6th International Conference on Safety & Environment in
Process & Power Industry - 13-16 April, 2014, Bologna , Italy
Addressing Dynamic Risk in the Petroleum
Industry by Means of Innovative Analysis
Solutions
Nicola Paltrinieri1, Giordano Emrys Scarponi1,2, Faisal Khan3, Stein Hauge1
1SINTEF
Technology and Society, Trondheim, Norway.
2University
of Bologna, Italy
3Memorial
University of Newfoundland, St. John’s, Canada
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Introduction
Snorre A 2004
Recent O&G industry accidents
Montara 2009
Macondo 2010
Gullfaks C 2010
Every event was unique and the direct causes often differed, but many of the
underlying causes were identified as recurring problems, such as:
• the failure to perform risk evaluation during changes/modifications, and
• the inadequate verification of safety barriers
(Tinmannsvik et al. 2011)
In particular it was reported:
• poor information flow between night and dayshifts and onshore and offshore
teams operating at Montara, Macondo and Snorre A, and
• poor involvement of measured pressure drilling experts in the planning, risk
assessment and operational follow-up of the Gullfaks C well operation.
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Introduction
In the Petroleum
industry, Integrated
operations (IO) refers
to new work
processes and ways of
performing oil and
gas exploration and
production, which has
been facilitated by
new information and
communication
technology.
The IO Center
conducts research,
innovation and
education within the
field of IO.
Integrated Operations
Integrated planning & execution
Smarter Decisions
Decision processes
across disciplines &
organizations
through
Integrated operations
Visualization &
communication
Data
acquisition
Data processing,
modeling, prediction
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Methodology
New dynamic risk approaches
Three innovative techniques, whose main feature is their dynamicity and capacity to be
reiterated and produce updated risk assessment, are applied and evaluated for their
potential suitability with IO solutions and related implications.
Dynamic Risk
Analysis
DyPASI
Methods
Risk Barometer
Novelties
8. Monitoring, review
and update
7. Communic.
& consultation
6. Risk evaluation
5. Establishing the risk
picture
4. Analysis of
consequences
3. Analysis of initiating
events
2. Hazard identification
1. Establishing the
context
NORSOK
Z-013
standard
steps
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Dynamic Procedure for Atypical
Scenarios Identification
Methodology
Pre-requirements
Step
Retrieval of risk
notions
Search for relevant information on undetected
potential hazards and accident scenarios not
considered in the bow-tie development.
2
Prioritization
Determination as to whether the data are
significant enough to trigger further action and
proceed with risk assessment.
3
Atypical
scenario
identification
Atypical scenarios are isolated from the early
warnings and a cause-consequence chain is
developed and integrated into the bow-tie d.
4
Definition of
safety measures
Definition of new barriers related to atypical
scenario elements.
1
As a
preliminary
activity the
application of
the
conventional
bow-tie
technique is
performed.
Description
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Dynamic Risk Analysis
Methodology
Pre-requirements
Step
1
Monitoring
and report of
process
incidents and
near misses
(Accident
Sequence
Precursors –
ASP).
2
3
Description
Scenario identification. The potential scenarios, their consequences,
causes and related safety barriers are identified by means of a BowTie Analysis.
Prior function calculation. A probability density function of type Beta
can be selected to represent the failure probability of safety barriers.
Its mean value can be used as a conditional probability in the
frequency analysis.
Formation of the likelihood function. This function is formed using
real time data from the process as it operates. These data are inferred
from the Accident Sequence Precursors and presented by a binomial
distribution.
4
Posterior function calculation. The posterior failure function of the
safety barriers is obtained from the prior and likelihood functions
using Bayesian inference. Bayesian inference is a tool which uses data
to improve an estimate of a parameter.
5
Consequence analysis. It is carried out on the scenario in order to
estimate its potential consequences.
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Risk Barometer
Methodology
Pre-requirements
Sensitivity
analysis of
QRA to define
relative
importance of
QRA
parameters
Definition of
RIFs related to
QRA
parameters
Definition of
risk indicators
related to
RIFs.
Step
Description
Formula
1
Risk indicators can be measured on an
arbitrary scale but values should be
mapped by means of a standardized
mark scale.
2
Definition of RIF values. Linear
weighted sum is used.
3
𝐾𝑖,𝑗
𝑟𝑖,𝑗 =
Definition of RIFs impact on QRA
parameter. Linear weighted sum is
used.
4
Development of QRA parameter
influence model. The relation between
the total weighted RIF value and the
parameter is established by a linear
interpolation.
5
Risk measure expansion by Taylor
series.
6
𝑚𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 = M(𝑥𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 )
𝑘=1
𝑤𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 𝑚𝑖,𝑗,𝑘
𝐽𝑖
𝑟𝑖 =
𝑗=1
𝑝𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖,𝐿 +
𝑤𝑖,𝑗 𝑟𝑖,𝑗
(𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑖,𝐿 )(𝑝𝑖,𝐻 − 𝑝𝑖,𝐿 )
(𝑟𝑖,𝐻 − 𝑟𝑖,𝐿 )
𝐼
𝐼 𝐵 (𝑖)∆ 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑅0 + ∆𝑅
𝑅 = 𝑅0 +
𝑖=1
Visualization through risk barometer.
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Application
Case-study: oil production process area
The case-study is a
typical oil production
process area located
topside on an offshore
platform. The process
area consists of the
following separate
modules:
•
Choke/manifold
module
•
Separation module
•
Gas compression
module
•
Gas recompression
module
•
Water
injection/production
module
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Data retrieval
Results
The following search systems were used to identify related risk notions:
• MHIDAS, (HSE – United Kingdom),
• ARIA (French Ministry of Environment), and
• Google Scholar (Google inc.).
Explosion
Fire
Release
Other
Tot
Disaster
3
3
Accident
8
6
Incident
4
6
2
12
Mishap
2
1
6
9
Tot
17
13
8
1
15
1
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Logic tree diagram
Results
Detail of the bow-tie diagram (right-hand side) referring to a multiphase loss of
containment in the 1st stage separator.
detect
leak
limit
leak
detect
pool
control
pool
control
ign
detect
gas
limit
control
gas dis pool dis
safe
safe
Pool
COND.
PROB. COND.
PROB.
safe
COND.
PROB.
pool disp.
gas disp.
COND. COND.
PROB. PROB.
COND.
COND.
PROB.
PROB.
environ. / tox.
flashfire/VCE
flashfire/VCE
ignition
Poolfire
safe
pool disp.
gas disp.
environ. / tox.
flashfire/VCE
flashfire/VCE
LOC
ignition
Poolfire
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Posterior frequency of accident
scenarios
Results
3.50E-07
3.00E-07
Env. tox.
Flashfire/VCE
Poolfire
Ev./year
2.50E-07
2.00E-07
1.50E-07
1.00E-07
5.00E-08
0.00E+00
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
On the basis
of the risk
notions
identified,
some fictional
accident
sequence
precursors
were defined
in order to
show the
application of
DRA.
Year
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Results
Definition of indicators
Practice
(actual oil company
case-study)
Theory
Technical
condition
A set of indicators defining the
status of the safety barriers in
the process area and
organizational influencing
factors was defined. Average
values with representative
variations were applied.
Competence &
training
Preparations and
RIF:planning
Technical
measures
Work practice
and work load
QRA
parameter:
Barrier PFD
Leak
frequency
RIF:
Operational
measures
Prevent
release
PSD system
PSVs
RIF:
Containment of
Organizational
process segments
measures
Disassembling of
HC-system
Work
supervision /
management
Quality of
procedures and
documentation
Indicator
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Real-time risk level
Results
Indicator
description
wi,j,k
xi,j,k
tp
Mark
ti
tp
ti
Findings during 3
last months that
resulted in
notification,
maintenance
request or project
15%
1
2
3.5
6
Open work permits
for a given area
13%
3
6
3.5
6
High high
risk
Low risk
tp
Bypasses and
overrides/inhibitio
ns of the gas
detection system
33%
Fraction of failed
valve tests
25%
1
2
1% 2%
3.5
6
1
3.5
Very
high risk
ti
Normal
risk
High risk
Etc…
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Discussion
Qualitative assessment of the
techniques
DyPASI and DRA demonstrated to be mutually complementary and to give a relatively
effective support to the continuous review and update of the risk picture.
DyPASI and DRA are still relatively tied to the QRA structure, but the Risk Barometer aims
to overtake and improve the QRA process by introducing new risk influencing factors.
Both DRA and Risk Barometer aim to evaluate how the performance of the safety barriers
in the plant affects the overall risk picture, but they respectively adopt a reactive and
proactive approach.
The Risk Barometer aims to effectively visualize the result, in order to provide a better
decision support during daily operations.
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Conclusions
Conclusions
All techniques were effectively applied to the generic case-study considered.
A clear complementarity between the different approaches was not identified because of
overlaps and different strategies adopted in the assessment of the risk picture.
The Risk Barometer, despite the fact it is still under development, was proven to be the
most suitable technique to dynamically assess the risk in the context of Integrated
Operations.
In fact, it is based on indicators that can be automatically collected from the system, in
order to give a real-time response, and addresses the issue of the visualization of
results, in order to share information across geographical, organizational and
discipline boundaries as a support for critical decision-making.
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