure and with the Coordinating Center’s director reporting directly to the National Security Adviser.
This placement in the White House structure will ensure the independence of the Coordinating
Center and establish its relationship to the President. The Coordinating Center would not necessarily be co-located with the NSC,
as this would not be required for an effective exercise of its powers under the Executive Order.
The committee weighed several options before making the recommendation for a new coordinating center and locating it and the
Appeals Panel within the NSC. There are five such options: (1) do nothing, which would keep things as they are; (2) create an
interagency group; (3) establish a group of private sector individuals; (4) create an agency within one of the cabinet departments
that has licensing authority, or which plays a role in the licensing process; and (5) establish an independent center with a separate
appeals panel that is housed within a government agency that is not directly involved with licensing decisions.
In the committee’s view, doing
nothing is simply not viable, as discussed above (see in particular Finding 2).
Bureaucratic infighting among the departments that are primarily responsible for licensing will
not cease until they are compelled to do so. The second option, to create an interagency group, was
rejected because experience supports the conclusion that this would devolve into just another
debating society and would not constitute a practical means to improve the existing system.4 The option to establish a
group made up of private sector members was rejected because that alternative would not be
acceptable to the government agencies involved. The option to place this responsibility with the
Department of Defense was rejected, because Defense, through its management of the Militarily
Critical Technologies List, is an important player in the export control regime. Similarly, any
placement within any cabinet-level department involved in licensing would also compromise the
independence of the coordinating center. The option to place these administrative functions with the Office of
Management and Budget was also considered. Although neither the NSC, nor the Office of Management and Budget is an
operational agency, the committee thinks that the
NSC is the better fit because of its focus on national
security and economic policy. In addition, the chain of command would have the coordinating
center’s director reporting directly to the National Security Advisor. The advantage of placing these entities
within the NSC is that it would signify the importance of these issues, in terms of both national security and economic policy. It
would also serve as a brake on the coordinating center’s director, in terms of choosing his or her
battles carefully.
A sunset provision allows the government to systematically prune the
export control lists in a safe and efficient way – a principled review
process is able to balance economic and national security concerns
NRC 9 The National Research Council (NRC) is the working arm of the United States National Academies, which
produces reports that shape policies, inform public opinion, and advance the pursuit of science, engineering, and
medicine, 2009, “Beyond ‘Fortress America’: National Security Controls on Science and Technology in a Globalized
World”, http://documents.library.nsf.gov/edocs/T10.5.C6-2009-PDF-Beyond-Fortress-America- National-SecurityControls-on-Science-and-Technology-in-a-globalized-World.pdf //OF
Recognize the interdependence of national security and economic competitiveness through a
principle-based system. Our current circumstances require clear articulation of the principles that
underlie our export control decisions. The committee recommends that these principles should
be: Maintain the value of protecting traditional U.S. national security in export control
policy. Historically, the goals
of U.S. export controls have been to deny the transfer of weapons or
weapons-related components and technologies to our adversaries, and to ensure the adequate
flow of critical supplies during wartime. These goals have been motivated by core national security values:
maintaining military advantage on the battlefield and sustaining the homeland. These are and should remain core values of export
control policy. Yet by
themselves they are no longer sufficient, because they do not reflect the
profound changes to our national security environment that have occurred since the end of the
Cold War.
Recognize that today this value must be balanced against the equally important
value of maintaining and enhancing the scientific and technological
competitiveness of the United States. As discussed in Chapter 1, this post-Cold War era has been
characterized by four main developments: the rise of new state and non-state adversaries, economic globalization,
the diffusion of scientific and technological expertise, and the fraying of the Cold War consensus among the countries of the antiSoviet West. In
this “flatter” world, the United States now has competitors in science and
technology and therefore must be able to compete. This is no longer just an economic maxim; it has
become a national security imperative. This means that decisions on controlling items or
categories of items should consider with equal weight the potential impact of their control on
America’s scientific and technological competitiveness and military capabilities.
Allow openness and engagement to prevail unless a compelling case can be made
for restrictions. Our market economy, our research enterprise, our collaboration with other
nations to defend ourselves, and our democratic system of government all rest on a foundation
of openness and international engagement. Questions regarding possible controls and restrictions on
science and technology must therefore start with a strong presumption for openness.
Articulate a rational basis for each restriction. Given the inefficiencies associated with restricting
openness and engagement, such restrictions can be justified only when they can be implemented
effectively and when their security benefits specifically outweigh the harm they will necessarily cause with respect to other values
and objectives. Therefore, restrictions on an unclassified technology should be implemented only when:
• The United States alone, or the United States and cooperating allies, possess technology that
leads not only to identifiable military advantage, but to an advantage that is likely to persist for a
significant period of time (i.e., the time needed to field a system based on that technology); • The United States, or
the United States acting together with allies, control the technology such that they can prevent it
from moving into the hands of possible adversaries; • The restrictions do not impose costs and
inefficiencies that are disproportionate to the restrictions’ security benefits; and • Restrictions are
re-examined and re-justified periodically to ensure they remain appropriate.
Protect the capability to “run faster.” Advances in exploiting technology and in furthering
research are typically made when the fundamentals in a field of science are understood—a
process that generally takes place in the unclassified and the international communities. The U.S.
research and development sectors—public and private research labs and industry—must remain better
prepared to anticipate and capitalize on research breakthroughs than those who would use these advances to
harm us or compete against us economically.
Treat weapons separately—but define them narrowly and precisely. Every government retains the right
to decide to whom it wishes to sell munitions—decisions that may not depend on whether other nations agree, or
whether there are economic advantages to be foregone. How-ever, serious complications can result from attempts
to treat weapons components, subsystems, and parts as weapons themselves when those
subsystems and components draw from a commercial or global technology base. If weapons are to be
controlled under a specialized munitions regime, “weapons” must be delineated from everything else, and that
definition should not extend weapons controls to broad swaths of technologies with multiple applications.
Recognize the “global public good” nature of health-related technologies. Even if restricting
health-related technologies could be argued to impair an adversary’s ability to pose deliberate
threats to health, such as by developing biological weapons, in many cases, the global ability to counter naturally
occurring disease would suffer as well. All countries are threatened when any of them have
difficulty containing and treating disease, so such controls would not be in the United States’ (or the world’s)
interests. Therefore, transfer of technologies and substances needed for public health should not be
restricted to legitimate recipients such as public health or research organizations.
When the licensing agency applies principles to decisions about export controls, the
focus will stay on why items
should or should not continue to be controlled rather than on adding to otherwise static lists of
controlled items. This kind of governance system can assess each decision as to whether an item
should be controlled against the governing principles that have been established within the system. Doing so can
ensure that the remaining controlled items are relevant to rapidly changing global conditions and can help ensure that decisions are
made in a timely manner. 2
Apply “sunset” requirements to unilaterally U.S. controlled items on export
control lists No version of the current control system should survive without an effective
method for pruning items from the control lists when they no longer serve a significant definable national security
interest. The method for pruning the lists should be disciplined, regularly scheduled, and based on
a presumption that a listed item will be removed from control unless a rational justification can
be presented for maintaining it on the list. Items from the lists that are classified weapons systems and those for
which the Defense Department provides a compelling exemption rationale would remain controlled. However,
component parts of weapons, if available on the open market outside the United States, would be eligible for decontrol. Thus, for a listed technology that is implemented at multiple levels of capability, the boundary separating what
is and what is not controlled should be frequently evaluated and adjusted using the same
principle: if a level of implementation of a technology is available on the open market, then it
should not be controlled.
The committee recommends a “sunset” rule under which every item on every list
that controls exports will be taken off the list at a specified time during each
calendar year unless a justification can be presented— consistent with the principles
enunciated above—for maintaining the particular item or category on the list. Any party with a governance or economic
interest in the decision to keep an item on the list could appeal to the independent appellate body recommended below. The recent
report of the Deemed Exports Advisory Committee contains practical suggestions in this regard.3
An economic competitiveness exemption allows for the export of
dual-use technologies without compromising national security
NRC 9 The National Research Council (NRC) is the working arm of the United States National Academies, which
produces reports that shape policies, inform public opinion, and advance the pursuit of science, engineering, and
medicine, 2009, “Beyond ‘Fortress America’: National Security Controls on Science and Technology in a Globalized
World”, http://documents.library.nsf.gov/edocs/T10.5.C6-2009-PDF-Beyond-Fortress-America- National-SecurityControls-on-Science-and-Technology-in-a-globalized-World.pdf //OF
The committee recommends that a second overarching principle should be incorporated into the export control system by
presidential directive. With the development of global markets and very significant scientific and technological centers in foreign
countries, the
United States can no longer realistically control dual-use items that are, or soon will
be, legally available in open markets overseas. Controls on these kinds of items cause far more
harm to national security and economic prosperity than they afford protection from threats
emerging from foreign sources. When a hostile state or non-state terrorist group can find
information or buy components or products on the open market in foreign countries, then the United
States gains no significant protection by prohibiting legitimate U.S. companies from exporting
these items to legitimate overseas purchasers.
The President should create, by Executive Order, a new Economic Competitiveness
Exemption. This exemption would provide as follows:
It is the policy of this Administration to foster and support the competitiveness of American science and technology on a world-wide
basis to the maximum extent possible. Scientific
and technological information, components, and products
may be controlled for export or deemed-export purposes only if the information,
component, or product (1) has received national security classification; (2) has been
generated or produced under a federally-funded grant or contract subject to written provisions,
agreed at the outset of the grant or contract, restricting export or deemed export; (3) is controlled under standards
recommended by a recognized professional body; or (4) has not been published or, by
embodiment in a process or product, is not readily available in the open public market outside
the United States. Information, components or products that are sufficiently close to becoming
available in the open public market outside the United States so that it is in the best interests of national economic
competitiveness to allow export, may also be exempted. However, nothing in this exemption prevents the
Department of State from declaring certain hostile countries, terrorist organizations, or
individuals as ineligible to obtain exports from the United States.
The committee’s recommendation with respect to the
Economic Competitiveness Exemption provides
another bright line and takes account of five important factors.
First, as with the Fundamental Research Exemption, this exemption would recognize the primacy of
classification for national security reasons. Any information, component, or product that
is classified should not be exported (except as part of a country-to-country exchange of classified information, as is
currently the case). As pointed out below, the classification system needs an intensive review and overhaul, but that is not the subject
of this report. The existing classification system can be accommodated within the committee’s recommendations, and the committee
does not address any changes in that system.
Second, this exemption would recognize that federally funded programs or projects
may be governed by contracts or terms, agreed on by the recipient of federal funds in advance, that
impose export controls where the funding agency elects to do so. So long as legitimate and
defensible ground rules are established in advance, and the recipient of the federal funds knows that export controls may be
imposed, then the choice to accept those controls is freely made.
Third, this exemption incorporates a voluntary corollary to the Fundamental
Research Exemption to cover situations in which a protocol recommending constraints has
been developed by responsible professional bodies.7 One example of this kind of voluntary system is the response
by the scientific community to the perceived risks associated with gene-splicing research.8 Another example is the work of the
advisory board established to provide reassurance that advances in biotechnology with potential applications for bioterrorism or
biological weapons development would receive responsible oversight.9 When professional bodies develop voluntary standards, the
government could use those standards to impose related export controls.
Fourth, when U.S. companies have a competitive edge, and information, components, or products are not yet
readily available on the open market overseas10 but shortly will be, a balancing test would be applied to
determine if export is in the best interests of the United States. The determination
with respect to a particular export license would rest on considerations such as allowing a U.S.
company to become the leader in the field and preempt foreign competition by selling overseas;
fostering the use of U.S. products rather than another country’s products (so that the content of these
products is known in the United States should that become important for homeland security or other national security purposes);
or maintaining U.S. competitiveness in a particularly important field.
Fifth, this exemption recognizes that the Department of State must continue to
have the option to deny exports for foreign policy reasons to countries whose policies and
behavior are considered inimical to the interests of the United States and its citizens and private corporations, as well as to private
entities or individuals known to have dealings with hostile states or with terrorist organizations. The Department of State has long
had the ability to impose foreign policy export controls, and these have always been considered to be entirely separate from national
security export controls. As such, they neither require nor are they based on the identification of an immediate, demonstrable threat
to U.S. national security for their justification.
The Export Control Regime is surveillance
Commerce et al 2001 Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration, US Census
Bureau, “AUTOMATED EXPORT SYSTEM (AES) CERTIFICATION REPORT Report to Congress Presented To:
Senate: Committee on Foreign Relations House: Committee on International Relations”, May 2001,
https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/aes/aes-certification-rpt.pdf//OF
The Census Bureau and Customs, as the primary developers of the AES, recommend that the full
implementation of mandatory filing for all items (licensed and unlicensed) on the CCL and the
USML, as well as all other shipper's export declaration information, and the integration of the AES
with other Federal Government agency licensing systems, as specified in the “Feasibility of Mandatory Automated Export
(AES) Filing” report issued July 27, 2000, be initiated in four stages as described below: Stage 1 - Require mandatory filing
through the AES only for exports of items on the USML and the CCL 90 days after the law
becomes effective. The law will become effective 270 days after AES is certified as a secure, functional
system. (FY 2001) Stage 2 - Require mandatory filing through the AES for the remainder of exports requiring
an export license. (FY 2002) Stage 3 - Require mandatory filing through the AES for all freight
forwarders, nonvessel operating carriers, consolidators, and other intermediaries, that file
commodity documentation on behalf of exporters. (FY 2003) Stage 4 - Require mandatory filing
through the AES for all exporters (U.S. principal parties in interest), including companies, individuals,
and other exporting entities that file commodity documentation. (FY 2005) 150 This proposed schedule
recognizes the urgency of improving the surveillance of exports on the USML and the
CCL, takes into consideration the time required to integrate the information systems among all the potential
Government users of the AES data, and acknowledges the fact that mandatory filing of SEDs over the AES will
represent a significant change in business practice for many exporters, especially smaller ones.
Inherency
AT: ECR solves
ECR doesn’t solve – it increased enforcement
Gottemoeller and Hirschhorn 13 Rose E. Gottemoeller is acting undersecretary of state for
arms control and international security, Eric L. Hirschhorn is undersecretary of commerce for industry and security,
“Letter to the Editor: Export Control Reform Tightens U.S. Arms Embargoes”, 6/3/13,
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_06/Export-Control-Reform-Tightens-US-Arms-Embargoes//OF
First, the
cornerstone of President Barack Obama’s Export Control Reform Initiative is rebuilding the
nation’s control lists so that the administration can prioritize its controls. This prioritization
does not mean that the administration is lowering its standards for ensuring that export controls
prevent human rights abuses or that it is weakening U.S. arms embargoes. A careful reading of how the initiative is prioritizing controls will show that
the new system will help the U.S. government do a better job of safeguarding vital technologies and will tighten U.S. arms embargoes. Second,
export control reform is a national security initiative and is unrelated to the National Export Initiative that
promotes exports. At its heart, the national security review for the export control initiative was conducted
by experts across the U.S. government to fundamentally reform the current system. Export
control reform is intended to enhance U.S. national security and foreign policy by focusing resources
on the threats that matter most, increasing interoperability with allies and partners by ensuring more timely access to U.S. defense articles during
conflicts, and strengthening the U.S. defense industrial base by reducing incentives for foreign manufacturers to avoid or even eliminate their use of
U.S. parts and components. Third, the
administration has not put forward any proposal to ease
restrictions on the export of small arms. It is considering some consolidation of
duplicative requirements that exist today, but this consolidation would not remove the requirement for
an export license, regardless of which agency has licensing jurisdiction. Possible consolidation into one set of requirements is a commonsense
approach that would make more efficient use of government resources and would ensure greater consistency and visibility for all agencies involved in
the licensing and enforcement process. Consolidation also would make it easier for exporters to comply with the rules. As has been the case for all
changes to the existing system proposed to date, any proposed changes to current export rules governing small arms will be published for public
comment. The administration will continue to make all planned and actual changes available from a single webpage at www.export.gov/ecr/. Fourth,
unlike the State Department, the
Commerce Department has a law enforcement branch with
more than 100 special agents dedicated exclusively to criminal and administrative
enforcement of export control violations, with all the requisite statutory law enforcement authorities. This special
Commerce Department unit is in addition to the continued criminal enforcement of State and Commerce department regulations by the FBI and the
Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement. This means that any
items moved to Commerce
Department jurisdiction actually will be subject to more law enforcement oversight. Finally, the
State Department’s ability to review proposed defense exports for potential human rights
concerns under export control systems that it and the Commerce Department administer will not be diminished as a result of
export control reform. The administration will continue to use its long-established criteria for
assessing the potential risks to international stability and human rights arising from proposed exports of munitions and dual-use items.
Export control reform will bolster, not diminish, the U.S. government’s ability to
administer an effective export control system to address national security and foreign
policy challenges, including human rights, in the 21st century.
AT: Satellite Export Reforms
Export reforms on satellites don’t solve China
Gerrish et al 14 Jeffrey Gerrish is a partner at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP,
Nathaniel Bolin is a legal counsel at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, and Jamieson Greer is an
associate of international trade at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, "US Government
Announces Reforms to Space and Satellite Systems Export Controls", 4/13/14,
http://www.skadden.com/insights/us-government-announces-reforms-space-and-satellite-systemsexport-controls//OF
Items that will transition from the USML to the CCL under the new rules include certain
commercial communications satellites and remote sensing satellites and probes and rovers for
planetary and interplanetary science and exploration. In part, this transition reverses the move in
the late 1990s that put licensing jurisdiction over commercial satellites in the hands of DDTC in response to concerns over
improper release of U.S. satellite technology to China. Many in the industry have blamed that move for reducing U.S.
competitiveness, as foreign buyers increasingly turned to “ITAR-free” alternatives to U.S. satellite technology. Importantly,
however,
items that transition from the USML to the CCL under the new rules will
remain subject to stringent end use controls, including prohibitions on their
export, re-export and transfer to China and embargoed countries such as Iran and North Korea (even when
the U.S.-origin items constitute only a small fraction of the overall finished product or system).
2AC Exports
Export Controls kill Comp
Export controls are directly responsible for other countries
closing the gap behind the US
Farkas 10 (Evelyn-Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia/Ukraine/Eurasia, “U.S.
Export Controls: Emerging Consensus On Increasing Risk,” American Security Project, April
2010, https://www.americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/US-ExportControls-Consensus-and-Risk-FINAL.pdf)
We have left the era of the military-industrial complex and entered a new reality of military
industrial complexity. Today, many cutting-edge technologies, such as encryption and software in general, are
developed in the private sector and sought by the government. This means the list of dual-use items
is growing, while at the same time globalization is ensuring that new items and services that
were once only available in the U.S. market are now readily available from foreign sources. In
addition, the United States is no longer unchallenged in the global marketplace either in terms of
market share or quality, even in militarily critical technologies.3 Today, for example, the Netherlands
and Japan are the leaders in the manufacture of lithography equipment, which is critical to making
semiconductors.4 In terms of market share in the defense arena, as one journalist has observed, “The United States’ position
as the world’s dominant military exporter since the Cold War-era is swiftly being eroded by the growth in Russian and European
supply.”5 The U.S. share of the global arms market has declined from about 40% in 2000 to approximately 27% in 2008.6 Whereas
American-made semiconductors used to be 10 years ahead of their Chinese competitors, the GAO reported that by 2002 the U.S.
lead had been reduced to two years. Over the ensuing six years, the gap narrowed further to about one generation—or one to two
years.7 In short, the
21st century reality is that the United States is no longer head and shoulders
above the rest of the world in terms of its scientific, technical, and military capabilities. In fact, we
risk losing that edge to countries such as China and India. Clearly, export controls are not responsible for this development,
but they do cut both ways. They are intended to limit the spread of technology, but in some cases they also
appear to damage the defense industry’s ability to make business decisions that support the
innovation on which future military advances depend.
Aerospace
US military aerospace is declining—private spending and increased
exports key
Deloitte 14 [Deloitte is the largest professional services network in the world by revenue and
by the number of professionals. Deloitte provides audit, tax, consulting, enterprise risk and
financial advisory services with more than 200,000 professionals in over 150 countries. 2014.
“2015 Global aerospace and defense
industry outlook”
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/manufacturing/us-mfg-2015global-a-and-d-outlook.pdf//jweideman]
The U.S. spends by far the most on defense with 39 percent of the total global spend.21 Thus, any reduction in the U.S. defense budget will have a disproportionally higher
impact on the global spend. On 1 March 2013 in the U.S., the Budget Control Act took effect including a US$37 billion reduction in defense spend, and US$52 billion of expected
reductions annually for the next nine years.22 Subsequently, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 mitigated the first two years of budget cuts with an add back of US$31.5 billion,
Notwithstanding, defense
contractors have experienced the impact of sequestration. Indeed, in 2013, the top 20 U.S. defense contractors experienced a 2.5
percent reduction in revenues.24 Through the first nine months of 2014, the top 20 U.S. defense contractors have experienced a revenue
decline of 2.1 percent, a trend expected to continue through the end of 2014.25 The National Defense
mitigating some of the sequestration impacts on military and domestic spending through 30 September 2015.23
Authorization Act of 2015 set defense spending at US$585 billion for fiscal 2015, which is US$30 billion less than the defense budget for fiscal 2014 and will likely continue to
put pressure on the U.S. defense contractor revenues in 2015.26 U.S. President Obama proposed a US$534 billion base budget along with a US$51 billion for overseas
contingency operations.27 Obama administration’s requested base budget exceeded federal spending limits as it is US$35 billion more than the federal spending cap set at
Thus,
global defense spending is expected to continue to decline. Figure 5 illustrates global government defense spending by country.
As shown, the U.S. government is by far the largest spender, accounting for 39 percent of the total global military spend.29 The global defense industry
in 2015 and beyond will be challenged in two major ways: how to grow profitably in a declining
market and what actions are necessary to cut costs to maintain acceptable financial
performance. Firstly, with declining budgets, there likely will not be sufficient work to sustain
current levels of revenues and earnings, requiring global defense companies to find other
sources of revenue. Governments are expected to continue to spend on programs of significant value, such as the next generation intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) technologies. The ability to know, process, react in real time to events on the ground, in
the air, and at sea will continue to be a strategic competitive advantage in armed conflict. The ability to
US$499 billion.28 The government customers of global defense companies continue to be challenged with affordability and competing domestic priorities.
process mega- billions of data bits provided by highresolution optics, communication sensing, and other multispectral sensors, is key to differentiating friend from foe, or
tactical threat versus benign events for example. The use of advanced data analytics to sift through the data and make sense of it will be another strategic advantage in armed
Defense companies will increasingly be
required to invest their own funds in potential growth areas, including next generation ISR as indicated above. Other areas of
growth that may help fill the revenue gap are foreign military sales to countries that are spending more on defense. Other promising areas of growth
are in cybersecurity, adjacent markets, and application of military technology innovations for
civilian markets. Lastly, growth is expected to come from inorganic sources via acquisitions. Acquisitions into new markets or consolidation of weaker companies to
conflict. Innovations in these areas represent a source of potential growth for defense companies.
create economies of scale are expected to accelerate in 2015.
Satellite export reform solves aerospace despite federal budget issues
Blakey 12 [Marion Clifton Blakey is president and chief executive officer of the Aerospace
Industries Association, an American defense industry trade association. January 2012
“Competing for Space: Satellite Export Policy and U.S. National Security”--- Introduction.
http://www.aia-aerospace.org/assets/CompetingForSpaceReport.pdf//jweideman]
The U.S. space industry currently faces dual threats; major reductions in federal aerospace
spending and overly restrictive satellite technology export policies. If we continue on this path,
without implementing the right reforms, our nation risks the scenario of a weakened space
industrial base that is unable to fully meet U.S. national security needs or sustain our
technological edge against foreign competitors. This new paper, Competing for Space: Satellite Export Policy and U.S.
National Security, clearly details the impact that inappropriate export controls and inadequate trade policies have
had on the U.S. satellite industry. It also offers recommendations that will make U.S. firms more competitive in the global
marketplace while at the same time protecting our national security. AIA believes that actions to modernize the export
control system and enhance space trade among our allies are long overdue and will build a
stronger, more robust U.S. satellite industry and supplier base that are able to meet the
challenges associated with budget-constrained government customers. We surveyed AIA members this year on
the topic of export regulations and the message was clear: outdated export controls are hurting U.S. companies. Data supports this view. The U.S. held
73 percent of the worldwide share of satellite exports in 1995 – this fell to a staggering 25 percent by 2005. Today, U.S. law requires export agencies to
still look at a nut, bolt, or screw for a commercial satellite and an anti-tank missile through the same regulatory prism. Clearly, it’s time for a change.
This paper sounds an urgent call to our national leaders to bolster opportunities for satellite
exports by modernizing the U.S. export control system. AIA’s recommendations center on the creation of market
conditions that would allow U.S. firms to compete and win their fair share of international commercial space business – nothing more, nothing less.
Maintaining a strong industrial and supplier base is, in itself, a major national security issue;
enabling this critical sector to compete internationally will become increasingly important as
government spending is constrained. Modernizing the nation’s export control system will result
in a healthier space industrial base – allowing the United States to better focus on sensitive
technologies and safeguard national security while creating high wage, high skill jobs. For our
national policymakers, promotion of satellite exports should rank among the most viable options to aid
our economy, reinforcing U.S. preeminence in space and ensuring our aerospace industrial base remains second to none.
Solves cyber-war and military power
NAW 10 [National Aerospace Week was established by the Aerospace Industries Association in
2010 as an opportunity for the aerospace and defense industry and its supporters. 2010,
“Aerospace and Defense: Second to None” http://nationalaerospaceweek.org/wpcontent/uploads/2010/04/whitepaper.pdf//jweideman]
However, we
remain concerned about the fragility of the supplier base. With another round of acquisitions and
supplier base remains particularly
vulnerable. These small businesses are critical to the primes and to the government. They face multiple challenges overcoming barriers to federal
contracting and once they leave the contracting base, they and their unique skills cannot be recovered. Along with our concern about
the industrial base is the long-term issue of modernizing our military hardware. The 1980s defense buildup is now 25 years old, and systems acquired then are in need of replacement. The decade of 2010-2019 is the crucial time
to reset, recapitalize and modernize our military forces. Not only are many of our systems reaching the end of their designed lives, but America’s
military forces are using their equipment at many times the programmed rates in the harsh
conditions of combat, wearing out equipment prematurely. Delaying modernization will make it
even harder to identify and effectively address global threats in the future. The Aerospace
Industries Association released a report in May 2011 that takes a historical look at spending in
the investment accounts and the ebb and flow of spending since the 1970s. It concludes that our
nation and its military members pay a large price when we decrease spending on procurement
and research and development. The report, Defense Investment: Finding the Right Balance, also recommends 35 percent of the
consolidations imminent along with a projected decline in defense spending, the
budget be devoted to modernization as a prudent and affordable level for supporting the force of today and the future. The requirements identified in
the 2010 QDR —
for the United States to overmatch potential adversaries and to execute longduration campaigns in coming years against increasingly capable potential opponents — will
require complex and expensive aerospace capabilities. This is a concern that the Defense Department recognizes. Since
the end of the Cold War, the Pentagon has reduced the number of weapons systems it has bought and there are fewer new-start programs further and
further apart. In 2010, for the first time in 100 years, the United States had no manned military aircraft in design. Forty-nine military aircraft programs
were underway in the 1950s, seven in the 1980s, and three in the 1990s. Today, looking beyond the F-35, there are none—with the possible exception of
a long-range bomber that is not yet approved for development. Defense modernization is not optional. While the fiscal 2012 budget request is a
reasonable target that takes into account funding needed to fight two wars, the pressure on the procurement and research and development budget is
sure to increase in the future. At the same time, America
must adapt its defenses to new kinds of threats. A largescale attack on information networks could pose a serious economic threat, impeding or
preventing commerce conducted electronically. This would affect not only 2011 Aerospace
Industries Association of America, Inc. 5 ATM transactions, but commercial and governmental
fund transfers and the just-in-time orders on which the manufacturing sector depends. It could
even pose threats to American lives, interrupting the transfer of medical data, disrupting power
grids, even disabling emergency communications links. In partnership with the government, our industry is
on the forefront of securing these networks and combating cyber attack. The American people also demand
better security for the U.S. homeland, from gaining control of our borders to more effective law enforcement and disaster response. The aerospace
industry provides the tools that help different forces and jurisdictions communicate with each other; monitor critical facilities and unpatrolled borders,
and give advance warning of natural disasters, among other capabilities. In many cases, government is the only market for these technologies.
Therefore, sound government policy is essential not only to maintain current capabilities, but to ensure that a technology and manufacturing base
exists to develop new ones.
[insert cyber impacts from ssra aff]
XT: Solves aerospace
The ban destroys the space industrial base
AIA 12 [Aerospace Industries Association, an American defense industry trade association.
January 2012 “Competing for Space: Satellite Export Policy and U.S. National Security”
http://www.aia-aerospace.org/assets/CompetingForSpaceReport.pdf//jweideman]
Supporting the Industrial Base The
U.S. space and defense industrial base–a collection of specialized
manufacturing firms and innovative small businesses–is responsible for the design and
development of space systems and components for commercial customers and the U.S.
government. These companies are unique: their major customers are agencies of the U.S. government such as NASA, the Defense Department
and those in the intelligence community. With relatively few opportunities to compete on contracts that can take years to complete, the industry’s highstakes business development paradigm has been referred to as “betting the ranch on winning in Vegas.”10 But
as government spending
on space and security programs decreases, contraction within industry is inevitable. The result
will mean less competition and innovation, and reduced capabilities to produce systems needed
by the government. Ultimately, some firms may fail outright. U.S. policymakers can counteract this
trend by removing existing barriers to new commercial opportunities for American space and
defense manufacturers. “The (current export control) system has the effect of discouraging
exporters from approaching the process as intended. Multinational companies can move
production offshore, eroding our defense industrial base, undermining our control regimes in the process, not to
mention losing American jobs. Some European satellite manufacturers even market their
products as being not subject to U.S. export controls, thus drawing overseas not only potential
customers, but some of the best scientists and engineers as well.” – Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. Speech on Export Control
Reform before Business Executives for National Security. April 20, 2010.9 “… there is a danger here that export controls, if
not reviewed and refined, can in fact create the opposite kind of a situation here, where our
industry is no longer competitive; therefore our industry is declining; therefore their ability to provide for us is also declining.” –
General C. Robert “Bob” Kehler, Commander, United States Strategic Command11 4 One major barrier to U.S. export competitiveness is the presence of
all satellites and related components (however innocuous) on the USML, which forces industry and its suppliers to rely more and more on diminishing
domestic federal programs in order to remain alive. Foreign competitors have used our own policies against us by marketing their satellites as devoid of
U.S. parts and components – “ITAR Free.” Meanwhile, efforts to promote exports within the Obama administration, like the National Export Initiative,
are not adequately optimized to support exports of commercial U.S. satellite technology. AIA Survey Results The 2011 AIA member survey referenced
in the Executive Summary offers new insights about the challenges associated with the current export regime. The survey provides a valuable snapshot
regarding the cost of the status quo for the industry, U.S. jobs and our security and economic interests. Do you see a connection between export
controls and space industrial base capabilities? More
than 90 percent of respondents saw some connection
between export controls and eroding space industrial base capabilities. Respondents reported that export
controls present barriers to U.S. companies, which our foreign competitors do not face. One small U.S. space business stated that due to ITAR barriers,
their “market share and profitability has been reduced significantly.” Another firm cited that “ITAR
controls are hurting the competitiveness of U.S. suppliers in areas where there is similar technology available in other parts of the world.” One business
cited ITAR controls as restricting firms from selling to international satellite builders and also added that foreign market protection exacerbates the
challenge. Their statements reflect a threat to the profitability and investment environment that encourages U.S. companies to research and develop
new capabilities.
2AC China
Controls Deck Exports
Export Controls deter exports to China – perceptions of uncertainty
uniquely impact business
AmCham China 9 American Chamber of Commerce in China, “The Effect of U.S. Export Controls: Case Studies from
China on Impact of Export Controls on Manufacturers’ Decisions to Use or Not Use U.S.-Origin Goods in Commercial Products”,
February 19, 2009 ,
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=39&ved=0CFgQFjAIOB4&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.amch
amchina.org%2Fdownload%3Fpath%3D%2Fcmsfile%2F2009%2F03%2F18%2F39ae86701a04416a26643d110852136c.pdf&ei=yBC
aVbDeL8PvsAXpto0w&usg=AFQjCNGl9ko2rllSEIqZaGgTsEzPU2blnw&sig2=K_VqDnmSQi2J16QWvdzOzg&cad=rja//OF
The examples presented in this report from the semiconductor, manufacturing, materials
processing, and aerospace industries represent a pervasive problem in which U.S. exporters of
parts, components, systems, and equipment are suffering the loss of sales and jobs due to
current U.S. export control policies. Many of these examples never reach the statistics
because the sales are lost even before an export license application is submitted,
and these examples represent only a small portion of impacted trade . As
manufacturers in China encounter delays and prohibitions related to the purchase and import of
U.S. commercial goods, these negative experiences are spread throughout industry, warning
other manufacturers of the potential problems that may arise during or following the purchase
of controlled items from the United States. This stigma that has become associated with U.S. products, particularly
in certain high technology sectors, also impacts U.S. sales of non-licensable goods, technologies and services. Concerns
about U.S. export controls have led to misconceptions about what is prohibited,
what requires an export license, and the length of license processing times. Other
concerns include overly-restrictive conditions placed on U.S. export licenses and fear of regulatory
changes that may prohibit future sales, parts and/or services, thereby suspending
manufacturing activities. While some other countries, such as Japan, may include conditions on export licenses that
restrict the transfer or re-export of a controlled item, they allow for approvals of such activities through a direct importer to exporter
consultation. By allowing the companies to seek approvals directly from their suppliers, these Japanese export licenses permit more
flexibility to the companies to resolve transfer and re-export issues quickly and efficiently. Companies
already face many
challenges from Chinese and other foreign non-U.S. competitors in areas such as competition
for talent recruitment, R&D funding, and speed of bringing products to market. U.S. export
control limitations add hurdles to manufacturers’ business strategies that build
additional time, resources and uncertainties into their technology and product
development roadmaps. This has led to Chinese manufacturers concluding that the benefits of
purchasing U.S. products are far outweighed by these drawbacks. Over the course of the U.S.-China
bilateral relationship, the United States has issued new regulations that have severely
impacted trade between the countries. Some of these changes were prompted by uncontrollable international
events that elicited strong political reactions of the U.S. Government. Other export control regulatory changes, however, have come
at seemingly unprompted times. These past
regulatory changes have raised the level of
uncertainty among foreign manufacturers about the ability of U.S. suppliers to
consistently and reliably supply future products, replacement parts and service.
Controls kill coop
New regulatory changes shut out China from the international
satellite market – this undermines US-China space cooperation and
US satellite competitiveness
Jingjie 13 Yang Jingjie (citing Chinese ministry officials) is a reporter for Global Times, “US excludes China
from satellite deal”, 1/7/13, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/754153.shtml//OF
The Chinese government and aerospace industry have called on the US to stop politicizing SinoUS space cooperation and allow China access to commercial launch services, after new revisions
to US satellite export control rules once again barred the emerging space power from obtaining
US satellites. US President Barack Obama Thursday signed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, which
included a section on the removal of satellites and related items from the US Munitions List with the aim of stimulating the
commercial space sector. However, the
relaxation of export controls shut China out by
stipulating that no satellites or related items may be exported, re-exported or
transferred to China, North Korea or any country that is a state sponsor of terrorism. It prohibits satellites or
related items from being launched in those countries, and prohibits those countries from using
these items in their launch vehicles. Only the president could waive the prohibition on a
case-by-case basis. In response, China expressed grave concern. Shen Danyang, spokesman for the Ministry of
Commerce, said Saturday that despite US promises that the reform of the export control system would
benefit Beijing and boost US exports of high-tech equipment to China, the US in fact took
measures to continue containing Sino-US cooperation in civilian-use satellites. "China is very
disappointed and dissatisfied," said Shen, adding that China hopes the US will stop
discriminating against it. Sino-US cooperation in commercial satellite launches ceased after
June 1999, when the US tightened its export controls following the Cox Report, which accused China of "illegally obtaining" US
space technology. Fu Zhiheng, a vice president of the China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC), told the Global Times that
Sino-US commercial space cooperation was active throughout the 1990s, during which CGWIC successfully launched 26 US
satellites into space. "With
six launches of Iridium communications satellites by our Long March
launch vehicles, we played an important role in the building of the US network," said Fu, listing a
number of other US partners such as Hughes and EchoStar. Despite a ban on satellite exports to China in the early 1990s, former US
presidents Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton all authorized launches in China during their tenures citing national
interests. "The
Obama administration has made repeated promises to relax high-tech export
controls. But it turns out that it has been the strictest," Zhou Shijian, a senior researcher with the Center for USChina Relations at Tsinghua University, told the Global Times. The new rules proposed by some rightwing legislators have in fact labeled China as "an enemy" of the US, Zhou said, noting that
even during the Cold War era, the US didn't stop space cooperation with the former Soviet
Union. Over the past 14 years, export controls haven't stopped China's space advancements.
In 2011 and 2012, China's Long March carriers made 19 launches each year, well ahead of the launches by the US. According to Fu,
since 2005, the CGWIC has carried out 16 international commercial launches, winning international contracts courtesy of low costs
and high reliability. In the most recent commercial launch in December 2012, a Long March launcher sent Turkish earth observation
satellite GK-2 into orbit. Egemen Imre, chief engineer of Satellite Systems Design Group under the Turkey-based space institute
TUBITAK UZAY, told the Global Times Sunday that
the Chinese company presented the best offer in terms of
technical merit and costs to win the tender, and regarded the launch as "very successful." A report
by the Aerospace Industries Association showed the global share of US satellite exports dropped from 73
percent in 1995 to 25 percent in 2005, which Zhou said was partly due to the prohibition of
launches in China. While appealing for US market access, Fu further noted that Chinese companies wouldn't
pose any threat or bring any competition to US commercial launch companies.
Satellite exports ban destroys trust and curbs US-China space coop
Richburg 11 [Keith, Washington post staffwriter and correspondent in asia. Masters from the
London school of economics. 1/22/11, “Mistrust stalls U.S.-China space cooperation”
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/01/21/AR2011012104480.html//jweideman]
BEIJING - China's grand ambitions extend literally to the moon, with the country now embarked on a multi-pronged program to establish its own
global navigational system, launch a space laboratory and put a Chinese astronaut on the moon within the next decade.
The Obama
administration views space as ripe territory for cooperation with China. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates
has called it one of four potential areas of "strategic dialogue," along with cybersecurity, missile defense and
nuclear weapons. And President Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao vowed after their White House summit last week to "deepen dialogue and
exchanges" in the field. But
as China ramps up its space initiatives, the diplomatic talk of cooperation has
so far found little traction. The Chinese leadership has shown scant interest in opening up the most sensitive details of its program, much
of which is controlled by the People's Liberation Army (PLA). At the same time, Chinese scientists and space officials say that
Washington's wariness of China's intentions in space, as well as U.S. bans on some hightechnology exports, makes cooperation problematic. For now, the U.S.-China relationship in space appears to mirror
the one on Earth - a still-dominant but fading superpower facing a new and ambitious rival, with suspicion on both sides. "What you have are two
major powers, both of whom use space for military, civilian and commercial purposes," said Dean Cheng, a researcher with the Washington-based
Heritage Foundation and an expert on the Chinese military and space program. ad_icon NASA's human spaceflight program has been in flux in recent
years, fueling particular concern among some U.S. observers about the challenge posed by China's initiatives in that area. There is "a lot of very wary,
careful, mutual watching," Cheng said. Song
Xiaojun, a military expert and commentator on China's CCTV,
said that substantial cooperation in the space field is impossible without mutual trust. Achieving
that, he said, "depends on whether the U.S. can put away its pride and treat China as a partner to
cooperate on equal terms. But I don't see that happening in the near future, since the U.S. is experiencing menopause while China is
going through puberty." But while China may still be an adolescent in terms of space exploration - launching its first astronaut in 2003 - it has made
some notable strides in recent months and years, and plans seem on track for some major breakthroughs. On the day Hu left for his U.S. trip, Chinese
news media reported the inauguration of a new program to train astronauts - called taikonauts here - for eventual deployment to the first Chinese space
station, planned for 2015. As part of the project, two launches are planned for this year, that of an unmanned space module, called Tiangong-1, or
"Heavenly Palace," by summer, and later an unmanned Shenzhou spacecraft that will attempt to dock with it. On a separate track, China is also working
through a three-stage process for carrying out its first manned moon landing. The first stage was completed in October with the successful launch of a
Chang'e-2 lunar orbiter. In 2012 or 2013, an unmanned landing craft is scheduled to take a rover to the moon to collect rock and soil samples. By 2020,
according to the plan, a taikonaut could land on the moon.
Chinese official statements prove the export ban destroys space coop
and commercial space development
Selding 11 [Peter B. de Selding is the Paris bureau chief for SpaceNews. He is responsible for
coverage of all European military, civil and commercial space programs and also covers
international regulatory organizations such as the International Telecommunications Union. BA
Washington University. 4/14/11, “Chinese Government Official Urges U.S.-Chinese Space
Cooperation” http://spacenews.com/chinese-government-official-urges-us-chinese-spacecooperation///jweideman]
A top Chinese government space official on April 14 appealed to the U.S. government to lift its
decade-long ban on most forms of U.S.-Chinese space cooperation, saying both nations would benefit from closer
government and commercial space interaction. He specifically called for cooperation on manned spaceflight, in which China has made massive
investment in recent years. Lei Fanpei, vice president of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corp. (CASC), which oversees much of China’s
launch vehicle and satellite manufacturing industry, said China
purchased more than $1 billion in U.S.-built satellites
in the 1990s before the de facto ban went into effect in 1999. - See more at: http://spacenews.com/chinesegovernment-official-urges-us-chinese-space-cooperation/#sthash.h3RXTysv.dpuf Since then, the U.S. International Traffic in
Arms Regulations (ITAR) have made it impossible to export most satellite components, or full
satellites, to China for launch on China’s now successful line of Long March rockets. The ITAR regulations that tightened the U.S. technology
export regime were put into place to punish China for its missile exports, and to slow development of China’s rocket industry by reducing its customer
base. Most commercial telecommunications satellites carry at least some U.S. parts, which is why ITAR
has all but locked China out
of the global commercial launch market. The U.S. government is reviewing the current ITAR regime, which U.S. industry says
has had the unintended effect of making it difficult to sell satellites and satellite components just about anywhere in the world. At the same time,
China’s domestic demand for launches of its own telecommunications, navigation, Earth observation and science satellites — and its manned space
program — has given the Long March vehicle sufficient business to earn it a record of reliability. The global insurance underwriting community now
ranks the Long March vehicle alongside Russian and European rockets for reliability when it sets insurance premiums. Addressing the National Space
Symposium here, Lei said Chinese vehicles launched more than 20 U.S.-built satellites in the 1990s. While cooperation with the United States has been
shut down, he said, China has maintained relations with the 18-nation European Space Agency, Brazil, France, Russia and others. China also has
developed a telecommunications satellite product line that has been bundled with a Chinese Long March vehicle to offer in-orbit delivery of
telecommunications spacecraft to a half-dozen nations that in many cases can offer China access to their crude oil reserves. Lei said he sees three areas
in which U.S.-Chinese
cooperation would be in both nations’ interests. The first, he said, is an open
commercial access of each nation to the other’s capabilities in satellites and launch vehicles. The
second, he said, is manned spaceflight and space science, particularly in deep space exploration. The
third is in satellite applications including disaster monitoring and management. –
Space coop impact
Commercial space cooperation spills over to every space security
threat--- norms, debris, space mil etc.
Cossa and santoro 13 [Ralph Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu,
Hawaii. He is also senior editor of the Forum's triannual electronic journal. David Santoro is a
senior fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS, where he specializes in nonproliferation and nuclear
security, disarmament, and arms control. November 4-5, 2013 Paving the Way for a “New Type
of Major Country Relations”
http://csis.org/files/publication/issuesinsights_vol14no9.pdf//jweideman]
Our US speaker argued that US-China
cooperation in space is essential because both countries have shared
interests and problems in this domain and because international space rules and norms need to
be expanded. When it began to be exploited in the mid-1950s, space was not governed by any rules. Steps toward the development of space
governance mechanisms were only established in the early/mid-1960s, with the notable conclusion of the Outer Space Treaty (1967). No major
space security agreement has been concluded since 1975, however. With the exception of the 2007 UN Debris
Mitigation Guidelines, major powers have failed to close the gaps and limitations in existing treaties. This is problematic because the
space domain is becoming more important in strategic relations: new actors include the European Space Agency,
Japan, Israel, India, Iran, North Korea, and South Korea. Several commercial actors are also becoming active, such as
SpaceX or Virgin Galactic. Meanwhile, orbital debris and traffic are increasingly difficult to manage
and positioning, navigation, and timing systems are more vulnerable. Actors are also
expanding military activities in space: there is growing interest in kinetic/laser anti-satellite
(ASAT) capabilities and jamming, growing concerns about the development of action-reaction
dynamics, and no effective forum for negotiations. Finally, the legal framework governing the
moon and celestial bodies does not include provisions on mining and could be a theater for
future conflicts. Our US speaker argued that it is in the interest of humankind to maintain safe access to space and promote its peaceful use.
Also critical is preventing interference with critical space infrastructure such as navigation and communication
systems, to improve international space situational awareness for safety, collision avoidance, and
verification, and to reduce international military tensions, harmful weapons test, and arms
race pressures. In recent years (even months), several space governance efforts have been initiated: Russia and China proposed the PPWT
(2008), the Europeans crafted the “International Code of Conduct” for space (2012), the UN Group of Governmental Experts concluded its work,
proposing that states adopt several transparency and confidence-building measures (2013), and the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS) is conducting a sustainability initiative, which is expected to conclude in 2014. US space policy is guided by the 2010 National Space Policy
US departments
of Defense and State have made outreach efforts to Beijing on space security since 2010. The
hope is to increase transparency and confidence-building measures to encourage responsible behavior in space.
and the 2011 National Security Space Strategy, both of which strongly support international cooperation. In this spirit, the
A longer-term possibility is the conclusion of verifiable treaties that promote security and stability. 15 Our US speaker argued that there are numerous
benefits to expanded US-China space talks: they would help reduce mistrust and promote better understanding of each other’s space interests, create
new rules/norms for safeguarding space utilities, provide a forum to defuse problems and avoid inadvertent military escalation, prevent further debrisproducing events and other actions of mutual concern, and improve peacetime and crisis stability. Specific ideas for US-China space initiatives could
include mutual noninterference pledges for space assets, exchanges of visits for space-launch observation, closer cooperation in debris-tracking and
collision avoidance, discussions about further developing the Code of Conduct, bilateral/multilateral talks on kinetic ASAT tests (leading to a ban with
international verification), and talks on concerns raised by space-based weapons (leading to a test ban, NFU, or no-first-deployment agreements). Of
course, there are political obstacles to such developments. For starters, high-level attention to space issues remains limited. Hardliners in both capitals
oppose greater cooperation and verification mechanisms to support new treaties are weak. Finally, China
wants
civil/commercial cooperation to come first, while the United States prioritizes military restraint and greater
transparency. Our Chinese speaker agreed that China and the United States have important shared interests and goals in space and that dialogue is
important, especially as threats are increasing. The question is how to frame this dialogue. According to Beijing, it should be based on equality and
mutual trust and take into account political considerations. In this regard, Washington needs to remember that Beijing’s activities in space are
essential. Progress in space cooperation is urgent because it has become a strategic issue but, as our speaker put it, “we need to find the right
atmospherics now.”
Space mil causes escalatory war in Asia
Easton 10 [Ian Easton is a research fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, where he conducts
research on defense and security issues in Asia. December 1, 2010. “The Asia-Pacific’s Emerging
Missile Defense and Military Space Competition”
http://www.npolicy.org/article_file/The_AsiaPacifics_Emerging_Missile_Defense_and_Military_Space_Competition_280111_1143.pdf//jw
eideman]
Competition is emerging over securing access to and control of the air and space mediums in the
Asia-Pacific region. This competition is being driven in large part by the rapid Chinese
development of asymmetric military capabilities and strategies that increasingly challenge the ability
of regional missile defense and military space programs to keep pace. This situation has serious
implications for the strategic landscape of the region and well beyond. Concerns that this paper hopes to
highlight include the long term threat to strategic stability that China’s military developments pose to the region, and the
accompanying potential for a major multi-faceted regional arms race driven by strategies and
weapons systems that are of an inherently escalatory and de-stabilizing nature. The historic military
modernization campaign being undertaken by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Chinese development, testing and deployment of advanced
anti-access, area-denial capabilities are eroding the confidence of other regional actors that they will have unimpeded access to and control of the air
and space mediums in the event of a conflict. This
is of crucial importance because the Asia-Pacific region is an
aerospace theater by its very nature, and thus access to and control of the air and space dimensions of any
future conflict will be critical to achieving political and military success on the land and the sea. The latest Quadrennial Defense
Review, in an oblique reference to China, states: “Future adversaries will likely posses sophisticated capabilities designed to contest or deny command
of the air, sea, space, and cyberspace domains.”1 Recognizing that a shifting balance of relative power and capabilities is underway, the U.S. and its
allies and partners in the region are seeking to develop a variety of means to counter China’s fast evolving capabilities. However, current trends suggest
that the U.S. and its allies will find it increasingly difficult to deter and defeat China in any future crisis or conflict. This is due, in no small part, to
China’s unprecedented buildup of conventionally armed missiles. A key component of the evolving regional air and space competition is the
proliferation of missile technology, most notably stemming from China’s on-going, largescale production of conventionally-armed ballistic and cruise
missiles. This is leading other regional actors to invest in missile defense, and in some limited instances, precise long-range strike capabilities of their
own to counter and deter the perceived Chinese threat. In turn, China is developing its own increasingly effective air and missile defense network in the
face of what it perceives of as missile threats on its periphery, and in doing so is challenging its potential rivals to develop ever better offensive and
defensive means of deterrence. China is particularly sensitive to the U.S. development of an integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) given
such a system’s suspected ability to have long-term impacts upon China’s nuclear deterrent. China is also alarmed by U.S. moves to develop a regional
theater ballistic missile defense network as a part of the BMDS, given the effects such a system could have upon China’s conventionally-armed ballistic
and cruise missile centric strategies. However, authoritative Chinese sources suggest that due to the relative advantages missiles provide over missile
defense systems in terms of strategic, tactical and economic effects, it is likely the PLA will continue to invest heavily in such systems, while also
bolstering its own missile defense capabilities.2 Influential Chinese strategists argue that modern conventional aerospace capabilities transcend the
nuclear threshold in that they are powerful enough to deter and defeat formidable enemies without having to resort to the threat of using nuclear
weapons.3 The advent of relatively inexpensive, mass-produced, precise conventional ballistic and cruise missiles is indeed altering security equations
as such weapons are indeed capable of creating strategic effects that were previously only limited to nuclear weapons. However, as will be discussed,
their development could actually increase the threat of nuclear war in the coming years. Closely related to the
subject of missile defense is the development and testing of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons and the
deepening regional militarization of space. Outer space has increasingly come to be seen as the
ultimate strategic high-ground from which to wage modern warfare and as a result is being
rapidly militarized by a number of actors in the Asia-Pacific region. Taking a sweeping view of the region,
one sees China’s rapidly expanding military space and ASAT programs continuing to push
towards a deepening militarization of space, and perhaps leading towards the weaponization of
space; the United States, highly reliant on militarized space, researching, developing and testing a number of technologies which seek to ensure
access to space in the event of a conflict; India and Russia, both having declared an interest in developing ASAT weapons and increasing their
exploitation of military space; and Japan and Taiwan possessing the technical and economic wherewithal to further evolve their budding military space
programs should the calculus of their respective strategic outlooks change in the future. Thus
the stage is set for what may prove
to be one of the most important competitions of this century: the race to exploit the ultimate
strategic high ground that space represents.
Space mil causes nuclear war
Cynamon 9 [Charles H. Cynamon, Colonel, USAF. “AIR WAR COLLEGE AIR UNIVERSITY
DEFENDING AMERICA’S INTERESTS IN SPACE.” //jweideman]
The near-peer nation represents the most complex adversary the United States could potentially
encounter. Major spacefaring nations, such as China and Russia, pursue space for economic
prosperity in the globalized world, national security, and the prestige associated with scientific
research.18 These nations have vested interests in unfettered access to and viability of a space environment free of purposeful interference as well
as harmful debris. It’s debatable whether these nations will militarize19 space to the degree of the United States. If they do choose to
compete with extra-regional, expeditionary militaries, China and Russia are likely to become as
dependent on space as the United States, consequently accepting many of the same
vulnerabilities. In a limited war with a near-peer, nuclear weapons would still figure
prominently in the calculus for either side to engage in space attacks, especially those assets
used for indications and early warning. The complexity in devising a space defense strategy against a 8 near-peer nation resides
in the need to simultaneously synchronize all instruments of national power toward a common objective. In concert, all elements of power
need to assure these nearpeer nations that US intentions are peaceful, dissuade them from
deploying anti-satellite capabilities, deter the use of space weapons, and defeat use of space weapons. While nearpeers are the most complex possible adversary, some non-peer spacefaring nations (aka rogue nations) present
perhaps the most dangerous adversary. Nations such as Iran and North Korea have access to
space by virtue of their ballistic missile programs, giving them launch capability for kinetic,
direct ascent anti-satellite or electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons. Furthermore, ground-based radio
frequency and directed energy capabilities could impair or damage US satellites. These nations are less likely to be deterred from using such capabilities
should conflict erupt. For the United States, a conflict with a rogue nation will likely be a limited war. If the US objective is regime change, our
adversary would likely view the conflict as unlimited--providing the incentive needed to escalate the hostilities against the United States’ decisive
advantage derived from space assets. For this reason, a space defense strategy against non-peer spacefaring nations must focus on a means to dissuade
acquisition of space weapons as well as to defeat an attack on US space assets
Absent measures, space mil and debris compound to exacerbate every
global threat
Moore 9 [Mike Moore was the director general of the WTO from 1999 to 2002 and served as
prime minister of New Zealand in 1990. He is author of A World Without Walls: Freedom,
Development, Free Trade and Global Governance. 2009. “Space Debris: From Nuisance to
Nightmare” http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/02/12/space-debris-from-nuisance-tonightmare///jweideman]
Is a space-related arms race under way? Yes. But there is still time to ratchet it down, and the Obama
administration has signaled that it might do so. That will be difficult, though. Exceptionalism is a major driver of foreign policy, and influential people
and hard-line think tanks are comfortable with the idea that full-spectrum dominance in all things military is America’s right. A
nightmare
scenario: The United States continues to work on its defensive ASAT systems. China and Russia
do the same to counter U.S. capabilities. India and Japan put together their own individual
systems. Ditto for Pakistan, if it survives as a coherent country. Israel follows suit, as does Iran. In a time of
high tension, someone preemptively smashes spy satellites in low-earth orbits, creating tens of
thousands of metal chunks and shards. Debris-tracking systems are overwhelmed, and lowearth orbits become so cluttered with metal that new satellites cannot be safely launched. Satellites
already in orbit die of old age or are killed by debris strikes. The global economy, which is greatly dependent on a
variety of assets in space, collapses. The countries of the world head back to a 1950s-style way of life, but there are
billions more people on the planet than in the 50s. That’s a recipe for malnutrition, starvation,
and wars for resources. The United States, by far the world’s most-advanced space power, must take the lead in Geneva and engage in
good-faith talks. If not, the space-is-ruined scenario could become reality.
UQ- New regs don’t apply to china
Embargo on satellite exports to china remains—assumes new regs
PWC 14 [PricewaterhouseCoopers (trading as PwC) is a multinational professional services
network. It is the world's second largest professional services network. 2014, “Aerospace &
defense 2014 year in review and 2015 forecast” http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/industrialproducts/assets/pwc-aerospace-defense-2014-year-in-review-and-2015-forect.pdf//jweideman]
On November 10, 2014, as part of the Export Control Reform initiative, controls on commercial
communications and remote sensing satellites and related ground equipment, certain parts and
components including specific “space qualified” microelectronic circuits, and other items and
technologies were moved from the US Munitions List to the Commerce Control List. This action was
done to facilitate more flexible licensing arrangements for items deemed less sensitive for national security reasons. More sensitive items, such as
military satellites, related ground equipment, parts critical for military functions, and services for all satellite exports remain subject to the stringent
controls of the US Munitions List (USML). The
remains in place.
long-standing embargo against satellite exports to China
UQ- Space exports low
Satellite exports to china are forbidden despite new regulations
Butler 12 [Amy, viation Week's senior Pentagon editor and has flown on a variety of military
aircraft. Apr 19 2012. “U.S. Relaxes Satellite Export Controls, Bolsters Some Restrictions”
http://aviationweek.com/awin/us-relaxes-satellite-export-controls-bolsters-somerestrictions//jweideman]
COLORADO SPRINGS — The Obama
administration is proposing to relax export controls for U.S.
satellite technologies to allow domestic companies to be more competitive in the global marketplace while at the same time
allowing for stricter restrictions against countries including China, Iran, North Korea and Syria.
In a new report to Congress, the administration proposes that communications satellites and remote-sensing spacecraft that lack classified components
or capabilities exceeding certain thresholds be available for sale abroad. This relief to the Internal Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) also would
pertain to the subsystem and parts on theses satellites, said Greg Schulte, deputy assistant secretary of defense for space policy, during a press
conference at the National Space Symposium here April 18. The regulations would be relaxed on these parts by transferring them from the U.S.
Munitions List, which has complex oversight requirements, to a more flexible Commerce Control List. This comes as a relief to companies that have
long complained that the restrictions put them at a disadvantage against foreign competitors. Underscoring this issue was a savvy marketing campaign
from a foreign manufacturer boasting to build an “ITAR-free” satellite. The hope, with the proposed regulatory changes, Schulte says, is that “the ITARfree label would become irrelevant.” These changes must first be approved by Congress. But pressure will be on lawmakers to begin examining the
proposal as companies grow increasingly concerned about diminished defense and intelligence spending amid the growing national deficit. Lou Ann
McFadden, chief of strategic issues for the Defense Technology Security Administration, says the new regulations, if enacted, would allow enforcement
agencies to focus their efforts more efficiently. “We are forced into monitoring these same people over and over,” she says of some companies that
repeatedly use foreign launchers, as an example, and have to repeat arduous oversight processes. More important, she says, is for the enforcement arm
of the government to focus on new companies working under the regulations, or bad actors. While
providing some relief, the
proposed regulatory changes are designed to put more restrictions on the transfer of critical
technologies to nations including China, Iran and Syria. Under current guidelines, a foreign end item — such as a
Chinese satellite — must contain less than 25% U.S. content. Now any U.S. part that makes its
way into a Chinese satellite would be a breach of these proposed regulatory changes, McFadden
says. Additionally, there would be a presumptive denial of any satellite export license request for
countries on the forbidden list, she says.
Export controls stop satellite transfers to china and coop
Xiaobing 6 [Guo Xiaobing, Scholar, China security journal. “Blockade on China or the United
States? U.S. Regulatory Policies on Space Technology Exports to China”
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=9&ved=0CGEQFjAI&ur
l=http%3A%2F%2Fmercury.ethz.ch%2Fserviceengine%2FFiles%2FISN%2F32335%2Fichapters
ection_singledocument%2F5760a644-77ad-424b-aa571a1bf419c607%2Fen%2Fcs2_chapter7.pdf&ei=CoaVVdqhAcfAtQWDhYCADQ&usg=AFQjCNEG
ygk44I9hJ7DVRU7WOik4 g_BwuQ&sig2=yJt1cvcgDRNBD6UkIBsPQQ//jweideman]
In March 1999, as noted above, the jurisdiction for licensing commercial satellite export was transferred to the State Department and commercial
satellites were once again labeled as munitions, as they were prior to the 1996 reform. The legal basis for the State Department’s oversight of
commercial satellite export thus became the ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) regime. The export procedures under ITAR are much
stricter and more complicated than the Department of Commerce’s EAR (Export Administration Regulations) regime. Separate permits are required
for the export of each article or technology falling under ITAR jurisdiction; several permits may therefore be required for the export of one satellite.
Technical data require a permit, as does application and actual hardware export. A permit is further required when final shipment is executed. Satellite
technology exports valued at $50 million or more, which includes nearly all satellite-related sales, require congressional approval prior to the State
Department’s issuing a license. When
articles under ITAR regulations are to be transferred, exported or resold by the initial recipient country, approval must first be obtained from the State Department.
In addition, any commodity made in a foreign country is seen as a U.S.-made commodity so long as it contains parts or subsystems under ITAR
regulations, regardless
of quantity. The sale and export of these commodities also require permits
from the State Department. In other words, following the regulatory changes, in order for a U.S.
company (or a non-U.S. company using U.S.-made parts) to sell commercial satellites to China,
a license (or series of licenses) from the State Department is required. Otherwise, companies
(and nations) face the threat of sanctions. After the export license jurisdiction was transferred, the U.S. Department
of Commerce maintained oversight over non-sensitive space articles, such as space-qualified
tape recorders. Unfortunately, the Commerce Department is not friendly either, as Chinese
space-related end-users are on the top of the department’s black list.3 The Department of
Commerce recently listed a total of 57 foreign entities that may not receive U.S. exports. Of
those, 19 were Chinese, putting China at the top of the list of nations with blacklisted entities. Further, 11 of the 19 end-users
were engaged in space research; the list included institutions of higher learning such as Beijing
University of Aeronautics and Astronautics and Northwestern Polytechnic University of China.
Since 2000, the United States has, time and again, failed to approve any export license for a satellite
sale to China on the grounds of missile technology proliferation. Despite their desire to cooperate, Chinese launch companies and U.S. satellite
makers can do nothing about it. In history, it is not uncommon for countries to use export control to weaken competitors. Generally, there are two
means of regulation. The first is so-called target regulation. For instance, to prevent another nation from developing weapons of mass destruction, strict
regulations on exports of specific nuclear, biological and chemical materials can be employed. To prevent another nation from developing its
conventional forces, restriction of the sale of certain advanced weapons and military technology can be used. The second regulatory means is
comprehensive regulation, which weakens another nation’s economic foundation through blanket restrictions on all types of civilian and military trade,
thus reducing resources for use in military development. France’s “Continental System” policy serves as an apt example. Some 200 years ago, Napoleon
strictly forbade countries on the European continent to trade with Britain in an effort to destroy the British economy. Those breaching the order would
be executed, while those leaders instigating trade would be deposed. U.S. regulations on space exports to China belong to this category. Not
only
are military space items and technology regulated but so too are satellites used strictly for
commercial purposes. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to refer to U.S. policy as a “Continental
System” in the modern space field.
AFF AT: Listner ev
Russia non-uniques and Coop’s better to stop tech stealing
Moskowitz 11 [by Clara Moskowitz, SPACE.com Assistant Managing Editor. cites JohnsonFreese, naval war college. 2011. “US & China: Space Race or Cosmic Cooperation?”
http://www.space.com/13100-china-space-program-nasa-space-race.html//jweideman]
China's space achievements don't have to be viewed as a threat at all, but rather as an
opportunity for collaboration, some experts say. Russia has worked with Beijing's space program
and even sold hardware and spacesuits to the Chinese, while other nations also have shown willingness to cooperate.
[Infographic: How China's First Space Station Will Work] The United States, however, has held back. " The fears are that if we work
with China, it would be to their technological benefit," Johnson-Freese said. "But I'm of the view
that it's always better to work with people and have some control than have someone off on their
own when you're not involved. More engagement with China is the way we learn about China."
Exports solve relations
Historically, US export controls has been the lynchpin of economic
and political US-China relations— reforming the export control
system reverses this
Nimmo 84 (Elizabeth M. Nimmo, ”United States Policy Regarding Technology Transfer to the
People's Republic of China,” Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, Volume 6 Issue 1
Spring, Spring 1984,
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1171&context=njilb)
Although the new regulations are applauded enthusiastically by numerous American business and political groups, they are not free
from criticism. Historically,
the United States export control policy has been one of the most
significant and controversial issues directly affecting both economic and political relations
between two countries.10 In formulating the new China export control policy, the Administration
acknowledged and tried to balance two competing interests: liberalization of export controls
through increased transfer of technology to promote better United States-China trade relations,
and the need for limitations on government licensing of advanced "dual use" technology in order
to preserve United States national security." On the one hand, it is desirable to export sophisticated
technology to aid in China's modernization effort, and to promote United States investment, by
making it easier for businesses to capitalize on China's rapidly expanding market for advanced
technology. On the other hand, there is concern that technology transferred to China now may be used against the United States
by China or some other country in the future.'2 Success of the new guidelines in promoting United States-China relations and
investment by United States firms in Chinese ventures will depend, in part, upon whether the Reagan Administration reached
a proper balance between these two goals, as well as the government's success in providing a workable
licensing process.
US-China S&T cooperation spills over to other sectors of bilateral
cooperation
Suttmeier 14 (Richard P. Suttmeier, Dr. Richard P. Suttmeier is a Professor of Political Science, Emeritus, at
the University of Oregon. He has written widely on science and technology development issues in China, “Trends in
U.S.-China Science and Technology Cooperation: Collaborative Knowledge Production for the Twenty-First
Century?”, Research Report Prepared on Behalf of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
September 11, 2014, http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Trends%20in%20USChina%20Science%20and%20Technology%20Cooperation.pdf)
In the years since
China and the US began scientific and technological cooperation, the S&T
relationship has contributed to the building of strong ties between the technical
communities of the two countries, and has facilitated the maturation of political and
commercial relationships as well. Over the years the asymmetries in capabilities and in
institutional structures have been reduced, and the scientific opportunities and
challenges to use science and technology to serve social needs have increased. The
need to move the bilateral relationship to a new level of cooperation is becoming
more compelling. At the same time, the potential for friction and conflict in the relationship may also be increasing as a
result of national security concerns and techno-nationalist sentiments on both sides. It would be terribly unfortunate if the latter
came to trump the remarkable challenges and opportunities which characterize the
S&T relationship at the new stage.
China willing to follow US norms in dual use tech transfer
Goldman and Pollack 97 (Goldman, Charles A. and Jonathan D. Pollack. Engaging China In the
International Export Control Process: Options for U.S. Policy. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1997.
http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/DB197. Also available in print form.)
Since 1988, the United States has repeatedly claimed that Chinese exports of missiles and
missile components posed a challenge to MTCR provisions, although China was not a
participant in the initial discussions related to controlling missile technology exports. The
United States has been particularly concerned with Chinese deliveries to Pakistan. Through
bilateral discussions the United States has sought to clarify both what the Chinese have sold or
transferred, and to try to gain China's commitment to restrain their future export activities. In
some instances, China has responded favorably to U.S. efforts to restrict its missile transfers,
specifically missiles in the M-9/M-11 category to Iran and Syria and possible follow-on sales to
Saudi Arabia beyond the CSS-2 missiles transferred in 1987 and 1988. So the record here shows
some Chinese willingness to respond to U.S. concerns. In addition, since 1991 the Chinese have
provided more explicit assurances of their commitment to MTCR guidelines. Although not
wholly binding, they do suggest movement toward restricting those activities that China has
undertaken in the past.
Export control reforms are a step in the right direction to stronger
US-China S&T ties
Suttmeier 14 (Richard P. Suttmeier, Dr. Richard P. Suttmeier is a Professor of Political Science, Emeritus, at
the University of Oregon. He has written widely on science and technology development issues in China, “Trends in
U.S.-China Science and Technology Cooperation: Collaborative Knowledge Production for the Twenty-First
Century?”, Research Report Prepared on Behalf of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
September 11, 2014, http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Trends%20in%20USChina%20Science%20and%20Technology%20Cooperation.pdf)
The implications of the new stage for the US include a heightened recognition of the strategic importance China attaches to its
science and technology development over the coming 15 years. This would involve an appreciation of the historical context in which
the MLP has been launched, and the current realities affecting its implementation, including balanced assessments of China’s
strengths and weaknesses. By extension, this implies the need for higher-level attention to the relationship within the US
government.
The US also should become more sensitive to the increasing complexity of the
relationship, the need to make more discretionary resources available to it, and the need to find
new mechanisms to accommodate the mix of public and private interests in
scientific and technological cooperation with China. The US needs to reexamine its
thinking about export controls, especially the accuracy of the risk assessments on which
they are based and whether the benefits form greater liberalization are not currently
underestimated.
Minimizing US export controls on dual-use technology will strengthen
US-China cooperation
Nimmo 84 (Elizabeth M. Nimmo, ”United States Policy Regarding Technology Transfer to the
People's Republic of China,” Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, Volume 6 Issue 1
Spring, Spring 1984,
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1171&context=njilb)
Although the new regulations are applauded enthusiastically by numerous American business and political groups, they are not free
from criticism. Historically, the United States export control policy has been one of the
most significant and controversial issues directly affecting both economic and
political relations between two countries.10 In formulating the new China export
control policy, the Administration acknowledged and tried to balance two
competing interests: liberalization of export controls through increased transfer
of technology to promote better United States-China trade relations, and the need
for limitations on government licensing of advanced "dual use" technology in
order to preserve United States national security." On the one hand, it is desirable to
export sophisticated technology to aid in China's modernization effort, and to
promote United States investment, by making it easier for businesses to capitalize
on China's rapidly expanding market for advanced technology. On the other hand, there is
concern that technology transferred to China now may be used against the United States by China or some other country in the
future.'2 Success of the new guidelines in promoting United States-China relations and investment by United States firms in
Chinese ventures will
depend, in part, upon whether the Reagan Administration reached a proper balance between these
government's success in providing a workable licensing process.
two goals, as well as the
Dual-use technology transfer strengthens political ties—low risk of
adverse effects on national security
Nimmo 84 (Elizabeth M. Nimmo, ”United States Policy Regarding Technology Transfer to the
People's Republic of China,” Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, Volume 6 Issue 1
Spring, Spring 1984,
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1171&context=njilb)
The arguments in favor of relaxing strategic controls on trade with China are equally strong, and in
fact prevailed, as evidenced by the new export regulations.55 Most obvious, perhaps, is the potential for
commercial advantage by facilitating increased United States-China trade by making technology
transfer easier. 56 Moreover, such increased trade would aid in China's modernization drive and,
therefore, have the benefit of fostering stronger political ties between the two countries.57
Proponents of a liberal export control policy for China claim that China is unlikely to pose a
threat to United States security interests without a mass export of the most advanced military
systems.58 In fact, many believe that increased technology transfer may prevent any potential for
instability in the region caused by a widening of the military gap between China and the Soviet
Union. 59 Another consideration in favor of relaxing export controls to China is that relations
between the United States and China are not the same as those between the United States and
the Soviet Union. China is relatively weak economically, technologically and militarily, and there is thus less danger
that it will be able to divert imported technology to military uses that could threaten United
States interests.' Moreover, identical restrictions applied to both China and the Soviet Union
may, in fact, discriminate against China because of China's economic and military weakness.61
Thus, the United States may claim, whether disingenuously or not, that it is merely trying to help
China compete in the world economic system and with its neighbor.
US-China S&T cooperation spills over to other sectors of bilateral
cooperation
Suttmeier 14 (Richard P. Suttmeier, Dr. Richard P. Suttmeier is a Professor of Political Science, Emeritus, at
the University of Oregon. He has written widely on science and technology development issues in China, “Trends in
U.S.-China Science and Technology Cooperation: Collaborative Knowledge Production for the Twenty-First
Century?”, Research Report Prepared on Behalf of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
September 11, 2014, http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Trends%20in%20USChina%20Science%20and%20Technology%20Cooperation.pdf)
In the years since
China and the US began scientific and technological cooperation, the S&T
relationship has contributed to the building of strong ties between the technical
communities of the two countries, and has facilitated the maturation of political and
commercial relationships as well. Over the years the asymmetries in capabilities and in
institutional structures have been reduced, and the scientific opportunities and
challenges to use science and technology to serve social needs have increased. The
need to move the bilateral relationship to a new level of cooperation is becoming
more compelling. At the same time, the potential for friction and conflict in the relationship may also be increasing as a
result of national security concerns and techno-nationalist sentiments on both sides. It would be terribly unfortunate if the latter
came to trump the remarkable challenges and opportunities which characterize the
S&T relationship at the new stage.
A2 Alt Causes
Historically, US export controls has been the lynchpin of economic
and political US-China relations— reforming the export control
system reverses this
Nimmo 84 (Elizabeth M. Nimmo, ”United States Policy Regarding Technology Transfer to the
People's Republic of China,” Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, Volume 6 Issue 1
Spring, Spring 1984,
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1171&context=njilb)
Although the new regulations are applauded enthusiastically by numerous American business and political groups, they are not free
from criticism. Historically, the United States export control policy has been one of the
most significant and controversial issues directly affecting both economic and
political relations between two countries.10 In formulating the new China export
control policy, the Administration acknowledged and tried to balance two
competing interests: liberalization of export controls through increased transfer
of technology to promote better United States-China trade relations, and the need
for limitations on government licensing of advanced "dual use" technology in
order to preserve United States national security." On the one hand, it is desirable to
export sophisticated technology to aid in China's modernization effort, and to
promote United States investment, by making it easier for businesses to capitalize
on China's rapidly expanding market for advanced technology. On the other hand, there is
concern that technology transferred to China now may be used against the United States by China or some other country in the
future.'2 Success of the new guidelines in promoting United States-China relations and investment by United States firms in
Chinese ventures will
depend, in part, upon whether the Reagan Administration reached a proper balance between these
government's success in providing a workable licensing process.
two goals, as well as the
Tech transfer overcomes internal alt causes- China has an incentive to
trade with US
Goldman and Pollack 97 (Goldman, Charles A. and Jonathan D. Pollack. Engaging China In the
International Export Control Process: Options for U.S. Policy. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1997.
http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/DB197. Also available in print form.)
Based on our understanding of the Chinese decision-making system, we have identified several
avenues for enhancing U.S. leverage over Chinese export behavior. We recognize that Chinese
behavior is influenced by the policies of numerous countries, and not simply by those of the
United States. Still, there are particularly important characteristics of the U.S. economic,
political, and technological position in the world. These characteristics provide the United States
with unusual opportunities to influence the Chinese system. First, the Chinese political
leadership seeks recognition and affirmation as a great power. The United States is
clearly able to help confer this recognition. Second, there are also sectors within the Chinese
uniformed services that value military relations with their counterparts in the United
States. In this realm, the United States (and DoD in particular) is in a position to increase these
ties. Third, Chinese enterprises throughout the system want to acquire and license
sophisticated technology. Much of that technology comes from U.S. firms. U.S. firms, of
course, are eager to sell technology to China. As it has in the past, the United States retains the
option of employing legal sanctions against Chinese firms or against China to restrict individual
categories of Chinese exports to the United States or U.S. exports to China.
China exports solves econ
Exporting to China solves econ
AmCham Shanghai 10 American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, “U.S. Export Competitiveness in
China”, 2010, https://www.amcham-shanghai.org/ftpuploadfiles/publications/viewpoint/us_export.pdf//OF
As the U.S. emerges from the economic downturn, U.S.
policymakers have rightly set their sights on exports
as an engine for sustained economic growth and job creation. The U.S. needs to focus
attention on fast-growing overseas economies where domestic demand is exploding, such as in
China. The China market offers a tremendous unmet demand for U.S. exporters to
satisfy. Driven by a growing Chinese middle class and expanding consumer base, China has the
potential to outpace Canada and Mexico to become America’s top export market. Already, U.S. goods
exports to China roughly doubled over the five year period between 2004 and 2008 and since 2000 have grown 330 percent. In
the first six months of 2010, China’s imports grew 50 percent. U.S. companies are in a solid
position to compete in China but run up against overseas competitors, especially from
Europe and Asia, which enjoy well-established government trade promotion support. The result: the
U.S. punches far below its weight in exports compared to other large developed countries. U.S.
goods exports last year accounted for only 7 percent of U.S. GDP compared to 35 percent in
Germany and 46 percent in South Korea – both key competitors for the China market. A key finding of this report is U.S.
exporters are losing market share in China, which costs the U.S. jobs and economic
growth. In fact, the U.S. ranks number 12 out of the top 21 nations and regions competing for
export sales to China. The findings, quantified in the China Market Export Competitiveness Index,
provide alarming evidence that the U.S. is falling behind the competition in China.
China is key – no other market has the potential
AmCham Shanghai 10 American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, “U.S. Export Competitiveness in
China”, 2010, https://www.amcham-shanghai.org/ftpuploadfiles/publications/viewpoint/us_export.pdf//OF
China should be the focus for policymakers working to increase U.S. exports as the
growth of the China market continues to outpace growth of other major U.S. export
destinations. Many believe China’s growth as a domestic market has only just begun. McKinsey & Co.
estimates that China’s middle class, the key to driving consumption in any economy, will reach 400 million people
by 2015. As China’s economy matures and further liberalizes, the country will demand an increasing volume
and diversity of goods and services that the U.S. should compete to fulfill. Going forward, Canada,
Mexico and Japan all represent smaller opportunities than China for export growth. In the first half
of 2010, a rise in domestic consumption pushed up China’s imports by more than 50
percent. AmCham Shanghai estimates that China will surpass the U.S. in merchandise imports in 2016
and become the world’s biggest merchandise import market by 2018. Additional export
sales to China’s rapidly expanding market will also contribute to reducing the U.S. trade deficit
with China and a more balanced trade relationship. A growing China driven by double-digit import growth and a shift
in government policy to a consumption-led development strategy offers a compelling opportunity for American exporters. “China
has to be a key part of any strategy to increase U.S. exports and jobs,” says U.S. Treasury
Secretary Timothy Geithner.
AT: Some Off-case
AT: Congress CP
President is uniquely key to enact the plan—Political obstacles
prevent Congress from acting effectively and on time
NRC 09 (Committee on Science, Security, and Prosperity; Committee on Scientific Communication
and National Security; National Research Council , “Beyond "Fortress America" National Security
Controls on Science and Technology in a Globalized World, 2009, This PDF is available from the National
Academies Press at: http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12567.html)
It is necessary to ameliorate the policy logjam that is the unintended consequence of Congress’s
inaction over dual-use export controls. The new President needs to resolve the long-standing
clash between the Cabinet departments that are the guardians of national and homeland
security interests, broadly defined, and the Cabinet departments that are the promoters of national
economic interests. It is only at the presidential level that the competing bureaucratic interests
of these two areas can be weighed and the current system reformed, so as to stem the decline
that so urgently needs attention. This approach is not an attempt to do an “end run” around one
of the branches of government, or to shortcircuit political debate, but responds to the marked
inability of recent Congresses to address this issue.71 In the absence of legislation, the International
Economic Emergency Powers Act of 1977 gives authority to the President to structure the
regulatory framework of the dual-use export controls system. An export control system that was last
significantly updated in the 1980s cannot provide the framework to deal with today’s security, economic, and technological realities.
Congress will eventually succeed in bringing the export control regime into the 21st century. But
the health of the U.S. scientific and technological enterprise, and the national security
imperative to keep abreast of technological developments worldwide, can no longer wait for
Congress to overcome the obstacles it has faced in this arena. This report therefore identifies actions that the
President can take under existing legislative authority to initiate necessary reforms. Not only will these reforms support
economic vitality and promote national security, but they will create a track record and
experience base that Congress can evaluate—and modify as it sees fit—at such time as export
control legislation can be successfully addressed there. In the meantime, it will be important to
keep Congress apprised of the actions recommended here and their effects, and to maintain a
dialogue on the nature of a future package of legislative reforms. In removing the pressure for
Congress to take immediate action, the proposals made can facilitate the longer-term legislative
process. Restructuring the export control process does not involve abandoning all export controls. Rather, the committee
recommends that two policy changes and two structural changes be made in order to retain needed export controls while shedding
the largest obstacles to an efficient system. With these changes implemented in an expedient manner, the United States will stem the
loss of technological and economic competitiveness and begin to benefit from carefully targeted and calibrated controls that reflect
and meet current challenges that the country faces in protecting both our national security and our economic well-being.
AT: Politics
The plan can be XO’d but its popular anyway
Wolf 12 Harrison G. Wolf is the Officer of Special Programs and Contract Course Coordinator for the University
of Southern California Aviation Safety & Security Program at the Viterbi School of Engineering. He received his
Masters Degree of Public Policy (M.P.P.) at the Pepperdine University School of Public Policy in 2010 where he
specialized in Economics and International Relations. The author received his Bachelor’s Degree in Arts (B.A.) from
California Polytechnic State University San Luis Obispo in December 2007 in Political Science with a Minor in
English, “ITAR Reforms for Dual-Use Technologies: A Case Analysis and Policy Outline”, 2012,
http://viterbi.usc.edu/aviation/assets/002/79883.pdf//OF
This is the perfect time for reforming the dual-use technology export control regime. The
export control regime is
controlled by an Executive Order that has been renewed each year, and at any time another
Executive Order could be issued for reforming the structure, goals, application,
and enforcement of export licenses. On January 27th, 2010, President Barack Obama noted a desire
for the United States government to institute reforms on a “out of date and ineffective” export
licensing regime for “dual-use industries” to promote U.S. competitiveness.31 There is current support by
the executive branch and the same party is in control of the Senate. The Republican Party has shown mild
support for restructuring and reforming the ITAR regime, and if the debate were phrased in a
pro-business manner there may be greater support in the future.
Broad support for reform
Kerr and Fergusson 14 [Paul, non-prolif analyst. Ian F. Fergusson
Specialist in International Trade and Finance. 1/13/14, “The U.S. Export Control System and the
President’s Reform Initiative” https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41916.pdf//jweideman]
Aspects of the U.S. export control system have long been criticized by exporters,
nonproliferation advocates, allies, and other stakeholders as being too rigorous, insufficiently
rigorous, cumbersome, obsolete, inefficient, or any combination of these descriptions. In August
2009, the Obama Administration launched a comprehensive review of the U.S. export control
system. In April 2010, then-Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates proposed an outline of a new
system based on four singularities:
• a single export control licensing agency for dual-use, munitions exports, and
Treasury-administered embargoes.
• a unified control list,
• a single primary enforcement coordination agency, and
• a single integrated information technology (IT) system
Squo export regime causes controversy—plan solves and gets internet
company backing
Fox-Brewster 5/26 [Thomas, Forbes staff writer. 5/26/15, “Why The World's Top Security
Pros Are Furious About Exploit Export Rules”
http://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2015/05/26/security-pro-fury-on-exploitexport-rules///jweideman]
Over the long weekend, rather
than taking a break, the hacker community was up in arms about proposed
rules that would restrict the free and open use of attack tools and software exploits invaluable
for their work. And some big voices have backed them, with Facebook, Google GOOGL +0.68%
and Yahoo YHOO +0.15% executives and researchers, fighting their corner in personal terms,
battling with the human rights activists who appeared to have caused the problems two years ago. At the heart of the matter is the Wassenaar
Agreement, a set of weapons export rules signed by various nations. Signatories aren’t required to ascribe to the rules, but they agree to implement
controls in whatever way they can. In December 2013, it was updated to include intrusion software on its list of dual-use technologies, which can be
used for defending against security threats, or for more surreptitious activity, such as surveillance. Signatories from the E.U. were quick to draw up
plans for their own applications of the agreement, but the US had, for unknown reasons, delayed delineating its own plans. But
controversy
erupted last week, when the U.S. Department of Commerce ’s Bureau of Industry and Security
(BIS), as part of its plans to implement the 2013 agreement, proposed the enforcement of a
license requirement for “the export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) of these cybersecurity
items to all destinations, except Canada”, effectively saying anyone who wanted to take attack code, malware samples and other
offensive tools outside of the US would require a license. Such code is regularly used by security researchers to find vulnerabilities in software and
company networks in order to push for a fix, which would benefit the masses; adding export controls would make life considerably more difficult for the
average researcher.
AT: China DA
Dual-use exports don’t increase Chinese military capability or cause
prolif
Lewis 2 [ James Lewis Senior Fellow and Director, Technology Policy Center for Strategic &
International Studies. “Export Controls/Dual Use Technology and Technology Transfer Issues”
January 17, 2002. http://csis.org/files/media/csis/congress/ts020117lewis.pdf//jweideman]
Chairmen, Commissioners, I would like to thank you for this opportunity to testify on
technology transfer, export controls and
China. This is an important topic and I applaud the Commission for looking at it. It is an important topic, but one that has
been much clouded by rhetoric and imprecision, and the Commission has an opportunity to dispel some of this.
That transfers of U.S. technology to China can damage national security has become a staple of
the larger debate over China policy. Critics charge that China improves its military capabilities
with U.S. commercial technology. While these charges are widely accepted, they are wrong.
Despite the noisy China cases that attracted public attention in the past few years, a close examination suggests that U.S.
technology is irrelevant to China's military modernization and that efforts to restrict high
tech trade are more likely to damage than to improve U.S national security. Contrary to claims
that China acquires U.S. commercial technology and turns it to military purposes, the Chinese
follow the more sensible course of acquiring modern military technology from non-U.S.
sources. U.S. commercial technology is important to China's continued economic growth, but these commercial technologies
are all available from other Western industrial nations that do not share U.S. concerns with
China and which do not support an embargo on advanced technology exports. Other countries with
advanced military and industrial technologies are willing to sell to China (although the ability of the PLA and
China's defense industry to absorb these technologies remain mixed, despite China's general economic progress). There is not the
slightest interest among America's major trade partners or allies in Europe or Japan support a
cold-war style embargo (or indeed any embargo on technology) for China. Finally, the U.S. technology sold to
China has been overwhelmingly civil and not military, and of little use in weapons production.
Given the limitations of its domestic arms industry, China can only improve its military through purchases of foreign military equipment. China cannot
manufacture major weapons systems equal in quality to the best Russian, U.S. or European equipment. While foreign purchases are crucial to any
effort to modernize China's military, the U.S. does not sell military or proliferationrelated items to China. None
of the items that have
starred in the U.S. debates over China - computers, satellites, telecommunications, elderly
machine tools, semiconductor-manufacturing equipment - are regarded by the three major
nonproliferation regimes (the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group
and the Australia Group for Chemical and Biological Weapons) as contributing to proliferation.
This point is usually lost in the larger dispute about China, where charges that U.S exports help China develop weapons of mass destruction are
frequent. An ironic aspect of the China tech transfer debate is that it focuses on general purpose industrial goods, not weapons or military technology.
The debate has blurred differences between military and civil technologies in a way that is unhelpful for analysis. Additionally, efforts to restrict access
to these industrial goods make little sense in light of growing global economic integration. Multilateral cooperation in controlling these technologies is
at a low ebb. While there was a consensus in the 1980s to control technology transfers among the U.S. and its allies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, this
consensus did not extend much beyond the Warsaw pact. The U.S. itself relaxed technology transfer controls for China in the late 1980s, when China
became a useful card to play against the Soviets.
China gets semi-conductors from Taiwan
Lewis 2 [ James Lewis Senior Fellow and Director, Technology Policy Center for Strategic &
International Studies. “Export Controls/Dual Use Technology and Technology Transfer Issues”
January 17, 2002. http://csis.org/files/media/csis/congress/ts020117lewis.pdf//jweideman]
This restriction runs headlong into China's desire to build an advanced national electronics industry and the desire of other supplier nations to take
advantage of China's cheap labor and domestic market. Many companies build plants in China to ensure access to China's expanding consumer market
and to lower their labor costs. While U.S. export policy tries hold transfers of semiconductor manufacturing equipment by U.S. firms to two or three
generations behind stateof-the-art, Taiwanese
firms have been transferring advanced equipment to China.
Taiwan is the leading foreign developer of China's microelectronics industry. All other major
suppliers - the Netherlands, Germany and Japan, have told the U.S. that they will not block
equipment sales to China. They have repeatedly questioned the contribution of semiconductor
manufacturing equipment to military capabilities and proliferation and ask whether there is still any strategic
rationale for controlling these items.
The squo locks out china and hurts global coop
Cheng 10 [Dean Cheng
Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center. 12/13/10, “Export Controls and the Hard Case of
China” http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/12/export-controls-and-the-hard-caseof-china//jweideman]
The Current U.S. Export Control System. Regrettably, the
current U.S. export control regime is out of date and out
of step with technological realities. Few U.S. allies are likely to join a strict regime aimed at
denying China all access to advanced technology. This is crucial because many European and
Asian states now have technological capabilities comparable to the U.S. in important fields.
Without broad agreement on an export control regime, unilateral American efforts will affect
only American exports, without actually curtailing Chinese access to many forms of high
technology. Even in areas in which the U.S. is dominant, the U.S. export control structure is
deeply flawed. In contrast with China’s efforts to create an integrated civil–military defense industrial base, the U.S. export control
regime is highly fragmented. The two major elements of the current regime are the Munitions List, under the jurisdiction of the U.S.
State Department and governed by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), and the
Commerce Control List (CCL), under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Department of Commerce and
governed by the Export Administration Regulations. American industry seeking to export hightech items are therefore confronted by two different lists, administered by two different
bureaucracies, each with its own licensing rules, reporting requirements, and oversight
authorities.
Non-unique – products get sold illegally because of inefficiencies in
the system
Cheng 10 Dean Cheng is Research Fellow in Chinese Political and Security Affairs in the Asian Studies Center at
The Heritage Foundation, “Export Controls and the Hard Case of China”, 12/13/10,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/12/export-controls-and-the-hard-case-of-china//OF
The complex and confusing system of U.S. export controls may not actually restrict access of
foreign countries, including the PRC, to sensitive military and dual-use technologies. Some
items will likely slip through the cracks, especially given the vagaries of precisely which
list and sanctions apply to which technologies: Some sanctions and embargoes only apply to items on
State’s U.S. Munitions List and not to those on the Commerce Control List. For example, Commerce-controlled items may be
exported to China while arms exports to China are generally prohibited.[35] Meanwhile, the
State Department and the
Commerce Department do not necessarily share information with each other, even in cases of
violations of their respective regulations. As a result, violators of one set of rules are not
automatically subjected to increased scrutiny under the other set.[36]
Chinese imports of dual-use tech are inevitable – Europe and Japan
Segal 4 Adam Segal, Maurice R. Greenberg Senior Fellow for China Studies and Director of the Digital and
Cyberspace Policy Program, “Practical Engagement: Drawing a Fine Line for U.S.-China Trade”, Summer 2004,
http://www.cfr.org/china/practical-engagement-drawing-fine-line-us-china-trade/p7063//OF
Chinese defense planners clearly are trying to acquire civilian technologies, such as microprocessors and
telecommunication equipment, and to convert them to military use, but it is not clear that there is much
the United States can do to prevent spin on. Commercial dual-use technologies are not
unique to the United States, and currently, only Washington considers the transfer of these
technologies to China to be a potential security threat. The Europeans have few direct security
interests in a potential conflict in Asia, especially across the Taiwan Strait. Some defense analysts in
Tokyo see the rise of China as a potential threat, but Japan continues to develop commercial and political ties
with Beijing and to see its own economic security as highly dependent on the development of the
Chinese market.12
AT: Topicality
Surveillance includes the process of overseeing economic and
financial policies
Boughton 9 (Historian for the IMF, “International Monetary Fund Surveillance” Princeton
University Press, The Princeton Encyclopedia of the World Economy, vol 2, pgs. 693-697,
proquest)
Surveillance, as practiced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), is the process of overseeing the functioning of
the international monetary system and certain economic and financial policies of IMF member states. The legal mandate
for this activity is Article IV of the IMF Articles of Agreement, which was rewritten after the 1973 collapse of the Bretton Woods
system, when exchange rates were no longer anchored by gold, and currency values of most of the major industrial countries floated.
Section 1 of the new Article IV (adopted in 1978) requires "each member ... to collaborate with the Fund and other members to
assure orderly exchange arrangements and to promote a stable system of exchange rates." Section 3 requires the IMF to "oversee the
international monetary system in order to ensure its effective operation, and
[to] oversee the compliance of each member
with its obligations under Section 1 of this Article." To that end, the fund is required to exercise "firm surveillance"
over member countries' exchange rate policies, and those members are required to consult with the fund on dieir policies.
BIS and Export enforcement conduct surveillance operations
California AOG 4 (California Office of the Attorney General, “New CLETS Service
Application: US Department of Commerce,” 2004,
http://ag.ca.gov/meetings/pdf/cn_04_us_doc.pdf
The applicant’s primary function is to conduct investigations involving violations of the Export
Administration Act. These investigations are matters of National Security & agents are involved
in search & arrest warrants, surveillance activities, undercover operations and task force
operations. The mission of the Bureau of Industry and Security, Export Enforcement, is to
protect U.S. national security, homeland security, foreign policy, and economic interests
through a law enforcement program focused on: sensitive exports to hostile entities or those that
engage in onward proliferation; prohibited foreign boycotts; and related public safety laws.
Licensing provisions monitor adherence to regulations and include
prohibitive intent
Henn et al no date [R. Charles Henn Jr., Alicia Grahn Jones, Lauren Sullins Ralls, and Lauren
A. Linder. Attorneys at law at Kilpatrick and Stockton. “Trademark Licensing Basics”
In contrast, other quality control provisions go on for pages and may address the numerous
practical
provisions that a licensor can request to ensure adequate quality control and prevent
abandonment,
such as:
(1) Being involved in the design process for the product;
(2) Reviewing early models and prototypes;
(3) Reviewing packaging, advertisements, labels, and other materials to ensure that the
mark is used properly and appears in a manner consistent with the licensor’s trademark
guidelines; and
(4) Requiring access to the licensee’s facilities, raw material, finished products, personnel,
and records to monitor the licensee’s adherence to the licensor’s quality standards.
Requires data collection
Mesenbourg and lee 7 [Thomas L. Mesenbourg, Ronald H. Lee Associate Director for
Economic Programs Senior Financial Advisor. “The Electronic Reporting Option⎯Does It Make
Sense or Cents? “ Papers presented at the ICES-III, June 18-21, 2007.
http://www.amstat.org/meetings/ices/2007/proceedings/ICES2007000040.PDF//jweideman]
Our Foreign Trade
Statistics Program, a principal economic indicator, collects almost all of its data electronically
through its Automated Export System. AES Direct and AESPcLink now have more than 23,475 companies participating. Another
761 companies file directly to the Customs Service. As of January 2007, 97.4 percent of all non-Canadian export transactions were filed using AES. The
AES has allowed the Census Bureau to reduce the number of paper Shippers Export Declarations (SEDs) collected monthly from 500,000 in 1999 to
approximately 39,300 in December 2007. Currently, more than 600,000 shipment transactions are processed monthly through AES Direct.
Contextual evidence proves licensing requirements on export
controls are a form of surveillance
Commerce et al 2001 Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration, US Census
Bureau, “AUTOMATED EXPORT SYSTEM (AES) CERTIFICATION REPORT Report to Congress Presented To:
Senate: Committee on Foreign Relations House: Committee on International Relations”, May 2001,
https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/aes/aes-certification-rpt.pdf//OF
The Census Bureau and Customs, as the primary developers of the AES, recommend that the full
implementation of mandatory filing for all items (licensed and unlicensed) on the CCL and the
USML, as well as all other shipper's export declaration information, and the integration of the AES
with other Federal Government agency licensing systems, as specified in the “Feasibility of Mandatory Automated Export
(AES) Filing” report issued July 27, 2000, be initiated in four stages as described below: Stage 1 - Require mandatory filing
through the AES only for exports of items on the USML and the CCL 90 days after the law
becomes effective. The law will become effective 270 days after AES is certified as a secure, functional
system. (FY 2001) Stage 2 - Require mandatory filing through the AES for the remainder of exports requiring
an export license. (FY 2002) Stage 3 - Require mandatory filing through the AES for all freight
forwarders, nonvessel operating carriers, consolidators, and other intermediaries, that file
commodity documentation on behalf of exporters. (FY 2003) Stage 4 - Require mandatory filing
through the AES for all exporters (U.S. principal parties in interest), including companies, individuals,
and other exporting entities that file commodity documentation. (FY 2005) 150 This proposed schedule
recognizes the urgency of improving the surveillance of exports on the USML and the
CCL, takes into consideration the time required to integrate the information systems among all the potential
Government users of the AES data, and acknowledges the fact that mandatory filing of SEDs over the AES will
represent a significant change in business practice for many exporters, especially smaller ones.
Export controls are monitoring with prohibitive intent
Kehl and Morgus 14 Danielle Kehl is a policy analyst at New America's Open Technology
Institute, where she researches and writes about broadband policy, Internet freedom, and other
technology policy issues, and Robert Morgus is a researcher at New America’s Open Technology Institute,
“The Dictator’s Little Helper: How to stop Western companies from exporting surveillance technologies to
authoritarian governments”, 3/31/14,
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/03/export_controls_how_to_stop_weste
rn_companies_from_sending_surveillance.html//OF
In essence, export
controls are licensing regulations that allow governments to
monitor—and in some cases, prevent—the flow of domestic products and services
to other countries. In the United States, they are part of a complicated and tiered system
administered by the Departments of Commerce, State, and Defense. American companies need to
check both the U.S. Munitions List, which controls defense-related items, and the Commerce
Control List, which controls so-called dual-use items (items that have both military and civilian uses), before
selling products to foreign countries. Generally, if the item in question is included in either list, a company
would need to seek a license to sell the technology abroad, giving the U.S. government the ability
to approve or deny the application based on a number of factors, including the destination and end-use.
One list consolidates the monitoring system
Farkas 10 Dr. Evelyn N. Farkas is a former Senior Fellow at the American Security Project. She was also
Executive Director of the congressionally-mandated Commission on the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction Prevention and Terrorism which issued the report World at Risk in 2008, “U.S. Export Controls:
Emerging Consensus On Increasing Risk”, April 2010, https://www.americansecurityproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2010/09/US-Export-Controls-Consensus-and-Risk-FINAL.pdf//OF
The single agency option would involve merging the DDTC and BIS functions and personnel, and could potentially even include
DOD personnel (though this appears unlikely). It
is unclear where this agency would be located—the State
Department is most likely. It is clear, however, that there would only be one list of items to be
controlled—divided into categories based on whether or how militarily critical or sensitive they
are. The system would provide for “cascading,” the ability to move items from the mostcontrolled category to lesser-controlled categories, and then out of the system entirely, based on
technological advances. At the same time, the administration would have to develop tiers of countries, or end-users, to scale
the level of scrutiny given to an item under consideration for export. This would be similar to a proposal made several years ago
directing the administration to “develop a matrix approach to ranking requests based on both technology and nationality of
applicants. A system should be in place for identifying and ranking the sensitivity of technologies and friendliness of countries. The
system should also be able to assess to what countries these technologies may be ultimately passed.”55
The clear advantage of this option would be that both
U.S. industry and policy makers would have
one bureaucracy, one form and, ideally, one computer system to track everything from
license or commodity jurisdiction requests, to shipment, and finally to end-use.
AT: Space Mil CP
Fails in the long term—their author
O’hanlon 5 [Michael, The brookings institution. November 1, 2005. “PRESERVING U.S.
DOMINANCE WHILE SLOWING THE WEAPONIZATION OF SPACE”
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/testimony/2005/11/01defenseohanlon/20051101.pdf//jweideman]
That said, military space competition will occur regardless of American policy, and other countries will gradually learn to
use space as the United States does today. That calls for a two tier approach from Washington. It must continue to anticipate, and protect against,
attacks on its satellites to the extent possible. Commercial communications satellites and low-altitude military assets are probably the most vulnerable.
Measures ranging from improved hardening against lasers to more maneuvering capability against microsats to retention of ground-based alternatives
to satellites are thus required. In addition, with crossing the rubicon of weaponization or testing, the United States should keep its technology options
open for development of antisatellite weapons of its own. Certain missile defense systems, together with laboratory research, provide
such capabilities; no dedicated ASAT programs are needed or desirable. The United States, leading the way on the increased militarization of space,
may not be able to prevent its weaponization indefinitely. But slowing the process for as long as possible
now appears the best way to serve its core military and strategic interests.
The pentagon tried and failed at the CP
Willman 15 [David, staff writer for the LA Times. April 5 2015. “The Pentagon’s $10-billion bet
gone bad” http://graphics.latimes.com/missile-defense///jweideman]
Leaders of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency were effusive about the new technology. It was the most
powerful radar of its kind in the world, they told Congress. So powerful it could detect a baseball over San Francisco from the other side of the country.f
North Korea launched a sneak attack, the
Sea-Based X-Band Radar — SBX for short — would spot the
incoming missiles, track them through space and guide U.S. rocket-interceptors to destroy
them. Crucially, the system would be able to distinguish between actual missiles and decoys. SBX
“represents a capability that is unmatched,” the director of the Missile Defense Agency told a Senate subcommittee in 2007. In reality, the giant floating
radar has been a $2.2-billion flop, a Los Angeles Times investigation found. Although it can powerfully magnify distant objects, its field of vision is so
narrow that it would be of little use against what experts consider the likeliest attack: a stream of missiles interspersed with decoys. SBX
was
supposed to be operational by 2005. Instead, it spends most of the year mothballed at Pearl
Harbor in Hawaii. The project not only wasted taxpayer money but left a hole in the nation’s defenses. The money spent on it could have
gone toward land-based radars with a greater capability to track long-range missiles, according to experts who have studied the issue. Expensive
missteps have become a trademark of the Missile Defense Agency, an arm of the Pentagon
charged with protecting U.S. troops and ships and the American homeland. Over the last decade, the agency
has sunk nearly $10 billion into SBX and three other programs that had to be killed or sidelined after they proved unworkable, The Times found. “You
can spend an awful lot of money and end up with nothing,” said Mike Corbett, a retired Air Force colonel who oversaw the agency’s contracting for
weapons systems from 2006 to 2009. “MDA
spent billions and billions on these programs that didn’t lead
anywhere.” The four ill-fated programs were all intended to address a key vulnerability in U.S.
defenses: If an enemy launched decoys along with real missiles, U.S. radars could be fooled,
causing rocket-interceptors to be fired at the wrong objects — and increasing the risk that actual warheads would slip
through. In addition to SBX, the programs were: • The Airborne Laser, envisioned as a fleet of converted Boeing 747s that would fire
laser beams to destroy enemy missiles soon after launch, before they could release decoys. It turned out that
the lasers could not be fired over sufficient distances, so the planes would have to fly within or near an enemy’s borders
continuously. That would leave the 747s all but defenseless against antiaircraft missiles. The program was canceled in 2012, after a decade of testing.
The cost: $5.3 billion. • The Kinetic Energy Interceptor, a rocket designed to be fired from land or sea to destroy enemy missiles during their early stage
of flight. The interceptor was too long to fit on Navy ships, and on land, it would have to be positioned so close to its target that it would be vulnerable
to attack. The program was killed in 2009, after six years of development. The cost: $1.7 billion. • The Multiple Kill Vehicle, a cluster of miniature
interceptors that would destroy enemy missiles along with any decoys. In 2007 and 2008, the Missile Defense Agency trumpeted it as a
“transformational program” and a cost-effective “force multiplier.” After four years of development, the agency’s contractors had not conducted a single
test flight, and the program was shelved. The cost: nearly $700 million.
AT: Trade Deficit CP
Russia- China gas deal means no demand
Cobb 14 [Kurt Freelance writer on energy policy. Oilprice.com. November 18 2014. RussiaChina Deal Could Kill U.S. LNG Exports. http://oilprice.com/Energy/Natural-Gas/RussiaChina-Deal-Could-Kill-U.S.-LNG-Exports.html//jweideman]
Russia and China have signed two large natural gas deals in the last six months as Russia turns
its attention eastward in reaction to sanctions and souring relations with Europe, currently Russia's
largest energy export market. But the move has implications beyond Europe. In the department of everything is connected, U.S. natural gas
producers may be seeing their dream of substantial liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports suffer
fatal injury because of Russian exports to the Chinese market, a market that was expected to be
the largest and most profitable for LNG exporters. Petroleum geologist and consultant Art Berman--who has been
consistently skeptical of the viability of U.S. LNG exports--communicated in an email that Russian supply will force the price of
LNG delivered to Asia down to between $10 and $11, too low for American LNG exports to be
profitable. Now, let's back up a little. U.S. natural gas producers have been trying to sell the story of an American energy renaissance based on
growing domestically produced gas supplies from deep shale deposits--now being exploited through a new form of hydraulic fracturing called highvolume slick-water hydraulic fracturing. Related: APEC 2014: Russia Tries To Leave Europe Behind The problem has been that overproduction and low
prices--now only a fraction of the $13 per thousand cubic feet (mcf) at the peak in 2008--have undermined the financial stability of the natural gas
drillers. Here's why: Natural gas from shale, referred to as shale gas, is generally more expensive to produce than conventional natural gas and will
require that natural gas prices go much higher than they are today--from around $4 per mcf almost certainly to over $6 per mcf and perhaps more to
pay the costs of bringing that gas out profitably. But at that price, U.S. LNG is no longer competitive in Europe. And now, because
of the
Russian-Chinese natural gas pipeline deals, it may no longer be competitive in Asia. Those are the two
largest markets for LNG. Without them it is doubtful that the United States will be exporting much LNG--except
perhaps at a loss. Here's the problem: To convert U.S. natural gas to liquefied natural gas, put it on specially built
tankers and ship it to Europe or Asia will cost about $6 per mcf. If the price of U.S. natural gas averages around $6 per mcf, the total
landed cost of U.S. LNG will be the cost of the gas plus the cost of converting it and shipping it, that is, around $12 per mcf. The most recent landed
prices for LNG to Asia as reported by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission were $10.10 per MMBtu* for China, $10.50 for Korea and $10.50 for
Japan. For Europe the numbers are even more sobering: $9.15 for Spain, $6.60 for the United Kingdom, and $6.78 for Belgium. All amounts are U.S.
dollars. These are probably reflective of spot prices rather than long-term contracts, and they are down due to softening energy demand that may be the
result of an economic slowdown in Asia and Europe. But, they give an indication of how difficult it will be for U.S. LNG to compete on the WORLD
MARKET. LNG
prices may well improve, but buyers of LNG typically sign cost-plus contracts. In the
United States that would be the cost of Henry Hub natural gas (traded on the New York
Mercantile Exchange) plus the cost of liquefaction and transportation. With no assurances--and
a good deal of evidence to the contrary--that Henry Hub gas will remain at current prices
(around $4) for the long term, it's difficult to see how there will be many long-term buyers of
U.S. LNG. One wonders, under such circumstances, just how many of the 14 proposed U.S. LNG export terminals will
actually be built. Having taken the long way around, let me return to the Russian-Chinese natural gas pipelines and their significance in this
drama. Gazprom, the Russian natural gas giant that will actually deliver the gas, valued the earlier deal in May at around $10.19 per MMBtu. The latest
deal has no announced value, but one analyst believes the Chinese will be asking for around $8 per MMBtu. Even
if the Chinese end up
accepting a price closer to the previous deal, some 17 percent of the Chinese natural gas supply
will be coming from Russia when the pipelines are complete several years from now. And that
will likely anchor the price of Chinese LNG imports between $10 and $11 per MMBtu, making
the price too low to be reliably profitable for U.S. LNG exporters.
Advantage Stuff
Semiconductors
Export Controls on the Semiconductor industry hamper its
competiveness
Rose et al 10 (David-Co-Chair of Semiconductor Industry Association trade compliance
committee, Cynthia Johnson-Co-Chair of Semiconductor Industry Association trade compliance
committee, Daryl Hatano- VP of Public Policy at the SIA, “Encryption Reform for
Semiconductor Export Controls,” Semiconductor Industry Association Trade Compliance
Committee, Semiconductor Industry Association,
http://www.semiconductors.org/clientuploads/directory/DocumentSIA/Export/SIA%20paper
%20Encryption%20Reform%20for%20Semiconductor%20Export%20Controls%20031210.pdf)
the principal export control process for semiconductor devices that are not devoted exclusively to encryption
or contain proprietary encryption is License Exception ENC. This vehicle imposes many requirements on
semiconductor components that complicate and disrupt global trade flows. A. Minimum 30-Day Export
Delay For most destinations, the existing ENC license exception available to semiconductor devices requires a delay
of at least 30 days for a product review accompanied by the prospect of the imposition of special export conditions.
This can cause significant operational instabilities. The uncertainty of the review period – both as to
length of time and outcome – can create problems, especially for large and complex product
introductions. Results from a government encryption review inevitably come in the final days of a product
introduction. Even a lack of response from the government at the end of the review period can cause uncertainty over the
appropriate classification of a device and the requirements for its export, e.g., can the item be exported to government end users?37
B. Impact on Foreign National Employees and Supply Chain Another
complication for exporters of
semiconductors is that they may have to change how they treat OEMs and suppliers as a result
of introducing encryption into a particular semiconductor device.38 Exports to these entities currently need
license authority and hence must proceed at least under License Exception ENC. This is particularly burdensome because
semiconductor companies need to segment their design process in a way that prevents the
inclusion of foreign nationals in portions of product designs that involve encryption. This regulatory requirement persists
even though the encryption algorithm embedded in a semiconductor device may be publicly available and not accessible or subject
to modification. C. International Repercussions of U.S. Classification of Semiconductors with Encryption Many countries impose
encryption controls on products based on their U.S. classification. Most U.S. semiconductor components that contain encryption are
classified under ECCN 5A002, a U.S. designation that is subject to export and often import controls by foreign countries. The
foreign controls are applied on U.S. components even when these components would qualify for
the ENC license exception in the United States. License exceptions for encryption items are not generally available in
foreign jurisdictions. This imposition of foreign requirements based on a U.S. export classification can
be particularly burdensome for U.S. companies operating overseas. D. Bifurcating Global Market into
Domestic and International Sectors It is difficult to participate in a global market when there are separate
requirements for exports that apply to the overseas market but not to the domestic market. This
discrepancy makes for inefficient production and dampens innovation for encryption products generally.
It can also provide an impetus to move research and development offshore to avoid U.S.
export controls on encryption technology. The current regulatory system creates a disincentive to build strong encryption
capabilities into commercial products as recommended by the U.S. Government because it is not economically feasible for U.S.
semiconductor companies to create separate, general purpose products for both the domestic and foreign markets. E. Collateral
Reporting Burdens Accounting and reporting requirements impose a bureaucratic cost that reduces productivity and adds nothing
to protecting U.S. interests.39 Taken
together, these encryption requirements for semiconductor components
impose a competitive constraint on U.S. semiconductors that can be very damaging in a highly
contested global market.
US export controls hurt the Chinese semiconductor industry
Yinug 9 (Falan-international trade analyst in the Office of Industries, “Challenges to Foreign
Investment in High-Tech Semiconductor Production in China,” United States International
Trade Commission, Journal of International Commerce and Economics, May 2009,
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/journals/semiconductor_production.pdf)
U.S. semiconductor manufacturing equipment and material exports to China are chiefly controlled for national
security and antiterrorism purposes.27 The U.S. government requires a license to export certain equipment and materials to China,
and for these items, it generally is the policy to approve exports for civilian end uses and deny exports having the potential for a
significant and direct contribution to Chinese military capabilities (GAO 2008, 9).28 According to some experts, the
U.S.
government generally allows semiconductor technology transfers to China if the technology is at least
three generations older than the current technology in the United States (U.S.-Taiwan Business Council
2008, 10).29 U.S. industry groups have argued that “export controls should not apply to mass market semiconductor products, or to
equipment and materials available from competitors who do not share [U.S.] views on export controls.” 30 Some industry officials
believe that U.S.
export controls, particularly on semiconductor equipment, have slowed the growth of the
semiconductor industry in China by inhibiting investment by foreign firms and technology
advancement of Chinese-owned firms.31 In 2007, the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) announced the creation
of a new program that removes individual export license requirements for certain authorized customers in China (DOC 2007).32
Three firms have qualified for eased U.S. export procedures for semiconductor equipment and materials under the program: Applied
Materials China, Ltd., SMIC, and Shanghai Hua Hong NEC Corporation (GAO 2008, 17). A recent U.S. Government Accountability
Office report found that the program has not been used as frequently as DOC had anticipated. For example, after the program
had been in existence for approximately one year, roughly 6 percent of the total exports of semiconductor manufacturing equipment
to China occurred under the program, while 94 percent occurred using an export license. Furthermore, as of June 2008, the report
found that only one of the three of the validated end-users authorized to receive semiconductor
equipment and materials under the program had received any items (GAO 2008, 22–23).
Green Tech
Export controls stunt Chinese green tech development
Lombardo et al 9 (Ingrid-consultant at Larkin Trade International (LTI) Associates,
Fannie Chen-Policy Analyst at AmCham-China, Justin Chan-Editor-in-Chief at AmCham
Shanghai, “The Impact of US Export Controls,” Insights, October 2009, pgs 21-25,
https://www.amcham-shanghai.org/NR/rdonlyres/0BE4C980-EEAC-4B66-953F77C5629157BA/11190/oct09_policy_update.pdf
One emerging market that could greatly benefit from the loosening of overly restrictive controls on
U.S. controlled technology in the future is the emerging green energy sector in China. Wind energy, for example, has
experienced fast growth as international and Chinese domestic wind turbine and blade manufacturers
establish production bases in China. Due to fierce competition in this market, technology
breakthroughs are required to achieve higher capacity per unit, higher speed and efficiency, and lower noise.
One way to achieve these goals is to incorporate carbon fiber composite materials within wind turbine
blades. Carbon fibers are lighter than traditional fiberglass, and their use could result in increased blade speed and
higher energy output. However, carbon fibers are currently restricted by U.S. export controls, and
thus far, Chinese wind turbine manufacturers have had difficulty accessing them. While there are reasons to
restrict the export of carbon fibers to military end users in China, there is no security threat in exporting them to
commercial wind turbine blade manufacturers with no ties to the Chinese military. Another example is the field of
solar panels and high-efficiency lighting (LED). The majority of solar cells currently being produced in China are siliconbased.
The most common manufacturing equipment being employed is non-controlled LPCVD and PECVD equipment. However, the
next generation of solar panels uses a type of compound solar cell, called GaAs III-V, which is produced
using controlled MOCVD equipment, which is also used to produce LEDs. Many Chinese green energy
companies are looking to integrate the production process of solar cell manufacturing and LED
production because the same equipment can be used for both. This is driving many LED manufacturers to
consider also producing commercial solar cells. However, U.S. export controls pose a significant barrier for
Chinese manufacturers who wish to import MOCVD equipment. The green technology space is equally
important to the U.S. and China from both an environmental and economic standpoint. As an international leader in
greentech solutions, the U.S. should be able to take advantage of the sincere interest in China to
develop clean energy solutions by promoting and selling its products in China. Limits on technology
transfer have the potential to hinder U.S.-China cooperation that would not “only contribute to a
more sustainable environment but will encourage investment and create jobs
Foreign Export Circumvention
Unilateral export control fails- EU nations will give the PRC the
tech
Cheng 10 (Dean- Senior Research Fellow at the Asian Studies Center as part of the Heritage
Foundation, “Export Controls and the Hard Case of China,” The Heritage Foundation, 12/10/10,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/12/export-controls-and-the-hard-case-ofchina)
Further complicating
the situation are China’s relationships with American allies. China has
extensive economic ties with the U.K., Germany, France, and many other Western nations and poses less of
a security challenge to them. Not surprisingly, China is not one of the “countries of interest” in the
Wassenaar Arrangement. Indeed, few states are likely to press for applying the agreement to the
PRC in absence of a pressing threat from Beijing.[5] “None of the participants in the [Wassenaar]
process appears to favor the types of strong controls—and U.S. dominance—that existed under CoCOM.”[6] This suggests
that, unless carefully thought out, any U.S. attempt to impose unilateral export controls on the PRC
would likely fail to prevent Beijing from obtaining comparable technologies from U.S.
competitors, while costing American manufacturers jobs and sales. On the other hand, a clear set of
controlled exports might allow the U.S. to present European and Japanese exporters with an opportunity to expand their
participation in the U.S. defense market in exchange for tighter controls over the listed technologies and processes.
Export are ineffective at restricting access of dual use tech to
China and only serve to hamper US competitiveness
Cheng 10 (Dean- Senior Research Fellow at the Asian Studies Center as part of the Heritage
Foundation, “Export Controls and the Hard Case of China,” The Heritage Foundation, 12/10/10,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/12/export-controls-and-the-hard-case-ofchina)
The complex and confusing system of U.S. export controls may not actually restrict access of foreign
countries, including the PRC, to sensitive military and dual-use technologies. Some items will likely slip
through the cracks, especially given the vagaries of precisely which list and sanctions apply to which technologies: Some sanctions
and embargoes only apply to items on State’s U.S. Munitions List and not to those on the Commerce Control List. For example,
Commerce-controlled items may be exported to China while arms exports to China are generally prohibited.[35] Meanwhile, the
State Department and the Commerce Department do not necessarily share information with each
other, even in cases of violations of their respective regulations. As a result, violators of one set of rules are not automatically
subjected to increased scrutiny under the other set.[36] In some cases, it is unclear whether the restricted
technologies are meaningful. A commonly cited problem with both the Munitions Control List and the Commerce Control
List is that the prohibitions are rarely reviewed. The CCL, for example, has not been revised in over 15 years.[37] This is
especially important for information technology. In light of Moore’s Law, which observes that
the density of transistors on a chip roughly doubles every 24 months, IT becomes much more
capable within a matter of two or three years. Unless regularly reviewed, export restrictions on
specific IT equipment rapidly fall behind the state of the technology. Meanwhile, these same
regulations often complicate cooperation with allies. For example, the U.K. and Australia have at
times found themselves subjected to export control policies, even on joint projects, which have
been approved by both the U.S. government and the U.K. or Australian government. One assessment
observed, “ITAR compliance obligations will become a significant obstacle to effective Australian and U.S. military
interoperation.”[38] The recently ratified U.S.–U.K. and U.S.–Australia treaties on defense trade cooperation, which allows the
transfer of certain defense items and services between Americans and authorized U.K. or Australian citizens without export licenses
or ITAR controls are essential first steps in correcting this problem. In other cases, erstwhile
allies seek to exploit U.S.
export controls to expand their own market share. Thales, a French aerospace manufacturer, has
produced a number of “ITAR-free” systems that incorporate no U.S. components and can therefore be
exported freely, including to the PRC. The company manufactured Sinosat-6B for the PRC and the W3C
telecommunications satellites to this specification.[39] For the W3C satellites, it allowed Eutelsat to use Chinese launchers to place
the satellite in orbit, ironically arranged through China Great Wall Industry Corporation. Meanwhile, Thales is also advertising
helicopter air data units to the same ITAR-free specifications.[40] These
deficiencies in the American export
control regime do not deny the PRC or other states access to advanced technology, but they do deny
American companies potential clients and market shares.
Competitiveness
Export controls hamper competiveness of US industry-this is
especially true with China
Markey 6 (Jay- President of NABCO INC, “Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission Title of Hearing: U.S. –China Commission hearing on China’s Military
Modernization and U.S. Export Controls” US-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, 3/17/06, http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/06_03_16_17_markey.pdf)
Our sales representative tells us that technology similar to the NABCO TCV is readily sold to China from several world-wide sources.
He states that the export
control restriction is only hurting U.S. business and restricting the
technology from reaching the entities that need it in China. Further, the product is used as a security device to
save human life, therefore, we cannot understand the benefit to national security by restricting sales. Our global trading
partners are telling us that they are designing out U.S. origin goods even if the inherent quality
is better, in order to avoid the burden of U.S. export control regulations. The effect upon foreign
direct investment will also be felt when foreign firms choose not to produce goods in the U.S. due to
the higher level of burden of U.S. export regulations targeted to one major trading partner.
NABCO, Inc. page 2 of 5 We understand that NABCO is one of only a limited number of companies to receive a Presidential Waiver
for export of goods to China and we appreciate the efforts of those in the U.S. government who assisted us. When export controls are
legislated instead of administered within the U.S. government agencies, however, these efforts are not enough for companies to
remain competitive. Now, I will provide a summary of the costs of China export controls to our business. NABCO’s story clearly
exemplifies the costs of overly burdensome export controls. The costs include loss of sales, administrative burden, and loss of jobs.
We are concerned about losing yesterday’s sale, however, due to the perceptions of our foreign customers, the loss of future sales and
loss of market share is even more troubling. Following is a summary of the various issues that negatively impact my company as a
result of not being able to ship our products to China: 1) We estimate the potential loss of $4-7 million in sales revenue. 2) The loss
of revenue means that we will not be able to hire an additional 4-8 employees to our workforce in Western Pennsylvania. 3) Damage
to our relationship with our sales agents and damage to our relationship with potential customers leads to these entities seeking
non-U.S. products and eventually creating an indigenous source. It
cannot be underestimated that the damage
done is used against us by our competitors, and a vast market for our company is going to be filled by
foreign companies, denying employment opportunities for skilled workers in Western Pennsylvania. I
can assure you that the next time a Chinese customer interested in our products understands that we
need to obtain an export license, the sale will go to a foreign company. In the real world, we cannot
sell our products and expect the customer to wait a year, or in this case, indefinitely, for us to
obtain a license. It is also difficult because we know the customer prefers our products and we
are unable to sell to him. This type of loss can be expected to affect all U.S. manufacturing
sectors if the proposed controls for China are implemented. Foreign trading partners will be required to
implement U.S. export controls when they trade U.S. origin goods with China. The proposed controls are global controls affecting
sales to all of our trading partners who seek to service their equipment with spare parts of U.S. origin. In addition, the proposed
regulation would require that our trading partners implement special inventory systems for U.S. origin goods in order to control the
ultimate destination for those goods. These foreign
trading partners will not want to be restricted by U.S.
export controls, nor absorb the associated costs. Instead, they will design out U.S. product. The
effect on the U.S. manufacturing base will be felt for many years into the future
Export controls are closing the gap between the US and other
countries
Farkas 10 (Evelyn-Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia/Ukraine/Eurasia, “U.S.
Export Controls: Emerging Consensus On Increasing Risk,” American Security Project, April
2010, https://www.americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/US-ExportControls-Consensus-and-Risk-FINAL.pdf)
We have left the era of the military-industrial complex and entered a new reality of military
industrial complexity. Today, many cutting-edge technologies, such as encryption and software in general, are
developed in the private sector and sought by the government. This means the list of dual-use items
is growing, while at the same time globalization is ensuring that new items and services that
were once only available in the U.S. market are now readily available from foreign sources. In
addition, the United States is no longer unchallenged in the global marketplace either in terms of
market share or quality, even in militarily critical technologies.3 Today, for example, the Netherlands
and Japan are the leaders in the manufacture of lithography equipment, which is critical to making
semiconductors.4 In terms of market share in the defense arena, as one journalist has observed, “The United States’ position
as the world’s dominant military exporter since the Cold War-era is swiftly being eroded by the growth in Russian and European
supply.”5 The U.S. share of the global arms market has declined from about 40% in 2000 to approximately 27% in 2008.6 Whereas
American-made semiconductors used to be 10 years ahead of their Chinese competitors, the GAO reported that by 2002 the U.S.
lead had been reduced to two years. Over the ensuing six years, the gap narrowed further to about one generation—or one to two
years.7 In short, the
21st century reality is that the United States is no longer head and shoulders
above the rest of the world in terms of its scientific, technical, and military capabilities. In fact , we
risk losing that edge to countries such as China and India. Clearly, export controls are not responsible for this development,
but they do cut both ways. They are intended to limit the spread of technology, but in some cases they also
appear to damage the defense industry’s ability to make business decisions that support the
innovation on which future military advances depend.
Export controls cost American companies billions of dollars
annually- the majority lose their business to foreign competitors
Lombardo et al 9 (Ingrid-consultant at Larkin Trade International (LTI) Associates,
Fannie Chen-Policy Analyst at AmCham-China, Justin Chan-Editor-in-Chief at AmCham
Shanghai, “The Impact of US Export Controls,” Insights, October 2009, pgs 21-25,
https://www.amcham-shanghai.org/NR/rdonlyres/0BE4C980-EEAC-4B66-953F77C5629157BA/11190/oct09_policy_update.pdf
U.S. export controls govern the shipment, transmission or transfer of specific products and information to foreign entities.
Outdated export controls restrict items and technologies that once impacted national security,
but no longer do because of rapid technology developments and increasing availability in foreign
markets. This presents a severe challenge to U.S. companies in China competing against companies
from countries without the same restrictions. Reforming these controls would provide U.S.
businesses a level playing field to compete on in international markets. Recent reports estimate that
reform could increase U.S. sales in China by hundreds of millions of dollars annually for hightech companies. Revising U.S. export control policy is a critical element to ensuring continued U.S.
economic security and success over the next decades. To help quantify the export controls’ damage to U.S. industry and
measure the true impact on U.S. competitiveness in China, AmCham-China’s Export Compliance Working Group (ECWG)
conducted the survey in April 2009, inviting members from AmCham-China and AmCham Shanghai to provide comments on how
U.S. export controls have impacted their businesses. In total, 134 members completed the survey, 77 of them from AmCham-China
and 57 from AmCham Shanghai. Among AmCham-China members, the greatest survey response came from the sectors of
aerospace, information technology and internet services while AmCham Shanghai respondents tended to come from the electronics,
engineering and technical consulting services sectors. The survey produced some striking results. Respondents whose businesses
involve the export of licensable items reported customers preferred buying non-U.S. products due to concerns about American
export controls at a rate of 51 percent. Meanwhile, 25 percent of all respondents, and 47 percent of those with businesses involving
the export of licensable items in China, have lost sales because of U.S. export controls. Of
those who had lost sales due
to U.S. export controls, 96 percent found that their customers ended up purchasing similar
items from nonU.S. sources. Among the 14 companies that provided value estimates, the total impact of U.S. export
controls on lost sales was placed at more than US$560 million per year. Although most respondents were not able to provide value
estimates of lost sales, the
data given provides an estimate that the total value of lost sales and
opportunities to American businesses in China could reach billions of U.S. dollars each year. The
ECWG compiled this compelling evidence of U.S. export control damage to industry in its report, “Lost U.S. Sales and Opportunities
in China Due to U.S. Export Controls.” This report was then submitted to the U.S. Department of Commerce in April. In follow-up
meetings, U.S. Department of Commerce officials and members of Congress expressed great interest in and appreciation for the data
from the report. It had a particularly strong impact within the Department of Commerce and added momentum to existing
initiatives to address export control reform.
Satellites
Export Controls fail specifically in the context of satellites
Cheng 10 (Dean- Senior Research Fellow at the Asian Studies Center as part of the Heritage
Foundation, “Export Controls and the Hard Case of China,” The Heritage Foundation, 12/10/10,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/12/export-controls-and-the-hard-case-ofchina)
Export controls reportedly have not impeded Beijing’s efforts to gain access to technology. The
GAO states, “Through joint ventures or incentive programs to encourage international companies to
locate to China, China has gained access to more advanced technology than it previously had or
could produce on its own.”36 According to the GAO, the export control system is hampered by
vulnerabilities and inefficiencies, which together with weaknesses in other government
programs (such as the Foreign Military Sales program and reviews of foreign investments in U.S. companies) place U.S.
critical technologies at risk of “theft, espionage, reverse engineering and illegal export.”37 The GAO asserts
that the U.S. government has been unable to weigh competing U.S. national security and
economic interests in large part because of interagency coordination challenges, inefficient
administration of the programs, and the lack of systematic evaluations of program effectiveness.
Neither State nor Commerce can identify weaknesses in the current system because they have not conducted systematic assessments
of the effectiveness of their programs. As one example of a vulnerability that is not being measured, the GAO points to the lack of
DOD oversight of foreign-owned or influenced contractors to ensure that they are preventing unauthorized access to U.S. classified
information.38 In
the case of export controls on satellites, foreign availability has thwarted U.S.
policy objectives vis-à-vis China. Foreign suppliers have stepped in to replace U.S. satellite
companies prevented from exporting to China since Congress passed legislation in 1999 moving
satellites under AECA jurisdiction (a response to the discovery that Chinese companies had received technical information from
Loral-Hughes that helped them improve their space-launch capability).39 Being
excluded from the Chinese market
has left U.S. industry in a position of relative disadvantage to their foreign competitors.
Export controls kill satellite industry- investors are spurred to
foreign programs that circumvent the controls
DID 11 (Defense Industry Daily- Online trade publication dedicated to defense acquisition,
“USA Moves to Improve Arms Export Regulation Process,” Defense Industry Daily, 7/20/11,
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/usa-moves-to-reform-arms-export-regulation-process04665/
Export control regulation are even affecting weapons development programs around the world, an area
that is not a primary focus for the Foreign Procurement Group, but is of great concern to many American defense firms.
ITAR processes make it difficult for firms like Raytheon, General Dynamics, et. al. to share information with their
own international subsidiaries, to include American technology in bids for foreign contracts, or even to
explore collaboration with foreign firms in allied nations. This can shut American firms out of
foreign weapons programs at the very earliest stages. Worse, many people outside America
perceive the USA’s export regimes as tools used as often for protectionism and hindering
business competitors, as for true security needs. American actions have sometimes fed and validated
this perception. The result is a growing set of concerted efforts to design American defense
technologies out of foreign military systems, in order to avoid falling under ITAR controls. This is
especially visible in the space field, where companies are specifically advertising satellite-related
technologies and platforms as “ITAR-free.” Those chickens are coming home to roost. Recent years have included GAO
reports that cite a decline in expected commercial satellite orders as a major contributor to cost
growth on key American military satellite programs. If that same trend begins to pick up in other
areas – and there is evidence that this is happening – the consequences for the American defense industrial
base, and the cost of American weapons purchases, will be dire.
Other
The BIS’s STA program excludes China
Yuan 13 (Tao-Department of International Economy and Trade, Nankai University, “To
Reduce Trade Frictions,” “On China’s Trade Surplus,” pgs 59-75, 7/20/13,
http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-38925-2_42
In August 2009, the United States began a comprehensive assessment of export control system, and
officially launched the reform process of export control system on August 31, 2010. The reform was an important measure consistent
with the five-year export multiplier program of the U.S. Obama administration. As
a key country of U.S. export control
and restrictions, China has paid great attention to the reform of U.S. export control system and
has repeatedly called on the U.S. to relax export controls against China so as to reduce ChinaU.S. trade imbalance. The United States has repeatedly made a commitment to consider relaxing hightech products export
controls against China. We find that in the new license exception, Strategic Trade Authorization (STA), which was
issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce In June 2011, ‘‘36 countries are included in §740.20(c)(1), which
authorizes exports, reexports and in country transfers that are subject to multiple reasons for
control. Eight destinations are included in §740.20(c)(2), which authorizes export, reexports and in
country transfers that are subject to national security reasons for control’’ (Bureau of Industry and
Security of the U.S. Department of Commerce 2011), but China was excluded from the 44 destinations
Boondoggle
(not sure of tag, makes many alt cause args but lists why export
controls are burdensome)
Bin and Xiao 13 (Li-professor of International Relations at the Department of
International Relations, Tsinghua University, and senior associate at Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Yang-researcher at China Institute of Contemporary International
Relations, “Measuring Political Barriers in US Exports to China,” Chinese Journal of
International Politics, Summer 2013, Volume 6, Issue 2, pgs 133-158,
http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/6/2/133.full#fn-1)
The major barriers to US exports to China are largely based on the political and security concerns of
the United States, that is, the fear that exporting to China products with military applications may
strengthen China’s military power and thus hurt US national security. These barriers, according to their
function, are in three categories: Administrative Barrier: export applications are denied by the administrative
process and included in US government statistics on export control impact. The US government
strictly constrains exports of dual-use products and technologies to China.24 ‘China is the focus
of US export control policy’ according to Vann H. Van Diepen, acting deputy assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation control in his testimony to the US-China Commission on 17 January 2002. Van Diepen went on to state that ‘the
Administration applies strong export controls on both dual-use items and munitions with the
goal of not contributing to nuclear, missile, CBW and other military programmes of concern in
China or elsewhere … The overall number of munitions-list exports to China since 1989 has been
extremely small.’ A further example was in 2001, when the US semiconductor manufacturer Semiconductor
Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) initiated cooperation to build a chip factory in Shanghai
and applied for two technology transfer cases related to electron beam technology to China. Soon afterwards, the Missile
Technology Export Committee (METC) (consisting of Department of Defense and Department of State) noted the
potential military use of the technology and the technology export application was eventually
withdrawn.25 Many companies may not try to apply for export licenses if they know in advance
that there is no hope of getting through the administrative application process. For this reason,
potential exports that do not materialize remain largely outside the statistics of denied export
applications. Institutional Barrier: exports are abandoned over concerns related to the export control
regime including various regulations, acts, and control lists. In this area, the US Congress adopts
legislative measures to constrain high-tech exports to China. For example, ‘The President shall certify to the
Congress at least 15 days in advance of any export to the People’s Republic of China of missile equipment or technology that: (1) such
export is not detrimental to the United States space launch industry; and (2) the missile equipment or technology, including any
indirect technical benefit that could be derived from such export, will not measurably improve the missile or space launch
capabilities of the People’s Republic of China’ (Strom Thurmond National Defence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 SEC.
1512.). The US administration also promulgates export regulations and imposes sanction lists to control certain exports to China. For
example, according
to current export regimes, China is listed in Group D and hence subject to a
level of export regulations almost as strict as those reserved for US-hostile nations like Cuba,
Iran, North Korea, and Syria.26 In addition, besides the general export regulations, specific acts and lists
have been designed for China and are currently in force. Understanding as they do that there is
likely no hope of receiving export licenses given the control regimes, some potential exporters
tend to abandon applications and give up their exports. Many companies have also established
Internal Control Programmes that abort any export plans that are at odds with export control
regulations. Therefore, many US potential exports to China never enter the process of export
applications and abandon the export process. Other potential exporters may worry about the cost, time, and
uncertainties of license applications and in end-use monitoring if their products are on control lists. For example, certain American
manufacturers complained that ‘the time taken to get a license has increased from 104 to 150 days’.27 So the
institutional
barrier may stop a large scope of potential exports, but only a small portion of cases actually
enter the license process, and these tend to encounter the administrative export barrier. Thus,
the calculation the US government has made on the impact of its control on exports to China
fails to include potential exports that are abandoned before entering the licensing process. Political
Barrier: exports are resigned under political pressures. American news media and opinion leaders
always place pressure on companies who sell high-tech products to China or have interest in
doing so. The concern is that such exports could hurt US national security, even when certain businesses may not be explicitly
forbidden under US export control regulations. Critics in the United States have objected to the decision to ease restrictions on
exports to China.28 The US congress
closely scrutinizes any important high-tech transfers to China, such
as those entailed in the US satellite launch services that China provides. In general, Congress is highly concerned
about the technical flow from the United States to China, and whether this has the potential to hurt US national security. The US
government also adopts a cautious position on high-tech sales to China. For instance, on the Bureau of
Industry and Security (BIS) homepage, there are only two country-related titles listed. They are: ‘India high-tech trade’ and
‘China high-tech trade’. The subject in the India link is ‘Facilitating US-India High Technology Trade’, but for China it is
‘Securing US-China High Technology Trade’.29 Faced with this political pressure, companies
might feel obliged by an invisible moral force to give up their exports to China. The potential
exports relinquished under this ethos are not, of course, included among those that are either
authorized or denied in the licensing process. Owing to these barriers, especially the last two, certain
potential export opportunities may be abandoned altogether and completely ignored within the
statistics of actual export license applications. All these barriers contribute to overall deductions in US exports to
China. It is therefore necessary to estimate the total size of all deductions rather than just calculate the number of export
applications that the US government has denied.
The dual list system and multiple agencies involve make exports
a bureaucratic boondoggle
DID 11 (Defense Industry Daily- Online trade publication dedicated to defense acquisition,
“USA Moves to Improve Arms Export Regulation Process,” Defense Industry Daily, 7/20/11,
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/usa-moves-to-reform-arms-export-regulation-process04665/
Right now, American technology export
controls are scattered across 3 major agencies. The Department of
Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is responsible for implementing and enforcing Export
Administration Act regulations, which pertain to the export and re-export of “dual-use” commercial
items. There are several lists associated with this effort, but the Commerce Control/ Critical Commodities List (CCL) is the most
prominent. The Department of State is technically responsible for approving explicitly military
sales. They enforce International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) sales, which are governed by the Arms Export Control
Act (22 U.S.C. 2778). Items governed by ITAR relate to the United States Munitions List (USML).
Those 2 agencies, and lists, are the main agencies involved with regulating American technology and military
exports, but they are not the only ones. The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets
Control, for instance, administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions, under the authority of both Presidential
national emergency powers and specific legislation. Sanctions can apply to specific companies as well as specific countries, and
proliferating subsidiaries often make effective administration, and timely compliance, very
difficult. The idea was that various agencies, with different agendas, would create a system of
“checks and balances” that would be more difficult to defeat. It has not worked out that way, and the
associated costs have been high. There are several obvious problems with these arrangements, and some that are not so
obvious. The most obvious problem involves overlapping jurisdictions . A Washington lawyer told DID that it
is not always clear where a specific item falls, even to the agencies involved. A company that wants
to act ethically may not be clear about where to submit its application, may go to one agency to
be told that they must now go to a different agency, or even be approved by one agency and
denied by another. The flip side is that especially savvy companies can also decide to “forum shop” their application, picking
the regulator they believe is most likely to say yes. The problem of multiple forums is made worse by long
processing times. These departments have limited funds, and the State Department is reportedly still mostly paper-based.
Commerce is only slightly ahead, with an IT systems installed in 1987, and not updated very much. Wasn’t 20
megabytes a lot of hard drive space back then? The net effect is long processing times – 4-6 months is considered typical
for an application. In that time, it’s very possible for the American company to find that the
foreign bid competition that it was trying to enter is closed and done. Or that the firm is unable
to make the required up-front commitment that the contract can be performed in a timely
fashion.
Offshoring
Trade deficit causes massive job loss and outsourcing- especially in
manufacturing
Kimball and Scott 14 (Will-Research Assistant at the Economic Policy Institute with a
B.A. in Economics and Political Science from University of Connecticut, Robert-Director of
Trade and Manufacturing Policy Research at the Economic Policy Institute with a Ph.D. in
Economics from UC-Berkeley, “China Trade, Outsourcing and Jobs,” Economic Policy Institute,
12/11/14, http://www.epi.org/publication/china-trade-outsourcing-and-jobs/)
Since China entered the World Trade Organization in 2001, the massive growth of trade between China and the United States has
had a dramatic and negative effect on U.S. workers and the domestic economy. Specifically, a
growing U.S. goods trade
deficit with China has the United States piling up foreign debt, losing export capacity, and losing jobs,
especially in the vital but under-siege manufacturing sector. Growth in the U.S. goods trade deficit with China
between 2001 and 2013 eliminated or displaced 3.2 million U.S. jobs, 2.4 million (three-fourths) of which were in
manufacturing. These lost manufacturing jobs account for about two-thirds of all U.S. manufacturing jobs lost
or displaced between December, 2001 and December 2013. Among specific industries, the trade deficit in the computer
and electronic parts industry grew the most, and 1,249,100 jobs were lost or displaced, 39.6 percent of the 2001–
2013 total. As a result, many of the hardest-hit congressional districts were in California, Texas, Oregon, Massachusetts, and
Minnesota, where jobs in that industry are concentrated. Some districts in New York, Georgia, and Illinois were also especially hardhit by trade-related job displacement in a variety of manufacturing industries, including computer and electronic parts, textiles and
apparel, and furniture. The
growing trade deficit with China has cost jobs in all 50 states and the
District of Columbia. Using a new model and new congressional district data to estimate the job impacts of trade for the
113th Congress, this study also finds that job losses occurred in every congressional district but one.1 This summary of the jobs
impact of trade with China arise from the following specific findings of this study: Most of the jobs lost or displaced by trade with
China between 2001 and 2013 were in manufacturing industries (2.4 million jobs, or 75.7 percent). Within manufacturing, rapidly
growing imports of computer and electronic parts (including computers, parts, semiconductors, and audio and
video equipment) accounted for 56.0 percent of the $240.1 billion increase in the U.S. goods trade deficit with
China between 2001 and 2013. The growth of this deficit eliminated 1,249,100 U.S. jobs in computer and
electronic parts in this period. Indeed, in 2013, the total U.S. trade deficit with China was $324.2 billion—$154.4 billion
of which was in computer and electronic parts. Global trade in advanced technology products—often discussed as a
source of comparative advantage for the United States—is instead dominated by China. This broad category of high-end
technology products includes the more advanced elements of the computer and electronic parts industry
as well as other sectors such as biotechnology, life sciences, aerospace, and nuclear technology. In 2013,
the United States had a $116.9 billion deficit in advanced technology products with China, and this deficit was responsible for 36.0
percent of the total U.S.-China goods trade deficit. In contrast, the United States had a $35.6 billion surplus in advanced technology
products with the rest of the world in 2013. Other
industrial sectors hit hard by the growing trade deficit with China
between 2001 and 2013 include apparel (203,900 jobs); textile mills and textile product mills (106,800); fabricated
metal products (141,200); electrical equipment, appliances, and components (96,700); furniture and
related products (94,700); plastics and rubber products (72,800); motor vehicles and parts (34,800); and
miscellaneous manufactured goods (107,600). Several service sectors were also hit hard, by indirect job losses,
including administrative and support and waste management and remediation services (196,900) and professional, scientific, and
technical services (169,900). The 3.2 million U.S. jobs lost or displaced by the goods trade deficit with China between 2001 and 2013
were distributed among all 50 states and the District of Columbia, with the biggest net losses occurring in California (564,200 jobs),
Texas (304,700), New York (179,200), Illinois (132,500), Pennsylvania (122,600), North Carolina (119,600), Florida (115,700), Ohio
(106,400), Massachusetts (97,200), and Georgia (93,700). In percentage terms, the jobs lost or displaced due to the growing goods
trade deficit with China in the 10 hardest-hit states ranged from 2.44 percent to 3.67 percent of the total state employment: Oregon
(62,700 jobs lost or displaced, equal to 3.67 percent of total state employment), California (564,200 jobs, 3.43 percent), New
Hampshire (22,700 jobs, 3.31 percent), Minnesota (83,300 jobs, 3.05 percent), Massachusetts (97,200 jobs, 2.96 percent), North
Carolina (119,600 jobs, 2.85 percent), Texas (304,700 jobs, 2.66 percent), Rhode Island (13,200 jobs, 2.58 percent), Vermont (8,200
jobs, 2.51 percent), and Idaho (16,700 jobs, 2.44 percent). The hardest-hit congressional districts were concentrated in states that
were heavily exposed to the growing U.S.-China trade deficit in computer and electronic parts and other durable goods industries
such as furniture as well nondurable industries such as textiles and apparel. The three hardest-hit congressional districts were all
located in Silicon Valley in California, including the 17th (South Bay, encompassing Sunnyvale, Cupertino, Santa Clara, Fremont,
Newark, North San Jose, and Miltpitas2), which lost 61,500 jobs, equal to 17.77 percent of all jobs in the district), the 18th
Congressional District (including parts of San Jose, Palo Alto, Redwood City, Mountain View, and Los Gatos), which lost 50,700
jobs, 14.72 percent), and the 19th Congressional District (most of San Jose and other parts of Santa Clara County, which lost 39,900
jobs, 12.31 percent of all jobs). Of the top 20 hardest-hit districts, eight were in California (in rank order, the 17th, 18th, 19th, 15th,
40th, 34th, 52nd, and 45th), six were in Texas (31st, 3rd, 10th, 18th, 17th, and 2nd), and one each in Oregon (1st), Massachusetts
(3rd), Georgia (14th), Minnesota (1st), New York (18th), and Illinois (6th). Job losses in these districts ranged from 13,900 jobs to
61,500 jobs, and 4.28 percent to 17.77 percent of total district jobs. The
job displacement estimates in this study
are conservative. They include only the jobs directly or indirectly displaced by trade, and exclude jobs
in domestic wholesale and retail trade or advertising; they also exclude respending employment.3 They also do not account
for the fact that during the Great Recession of 2007–2009, and continuing through 2013, jobs displaced
by China trade reduced wages and spending, which led to further job losses. Further, the jobs impact of
the U.S. trade deficit with China is not limited to job loss and displacement and the associated direct wages losses. Competition
with low-wage workers from less-developed countries such as China has driven down wages for
workers in U.S. manufacturing and reduced the wages and bargaining power of similar, noncollege-educated workers throughout the economy, as previous EPI research has shown. The affected population
includes essentially all workers with less than a four-year college degree—roughly 70 percent of the workforce, or about 100 million
workers (U.S. Census Bureau 2012). As earlier EPI research has shown, trade with China between 2001 and 2011 displaced 2.7
million workers, who suffered a direct loss of $37.0 billion in reduced wages alone in 2011 (Scott 2013a). The
nation’s 100
million non-college educated workers suffered a total loss of roughly $180 billion due to
increased trade with low-wage countries (Bivens 2013). These indirect wage losses were nearly five
times greater than the direct losses suffered by workers displaced by China trade, and the pool of
affected workers was nearly 40 times larger (100 million non-college-educated workers versus 2.7 million displaced workers). The
U.S. trade deficit with China has increased since China entered into the WTO Proponents of China’s entry into the World Trade
Organization (WTO) frequently claimed that it would create jobs in the United States, increase U.S. exports, and improve the trade
deficit with China.4 In 2000, President Bill Clinton claimed that the agreement then being negotiated to allow China into the WTO
would create “a win-win result for both countries.” Exports to China “now support hundreds of thousands of American jobs,” and
these figures “can grow substantially with the new access to the Chinese market the WTO agreement creates,” he said (Clinton 2000,
9–10). China’s entry into the WTO in 2001 was supposed to bring it into compliance with an enforceable, rules-based regime that
would require China to open its markets to imports from the United States and other nations by reducing tariffs and addressing
nontariff barriers to trade. Promoters of liberalized U.S.-China trade argued that the United States would benefit because of
increased exports to a large and growing consumer market in China. The United States also negotiated a series of special safeguard
measures designed to limit the disruptive effects of surging imports from China on domestic producers. However, as
a result of
and illegal barriers
to imports, dumping, and suppression of wages and labor rights, the envisioned flow of U.S. exports to China
did not occur. Further, the agreement spurred foreign direct investment (FDI) in Chinese enterprises, which has expanded
China’s currency manipulation and other trade-distorting practices, including extensive subsidies, legal
China’s manufacturing sector at the expense of the United States. Finally, the core of the agreement failed to include any protections
to maintain or improve labor or environmental standards or to prohibit currency manipulation. In retrospect, the promises about
jobs and exports misrepresented the real effects of trade on the U.S. economy: Trade leads to both job creation and job loss or
displacement. (This paper describes the net effect of trade on employment as jobs “lost or displaced,” with the terms “lost” and
“displaced” used interchangeably.) Increases in U.S. exports tend to create jobs in the United States, but increases in imports lead to
job loss—by destroying existing jobs and preventing new job creation—as imports displace goods that otherwise would have been
made in the United States by domestic workers. This is what has occurred with China since it entered the WTO; the United States’
widening trade deficit with China is costing U.S. jobs. From 2001 to 2013, imports from China increased dramatically, rising from
$102.1 billion in 2001 to $438.2 billion in 2013, as shown in Table 1.5 U.S. exports to China rose rapidly from 2001 to 2013, but from
a much smaller base, from $18.0 billion in 2001 to $114.0 billion in 2013. As a result, China’s exports to the United States in 2013
were almost four times greater than U.S. exports to China. These trade figures make the China trade relationship the United States’
most imbalanced by far (authors’ analysis of USITC 2014).
Protectionism
Removing export controls on China will reduce the trade deficit
substantially while supplying China with the technology that it
desperately needs.
China Daily 11 (International Chinese newspaper, “No winners in U.S. hi-tech export
controls,” ChinaDaily.com, 5/13/11, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/201105/13/content_12504141.htm)
The United States has launched a number of trade remedy measures against China over recent years while restricting hitech exports to China through export controls, and both policies have negatively affected the
development of bilateral trade. Industry insiders generally believe that the enormous scale of trade between China and
the United States, the differences in their development stages as well as complementary economic structures form a foundation for
the stable development of bilateral economic and trade ties. Both sides should make unremitting efforts to further develop mutually
beneficial and win-win economic and trade ties. 'Export controls' cause trade imbalance In fact, the root
cause for the U.S.
trade barrier is China's trade surplus against the United States. The export controls established
by the United States have restricted hi-tech exports to China and are undoubtedly a key cause
behind China's trade surplus with the United States. Data from the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) shows that
China's import and export value reached up to 3 trillion U.S. dollars in 2010, with a trade surplus of 183 billion U.S. dollars,
including 181 billion U.S. dollars of trade surplus with the United States. This means that 99 percent of China's trade surplus came
from the trade with the United States, while China's trade surplus with other countries was close to zero. Chen Deming, minister of
MOFCOM, said that China
has focused more and more on boosting import from the United States over
the past two years, which has not only realistically improved the trade ties between the two countries but also showed deep
sincerity. Increasing hi-tech exports to China will be beneficial to the United States, China and even the entire
world. Sun Fei, head of the Financial Investment Committee under the China Association for Promoting International Economic and
Technical Cooperation, said that hi-tech
products become outdated quickly in an increasingly
informationized world. Even if the United States refuses to export certain technology to China,
China can still manage to obtain it from other countries or to develop more advanced technology
by itself. The United States should lift restrictions on exports of hi-tech products to China as long as the exports do not impair its
national security. Sun noted that the U.S. restrictions on high-tech exports have been a main contributor
to its trade deficit with China in recent years. Dispelling prejudice, misconceptions Sun Zhe, director of the Center
for China-U.S. Relations at Tsinghua University, said the current U.S. administration has imposed restrictions on the
exports of hi-tech products for civilian use. After taking office, U.S. President Barack Obama streamlined the procedures
for exporting civilian hi-tech products, integrated and optimized different governmental agencies in charge of such
exports, which slashed the number of hi-tech products subject to export controls, in order to boost exports. However, these
changes did not apply to China, meaning that high-tech exports to China still follow old laws and
regulations. In fact, multinational corporations hold many hi-tech patents in the United States. To export civilian high-tech
products, these corporations must first apply to the U.S. government for approval. Furthermore, they have prejudice and
misconceptions about exporting high-tech products to China. Imposing
restrictions on high-tech exports will
lead to missed opportunities Expanding imports is a long-term strategy of China. As the world's
largest developing country, China has become the fastest growing major export market for the United States, the world's largest
developed country, for nine consecutive years. U.S. exports increased 2 percent in 2010 and its exports to China increased 50
percent. The Center of Forecasting Science under the Chinese Academy of Sciences predicted that the China-U.S. trade volume will
exceed 450 billion U.S. dollars in 2011 and the growth rate of U.S. exports to China will exceed 18 percent. Experts said that the
United States should release related policies to further strengthen the mutually beneficial cooperation partnership with China in
order to benefit the people of the two countries even more. Sun said that China
currently needs to introduce a large
number of advanced civilian technologies and equipment, and urgently needs advanced
technologies in clean energy, energy conservation, alternative energy and environmental
protection. It is a noteworthy phenomenon that China recently made astounding advances in the research and development of
various civilian advanced technologies, such as large civil aircraft, nuclear power and super computers for agro-meteorological
sounding. The
"latecomer effect" of China's technology is obvious. Therefore, the United States should
understand that it will miss opportunities if it limits high-tech exports. Actually, U.S. companies
will be able to occupy a larger share of China's emerging market as long as the U.S. government
lifts restrictions on civilian high-tech exports to China.
Dual use export controls destroys US competitiveness and
exasperates the US-China trade deficit
Capri 11 (Alex-Partner and regional leader, Asia trade and customs, with KPMG China,
“Growing U.S.-China Trade Highlights Cumbersome Export Controls,” Forbes, 6/21/11,
http://www.forbes.com/2011/06/21/china-export-controls-opinions-contributors-kpmg.html)
Selling something as innocuous as brake pads can easily get a company into trouble if it’s found
to be exporting them into China without a special license. The same rules apply for a host of different items,
such as the ubiquitous SIM card, which can be found in everything from mobile phones to smart cards and even some electric toys.
This is due to a heightened focus on export controls for goods that are imported from the U.S. into China.
Brake pads and SIM cards, for example, are considered “dual use” goods as they could potentially be
converted for military activities: brake pads for military vehicles and SIM cards to program a missile or detonate a bomb.
In 2010, trade between the U.S. and China hit $385 billion, up 30% from the previous year. As it continues to grow, so too will the
the prevailing
views is that China’s trade imbalance with the U.S. (an imbalance that’s significantly higher than
with any other country or region) is due to the U.S. over-regulating and restricting the sale of too
many technologies. Simply put, large areas of market demand in China are being thwarted. Under this
argument, it is U.S. Export Control laws that have undermined the ability of the U.S. to balance its trade flows
with China. These laws have allegedly closed off lucrative markets to U.S., Chinese and other multinational corporations (MNC).
It is difficult to assess the extent to which this has impeded trade, however, the immediate impact of such restrictions is
likely to be a net reduction in trade. What is new about all the talk of controlled and restricted technologies, is that for the
first time, the topic of export controls has been elevated to the same level of the U.S.-Sino trade
dialogue as the other usual suspects: antidumping and countervailing duties, intellectual property, government
debate about China’s trade surplus with the U.S., which according to U.S. figures, hit $181 billion in 2010. One of
procurement and indigenous innovation programs and currency valuations. Two things have become apparent: the first is that
hyper-sensitivities around strategic technologies are widespread and, for
the U.S. leadership, the need to ring-fence
these technologies supersedes balancing its trade deficit with China. The second is that MNCs may
need to adjust business plans to a world where increased export control regulations and massive
penalties (both civil and criminal) may become the norm. There are currently a half dozen
governmental agencies in the U.S. that are charged with regulating, policing, and enforcing stringent rules
around the sale and transfer of controlled goods and technologies. Penalties for non-compliance are harsh.
Businesses engaged in the international trade of seemingly innocuous commercial technologies must
commit to implementing compliance regimes within their organizations. MNCs must screen
suppliers and customers against extensive “denied party lists” and perform “end-user” and “enduse” verifications. For many items, including so-called “dual use” items (any commercial products or technologies
which could be altered or reprogrammed for military or other nefarious uses), MNCs must properly identify and
classify goods in order to obtain required licenses. This has become a massive undertaking for
the typical MNC, as rationalized production processes now span multiple countries and involve
large numbers of parts, components and critical information, which is also considered a
“deemed export.” Consider the challenges facing a MNC with a supply chain that moves tens of thousands of controlled items
each day to customers and production centers around the world. As these controlled goods pass through third
countries, they often require back-to-back export certificates for each shipment from the host
countries’ regulatory agencies. In short, export control compliance has become a Herculean task.
And because the concept of “extra-territoriality” applies to U.S. export controls, the full force of U.S. law follows an
exported item throughout the international supply chain. As international commerce evolves
toward the next generation of information technology particularly cloud computing, consider the challenges facing a company as
it attempts to manage its export controls risks. Any controlled information transmitted into the cloud could
become a potential violation if it is shared, accessed or viewed by the wrong people. There is growing
consensus within the U.S. and international business communities that existing export regulations need to be simplified and scaled
back. While there clearly are a number of sensitive technologies with critical national defense implications that should be controlled,
there are many more products and technologies that businesses claim should be removed from the controlled goods list. This brings
us back to the example of brake pads and SIM cards, which both require special licenses because they could be used for military
activity. Many U.S.-based MNCs have asserted that export
controls on certain controlled goods achieve
nothing more than lock them out of overseas markets, as lots of foreign companies are willing to
sell these same products. Conventional thinking is that it’s only a matter of time before Chinese firms
acquire the means to produce many of these same technologies, thus it would be preferable to
build relationships earlier rather than become direct competitors later. While this may be true with many
kinds of seemingly innocuous “dual use” technologies, there are also sensitive, strategic items which, if they were to be obtained by
the wrong individuals, could create major problems that could affect international commerce and more.
High tech export controls on China increase the trade deficitintensifying trade disputes
Yuan 13 (Tao-Department of International Economy and Trade, Nankai University, “To
Reduce Trade Frictions,” “On China’s Trade Surplus,” pgs 59-75, 7/20/13,
http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-38925-2_42
The United States and EU are the world’s two largest suppliers of technologies, related materials and equipments, and they have
great advantage in producing and exporting high-tech products. However, the
U.S. and EU have not abolished nor
relaxed the export controls against China because they worry about two aspects. The first is that
the U.S. and EU worry that the high-tech technologies exported to China will strengthen Chinese
military since the U.S. and EU still hold a Cold War mentality, thinking that China should not
develop military. The second is that the U.S. and EU worry that the high-tech technologies
exported to China will help China to upgrade Chinese industries and weaken the U.S. and EU’s
technological advantage over China. The U.S. and EU do not want to see a stronger competitor of
China in world market of high-tech products. The China threat theory, which argues that it is
inconceivable for China to have a peaceful rise and reflects that the Western countries worry about losing of leading advantage since
China’s economy develops so fast, reminds
China that it is a hard work to urge the U.S. and EU to relax the
export controls of high-tech products against China, especially in the course of economic crisis.
The U.S. and EU’s export control policy is bound to reduce their exports to China and increase their trade
deficit with China, thus intensifying trade disputes with China. The US has had very great trade
surplus in high-tech products export. According to reports of the U.S. Aerospace Industries Association, in 1998 the
U.S. aerospace products had trade surplus of $37 billion, and the U.S. high-tech products trade surplus was only $4.4 billion that
year. The aerospace industry, with big trade surplus, has played an important role in alleviating trade deficit of the United States. As
the U.S. began to strengthen export controls since 2001, hightech products in particular, aviation products became the key target of
tightened export control, so the U.S. had $16.6 billion trade deficit of high-tech products in 2002, and the U.S. trade deficit of hightech products expanded to $27.4 billion in 2003. Obviously, with
tightened export controls, growth rate of the
U.S. exports fell and it was harmful for the U.S. trade balance, leading to and intensifying trade
disputes between the United States and other countries. China should continue to take measures
to persuade the U.S. and EU to relax export controls against China, to increase high-tech exports to
China and to reduce the U.S. and EU trade imbalance with China. Chinese leaders have urged the
U.S. and EU to relax export controls over hightech products to China for many times, which
reflects that China wants to reduce trade surplus with the U.S. and EU through importing more
high-tech products from the U.S. and EU. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao urged the European Union (EU) to relax its
export control over high-tech products to China at the fifth China-EU Business Summit on November 30, 2009. European
Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso and Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt, whose country holds the EU’s rotating
presidency, also attended the Summit. The premier said China was ready to expand cooperation with the EU in intellectual property
rights (IPR) and would step up IPR protection and law enforcement to safeguard the lawful rights and interests of foreign
businesses, EU companies included. At Chinese-German Forum for Economic and Technological Cooperation in Berlin on June 28,
2011, Chinese Premier Wen said ‘‘the EU’s export control visa-vis China has restricted German export of high- and new-tech
products to China and greatly undermined the competitiveness of German companies in the Chinese market. We hope that Germany
will urge the EU to relax such export control and increase the share of high- and new-tech products in its trade with China.’’
China’s Vice-President Xi Jinping urged the United States to take ‘‘concrete action at an early
date’’ to relax restrictions on high-tech exports to China during a discussion with U.S. and Chinese business
leaders, which was also attended by the U.S. Vice-President Joe Biden, in Beijing August 19, 2011. Chinese Vice Premier
Wang Qishan urged the United States to ‘‘set a clear timetable and roadmap’’ for lifting hightech export controls against China during the third annual US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED)3 at the
Department of the Interior in Washington May 9, 2011. Chinese Commerce Minister Chen Deming also pressed the U.S. to lift hightech export restrictions to China. ‘‘Because
the U.S. restricts its export of high technology to China,
American companies suffered a lot in terms of losing market share in China,’’ Chen said at a press
briefing.
Protectionism spirals out of control-causing widespread conflict
Panzer 7 (Michael J- Faculty at New York Institute of Finance, “Financial Armageddon:
Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse,” Kaplan Publishing, 2007, pgs 137-138)
The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and
dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that
must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or
basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world
where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes
over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment
and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise
to fullscale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic
conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for confl icts that stem from cultural and religious
differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by
channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology
and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of
their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent
conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running
amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an
increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of
its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a
growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even
speculated that an
“intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at
some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious
differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering
resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists
employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise
missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret
stepped-up confl icts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world
war.
Loosening exports is key to avoid protectionism
Baisong 12 (Jin-deputy director of the department of Chinese trade studies at the Chinese
Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation, “Protectionism is Not Remedy,”
China Daily, 2/17/12, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/201202/17/content_14630966.htm)
US should cease accusing China of unfair trading and ease its export restrictions to boost manufacturing
and create jobs To maintain its superpower status, the United States frequently points an accusatory
finger at China, the world's second largest economy, and deals with "made-in-China" products in a similar way to the approach
it used to take with Japan. It takes anti-dumping and anti-subsidies measures, while trying to curb imports from China by raising
tariffs. It has also pressurized China with the Super 301 provision of the US Trade Act, and continues to call for appreciation of the
renminbi. The US has also initiated the creation of a new trade body to probe into China's "unfair trade". Such trade
protectionism is usually of little benefit to the US. For instance, in 2009, higher tariffs were levied on tires
imported from China. However, according to a Wall Street Journal report in January, Thailand, Indonesia, and Mexico have now
replaced China as the source of tire imports. The protectionist measures failed to help US tire manufacturers, as US labor costs make
their products expensive compared to those from developing countries. The tariffs did nothing to help boost US employment,
instead they dealt a heavy blow to the many small firms that used to import tires from China. It's
absurd for the US
government to blame others instead of trying to revive its own economy. As former chairman of the US
Federal Reserve Board, Alan Greenspan, has observed, the quantitative easing policy has failed to boost
investment because US enterprises do not make long-term investments as interest rates are so
unpredictable. Besides, in contrast to Germany, which cut salaries and welfare payments to stay competitive following the
onset of the global economic slowdown, US employees retained their high salaries, especially in the financial sector, which did
nothing to fix the defects in the US industrial structure and seriously curbed the recovery of its manufacturing industry. For
example, Apple's iPhone is jointly made in the US, Japan, China, and other countries, but the lion's share of the profits go to the US,
the assembly enterprises in China make only 2-3 percent profit. But in the manufacturing chain, such labor-intensive work naturally
creates more jobs in China than in the US. In
order to ease the trade imbalance, the US should clearly
recognize its structural defects and implement short-term economic resurgence policies.
Although restraining China's development is one option for maintaining the US' global
dominance, such a strategy is difficult to realize, and may push relations between the US and
China to a dangerous point. If the US chooses instead to strengthen its cooperation with China
and ease its export controls it will definitely boost its exports. China is now the world's second largest
economy, and is still one of the most rapidly growing economies. China is also the most rapidly growing destination
for US exports. According to statistics from China's General Administration of Customs, in 2011 imports from the US totaled $122
billion. China
badly needs US high-tech products for its economic development. But regrettably,
the US' Cold War mentality has resulted in it imposing export controls on 2,000 types of hightech products and prohibiting their export to China. If Washington lifts the ban, it is expected
that China will double its imports from the US. In the long run, expanding exports to China will
encourage US enterprises to invest in domestic manufacturing addressing the economic
structural deficiency and the heavy debt burden facing the US.
Statistics are on our side- liberalization of export controls on
high tech/dual use tech of China would narrow the US-China
deficit substantially
Bin and Xiao 13 (Li-professor of International Relations at the Department of
International Relations, Tsinghua University, and senior associate at Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Yang-researcher at China Institute of Contemporary International
Relations, “Measuring Political Barriers in US Exports to China,” Chinese Journal of
International Politics, Summer 2013, Volume 6, Issue 2, pgs 133-158,
http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/6/2/133.full#fn-1)
More generally speaking, China
is discriminatively placed in an anomalous position in the US export
control regime, a development that runs contrary to the commitment of ‘building a positive,
cooperative and comprehensive US-China relationship for the 21st century, and … concrete actions to
steadily build a partnership to address common challenges’.45 The BIS, Department of Commerce, is in charge of export regulations
according to the EAR, implemented in March 1997.46 In EAR, nations are listed in four groups. ‘Cooperating governments are the
national governments of countries listed in Country Group A:1. Group B is for countries with license exceptions: ‘Export Control
Classification Number (ECCN), provided the items are destined to civil end-users for civil end-uses. Country
Group D:1
‘Prohibits exports and reexports of replacement parts to countries in Country Group E:1.’47 With
regards to the countries studied in this article, France, UK, and Japan are listed in Groups A/B and Brazil appears in Groups A/B/D.
China, however, is listed only in Group D.48 Furthermore, China is the only economic entity addressed in a separate
chapter in EAR, in Part 744, Control Policy: End-User and End-Use Based, Chapter 21, Restrictions on certain military end-uses in
the People's Republic Of China (PRC). In this article, it is stipulated that ‘in addition to the license requirements for items specified
on the Commerce Control List (CCL), you (exporter) may not export, reexport, or transfer any item subject to the EAR listed in
Supplement No. 2 to Part 744 to the PRC without a license …’. At the same time, the
complexity of regulations on
export to China is also demonstrated in the rules stating ‘when submitting a license application
pursuant to this section, you must state in the “additional information” section of the
application that “this application is submitted because of the license requirement in §744.21 of the
EAR (Restrictions on Certain Military End-uses in the People's Republic of China).” In addition, either in the additional information
must include all known information
concerning the military end-use of the item(s). If you submit an attachment with your license
application, you must reference the attachment in the “additional information” section of the application.’ The particularity of
section of the application or in an attachment to the application, you
treatment for China was also apparent in recent US policies, especially when compared to that applicable to other great powers. For
the VEU regime was explained as enabling a number of Chinese corporations to import
sensitive technology from the United States more easily.49 However, in reality the United States removed 159
Indian corporations from the ‘entity list’, but only offered VEU treatment to five China corporations, 50 even
instance,
though India conducted a nuclear test in 1998. Therefore, India was subject to far fewer US export constraints compared to China.
This explains why the US EIMMA to China dramatically dropped, as illustrated in Figure 1. Potential US Exports to China China
has a great demand for high-tech products from the United States and holds substantial and
sufficient foreign exchange reserves. If the United States were to liberalize its export constraints
against China, the country’s imports of dual-use products from the United States would
significantly rise, leading to an increment in the weight of EIMMA and a decline in the weight of EILMA. Our calculation
enables us to estimate the potential growth in exports, and how much the US–China trade deficit would be reduced if the United
States were to liberalize its export constraints against China. The estimations are carried out in two ways. The first analyses the
differences between US weights of EIMMA to China and to other countries. The second compares the US weight of EIMMA to China
in 1998 with that in more recent years. The first analysis explores the potential for US exports if the United States were to treat
China the same as other countries. The second type of analysis is useful for understanding the level of exports the United States
could achieve if it reverted to its export pace during the 1990s. The estimate results are shown in Table 3. According to average
2004–2009 data, if
the United States were to liberalize its export barriers against China to the same
level as those applicable to France, US exports to China would increase by $45.7–76.0 billion, at
a growth rate of 82.71–137.59%, thereby narrowing the US–Sino trade deficit by 20.28–33.74%.
Similarly, should the US adjust its export barriers against China according to those applicable to Brazil, the increment of exports
would be $13.5–54.9 billion, a growth rate of 24.25–99.41%, narrowing the Sino–US trade deficit by 5.95–24.38%. At India’s level,
the increment of exports would be $12.0–31.5 billion, a growth rate of 21.74–56.94%, narrowing the Sino–US trade deficit by 5.33–
13.96%. And if the United States rolled back its export barriers against China to the 1998 level, its exports to China would increase by
$17.8–37.8 billion, at a growth rate of 32.23–68.45%, narrowing the deficit by 7.90–16.79%. In conclusion, the
US export
barriers against China amount not to ‘little more than a rounding error’ but to an outstandingly
huge volume of exports. The existing barriers have disordered the pattern of US exports by
significantly reducing the weight of dual-use products exported to China compared with that of
those to other countries, namely, France, Brazil, and India. Should the US government choose to export
more products to China, China would welcome such an export increase. Liberalizing US export
constraints against China would help to restore the normal, reasonable pre-1999 pattern, effectively promoting US
exports to China, and redress the high US–Sino trade deficit.
NEGATIVE
China DA
1NC Shell
US technology is key for Chinese militarization- Supercomputers
Clark 15 (Don Clark, Writer for The Wall Street Journal, “U.S. Agencies Block Technology Exports for
Supercomputer in China”, The Wall Street Journal, April 9th, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-agencies-blocktechnology-exports-for-supercomputer-in-china-1428561987)
U.S. officials are blocking technology exports to facilities in China associated with the world’s
fastest supercomputer, a blow to Intel Corp. and other hardware suppliers that adds to the list of tech tensions
between the two countries. Four technical centers in China associated with the massive computer known as
Tianhe-2 have been placed on a U.S. government list of entities determined to be acting contrary
to U.S. national security or foreign-policy interests. The system, which is powered by two kinds of Intel
microprocessor chips, and an earlier system called Tianhe-1A “are believed to be used in nuclear explosive
activities,” according to a notice dated Feb. 18 and posted by the U.S. Commerce Department. The Commerce
Department didn’t immediately respond to requests for comment. Intel was denied an export license late last fall
to supply more chips associated to Chinese supercomputer projects, Intel spokesman Chuck Mulloy said
Tuesday. China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, three of the centers, and Chinese computer maker Inspur Group
Co.—which helped build the machine—didn’t immediately respond to requests for comment. The National Supercomputing Center
in Guangzhou said it didn’t immediately have a comment. Intel’s Mr. Mulloy said the chip maker is in compliance with the law.
Designers of the Tianhe-2—or the Milky Way-2 in English—have said it is mostly used for scientific projects like genome research.
The blockage comes at a time when U.S. technology companies are grappling with Beijing’s
proposed new restrictions on their ability to do business in the vast Chinese market amid rising
concerns there over cybersecurity. The companies are protesting China’s new banking-technology procurement rules as
well as a proposed counterterrorism law that they say are overly invasive and involve handing over sensitive material. The Obama
administration has called on Beijing to hold back on those efforts. Supercomputers—room-sized systems that yoke together large
numbers of processor chips—are often used in weapons research, code breaking, weather forecasting and many scientific disciplines.
The U.S. has long dominated the field, which has become a symbol for national competitiveness in technology. The Tianhe-2 system
in 2013 vaulted to the top of a twice-yearly ranking of supercomputers, based on its performance on a series of standard computing
tests. The U.S. government action effectively blocks Intel and others from selling newer chips to update the system. They
must
seek an export license to sell technology to be used by the four Chinese sites. Such licenses are
“usually subject to a policy of denial,” according to the Commerce Department notice. Intel has dealt
with Inspur rather than directly with the Chinese centers, said Mr. Mulloy, the Intel spokesman. He said the company was
informed in August by the Commerce Department that an export license would be required to
supply chips associated with previously disclosed supercomputer projects associated with
Inspur. “Intel complied with the notification and applied for the license, which was denied,” Mr. Mulloy said. Despite the
potential use of supercomputers for military applications, governments have rarely applied export restrictions to the technology.
One potential reason is that most of components used in such systems are widely available around the world and their shipments
would be hard to stop.
China significantly lags behind the U.S. in chip design, though the government
has been bankrolling research to improve the capabilities of local chip makers. Horst Simon, a
supercomputer expert and deputy director of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, said the
U.S. restrictions in the long run will help Chinese chip makers and hurt U.S. companies. “The Chinese will be
more incentivized to develop their own technology, and U.S. manufacturers will be seen as less reliable and potentially not able to
satisfy foreign orders,” Mr. Simon said. The
U.S. government restrictions list national supercomputing
centers in the cities of Changsha, Guangzhou and Tianjin, as well as the National University of
Defense Technology in Changsha. News of the government restrictions was reported earlier by the website VR World.
Military modernization fuels aggression against Taiwan
Minnick 15 Wendell Minnick, B.S., M.A., is an author, commentator, journalist and Asia Bureau Chief for
Defense News, a Washington-based defense weekly newspaper, “White Paper Outlines China's Ambitions”, 4/27/15,
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/warfare/2015/05/26/china-us-pentagon-taiwan-reportsouth-east-sea-islands-reefs-s400-su35-missiles-satellite-space-deterrence/27957131//OF
The Chinese
government report does make it clear that the military is implementing
strategic guidelines of "active defense" in new maritime scenarios. "In line with the evolving
form of war and national security situation, the basic point for PMS [preparation for military struggle] will be placed on winning
informationized local wars, highlighting maritime military struggle and maritime PMS." The Chinese report states that the
maritime environment is now a critical security domain. "The traditional mentality that land outweighs sea
must be abandoned," it says. China will develop a "modern maritime military force structure
commensurate with its national security and development interests, safeguard its
national sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, protect the security of
strategic SLOCs [sea lines of communication] and overseas interests, and participate in international maritime
cooperation, so as to provide strategic support for building itself into a maritime power." Taiwan
appears doomed in both the Pentagon and Chinese report. The Chinese report states that " 'Taiwan
independence' separatist forces and their activities are still the biggest threat to the peaceful
development of cross-Straits relations … the root cause of instability has not yet been removed." The
Pentagon report indicates that the primary driver of Chinese military modernization is a
conflict over Taiwan. The self-ruled democratic island has resisted China's threats since the
end of the Chinese civil war in 1949. The report indicates that Taiwan's multiple military
variables to deter Chinese aggression are eroding. In the past, these have included China's inability to
project sufficient power across the Taiwan Strait, the Taiwan military's technological superiority and the inherent geographic
rewards of island defense.
China-Taiwan war draws in the US and goes nuclear
White 15 [Hugh, Professor Hugh White', Australian National University. National Interest staff
writer. 5/5/15, “Would America Risk a Nuclear War with China over Taiwan?”
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/would-america-risk-nuclear-war-china-over-taiwan12808//jweideman]
After a decade of relative harmony, tensions
between Beijing and Taipei are rising again. As Taiwan's leaders and voters
face big choices about their future relations with China, America must think carefully about its commitments to Taiwan. Would America be
willing go to war with China to prevent Taiwan being forcibly united with the mainland? J. Michael
Cole, responding in The National Interest to a recent op-ed of mine in Singapore's Straits Times, expresses a widely held assumption that it
would, and should. To many people it seems self-evident that America would honor the commitments enshrined in
the Taiwan Relations Act. But the TRA was passed in 1979, when China's GDP was 1/20th the size of America's, its place in the global
economy was miniscule, its navy and air force were negligible, and its prospects for progress depended completely on America's goodwill. So back then
a US-China conflict carried much bigger economic and military risks for China than for America. That made the TRA's commitments both highly
credible and very unlikely to be tested. Washington could safely assume that Beijing would back off to avoid a conflict in which China had so much
more to lose than America. Things are different today. China's economy is now so big and so central to global trade and capital flows that the
consequences of any disruption would be just as serious for America as for China. Militarily, America
can no longer expect a swift
and certain victory in a war over Taiwan. China's anti-access/area-denial capabilities would
preclude direct US intervention unless those capabilities had first been degraded by a sustained
and wide-ranging strike campaign against Chinese bases and forces.China would very likely respond
to such a campaign with attacks on US and allied bases throughout Asia. The US has no evident
means to cap the resulting escalation spiral, and no one could be sure it would stop below the
nuclear threshold. The possibility of nuclear attacks on US cities would have to be considered.
These new realities of power mean that today a US-China conflict would impose equal risks and
costs on both sides. And where costs and risks are equal, the advantage lies with those who have more at stake, and hence greater resolve.
China's leaders today seem to think they hold this advantage, and they are probably right. It is therefore a big mistake to keep
assuming, as many people seem to do, that China would be sure to back off before a crisis over
Taiwan became a conflict.
2NC UQ
US dual use technology suspended transfer of dual-use technology
towards China
Kan 14 (Shirley A. Kan, Specialist in Asian Security Affairs, “U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress,”
July 29, 2014, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=756603)
This CRS report, updated as warranted, discusses policy issues regarding military-to-military (mil-to-mil) contacts with the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) and provides a record of major contacts and crises since 1993.
The United States suspended
military contacts with China and imposed sanctions on arms sales in response to the Tiananmen
Crackdown in 1989. In 1993, the Clinton Administration reengaged with the top PRC leadership,
including China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Renewed military exchanges
with the PLA have not regained the closeness reached in the 1980s, when U.S.-PRC strategic
cooperation against the Soviet Union included U.S. arms sales to China. Improvements and
deteriorations in overall bilateral relations have affected military contacts, which were close in
1997-1998 and 2000, but marred by the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, mistaken NATO
bombing of a PRC embassy in 1999, the EP- 3 aircraft collision crisis in 2001, and aggressive
maritime confrontations (including in 2009).
2NC Link
Export Controls are crucial in ensuring that Taiwan can defend itself
against China
Stokes 6 (Mark-Director of the US-Taiwan Enterprise Foundation, “PREPARED
STATEMENT OF MARK A. STOKES, U.S. –China Commission hearing on China’s Military
Modernization and U.S. Export Controls,” US-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, 3/16/06, http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/06_03_16_17_stokes_0.pdf
In summary, the
PRC’s growing arsenal of increasingly accurate and lethal conventional ballistic and lack attack cruise
missiles is a central aspect of Beijing’s strategy against Taiwan and potential foreign intervening
forces. The intended strategic, economic, and military effects have proved ineffective in intimidating the people on Taiwan, or
their democratically elected leaders. Linkages between Taiwan’s own potential deployment of advanced surface-to- surface missiles
and Beijing’s growing deployment of offensive strike assets are clear. While it seems appropriate to many in the U.S. that Taiwan
should take decisive steps to undercut the coercive utility of the PRC’s ballistic missiles, taxpayers and voters on the island have the
right to determine how best to utilize their own resources in an increasingly constrained environment. They are the best qualified to
judge what their requirements are, in an atmosphere free from outside coercion. When able to transcend the irrationality that often
accompanies a democratic form of government, there
is a basic consensus regarding what Taiwan’s requires
for adequate self-defense within the context of Taiwan’s broader national interests. In addressing the U.S.’ role in
providing Taiwan with the necessary defense articles and services, including the ability to
counter the growing missile threat, I offer one consideration. Like Japan and other advanced economies, Taiwan
may be endowed with competitive advantages that could contribute to U.S. missile defense
development and other defense industrial programs. Greater defense industrial defense
cooperation between U.S. and Taiwan industry on defense programs, thus creating jobs and income for
domestic constituencies on both sides of the Pacific, may encourage greater expenditures on defense. Faced with
the downturn in its economic situation in 2001, the ROC has decided to shore up its defense industry as a
means to sustain economic growth while also ensuring a sufficient self-defense capability. In
order to create a more favorable environment for greater defense industrial cooperation, one
measure for your consideration is for U.S. government entities, such as the Department of Commerce, to assist
Taiwan’s government to further enhance its already existing export control system to better prevent
unauthorized third party transfers of the U.S. technology. Taiwan’s economic health may be as
important, if not more so, than its defense in ensuring the long term survival of its democracy
2NC Internal Link
Dual use technology is necessary for China to develop the military
capabilities to overtake the US
Hawkins 6 (William-Senior Fellow, U.S. Business and Industry Council, “Testimony of
William R. Hawkins,” US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 3/17/6,
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/06_03_16_17_hawkins.pdf)
The United States wants Boeing and other American aerospace firms to sell as much as possible to China’s civilian aviation, but what
Beijing really wants is military technology, which it is simply not prudent for Washington to allow. Sales of military
or “dual use” technology might amount to billions of dollars over some time period, but not on anything like the scale
needed to balance trade. For example, 2003 was a peak year for Russian arms sales to China, not just “dual use” technology, but
entire weapons systems including fighters, missiles and warships. But the total was only $5.1 billion.3 The transfer
knowledge from the sale of American technology to China would
of the
do more to narrow the military
capabilities gap than the trade gap. 3 Some individual companies might make a profit if restrictions were lifted, but if
they resulted in higher performance Chinese weapons, the cost that the U.S. economy would have to bear to offset Chinese gains
would likely be greater by orders of magnitude. For example, Toshiba Machine sold four nine-axis and four five-axis milling
machines to the Soviet Union in 1982-1984. The machines were used to make improved propellers for Soviet submarines which
made them quieter and harder to detect. Toshiba Marine rang up $17 million for the sales, but it cost the U.S. several billions of
dollars— some estimates have run to $10 billion or more, in an effort to regain the ability to track these improved Soviet
submarines.4 Private profit is not only a wholly inappropriate factor to weigh against national security, it is also an entirely
inadequate factor in even purely monetary terms. Beijing
is eager to convert its growing economic clout into
military power. The writings of Chinese military leaders and strategists are devoted to finding ways to
defeat the United States in war. In a paper delivered in September 2003 at a conference on the Chinese military
sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation and the U.S. Army War College, Jason Bruzdzinski
concluded from his survey of Chinese writings that “PLA [People’s Liberation Army] analysts
are carefully studying the
vulnerabilities of U.S. weapons, platforms and military systems...to develop operational methods
to counter technologically superior adversaries in a future war.”5 The Chinese know they must
close the technology gap in at least some areas if they are to prevail. To do so they will not only need to
“achieve a leap-forward style of development in defense and army modernization” as President Hu Jintao has put it, but acquire
and incorporate foreign technology into their projects. Beijing’s approach to building up its defense industry
through trade was set out in the mid-1990s. Among the principles stated by Shun Zhenhuan, a senior researcher at the State
Planning Commission, were to “win more foreign exchange” from commercial exports which could be used to buy advanced
technology; “boldly attract the investment of foreign capital”; and “develop substitutes for import products or analyze foreign
technology and master imported products as much as possible for reproduction and imitation.”6 China’s theft of intellectual
property is thus part of its national strategy and has reached what the office of the U.S. Trade Representative termed “epidemic”
proportions in its 57 page chapter on Chinese trade barriers released last year. 7 No
clear line can be drawn
between commercial and military technology in China, nor for that matter in any advanced
economy. The aerospace sector in China is entirely in stateowned enterprises. In 1999, Beijing established
ten new aviation corporations, splitting AVIC (Aviation Industry of China) into AVIC I and II, authorized to make investments and
act as holding companies under the direct supervision of the central government. Generally speaking, AVIC I focuses on large- and
medium-sized aircraft, both commercial and military; while AVIC II gives priority to smaller airframes, missiles and helicopters. At
the Zhuhai airshow, it was common to see tactical fighters and airliners, cruise missiles and business jets, helicopter gunships and
crop dusters, displayed side-by-side in company pavilions. But then the same could be said for Boeing in the United States, which
builds both fighters and airliners; or EADS in 4 Europe, which is the continent’s largest defense contractor and the builder of Airbus.
The supply chains for all these large aerospace firms includes firms which make products for
both civilian and military use. Indeed, the trend in recent years has been for defense contractors to use more “commercial
off the shelf” (COTS) items developed in the private sector. To a great extent, the worldwide diffusion of much of this knowledge is
inevitable due to the expansion of global commerce. However, there
are still elements that need to be curtailed,
means increased vigilance and
such as the enhancements often needed to “militarize” COTS products. This
monitoring is needed over both trade and investment. A narrowly defined munitions list is inadequate in a world of
increasing “dual use” technology.
2NC SCS Scenario
Export controls prevent China from achieving military advancements
– key to prevent aggression in the SCS
Mai 14 (Wenyi- Graduate of Gore Business School at Westminster College, “The U.S. High
Technology Export Control towards China,” Gore Business School, Westminster College,
4/19/14, http://content.lib.utah.edu/utils/getfile/collection/wc-ir/id/68/filename/69.pdf)
The causes behind the technology export control are diversified and complex. The Worldsystem Theory gives
a perfect theoretical explanation to the occurrence and development of this policy. In reality, this policy is a combination product of
military, political, and economic factors. Among these factors, military
security is always thought to serve as the
dominant cause, under which other factors are considered (Niu 2010). However, the continuously fast-paced economic
growth makes China the world’s second largest economic power. The competition between the U.S. and China directly increases the
number of economic conflicts in recent years and makes the economic factor play a more and more significant role in the U.S.
technology 10 trade control policy. In this section, three main factors of this policy will be discussed: military, political, and
economic causes. Theoretical Explanation – World-systems Theory The
World-systems theory introduced by Immanuel
theoretical support to the high-tech export restrictions. According to national strength,
industrial level, and social science level, Wallerstein addressed the inequality of the world and divided it into three classes. Core
countries are those that have sufficient high-skill labor and concentrate on the production of
capital-intensive commodities; periphery countries are those that have abundant cheap raw material and labor, and
Wallerstein offers
concentrate on the production of labor-intensive commodities; semiperiphery countries, just as their name implies, are those
between the core and periphery countries. Among the core countries, there is also a core called “hegemon,”
which has the actual dominant over the whole world. The country that becomes the world hegemon should satisfy several criteria:
maintains a core status over a long period of time, has a diversified and highly industrialized economy, and owns advanced
technology. The
hegemon has profound influences on other countries, while it is free from external
control. On the contrary, periphery countries are dominated by core countries. Semi-periphery countries are in between, which
influence periphery countries while under the control from core countries. However, this classification is not stable, and all kinds
of technological revolutions may cause the fluctuations of the national status. This is also why
core countries would choose to limit the technology exports to semiperiphery and periphery
countries to prevent them from threatening their core status. Wallerstein characterizes the contemporary
world as “American hegemony.” The U.S. is a typical core country with influential political, military, and economic power over
international affairs. For
the U.S., advanced technology is the most significant factor to maintain its
hegemony 11 status. To prevent the transformation of its technical advantage to periphery and
semi-periphery countries, the U.S. executes restrictions on high-tech exports. China is a semiperiphery country that has its own followers but also suffers from the developed countries’ control. For
China, technical improvement and education are the only two methods to help it edge into core countries.
While education is an internal factor, technology has some external characteristic, which makes it possible for China
to transfer advanced technology from core countries. Facing the severe restrictions of high-tech export to it,
the Chinese government keeps appealing to the U.S. to relax this policy and keeps increasing its research
and development input. Military Causes Trade policy is always inextricably related to national security.
However, the military relationship is usually thought to be the least developed section in Sino-US relationship. The military
causes behind the technology export control policy are combined by two aspects: China’s increasing
military power and the military-to-military relationship between the U.S. and China. The first factor
is China’s increasing military power. The military of China is known as “the People’s Liberation Army.” With an average of 11.8%
annual growth in military spending and China’s military modernization program, the PLA concentrates on military research and
modernizes at a fast speed (Lawrence 2012). After the U.S. and Russia, China is currently ranked the third in Global Firepower,
which is a widely accepted measurement criteria of national military power (globalfirepower. com 2014). For example, the invention
of unpiloted armedaircraft, the successful launches of ten spacecrafts, and the potential nuclear strength are all typical symbols of
Chinese military modernization. Aiming
at preventing China from becoming 12 a military threat to
America, restrictions on the exports of technology products are used to limit the military
development of China. The second factor is the intense military-to-military relationship between the
U.S. and China. For example, the U.S. intervention in the Taiwan issue has been a sensitive topic between Sino-U.S.
relationships since the establishment of China. In addition, the disputes between China and its neighboring countries over the
South China Sea and the East China Sea problem is also a threat for the stability of the U.S., which is also a
pacific-ring country (Lawrence 2012). China’s neighboring countries, Japan, Vietnam, and Malaysia, are all loyal
followers of the U.S. For the power balance around the Pacific Ocean and the interests of its followers, the
U.S. will not choose to support China and will never offer it any military equipment. Depending on
these two factors, the U.S. keeps holding the arm embargo policy towards China and implementing restrictions on
military-use goods export to it. As a significant part of technology exports, these restrictions
reduce the entire trade volume of technical products. (Hammer, Koopman, and Martinez 2009) The graph above
shows the composition of U.S. advanced technology products exported to China. It is easy to indicate that the share of military
goods, nuclear technology and weapons 13 is zero; the share of advanced materials, with its potential use in military, is also zero. In
addition, the composition of aerospace products decreased sharply from forty percent in the year 2002 to zero in the year 2008,
because of the increasing significance of aerospace technology in national security (Hammer, Koopman, and Martinez 2009). With
limit military functions, electronics, flexible manufacturing, and information make up the major components in the U.S. advanced
technology exports to China. Political Causes Using the Cold War as a turning point, the political factors behind the U.S. technology
control policy can be divided into two historical periods, in which the emphasis of Sino-U.S. relationship switched from hostility to
complex independence. Before the end of the Cold War, differences in political systems and opposite ideologies are dominant
political causes and laid the foundation of mistrust between America and China. This
absence of trust led America and
China into two contrary political and military blocs and directly caused the restrictions on hightechnology exports. The authoritarian system of the Communist Party in China is treated as a suppression of the masses’
willingness by the western countries, especially the U.S. that has comprehensive political liberty and multi-party democracy
(Lawrence 2012). However, from the other aspect, the Chinese government believed that capitalist countries kept seeking to shake
its political foundation of the Communist Party. So the Communist Party prevented the Chinese society from the “capitalist
influences”, especially ideological effects. The
mistrust in political sphere cut off all kinds of connection
between two countries, including the technology trade.
SCS conflict escalates and goes nuclear
Wittner 11 Lawrence S. Wittner is an Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of
New York, "Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?", 11/28/11,
www.huntingtonnews.net/14446//OF
While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars,
with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The
current deterioration of U.S. relations with
China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The
gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing
economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the
South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with
other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position
as a Pacific power.” But need
this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could.
the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S.
government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean
War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and
After all, both
Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear
weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then.
Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet
government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military
ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some
pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars
between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But
the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed
Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost
slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon”
in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own
nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously,
NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to
respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack
on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear
deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern
variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems
needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans
convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater
than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while
the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear
weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that
“victory” entail? A
nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10
million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation
poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be
reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft
by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter”
around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and
generating chaos and destruction.
Some other impact stuff
Turns heg/regional power
Colby 13 Elbridge Colby is a principal analyst at CNA, where he focuses on strategic and deterrence
issues, “Don't Sweat AirSea Battle”, 7/31/13, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/dont-sweat-airseabattle-8804?page=show//OF
A China that can undertake such military operations will also be a China that will be able to
mount a formidable—and in some cases dauntingly formidable—challenge to the military power of the
United States and its allies in the region. This is no coincidence, as China’s military modernization
programs are clearly designed, according to the U.S. government’s own assessment, to “counter third-party
[read: U.S.] intervention” in disputes it cares about. If the Chinese can achieve the military upper
hand over the United States in the Asia-Pacific, the U.S. network of alliances and partnerships—
and the regional order it has underwritten—would no longer count for much beyond ceremony in
military terms.
AT: EU exports now
AT: Impact D
Most probable scenario for nuclear war
CSIS 13 [Center for Strategic and international studies—working group report. 2013, "Nuclear
weapons and U.S.-China Relations: A way Forward"
csis.org/files/publication/130307_Colby_USChinaNuclear_Web.pdf//jweideman]
Considerations of U.S.-China nuclear relations would be a largely academic exercise without the serious risk of conflict and tension those relations
entail. Unfortunately,
the significant sources of tension and disagreement between the United
States and China could, in the worst case, lead to conflict because a number of these disputes
center on highly valued interests for Washington and Beijing and could be exacerbated by third
parties, by miscommunication and miscalculation, by domestic political pressures, and by the
perceived need to “save face.”10 Moreover, few of these dis- putes appear likely to be resolved definitively in the near term. Beyond
disputes, there is also the simple geopolitical reality of the rise of a new great power in the arena of a well-established status quo power. From time
immemorial, this reality has proved to be a source of tension and competi- tion among nations—and has often led to war. A
large-scale
conventional war between the United States and China would be incredibly dangerous and
destructive, and nuclear war between the two countries would be devastating for all involved. Even
though the likelihood of conventional war between the two nations is currently low—and the probability of nuclear war is even lower—the appallingly
high costs, dangers, and risks of a war demand that this risk be taken seriously and that steps be taken to render armed conflict more unlikely and less
dangerous. The fact that China and the United States could come to blows does not mean that any conflict would result in the use of nuclear weapons,
but it also does not mean that the use of nuclear weapons can be confidently ruled out, especially because even conflicts over apparently marginal issues
can—in ways that are not entirely predictable in advance—escalate into conflicts over core interests. For these reasons, perhaps the single most important task of American statecraft in the coming century will be managing China’s rise in a way that preserves peace while also defending important
U.S. interests.11 The following factors could threaten those objectives. Disputes ■ Taiwan. Taiwan
remains the single most
plausible and dangerous source of tension and conflict between the United States and China.
Beijing continues to be set on a policy to prevent Tai- wan’s independence, and the United States maintains the capability to come to Taiwan’s defense.12 Although tensions across the Taiwan Strait have subsided since both Taipei and Beijing embraced a policy of engagement in 2008, the
situation remains combustible, complicated by rapidly diverging cross-strait military
capabilities and persistent political disagreements.13 Moreover, for the foreseeable future Taiwan is the
contingency in which nuclear weapons would most likely become a major factor, because the fate of the
island is intertwined both with the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and the reliability of U.S. defense commit- ments in the Asia-Pacific
region.
Reject their defense- PRC military actions are impossible to predictempirics
Newmyer 6 (Jacqueline-Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and Intl. Affairs, Kennedy School
of Govt., Harvard, “Filling a Gap in Our Understanding of Chinese Strategy” US-China
Economic and Security Review Commission , 3/16/06,
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/06_03_16_17_newmyer_1.pdf)
The subject of Chinese military modernization encompasses not only technology or capabilities but
also behavior. If we focus solely on the weapons platforms and other kinds of hardware and software that the
People’s Republic of China (hereafter, “PRC” – or just “China”) is pursuing, or even on the size of the Chinese defense budget, then
we risk failing to anticipate what China will actually do with its new arsenal. The PRC’s behavior is a
function of China’s approach to strategy – its orientation to war and peace. If we want to know how China will act, we
should be asking, What strategic tradition or orientation lies behind the modernization of the
Chinese military? We might think that we know, but the conventional understandings are deficient in that
they fail to capture how China has actually behaved in the post-1949 period. On this grounds, we should not
be so confident that we can use the extant theories to understand how China will behave in the future.
I’m going to present an alternative theory of Chinese strategy – one that may be new to us but is actually very old for the Chinese. In
fact, it’s based on ancient philosophical principles – or a particular way of looking at the world and man’s place in it – that has
shaped Chinese politics through the ages. An approach that is derived from what I believe to be the Chinese understanding of
strategy casts strategy as a matter of aligning with dominant tendencies, or the propensity of things, as the French scholar François
Jullien has suggested. The Chinese term for this is shi, which figures prominently in Sun Zi’s Art of War. A
shi strategy
depends on the possession of an intelligence advantage designed to allow for catching enemies
off-guard through dramatic shifts in policy or sudden, crippling attacks. This might seem vague, but in fact it
differs from the prevailing perspectives on Chinese strategy with regard to the expectations it sets out for Chinese behavior. So let
me first turn to these other theories – by way of explaining what shi is not – and then I’ll say more about what shi is, how it has
worked in practice, and what this implies for US policy. Newmyer 2 A natural way to approach the question of strategy is to put
ourselves in Hu Jintao’s shoes and ask, What would we do? We have plenty of models about how states, including China, behave,
and these frameworks are built largely on our own experiences. Perhaps the most popular model for understanding the PRC today is
as a “rising power.” If we were in China’s shoes, we would choose policies that would serve our continued economic growth. As long
as we were rising (and had not yet “arrived”), we would seek to avoid conflict, though we might hedge by investing in a minimal
deterrent capacity, for instance, the military assets necessary to keep Taiwan from declaring independence or the US from
intervening in the event of such a declaration. (The Princeton scholar Aaron Friedberg describes this outlook and some variations on
it in his latest International Security article.) A second perspective starts from a different idea of what drives China’s strategy but
leads to the same conclusion about Chinese behavior. This increasingly influential perspective, associated with the work of Allen
Carlson and Taylor Fravel, is that fears of internal unrest will keep China’s rulers preoccupied at home, determined to avoid conflict
abroad in order to concentrate on putting the domestic house in order. But the record of China’s post-1949 behavior does not fit with
either model. If the first framework suggests that China
is sensitive to its relative power and will shrink from
confrontation with militarily superior states, then how do we explain the PRC’s aggression
against the US in Korea or against the Soviets at Zhenbao Island in 1969? Taking on superpowers hardly seems like the
product of a generic realist calculus. And the idea that China will not fight external wars while internal
unrest looms large does not square with the record of Chinese initiation of conflict in 1949-1950, when
Mao had yet to consolidate the Civil War victory, or in 1969, when China took on the Soviets at the height of the Cultural Revolution,
or in 1979, when Deng Xiaoping attacked Vietnam shortly after taking power – before he had necessarily consolidated his position.
In fact, Iain Johnston of Harvard once did a study showing that in
the post-World War II period, of major powers, the
Chinese were most likely to escalate in international crises. The Shi Strategic Framework So perhaps an
alternative theory would better capture how China has behaved in the last half-century. The shi theory of strategy has the virtue of
being an attempt to see the world in the way that the Chinese see it. Unlike our way of thinking about strategy as a matter of picking
a goal – for instance, in the above examples, peace – and then figuring out how to achieve it, the Chinese approach does not feature
such an overarching objective looming in the distance. Rather, acting
strategically in China means taking
actions that make sense in light of the predominant tendencies at any given moment.
So as trends seem to be going – either favorably or unfavorably for China – so goes Chinese strategy. Effectively,
again, this makes the Chinese capable of rapid shifts in alliances, diplomatic postures, and even
states of war or peace. And it militates toward being ready at the outset of hostilities to inflict a debilitating blow – as a
matter of exploiting the favorable propensity of things because if you are mindful propensity, by the time you fight, you should have
already won, as Sun Zi says. Newmyer 3 Where does this approach come from? Jullien traces the idea of shi to ancient Chinese
philosophy, which downplays men’s ability to master nature, holding that circumstances and events unfold inexorably according to a
sacred, virtually unfathomable order. And Jullien traces the first concrete application of the concept of “the propensity of things” to
the moment of China’s political founding at the end of the Warring States period (c. 220 BC), when a school of philosophers known
as the “Legalists” (even though their theory is tyrannical, not liberal) articulated how to confine subjects to the position of
supplicants – according to the propensity of the sovereign’s authority. Many of the texts now known as Chinese military classics,
including Sun Zi’s Art of War, date to this time and might be said to specify the mechanisms of rule in accordance with shi – from
extensive surveillance to the wielding of punishments and rewards in an awe-inspiring way to keep the population in line. China’s
first unifier, Qin Shi Huangdi, founder of the Qin Dynasty, is supposed to have exploited these techniques to consolidate control over
his own kingdom and then conquer the others. Emperor Qin and his successors were in the position of constantly deploying strategy
against their own people, so the application of shi as a strategic precept spans categories that Westerners usually divide into the
political on the one hand and the military on the other. This continuity means that the Chinese approach to external warfare features
practices perhaps most easily employed at home – for instance, intelligence, bribery and other methods of cooption, and the
targeting of leaders of hostile groups. It is not a coincidence that, among canonical works on strategy, Sun Zi’s Art of War and other
Chinese classics accord espionage and sabotage unusually prominent roles. In terms of operational hallmarks, then, the lynchpin of
the shi approach to strategy is superior information, an intelligence advantage. The PRC has to know, better than its rivals and
enemies, what the dominant trends are. So Chinese strategy should place a large emphasis on spying and depriving competitors of
equivalent information about itself – through concealment and deception. The evolving nature of China’s strategy means that we
cannot frame the PRC as either “status quo” or “revisionist” and leave it at that. The Chinese will be constantly revising their goals.
And this should resonate with readers of Sun Zi because, as François Jullien points out, the Art of War is about using intelligence to
figure out the propensity of things while keeping the enemy from doing the same. So let me just suggest how this applies in practice.
When we look at the record of Chinese behavior we should see 1) a willingness to make abrupts
shifts; 2) an emphasis on information dominance and deception; and 3) plans designed to
undermine enemies at the outset of hostilities. Does this capture the PRC’s history? I think the answer is “yes.” In
terms of shifting alliances and diplomatic postures, we can refer to the way that Mao entertained British and American overtures in
1949 only to take on the allied coalition in Korea. We could also consider Bandung in 1955, which appeared to be a charm offensive
aimed partly at India, though by 1962, China had secretly built a road near the Sino-Indian border and completed preparations for
war. Or, in very recent memory, we could observe how the Newmyer 4 Chinese have shifted from a militarized policy toward Taiwan
in the mid-1990s to, of late, a kind of sunshine policy involving courting Taiwanese opposition leaders. The emphasis on intelligence
superiority is difficult to find in the historical record because of the sensitive nature of the subject, but one way we can see it is in its
association with the third pillar of shi, undermining enemies at the outset of hostilities, because this requires keeping targets in the
dark about inimical intentions or modes of fighting. The Chinese have a record of initiating war by surprise – trying to undo the
enemy with an opening gambit that will ensure victory. (For an exploration of examples from Korea and Zhenbao Island to offshore
islands episodes, see my November 2005 Long-Term Strategy Project report on Chinese surprise attacks, “Regimes, Surprise
Attacks, and War Initiation,” and a subsequent workshop report on the same subject.) For the sake of time, let me just take a few
seconds on Korea now. Korea – and the disaster that befell coalition forces in late November 1950 – has been seen as an example of
American provocation or, at least, failure to heed a warning sent by the Chinese through the Indian ambassador on the eve of the
Chinese intervention. We now know that the Chinese planned for entering Korea much earlier than we had earlier believed. In fact,
the Chinese knew about Kim Il Sung’s intention to invade much earlier than we had previously known. And we now know that the
word Zhou used at his meeting with the Indian ambassador, where the threat was relayed, was a deliberately vague term. So what
happened in November 1950 looks less about American provocation and more about a Chinese effort to ensure success through
surprise – manipulating our expectations and concealing preparations for the ambush. Applications and Policy Implications How
ingrained is the shi approach to strategy? Maybe today the Chinese are becoming so wealthy or “free market”-ized that their strategic
orientation is changing. But maybe not. I don’t think we know. An important clue will be what the Chinese government thinks about
its position vis-à-vis its subjects. How domestically secure Beijing is is bound up with shi because, as I mentioned above, the shi
approach grows out of the Chinese regime. If Chinese elite politics continues to be a province of close monitoring of the population
and “surprise attacks” against key dissidents, then we should be attuned to the persistence of the shi approach abroad. The first
major policy
implication is that we should not base our attempts to influence China on
expectations based on linear projections from recent behavior. Rather, we should be humble and recognize
that our signals could be misread because we are dealing with a different kind of regime, or, at least,
depending on the persistence of shi, a regime with a different approach to strategy. The second policy implication is that the shi
approach creates an intelligence requirement for us to better understand – and, in particular at the classified level, investigate –
Chinese concealment and deception efforts. Newmyer 5 The
bottom line, in a word, is that attempting to see the world
through Beijing’s eyes suggests that what the PRC can do by virtue of its military capabilities and what it
has done in the recent past are not necessarily guides to what the PRC will do.
Ptx Link
PTX link
The plan’s a political lightning rod
Pennington 5/12 [Matthew, The associated press staff writier. 5/12/15, “Obama
administration urges approval of U.S.-China nuclear pact”
http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2015/05/12/obama-administration-urgesapproval-of-us-china-nuclear-pact/27198931///jweideman]
WASHINGTON — The
Obama administration on Tuesday urged senators to support a new 30-year
agreement with China on civilian nuclear cooperation but faced a barrage of concern from both
parties that Chinese companies are exporting sensitive technology to Iran and North Korea.
Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Countryman told the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that China's nonproliferation record has "improved
markedly" since the last agreement was signed in 1985, "though it can still do better." He said he could not confirm that Chinese firms have stopped
selling such technology. The current agreement expires at the end of the year. President Obama submitted the new agreement to lawmakers April 21 for
a period of review lasting 90 days when Congress is in session. If unopposed by legislation, the agreement goes into force. Frank Klotz, under secretary
for nuclear security at the Department of Energy, said the agreement will "enhance our ability to manage and mitigate the risk of China diverting
sensitive nuclear technology to its military programs or re-exporting it without U.S. permission." Republicans
and Democrats
acknowledged economic benefits for the U.S. nuclear industry from cooperation with China, but voiced wide-ranging concerns over
Beijing's sticking to its international obligations.
Plan is seen as a concession to China and is drawn into larger fights—
No XO
Gertz 13 [Bill Gertz is an American editor, columnist and reporter for The Washington Free
Beacon and The Washington Times. 9/18/13, “China Seeks Weaker Export Controls on Military
Equipment” http://freebeacon.com/national-security/china-seeks-weaker-export-controls-onmilitary-equipment///jweideman]
China has supplied the Obama administration with a detailed list of space, military, and defense
technology controls that it wants changed, and an interagency review is underway to meet some of Beijing’s demands, according
to U.S. officials. The Chinese government list of U.S. defense and dual-use civilian-military trade controls and policy changes was sent recently to the
Commerce Department in preparation for an upcoming meeting of the U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT). The request
includes lifting all sanctions imposed by Congress after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre; permitting transfers of 15 Black Hawk engines for
helicopters sold in the 1980s prior to those sanctions; and the lifting of U.S. sanctions on five Chinese companies involved in past illicit arms sales to
Iran, and other rogue states, according to officials familiar with internal reports. Other
controls Beijing wants eliminated as
part of the JCCT process include the removal of limits on commercial satellite cooperation and
exports; access to integrated circuit technology; permission to buy high performance computers; allowing transfers of deep water oil and gas
exploration equipment; the easing of civilian nuclear technology controls; and greater access to U.S. aerospace and electronics technology. Beijing
also wants the State Department’s arms export control list, known as the U.S. Munitions List,
downgraded and administered by the trade-oriented Commerce Department as part of its
Commerce Control List. The change would ease the export of sensitive defense technology to
China. “The administration has asked agencies to discuss what to give the Chinese” from the list, said one official close to the discussions.
Additionally, the Chinese list includes a request that the administration block a provision of the fiscal 2014 House appropriations bill that would restrict
exports of U.S. information technology to China. “I’m
surprised the administration would allow the Chinese
government to interfere with the operation of the American government,” said Rep. Frank Wolf
(R., Va.) in an interview. He added that China’s demand for the administration to change the appropriations bill was “very troubling.” Wolf is chairman
of the appropriations subcommittee for the Commerce Department that drafted the legislation. It was approved by the committee following concerns
that state-owned Chinese telecommunications companies, like Huawei Technologies and ZTE, are engaged in illicit cyber espionage against the United
States. The Chinese also asked the administration to allow the Commercial Aircraft Corp. of China (COMAC) to be named a “validated end-user,” status
that would permit easy exports of sensitive defense-related aircraft technology. COMAC is linked to China’s main military manufacturer, Aviation
Industries Corp. of China (AVIC) that produces fighters, nuclear-capable bombers, and 90 percent of the aviation weapon systems used by the Chinese
military. An AVIC subsidiary, China National Aero-Technology Import & Export Corp., was sanctioned by the U.S. government in 2008 for illicit arms
sales to Iran and Syria. A U.S. official said granting COMAC the validated end-user status would increase the risk that militarily significant U.S. aircraft
technology will boost China’s military buildup. The list of export control concessions sought by Beijing was produced by China’s Ministry of Commerce.
It will be presented formally during an upcoming meeting of the Joint Commission, to be held in Beijing in November or December. A spokeswoman
for the office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the agency that along with the Commerce Department is in charge of the U.S. side of the joint
commission, had no comment. Carol Guthrie, the spokeswoman, said no date has been set for the next commission meeting. The last joint commission
session was in December. John
Bolton, former undersecretary of state for international security, said he
opposes making concessions on export controls of high-technology trade with China. He noted
China’s failure to cooperate with the U.S. government request to return fugitive former National Security Agency
contractor Edward Snowden, who sought refuge first in Hong Kong before being granted asylum in Russia. “I would make no concessions to
China, and I would make it clear that this is a partial repayment for their refusal to hand over Snowden to us,” Bolton said in an email. “Neither China
nor Russia have felt any pain for their lack of cooperation, but it’s never too late to start.” William C. Triplett, former Republican counsel for the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, said giving in to Chinese demands to ease export controls would compound the administration’s recent mishandling of
Syria policy and assist China’s military buildup. “Granting anything on this list would cause total consternation in Tokyo, Manila, and Delhi,” Triplett
said. “And after the events of the past week, why would President Obama want to look weak to a Chinese communist leader who is a throw-back to the
Mao era?” he asked. China’s list asked that the administration remove sanctions on five Chinese entities that were involved in proliferation violations.
They include Poly Technologies, China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corp., Kunlun Bank, and Zhuhai Zhenrong. China also sought to gain
access to robotic fiber placement machines—technology restricted for export because they can be used to manufacture composite material used in
radar-evading stealth weapons. Commerce Department and USTR officials met last week in Beijing with Chinese counterparts for a mid-year review of
the joint commission. The U.S. delegation was led by Wendy Cutler, acting deputy U.S. Trade Representative, and Francisco Sanchez, undersecretary of
commerce for international trade. The officials discussed “strengthening the increasingly productive trade relationship” with China at the talks,
according to a Commerce Department press release. “The JCCT remains an important venue for us to address concrete trade and investment issues,
and we look forward to working on these issues with our Chinese counterparts in the weeks and months ahead,” Cutler said. Topics discussed in Beijing
included intellectual property rights, pharmaceuticals, government procurement, investment, services, industrial policies, regulatory obstacles, and
agriculture. The statement made no mention of China’s request to loosen U.S. export controls on defense and dual-use technology. The Chinese
government has been pressing the Obama administration to loosen its export
control policies on high-technology defense
and space goods, claiming China is unfairly treated by the trade restrictions. Sanctions imposed after the Tiananmen massacre, when Chinese
military forces were called in to disperse unarmed pro-democracy protesters from Beijing’s main square, cannot be lifted by the
administration and would require congressional action. However, the administration has sought to carry out a largescale loosening of export controls as part of a reform initiative launched two years ago. Last year, the administration notified
Congress that it was granting a high-technology arms export license to a Hong Kong satellite
company with Chinese ties. The license was opposed by congressional Republicans who
said it violated sanctions on Beijing. U.S. Ambassador to China Gary Locke announced earlier this year that the administration
planned to loosen export controls on nearly one-third of the 141 high-technology items sought by China that now require stringent national-security
export licensing. Critics
of the administration’s export control reform say the new policy will boost
China’s large-scale military buildup. There is no difference between civilian and military manufacturers in China. A joint State
Department-Pentagon report to Congress published in April warned that easing controls on U.S. satellite
exports “could significantly improve the military potential of another country,” believed to be a
reference to China. “Space assets provide important military and intelligence capabilities
ranging from strategic intelligence collection to improved tactical communications,” the report
said. “If they can succeed in acquiring the necessary and sufficient technology and expertise, it could translate into a significant enhancement of that
nation’s military.” In recent years, U.S. security agencies in charge of enforcing export controls have prosecuted numerous cases of Chinese nationals or
their surrogates for stealing or illicitly purchasing embargoed U.S. technology with military applications. Larry Wortzel, a former military intelligence
official, testified before the congressional U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission in July that Chinese economic espionage and cyber
theft has harmed U.S. national security. “China’s cyber espionage against the U.S. government and defense industrial bases poses a major threat to U.S.
military operations, the security and well-being of U.S. military personnel, the effectiveness of equipment, and readiness,” Wortzel said. “China’s cyber
espionage against U.S. commercial firms poses a significant threat to U.S. business interests and competiveness in key industries,” he added. According
to Wortzel, Chinese companies steal U.S. technology and data as a more cost effective way of avoiding investment and time in research and
development programs. “These thefts support national science and technology development plans that are centrally managed and directed by the PRC
government,” he said.
Causes controversy no matter what, and recency indicts don’t apply to
this card
Stone and Posey 4 [Benjamin, and Hugo. Staff writers for the National Defense Magazine.
September 2004. “U.S. Defense-Export Controls: Stuck in Cold War”
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2004/September/Pages/US_DefenseExport3439.aspx//jweideman]
The U.S. defense export-control establishment continues to be buffeted from all sides.
Depending on the critic du jour, U.S defense trade controls are either too weak and threaten U.S.
national security, or too heavy-handed and threaten U.S. economic interests. A multitude of supporting
arguments buttress these two core critiques: U.S. allies and friends will trade U.S.-developed advanced capabilities to countries that the United States
does not want to have access to the technology. Restricting U.S. defense trade will only encourage the development of indigenous capabilities, not tied
to U.S. maintenance or logistics. Restricting U.S. defense trade will only cede the field to competing European and Asian suppliers. This soon may be
highlighted, should the European Union elect to lift its 1989 ban on selling arms to China. This
is a double-edged argument,
feeding distrust of U.S. allies and friends. What remains curious is that these arguments have
remained fairly constant from the beginning of the Cold War to the post 9-11 era despite a
radically changing geo-political environment. The Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) led the
charge in controlling defense trade with Communist Bloc countries during the Cold War. In the post-Cold War era, Russia and most of the former
Warsaw Pact countries are full participants in the toothless successor organization, the Wassenaar Arrangement. The rationale for export controls in
the international community evolved from restricting trade with the Communist Bloc, via the CoCom, to contributing “to regional and international
security and stability, by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms, and dual-use goods and technologies”
according to the official Wassenaar website, www.wassenaar.org. While this agreement brought many of the members of the former Communist Bloc
into a multilateral relationship with the West (to the applause of free-traders), it unfortunately has no teeth. The “decision to transfer or deny transfer
of any item is the sole responsibility of each participating state,” the website said. This
encourages many in the U.S.
government to distrust the ability of the international community—particularly in Europe—to
adequately control defense exports to parties unfriendly to the United States.
Advantage Cp
1NC Space Mil CP
The United States federal government should do R&D for active
satellite self-defense mechanism, including; sensors, microsatellite
explosives, and low intensity laser.
That solves ASATS and space war
O’hanlon 5 [Michael, The brookings institution. November 1, 2005. “PRESERVING U.S.
DOMINANCE WHILE SLOWING THE WEAPONIZATION OF SPACE”
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/testimony/2005/11/01defenseohanlon/20051101.pdf//jweideman]
So a moderate and nuanced policy, rather than an absolutist or ideological one, is the right path
ahead for the country. But getting beyond broad ideological arguments and laying out concrete guidelines for the future requires a rather
detailed type of analysis. This testimony provides such an analysis, at least in preliminary form. Its main thrusts are that a policy of
3 slowing space weaponization now, while protecting key U.S. space assets and preserving U.S.
military space options for the future, should have the following key elements: „ The United States should
recognize that some of its military satellites and many of the commercial satellites on which its armed forces increasingly depend for communications
are already vulnerable, and quite likely to become more so. „ Accordingly, the
United States should explore, at the research
and development level for now, various active self-defense mechanisms for satellites. These will
of course require sensors for detecting and tracking possible threat satellites, such as
microsatellites carrying explosives or other devices for interfering with them. But they could also
entail short-range weapons, such as high-powered microwaves, lowintensity lasers, or
deployable microsatellites that could pursue and somehow neutralize the enemy microsat once
they reached it. Such self-defense weapons should not be deployed until concrete evidence shows that they are needed, however, since most
could be used not just defensively but offensively. That same consideration argues against appropriating large additional sums for such activities,
though modest increases may be in order.
2nc solvency
Detection sensors stop attacks
O’hanlon 5 [Michael, The brookings institution. November 1, 2005. “PRESERVING U.S.
DOMINANCE WHILE SLOWING THE WEAPONIZATION OF SPACE”
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/testimony/2005/11/01defenseohanlon/20051101.pdf//jweideman]
The United States needs to know if its satellites are under attack or likely to soon be under
attack, to the extent possible.2 Otherwise, evidence of attack may only occur as multiple simultaneous
satellite failures allow for no other real possibility. Such sensors can trigger shields or other protective measures to be
deployed against certain types of threats, such as jammers or lasers. They may allow for satellite maneuvers or other means of evading kinetic or
explosive attack, as discussed more below. For example, if
the enemy ASAT were in reasonably close proximity, it
might be defeated with high-energy but short-range microwaves by a device that would not
necessarily constitute a more general ASAT capability. But leaving aside the 7 possible responses, which are not urgently
needed at present, space awareness is important on multiple grounds and should be improved now. Some U.S. satellites, including Defense Support
Program early-warning assets and National Reconnaissance Office imaging satellites, already have some attack warning capability. But most U.S.
satellites apparently do not.3 The
U.S. space surveillance network can track the movements of larger
objects or boosters, and that may suffice for now against homing space mines. But at some
future date, satellites may need their own warning of approaching microsats. And low-altitude
satellites should soon have sensors that would alert them to artificial illumination by laser.
It’s the best preventative measure
O’hanlon 5 [Michael, The brookings institution. November 1, 2005. “PRESERVING U.S.
DOMINANCE WHILE SLOWING THE WEAPONIZATION OF SPACE”
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/testimony/2005/11/01defenseohanlon/20051101.pdf//jweideman]
Systems such as the Clinton administration’s midcourse defense could easily have capabilities against
low-altitude satellites, which move at roughly the altitudes and speeds characteristic of ballistic
missile warheads. Other missile defense concepts may have similar capacity. Notable is the
airborne laser, designed primarily for intercepting relatively short-range missiles in their boost
phase. Even though satellites would not be located in the upper atmosphere, where the airborne laser is intended to do its work, they are probably
no more difficult to reach with its beam than a burning rocket within the upper atmosphere. They would not be destroyed via the
same mechanism as a liquid-fueled ballistic missile, the intended target of the ABL, but in many cases could be damaged or destroyed by its
megawatt-class laser. The airborne laser is not quite as advanced as the Clinton midcourse system, but it could be capable of an intercept within several
years. 16 These
types of programs thus will provide real, if latent, ASAT capabilities rather soon.
That fact is not reason enough to cancel or curtail the programs. Missile defense is a sufficiently
worthwhile enterprise to justify the effort. LEO satellite trajectories are so similar to those of ballistic missiles—in fact, easier to
intercept, since they are more predictable—that a long-range midcourse missile defense system is in effect also
an ASAT by definition, at least within certain geographic constraints. But this fact is not necessarily a downside of
missile defense development. Because other means of countering enemy satellites—jamming
downlinks and uplinks, destroying ground stations, hiding U.S. military assets or making them
hard to track—are not foolproof, some ASAT backup may prove prudent in the future. The
possibility that the United States will someday need ASAT capability is great enough that missile
defense systems with potential ASAT applicability are useful to possess. At the same time, however, it is
strongly preferable that they not yet be provided all the capabilities needed for ASAT purposes, or tested against satellites. An approach of hedging
makes the most sense.
1NC Aerospace CP
The United States federal government should lift regulations on
commercial drones.
Solves aerospace exports
Beattie 15 [Victor, VOA news staff writers. 2/16/15, “US Unveils Proposed Guidelines for
Commercial Use of Drone Aircraft” http://www.voanews.com/content/us-aviation-agencyreleases-proposed-drone-rules/2645065.html//jweideman]
Although the new
regulations are still months or years away, the long-anticipated rules would open a new era in which small,
commercial drones less than 25-kilograms can perform tasks like crop monitoring and bridge and electrical tower inspections.
Operators of the drones, known as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), would have to pass a written proficiency test to obtain a special pilot certificate,
fly only during daylight hours, at speeds of 160 kilometers per hour or less, in airspace under 152 meters and remain in line-of-sight of the aircraft.
Users would have to be 17 years of age or older, their vehicles banned from flying over people and kept from the area around airports. News
organizations would still be barred from taking pictures from UAVs. The
latest version also does not allow companies,
like Amazon, to deliver packages using drones. However, with advances in technology, those
rules could be modified. Demand for drones is rising worldwide and the commercial
applications are enormous. Unmanned aerial vehicles can streamline costs, eliminate risky jobs and foster innovation. Todd Curtis,
founder of the Seattle-based AirSafe.com, said the proposed rules are a sensible first step. "The technology of drones is advancing at such a rapid rate
that, even if the FAA tried to the best of its ability put out regulations very quickly, they’d probably be superseded by the technology. So, having some
guidance now, even though it’s not official, will bring some kind of sensibility and some kind of limitations to what commercial people plan to do with
drones," said Curtis. Curtis thinks the use of drones for certain tasks will replace pilots using manned aircraft for the same jobs. " There
are the
obvious potential economic and non-economic benefits of having a system where you can have flights
conducted in ways that don’t put at risk any flight crew members. Now, certainly, if we stick to just the commercial
use of aircraft, there are a lot of commercial uses that are happening right now from agricultural crop dusting to doing aerial surveys of forests and
such, aerial surveys of pipelines and high power lines where you have piloted aircraft and pilots at risk. You can have a drone that’s as capable, or
perhaps even more capable, than one that has a person in it that’s going to be much smaller and potentially flying in ways that are much less
dangerous," said Curtis. FAA Administrator Michael Huerta said the federal agency will use public education campaigns and fines to enforce its new
rules once adopted. The FAA is still drafting rules for larger drones, and that process could take years. The use of so-called “micro-drones” by hobbyists
has also become popular in the United States. Vehicles of less than two-kilograms (1.9958 kg) have few restrictions. They must fly under 122 meters,
remain in line-of-sight and stay eight kilometers
from airports. As in so much of the aerospace industry, the
world has followed the lead of the U.S. and Europe. But, Curtis believes that when it comes to
drones, the situation will be different. "It’s a technology that is dispersed around the world. It’s a
capability that an individual could take up and use and learn it in short order. There is no need for a large
government or large corporate infrastructure to have one or several drones flying in a short period of time. So, anything that’s done in one country is
likely to have very little effect in other countries because the drones are made in many places, they’re used by many organizations and many
individuals. Most of them have no direct connection with their national government with respect to getting permission to fly or do whatever they wish.
So, certainly, the U.S. can lead when it comes to drone regulations and drone management, but their ability to affect other countries is somewhat
limited," said Curtis.
1NC Trade Deficit CP
The United States federal government should reverse the DOE’s
advise to American companies on allowing Chinese investment, and
approve all natural gas exports to China
The DOE advised business not to allow Chinese investment—The
counterplan causes nat gas exports that solve the advantage
Mcallister 15 [Edward, Reuters staff writer. May 14, 2015. “U.S. government discouraged
Chinese investment in LNG exports” http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/14/us-lng-chinaidUSKBN0NZ2F720150514//jweideman]
The U.S. Department of Energy has advised American companies not to allow Chinese
companies to invest in U.S. liquefied natural gas export projects, the head of one such venture told Reuters on
Thursday. The advice contributed to a lack of lucrative U.S. gas export deals with Chinese
companies, said Michael Smith, the chief executive of Freeport LNG. Some existing deals for liquefied
natural gas, or LNG, are worth billions of dollars. Smith said his privately owned company, which is building an LNG
export project on the Texas coast to supply customers in Asia starting in 2018, was encouraged during the federal approval process to avoid inviting
Chinese participation in case of a political backlash. "We were advised by the DOE to be careful who our customers were, because this is very political,"
he said, calling the prospect of Chinese interest in a major U.S. export project as "a political hot potato we couldn't take the risk on." The issue of
exporting U.S. LNG has revealed a sharp divide between energy companies that want to sell the U.S. commodity on world markets and consumes who
say it would push up prices at home. Each
LNG project is subject to a tough approval process by the Energy
Department, which weighs the impact that each project will have on the domestic gas market
and on the environment. The agency, contacted by Reuters, would not confirm or deny giving the advice, but said it has granted
approval to seven projects to export U.S. LNG globally, including to China. "The final destinations for LNG cargoes will be dependent upon commercial
arrangements and factors, and are only reported to the department after delivery," a department spokeswoman said in an email. Customers from across
the world have signed up to buy future shipments of U.S. LNG as a drilling boom causes a supply glut and pushes domestic prices far below global
levels. Some customers have taken equity stakes in the projects, the first of which is expected to start up later this year. However, despite forecasts of
growing gas demand in China, and U.S. projects expected to begin exporting to Asia beginning this year, no Chinese companies have signed up for U.S.
exports directly. (Some U.S. LNG will end up on Chinese shores, but only through secondary deals.) That is not because of a lack of interest. Freeport
has turned down potential Chinese customers, heeding the Energy Department's advice, Smith said. Attracting Chinese lenders would likely have
meant Chinese companies acquiring a stake in the export project, Smith said. Chinese equity in the project would almost certainly have led to exports to
China.
2nc- Demand
Yes Chinese demand
HSN 6/16 [Hellenics shipping news, global trade news agency. 6/16/15, “Asia’s LNG Buyers
Get Sweeter Deals” http://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/asias-lng-buyers-get-sweeterdeals///jweideman]
“Asian buyers are in a strong position to negotiate for further concessions,” said analysts at BMI Research in a
note. Increased gas exports from North America are set to add to supplies, bringing a new level
of competition to the market. The U.S. Energy Department has granted approvals to 10 projects to ship gas to countries that
don’t have free-trade agreements with the U.S., giving those exporters access to major markets such as China and
Japan. Four of them are under construction, and one is expected to begin exporting later this year. U.S. LNG exporters have said they would allow
buyers to resell cargoes in the spot market, giving them the opportunity to trade the gas. That contrasts with major producers such as Qatar, which
demand that gas be delivered to a specified location. U.S. LNG exports will be “structured very differently to conventional supply. It’s a different pricing
construct, but it also has more flexibility,
head of energy marketing and shipping.
less constraints and lower barriers to entry,” said Steve Hill, BG Group’s
Exports
UQ- Aerospace
Aerospace sector is strong
Murray 15 [Seb Murray
Editor at BusinessBecause. EU newspaper. Sunday 28th June 2015. “Aerospace MBA Programs
Take Flight As Sector Faces Skills Crunch” http://www.businessbecause.com/news/mbacareers/3337/aerospace-mba-programs-take-flight//jweideman]
The global aerospace industry is set for take-off. A boom in aviation, the introduction of
increasingly fuel efficient aircraft, and a falling oil price have combined to set the scene for years
of growth for the aviation business. The world’s biggest aircraft manufacturers have record orders. The International Air Transport
Association projects airlines to generate the strongest profit margins since the mid-1960s. And, meanwhile, the Space Foundation says the world’s
space economy is growing at 10% a year. “For the airline business, 2015 is turning out to be a positive year,” says Tony Tyler, chief executive officer at
IATA. “Since the tragic events of September 2001, the global airline industry has transformed itself with major gains in efficiency.” The strength of the
aerospace sector has spurred a significant increase in career opportunities. Dr Christophe Bénaroya, director of the Aerospace MBA at France’s
Toulouse Business School, says the recruitment market has been buoyant over the past two decades. The rapid growth of new markets such as China,
India and the Middle East are shaping and driving the aerospace industry. Growth
is also spurred by changes in technology,
manufacturing and new consumer expectations.
Growth set for dramatic recover, and its resilient—best methodology
FAA 14 [Federal aviation association. 2014. “FAA Aerospace Forecast Fiscal Years 2014-2034”
https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/apl/aviation_forecasts/aerospace
_forecasts/2014-2034/media/2014_FAA_Aerospace_Forecast.pdf//jweideman]
Developing forecasts of aviation demand and activity levels continues to be challenging as the
aviation industry evolves and prior relationships change. In times of amplified volatility, the
process is filled with uncertainty, particularly in the short-term. Once again, the U.S. aviation
industry has shown that the demand for air travel is resilient as it rebounds from its most recent
downward spiral caused by the Great Recession. As 2014 begins, lingering questions remain. Are the U.S. and global
economies on firm ground? Have the structural changes undertaken by the industry over the past 5 years revamped the industry from one of boom-tobust to one of sustainable profits? Has industry consolidation finished? The
FAA has developed a set of assumptions and
forecasts consistent with the emerging trends and structural changes currently taking place
within the aviation industry. The intent of these forecasts is to accurately predict future
demand; however, due to the large uncertainty of the operating environment, the variance around the forecasts is wider than it was in prior years.
The commercial aviation forecasts and assumptions are developed from econometric models
that explain and incorporate emerging trends for the different segments of the industry. In addition, the commercial aviation
forecasts are considered unconstrained in that they assume there will be sufficient infrastructure to handle the projected levels of activity. These
forecasts do not assume further contractions of the industry through bankruptcy, consolidation, or liquidation. They also do not assume any drastic
changes in federal government operations. The commercial aviation forecast methodology is a blended one. The starting point for developing the
commercial aviation forecasts (air carriers and regionals) is the future schedules published by airlines through Innovata. To generate the short-term
forecast (i.e., one year out) current monthly trends are used in conjunction with published monthly schedules to allow FAA forecasters to develop
monthly capacity and demand forecasts for both mainline and regional carriers for fiscal and calendar years 2014-15. The medium to long-term
forecasts (2015-2034) are based on the results of econometric models. The general aviation forecasts rely heavily on discussions with industry experts
conducted at industry meetings, including four Transportation Research Board (TRB) meetings of Business Aviation and Civil Helicopter
Subcommittees in May 2013 and January 2014 along with the results of the 2012 General Aviation and Part 135 Activity Survey. The
assumptions have been updated by FAA analysts to reflect more recent data and developing
trends, as well as further information from industry experts. The FAA also presents the draft
forecasts and assumptions to industry staff and aviation associations, who are asked to
comment on the reasonableness of the assumptions and forecasts. Their comments and/or suggestions have been
incorporated into the forecasts as appropriate. FAA Aerospace Forecast Fiscal Years 2014-2034 35 ECONOMIC FORECASTS For this year’s Aerospace
Forecast, the FAA is using economic forecasts developed by IHS Global Insight, Inc. to project domestic aviation demand. Furthermore, the FAA
uses world and individual country economic projections provided by IHS Global Insight, Inc. to forecast the demand for international aviation services.
Annual historical data and economic forecasts are presented in Tables 1 through 4. U.S. economic forecasts are presented on a U.S. government fiscal
year (October through September) basis, whereas international forecasts are presented on a calendar year basis. As the recovery is now approaching its
fifth year, the headwinds that have been faced by the economy appear to be diminishing. IHS Global
Insight expects the recovery
to begin to accelerate and the U.S. economy to grow faster than in the past few years. In the U.S.,
private sector debt levels have been coming down and public sector debt levels have stabilized. The housing market had its best performance since 2007
despite a rise in mortgage rates in the summer of 2013. The most recent data suggest a firming of the employment market. In the global economy, the
outlook for Europe is improving and recent data from China still points to a “soft” landing (e.g. GDP growth remaining above 7 percent).
Increasing
Herb 14 [Jeremy, Staff writer for The Hill. 01/02/14. “Study predicts 5 percent defense and
aerospace growth” http://thehill.com/policy/defense/194286-study-predicts-5-percentdefense-and-aerospace-growth//jweideman]
But the
overall defense and aerospace industry will still grow in 2014, thanks to boosted revenue
in the aerospace sector. “It is likely that 2014 will bring high single to double-digit levels of growth in
the commercial aerospace sub-sector, as experienced in 2012 and expected in 2013, given the dramatic
production forecasts of the aircraft manufacturers,” Deloitte says. The 2014 growth in the
commercial aerospace industry is being driven by record-setting production levels, due to the
accelerated replacement cycle of obsolete aircraft with newer fuel-efficient planes. The report predicts that by 2023, annual production levels in the
commercial aerospace industry will increase by 25 percent. The Deloitte report also cites increases in passenger demand in places like the Middle East
and the Asia-Pacific region. For the defense industry, the end of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan has driven defense budgets lower. The report says
that defense spending is increasing in several areas — the Middle East, China, India, Russia, South Korea, Brazil and Japan — but that isn’t
counteracting declines elsewhere. The
U.S. defense budget has a major impact on the global trends, as the
United States accounts for 39 percent of global defense spending. The Pentagon had $37 billion cut from its 2013
budget under sequestration. While the budget deal reached last month provided the Pentagon with $31 billion in sequester relief over the next two
years, the new Defense budget cap is still $30 billion lower than the Pentagon’s proposed 2014 budget.
UQ- AT: Deloitte ev
Deloitte concedes squo market strategies solve
Deloitte 14 [Deloitte is the largest professional services network in the world by revenue and
by the number of professionals. Deloitte provides audit, tax, consulting, enterprise risk and
financial advisory services with more than 200,000 professionals in over 150 countries. 2014.
“2015 Global aerospace and defense
industry outlook”
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/manufacturing/us-mfg-2015global-a-and-d-outlook.pdf//jweideman]
Secondly, in
order to maintain margins in a declining revenue environment, costs need to decrease.
Successful defense companies have already been anticipating defense budget cuts and have been
reducing staff, cutting overhead costs, and getting lean. They are accelerating the substitution of
process automation over more expensive labor, resulting in higher operating earnings per employee. Digital product
development and computer aided design have been a game changer by creating significant
efficiencies in the product development process. Lean manufacturing and six sigma initiatives
have significantly cut waste and inefficiency in the production process. It is expected these
initiatives and programs will accelerate in 2015 as companies manage their margins and
profitability in a declining revenue environment.
China Adv
US-Relations Thumpers
Cyberespionage, political tensions, and national security concerns
hamper US-China S&T trade
Suttmeier 14 (Richard P. Suttmeier, Dr. Richard P. Suttmeier is a Professor of Political Science, Emeritus, at
the University of Oregon. He has written widely on science and technology development issues in China, “Trends in
U.S.-China Science and Technology Cooperation: Collaborative Knowledge Production for the Twenty-First
Century?”, Research Report Prepared on Behalf of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
September 11, 2014, http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Trends%20in%20USChina%20Science%20and%20Technology%20Cooperation.pdf)
Technology Leakage and Security Concerns For the most part, the
government-to-government
relationship is not a conduit for the transfer of sensitive technologies, especially
technologies embedded in physical artifacts. The fact that the relationship does involve training
and visits to U.S. laboratories, however, ensures that knowledge transfers occur. U.S. concerns
over the course of the last decade about “deemed exports” and “human embodied” transfers of sensitive scientific
knowledge or technology have led technical agencies to put in place mechanisms to vet visiting
scientists and engineers. 74 Overall, however, the government-to-government relationship is much
less a conduit for technology transfer than commercial relations or academic channels.
Security concerns have become far more prevalent in the relationship now than in the past,
in large part due to various political tensions between the two countries and China’s rise as
a commercial and potential military competitor. Allegations of cyberespionage
activities made by both sides against the other further highlight the increasing prevalence of
information security issues. In particular, concerns over Chinese espionage and technology
acquisition strategies have led to greater wariness in the conduct of relations on the U.S. side in
the face of reports from several agencies that Chinese interests in scientific collaboration seem
to be targeted at specific fields and facilities where China hopes to enhance capabilities.75 A lessthan-transparent state secrecy legal environment on the Chinese side has led to limitations on
data sharing under certain protocols. This has led to U.S. frustrations over the conduct of field research in ways that
are inconsistent with the culture of scientific openness with which U.S. officials and investigators are familiar.76 As a further
sign of deepening security concerns on the Chinese side, the recently formed Central National
Security Commission has included science and technology as one of 11 areas for which state
security must be strengthened. 77 How this development will affect U.S.-China cooperation remains to be seen. From a
Chinese perspective, U.S. export controls and visa processes (though much improved) are also manifestations of a security
consciousness that is not always consistent with open scientific practices. A
recent controversy over the
prohibition of Chinese participation in the NASA Ames Research Center meeting
to discuss the findings from the Kepler interplanetary survey mission illustrates
this tension. 78 It has long been assumed by the U.S. side that Chinese intelligence agencies play a key role in identifying
technology acquisition targets, which are then shared with civilian S&T agencies as well as national security agencies.79 Since this
report is being prepared on an unclassified, open source basis, it is not possible to determine the extent to which such technology
acquisition targeting enters into the S&T relationship under the Agreement other than to note that several U.S.
agencies have
expressed concern during interviews with the author about what appears to be Chinese targeting
of selected laboratories and fields of study for cooperative activities.80 Several recent cases do illustrate
that S&T cooperation, as discussed further below, is not immune to espionage.81
Aff does not overcome S&T nationalism in dual-use tech transfernational security concerns
Suttmeier 14 (Richard P. Suttmeier, Dr. Richard P. Suttmeier is a Professor of Political Science, Emeritus, at
the University of Oregon. He has written widely on science and technology development issues in China, “Trends in
U.S.-China Science and Technology Cooperation: Collaborative Knowledge Production for the Twenty-First
Century?”, Research Report Prepared on Behalf of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
September 11, 2014, http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Trends%20in%20USChina%20Science%20and%20Technology%20Cooperation.pdf)
But while the stakes are rising, questions about the modalities of relationships in S&T are also becoming more complex. Research
and innovation today are frequently characterized by the shortened time between scientific
discovery and technological application. Scientific research is therefore seldom far from commercial application and
from the emergence of dual-use technologies having both commercial and military applications. Concerns among business
enterprises, universities, and governments for protecting proprietary knowledge, or
knowledge of relevance to national security, have been heightened. Thus, the winwin, positive-sum assumptions about cooperation in science have become
complicated by the fact that the development of commercial and national security applications
of new knowledge often introduce competitive pressures and the possibility of zero-sum
outcomes. National governments continue to adopt policies designed to capture value from
scientific and technological advances and enhance national capabilities for research and
innovation, even as they expand international cooperation. Both China and the United States
exhibit these tensions between "science and technology nationalism" and "science and
technology globalism"; the relationship between the countries is an especially rich case of
how these tensions are managed.
Alt Causes- Export Control
Alt causes to successful export control- the aff does not reverse
Chinese mindset
Goldman and Pollack 97 (Goldman, Charles A. and Jonathan D. Pollack. Engaging China In the
International Export Control Process: Options for U.S. Policy. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1997.
http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/DB197. Also available in print form.
Why has China
remained largely outside the export control process? First, China was long
excluded from this process. Its membership in export control regimes was not sought by the
United States or other powers. Second, there are questions of national sovereignty and of
nationalistic sensitivities; the Chinese remain very wary of actions or policy requirements
that appear intrusive in their own decision-making process and policy-making procedures.
Third, there is insufficient support within China to connect export control to China's
national security interests. Fourth, weapons exports (including some sensitive
weapons technologies) remain alluring to Chinese institutions and policymakers
for financial as well as geopolitical reasons. Chinese enterprises, for example, have explicit sanction to pursue hard
currency earnings, given that the state is no longer fully prepared to subsidize the activities of these organizations. The
increasingly difficult financial straits of the Chinese defense industries have compelled an export
orientation in both military and civilian goods. There has been a wide array of activities both in the military and
nonmilitary sector to enhance the attentiveness of Chinese enterprises to market forces. This has been very relevant to
the sales of arms in South Asia and the Middle East, given that the Chinese have seen clear
opportunities to sell and that states have been willing to buy. Fifth, there are also
geopolitical motives. The Chinese hope to secure credible political ties with states potentially
useful to their long-term interests, and more generally to keep China's options open at a very fluid
time in the international system. China's weapons exports are also related to internal political
factors. The so- called "Princelings"—the sons and daughters of senior Chinese leaders who dominated Chinese
national security policymaking in the early decades of Communist rule—wield substantial power in this area. The
offspring of these leaders have had extensive access to vital resources within the system. In the past, they have been able
to exercise a high degree of autonomy, both for personal financial gain as well as for the gain of the institutions that
they represent. Their activities have been subject to increasing restraint by senior leaders, so the
looming generational transition may exacerbate the kinds of export control
problems the United States has faced with China. It would nonetheless oversimplify matters if too
much significance is placed on this last factor alone. A comprehensive understanding must rest on the
full range of interests and factors shaping Chinese attitudes toward export control and the
People's Republic of China's (PRC's) past and future dispositions in this area.
Aff alone fails- must address Chinese policy barriers first
Goldman and Pollack 97 (Goldman, Charles A. and Jonathan D. Pollack. Engaging China In the
International Export Control Process: Options for U.S. Policy. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1997.
http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/DB197. Also available in print form
Earlier in the briefing, we
described four principal policy goals for the United States: (1) gaining
Chinese adherence and full participation in international agreements; (2) improving
the export control system in China; (3) gaining greater access to and transparency into
the Chinese military system, including military enterprises; and (4) improving the
enforcement of Chinese laws on Chinese enterprises. This chart links the strategies we have
identified to the primary policy goals. Although other linkages exist, we judge that the ones above are of primary importance. As the
chart makes clear, none of the strategy options by themselves can address all four policy goals.
Rather, a combination of strategy options is required to subsume all the policy goals. In
particular, it is necessary to combine high-level strategies with working-level strategies
to advance all four policy goals.
Inclusion of China in international agreement negotiations is a
prerequisite to the aff
Goldman and Pollack 97 (Goldman, Charles A. and Jonathan D. Pollack. Engaging China In the
International Export Control Process: Options for U.S. Policy. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1997.
http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/DB197. Also available in print form
The Chinese have been excluded from an important part of the international rule-making
process and denied a seat at the table in negotiating and working out multilateral agreements for
export controls. Although the United States has kept China informed about the Wassenaar discussions, the Chinese
have not been included formally in the Wassenaar Arrangement discussions. Because they have not had
much opportunity to interact with the other national teams, the Chinese have not contributed to joint statements
of principle or other measures that could elicit increased Chinese participation. In addition, the
technical sessions in multilateral agreement negotiations are frequently staffed by Defense Department officials, and these sessions
are a principal means by which the Defense Department builds professional relations with defense officials from other nations.
Since China has no seat at these negotiations, there is no opportunity to develop
fuller professional ties between the participants in the U.S. and Chinese defense systems.
U.S. restrictions on military contacts and policy discussions with China following the
Tiananmen Square incident have had a profound impact on China's participation
in international export control discussions. While the restrictions on military contact with
China may have been motivated by sound political reasons in response to events at Tiananmen,
these restrictions have hampered the development of the U.S.-China defense relationship as a
whole. Without the foundation of early, ongoing discussions, it is much more difficult to ensure subsequent compliance by China.
Other countries also have a clear role to play, especially in the domain of defense relations. The
process of developing working relationships in the defense area must necessarily
be a multilateral one, since China interacts with many countries in foreign and defense policy. U.S. actions
alone will not ensure successful policy outcomes.
Dual-use tech = Chinese militarization
Dual-tech transfer risks Chinese military modernization as China
integrates US tech for military purposes
OTA 85 (U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Energy Technology Transfer to China—A Technical
Memorandum, OTA-TM-ISC-30 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1985,
https://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk2/1985/8510/8510.PDF)
1. Diversions to Military Applications The
ultimate risk is that a future China that may be hostile to the
United States would benefit militarily as well as economically from certain energy-related
technologies transferred by the United States today. Concerns for Chinese military benefits are
associated with the transfer of "dual-use" technologies (some of the seismic, calibration, and computer
technologies used in energy development) and aspects of nuclear technology (discussed separately, in a later section).
China's current leadership appears committed to domestic economic reform and to opening itself lo foreign investment. China has
stated that it values cooperation with the United States as part of this process. It is, however, difficult if not impossible to predict
policy shifts that might occur a decade in the future. U.S. policymakers must therefore take into account the possibility that dramatic
shifts could occur, since under such circumstances we could regret the dual-use transfers we make today. We
know enough about the organization of Chinese R&D. and China's considerable science and
technology capabilities, not to be careless about dual-use transfers. Some Chinese scientists and
engineers who have studied in the United States will return to serve in China's military or their
know-how will benefit military development indirectly. Over the long run, it is impossible to
"compartmentalize" technologies in terms of their impacts on an economy. In the near term, however,
there are a number of factors that limit the military risks associated with civilian energy technology transfers to China. Many energy
technology transfers do not include sensitive dual-use items, and therefore do not directly pose problems for U.S. national security.
China's ability to apply such technologies is also limited by the slow pace of Chinese military modernization. In the intermediate
term, how- ever, China will be able to absorb increasingly sophisticated dual-use
technologies. Therefore, if economic modernization proceeds apace, over the longer term
China's growing technological expertise can be expected to make significant
contributions to its military. In theory, the U.S. export control system provides a
mechanism for constraining the transfer of sensitive technologies. The United States can
and does attach conditions on the transfer of dual-use equipment (leasing, operation by U.S. citizens) that limit the diffusion of
sensitive technologies to the military sector. Such controls are costly, not welcomed by the Chinese, and certainly do not completely
rule out the possibility of diversions. China can also obtain (and reportedly has in some instances) U.S.-manufactured dual-use
technologies in Hong Kong and third countries. Another possibility is that dual-use technologies transferred
to China might fall into the hands of unfriendly countries. But China today has little incentive to
transfer sensitive technologies to countries such as Vietnam or the U.S.S.R. because doing so would create security problems on its
own borders. In addition. U.S. firms set limits on retransfers through written contracts (which the Chinese seem to honor) and
through their option to forgo further transfers if violations occur. In the case of nuclear technology, there are
special problems (discussed below) surrounding retransfers to third countries related to the
potential spread of nuclear weapons.
Balance inevitable
Chinese growth makes trade balance inevitable
Jin and Li 7 [Mr. Jin is assistant professor of finance at the Harvard Business School. Mr. Li is
vice chairman of China Overseas-Educated Scholars Development Foundation and former CEO
of Bank of China International. 2007. “The U.S.-China Trade Deficit, Debunked”
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB117978452454310028//jweideman]
Is there another international conflict on America's horizon? Tension is steadily mounting
between the United States and China over trade issues. The U.S. trade deficit with China accounted for almost one-third
the record $765 billion U.S. trade deficit in 2006. Both sides agree that this large imbalance is unsustainable, but negotiations to reduce it are making
little progress -- putting pressure on the negotiators in Washington at this week's Strategic Economic Dialogue meetings. If not managed properly, the
trade imbalance could escalate into a trade war. But
is this conflict really necessary? The U.S. economy is healthy,
close to full employment and flexible. Over time, the U.S. will likely "grow out of the problem" of
trade deficits with China, as former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan put it. As China's
industrialization matures, its citizens will grow richer and domestic consumption will rise, thus
enabling the country to achieve better balanced growth.
China war defense
[note—read impact d from tpa file]
No risk of china war
Friedman 14 [Benjamin H. Friedman is a research fellow in Defense and Homeland Security
Studies at the Cato Institute. 2014. “Cut Away: The U.S. Military Still Deters China”
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/cut-away-us-military-still-deterschina//jweideman]
Their concern is
that Pentagon budget cuts and distractions in Europe and the Middle-East undermine the U.S.’s
ability or willingness to fight. So China might be emboldened to use its growing military for
territorial aggression. Those fears are misplaced. States on the receiving end of deterrent
threats historically pay little attention to what the threatening state did elsewhere; they focus on its
interests in their conflict and the military balance there. Because the United States and its Asian allies are not close
to losing their military advantages over China and have as much reason now to fight as ever,
U.S. defense cuts and foreign troubles do not endanger East Asia’s stability. “ U.S. defense cuts and foreign
Pundits, Congressional Republicans, and even allies have lately taken to worrying about U.S. military commitments in Asia.
troubles do not endanger East Asia’s stability.” The Obama administration wants to spend $521 billion on “national defense” in fiscal year 2015, along
with a supplemental request of $79 billion or so. If current spending caps remain the law, U.S. military spending, adjusting for inflation, will fall slightly
in 2016, making it about 15 percent lower than 2010, the peak of the recent buildup, and then begin gradually rising. Still, non-war 2016 Pentagon
spending would exceed U.S. Cold War averages and amount to roughly three times PLA spending, even adjusting for purchasing power differences. And
the United States will devote a much bigger share of its wealth to military power. Of course, total military spending reveals little about how combat
between states would go. That depends mainly on the geography of combat and capabilities of the forces that can deploy to the fight. Those
considerations show why the United States and its Asian allies will contain China for the
foreseeable future. While a comprehensive review of the U.S.-China balance of power is impossible here, several points are revealing.
First, in the most likely war scenarios, the United States and an ally would be defending a
coastline or island. Defending is easier than attacking, especially against invaders coming from the sea, as Chinese forces attacking Japan,
defended islands, or Taiwan must. Dug-in forces on shore can withstand air attack and brutalize the ships or aircraft carrying landing forces. Second,
any U.S.-China war would occur in domains of relative U.S. strength: the air, the sea, and even space. Even if
China manages to deploy ballistic or cruise missiles capable of hitting moving U.S. ships, the missiles’ accuracy will depend on the radars that are
vulnerable to jamming or direct attack. China has little prospect of gaining the ability to track and kill U.S. submarines, which can wreck havoc on the
PLA Navy. And in the South China Sea, Chinese fighter aircraft would exceed ranges where airborne warning and control aircraft could cue them,
unlike their U.S. rivals. Inexperience and institutional deficiencies slow China’s ability to close those gaps, whatever it’s spending. Breathless reports
notwithstanding, the Chinese defense industry still struggles to make stealth aircraft and precision-guided missiles. The PLA is still learning to operate
its sole aircraft carrier and to keep ballistic submarines at sea. The
PLA lacks combat experience and suffers from graft;
officer’s promotions and procurement awards often require kickbacks. Certainly the Pentagon has its own
acquisition problems, which is one reason why the Navy and Air Force have shrunk over decades in terms of ships and aircraft. But, at the same time,
gains in accuracy, surveillance capability and communications systems have made each platform more deadly and the whole force more capable. Today
the Pentagon is attempting to preserve these relative strengths. Planned cuts focus on personnel spending, while procurement and operational accounts
do relatively well over the next five years. Third, limits on U.S. force availability are often overstated. Hawks claim that
global responsibilities would leave only a portion of the U.S. military available for China. But war is unlikely to erupt without crisis that allows the
United States to move forces to the region, especially the aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, and fighter aircraft most relevant to Pacific
combat. And the war would be important enough to merit lessening forces elsewhere. China, meanwhile, has its own competing military concerns, such
as India. Fourth, U.S.
nuclear weapons go far to deter China. Even if Chinese leaders doubt that the
United States would risk nuclear war for an ally, the consequences of being wrong about that
quell aggression. And Chinese leaders still cannot be sure that their nuclear arsenal can
survive a U.S. first strike. Finally, there is little reason to assume China will become more
aggressive. Economic and demographic trends militate against China sustaining its rate of
military spending. And fear of major war, even a conventional one with a state like Japan, tempers China’s territorial
ambitions. In that, China follows other historically big powers, including the Soviet Union.
Naval blockades shuts down China
Zhang 14 [Xunchao Zhang ACYA & University of Sydney International Relations, International
Security and Arms Control, Foreign Policy Bachelor of International Relations. 11/14. “A
U.S.China War in Asia: Could America Win by Blockade?”
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/272481536_A_U.S.China_War_in_Asia_Could_Am
erica_Win_ by_Blockade//jweideman]
Is it viable for the United States to impose a naval blockade against China in a potential conflict?
That’s a critical question in the study of China’s maritime and energy strategies. China’s crude oil dependence is obviously
the key variable determining the success and failure of a blockade. Although China can produce
many of its vital goods, such as grain and coal, in 2013 China imported 64.5% of its crude oil
consumption. Oil-based liquid fuels, such as gasoline and diesel, are vital for vehicles. And an overwhelming proportion of
China’s crude oil imports—with the exception of imports from Russia and Kazakhstan—rely on seaborne
transportation. But China’s reliance on seaborne oil imports isn’t matched by its naval capability.
It doesn’t have overseas bases to support regular operations in distant regions. By contrast, the US Navy
not only possesses formidable ocean-going capabilities, but also quantitative and technological
advantages. That asymmetry between China’s high level of reliance on seaborne oil imports and
its low level of naval capability to protect those imports means the US Navy could successfully
interdict China’s seaborne oil trade. Although China’s concern about a US blockade is often mentioned, few studies have attempted
to provide a quantitative estimate of the consequence of a blockade. Using the inverse formula of energy intensity, drawing on statistics published by
British Petroleum and the US Energy Information Administration, I produced a preliminary estimate that
an energy blockade cutting
off all 87% of oil imports that came by sea (that is, rather than overland or by river) would cause a direct reduction of 6.6% to
the Chinese GDP (as measured by purchasing power parities), a figure equivalent to the size of the Australian economy. The indirect damage of a
blockade in terms of reducing commercial/industrial efficiency would likely be even more serious. Therefore, I
found a naval blockade
could produce economic devastation and consequently a viable strategy for the US in a conflict
with China.
Export Reform Fails
Repealing Export Controls is ineffective-lack of understanding of
PRC military-civilian relations
Cheng 10 (Dean- Senior Research Fellow at the Asian Studies Center as part of the Heritage
Foundation, “Export Controls and the Hard Case of China,” The Heritage Foundation, 12/10/10,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/12/export-controls-and-the-hard-case-ofchina)
One of the challenges of interacting with China is the opacity of its structures and organizations.
The interrelationship between the military and civilian industrial bases—which entities are associated or
linked to other entities—is poorly understood. Consequently, business relations with Chinese companies are
fraught with risk. A systematic effort to gather and make available more detailed information on
the organization and structure of China’s military-industrial complex would benefit both U.S.
industry and the government. This effort should pay special attention to businesses that are linked
to the military’s network of research institutions. Only with this information can U.S. businesses
engage Chinese corporations, while minimizing the risk of revealing key technologies and
procedures. Moreover, such information would be invaluable for other purposes, such as imposing
sanctions and monitoring technology and weapons transfers to pariah states. Many Chinese
companies, including state-owned enterprises, interact with unsavory regimes, such as those in Sudan and
Burma, but they often do so through a variety of fronts and subsidiaries. Sanction regimes can
only hope to affect commercial interactions by identifying these various relationships and,
ultimately, the decision makers. This suggests a need to expand the budget for the defense and
intelligence communities to undertake longer-term studies of both the Chinese militaryindustrial complex and its extensive ties to China’s enormous commercial sector. In the face of a
retrenching defense budget, it would be penny-wise, but pound-foolish, to reduce such longer-term analyses that are essential for
both commercial and security purposes.
Neg UQ—New regs solve Aerospace
New regs solve satellite export internals
BIS 14 [Beauaeu of industry and security, commerce department. May 13 2014. “Commerce
Department to License Export of Satellites; Move is Key Component of Export Control Reform
Initiative” https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/about-bis/newsroom/107-aboutbis/newsroom/press-releases/press-release-2014/678-commerce-dept-to-license-export-ofsatellites//jweideman]
WASHINGTON -- The
U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) today
published regulations that will fundamentally change the nature of U.S. export controls on most
commercial, scientific, and civil satellites and their parts and components. Together with a companion rule
issued by the Department of State, the action moves the items from Category XV of the State Department's
U.S. Munitions List (USML) to the Commerce Control List. "Today's action reflects the
cooperation that has made the President's Export Control Reform Initiative such an
extraordinary success story," said Under Secretary of Commerce Eric L. Hirschhorn. "For the many American
businesses that compete in this key technology sector, it means a stronger United States defense
industrial base, the ability to focus the government's limited resources on the technologies and destinations of greatest concern, an increase in
the competitiveness of the U.S. satellite industry, and a reduction in the licensing burden on U.S. exporters." The items moving to Commerce
jurisdiction include communications satellites that do not contain classified components, certain remote sensing satellites, spacecraft parts,
components, accessories, attachments, equipment, or systems that are not specifically identified in the revised category, and all radiation-hardened
microelectronic microcircuits. In many instances, the updated regulations also allow the commercial, scientific and civil satellites transferred to
Commerce jurisdiction to incorporate parts and components listed on the USML and remain under Commerce licensing authority. The changes to the
controls on radiation-hardened microelectronic microcircuits take effect 45 days after publication of the rule, while the remainder of the changes take
effect 180 days after publication. BACKGROUND BIS controls exports and reexports of commodities, technology, and software for reasons of national
security, missile technology, nuclear non-proliferation, chemical and biological weapons non-proliferation, crime control, regional stability, foreign
policy, and anti-terrorism.
Disproves the magnitude of the I/L
Ostrove 15 [Bill, Forecast international. 2/12/15, “Changing U.S. Export Laws Affect Satellite
Production Going Forward” http://blog.forecastinternational.com/wordpress/changing-u-sexport-laws-affect-satellite-production-going-forward///jweideman]
Over the past few years, there has been growing concern in some circles that export restrictions
have held U.S. manufacturers back. With the recent economic crisis and a push to increase American exports to revitalize the
manufacturing sector of the economy, International Traffic in Arms ( ITAR) restrictions have received renewed attention.
On January 3, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2013 was signed into law. The bill included a
provision to repeal the 1999 law that placed U.S. satellites and spacecraft components on the munitions
list. The new law allows many spacecraft and components to be placed on the Commerce Control
List (CCL), which is managed by the pro-business Commerce Department rather than the Department of Defense, which is concerned with
military security. Restrictions still apply. For example, restrictions are still placed on satellite exports to countries like China, North Korea, and Iran.
However, waivers may be granted for China if a satellite is being exported there to be launched by a Chinese rocket. Export of hosted payloads and
other U.S. government furnished equipment will also remain restricted. The effect these rule changes will have on the global commercial
communications satellite industry is difficult to quantify. The Aerospace Industries Association trade group estimates that between 1999 and 2009,
trade restrictions cost U.S. companies $21 billion and 9,000 jobs. However, there are other factors that could have contributed to those figures. For
the changes will
likely make U.S. manufacturers more competitive globally, providing some relief to companies
such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin that have relied heavily on the U.S. government for sales. Other U.S.example, many European manufacturers can now compete with their U.S. counterparts on price and technology. In any case,
based satellite manufacturers like Space Systems/Loral and ATK Orbital will also benefit. The new rules could also increase pressure on European
manufacturers, such as Airbus Defence & Space and Thales Alenia Space.
Neg AT: space coop I/L
Zero solvency—space coop with china is illegal for a bunch of other
reasons
David 13 [Leonard David, SPACE.com's Space Insider Columnist | December 13, 2013.
“Under a China Moon: The Politics of Cooperation in Space” http://www.space.com/23965china-moon-rover-landing-cooperation.html//jweideman]
As reported by Marcia Smith, founder and editor of SpacePolicyOnline.com, Wolf
is one of Congress' strongest critics of the
Chinese government. The legislator included a provision in law prohibiting NASA and the White
House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) from spending any appropriated
funds on anything related to space cooperation with China. By public law, neither NASA nor
OSTP may "develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement or execute a bilateral policy, program,
order or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate or coordinate bilaterally in any way
with China or any Chinese-owned company," including "the hosting of official Chinese visitors at facilities belonging to or
utilized by NASA." The only exceptions are if the activity is specifically authorized by Congress or NASA, or if OSTP certifies to Congress 14 days in
advance that the activity will not result in the transfer of "technology, data or other information with national security or economic security
implications to China or a Chinese-owned company," Smith posted on the website. When asked how best to work with the Chinese, Clive Neal, a leading
lunar scientist at the University of Notre Dame's Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering and Earth Sciences, responded: "That's a tough
one." "I think that collaborations between U.S. and Chinese lunar scientists is OK, as long as no NASA grant money is expended, unless the rules have
recently changed," Neal told SPACE.com. "Passing along information in an open forum is also OK. However, after that, my knowledge gets a little
murky." But,
Neal said, one thing is clear: The "political wrangling is holding back both science and
exploration of the moon, and is frustrating quite a few voters here in the United States.”
Can’t happen even if they want it to
Morring 14 [Frank, Aviation Weekly. 1/16/14, “NASA, China Meet On Possible Cooperation”
http://aviationweek.com/space/nasa-china-meet-possible-cooperation//jweideman]
The law was drafted by Rep. Frank Wolf (R-Va.) on national security and human rights grounds.
But NASA has cooperated with China on space projects in the past, and Administrator Charles
Bolden visited China’s human-spaceflight launch site on an official tour that he was unable to
reciprocate after Wolf’s law was enacted as a provision of a NASA appropriations measure. “We are
looking for ways in time to find different ways we can be a partner to them,” Bolden said at the end of the heads-of-agency meeting. “Human spaceflight
is not something that’s going to happen with U.S. [and] China in the foreseeable future, because we
are forbidden from doing that
by law, so let’s just get that out there … That’s not going to change; not today, anyway.”
AT: Coop=norms
Coop can’t influence Chinese space norms
Cheng 14 [Dean Cheng
Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center. The Heritage foundation. “Prospects for U.S.China Space Cooperation” April 2014.
http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2014/04/prospects-for-us-china--spacecooperation//jweideman]
My name is Dean Cheng. I am the Senior Research Fellow for Chinese political and security affairs at The Heritage Foundation. The views I express in
this testimony are my own, and should not be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation. My
comments
today pertain to prospects for cooperation with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in outer
space. While the United States should not avoid cooperation with any country out of fear, at the same time, it is vital that cooperation
occur with full understanding and awareness of whom we are cooperating with, and that such
cooperation serve American interests. In the case of the PRC, the combination of an opaque
Chinese space management structure, a heavy military role in what has been observed, and an
asymmetric set of capabilities and interests raise fundamental questions about the potential
benefits from cooperation between the two countries in this vital arena. To this end, it is essential to recognize a
few key characteristics of China’s space program. First, that China possesses a significant space
capability in its own right, and therefore is not necessarily in need of cooperation with the
United States. Too often, there is an assumption that the PRC is still in the early stages of space
development, and that we are doing them a favor by cooperating with them. Second, that the
Chinese space program is closely tied to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), their
military. Therefore, any cooperation with the PRC in terms of space must mean interacting, at
some level, with the PLA. Third, that the Chinese space program has enjoyed high-level political
support, is a source of national pride, and is therefore not likely to be easily swayed or
influenced by the United States, or any other foreign actor. These three issues, in combination,
suggest that any effort at cooperation between the United States and the PRC will confront
serious obstacles, and entail significant risks.
China won’t cooperate
Cheng 14 [Dean Cheng
Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center. The Heritage foundation. “Prospects for U.S.China Space Cooperation” April 2014.
http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2014/04/prospects-for-us-china--spacecooperation//jweideman]
Within this context, then, the
prospects for meaningful cooperation with the PRC in the area of space
would seem to be extremely limited. China’s past experience of major high-technology
cooperative ventures (Sino–Soviet cooperation in the 1950s, U.S.–China cooperation in the
1980s until Tiananmen, and Sino–European space cooperation on the Galileo satellite program)
is an unhappy one, at best. The failure of the joint Russian–Chinese Phobos–Grunt mission is likely
seen in Beijing as further evidence that a “go-it-alone” approach is preferable. Nor is it clear that,
bureaucratically, there is significant interest from key players such as the PLA or the military
industrial complex in expanding cooperation.[10] Moreover, as long as China’s economy continues to expand, and the top
political leadership values space efforts, there is little prospect of a reduction in space expenditures—making international cooperation far less urgent
for the PRC than most other spacefaring states.
China won’t coop, will employ deception strategies and their selfinterest dooms diplomacy
Stone 13 [Christopher Stone is a former member of the National Space Society Board of
Directors. 2/25/13, “US cooperation with China in space: Some thoughts to consider for space
advocates and policy makers” http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2246/1//jweideman]
While many people seem to believe that the old strategic constructs of Thucydides of “security,
prestige and wealth,”23 don’t apply today in the 21st century, they need to listen only to the
words of the Chinese leadership. According to one report from DTRA in 2011, “Evidence of
this [technology ensuring global power and leadership] mentality can be found in the expression
Chinese scientists and engineers use to explain China’s sizable expenditures on its space
program—an investment intended to secure ‘a place for one’s mat’ or China’s rightful place
among spacefaring nations. For decades the sentiment behind this expression has proven remarkably enduring among the top echelons
of the Chinese Communist Party. In a widely quoted remark, Chinese Premier Wen Jaibao argued in a 2005 speech that ‘science and technology are the
decisive factors in the competition of comprehensive national strength.’”24
What is the reason for China’s apparent
denial25 of these goals for “comprehensive national strength” and “securing their rightful place”
in the global pecking order of space leadership? According to an American Enterprise Institute (AEI) analysis, “Beijing
seeks to constrict America’s presence, alliances, access and influence in Asia and to limit the autonomy of
Asian democracies.”26 The bottom line, according to the AEI analysts, is this: “ China is committed to a strategic deception
campaign that masks Beijing’s ambition to restore what its leaders see as their country’s rightful
place at the apex of an Asian and possibly a global hierarchy.”27 In short, there is more to China’s
space program than just the glory and prestige of exploring space or having the capability to
launch people into orbit. This is part of a grand strategy that seeks to not only lead the world in
science and technology but also prevent US diplomatic influence in the Asia-Pacific region and even globally in
various arenas, including economic development, national survival, as well as energy resources and control. In addition, it aids their goal of being able
to “disrupt U.S. access to intelligence, navigation and communications satellites”28 during conflict or crisis in the Asia-Pacific region as part of the
development of Chinese military space forces’ doctrine of “Assassin’s Mace”.29 In Chinese thinking, diplomacy becomes a crucial complement to both
economic development and national survival. As an example, an SAIC report notes, Chinese energy diplomacy aims, among several objectives, to
“protect China’s existing energy access to meet its growing demand for imported oil, to ease tensions in critical oil producing regions of the world… and
The Chinese,
according to their own words, are also looking beyond their gains and investments globally in
oil, rare earths, and the like, and aiming for cultivation of resources in space. Thus it is not surprising to see
to promote Chinese interests in other parts of the world to increase China’s [energy supplies] and foreign resource base.”30
space-based solar power and development of space resources addressed in white papers and reports from the Chinese Academy of Space Technology.
These national goals and ambitions, and the role of space, are done with the Chinese national
interests in mind, “regardless of the cost to other nations.”31 Both US sides (pro-China and anti-China cooperation) would presumably like to
see space exploration and space power benefits for the United States. However, caution is probably the best course of action given all the data collected
and presented in the media and the various reports. Because of these objectives, “it
is a sound assumption that China would
employ multiple means, including the possibility of strategic deception and perception
management, to help achieve these three basic national objectives-survival, development and
influence.”32 Put another way, as mentioned before, these are the three Thucydides concepts of security, prestige, and wealth. National power and
influence are still alive and well in the world and in space, and the United States and space advocacy groups alike would be wise to acknowledge this
and plan their space and energy strategies accordingly. As an SAIC report puts it, “it’s better to understand how the Chinese government does business
and pragmatically engage with it while maintaining a healthy skepticism.”33 When developing plans or statements of the supposed need to engage with
China, given other allied spacefaring states in the Asia-Pacific region like Japan and Australia, “U.S. representatives should have information about
Chinese strategic deception and perception management at their disposal”34 and in their minds.
AT: coop solves space mil
Coop fails—china is self interested and will coopt tech for military
purposes
Listner 14 [Michael J. Listner is an attorney and the founder and principal of Space Law and
Policy Solutions, a think tank and consultation firm that concentrates on legal and policy
matters relating to space security and development. July 2014. “Commentary | Two Perspectives
on U.S.-China Space Cooperation” http://spacenews.com/41256two-perspectives-on-us-chinaspace-cooperation///jweideman]
One definition of “cooperation” in terms of ecology is the beneficial but inessential interaction between two species in a community. Considering the
nature of geopolitics, this is an apt definition for “cooperation” between states and forms a good basis for analysis in particular when discussing outer
space cooperation between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. Utilizing this definition,
two questions arise: First, would outer space cooperation between the United States and China be
beneficial to the national security interests of the United States? Second, is outer space
cooperation with China essential to the national security interests of the United States? Not
surprisingly, national security is a focal point of the analysis given the inherent nature of states to consider their own interests before those of another,
especially given
that the United States and China are geopolitical competitors. When states,
including geopolitical competitors, cooperate, there is always an unspoken premise that aside
from the stated political goal each participant will have the unstated goals of reaping short- and
long-term benefits of resources belonging to the other. In terms of cooperation between China and
the United States, any stated goal of cooperation would implicate technology, intellectual
property, scientific methodologies and funding. Given this presupposition, does China possess an
advantage in any of these areas that would benefit the national security interests of the United
States in a partnership? The answer is to both questions is cumulatively no. China has made significant
strides in its space program, and its accomplishments follow in the footsteps of the outer space activities performed by the United States. China does
have the perception of momentum in its space program and uses current technology to facilitate its achievements, but it still lags behind.
Cooperation with China would reap no tangible benefits in terms of technology for the United
States and in fact would risk exposing outer space technology and methodologies that China
could appropriate under the guise of cooperation and incorporate into its own space and
military programs. There is precedent for this concern from China’s participation in the Galileo
satellite navigation system. China’s technical partnership with the European Union on the
Galileo project led to its application on China’s indigenous Beidou Phase 2 satellite navigation
system. The accuracy of the Beidou signal came as a surprise to its European partners as such accuracy was unlikely to be obtained without taking
shortcuts. Thus, what began as a cooperative effort between the European Union and China led to
China reaping the technological benefit with the resultant national security implications. Such
would be the case with a cooperative effort with the United States. Any effort would expose U.S.
technology, and it stands to reason that no matter what safeguards were put in place China
would acquire and benefit from that technology. Not only would the United States not benefit from a cooperative effort it
would also sacrifice its technological advantage and compromise its national security.
Space Mil Defense
No space weaponization and the impact is hyped
Deblois 3 [Bruce M. DeBlois is Director of Systems Integration at BAE SYSTEMS, Reston,
Virginia. He was formerly
Adjunct Senior Fellow for Science and Technology at the Council on Foreign Relations.
07/05/03 “The advent of space weapons” //jweideman]
SPACE POSES a unique challenge to policy makers, a realm in which spacefaring states face conflicting and contradictory interests both at home and
abroad. Many defense planners have viewed space as a military area of operations to be mastered and dominated. On the other hand, those involved
wide space-based applications such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and mapping, charting and geodesy (MC&G) perceive
important benefits from a multilateral, non-weaponized approach.
Space weaponization is most often die centerpiece of
discussions involving national and international space posture. The current debate on space
weaponization encompasses several broadly defined positions, from establishing a space sanctuary to a policy
of‘get-there-first’. The latter is based on the belief that because weaponization is inevitable, responsible and capable states should take the initiative to
control and dominate space. Those supporting space sanctuary policies reject the inevitable weaponization argument, and insist that establishing
unilateral hegemony in space would ultimately undermine national security by destabilizing the international environment. Polarizing the issue as
proponents of weapons and war, versus those who favor international peace, incites an emotional response and misdirects attention away from the real
issue: that is, what is the best approach toward international security in space? More specifically, can uv - as a community of responsible stales reasonably expect to form a secure international environment on the frontiers of space, without weapons available to those who would seek to secure
that environment? The purpose of this essay is to objectively articulate the best arguments on both sides of this issue, and to formulate a way forward
that is perhaps sub- optimal from die perspective of either camp, but a better alternative in die aggregate. Defining ‘Space Weaponization' and ‘Space
Militarization’ To
date, space has been militarized but not weaponized. The distinction is more than
semantic. For the purposes of this discussion, a space weapon is that which is built with
destructive intent to be used in a terrestrial-to-space, space-to-space or space-to-terrestrial
capacity. Logical sub-divisions still apply: (1) weapons of mass destruction (WMD) including chemical,
biological and nuclear weapons, and (2) conventional weapons including kinetic energy
weapons (KEW), chemical explosive weapons (CEW), and directed energy weapons (DEW). The
transition from space militarization to space weaponization is not an ‘all-or- nothing’ affair. As depicted in Figure 1, a continuum is defined on which to
judge the likely impact of possible military activities in space. Points along this continuum loosely relate the level of weapons’ deployment in space to
the level of threat any foreign perspective might recognize from such a deployment. A few themes are apparent in this depiction. First, ISR, MC&G
and space communications have
played an ever-growing military force enhancement role, but we have
lived with this for arguably 40 years, and there is a sense tliat everyone watching everyone from
an open skies world view is stabilizing and non-threatening. Hence the ISR, MC&G and communications force
enhancement elements are seen as a less provocative militarization of space but not as the more threatening weaponization of space. Second, unilateral
approaches to space weaponization are significantly more threatening than approaches that openly invite multilateral involvement. Third, terrestrial
basing is less provocative than the continuous threat posed by the omnipresence afforded by space basing. The current state of affairs reflects that space
is currently militarized - but not weapottized. The definitions here allow a concise and unambiguous summary of the current state of affairs and the
issue at hand, without being sidetracked with semantics. Globally, we are postured with communications and intelligence gathering capabilities diat
offer die possibility of everyone watching everyone - nurturing global stability (level 2 in Figure 1). These capabilities are used in military force
enhancement roles and are accurately referred to as space militarization, but
few would argue that these force
enhancement capabilities constitute space weapons. Few, if any, multi-lateral attempts at advanced terrestrial-to-space
weapons development (level 3) have occurred, and there may be latent terrestrial-to-space capable systems (level 4) such as airborne lasers, but they
are not dedicated ASAT systems, nor has dieir use as space weapons been exercised to any great extent. In fact, bodi Russia
and the United
States have opted in favor of restraint on ASAT deployment. So in these terms, the issue becomes clear: given that
space is currently militarized - but not uvaponized - should tve allow space iveaponization (either explicitly by collaborative and coordinated action, or
implicitly by inaction) to occur?
No China space militarization
Jianqun 6 [Teng Jianqun is director of the Research Department of the China Arms Control
and Disarmament Association. He served in the PLA Navy and Army for 25 years and retired as
a colonel in 1995. 2006. “Trends in China’s Space Program And the Prevention of Outer Space
Weaponization” //jweideman]
Based on the above review of China’s space program ambitions, we can, at the very least, draw
the following conclusions. The primary effort is in meeting the challenges in civilian research
and development. This contrasts with the early period of China’s nuclear energy development,
when the primary focus was on developing nuclear weapons. Under the different international security environment
today however, China is striving to develop its economy and build a harmonious and prosperous society, for which space technology applied in the
broader civilian sector will be a principal driver. In pursuit of its space aspirations, China is realizing the centuries-old dream of ‘flying into space’ to
show itself as a world power and to bolster national spirit. The
international environment China faces presently has
changed profoundly since the 1980s. ‘Peace and development’ have become the theme of the
times. China no longer faces the nuclear threats and blackmail it once did in the 1950s and 1960s. According to statistics from Indian scholars, from
its founding in 1949 to the 1980s, China has been threatened with use of nuclear weapons at least 40 times by certain powers, mainly the United States.
However, in recent ~68~ decades, without pressure to use outer space technology for military applications, major
space-faring nations
including the United States and the Soviet Union (later Russia) have begun to cooperate
extensively in space. Such collaboration, including satellite launches, is the inevitable outcome of
easing Cold War tensions. Over the past 20 years, the development of China’s space program has
coincided with the country’s reform and opening-up. In the mid-1980s, with potential threats such as invasion and
intervention by foreign military powers decreasing, China shifted its focus to economic development. This led to a fundamental change in China’s
military posture. Up to this point, China’s military had been readying itself for imminent war. The state of alertness in “preparing for an early war, a big
war, a nuclear war”, as advocated by Mao Zedong, was abandoned.2 Consequently, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) that had for decades been the
country’s top priority was downgraded to serving and yielding to the country’s comprehensive economic construction. Thus began the period of
development under which the guiding principle for the PLA would be restraint. This was reflected by full-scale disarmament. Between 1985 and 2005,
the PLA was reduced in size by 1.7 million. At the same time, China
has entered a stage of full economic liberalization
and development. Standards of living have risen significantly and China’s comprehensive national strength has noticeably improved. Such
a domestic environment suggests that China will not develop its space program in the same way
its nuclear program was developed under Mao and the first generation of leaders – through belt
tightening and military application. It is neither realistic nor necessary to commit limited space
resources to military purposes.