Julian Schofield TEXT OF GERSI G8 PFP Project As of Sep 23 2010
Decision-making time in South Asia is extremely abbreviated, given that it takes only four minutes for a missile to fly from Islamabad to New Delhi. The costs of nuclear war are expected to be substantial, even with the truncated arsenals of the region. An SAIC designed nuclear simulation of a counter-force Indo-Pakistan engagement using 50 kiloton warheads incurred 36 million casualties in India and 20 million in Pakistan. Another political simulation within the US-government reported serious local and international consequences from a 25 warhead detonation in the Punjab.
1
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the detonation of a warhead by a non-state actor relying on components and materials from an insecure South Asian weapons storage facility would have equally serious repercussions.
This chapter will examine the room for Canada’s role in engaging Pakistan in its five priority areas of the G8 Global Partnership Program, as well as explore additional venues that can achieve these goals with respect to Pakistan. The report begins by providing a strategic context to Pakistan’s arms control policies and objectives, and then examines the applicability of the five priority areas: nuclear submarine dismantlement, redirection of weapons scientists, nuclear and radiological security, chemical weapons destruction, biological non-proliferation, and an Incidents at Sea agreement. Of these, there is little prospect of a major cooperation program with Pakistan, but there is an opportunity for Canada to contribute to energy reactor safety and security as part of a broader international program. Canada can best engage Pakistan in agreements intended to promote the principles of the G8 Partnership for Peace in bilateral arrangements embedded in multilateral agreements. These agreements may be diffuse, and may even be directed at Pakistan if they are linked to programs with India or with economic or military programs for Pakistan. Pakistan has already been active as part of the Proliferation
Strategic Initiative as well as an adherent of Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004),and a number of complex bilateral arrangements with India. There are even prospects for a South
Asian variant of an Incidents at Sea Agreement.
Pakistan’s Diplomatic Strategy and Arms Control
Pakistan’s primary security concern is India. India and Pakistan suffer from conflicting principles of legitimacy.
2
Pakistan as the home of South Asian Muslims is undermined by India’s secular and inclusive constitution, which inhibits full mutual recognition. The Two-Nation principal as the basis for Pakistan fuels irredentism in India among Muslims and non-Muslim minorities. Pakistan is therefore apprehensive that India may take advantage of an opportunity and further break-up Pakistan as it did in 1971. Though Pakistan has favourable military odds on its immediate border with India, in a long-term conflict Pakistan is at a severe disadvantage because of India’s superior resources. In particular India has almost a decisive advantage in the strength of its air force and navy.
3
1
Robert Batcher, “Consequences of an Indo-Pakistani Nuclear War,” International Studies
Review Vol.6, No.4 (December 2004), 135-162; Vernie Liebl, “India and Pakistan: Competing
Nuclear Strategies and Doctrines,” Comparative Strategy , Vol.28, Issue 2 (April 2009), 154-163
2
Ziba Moshaver, Nuclear Weapons proliferation on the Indian Subcontinent (Houndmills:
MacMillan, 1981) p.177
3 Hasan-Akari Rizvi. “Pakistan’s Nuclear Testing” in Modern Asian Studies , Vol. 41, No. 6
(Nov. – Dec., 2001), pp. 943-955, 943; Zafar Iqbal Cheema, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Use Doctrine
1

Julian Schofield TEXT OF GERSI G8 PFP Project As of Sep 23 2010
As the smaller state, Pakistan’s strategic counterpoise has therefore been to restrain
India’s military growth by embedding it in international agreements. This approach has for the most part been unsuccessful, because India has resisted engaging in restrictive agreements, such as the 1967/1995 NPT (Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty). In fact, as part of the 1972 Indo-
Pakistan Simla Agreement, which terminated the outstanding issues remaining from the 1971
War, Pakistan conceded that it would attempt to resolve issues bilaterally rather than multilaterally with India. Furthermore, the diplomatic weakness of Pakistan’s spate of military governments, and India’s generally greater international prestige, has resulted in failures when
Pakistan has attempted to involve the international community in its disputes with India. The
1965 and 1971 Wars, and the Dras-Kargil conflict in 1999 have all reinforced Pakistan’s tendency to self-isolate. Pakistan’s relative successes against India, such as the 1965 Rann of
Kutch episode, the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, and the 2002 standoff, were largely the result of great power support, usually in the form of an assertive U.S. or China.
Another consequence of the 1972 Simla Agreement has been that third party involvement, either by an outside power or by international organisations such as the UN, have had difficulty mediating disputes between Pakistan and India as Delhi continues to seek to cement its regional hegemony.
4
During 1983-84 Pakistan President Zia ul-Haq alerted the U.S. that India was preparing to preventatively destroy Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure, to which
Pakistan threatened a response in kind.
5
This option was being openly considered in India because of the convergence of a number of factors: the 1979-80 induction of Jaguar nuclearcapable bombers into the IAF Indian Air Force (IAF), Pakistan’s acquisition of F-16 aircraft in
1981, and Israel’s demonstrative counter-proliferation attack on Osiraq that year in Iraq.
6
An
ADA (Air Defence Alert) mission was consequently organized by aircraft over Kahuta starting in March of 1985 from Chaklala (with F-16s doing night ADA). In December 1985, increased tensions from the reciprocal fear of counter-facility attack led India and Pakistan to an agreement not to strike at their respective nuclear production sites, and annually requires an exchange of a list of identified facilities.
7
Regardless, there followed in June of 1986 a strongly worded threat from the Soviet Union against Pakistan, as well as further threats of attack from India in 1986-
1987, but the agreement has remained in effect.
8
In October 1985 Pakistan and India also and Command and Comtrol,” in Peter Lavoy, Scott Sagan, and James Wirtz (eds),
Planning the
Unthinkable (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 158-181, 168
4
Nandini Patel, “India and the United Nations Organization, “ in Usha Thakkar and Mangesh
Kulkarni (eds.), India in World Affairs: Towards the 21 st
Century (Mumbai: Himalaya
Publishing House, 1999), 245-260; 4 Ali Ahmed, “Reviewing India’s Nuclear Doctrine,” IDSA
Policy Brief , New Delhi (Apr 24, 2009), 2
5
Waheguru Pal Singh Sindhu,
Evolution of India’s Nuclear Doctrine
(New Delhi: Centre for
Policy Research, Occasional Paper No.9, 2003-2004), 8; Ayesha Ray, “The Effects of Pakistan’s
Nuclear Weapons on Civil-Military Relations in India,” Strategic Studies Quarterly (Summer
2009), 13-71, 21
6
Waheguru Pal Singh Sindhu, Evolution of India’s Nuclear Doctrine (New Delhi: Centre for
Policy Research, Occasional Paper No.9, 2003-2004), 19
7
Ayesha Ray, “The Effects of Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons on Civil-Military Relations in
India,”
Strategic Studies Quarterly (Summer 2009), 13-71, 22
8 Shaheen Foundation, The Story of the Pakistan Air Force 1988-1998 (Islamabad: Oxford
University Press, 2000), 133
2

Julian Schofield TEXT OF GERSI G8 PFP Project As of Sep 23 2010 concluded a bilateral missile pre-notification pact.
9
Both treaties remain in effect, although an ancillary hotline agreement designed to avert misunderstandings during crises remained unused during the Dras-Kargil conflict in 1999.
10 India and Pakistan also have a long history of informal and semi-formal channels of negotiations, often through their foreign affairs academies and senior statesmen, though again, this channel was neglected during the Dras-Kargil episode.
Pakistan’s arms control strategy nevertheless reflects the impulse to engage and limit
India’s strategic flexibility. Pakistan’s testing moratoria after its detonations in 1998 is conditional on India’s, and is under substantial pressure because of the desire by both states to validate thermonuclear warheads.
11
Pakistan may resume testing if India’s offer of being accepted as a nuclear weapons state in the NPT in exchange for its accession, is accepted.
Mimicking India, Pakistan has refused to acceded to the NPT, the MTCR (Missile Technology
Control Regime), the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban treaty), or the FMCT (Fissile Material
Cut-off Treaty). Pakistan’s disagreement with the FMCT is further linked to China’s, which in turn links it to discussions over PAROS (Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space Treaty). It is widely believed that the US is seeking an FMCT to limit China’s nuclear arsenal, and China, which views US ballistic missile defense developments in space with apprehension, has linked the FMCT with PAROS.
12
One of China’s motives for its January 2007 anti-satellite test was to unstick this impasse.
13
This is problematic for the FMCT because both Indian and Pakistani compliance is unlikely without Beijing.
14
Furthermore, in the absence of a PAROS-like regime,
India and Pakistan may forge ahead with missile defense plans that may render their arsenals unstable because of their low force levels. In 2006, India’s AAD system conducted a successful endo-atmospheric test interception of a Prithvi ballistic missile. In 2007, India’s PAD system conducted a successful exo-atmospheric interception. When the US blocked the export of the
Israeli Arrow system, India explored the importation of Russia’s S-400 system, and entered into
9
Paul Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin,
Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security
Issues (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2009), 6
10
On evidence of the lack of utility of hotlines: Virginia Page Fortuna, “Scraps of Paper?
Agreements and the Durability of Peace,”
International Organization Vol.57, No.2 (Spring
2003), 337-372, 361, 363
11 Andrew Morgan, “The Development of India’s Nuclear Program,” Army Chemical Review
(Summer 2009), 32-34, 33
12
Siddharth Varadarajan, "Arms Control in a Unipolar World," The Hindu , May 31, 2006, http://www.hindu.com/2006/05/31/stories/2006053103781000.htm
, and Sharon Squassoni,
Andrew Demkee, and Jill Marie Parillo, "Banning Fissile Material Production for Nuclear
Weapons: Prospects for a Treaty (FMCT)," Congressional Research Service Report , July 6,
2006, cited in Sharad Joshi, Nuclear Proliferation and South Asia: Recent Trends , James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies August 2007.
13
Bates Gill and Martin Kleiber, "China's Space Odyssey," Foreign Affairs , May/June 2007, vol.
86, Issue 3, cited in Sharad Joshi, Nuclear Proliferation and South Asia: Recent Trends , James
Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies August 2007.
14
Hui Zhang, "FMCT and PAROS: A Chinese Perspective," INESAP Information Bulletin , Issue
20, August 2002, International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation, cited in Sharad Joshi, Nuclear Proliferation and South Asia: Recent Trends , James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies August 2007.
3

Julian Schofield TEXT OF GERSI G8 PFP Project As of Sep 23 2010 direct negotiations with the U.S. in February 2008. Consequently, Pakistan has shown an interest in the Chinese FT-2000A endo-atmospheric BMD (equivalent to the Soviet S-300).
15
In 2008, Pakistan President Ali Asif Zardari declared a no first use (NFU) nuclear policy against non-nuclear states, though retaining first use against a nuclear-armed state such as
India.
16
Pakistan is aware that India’s conditions for acceding to a total NFU are dependent on developments in China, so there is little prospect of Pakistan having to change its policy in the near term.
17
Consequently, Pakistan has proposed a NWFZ (nuclear weapons free zone) and a
Non-Aggression Pact with India, both of which would put India at a disadvantage with respect to
China. India also rejected the Non-Aggression Pact on the basis that this would limit its retaliatory right against Pakistan-sponsored Kashmiri militants.
18
In South Asia, there have been nearly 50 summits and high-level official meetings since partition.
19
Supplementing the official channels is a decade-old continuous second-track dialogue that involves former federal members from both capitals.
20 India and Pakistan have had a tradition of ‘managing’ their conflicts through ad hoc restraints and informal agreements.
21
During the Rann of Kutch conflict in 1965, the Pakistani Air Chief negotiated an agreement by phone with the Indian Air Chief not to use aircraft on the vulnerable infantry positions of either side. This agreement was tacitly extended to a moratorium on the use of aircraft and artillery bombardment on civilian populations, and it held with few exceptions during the 1965 and 1971 wars.
22
Even in the midst of conflict, India and Pakistan have effected agreements on regulating their interaction. For example, in 1990, the respective Directors of Military Operations had
15
Oliver Thranert and Christian Wagner, Pakistan as a Nuclear Power (Berlin: Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik, 2009), 27; Anupam Srivastava. “India's Growing Missile Ambitions:
Assessing the Technical and Strategic Dimensions” in
Asian Survey , Vol. 40, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr.,
2000), pp. 311-341, 325-7
16
Paul Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin,
Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security
Issues (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2009), 7; Zafar Iqbal Cheema, "The
Role of Nuclear Weapons in Pakistan's Defense Strategy," IPRI Journal , Islamabad Policy
Research Institute, Summer 2004, http://ipripak.org/journal/summer2004/therole.shtml
, cited in Sharad Joshi, Nuclear Proliferation and South Asia: Recent Trends , James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies August 2007.
17
Sukanta Acharya, "Security Dilemmas in Asia," International Studies, 44, 1 (2007), pp. 57-60
18 "India rejects 'no-war' pact plea," The Hindu , January 25, 2002, http://www.hinduonnet.com/2002/01/25/stories/2002012503140100.htm
, cited in Sharad Joshi,
Nuclear Proliferation and South Asia: Recent Trends , James Martin Center for Nonproliferation
Studies August 2007.
19
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 1999/2000 (London: Oxford
University Press, 2000), 221-233
20
Niaz Naik, Interview, 23 April 1999, Islamabad, Pakistan.
21 Zia Mian, “Renouncing the Nuclear Option,” in Samina Ahmed and David Cortright (eds.),
Pakistan and the Bomb – Public Opinion and Nuclear Options (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame, 1998): 62-63.
22 Sumit Ganguly, “Discord and Collaboration in Indo-Pakistani Relations,” in Kanti Bajpai and
Harish C. Shukul (eds.) Interpreting World Politics (New Delhi: Sage, 1995): 408-409.
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Julian Schofield TEXT OF GERSI G8 PFP Project As of Sep 23 2010 informally agreed not to use multi-barrel rocket artillery or heavy mortars on each other’s positions in Kashmir.
23
However, formal arms control agreements between India and Pakistan are particularly prone to exploitation. This is because they create incentives for cheating through escalation.
Current arms control agreements include the prior notification of military exercises, a hotline between the respective Directors of Military Operations, and a promise not to strike at known nuclear weapon sites (including an exchange of classified lists). Of these, the prior notification of military exercises was ignored by India during Brasstacks in 1987, which nearly escalated to war, and the hotline was deliberately left unused by both sides during the 1990 Crisis. In both cases, what were supposed to be confidence-building measures were used instead as brinkmanship devices. In the South Asian context, this ‘irrationality’ may correspond to clear abrogations of responsibility by the national government over the actions of subordinate commanders, thus disguising tactical gains as localized accidents. In 1971, an attempt by the
Indian and Pakistani Air Chiefs to curb mutual aerial incursions over each other’s territories failed for these reasons: pilots on both sides were permitted to circumvent flight restrictions with impunity. Consequently, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) established in 1983 has been virtually ineffective in initiating a dialogue between the countries of
South Asia.
24
While it sought cooperation in non-controversial socio-economic and cultural areas, India and Pakistan have refused to place any discussion of political and security conflicts on its agenda.
The management of exploitation can be viewed as a trade-off between providing too much space so as to avoid accidental encounters, and thereby surrendering territory, or, limiting exploitation by closing the gap with an opponent, and risking the likelihood of unintended escalation. Most early violations in Kashmir did not escalate precisely because the overwhelming number were caused by stray cattle, locals visiting relatives on the other side of the cease-fire line, and smuggling.
25
There was thus no deterrent incentive to react to violations. The Indians were however concerned that the Pakistanis would attempt to use these movements to consolidate territory. According to a UN study, India’s strategy was to ‘close the gap’ for errors, which was the principal cause of the gradual rise in incidents between 1954 and 1961. These incidents peaked during Pakistani infiltration attempts between 1963 and 1965.
26
23 Attar Chand, Pakistan Terrorism in Punjab and Kashmir (New Delhi: Amar Prakashan, 1991): vii; These informal agreements tend to supplement formal agreements that do not include
Kashmir. Formal agreements over Kashmir include the Karachi Agreement (1949) and the
Liaquat-Nehru Agreement that ended the second war scare of 1951. The Nehru-Noon Accord
(1958), the West-Pakistan Border Ground Rules (1960), and the Prior Notification of Border
Exercises (1966) were tacitly not extended to include Kashmir.
24
Mohan Kashikar, SAARC – Its Genesis, Development, and Prospects (Mumbai: Himalaya
Publishing House, 2000), 135-175; A. K. M. Abdus Sabur and Mohammad Humayun Kabir,
Conflict Management and Sub-Regional Co-Operation in ASEAN: Relevance for SAARC
(Dhaka: Academic Press, 2000), 50-76, 185-190; Ross Massoud Hussain, “SAARC 1985-1995:
A Review and Analysis of Progress,” in Eric Gonsalves and Nancy Jetly (eds.), The Dynamics of
South Asia — Regional Cooperation and SAARC (New Delhi: Sage, 1999), 21-39.
25
Pauline Dawson, The Peacekeepers of Kashmir – The UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (London: Hurst & Company, 1994): 80-1.
26
Bhupinder Singh, 1965 War (Patiala: B.C. Publishers, 1982): 2.
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Julian Schofield TEXT OF GERSI G8 PFP Project As of Sep 23 2010
Since at least the 1980s, this persisting ambiguity between accidental and deliberate action has been possible because both sides prefer to maintain the flexibility necessary for retaliation. It has led Pakistan to avoid a clear delineation of the LOC, and has led India to exploit the ambiguity of the CFL as specified in the Karachi Agreement, to encroach upon the
Siachen Glacier. In 1972, this also contributed to the Indian decision to remove the UN observers from its side of the Kashmir frontier. This has fostered a norm in which localised conflicts are viewed as both inevitable and legitimate, and in which informal arms control has taken the form of a tacit agreement not to permit any one incident to escalate too far. It is maintained in part by the fact that most of the action is conducted by static artillery and infantry units engaged in a war of attrition in which the capture of territory is very infrequent. Although respective conventional armed forces still face off, their main armoured strike corps are sufficiently withdrawn to minimise the risk of unintended border escalation.
27
Tacit local cooperation and agreements were a common feature between commanders along the Kashmir CFL in the 1950s and late 1960s, and probably had their origin in the ad hoc coordination conducted by British officers contracted in the sub-continent’s armed forces during the Kashmir conflict. Between 1965 and 1971, most border incidents were resolved by local commanders under the aegis of UNMOGIP. The United Nations Military Observer Group in
India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), stationed in Kashmir, is the only mission operating on disputed territory that separates two demonstrated nuclear weapons-capable powers. Through its network of observers, it can bring international attention to the danger of escalation in the region, assist local commanders in conflict prevention and resolve misunderstandings. Its mission has been to monitor and investigate violations of the CFL, and assist both parties in minimizing the likelihood of conflict. As a brake on escalation between two particularly crisis prone and nuclear weapons-capable powers, UNMOGIP has been one of the most cost-effective international missions ever established.
28
Pakistan is unlikely to sacrifice its long-term security interests for even significant short term assurances. The distinction is made because Pakistan’s experience of engagement with the
U.S. is that it has often been interrupted by changing political interests in Washington, and there is an expectation that eventually U.S. focus will shift elsewhere. Threatening Pakistan’s security directly can produce compliance, as in the case of the request by the Bush Administration through Richard Armitage for infrastructural and overflight access through Pakistan into
Afghanistan. But even then Pakistan remained reluctant to intervene aggressively in the FATA and PATA (Federally and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas). When Pakistan was most financially and militarily dependent on U.S. foreign and military aid, in the period from 1954 to
1962, four successive U.S. attempts at brokering peace between Afghanistan and Pakistan, including by then Vice President Richard Nixon, were rebuffed in 1953, 1954, 1955, and 1961.
27
— , The Story of the Pakistan Air Force—1988-1998—A Battle Against Odds (Karachi:
Shaheen Foundation, 2000), 105-134.
28 The annual cost of UNMOGIP in 1981 was US$6 million. See Pauline Dawson, The
Peacekeepers of Kashmir – The UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (London:
Hurst & Company, 1994), p.314; See also: ‘Overview of Fatalities by Missions – As of 31
December 1997’, Peacekeeping and International Relations , Vol.27, No.1, January/February
1998, p.19
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Julian Schofield TEXT OF GERSI G8 PFP Project As of Sep 23 2010
A fifth attempt, by U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in 1974, was also rejected.
29
However, in September 1986, Pakistan did cease Chinese nuclear cooperation in exchange for
US foreign aid, though this and commercial relations with the US were insufficient to maintain that control by the late 1980s. The U.S. subsequently cut all military and economic aid to
Pakistan when it became obvious that the Soviet threat was exceeded by the progress of
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, and this provoked a serious balance-of-payments crisis. Pakistan is to some extent more easily appeased when it has its commercial interests satisfied. Pakistan’s current cooperation with the U.S. is to some extent dependent on the fact that the U.S. is
Pakistan’s largest export market, especially for its textiles. This was also the case in the 1980s and influenced Pakistan’s to ensure that its nuclear weapons program remained opaque so as not to undermine US nonproliferation efforts elsewhere. Pakistan proceeded to its nuclear testing in
May of 1998 despite heavy dependence on International Monetary Fund (IMF) guided reforms.
30
Currently Pakistan is receiving US$500 million in aid per year, and this may triple to US$1.5 billion.
31
The US is also Pakistan’s largest creditor and export market. Pakistan-US trade was
US$5.6 billion in 2009.
32
The implication is that broader non proliferation initiatives applied against Pakistan will largely fail unless they entice Pakistani cooperation. Threats will push Pakistan closer to
China and Saudi Arabia. Physical adjacency with China and Iran make any exchange of technology and goods difficult to intercept. Rather, Pakistan’s cooperation will likely require substantial concessions in other issue areas, such as in commerce and market access, and to a great extent the US has engendered this reciprocity by affording Pakistan export access to its domestic textile market.
(1) Nuclear Submarine Dismantlement :
Unlike India, which possessed a Charlie SSGN, currently has at sea, undergoing trials, the Arihant SSBN, and anticipates leasing one or two Akula II SSNs from Russia, Pakistan does not possess any nuclear-powered submarine, and it is unlikely to do so in the near future.
Pakistan’s navy, which receives only 10 percent of the defense budget, is primarily focused on upgrading the KSEW (Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works), where it intends on building three new submarines (and is currently building four Chinese-designed frigates). Pakistan currently possesses only five conventionally powered submarines of the French Agosta class. In any case, were Pakistan to embark on a nuclear-powered submarine program, it would depend in large part on Chinese manufacturing assistance, since direct sale of missile-armed nuclear powered submarines is prohibited by international treaty (but leases are permissible if the vessel’s missiles have a range of less than 300 km). China certainly has some capacity (limited as compared with the U.S. and the Soviet Union), having built nine nuclear powered submarines: one Xia SSBN, two Jin SSBN, four Han SSN and two Shang SSN. Were Pakistan to consider a
29
M. Rafique Afzal, Pakistan History and Politics 1947-1971 , (Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2001), pp.253-254.
30 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 1998/1999 (London: Oxford
University Press, 1999), 225.
31 http://www.theroar.in/othernews/india-has-no-link-with-pak-afghan-transit-trade-qureshi/
32 AFP, “Make Trade Part of Pakistan Strategy: US Business,” March 24, 2009.
<http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hbha99ffWWimoYctlbsaz--juIgQ>
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Julian Schofield TEXT OF GERSI G8 PFP Project As of Sep 23 2010 nuclear submarine option, it may leapfrog on Chinese preferences for liquid metal-cooled rather than pressurised water-reactors, which may pose special decommissioning challenges.
33
But given the life expectancy of nuclear submarines, were Pakistan to manufacture one within the next decade, it may be mid-century before it is time for dismantlement.
(2) Redirection of Former Weapons Scientists :
Pakistan has its nuclear industry bifurcated between an IAEA-safeguarded establishment of energy reactors and its nuclear weapons complex, though there are significant overlaps in personnel. Both of these are undergoing rapid expansion and there is therefore no issue of excess underemployed scientists in Pakistan. Although Pakistan’s military relationship with China began in 1960, it was not until 1974, following the detonation of India’s PNE (Peaceful Nuclear
Explosive) that China began to provide nuclear assistance.
34 In terms of personnel development,
Pakistani physicists were trained in China in the 1970s, and Chinese nuclear scientists were allegedly working at Wah and Kahuta in 1985.
35
China has also provided training and assistance in the construction of three Khushab reactors, which provide Pakistan its warhead plutonium.
36
According to claims by AQ Khan, there were 1,200 engineers and scientists working at Kahuta
(out of 33,000 engineers from the 4.3 million Pakistanis with university degrees).
37
Given three organizations contributed to the nuclear weapons program: Khan Laboratories responsible for enrichment, plus the National Development Complex (NDC, including the Wah Group which worked on bomb assembly), and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), plus some
33 IISS, Military Balance 2009 (London: Routledge, 2009), 339, 341, 354, 383-384; David
Miller, Submarines of the World (St.Paul: MBI, 2002), 248-9, 340, 342-3, 360-2, 392-393, 406-7
34
Walter B. Wentz, Nuclear Proliferation , (Michigan, Univeristy Microfilms International,
1967), 137; Jonathan Pollack, “China and Asia’s Nuclear Future,” in Bridging the
Nonproliferation Divide, the United States and India , ed., Francine R. Frankel (New York,
University Press of America, 1995), 97-119, 107-112; Gordon G. Chang, Nuclear Showdown
North Korea Takes over the World , (New York, Random House, 2006), 126
35 Jeffrey T. Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea , (New York, W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), 343; George Quester,
The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation , (Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, 1979),
205
36
Joseph Cirincione, Deadly Arsenals , (Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 2002), 148-150, 207, 211-213; Jonathan Pollack, “China and Asia’s Nuclear Future,” in
Bridging the Nonproliferation Divide, the United States and India , ed., Francine R. Frankel
(New York, University Press of America, 1995), 97-119, 107-112; Dinshaw Mistry, “NATO
Expansion, Round Two: Making Matters Worse,”
Security Studies vol. 11, no.3 (Spring 2002),
91-122, 102; Bill Gertz, “Pakistan Deploys Chinese Missiles,” Washington Times , June 12,
1996; R. Jffrey Smith, “Report Cites China-Pakistan Missile Links,” Washington Post , June 13,
1996; Chaim Braun, Christopher F. Chyba, “Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Regime,”
International Security , vol. 29, no. 2, (Fall 2004), 5-49, 24
37 Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, 1979-99 (New
York: Palgrave, 2001), 113
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Julian Schofield TEXT OF GERSI G8 PFP Project As of Sep 23 2010 army engineer elements, the total may be a multiple of three or four times the Kahuta figure.
38
Bomb design, assembly and testing were the responsibility of the NDC and the PAEC, and not
Khan Laboratories.
39 There is therefore little prospect that Pakistan will cooperate with any program than seeks to decelerate or increase costs to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program.
The path to reducing the extent of nuclear training provided to Pakistan lies through
China. China’s goal was to counterbalance India in a measured way without provoking regional instability, and so it would provide just sufficient assistance to Pakistan until it could manage certain aspects of a nuclear weapons program on its own, without large scale direct transfers of technology.
One example of this was Pakistan’s attainment of boosted fission technology during its 1998 nuclear tests.
40
Other forms of assistance included sharing warhead designs in 1982-83, nuclear test data, sufficient enriched uranium for two warheads in 1983, triggering technology, warhead shaping furnace, plutonium technology, and ring magnets for centrifuges.
41
China has also provided a substantial amount of nuclear weapons-related assistance in the form of M-11 missile exports, plus laying the groundwork for a missile manufacturing plant in Pakistan.
42
When China was sanctioned by the U.S. in June 1991 for its M-11 transfer, it confirmed that it would abide by the technology transfer restrictions of the MTCR in 1992, but was again sanctioned in late-1992 and lifted again in 1994, 1998 and 2001 when it re-affirmed its commitment.
43
38
Interview of A.Q. Khan by book author (Islamabad: 28/02/94), cited in Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha,
Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, 1979-99
(New York: Palgrave, 2001), 67,
69, 186
39
Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha,
Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, 1979-99
(New
York: Palgrave, 2001), 187-188
40 Jason Ellis and Geoffrey Kiefer, Combating Proliferation (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2004), 37; Samina Ahmed, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning
Points and Nuclear Choices”
International Security , vol. 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999), 178-204, 199-
200.
41
Jeffrey T. Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea , (New York, W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), 343; Joseph Cirincione,
Deadly Arsenals , (Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), 148-150,
213; Jeffrey T. Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi
Germany to Iran and North Korea , (New York, W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), 342; Chaim
Braun, Christopher F. Chyba, “Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Regime,” International Security , vol. 29, no. 2, (Fall 2004), 5-49, 21; Samina
Ahmed, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices”
International Security , vol. 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999), 178-204, 187; Gordon G. Chang, Nuclear
Showdown North Korea Takes over the World , (New York, Random House, 2006), 127; T.V.
Paul, Power versus Prudence, Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons , (McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 2000), 189
42 Jonathan Pollack, “China and Asia’s Nuclear Future,” in
Bridging the Nonproliferation Divide, the United States and India , ed., Francine R. Frankel (New York, University Press of America,
1995), 97-119, 107-112; Joseph Cirincione, Deadly Arsenals , (Washington, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2002), 214-215
43 Joseph Cirincione, Deadly Arsenals , (Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 2002), 152; Dinshaw Mistry, “Beyond the MTCR: Building a Comprehensive Regime to
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Julian Schofield TEXT OF GERSI G8 PFP Project As of Sep 23 2010
This policy shift by China towards supporting non-proliferation was influenced in part by the threat of proliferation in East Asia that would adversely affect the Chinese deterrent, and
China’s shifting priorities towards stable trade relations with the U.S. and other major states pursuing non-proliferation. To mollify US concerns since the early 1990s, China pledged in 1996 not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in Pakistan, but there is substantial evidence that Chinese support continued into 2002.
44 The current conventional wisdom is that
China has indeed been compliant with the NPT, MTCR and NSG, though it remains a nonmember of the NSG and seems to not require the IAEA to safeguard facilities it helped build in
Pakistan.
45
In effect limiting Pakistan’s nuclear training is indirectly accessible through the influence of the major powers on China’s sharing of nuclear knowledge with Pakistan.
(3) Chemical Weapons Destruction :
There are no verifiable reports that Pakistan has ever engaged in the production of chemical weapons.
46
Nor is it likely that British stocks of Second World War chemical weapons that remained in Pakistan at the end of the war have remained usable (US stocks in British India were apparently dumped at sea). Pakistan has the manufacturing capacity to produce a range of chemicals from imports, which make it possible for it to produce chocking, blood, blister and nerve agents.
47
Although Pakistan is known to have domestic militant groups which have established limited chemical weapons laboratories, and even some individuals who have communicated with al Qaeda, Pakistan has applied comprehensive controls. According to a report from NTI, evidence acquired after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan revealed that two
Pakistani nuclear scientists, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Chaudhry Abdul Majeed, assisted
Contain Ballistic Missile Proliferation,”
International Security , vol. 27, no. 4 (Spring 2003), 119-
149, 122
44
Alexander H. Montgomery, “Ringing in Proliferation: How to Dismantle an Atomic Bomb
Network,”
International Security , Vol. 30, no. 2, (Fall 2005), 153-187, 171.
45
Gordon G. Chang, Nuclear Showdown North Korea Takes over the World , (New York,
Random House, 2006), 126; Shirley Kan, Zachary Davis, “China,” in
Nuclear Proliferation After the Cold War , Mitchell Reiss, Robert S. Litwak eds., 145-164, 146-147
46
India admitted to possession of chemical weapons in June 1997). Stephen Engelberg with
Michael R. Gordon, “India Seen as Key on Chemical Arms,”
New York Times , Jul. 10, 1989, cited in Charles C. Flowerree, “Current Chemical Weapons Proliferation,” in Trevor Findlay
(ed.), Chemical Weapon & Missile Proliferation – With Implications for the Asia/Pacific Region
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991): 12, 17. See E.J. Hogendoorn, “A Chemical Weapons
Atlas,”
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , vol.53 (September/October 1997). On Indian and
Pakistani chemical facilities inherited from the British, see the Bonn International Center for
Conversion (www.bicc.uni-bonn.de). Thom Shanker, “Lack of Candor Blocks Chemical Arms
Treaty,”
Chicago Tribune
, Apr. 4, 1989; Gary Thatcher, “The Paradox of Proliferation,”
Christian Science Monitor , December 13, 1988, 89; Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare – Vol II CB Weapons Today (New
York: Humanities Press, 1973): 244-245, 372, 375.
47 Prospects of Chemical Industry in Pakistan, Ministry of Industries & Production, Government of Pakistan, www.eac.gov.pk.
10

Julian Schofield TEXT OF GERSI G8 PFP Project As of Sep 23 2010 al Qaeda members with dispersal methods for chemical and biological agents.
48
Pakistani authorities furthermore dismantled a clandestine chemical laboratory operated by Lashkar-e-
Jhangvi in Karachi, possibly in preparation for a chemical attack.
49 These highlight the challenges facing non-proliferation policies in states undergoing rapid industrialization. In the specific case of Pakistan, it is indicative of the level of sophistication of its domestic terrorist groups. According to the NTI report, in 1999 Pakistan required all domestic chemical manufacturers to report their imports, and in 2000 a law was enacted prohibiting the development, production and use of chemical weapons in Pakistan.
50
These arrangements were made in accordance with Pakistan’s 1997 ratification of the 1997 CWC, which has since been followed up by OPCW inspections.
51
Pakistan has little incentive to manufacture chemical weapons given the superior power afforded by its nuclear arsenal. Also, given that it did not choose to manufacture chemical weapons in anticipation of or following any of its conflicts with India, or during the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, suggests that there is little military or civilian support for a chemical option. It is also unlikely Pakistan will export chemical weapons or their ingredients as part of a barter arrangement with a state that does intend to manufacture nuclear weapons. Furthermore, given the low feasibility of exporting large quantities of chemicals from Pakistan to beyond
South Asia, even the activities of non-state actors is unlikely to pose much of a threat. Canada can at best share detection and disposal skills with Pakistan, perhaps as part of a preventative policy against the smuggling out of Pakistan of chemical agents intended for unauthorized use elsewhere.
(4) Biological Non-Proliferation :
48
Douglas Franz and David Rohde, "A Nation Challenged: Biological Terror; 2 Pakistanis
Linked to Papers on Anthrax Weapons," New York Times, 28 November 2001, www.nytimes.com; B. Muralidhar Reddy, "Pakistan Denies Link Between Scientists and Al
Qaeda," Hindu, 29 November 2001, www.hinduonnet.com; Tom Walker, Stephen Grey, and
Nick Fielding, "Bin Laden's Camps Reveal Chemical Weapon Ambition," The Sunday Times, 25
November 2001, www.timesonline.co.uk. Cited in http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Pakistan/Chemical/index.html#fnB11
49
"Karachi labs hint at terrorists trying to acquire chem weapons," Press Trust of India , 19
September 2001; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 19 September 2001, www.lexis-nexis.com.
Cited in http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Pakistan/Chemical/index.html#fnB11
50
"Government to monitor toxic chemical use in Pakistan," Deutsche Presse-Agentur , 27
February 1999; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 27 February 1999, www.lexis-nexis.com
;
"Pakistan promulgates law against chemical weapons," Deutsche Presse-Agentur , 11 October
2000; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 11 October 2000, www.lexis-nexis.com. Cited in http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Pakistan/Chemical/index.html#fnB11
51 B. Muralidhar Reddy, "Chemical Weapons Inspectors Visit Plant in Pak.," Hindu, 1 May
2003; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 1 May 2003, www.lexis-nexis.com; "UN Chemical
Weapon Inspectors End Tour of Pakistani Fertilizer Plant," Financial Times Information, 20
June 2003; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 20 June 2003, www.lexis-nexis.com. Cited in http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Pakistan/Chemical/index.html#fnB11
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Julian Schofield TEXT OF GERSI G8 PFP Project As of Sep 23 2010
Pakistan has an emerging biotechnology industry, but there is no evidence that Pakistan has engaged in any official offensive biological weapons activities, nor is there evidence that non-state actors in Pakistan have done the same.
52 Pakistan ratified the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention in 1974.
53
Nevertheless, as part of a broad range of sanctions adopted by the U.S. in response to Pakistan’s May 1998 nuclear weapons tests, the U.S. sanctioned four organizations believed to have the potential to engage in biological weapons research: the Center for Advanced Molecular Biology (Lahore); Karachi CBW Research Institute (Karachi); Karachi
CW & BW Warfare R&D Laboratory (Karachi); and the National Institute of Biotechnology and
Genetic Engineering (Faisalabad).
54
It is however very unlikely that Pakistan would exploit biological weapons given its nuclear arsenal, the impact on relations with India, and the wideranging impact it would inflict on South Asian agriculture and ecology. There is therefore little prospect for involvement by Canada except in the provision of detection and cleaning knowledge in the event that a non-state actor embarked on such a project.
(5) Nuclear and Radiological Security :
There is widespread concern in the governments of developed states of the possibility of a terrorist, presumably Islamic, nuclear attack. There was a similar concern within the U.S. in the 1950s regarding possible infiltration of communist briefcase nuclear weapons. The focus on contemporary nuclear terrorism was taken up by the RAND corporation immediately after the end of the Cold War, and received additional impetus after the September 11 attacks in the U.S.
It was most recently a major concern at the April 2010 U.S. Nuclear Security Summit, attended by 46 state leaders. Pakistan is repeatedly raised as a key state of concern because of its burgeoning nuclear weapons complex, the indirect relationship between its various intelligence services and violent non-state groups, some of which Pakistan is now fighting, that Pakistan provoked the Dras-Kargil conflict under the cover of a nuclear deterrent, and that Pakistan was the host to AQ Khan, whose proliferation commerce posed a significant threat to Western security interests.
55
It is perhaps also less publicly stated that Pakistan is worrisome because it is an Islamic state prone to military takeovers, and very little is actually known of its nuclear facilities security. There is evidence that Pakistan continues to pose a state-state proliferation
52 http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Pakistan/Biological/index.html
. Cited in same:
Proliferation Threat and Response , January 2001. A contradictory viewpoint: Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks , Office of Technology Assessment website,
August 1993, archived at www.wws.princeton.edu/ ~ota/ ns20/ alpha_ f.html; Proliferation
Threat and Response, Office of the Secretary of Defense website, January 2001, www.fpc.state.gov/ c4729.htm.
53
http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Pakistan/Biological/index.html
54 "Rules and Regulations," Federal Register website, November 19, 1998, v. 63, 223, frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/ cgi-bin/ getdoc.cgi? dbname= 1998_ register& docid=fr19 no98-
18.pdf. Cited in ://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Pakistan/Biological/index.html
55 Seymour Hersh, “Defending the Arsenal – In an Unstable Pakistan, Can Nuclear Warheads be
Kept Safe,”
The New Yorker , Nov 16, 2009.
12

Julian Schofield TEXT OF GERSI G8 PFP Project As of Sep 23 2010 challenge. Pakistan allegedly discussed nuclear program options with Saudi Arabia in 2005.
Saudi officials toured Pakistan’s nuclear facilities, including Kahuta, and missile test areas.
56
Pakistan’s increase of its nuclear arsenal has continued unabated since 1998, and has received recent stimulus from Indian-U.S. nuclear material agreements, despite serious financial challenges.
57
Its 2008 estimated arsenal of nuclear warheads stood at between 70 to 90, out of a material capacity of 120. Pakistan’s nuclear materials, consisting primarily of uranium-235 (in contrast with India’s reliance on Pu-239), is drawn from the 1,300-1,500 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from its 10-20,000 Kahuta centrifuges (15k SWU/annum), which produces about 100 kg/year of weapons grade uranium.
58
This, at no more than 18kg per warhead, is sufficient to produce about 7 warheads per year.
59
Pakistan may have also produced some 500 kg plutonium from its 40-50 megawatt indigenously-built Khushab reactor that has been in operation since April 1998 under the auspices of the PAEC (Pakistan Atomic Energy
Commission) chairman Munir Ahmad Khan.
60 Plutonium from Khushab is processed at the New
Labs Reprocessing Plant near Islamabad, and in operation since 1981. One study estimates that
Pakistan has managed to assemble three to five plutonium warheads. The Pakistanis are building two more reactors at Khusab, which, when completed, will give it an ability to produce 50 warheads per year, a rate matching India.
61
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program has historically received important direction and assistance from China since 1974, including warhead designs,
56
"Saudi Arabia Working on a Secret Nuclear Program with Pakistan Help-Report," Forbes
Magazine , March 28, 2006, http://www.forbes.com/finance/feeds/afx/2006/03/28/afx2629000.html
. Cited in Sharad Joshi ,
Nuclear Proliferation and South Asia: Recent Trends , James Martin Center for Nonproliferation
Studies August 2007; Arnaud de Borchgrave, "Islamabad Trades Weapons Technology For Oil,"
The Washington Times , October 22, 2003, cited in Sharad Joshi , Nuclear Proliferation and South
Asia: Recent Trends , James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies August 2007.
57
Nina Koshy, “Maximizing Minimum Nuclear Deterrence,” Asia Times, June 4 2009; In contrast, this report argues that Paksitan had determined an optimal force level. Paul Kerr and
Mary Beth Nikitin,
Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues
(Washington,
D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2009), 4-5
58
Oliver Thranert and Christian Wagner, Pakistan as a Nuclear Power (Berlin: Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik, 2009), 8
59 Daniel S. Geller. “Nuclear Weapons and the Indo-Pakistani Conflict: Global Implications of a
Regional Power Cycle” in
International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique, Vol. 24, No. 1, Power Cycle Theory and Global Politics. Cycle de pouvoir et politique mondiale (Jan., 2003), pp. 137-150, 141; Paul Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin,
Pakistan’s
Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research
Service, 2009), 3
60
Paul Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin,
Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security
Issues (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2009), 3
61
Oliver Thranert and Christian Wagner, Pakistan as a Nuclear Power (Berlin: Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik, 2009), 8; Joby Warrick, “Pakistan Expanding Nuclear Program – Plant
Underway Could Generate Plutonium for 40 to 50 Bombs a Year, Analysts Say,” Washington
Post , July 24, 2006, A01.
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Julian Schofield TEXT OF GERSI G8 PFP Project As of Sep 23 2010
HEU, scientific testing and training, and missiles technology and production capacity.
62
Pakistan may have tested a nuclear warhead design at a Chinese test site on May 26 1990. Saudi Arabia has also provided substantial financial aid.
63
Pakistan also has a parallel nuclear energy program which is largely IAEA safeguarded.
The Kanupp reactor in Karachi was completed in 1966 and is due for decommissioning in 2012.
While it produced plutonium, it was under IAEA safeguards.
64 Kanupp-2 in Karachi was put under construction in 2008 with completion in 2012, and Kanupp-3 is expected to begin construction imminently. Chasnupp-1 at Chasma began operation in 2000, and Chasnupp-2 is set to begin in 2011. Two additional reactors at Chasma have also been approved for construction.
There are many more energy reactors in the proposal stage. Pakistan also possesses two research reactors, Parr-1 and Parr-2, under IAEA-safeguards. Pakistan may import its uranium from
China and it may eventually mine uranium from Bannu Basin in the central Punjab.
According to the 1540 Committee, Pakistan has fully complied with UN Security Council resolution 1540 (Apr 28, 2004), which committed it to a series of broad principles of nonproliferation of WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) and their delivery means, primarily missiles, and also called for it to support multilateral non-proliferation treaties (despite Pakistan not being a signatory to any of them). Pakistan has submitted reporting on its implementation of
UNSCR 1540 addressing national laws and border procedures, and how they safeguard against the illegal transfer of WMD technology to non-state actors. Legislation enacted by Pakistan include the Export Control Act on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment related to
Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Means, 2004. This law establishes a board to administer export control guidelines, supervise recording by exporters, licensing of controlled goods, and enforcement.
65 Pakistan ratified the CPPNM (1980 Convention of the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material), though Pakistan is not a member of NSG (Nuclear Supplier’s
Group) or the AG (Australia Group) export control regimes, and has not joined the NTC (2005
Nuclear Terrorism Convention). Pakistan has been the recipient of IAEA workshops, including the November 5-16, 2007 National Training Course on Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Materials, in Islamabad. Pakistan has unsuccessfully sought a nuclear trade deal with the
U.S. along similar lines as the U.S.-Indian 123 Agreement, as well as exemptions from the NSG regulations. Pakistan is very unlikely to comply with the MTCR as it applies to the import of missiles, though it may with regard to the export of missiles.
62
Joseph Cirincione, Deadly Arsenals , (Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 2002), 148-150; Jeffrey T. Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, American Nuclear
Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea , (New York, W.W. Norton &
Company, 2006), 342; Chaim Braun, Christopher F. Chyba, “Proliferation Rings: New
Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,”
International Security , vol. 29, no. 2, (Fall
2004), 5-49, 21; Samina Ahmed, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and
Nuclear Choices”
International Security , vol. 23, no. 4 (Spring 199), 178-204, 187
63
Oliver Thranert and Christian Wagner, Pakistan as a Nuclear Power (Berlin: Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik, 2009), 8
64
Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 197
65
Pakistan: Law on Export Control for Nuclear and Biological Weapons," Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, http://www.sipri.org/contents/expcon/2004pakistandulaw.html.
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Julian Schofield TEXT OF GERSI G8 PFP Project As of Sep 23 2010
Pakistan is believed to have a more advanced and hardened and battle-ready command and control system when compared with India, due primarily to the domination of nuclear weapons control by the military.
66 In the 1990s, neither of the governments of Prime Ministers
Nawaz Sharif or Benazir Bhutto had access to nuclear decision-making. In March 1999, a
National Command Authority was articulated and a Strategic Plans Division set-up to control and exercise Pakistan’s nuclear assets. Nuclear weapons policy is, in theory, determined by the
Employment Control Committee (ECC) which is chaired by Pakistan’s head of government, the
President.
67
Target selection was likely the responsibility of the STA (Surveillance, Targeting and Analysis) sub-directorate established in 1985 within the air force’s element of the
Directorate of Operations.
68
The National Security Council established the National Command
Authority, chaired by the then Chief Executive, Musharraf, which exercises all logistic and operational plans for the use of nuclear weapons. It comprises two committees: the Employment
Control Committee and the Development Control Committee. Pakistan’s Strategic Plans
Division, housed in the Joint Services Headquarters (also the Secretariat for the NCA), is responsible for nuclear weapons development and deployment, as well as C3I. The Employment
Control Committee which will presumably make the decision to launch nuclear weapons, comprises, the Chief Executive, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence, Minister for
Interior, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), Services Chiefs, Director General
Strategic Plans Division (SPD), and Technical Advisors as required.
69
In December 2007 this nuclear decision-making structure was formalised by law, and no civilian government has since altered it.
70
In practice, however, the military maintains a monopoly over the development, deployment and targeting of nuclear weapons.
71
From 2001 the U.S. has provided Pakistan about
U.S.$100 million in security aid for its nuclear materials and facility security in the form of helicopters, night vision equipment and radiation detection equipment, and most U.S. officials agree that Pakistan’s arsenal is under reasonable protection.
72
Pakistan allegedly refused the U.S. offer of PAL (Permissive Action Link) because it may have developed its own, and concerns that the U.S. would not transfer the enabling technology.
73
66
Paul Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin,
Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security
Issues (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2009), 6-7;
67
Paul Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security
Issues (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2009), 8
68
Shaheen Foundation, The Story of the Pakistan Air Force 1988-1998 (Islamabad: Oxford
University Press, 2000), 121-122
69 http://www.fas.org/news/pakistan/2000/000203-pak-app1.htm, cited in Peter Lavoy,
“Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine,” in Dossani (ed),
Prospects for Peace (Stanford: Stabford
University Press, forthcoming), p.3, 21
70
Ian Bremmer & Maria Kuusisto,
Pakistan’s Nuclear Command and Control: Perception
Matters (London: SASSI, 2008), 9
71
Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008), 421
72
"U.S. Secretly Aids Pakistan in Guarding Nuclear Arms" . The New York Times . 2007-11-18. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/washington/18nuke.html?ref=us . Retrieved 2007-11-18
73
New York Times /18 November 2007 ; http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategicdossiers/nbm/nuclear-black-market-dossier-a-net-assesment/pakistans-nuclear-oversightreforms/ Sharad Joshi, Nuclear Proliferation and South Asia: Recent Trends , James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies August 2007; According to one account, the United States
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Julian Schofield TEXT OF GERSI G8 PFP Project As of Sep 23 2010
Threats to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal are four-fold. First, there is the instance of a Taliban assault on a nuclear facility, the kidnapping of nuclear scientists, the seizure of nuclear material to fashion a radiological device, or the seizure of a nuclear warhead. Aside from the kidnapping of nuclear scientists, which has occurred, and an assault on a nuclear facility, which is very improbable for the Taliban because of its inability to penetrate the Punjab without local assistance (which is not likely forthcoming), this source of threat is limited.
74
Second, indigenous, primarily Punjabi Islamist militants may seek to carry out the acts described above. These groups have a much higher probability of success than the Taliban, are not easily screened because of their links with the intelligence establishment, and they have conducted several successful bombings, assassinations (including attempts on then President
Pervaiz Musharraf), and assaults on military facilities, including the Army’s GHQ in
Rawalpindi, across the Punjab. This movement highlights to some extent the cleavages within
Pakistan as much as it does Pakistan’s lack of a police state or garrison state structure. The military’s intelligence services, the ISI (Inter Services Intelligence) and MI (Military
Intelligence), or the civilian IB (Investigation Bureau) or FIS (Federal Investigation Service), have not evolved Pakistan’s security services into an all-pervasive force typical of totalitarian states such as the Soviet Union or China. Nevertheless, the MQM, a Mohajir movement that was militant in the 1980s and 1990s, produced violence that killed over 1,000 persons in Pakistan’s largest city of Karachi (1986-2002), attacks that included bombing a train, a cricket match, and a car bomb (45 killed), kidnapping of foreigners and military personnel, assassinating senators, forcing the shutting down of the U.S. embassy. The MQM, though never defeated, never managed to attack Karachi’s energy reactor. Nor is militant Sunni-ism sufficiently overpowering that it could either overcome the substantial Shia minority (including the founder of Pakistan
Mohammad Ali Jinnah) or the Deobandi-Barelvi cleavages within Sunni-ism itself that would make a legitimate seizure of government tenable.
75
Third, there is the possibility of a military-coup assisted by the aforementioned Islamists, which could then produce either civil war in Pakistan, or provide Islamist insurgents more direct access to nuclear weapons. This is a highly unlikely scenario given the Pakistan army’s technocratic organization and its historically consultative process for determining whether to conduct a coup. There has never been a coup in Pakistan that was not approved of by the senior division/corps commanders, and no coup that didn’t have that support ever survived the planning stages. When militants have threatened core military interests, such as at the Red Mosque in prepared contingency plans to take over Pakistan's nuclear arsenal in the event of an impending takeover of the country by fundamentalist groups. See Seymour Hersh, "Watching the Warheads:
The Risks to Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal," The New Yorker , November 5, 2001. See also Farzana
Shaikh, "Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb: Beyond the Nonproliferation Regime," International Affairs ,
78, 1, 2002, pp. 40-41.
74 Julian Schofield, “The Prospect of a Populist Islamist Takeover of Pakistan,” in Usama Butt
(ed), Escaping Quagmire: Strategy, Security and the Future of Pakistan (New York: Continuum, forthcoming Fall 2010), forthcoming.
75 Julian Schofield “Islam and the Afghanistan Campaign,” CEPES - Pointe de Mire , Vol.11,
No.4 (Mar 2010).
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Julian Schofield TEXT OF GERSI G8 PFP Project As of Sep 23 2010
2007, the military dispatched its SSG (Special services Group) which without restraint quashed the Islamists.
76
Fourth, Pan-Islamists within Pakistan may attempt to share an Islamic bomb. Both AQ
Khan, and his semi-official military supporter, General Aslam Beg, are Mohajirs, a welleducated Urdu speaking minority which articulated Pakistan’s broad definition of Islam that forms the core of its anti-sectarian identity. Both AQ Khan and Aslam Beg reject the narrow ethnic particularism and militant Islam of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and al Qaeda, and their militant Sunni allies within Pakistan. Where a Pashtun-based movement would never share nuclear technology with the Persians because of historical animosity, AQ Khan transcended narrow cleavages with a typically Mohajir vision of Pan-Islam. The domination of the Pakistan military by the Punjabis, and of federal politics by the religiously more syncretic Sindhis has meant that Pan-Islam is far removed from the Pakistani elite. Nevertheless, this was and is a far more likely source of a nuclear security threat than that posed by the marginalized movements associated with the Pashtun, Arab and Uzbek militants along the Northwest Frontier and in
Afghanistan.
Canada’s role here is limited to joining with other G8 members that have the resources to contribute to the security of fissile material and nuclear installations within Pakistan. It is more politically feasible for Canada to defer the security of military installations to the nuclear weapons states and perhaps Germany, and instead focus on contributing to the training and equipping of security personnel involved with Pakistan’s nuclear energy complex. This could involve courses in Canada for senior Pakistani security officials and local training for ground personnel. Given the similarity between Pakistan’s new reactor designs and its original Candu reactor purchase, Canada could cooperate with China and upgrade the security and safety standards and equipment for the reactors under completion.
(6) Incidents at Sea Agreement :
India’s first nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, the INS Arihant SSBN, which was launched on July 26, 2009, will provoke a counter SSBN program in Pakistan, increasing the likelihood of aggressive encounters at sea. It is estimated to become operational in 2012, and will be armed with 750 km range K-15 Sagariak Sea Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM).
77
It is not clear whether the Arihant has resolved the stealth problems usually associated with noisy first generation submarines.
78 An easily detectable SSBN may feed strategic instability if this entices opposing navies to hunt it, providing incentives for it to be used preemptively. India is furthermore currently exploring a program of deploying five ATV submarines as its next tranche of SSBNs, which will achieve completion over the next ten to fifteen years.
79
76
Julian Schofield and Michael Zekulin, “Appraising the Threat of an Islamist Military Coup in
Pakistan,” Defense & Security Analysis (June 2010), Vol.26, No.2, forthcoming.
77
Manpreet Sethi, “INS Arihant and Credible Nuclear Deterrence,” National Defence and
Aerospace Power (Aug 31, 2009), 1-6, 1
78 C. Raja Mohan, “India’s Nuclear Navy: Catching up with China,” ISAS Insights No.78,
Singapore (July 20, 2009), 1-8, 6-7
79
Manpreet Sethi, “INS Arihant and Credible Nuclear Deterrence,” National Defence and
Aerospace Power (Aug 31, 2009), 1-6, 4; C. Raja Mohan, “India’s Nuclear Navy: Catching up with China,”
ISAS Insights No.78, Singapore (July 20, 2009), 1-8, 4
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Julian Schofield TEXT OF GERSI G8 PFP Project As of Sep 23 2010
The U.S.-Soviet remedy for stabilizing their naval interactions, including the tracking of their respective SSBNs, was the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement. Despite some notable violations (particularly during the conduct of simulated attacks on USN vessels during the
October Crisis of 1973), in 1983, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman credited the agreement with having reduced the number of naval incidents in the 1970s and 1980s. Aside from its stipulations for responsible navigation, the key provisions of the 1972 Incidents at Sea
Agreement required that ships and aircraft conducting surveillance do so from a distance
(Art.III.4), prohibited simulated attacks by the opening of weapons bays, or the launching or dropping of objects of any kind on or near the ships of the other party (Art.III.6), required the notification of large scale maneuvers that might prove a hazard to navigation at sea three to five days prior (Art.VI.1), and provided for annual consultations (Art.IX). The 1973 Protocol to the
Agreement extended these same requirements to non-military vessels of both parties. The agreement functioned as a confidence building process, thereby reducing miscalculation and accidents.
80
Such an agreement established early in South Asia could act as a preemptive approach to instilling regional norms.
Conclusion
Canada can best engage Pakistan in agreements intended to promote the principles of the G8 Partnership for Peace in bilateral arrangements embedded in multilateral agreements.
There is little prospect of a major cooperation program with Pakistan, but there is an opportunity for Canada to contribute to energy reactor safety and security as part of a broader international program.
80
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agreements – Texts and Histories of the Negotiations (Washington, D.C.: United States Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, 1990), p.143.
18