Contents
Solvency Frontline 1/ ............................................................................................................................ 2
Solvency Frontline 2/ ............................................................................................................................ 4
Solvency Frontline 3/ ............................................................................................................................ 6
Solvency Frontline 4/ ............................................................................................................................ 7
Terrorism Turn- Ext: 702 Key .............................................................................................................. 10
Economy Frontline 1/.......................................................................................................................... 12
Economy Frontline 2/.......................................................................................................................... 13
Economy Frontline 3/.......................................................................................................................... 14
Economy Ext: 2NC: Resilience ............................................................................................................. 16
Trade Frontline 1/ ............................................................................................................................... 17
Trade Frontline 2/ ............................................................................................................................... 18
Trade Frontline 3/ ............................................................................................................................... 20
Trade Frontline 4/ ............................................................................................................................... 21
Trade Frontline 5/ ............................................................................................................................... 22
Trade Frontline 6/ ............................................................................................................................... 25
Trade Ext: 2NC PTA Turn 1/ ................................................................................................................ 27
Trade Ext: 2NC PTA Turn 2/ ................................................................................................................ 28
Solvency Frontline 1/
Zero Solvency:
 Localization already in place
 No Forum for International Harmonization
 Competing Interest Overwhelm “signals”
Susan Ariel Aaronson ‘12 (Research Professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George
Washington University22 December, “Can trade policy set information free?”
http://www.voxeu.org/article/trade-agreements-global-internet-governance )
Although the internet is creating a virtuous circle of expanding global growth, opportunity, and information flows (Lendle et al. 2012),
policymakers and market actors are taking steps that undermine access to information, reduce freedom of
expression and splinter the internet (Herald 2012). Almost every country has adopted policies to protect privacy,
enforce intellectual property rights, protect national security, or thwart cyber-theft, hacking, and spam.
While these actions may be necessary to achieve important policy goals, these policies may distort cross-border information
flows and trade. Meanwhile, US, Canadian and European firms provide much of the infrastructure as well as censorware or blocking
services to their home governments and repressive states such as Iran, Russia, and China (Heacock 2011, Horwitz 2011, Ungeleider 2011). As a
result, although the internet has become a platform for trade, trade
itself and trade policies have served both to enhance
and undermine both internet freedom and an open internet. Trade agreements as internet governance Trade
agreements and policies have become an important source of rules governing cross-border information flows: Policymakers recognise that
when we travel the information superhighway, we are often trading – and internet usage can dramatically expand trade 1 . The internet is not
only a tool of empowerment for the world’s people, but a major source of wealth for US, EU, and Canadian business. Moreover,
internet
commerce will grow substantially in the future as much of the world’s population is not yet online (OECD
2008, Internet World Stats 2012). US, European and Canadian policymakers want to both protect their firms’ competitiveness and increase
market share. US, European and Canadian governments understand that while some domestic laws can have global reach, domestic laws on
copyright, piracy, and internet security do not have global legitimacy and force. Hence, they recognise they must find common ground on
internationally accepted rules governing cross-border data flows In theory, the WTO should be an appropriate venue for such discussions. WTO
members agreed not to place tariffs on data flows. In addition, the WTO’s dispute settlement body has settled two trade disputes related to
internet issues: internet gambling and China’s state trading rights on audiovisual products and services (WTO 2007, WTO 2012). However, the
member states have not found common ground on how to reduce new trade barriers to information
flows 3 . In 2011, several nations stopped a US and EU proposal that members agree not to block internet service providers or impede the
free flow of information online 4 . Moreover, the members of the WTO have made little progress on adding new regulatory
issues such as privacy and cyber security that challenge internet policymakers 5 . However, many new online
activities will require cooperative global regulation on issues that transcend market access – the traditional turf of the WTO. These issues will
require policymakers to think less about ensuring that their model of regulation is adopted globally but more about achieving interoperability
among different governance approaches (see Burri and Cottier 2012). Alas, policymakers are not consistently collaborating to achieve
interoperability. Trade giants and the internet In a recent policy brief (Aaronson and Townes 2012), Miles Townes and I examined how the US,
the EU, and Canada use trade policies to govern the internet at home and across borders. We found the three trade giants use bilateral and
regional trade agreements to encourage ecommerce, reduce online barriers to trade, and to develop shared policies in a world where
technology is rapidly changing and where governments compete to disseminate their regulatory approaches (Coppock and Maclay 2002).
Policymakers also use export controls, trade bans or targeted sanctions to protect internet users in other countries or to prevent officials of
other countries from using internet related technologies in ways that undermine the rights of individuals abroad. Finally, policymakers may use
trade agreements to challenge other governments’ online rules and policies as trade barriers. We discuss how these policies, agreements, bans
and strategies could affect internet openness, internet governance, and internet freedom The US is actively pushing for binding provisions in
trade agreements that advance the free flow of information while challenging other nations privacy and server location policies as trade
barriers. However, the US provisions are incomplete. Hence, we recommended that as trade agreements have long addressed governance, the
US and other governments negotiating binding provisions to encourage cross-border information flows
should also include language related to the regulatory context in which the internet functions; free
expression, fair use, rule of law, and due process. Moreover, the US and other nations should coordinate policies to promote
the free flow of information with policies to advance internet freedom. Policymakers may need to develop principles for the proper role of
government in balancing Internet freedom and stability at the domestic and global levels. Finally, governments
may also need to
develop shared principles for steps governments may take when countries do not live up to these
principles (a responsibility to protect the open internet). Internet openness We also believe that the US, EU and Canada should also show
their commitment to internet openness by annually reporting when and why they blocked specific applications or technologies and/or limited
content (or asked intermediaries to limit access) to sites or domains. With this information, policymakers may get better understanding of how
to achieve a flexible and effective balance of internet stability and internet openness. Is censorship a barrier to trade? Policymakers don’t know
if censorship is also a barrier to trade. The US and EU have issued reports describing other countries’ internet policies – regarding privacy,
censorship, server location and security policies – as potential barriers to trade. However,
none of the three governments has
yet challenged internet restrictions as a barrier to trade. We recommended that trade policymakers ask the WTO
secretariat to analyse if domestic policies that restrict information – short of exceptions for national security or public morals – are also barriers
to cross-border information flows which can be challenged in a trade dispute. Moreover, policymakers should develop strategies to quantify
how such policies affect trade flows. Conclusions Without deliberate intent, domestic and trade policies may gradually fracture a unified, global
internet. Given that countries have different priorities for privacy, free speech, and national security, the
harmonisation of strategies to advance the open internet is unlikely.
international
Solvency Frontline 2/
Turn: Terrorism
A. Terrorist threats are immanent: only counter-intelligence avoids catastrophic
attacks.
James Jay Carafano et al ’15 (Ph.D., Charles "Cully" Stimson, Steven P. Bucci, Ph.D.,John Malcolm and
Paul Rosenzweig, May 21, Backgrounder #3018 on National Security and Defense, Heritage Foundation,
Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act and Metadata Collection: Responsible Options for the Way Forward”
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/05/section-215-of-the-patriot-act-and-metadatacollection-responsible-options-for-the-way-forward
The Real and Growing Threat of Terrorism Any debate about America’s counterterrorism capabilities must be conducted in the context of the
actual terrorist threat the U.S. faces. Since 9/11, The Heritage Foundation has tracked Islamist terrorist plots and attacks, which now, after the
recent shooting in Garland, Texas, total 68.[1] This figure, however, does not consider foiled plots of which the public is unaware. Recently,
there has been a dramatic uptick in terrorism: The shooting in Garland is the sixth Islamist terrorist plot or attack in the past
five months. Add to that number the surge of Americans seeking to support or join ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliates, and one fact becomes clear:
The U.S. is facing the most concentrated period of terrorist activity in the homeland since 9/11. Of course, it
is no coincidence that this spike in terrorism parallels the spread of the Islamic State and other radical groups across Syria, Iraq, and other parts
of the Middle East. More than 150 American passport holders have traveled to Syria, or attempted to travel there, to join the fighting, along
with more than 20,000 fighters from more than 90 countries.[2] Many of these individuals with American passports are believed to have joined
ISIS or the Nusra Front, an affiliate of al-Qaeda in Syria. Both the Nusra Front and ISIS espouse an anti-Western Islamist ideology that calls for
terrorist attacks against the United States. For example, in July 2012, the leader of ISIS, self-proclaimed caliph Abu Bakr Baghdadi, threatened to
launch attacks against the U.S. homeland. Baghdadi warned Americans, “You will soon witness how attacks will resound in the heart of your
land, because our war with you has now started.”[3] Toward this end, al-Qaeda formed a unit of veteran terrorists to recruit some of the
Western foreign fighters in Syria and train them to conduct terrorist attacks in their home countries. This unit, dubbed the Khorasan group by
U.S. officials, is embedded in the Nusra Front and is particularly interested in recruiting fighters who hold American passports.[4] These terrorist
organizations have undertaken a significant effort to reach out to individuals across the world in order to radicalize and recruit them. In recent
testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee, FBI Director James Comey stated that: The threats posed by foreign fighters, including
those recruited from the U.S., traveling to join the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and from homegrown violent extremists are
extremely dynamic. These threats remain the biggest priorities and challenges for the FBI, the U.S. Intelligence Community, and our foreign,
state, and local partners. ISIL is relentless and ruthless in its pursuits to terrorize individuals in Syria and Iraq, including Westerners. We are
concerned about the possibility of individuals in the U.S. being radicalized and recruited via the Internet and social media to join ISIL in Syria and
Iraq and then return to the U.S. to commit terrorist acts. ISIL’s widespread reach through the Internet and social media is most concerning as
the group has proven dangerously competent at employing such tools for its nefarious strategy.[5] In the past several weeks, Director Comey
has increased the intensity of his warnings, stating that “hundreds, maybe thousands” of individuals across the U.S. are being contacted by ISIS
to attack the U.S. homeland.[6] Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson has echoed these warnings, saying that lone-wolf terrorists
inspired by ISIS could strike at any moment.”[7] The 2015 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community states that: Attacks
by lone actors are among the most difficult to warn about because they offer few or no signatures. If
ISIL were to substantially
increase the priority it places on attacking the West rather than fighting to maintain and expand
territorial control, then the group’s access to radicalized Westerners who have fought in Syria and Iraq
would provide a pool of operatives who potentially have access to the United States and other Western
countries.[8] On the same note, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center also stated in his testimony to the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence this February that there has been a recent “uptick in terror attacks in the West.” T his increase in attacks
“underscores the threat of emboldened Homegrown Violent Extremists and, how the rapid succession
of these attacks may motivate some to attempt to replicate these tactics with little-to-no warning.”[9]
These statements and assessments, together with the explicit and public statements of intent by multiple terrorist groups and the recent
surge in terrorist plots and attacks against the U.S. homeland, demonstrate that the threat of terrorism
is on the rise. Fortunately, the U.S. has improved its ability to foil these attacks, largely due to
intelligence capabilities that include but are not limited to the bulk telephone metadata program under Section 215 of the PATRIOT
Act.
Solvency Frontline 3/
B. Extinction:
Alexander ‘3 (Terrorism myths and realities,” The Washington Times, August 27,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2003/aug/27/20030827-084256-8999r/print/ )
Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that the international community failed,
thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threats to the very survival of civilization itself. Even the United
States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to
their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented
tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and
its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began
almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process
through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements (hudna). Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected
by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of
the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of
politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and
psychological warfare. Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of
conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The
internationalization and brutalization of current and future
terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism (e.g. biological, chemical,
radiological, nuclear and cyber) with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global
security concerns. Two myths in particular must be debunked immediately if an effective counterterrorism "best practices" strategy can
be developed (e.g., strengthening international cooperation). The first illusion is that terrorism can be greatly reduced, if not eliminated
completely, provided the root causes of conflicts -- political, social and economic -- are addressed. The conventional illusion is that terrorism
must be justified by oppressed people seeking to achieve their goals and consequently the argument advanced by "freedom fighters"
anywhere, "give me liberty and I will give you death," should be tolerated if not glorified. This traditional rationalization of "sacred" violence
often conceals that the real purpose of terrorist groups is to gain political power through the barrel of the gun, in violation of fundamental
human rights of the noncombatant segment of societies. For instance, Palestinians religious movements (e.g., Hamas, Islamic Jihad) and secular
entities (such as Fatah's Tanzim and Aqsa Martyr Brigades)) wish not only to resolve national grievances (such as Jewish settlements, right of
return, Jerusalem) but primarily to destroy the Jewish state. Similarly, Osama bin Laden's international network not only opposes the presence
of American military in the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq, but its stated objective is to "unite all Muslims and establish a government that follows
the rule of the Caliphs." The second myth is that strong action against terrorist infrastructure (leaders, recruitment, funding, propaganda,
training, weapons, operational command and control) will only increase terrorism. The argument here is that law-enforcement efforts and
military retaliation inevitably will fuel more brutal acts of violent revenge. Clearly, if this perception continues to prevail, particularly in
democratic societies, there is the danger it will paralyze governments and thereby encourage further terrorist attacks. In sum, past experience
provides useful lessons for a realistic future strategy. The prudent application of force has been demonstrated to be an effective tool for shortand long-term deterrence of terrorism. For example, Israel's targeted killing of Mohammed Sider, the Hebron commander of the Islamic Jihad,
defused a "ticking bomb." The assassination of Ismail Abu Shanab -- a top Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip who was directly responsible for
several suicide bombings including the latest bus attack in Jerusalem -- disrupted potential terrorist operations. Similarly, the U.S. military
operation in Iraq eliminated Saddam Hussein's regime as a state sponsor of terror. Thus, it behooves those countries victimized by terrorism to
understand a cardinal message communicated by Winston Churchill to the House of Commons on May 13, 1940: "Victory at
all costs,
victory in spite of terror, victory however long and hard the road may be: For without victory, there is no
survival."
Solvency Frontline 4/
Turn: Cyberwar- China will perceive the plan as weakness- leading to catastrophic
cyber attacks.
Dan Blumenthal ’13 (Asia, Foreign and Defense Policy Analyst, February 28, Foreign Policy, “The great
cyber smackdown: How to win a cyberwar with China,” )
The Internet is now a battlefield. China is not only militarizing cyberspace — it is also deploying its
cyberwarriors against the United States and other countries to conduct corporate espionage, hack think
tanks, and engage in retaliatory harassment of news organizations. These attacks are another dimension of the
ongoing strategic competition between the United States and China — a competition playing out in the waters of the East and South China
seas, in Iran and Syria, across the Taiwan Strait, and in outer space. With a number of recent high-profile attacks in cyberspace traced to the
Chinese government, the cybercompetition seems particularly pressing. It is time for Washington to develop a clear, concerted strategy to
deter cyberwar, theft of intellectual property, espionage, and digital harassment. Simply
put, the United States must make
China pay for conducting these activities, in addition to defending cybernetworks and critical
infrastructure such as power stations and cell towers. The U.S. government needs to go on the offensive
and enact a set of diplomatic, security, and legal measures designed to impose serious costs on China for
its flagrant violations of the law and to deter a conflict in the cybersphere. Fashioning an adequate response to this
challenge requires understanding that China places clear value on the cyber military capability. During the wars of the last two decades, China
was terrified by the U.S. military’s joint, highly networked capabilities. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) began paying attention to the role of
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) assets in the conduct of war. But the
PLA also concluded that the seeds of weakness were planted within this new way of war that allowed
the United States to find, fix, and kill targets quickly and precisely — an overdependence on information
networks. Consider what might happen in a broader U.S.-China conflict. The PLA could conduct major efforts to disable
critical U.S. military information systems (it already demonstrates these capabilities for purposes of deterrence). Even more
ominously, PLA cyberwarriors could turn their attention to strategic attacks on critical infrastructure in
America. This may be a highly risky option, but the PLA may view cyber-escalation as justified if, for example, the United States struck
military targets on Chinese soil. China is, of course, using attacks in cyberspace to achieve other strategic goals as well, from stealing trade
secrets to advance its wish for a more innovative economy to harassing organizations and individuals who criticize its officials or policies. Barack
Obama’s administration has begun to fight back. On Feb. 20, the White House announced enhanced efforts to fight the theft
of American trade secrets through several initiatives: building a program of cooperative diplomacy with like-minded nations to press leaders of
“countries of concern,” enhancing domestic investigation and prosecution of theft, promoting intelligence sharing, and improving current
legislation that would enable these initiatives. These largely defensive measures are important but should be paired with more initiatives that
start to play offense. Offensive measures may be gaining some steam. The U.S. Justice Department, in creating the National Security Cyber
Specialists’ Network (NSCS) last year, recognizes the need for such an approach. The NSCS — consisting of almost 100 prosecutors from U.S.
attorneys’ offices working in partnership with cyber-experts from the Justice Department’s National Security Division and the Criminal Division’s
Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section — is tasked with “exploring investigations and prosecutions as viable options for deterrence
and disruption” of cyberattacks, including indictments of governments or individuals working on the government’s behalf. It’s a good first step,
but Congress could also consider passing laws forbidding individuals and entities from doing business in the United States if there is clear
evidence of involvement in cyberattacks. Congress could also create a cyberattack exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which
currently precludes civil suits against a foreign government or entity acting on its behalf in the cyber-realm. There is precedent: In the case of
terrorism, Congress enacted an exception to immunity for states and their agents that sponsor terrorism, allowing individuals to sue them.
Enterprising companies and intelligence personnel are already able to trace attacks with an increasing degree of accuracy. For example, the U.S.
security company Mandiant traced numerous incidents going back several years to the Shanghai-based Unit 61398 of the PLA, which was first
identified publicly by the Project 2049 Institute, a Virginia-based think tank. Scholars Jeremy and Ariel Rabkin have identified another way to
initiate nongovernmental legal action: rekindling the 19th-century legal practice of issuing “letters of marque” — the act of commissioning
privateers to attack enemy ships on behalf of the state — to selectively and cautiously legitimize retaliation by private U.S. actors against
hacking and cyber-espionage. This would allow the U.S. government to effectively employ its own cybermilitia. Creating new laws or using
current ones would force the Chinese government and the entities that support its cyberstrategy to consider the reputational and financial
costs of their actions. Of course, if the United States retaliates by committing similar acts of harassment and hacking, it risks Chinese legal
action. But America has a key advantage in that its legal system is respected and trusted; China’s is not.
Diplomatic action should bolster these efforts. The Obama administration’s suggestions for pressuring China and other countries are a good
start, but U.S. diplomacy must be tougher. In presenting Chinese leaders with overwhelming evidence of cyber-misdeeds (but without giving
away too many details), Washington should communicate how it could respond. To control escalation, the administration should explain what
it views as proportionate reprisals to different kinds of attacks. (For instance, an attack on critical infrastructure that led to deaths would merit
a different response than harassment of the New York Times.) As the administration’s report suggests, the United States is not the only victim
and should engage in cooperative diplomacy. The United States should set up a center for cyberdefense that would bring together the best
minds from allied countries to develop countermeasures and conduct offensive activities. One such center could be Taiwan, as its
understanding of Chinese language, culture, business networks, and political landscape make it invaluable in the fight against cyberattacks. Of
course, centers could be placed elsewhere and still utilize Taiwan’s knowledge, but even the threat of placing a cyberdefense center just across
the strait would be very embarrassing for China’s leaders, as Taiwan is viewed as a renegade province. The point is not to be gratuitously
provocative, but rather to demonstrate that the United States options that China would not favor. The U.S. military’s cyber-efforts presumably
already include it own probes, penetrations, and demonstrations of capability. While the leaks claiming the U.S. government’s involvement in
the Stuxnet operation — the computer worm that disabled centrifuges in the Iranian nuclear program — may have damaged U.S. national
security, at least China knows that Washington is quite capable of carrying out strategic cyberattacks. To
enhance deterrence, the
U.S. government needs to demonstrate these sorts of capabilities more regularly, perhaps through cyberexercises modeled after military exercises. For example, the U.S. military could set up an allied public training exercise in which it conducted
cyberattacks against a “Country X” to disable its military infrastructure such as radars, satellites, and computer-based command-and-control
systems. To use the tools at America’s disposal in the fight for cybersecurity will require a high degree of interagency coordination, a muchmaligned process. But Washington has made all the levers of power work together previously. The
successful use of unified legal,
law enforcement, financial, intelligence, and military deterrence against the Kim regime of North Korea
during a short period of George W. Bush’s administration met the strategic goals of imposing serious
costs on a dangerous government. China is not North Korea — it is far more responsible and less totalitarian. But America must
target those acting irresponsibly in cyberspace. By taking the offensive, the United States can start to impose, rather than simply incur, costs in
this element of strategic competition with China. Sitting
by idly, however, presents a much greater likelihood that
China’s dangerous cyberstrategy could spark a wider conflict.
Terrorism Turn- Ext: 702 Key
702 crucial to signals intelligence- empirically prevents major attacks.
James Jay Carafano et al ’15 (Ph.D., Charles "Cully" Stimson, Steven P. Bucci, Ph.D.,John Malcolm and
Paul Rosenzweig, May 21, Backgrounder #3018 on National Security and Defense, Heritage Foundation,
Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act and Metadata Collection: Responsible Options for the Way Forward”
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/05/section-215-of-the-patriot-act-and-metadatacollection-responsible-options-for-the-way-forward
The Way Forward The United States
is in a state of armed conflict against al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, ISIS,
and associated forces. It must therefore rely on all lawful tools of national security, including but not
limited to robust signals intelligence. As the 9/11 Commission Report made crystal clear, one of the key failures of the United
States before the 9/11 attacks was the government’s inability to “connect the dots” between known or suspected terrorists. The artificial
“wall” between domestic law enforcement and U.S. intelligence agencies, enacted during the 1990s, proved to
be America’s Achilles’ heel. Some analysts believe that had America had a Section 215–type program in place before 9/11, U.S.
intelligence, along with domestic law enforcement, would have been able to connect the dots and prevent at least some of the hijackers from
launching their devastating attack.[14] In fact, according to a report by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, using the
Section 702 of the FISA has contributed to thwarting 54 total
international terrorist plots in 20 countries.[15] Thirteen of those plots were directed inside the United
States. As Americans, we cherish our constitutional rights, including our right to privacy. Numerous court decisions have held that data, in the
authorities under Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act and
hands of third-party providers, are not protected by the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.[16] There is a case pending before the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in which the issue before the court is whether Section 215 violates the Fourth Amendment; that
court has not yet issued its opinion.[17] As Section 215 expires at the end of May 2015, policymakers are faced with the following quandary:
How do they protect Americans from a determined enemy while respecting this nation’s healthy distrust of government surveillance? First,
given the increasing nature of the threat and the unique nature of this enemy, it would be unwise to completely abandon the use of telephone
metadata in helping to disrupt future terrorist plots and/or gain intelligence about known or suspected foreign terrorists. Second, Senator
Mitch McConnell (R–KY) has proposed a straight extension of Section 215 to the year 2020. However, that approach does not address the
Second Circuit’s ruling that the statute as written does not authorize the bulk metadata collection program and would likely result in the federal
district court judge who now has the case enjoining the government from continuing the program. In view of ISIS and al-Qaeda’s renewed
determination to strike the American homeland, there are three major policy options that Congress should consider. Policy Option No. 1. The
first option would be to amend Section 215 specifically to allow the NSA to collect bulk telephone metadata and query that data pursuant to
FISC court orders; codify the existing program as it has been modified by the Administration but add in cell phone data as well; and fold in the
transparency, privacy, and civil liberties contained within the USA Freedom Act, discussed in detail below. Such an amendment would put the
program on stronger statutory grounds and address the Second Circuit’s holding. There are technical and business practice arguments in favor
of this, but it would not address the concerns of many that the government was maintaining a database of telephony metadata. While this
approach offers the simplest method to query and analyze the metadata, as it is housed in one place, this approach currently suffers from lack
of transparency, lack of civil liberties protections, and privacy concerns. In 2014, the National Research Council appointed a committee of
experts to assess “the feasibility of creating software that would allow the U.S. intelligence community more easily to conduct targeted
information acquisition rather than bulk collection”[18] as called for in Section 5(d) of Presidential Policy Directive 28. Committee members and
experts included people from Oracle, Microsoft, Google, and other industry and academic experts. After a thorough review, these experts
found that there is currently no technologically feasible alternative to the current metadata bulk collection platform. It is safe to assume that
the commercial IT world is already working to find a way to provide the tools to do just that sort of analysis. Today, only by keeping all the data
together and making appropriate inquiries of the data can the dots be connected, but in the immediate future, other options should become
available. Policy Option No. 2. The chief concern among policymakers who are skeptical of government surveillance, and in particular Section
215, is that it is the government that holds the telephony metadata. Such policymakers have also noted that there are not enough privacy
protections built into the existing program. One solution to the first concern would be to establish and require that a private, third-party entity
house the telephony metadata, including cell phone metadata. The metadata would be collected in bulk but housed by a private third party.
Court orders from the FISC would authorize select employees of the private entity, with appropriate security clearances, to query the database.
Just as in policy option number one, the Congress could add transparency, civil liberties, and privacy protections to the FISC and program, as
discussed below. This alternative would take time to develop and has gained little traction on either side of the debate. Policy Option No. 3. The
third policy option is the House-passed USA FREEDOM Act—legislation that reauthorizes Section 215 and reforms it to end government bulk
collection of telephone metadata by the NSA. Instead, the metadata resides with the telephone carriers, where the government will have
access to it subject to a court order by the FISC. The USA FREEDOM Act replaces bulk collection with a program called a “Call Detail Record.”
Under this new program, whenever the NSA feels it has reasonable, articulable suspicion that a phone number is associated with international
terrorism, it can seek an order to access information about that number from the FISC. If the FISC gives the order, the NSA will submit one or
several queries to the telecom companies for historical and real-time data on the number in question. At that time, both historical and realtime data related to the suspicious number will flow into the NSA, as well as data on the two generations of numbers surrounding it (referred to
as “hops”). This information will flow on a 24/7 basis for 180 days, double the amount of time that a FISC order currently authorizes. At the end
of 180 days, the NSA can seek renewal for another 180-day time period. Ending the bulk collection of telephone metadata by the government,
or even housing it in a private third-party entity, may encumber the ability of the intelligence community to analyze all the data in real time
across a known pool of data. Such a change will inevitably slow down investigators, but as the technology changes, this should be rectified. That
said, numerous intelligence community leaders have said that while it is far from ideal, they could live with such a system, understanding that
America is accepting some risk by doing so. Section 102 provides for emergency authority for the Attorney General to require emergency
production of tangible things absent a court order as long as he or she informs a FISC judge and subsequently makes an application to the court
within seven days after taking this action. The USA FREEDOM Act also establishes several civil liberties protections for the existing program as it
relates to the telephone metadata program. Section 401 of the Act requires the presiding judges of the FISC to designate not fewer than five
individuals to be eligible to serve as amicus curiae—friends of the court. Those designated shall be experts in privacy and civil liberties,
intelligence collection, and communications technology and be eligible for a security clearance. The amicus curiae serve to assist the court in
the consideration of any novel or significant interpretation of the law. Section 402 of the Act also mandates the Director of National
Intelligence, in consultation with the Attorney General, to conduct a declassification review of each decision, order, or opinion by the FISC and,
to the extent practicable, make those decisions, orders, or opinions publicly available. The USA FREEDOM Act also contains other reforms,
including prohibiting bulk collection utilizing FISA pen register and the “trap and trace” procedures in Section 201. The Act is the only legislative
vehicle that has passed a chamber of Congress. It is not perfect and could be improved. For example, there should be a uniform period of time
for carriers to maintain the telephone metadata. Another could be designating a specific format in which the carriers must maintain the data to
allow more expeditious analysis once the data is appropriately obtained. The
USA FREEDOM Act strikes a balance between
maintaining our national security capabilities and protecting privacy and civil liberties, and this should
always be the goal. Conclusion The threat of international terrorism is real and on the rise. The United States
remains in a state of armed conflict against non-state actors: al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, ISIS, and associated forces. Winning this armed
conflict requires a coordinated, sophisticated, and comprehensive strategy that harnesses all aspects of America’s national power. For decades,
over many armed conflicts,
the United States has relied on and utilized the fruits of lawful signals intelligence to
disrupt, degrade, detect, and ultimately defeat the enemies of the United States. Today, because of
stunning advances in technology, we have the ability to search through billions of anonymous bits of
telephone call data and draw connections among known and suspected foreign terrorists about whom
we otherwise might never have known. Those connections and the connections made possible by other aspects of national
power enable those who defend our freedoms to keep us safe. In crafting the best policies with respect to mining telephone metadata,
Congress has a solemn duty to abide by the Constitution, particularly our Fourth Amendment right to be secure in our persons, houses, papers,
and effects against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” At the same time, Congress has to recognize that telephone metadata is not a
subscriber’s personal property: It is owned by the telephone companies as part of their business records. Yet the data is sensitive, and
American citizens expect that their phone records, even if they do not own them, are private information. Congress must find a way to balance
these two interests, because allowing the capacity to query third-party telephone metadata—signals intelligence—to expire is unwise and
dangerous, especially during a time of armed conflict. The three options contained in this paper are all considered viable options by some. None
will make everyone happy, but now it is time for Congress to make a choice.
Economy Frontline 1/
Companies are circumventing localization now:
 foreign lobbying
 legislative reform
 foreign data centers
Jonah Force Hill ‘14 (technology and international affairs consultant based in San Francisco and
a Fellow of the Global Governance Futures program, “THE GROWTH OF DATA
LOCALIZATION POST-SNOWDEN: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S.
POLICYMAKERS AND BUSINESS LEADERS”)
In an attempt to stem the data localization trend, U.S. firms and trade associations have launched
a multi-pronged campaign to regain the trust of foreign governments and customers. Intense
lobbying efforts are underway to reform U.S. surveillance laws,18 which have been viewed as
overly permissive with regard to governmental collection of data, and to highlight the many
ways that localization could harm economic competitiveness and growth.19 Domestically,
Microsoft20 and Google, joined by Apple, Facebook and other firms, successfully sued the U.S.
government in order to gain legal authority to provide the public greater detail on the information
the U.S. government collects from them.21 Google’s Eric Schmidt, Facebook’s Mark
Zuckerberg, Netflix’s Reed Hastings, and the leaders of Dropbox, Palantir, and other top tech
executives met with President Barack Obama in March 2014, to discuss potential surveillance
reforms.22 IBM is reportedly spending more than a billion dollars to build 15 new data
centers overseas in an effort to preempt formalized localization rules.23 Salesforce.com, a
major cloud services provider, has announced similar plans.
Economy resilient
Donald Kohn 15, Senior Fellow in Economic Studies at Brookings, 1/30/15, U.S. Monetary Policy:
Moving Toward the Exit in an Interconnected Global Economy,
www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2015/01/30-us-monetary-policy-global-economy-kohn
The global financial authorities have made major strides in making their systems more resilient to
unexpected developments, in particular with higher capital and greater liquidity for banks and bank
holding companies. In several jurisdictions, banks have been stress tested with scenarios that included
rising rates. Moreover, we’ve seen several episodes in which volatility and risk spreads have risen,
including the summer of 2013 during the so-called taper tantrum, and in the past few months amid
mounting uncertainty about global economic prospects, plunging oil prices, growing political and
economic tensions in the euro area, and strong monetary policy responses. Although there’s been some
fallout from these financial market developments, none has threatened financial stability.
Economy Frontline 2/
Economic decline doesn’t cause war.
Ferguson ‘6 (Niall, Professor of History – Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, 85(5), September /
October, Lexis)
Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links
the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany
started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression
were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between
economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of
growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some
severe economic crises were not followed by wars.
Economy Frontline 3/
Zero risk of Internet Collapse.
JOHN C. DVORAK ‘7 (columnist for PCMag.com, May 1, “Will the Internet Collapse?”
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2124376,00.asp
When is the Internet going to collapse? The answer is NEVER. The Internet is amazing for no other reason than that it
hasn't simply collapsed, never to be rebooted. Over a decade ago, many pundits were predicting an all-out catastrophic failure, and back then
the load was nothing compared with what it is today. So how much more can this network take? Let's look at the basic changes that have
occurred since the Net became chat-worthy around 1990. First of all, only a few people were on the Net back in 1990, since it was essentially a
carrier for e-mail (spam free!), newsgroups, gopher, and FTP. These capabilities remain. But the e-mail load has grown to phenomenal
proportions and become burdened with megatons of spam. In one year, the amount of spam can exceed a decade's worth, say 1990 to 2000, of
all Internet traffic. It's actually the astonishing overall growth of the Internet that is amazing. In 1990, the total U.S. backbone throughput of the
Internet was 1 terabyte, and in 1991 it doubled to 2TB. Throughput continued to double until 1996, when it jumped to 1,500TB. After that huge
jump, it returned to doubling, reaching 80,000 to 140,000TB in 2002.
This ridiculous growth rate has continued as more
and more services are added to the burden. The jump in 1996 is attributable to the one-two punch of the universal
popularization of the Web and the introduction of the MP3 standard and subsequent music file sharing. More recently, the emergence of inane
video clips (YouTube and the rest) as universal entertainment has continued to slam the Net with overhead, as has large video file sharing via
BitTorrent and other systems. Then VoIP came along, and IPTV is next. All the while, e-mail numbers are in the trillions of messages, and spam
has never been more plentiful and bloated. Add blogging, vlogging, and twittering and it just gets worse. According to some expensive studies,
the growth rate has begun to slow down to something like 50 percent per year. But that's growth on top of huge numbers. Petabytes. So when
does this thing just grind to a halt or blow up To date, we have to admit that the structure of the Net is robust, to say the least. This is
impressive, considering the fact that experts were predicting a collapse in the 1990s. Robust or not, this Internet is a transportation system. It
transports data. All transportation systems eventually need upgrading, repair, basic changes, or reinvention. But what needs to be done here?
This, to me, has come to be the big question. Does anything at all need to be done, or do we run it into the ground and then fix it later? Is this
like a jalopy leaking oil and water about to blow, or an organic perpetual-motion machine that fixes itself somehow? Many believe that the Net
has never collapsed because it does tend to fix itself. A decade ago we were going to run out of IP addresses—remember? It righted itself, with
rotating addresses and subnets. Many of the Net's improvements are self-improvements. Only spam, viruses, and spyware represent incurable
diseases that could kill the organism. I
have to conclude that the worst-case scenario for the Net is an outage here
or there, if anywhere. After all, the phone system, a more machine-intensive system, never really imploded after years and years of
growth, did it? While it has outages, it's actually more reliable than the power grid it sits on. Why should the
Internet be any different now that it is essentially run by phone companies who know how to keep networks up? And let's be real here. The Net
is being improved daily, with newer routers and better gear being constantly hot-swapped all over the world. This is not the same Internet we
had in 1990, nor is it what we had in 2000. While phone companies seem to enjoy nickel-and-diming their customers to death with various
petty scams and charges, they could easily charge one flat fee and spend their efforts on quality-of-service issues and improving overall
network speed and throughput. That will never happen, and phone companies will forever be loathed. But when
all is said and done,
it's because of them that the Internet will never collapse. That's the good news. The bad news is they now own
the Internet—literally—and they'll continue to play the nickel-and-dime game with us.
Economy Ext: 2NC: Resilience
Global economic governance institutions guarantee resiliency
Daniel W. Drezner ‘12, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October
2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,”
http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_TheIrony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf
Prior to 2008, numerous foreign policy analysts had predicted a looming crisis in global economic governance.
Analysts only reinforced this perception since the financial crisis, declaring that we live in a “G-Zero” world. This paper takes a closer look at
the global response to the financial crisis. It reveals a more optimistic picture . Despite initial shocks that
were actually more severe than the 1929 financial crisis, global economic governance structures responded quickly
and robustly. Whether one measures results by economic outcomes, policy outputs, or institutional flexibility, global economic
governance has displayed surprising resiliency since 2008. Multilateral economic institutions performed well
in crisis situations to reinforce open economic policies, especially in contrast to the 1930s. While there are areas where
governance has either faltered or failed, on the whole, the system has worked. Misperceptions about global economic
governance persist because the Great Recession has disproportionately affected the core economies – and because the efficiency of past
periods of global economic governance has been badly overestimated. Why the system has worked better than expected remains an open
question. The rest of this paper explores the possible role that the distribution of power, the robustness of international regimes, and the
resilience of economic ideas might have played.
Trade Frontline 1/
Turn: Preferential Trade agreements increase the likelihood of conflict by antagonizing
excluded nations. Best evidence concludes.
Timothy M Peterson ’15 (Department of Political Science, University of South Carolina, “Insiders
versus Outsiders: Preferential Trade Agreements, Trade Distortions, and Militarized Conflict,” Journal of
Conflict Resolution, Vol. 59(4).)
States entering into preferential trade agreements (PTAs) stand to gain considerably from the reduction or elimination of trade barriers with
members. However, since pioneering work by Viner (1950), scholars have noted that gains from preferential liberalization could accrue at the
expense of third parties from whom trade is diverted rather than from the creation of trade that would not otherwise exist. Given the potential
for some PTAs to reshape trade patterns to the advantage of members, it stands to reason that states
excluded from such an
agreement might view it as a threat. This perception could, in turn, spark political tension between
members and excluded states. Despite the potential for some PTAs to provoke threat perception among states left out of the
agreement, there has been little study of the potentially aggravating impact of PTAs on the political relationships of members vis-a`-vis
nonmembers. Rather, numerous studies emphasize that PTAs can reduce conflict propensity between members benefiting from trade
integration (e.g., Mansfield, Pevehouse, and Bearce 1999/2000; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2000; but see Hafner-Burton and Montgomery
2012). A focus on the peace within PTAs is not surprising, given that trade agreements have proliferated relatively recently, during a period in
which militarized conflict between states has been rare. However,
regionalism is flourishing, as multilateral
liberalization falters (as evidenced, e.g., by the stalling of the Doha round World Trade Organization [WTO] negotiations). Recent years
have witnessed the relative decline of US hegemony, which arguably facilitated a global liberal trade regime in the post–World War II period
(e.g., Gilpin 1987; Gowa 1986; Keohane 1984; Kindleberger 1973; Krasner 1976; Mansfield 1998). Simultaneously, China,
along with
other developing states, has begun pursuing PTAs, as its economic and military power grows. These
developments suggest a need to examine the potentially competitive nature of (at least some) PTAs, and the consequential possibility of
conflict between members and nonmembers thereof. At a minimum, exclusive
PTAs could reduce the degree to which
members and nonmembers enjoy this era of reduced hostilities. At worst, discriminatory trade
agreements could engender zero-sum trade policies and rising inter-bloc conflict in the coming years. In
this article, I argue that PTAs promote member versus nonmember conflict when they reduce—at least in relative terms—the exports of
nonmembers, leading these states to perceive a threat to their economic security. Accordingly, I examine altered trade patterns associated with
PTAs as a predictor of conflict between dyads wherein one state belongs to a PTA excluding the other state. I
introduce a new
technique to estimate this phenomenon using a triadic extension of the gravity model of trade. Using
estimates of the degree to which one dyadic state’s exports are affected by the other’s membership in an exclusive PTA, I find that trade
distortions resulting in relatively lower exports for the non-PTA member are associated with a higher
probability that a dyad experiences a militarized interstate dispute (MID) or fatal MID.1 However, I also find
that this effect becomes less consistent as dyadic trade becomes more important to each state’s economy. As dyadic trade increases, so too
Peterson 699 does the variation in the degree to which a PTA outsider harmed by trade distortions tolerates this discriminatory behavior by the
PTA insider. This point is particularly salient for foreign policy makers because it suggests that retaliation against perceived threats, for example,
through the imposition of import barriers or the formation of a competing bloc, could amplify the risk of hostilities. I proceed with a discussion
of the research linking PTAs to economic and political competition. Then, I explore the consequences for dyadic peace of distorted trade
patterns associated with PTAs, introducing a triadic extension of the gravity model of trade to estimate the influence of exclusive PTAs on trade.
Next, I describe my research design and present a statistical analysis of the link between PTAs, reshaped trade patterns, and militarized conflict
between 1961 and 2000. I conclude with a discussion of the relevance of my findings for scholars and policy makers alike amid the accelerating
proliferation of PTAs.
Trade Frontline 2/
Globalization unsustainable- 7 Warrants: speed, extension, resources, ecology,
population, inequality, systemic market vulnerability.
Sandra Bhatasara ’11 (Lecturer & Member of the Faculty of Social Studies Research Working
Committee University of Zimbabwe, “From Globalization to Global Sustainability: Perspectives on
Transitions,” Journal of Global Citizenship & Equity Education, Volume 1 Number 1 )
This paper presents a transition perspective to sustainable globalization. In my view, globalization is not entirely bad. Globalization presents
various opportunities in different domains. However, we cannot deny the fact that the
current nature of globalization, in terms
of the speed, extensiveness and impacts on the earth system is unsustainable. The argument that globalization
should be steered towards sustainability is undeniable yet the daunting question is how can that be done? The complexity of
globalization and sustainability defy simplistic explanations, thus one should take an interactive
perspective on transition by looking at some key scenarios in global governance, global trade,
multinational corporations, markets and information systems. However, one ought to acknowledge that transitions
should be viewed in long term perspectives. Specific targets, indicators for transition and importance vary. There is no guarantee that
transitions to sustainable globalization will be smooth thus, a number of challenges can be seen such as lack of institutional mechanisms,
resources, political and ideological resistance among others. In this regard, the imperatives for understanding the necessity for transitions, the
possible scenarios and challenges will be understood by subjecting relevant literature to critical scrutiny using the Critical Discourse Analysis
approach. This paper should be considered as a “think piece”. Globalization, sustainability and transitions are too complex to be considered
only from literature reviews. However, on the basis of the literature I have reviewed, it has been possible to derive some scenarios and
conclusions on the transition to sustainable globalization. Review and Definitions of Concepts Globalization has a plurality of definitions, some
of them proffered by the internalization, liberalization, universalization, westernization, modernization and deterritorialization approaches. This
paper is concerned with transition to sustainable globalization which stems from the fact that the current nature of globalization is
unsustainable hence the definition proffered here. Globalization refers to the unsustainable, accelerated integration, at the global level, of
economic growth, environmental problems, human development, cultural dynamics and political engagements. Sustainability is a difficult
concept to define for various reasons. It is normative and there is no global consensus on what should be sustained. Some people argue for
sustaining production systems whilst others argue for sustaining consumption patterns. At the same time, there are others who call for
sustaining environmental quality, economic and social capital (Kemp and Loorbach, 2003). Borrowing from the World Commission on
Environment and Development (1987), the issue of sustainability is related to development or growth that meets the present needs without
endangering the ability of future generations to meet their needs. Sustainability should be about equal opportunities to utilize resources intragenerationally and inter-generationally. Sustainability should also be based on the ethical principles of equity in distribution of income, wealth
and control of resources. The National Research Council (1999), defines sustainability transition as meeting the needs of a stabilizing future
world population while reducing hunger, poverty and maintaining the planet’s life support systems. The definitions by the World Commission
on Environment and Development and the National Research Council capture the three pillars of sustainability, which are economy, society and
ecology on which transitions to sustainability should focus. Grosskurth and Rotmans (2004), argue that one important denominator of these
definitions is an implied balance of economic, ecological and social developments. The concept of sustainable development has received
criticism from various angles, one example being that it is considered as vague. Some scholars argue that the concept lacks definitional clarity
thus it is prone to manipulation. However, the lack of clarity can be a strength in the sense it allows for a multiplicity of contextual
interpretations which are absent in classical development discourses. At the same time, sustainability in most cases is interpreted in economic
terms to mean sustainable economic development. Bensimon and Benatar (2006), for example argue that sustainable development should not
be considered in economic terms, but should reflect other important aspects that are needed for a decent human life as well (e.g. education, a
healthy living environment and democracy). As noted by Huynen (2008), they propose an alternate concept the “development of sustainability”
instead of sustainable development. Transition is also a highly contested concept, invoking various views from different scholars. According to
Rotmans (2000), referring to the ICIS-MERIT (International Center for Integrated Assessment and Sustainable Development–Maastricht
University Economic and Social Research Institute for Innovation and Technology) Report, transition is a gradual process of societal change in
which society or an important sub-system of society structurally changes. Kemp and Loorbach, (2003) noted that transition is a result of an
interplay of developments that sustain and reinforce each other thus transitions are not caused by a single variable and are non-linear in
nature. Thus, borrowing from Martens and Rotmans (2002), in this paper, transitions refer to possible policies, strategies, paths or projects that
can be undertaken towards the development of sustainability in a globalizing world. A Case for Transitions to Sustainable Globalization The
phenomenon of globalization raises a number of questions or even quarrels and one of the most imperative questions is on sustainability. Here
I present why we need transitions to sustainability in a globalizing world. Supporters of globalization often associate it with unending prosperity
and peace yet there are built in contradictions that make globalization unsustainable. Globalization supporters address the question of
sustainability in a token fashion, if at all. The rapid growth of global markets and corporate capital is evident; however this growth raises the
issue of sustainability. Huynen (2008) noted that “today it is acknowledged that achieving sustainable development on a global scale is one of
the greatest challenges for the 21st century” (p. 3). In addition, a number of scholars converge on the idea that the
current nature of
globalization is threatening the earth’s capacity to sustain life. Nagarajan (2006) noted that some global indicators of
change in the Earth’s landscape are distinct signs of human domination of the planet. These are increased atmospheric carbon
dioxide, substantial modification of the planet’s land surface, increased use of finite fresh water supply,
vastly modified nitrogen cycles, overexploitation or depleted fisheries and mass extinction of species
(Nagarajan, 2006). Global warming, the thinning of the ozone layer, pollution, loss of biodiversity,
depletion of natural resources, widespread desertification and deforestation are occurring within the
context of globalization. These environmental problems restrict the set of options at the disposal of future generations to meet their
needs thus sustainability becomes problematic. Furthermore, massive population movement and urbanization are also
causing an ecological crisis. Ecological degradation reduces land productivity, threatens human health
and worsens the conditions of the poor. In this regard, globalization is unsustainable. Globalization may improve the material
and social wellbeing of poor people but may be economically, socially, politically and ecologically unsustainable. The volatility of global
markets is evident and history may repeat itself. The crash of the Argentine economy, the financial crisis
in Asia in 1997 and the 2008 worldwide financial crisis are clear indicators of how financial contagion can
produce economic depression. The volatility of global financial markets is systemic and there is nothing
that is fully regulating it. Electronic trading makes it impossible to regulate global financial markets and international financial
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are unable to do so. The myth of free trade is causing instability and socio-economic
exclusion of the poor. According to Baum (2001), the current forms of globalization are making the world a safe place for unfettered market
liberalism and the consequent growth of inequities. The developed countries use protectionist policies and subsidies on agricultural and
cultural products whilst reducing protection over manufacturing industries. This is leading to the marginalization of the less developed
countries in the form of low trade. In addition, there are myopic ideas of economic growth with prosperity. What is happening is not economic
growth but, growth of specialization of production in countries such as India and China. The question is who will consume all the innovation and
products? Another reason, globalization is economically unsustainable is because of labour requirements and the devaluation of labour. The
question is who will provide labour for the entire world? Globalization is
socio-culturally unsustainable because it is
exclusionary and uneven. Two thirds of humanity is living in endemic poverty yet high growth rates are
being witnessed. There is poverty among plenty or growth with poverty. The trickle down effect that proponents of globalization talk
about has remained elusive. International and intra national income inequalities have widened. Globalization is distorting and
swallowing local and national cultural values. Globalization is destroying subsistence economies of the
poor, social security and moral geographies of poor nations. The principles of sustainability are therefore distorted.
McMichael, Smith and Corvalan (2000) noted that it is because of unmanaged “transition” to development that is generalized to all countries in
the form of unsustainable production patterns and wasteful consumption of rich nations that a new system is urgently required. Financial
assistance to the poor nations by the developed nations is reducing the poor nations to super exploited neo-colonies relegated to the roles of
primary commodity producers entirely dependent and subordinate to the powers of multinational corporations. Globalization
creates
a risky and speculative or spoiled dependency. The nation state is said to have been incapacitated by liberalization. On another
note, immigration policies of the developed countries are exclusionary. They regulate the free movement of skilled labour yet they advocate
free, unregulated trade. Globalization supposes integration yet there are no equal opportunities between the rich and the poor. This inequality
negatively affects the economic performance of the poor countries. Global
inequalities may also give rise to nationalistic
reactions, resentment and terrorism thus upsetting peace and political stability.
Trade Frontline 3/
Turn: Free trade benefits are more than reversed by increasing the wealth gap.
Josh Bivens April 22, ‘15 (Economic Policy Institute, “No, the TPP Won’t Be Good for the Middle Class,”
http://www.epi.org/blog/no-the-tpp-wont-be-good-for-the-middle-class/ )
President Obama has been vociferously defending the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) recently. He insists that it will be good for the American
middle class and that TPP’s critics arguing otherwise are wrong. But in this case he’s wrong and the TPP critics are right: there
is no
indication at all that the TPP will be good for the American middle class. I tried to take this on in very wonky terms in
this long-ish report here, and in this post I’ll try to boil it down a bit. The basic argument for why the TPP is likely to be a bad deal for the middle
class is pretty simple. For one,
even a genuine “free trade agreement” that was passed with no other
complementary policies would actually not be good for the American middle class, even if it did
generate gains to total national income. For another, the TPP (like nearly all trade agreements the U.S. signs) is not a
“free trade agreement”—instead it’s a treaty that will specify just who will be protected from
international competition and who will not. And the strongest and most comprehensive protections offered are by far those for
U.S. corporate interests. Finally, there are international economic agreements that the United States could be negotiating to help the American
middle class. They would look nothing like the TPP. Even genuine “free trade” would likely be hard on the American middle class Most (not all,
but most) of the countries that would be included in the TPP are poorer and more labor-abundant than the United States. Standard trade
theory has a clear prediction of what happens when the United States expands trade with such countries:
total national income rises
in both countries but so much income is redistributed upwards within the United States that most
workers are made worse off. This is sometimes called “the curse of Stolper-Samuelson”, after the theory that first predicted it. And
there is plenty of evidence to suggest that it’s not just a theory, but a pretty good explanation for (part of) the dismal performance of wages for
most American workers in recent decades and the rise in inequality. And the scale of the wage-losses are much, much larger than commonly
realized—it’s not just those workers who lose their jobs to imports. Instead, the majority of American workers (those without a 4-year college
degree) see wage declines as a result of reduced trading costs. The intuition is simply that while waitresses and landscapers might not lose their
jobs to imports, their wages are hurt by having to compete with trade-displaced apparel and steel workers. All
of this evidence means
that the burden of proof is awfully high for those claiming that a simple trade agreement that reduces
trading costs and expands imports and exports will be affirmatively good for the American middle class.
What exactly will this treaty do that will turn the predictions and evidence about past global integration completely on their head? The
standard argument from those supporting trade agreements who are genuinely concerned about the middle class (and to be clear—I do believe
the President is genuinely concerned about the middle class) is that these agreements generate gains to total national income, and that these
gains then could be channeled through subsequent policy maneuvers to those on the losing end. Maybe, but
the net national gains
from lowering trade costs tend to be wildly overestimated. In short, even “free trade” tends to redistribute
a lot more (about 5 or 6 times as much) income as it generates.
Trade Frontline 4/
Total Defense: Free trade theory doesn’t apply to current deals. IPR protection guts
any benefit.
Josh Bivens April 22, ‘15 (Economic Policy Institute, “No, the TPP Won’t Be Good for the Middle Class,”
http://www.epi.org/blog/no-the-tpp-wont-be-good-for-the-middle-class/ )
Given that complementary policies to re-re-distribute the income redistributed away from typical
American workers are a necessary condition to make the middle class better off from “free trade”, one
is compelled to ask just what are the subsequent policy maneuvers that the current Congress will likely
undertake to compensate those on the losing end? Yes, there has been some talk about beefing up
Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA), but this is compensation that is too small by an order of magnitude
(see the conclusion in this report for the right comparison). TPP isn’t even about free trade—it’s about
who will and won’t face fierce global competition. And guess who won’t? And as has been welldocumented by now, much of what the U.S. policymaking class champions under the rubric of “free
trade” is nothing of the sort. For example, the biggest winners from trade agreements have traditionally
been U.S. corporations that rely on enforcing intellectual property monopolies for their profits—
pharmaceutical and software companies, for example. These companies have been successful in getting
U.S. negotiators to make enforcing their intellectual property monopolies in our trading partners’
economies the price of admission to preferential access to the U.S. market. It is not just an irritating bit
of chutzpah to label agreements with provisions like this as “free trade agreements” (though it certainly
is that), these provisions actually affirmatively make the distributional outcomes even more regressive
than simple “free trade” would already make them. Further, between these provisions and the
intentional failure to include a strong provision to stop currency management undertaken by our trading
partners, the TPP will even manage to substantially blunt any beneficial impact the treaty might have
had in expanding access to foreign markets for most U.S. exporters. Because foreign consumers will
have to pay more now for US exports covered by intellectual property monopolies and will hence have
less income left over to buy other U.S. exports, and because foreign governments will remain free to
keep their own currencies artificially competitive relative to the U.S. dollar, U.S. exporters of
manufactured goods are likely to see not much improvement at all in their market share in trading
partner economies. What would a good international agreement for the middle class look like? Simply
put, nothing at all like the TPP.
Trade Frontline 5/
Alt Causality: US dumping is the key barrier to global free trade.
Daniel J. Ikenson ’13 (director of Cato’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies, Forbes on
January 16, “Protectionist Antidumping Regime Is a Pox on America’s Glass House,”)
Other candidates come to mind when contemplating the world’s worst international trade scofflaw, but the United States makes a strong case
for itself. A recent Commerce Department determination that foreign companies like Samsung, LG, and Electrolux engaged in “targeted
dumping” by reducing prices on their washing machines for Black Friday sales confirms that the United States is actively seeking that
ignominious distinction. U.S. policies have been the subject of more World Trade Organization disputes (119, followed by the EU with 73, then
China with 30) and have been found to violate WTO rules more frequently than any other government’s policies. No
government is
more likely to be out of compliance with a final WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) ruling — or for a longer
period — than the U.S. government. To this day, the United States remains out of compliance in cases involving
U.S. subsidies to cotton farmers, restrictions on Antigua’s provision of gambling services, country of
origin labeling requirements on meat products, the so-called Byrd Amendment, a variety of antidumping
measures, and several other issues, some of which were adjudicated more than a decade ago. In some
of these cases, U.S. trade partners have either retaliated, or been authorized to retaliate, against U.S.
exporters or asset holders, yet the non-compliance continues as though the United States considers
itself above the rules. Despite all the official high-minded rhetoric about the pitfalls of protectionism and
the importance of minding the trade rules, the U.S. government is a serial transgressor. Nowhere is this
tendency to break the rules more prevalent than it is with respect to the Commerce Department’s administration of the antidumping law.
Nearly 38 percent (45 of 119) of the WTO cases in which U.S. policies have been challenged concern U.S. violations of the WTO Antidumping
Agreement. The epidemic of targeted dumping findings — such as the one concerning washing machines, if the U.S. International Trade
Commission renders an affirmative injury finding next week — will more than likely produce new WTO cases. The antidumping law is purported
to exist to protect American companies and their workers from the effects of foreign competitors selling their products in the United States at
“unfairly low” prices. Why price competition — encouraged as it is between domestic rivals — suddenly becomes unfair or worth thwarting
when foreigners are offering the lower prices is a question without a satisfactory answer. The public is under the false impression that trade is a
contest between Team America and the foreign team, and that they should cheer when our government erects barriers to defend us against
foreign commercial success. The persistence of that mindset shields U.S. antidumping policy from the scrutiny it deserves. Instead, the law has
become a mechanism through which domestic companies — with the assistance of creative lawyers and a captured government agency that is
committed to keeping America safe from imports — can saddle their competition (both foreign and domestic) with higher costs, control supply,
increase their own prices, and reap higher profits. Nevermind that this “success” comes at the expense of consumers and firms in downstream
industries that require access to the restricted product. While President Obama urges U.S. companies to become more competitive at home
and abroad, the U.S. antidumping law kneecaps these very same enterprises by making their industrial inputs and intermediate goods scarce
and more expensive — as described and documented in this paper. It also inspires retaliatory protectionism abroad. In general terms, dumping
is defined as the sale of a product in a foreign market at a lower price than the price obtained by the same producer in his home market.
Dumping is measured by comparing a foreign producer’s U.S. and home market prices over a specific period of time. For each comparison, the
difference between the U.S. price and the home market price is considered the unit margin of dumping. A positive dumping margin results
when the U.S. price is lower than the home market price and a negative dumping margin is the result when the U.S. price exceeds the home
market price. The antidumping duty ultimately imposed is, in theory, equal to the weighted average dumping margin calculated for all U.S. sales
expressed as a percentage of U.S. sales value. Under the WTO Antidumping Agreement (ADA), governments are permitted to have antidumping
laws and to apply antidumping duties to redress dumping that is found to be a cause of material injury to the domestic industry producing the
same or similar products. Although the ADA is deferential to national governments when it comes to the details of implementing their
antidumping laws, it does articulate certain minimum standards intended to limit the scope for abuse, such as reaching affirmative findings of
dumping when no dumping has occurred or manufacturing punitively high antidumping duty rates, for example. But this seemingly mechanical
exercise of comparing prices and calculating margins is rife with subjective interference and methodological sleights of hand. Under the U.S.
antidumping law, the Commerce Department maintains considerable discretion when it comes to determining the existence and measuring the
magnitude of dumping. Which sales should be included in calculating average prices? What product models should be collapsed together and
treated as a single model for purposes of calculating average prices? What expenses should be subtracted from gross prices before net prices
are compared between markets? Is there evidence of targeted dumping? Those are just a few of the many kinds of consequential, resultschanging decisions the Commerce Department renders during the course of an antidumping proceeding. That broad discretion has been
abused over the years, as confirmed by the hundreds of U.S. court rulings that have found the Commerce Department acting illegally or
otherwise beyond it authority. Just as U.S. antidumping administration has so frequently run afoul of the U.S. law, it has also been found on
dozens of occasions to violate U.S. obligations under the WTO Antidumping Agreement. In 12 of the 45 cases in which ADA violations were
alleged by U.S. trade partners, the methodological trick known as “zeroing” was at least one of the subjects of controversy. Ultimately, this
issue is the motivation behind the Commerce Department’s shenanigans in the case involving imported washing machines, targeted dumping,
and Black Friday sales. “ Despite
all the official high-minded rhetoric about the pitfalls of protectionism and the importance of
minding the trade rules, the U.S. government is a serial transgressor.” To appreciate the affront to fairness and mathematical
integrity that zeroing represents, recall that antidumping duty rates are determined by calculating a weighted average dumping margin, which
derives from individual dumping margins calculated for multiple comparisons. Some of those comparisons produce positive dumping margins
(whenever the U.S. price is lower than the home market price) and some yield negative dumping margins (whenever the U.S. price is higher
than the home market price). Zeroing refers to the practice of assigning those negative dumping margins a value of “ 0″ before calculating the
weighted average dumping margin, which has the effect of increasing the weighted average dumping margin and the applied antidumping duty
rate. Analysis from the Cato Institute found that zeroing, in a sample of 18 actual antidumping case records reviewed, artificially inflated
antidumping duties by 44 percent. Here’s how it works in practice. Let’s say a foreign widget producer makes two sales in the United States. He
sells one widget at a net price of $1.00 and the other at a net price of $3.00. In his home market, he sells the same widgets for $2.00. Is he
dumping? There is a dumping margin of $1.00 on the first sale ($2.00 — $1.00 = $1.00) and a dumping margin of minus (-)$1.00 on the second
sale ($2.00 — $3.00 = -$1.00). The weighted average dumping margin is 0 and thus there is no dumping. But when the Commerce Department
engages in zeroing, it treats the -$1.00 dumping margin as equal to $0.00, denying its impact on the overall weighted average dumping margin.
By zeroing, the Commerce Department would find a total dumping margin of $1.00 and express it over the total value of all U.S. sales ($4.00),
which would yield an antidumping duty rate of 25 percent. Magic! Zeroing has been found by the WTO Appellate Body — on numerous
occasions and under multiple comparison methodologies — to violate Article 2.4 of the ADA because it precludes consideration of the impact of
all export sales in determining the existence and magnitude of dumping, and thus precludes a fair comparison. After many years of appeals and
foot-dragging, the United States finally changed its policy to comply, grudgingly, with the jurisprudence that has shut the door on zeroing under
all circumstances, using all comparison methodologies…with the possibility of one tiny exception. (This article describes the evolution of the
zeroing jurisprudence and provides a detailed analysis of this “tiny exception.”) Article 2.4.2 of the Antidumping Agreement states that the
existence of margins of dumping during the investigation phase “shall normally be established” by comparing prices on an average-to-average
or transaction-to-transaction basis, but may be conducted on a home market average-to-individual export transactions basis: [I]f the authorities
find a pattern of export prices which differ significantly among different purchasers, regions or time periods, and if an explanation is provided
as to why such differences cannot be taken into account appropriately by the use of a weighted average-to-weighted average or transaction-totransaction comparsion. The justification for the exception under Article 2.4.2 is, presumably, that that comparison methodology allows the
authorities to home in on targeted dumping, which may be revealed by patterns of price differences among purchasers, regions or time
periods. Some have argued that zeroing must be permissible under the exceptional method because otherwise its prohibition would yield
results identical to those obtained under the weighted average-to-weighted average method. This “mathematical equivalence” argument, as it
is called, holds that there would be no practical reason for the exception to exist if zeroing were precluded, and that would then violate the
rules of effective treaty interpretation by rendering the exception inutile. And, finally, this takes us back to Commerce Department’s
determination that foreign washing machine manufacturers are engaging in targeted dumping. The Commerce Department is attempting to
operationalize the mathematical equivalence argument by making this tiny, rarely-ever-used exception the new rule so that it has license to
engage in zeroing and inflate antidumping duty rates on behalf of certain domestic producers. But it is carelessly and defiantly overplaying its
hand. For starters, the standards that Commerce is trying to establish for finding a “pattern of export prices which differ significantly among
different purchasers, regions or time periods” have no statistical rigor, no theoretical underpinnings, and no relation whatsoever to unmasking,
isolating, or measuring targeted dumping. Two arbitrary benchmarks must be met to find targeted dumping. First, at least 33 percent by
volume of the sales to an allegedly targeted group must be at prices that are less than one standard deviation below the average price to all
other groups. Why 33 percent? Why one standard deviation? Neither figure is supported by statistics literature or law. Second, at least 5
percent of the volume of sales to the allegedly targeted group must be at prices that are lower than the average price of the lowest-priced nontargeted group by a margin (a gap) that is greater than the average gap between the average prices of all the non-targeted groups. The idea
here is that the allegedly targeted group should be uniquely identifiable as having received significantly lower prices. The problem again,
though, is the arbitrary nature of the 5 percent threshold. Seems way too low anyway. With those benchmarks satisfied, the Commerce
Department considers itself free to measure dumping by using the weighted average-to-transaction methodology for all sales, and to engage in
zeroing for all sales. Beyond these obvious shortcomings is the fact that if the application of zeroing to all sales to inflate dumping margins is
automatically triggered by the idenfication of any customer or any region (however infinitesimally small petitioners wish to define it) or any
time period (ranging anywhere from one day to one year) that meets the benchmarks for a targeted dumping analysis without need of any
plausible explanation as to why the particular group would be targeted, then every single petitioner in every subsequent case will pour over the
numbers and run their own statistical analyses to identify just one group, any group, however imaginatively defined, that satisfies those
benchmarks. Black Friday sales are an obvious candidate for a targeted group. This whole enterprise is an absurdity that other governments
should and will find offensive. In addition to the shortcomings identified above is the fact that the Commerce Department’s statistical tests are
not even doing what the Commerce Department thinks they’re doing. By comparing average prices instead of actual prices, the standard
deviations it uses as benchmarks are significantly tighter because the range of prices, which produce the standard deviations, has been
squeezed tighter by averaging them first. So, beyond all of the theoretical objections are these practical misapplications that, at the very least,
should be remanded back to Commerce by the courts. The Commerce Department’s sloppiness appears to be the product of a brute force
effort to clear any annoying obstacles in its drive to recuscitate zeroing as the default practice of the U.S. antidumping authorities. Finally, even
if the exceptional method is permitted in any given case, that doesn’t grant license for zeroing as Commerce conceives of it. There should be no
question that that approach will run afoul of the Appellate Body’s interpretation of what is permitted under the exceptional method. The AB
has ruled on numerous occasions that fealty to Article 2.4.2 cannot come at the expense of fealty to the fair comparison language of Article 2.4,
and zeroing all sales clearly commits that error. Unmasking and measuring the extent of targeted dumping does not necessitate resort to the
exceptional method for all sales. In fact, measuring targeted dumping can be achieved by resorting to the exceptional method and allowing
zeroing for only the targeted groups, while using the normal, average-to-average method without zeroing for all other comparisons. This
invalidates the “mathematical equivalence” argument. But the Commerce Department will no doubt have to revise its targeted dumping tests
first. The
regime.
United States is definitely one of the world’s biggest trade scofflaws and the antidumping
Trade Frontline 6/
They can’t reverse the burden of current US non-compliance with WTO.
Skyes 14 (Alan O., Robert A. Kindler Professor of Law at New York University School of
Law, "An Economic Perspective on As Such/Facial versus As Applied Challenges in the
WTO and U.S. Constitutional Systems," Journal of Legal Analysis, March 5, Winter 2013 5
(2))
Suppose that in the event of (at least any inefficient) harm to a potential claimant, the claimant will have an as
applied challenge and a remedy that is fully and accurately compensatory, in the sense that it restores the
welfare of the claimant to its level before the occurrence of the harm. Assume further that no third parties are affected by the
potential respondent’s conduct. Under these assumptions, as such challenges are simply unnecessary and can easily
prove counterproductive. The potential complainant by assumption is insulated from harm, the respondent will internalize costs of
inefficient harm to the complainant, and the respondent will be induced to act efficiently.48 If a claimant can bring an as such challenge
nevertheless, it will simply impose unnecessary costs on the respondent, and a claimant may even pursue a challenge strategically to try and
extract surplus. Putting aside third party externalities, these observations suggest that as such challenges are undesirable if claimants can bring
successful as applied challenges following inefficient harm and receive full compensation (ignoring litigation cost complications for the
moment). Conversely, inadequacy of the ex post remedy is a necessary condition for as such challenges to become desirable from an economic
standpoint although, as shall be seen, it is by no means sufficient. An
injured party’s remedies may prove inadequate for
three types of reasons. First, the substantive law at issue may afford no remedy for inefficient harms. For
example, imagine a system of tort law under which no injury is compensable unless it is intentionally inflicted. Under these circumstances, the
incentive for injurers to take economically worthwhile precautions against accidental harm will be lost,
even if the remedy for intentionally inflicted harms is fully compensatory. Although inefficiencies in the substantive
law represent an important class of problems in many fields, they afford little basis for choosing between as such and as applied challenges. If
the underlying substantive law fails to condemn inefficient behavior (or prevents efficient behavior), it seems unlikely that either type of
challenge can promote efficiency. Accordingly, I will assume that the underlying substantive law is efficient, in the sense that it at least allows a
claim for relief whenever the complainant suffers inefficient harm. A
second possible reason for inadequate remedies is
legal error in ex postadjudication. The complainant with a meritorious as applied challenge may be denied relief by mistake. I will not dwell
on this possibility either, however, because it seems unlikely to afford a compelling case for as such challenges. Indeed, for reasons that are
developed later, a pre-enforcement as such challenge may be more likely to result in error than a post-enforcement as applied challenge. The
third reason why remedies may prove inadequate is simply that they may fail to afford full and accurate
compensation for harm suffered. With particular reference to the WTO and the U.S. Constitutional systems,
serious concerns arise in this regard. Under WTO law, a violator incurs no formal sanction until a
complaining member has brought a case, received a favorable adjudication, and the violator has
exhausted a “reasonable period of time” to bring its behavior into compliance.49 The practical result is that a
violator can break the rules for a period of years before any formal sanction is triggered, and indeed can avoid
any formal sanction completely by curing the violation within the “reasonable period.” Commentators sometimes refer to this
system as the “three-year free pass.” In addition, it may be doubted that the formal remedy for WTO
violations after the expiration of the “reasonable period”—trade sanctions imposed by the complainant—can
compensate complainants even for the prospective harm suffered due to the ongoing violation.50 Small
countries, for example, cannot use trade sanctions to improve their terms of trade, and often complain that
retaliatory measures amount to “shooting themselves in the foot.” Larger countries with the ability to improve their
terms of trade through sanctions may also be undercompensated for prospective harm because of the principle that trade sanctions must be
“equivalent” to the harm caused by the violation, a vague standard administered in somewhat unclear fashion by WTO arbitrators. If the
arbitrators allow only the level of retaliation that restores the complainant’s terms of trade, for example, then the complainant is
undercompensated because of the decline in trade volume due to the violation.51 In
the U.S. Constitutional system, remedies
are also limited in many cases. Depending on the particular constitutional violation in question, damages for past harm
suffered may not be available at all, and the remedy may be limited to an order directing the government
to desist from the conduct in question going forward (such as an order declaring that the enforcement of a statute against
the plaintiff was unconstitutional). Likewise, some violations may involve conduct that irreparably alters the future course of affairs, such as
restrictions on speech or voting that affect the outcome of an election. Measures to
practical matter prove infeasible.
restore the status quo ante may as a
Trade Ext: 2NC PTA Turn 1/
Their attempt to increase trade through TPP-style preferential agreements increases
the risk of miscalculation and war. The SQ is safer because bi-lateral trade focus
empirically reduces the perception of discrimination.
Timothy M Peterson ’15 (Department of Political Science, University of South Carolina, “Insiders
versus Outsiders: Preferential Trade Agreements, Trade Distortions, and Militarized Conflict,” Journal of
Conflict Resolution, Vol. 59(4).)
Conclusion The results of my statistical analyses suggest that trade
distortions provoke hostility between PTA members
and nonmembers. However, this effect becomes less consistent as dyadic trade increases. The results of this study demonstrate that
economic agreements can be used as a form of discrimination, benefiting insiders at the expense of outsiders. Outsiders suffering
from trade distortions potentially could respond with hostility to a perceived economic attack. My
findings are critical for scholars and policy makers to consider, given the tension caused by mere
negotiations toward PTAs such as the TPP. If China were to perceive economic disadvantage following
from successful implementation of the TPP, it could accelerate its pursuit of rival PTAs such as the RCEP.
Escalation of such behavior has the potential to cause a conflict spiral. Although all-out war between the United
States and China seems unlikely in an era of nuclear deterrence, the pursuit of rival spheres of influence could escalate
into a situation not unlike the Cold War. Importantly, however, my results suggest that the negative implications of
PTA-distorted trade can be mitigated by continued reliance on dyadic trade. This point is particularly important for
policy makers, suggesting that further restriction of trade as retaliation against perceived distortion could be counterproductive to the goal of
avoiding conflict. Future research can benefit from examining additional consequences of PTAinduced trade distortions.
The perception
of threat from such distortions could lead states to increase their own levels of protectionism and may
promote the use of sanctions. Finally, it is important to note that division into rival blocs is not the only possible outcome of
preferential liberalization. States left out of agreements could lobby to expand the scope of integration in an inclusive manner.33 Accordingly,
future research can benefit from uncovering conditions that might preclude states from engaging in discriminatory trade practices,34 which,
although welfare enhancing for members, could provoke costly conflict with nonmembers in spite of predictions that the highly interdependent
global economy promotes enduring peace.
Trade Ext: 2NC PTA Turn 2/
Our Turn outweighs the case- 3 warrants:
 Their literature is biased to ignore conflict
 The Prisoner’s Dilemma creates an incentive for exclusive PTAs
 Domino Effect outweighs solvency
Timothy M Peterson ’15 (Department of Political Science, University of South Carolina, “Insiders
versus Outsiders: Preferential Trade Agreements, Trade Distortions, and Militarized Conflict,” Journal of
Conflict Resolution, Vol. 59(4))
The potential for preferential trade liberalization to enable discrimination by members against nonmembers is discussed by Viner (1950) in his
seminal study of the ‘‘customs union issue.’’ Specifically, Viner notes that preferential reduction in trade barriers can lead to a perverse form of
trade; instead of replacing inefficiently produced domestic commodities with efficiently produced foreign ones, PTAs can lead states to
discriminate in favor of insiders, importing from relatively less efficient member states rather than relatively more efficient third parties. In
other words, PTAs may be trade diverting rather than trade creating. Economists witnessing early PTAs feared that political
relationships could be harmed by these discriminatory agreements. Bhagwati (1991, 64) quotes a statement by John Maynard Keynes
suggesting that preferential liberalization is intrinsically adversarial: The separate blocs and all the friction and loss of friendship they must bring
with them are expedients to which one may be driven in a hostile world where trade has ceased over wide areas to be cooperative and
peaceful and where are forgotten the healthy rules of mutual advantage and equal treatment. But it is crazy to prefer that. Keynes
is
describing a classic example of a prisoner’s dilemma: while all states’ welfare would be improved by
multilateral liberalization, smaller groups of states face incentives to enact preferential liberalization
that benefits them at the expense of outsiders. Because there exists no global authority to prevent states from joining PTAs,2
states may be inclined to do so not simply because they seek to gain an advantage over outsiders (although this motivation is probably quite
common),3 but because they fear falling behind if others form agreements from which they are excluded.
Once a PTA is formed,
cooperation between states could break down throughout the system. Baldwin (1996; see also Mansfield 1998)
suggests the 700 Journal of Conflict Resolution 59(4) potential for a ‘‘domino effect’’ in which the formation of one PTA
causes outsiders to pursue rival agreements in order to offset the economic harm associated with
exclusion. Economists tend to examine the political consequences of PTAs only indirectly; however, they devote considerable attention to
the question of whether PTAs are truly welfare enhancing, given the potential for discrimination against more efficient nonmember states (e.g.,
Lipsey 1957; Wonnacott 1996; Panagariya and Krishna 2002). Additionally, a large literature examines whether PTAs are ‘‘stumbling blocks’’ or
‘‘building blocks’’ to wider, multilateral liberalization (e.g., Bhagwati 1991; Levy 1997; Baldwin and Seghezza 2008). Studies in the early 1990s
warned that regionalism could provoke tariff wars and even precipitate the collapse of international trade (e.g., Bhagwati 1991, 1992; Krugman
1991). However, later studies advocate a more sanguine view of regionalism, concluding that contemporary PTAs tend to be trade creating
rather than diverting and that preferential liberalization is enacted by interests favoring multilateral liberalization as a politically viable first step
in this direction amid opposition by domestic interests harmed by free trade (Oye 1992; Eichengreen and Frankel 1995; Mansfield and Milner
1999). Yet, other work suggests that PTA-induced discrimination could vary. For example, Kono (2007) suggests that PTAs could facilitate wider
liberalization in the specific case where members’ intra- and extra-PTA comparative advantages are similar, but have the opposite effect—
Given the
potential for at least some PTAs to be discriminatory, it follows that foreign policy makers perceiving
harm from an exclusive trade agreement might protest what they view as an economic alliance against
them. However, these political consequences of discriminatory trade practices have been largely
unexplored. Instead, research tends to focus on political benefits—including reduced conflict propensity—gained by states sharing
leading to higher external protectionism—when members’ comparative advantages differ for insiders versus outsiders.
membership in a trade agreement (e.g., Mansfield, Pevehouse, and Bearce, 1999/2000; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2000; Bearce and Omori
2005).4 The generally
optimistic view of PTAs could follow from a focus at the agreement or region level of
analysis, which obscures the reality that many states are enmeshed in a complex network of partially
overlapping trade agreements. In the next section, I explore the consequence of PTA involvement from the perspective of a dyad,
each state within which also trades with third parties. I outline the conditions under which reshaped trade patterns following from one state’s
participation in an exclusive PTA can elicit a perception by the nonmember that the trade agreement is threatening to that nonmember’s
economic security.