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FOCUS - 1 of 3 DOCUMENTS
RAMON MURILLO, Plaintiff, v. IAN PARKINSON, et al., Defendants.
No. CV 11-10131-JGB (VBK)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF
CALIFORNIA, WESTERN DIVISION
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79343
March 31, 2015, Decided
March 31, 2015, Filed
COUNSEL: [*1] Ramon Murillo, Plaintiff, Pro se, Delano, CA.
For Ian Parkinson, individual, Ian Parkinson, Sheriff, official capacity, County of San Luis Obispo, Ulloa, individual,
Ulloa, Deputy Sheriff, official capcity, Mayes, individual, Mayes, County Deputy Sheriff, official capacity, Adams,
individual, Adams, County Deputy Sheriff, official capacity, Rushing, individual, Rushing, County Deputy Sheriff, official capacity, San Luis Obispo County Jail, Defendants: Douglas C Smith, Nathan Aaron Perea, The Smith Law Offices
APC, Riverside, CA.
JUDGES: VICTOR B. KENTON, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
OPINION BY: VICTOR B. KENTON
OPINION
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Jesus G. Bernal, United States District Judge,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and General Order 05-07 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
PROCEEDINGS
On January 12, 2012, Ramon Murillo (hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiff") filed a "Civil Rights Complaint Pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983" against Defendants Ian Parkinson - Sheriff of San Luis Obispo County; County of San Luis Obispo;
Deputy Michael Ulloa; Deputy Mayes; Deputy Manpal; Deputy Adams; Sgt. Rushing; and the San Luis [*2] Obispo
County Jail.
On February 3, 2012, the Court issued an Order re Dismissal with Leave to Amend.
On March 26, 2012, Plaintiff filed a verified "First Amended Complaint."
On October 11, 2012, the Court issued an Order directing the United States Marshal to serve Defendants with a
Summons and First Amended Complaint.
On January 14, 2013, Defendants County of San Luis Obispo, Ian Parkinson, Emmett Rushing, Michael Ulloa, Tyler
Adams and Jeremiah Mayes filed an "Answer to the First Amended Complaint."
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2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79343, *
On July 1, 2014, Defendants Ian Parkinson, County of San Luis Obispo, Michael Ulloa, Tyler Adems, Jeremiah
Mayes and Emmett Rushing filed "Defendants' Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative
Partial Summary Judgment; and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof;" "Defendants' Separate
Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law;" "Defendants' Request for Judicial Notice;" "Declaration of
Emmett Rushing in Support of Defendants' Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative Partial
Summary Judgment;" "Declaration of Nathan A. Perea;" "Declaration of Michael Ulloa;" "Declaration of Attorney
Bradford J. Hinshaw, Esq.;" and [*3] "[Proposed] Order re Defendants' Notice and Motion for Summary Judgment or in
the Alternative Partial Summary Judgment."
On July 3, 2014, the Court issued a Minute Order ordering Plaintiff to file an Opposition or Statement of
Non-Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment within 30 days and attached a Rand 1 notice discussing the
requirements for opposing a motion for summary judgment.
1
Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 1998).
On August 22, 2014, Plaintiff filed a document entitled "Plaintiff's Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment."
On August 25, 2014, Plaintiff filed an "Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's First Amended
Complaint;" "Declaration of Ramon Murillo in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition re Motion for Summary Judgment;" and
"Plaintiff's Separate Statement of Uncontroverted Facts."
On September 12, 2014, Defendants filed "Defendants' Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment or in the Alternative Partial Summary Judgment."
Having reviewed the First Amended Complaint, Defendants' Answer, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment,
Plaintiff's Opposition and Defendants' Reply, the Court hereby recommends that [*4] Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment be granted in part and denied in part.
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS IN HER FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated her First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when Defendants
allegedly denied Plaintiff access to a law library, assaulted her, and withheld food, yard time, showers, clothing and
hormone therapy. (See First Amended Complaint ["FAC"] at pp. 6-7, 12.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants have
violated 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and 42 U.S.C. § 1986. (FAC at p. 2.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants discriminated against her
based on her transgender orientation. (Id.) Defendants denied Plaintiff law library access and retaliated against Plaintiff
for exercising her First Amendment rights. (FAC at pp. 4-6, 8-12.) Defendants also denied Plaintiff her Equal Protection
rights and conspired against her. (FAC at p. 2.) Plaintiff alleges that she was beaten and discriminated against for being
transgender. (FAC at pp. 3, 5-6.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Based on its review and consideration of the declarations and attached exhibits filed in support of and in opposition to
the pending Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court finds the following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted:
In May of 1999, Plaintiff was tried and convicted in San Bernardino County, California for [*5] violating seven
counts of California Penal Code ("PC") § 288(b)(1), forced sex with a minor. (Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts
["DSUF"] 3.) Plaintiff was sentenced to 32 years in prison. (DSUF 4.) In 1999, Plaintiff began to identify herself as a
transgender (DSUF 5), and began to receive hormone therapy for a Gender Identity Disorder. 2 (DSUF 5.) Plaintiff received the therapy on and off since 1999. (DSUF 5.)
2 In Plaintiff's FAC, she referred to herself with masculine pronouns; in Plaintiff's Opposition, Plaintiff used
feminine pronouns to describe herself. Therefore, the Court in an effort to adhere to Plaintiff's preference will also
use feminine pronouns for Plaintiff.
In 2005, Plaintiff was housed at the California Mens Colony ("CMC") in San Luis Obispo, California. (DSUF 6.)
During her stay at CMC, Dr. Joseph Kuntz performed a circumcision on Plaintiff to which Plaintiff claimed she did not
consent. (DSUF 7.) In October 2006, Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Joseph Kuntz. (DSUF 8.)
Plaintiff filed her lawsuit as a pro per plaintiff, in the Superior Court of California, County of San Luis Obispo, Case No.
CV 060845 ("Kuntz Case"). (DSUF 8.)
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From March 19, 2011 [*6] to April 4, 2011, Plaintiff was housed at the San Luis Obispo County Jail (FAC at ¶ 22.)
Plaintiff was transported to San Luis Obispo County Jail from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR") for the trial on the Kuntz Case. (DSUF 9.) Plaintiff was classified at CDCR as "Administrative Segregation, Protective Custody Classification" and consequently upon entry at the San Luis Obispo County Jail, she was also
placed in Administrative Segregation. (DSUF 9.) However, Plaintiff disputes this contention and claims she was placed in
Administrative Segregation because she is transgender. (DSUF 11.)
The Kuntz Case was strictly a civil negligence, medical malpractice lawsuit. (DSUF 10.) The Kuntz Case did not
challenge Plaintiff's conditions of confinement at any one of the California prisons Plaintiff resided; it did not challenge
Plaintiff's criminal sentencing; and it did not allege Dr. Kuntz was working for a public entity giving rise to a civil rights
claim. (DSUF 10.) Plaintiff attended court for pretrial conferences in the Kuntz Case on March 23 and 24, 2011, and
attended the four-day jury trial from March 28 through April 1, 2011. (DSUF 11.) The Kuntz Case [*7] ended in a
defense verdict. (DSUF 11.) Plaintiff remained in custody at San Luis Obispo County Jail and awaited transport to CDCR,
which occurred on April 4, 2011. (DSUF 12.)
County Jail policy regarding access to the law library for inmates is to provide priority to pro per litigants in criminal
proceedings, or litigants challenging the conditions of their confinement. (DSUF 14.) County jail policy is to require
litigants in actions not related to civil rights claims or criminal defense actions to obtain a court order allowing them to
access the law library. (DSUF 15.) Per the County Jail policy, Plaintiff's medical malpractice lawsuit in the Kuntz Case
required a court order. (DSUF 16.) Defendants Officers Adams and Rushing told Plaintiff she needed to have a Court
Order to access the library for legal matters. (DSUF 17.)
On March 23, 2011, Plaintiff requested an Order from the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court judge to allow her
to have access to the law library. (DSUF 17.) The trial judge issued a Minute Order on March 23, 2011, which stated in a
handwritten note, "If it can be reasonably accomplished the Sheriff shall bring to court each day with the Plaintiff a copy
of Plaintiff's [*8] legal file and Defendant's exhibits and trial documents." (DSUF 18.) The March 23, 2011 Minute
Order also stated, "The Plaintiff is self represented, facing trial on 3/28/11, and should be granted all reasonable access to
legal research facilities. The Plaintiff shall arrive in court each day, starting Monday, 3/28/11, attired in civilian clothing."
(DSUF 19.) Plaintiff had civilian clothing on at the hearing and during the trial. (DSUF 36.) According to the Pro Per Log,
Plaintiff had access to her legal research materials after March 23, 2011. (DSUF 23.)
Plaintiff alleges on March 23, 2011 Defendants Deputies Mayes, Adams, Manpal and Sgt. Rushing denied Plaintiff
access to law research facilities and to her own legal materials and trial briefs. (FAC at ¶ 32.) Plaintiff alleges when
returning from court on March 23, 2011 that Defendants refused to feed her and started pushing Plaintiff, calling her
"faggot, queer with tits." (FAC at ¶ 33.) Defendant Deputy Ulloa smacked Plaintiff in the face and head, calling her a
"rat-ass-faggot." (Id.) Defendant Sgt. Rushing was laughing and kicked Plaintiff, saying "we are the real thing, not no
correctional officer." (Id.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant [*9] Sgt. Rushing then ordered Defendants Deputies Adams and
Mayes to strip Plaintiff naked in the middle of the hall. Plaintiff was then punched by Defendants. Sgt. Rushing then said,
"No budget, no law library." (Id.)
A pretrial conference hearing was held on March 24, 2011. (DSUF 21.) Plaintiff alleges that she informed the Court
of the alleged March 23, 2011 assault, that she was hurt in the knee and was hit in the face and given a bloody nose, and the
Court responded with the March 24, 2011 Order. (DSUF 37, 38.) The only statement noted on the March 24, 2011 Minute
Order is, "The Plaintiff shall be allowed to bring to Court each day whatever legal materials he is able to carry with him."
(DSUF 21.) There is no mention in the March 24, 2011 Minute Order that Plaintiff was refused access to the law library.
(DSUF 21.) Also, the attorney in the civil case, representing Dr. Kuntz, never saw Plaintiff displaying injuries associated
with a physical assault throughout the entire trial. (DSUF 22.)
The Custody Post Logs for March 24, 2011 and March 25, 2011, show Plaintiff had accessed the legal research room,
which the jail calls the "502 room." (DSUF 24.) Plaintiff alleges that this room is [*10] an empty cell with a typewriter,
table and chair but no other services are provided. (Plaintiff's Opposition at 3; Plaintiff's Statement of Undisputed Facts
["PSUF"] 6.)
Plaintiff alleges on April 1, 2011, "while returning from trial, Defendants Ulloa, Mayes, Manpal, Adams and Sgt.
Rushing got Plaintiff naked in the A-Hall, and started to punch, strike, and kick Plaintiff" calling her a "rat faggot" and
other names and placed her in Administrative Segregation without medical attention. (FAC at ¶ 36.) Defendants deny that
this incident occurred. (DSUF 25)
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During the entire period Plaintiff stayed at the County Jail from March 19, 2011 through April 4, 2011, Defendants
contend that Plaintiff was provided meals on a daily basis. (DSUF 20.) Meal periods, such as breakfast, lunch and dinner,
are served to all inmates at the same time in order to ensure order and safety among the inmates as well as the correctional
staff. (Id.) According to Defendants Sgt. Rushing and Deputy Ulloa, Plaintiff was never denied meals (DSUF 26);
however, Plaintiff disputes this contention and alleges she was denied eight meals. Plaintiff never complained to the Trial
Judge that she was not receiving meals. (DSUF [*11] 40.) Defendants also allege that Plaintiff participated in the
clothing exchanges and showers (DSUF 27); however, Plaintiff alleges she was not provided with showers or clean
clothes.
Yard time was provided to Plaintiff when weather permitted. (DSUF 28.) An inmate housed in Administrative
Segregation is granted yard access for exercise on Tuesdays, Thursday and Saturdays, when weather permits. During the
period that Plaintiff was housed at the San Luis Obispo County Jail, weather did not permit yard access on March 22-27,
2011. Plaintiff was given yard access on Tuesday, March 29, 2011, Thursday, March 31, 2011 and Saturday, April 2,
2011. (DSUF 28.) Plaintiff attended court for pretrial conferences on March 23, 2011 and March 24, 2011 and trial from
March 28, 2011 to April 1, 2011. (DSUF 11.)
Plaintiff received her hormone therapy once during week 2 of the 16-day period, and received hormone therapy three
days before she was transferred to County Jail which is consistent with her prescribed therapy. (DSUF 30, 41.)3
3 Plaintiff in her Opposition states that she, "is not alleging [d]enial of Hormone Therapy in this Complaint ..."
(Plaintiff's Opposition at 3.)
Plaintiff has no evidence of a policy [*12] created by Defendant Sheriff Ian Parkinson or imposed by the County of
San Luis Obispo and admits to neither meeting or otherwise communicating with Defendant Sheriff Ian Parkinson.
(DSUF 42.)
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendants seek summary judgment or in the alternative partial summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claims for alleged
violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments); and allegations of conspiracy under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986. Specifically, Defendants contend that Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against Defendants Sheriff Ian
Parkinson and the County of San Luis Obispo fail as a matter of law and that Plaintiff's § 1983 claim based on alleged
violations of her Fourteenth Amendment rights also fail. Defendants also contend they are entitled to qualified immunity
against each of Plaintiff's alleged constitutional violation claims on the following grounds: (1) Plaintiff did not have a
constitutional right to access the law library and if she did, the right was not clearly established; (2) confinement in Administrative Segregation is not a civil rights violation; (3) Plaintiff was not denied meals, showers, clothing or yard time;
and (4) Plaintiff's alleged assaults are not supported by facts and are subject to immunity. Finally, Plaintiff's [*13] 42
U.S.C. § 1985 and § 1986 claims fail as a matter of law.
PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff in her Opposition contends that Defendants violated her First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and
acted with deliberate indifference when (1) Defendants denied Plaintiff access to the courts by denying her access to the
law library, legal materials and legal supplies; (2) used excessive force in retaliation and discrimination against Plaintiff
because Plaintiff is transgender; and (3) denied Plaintiff her equal protection rights by denying Plaintiff showers, hygiene,
food (at times), yard time, clothing exchange, and enacted policies that violated Plaintiff's civil rights.
DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendants contend that Defendant Sheriff Ian Parkinson did not violate Plaintiff's rights in his official or individual
capacities; that Plaintiff was not retaliated against in violation of her due process rights; that Plaintiff fails to address
whether she was constitutionally entitled to access a law library for the Kuntz Case; that Plaintiff's excessive force claim
fails; and Plaintiff has failed to present facts to dispute that she received food, showers, yard [*14] time and clothing.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for summary judgment should be granted if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48
(1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion, and identifying the
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portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits which demonstrate the absence
of a triable issue of material fact.4 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The burden then shifts to the
non-moving party to present specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact warranting trial. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. In resolving a motion for summary judgment, "[T]he inquiry performed is the
threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial - whether, in other words, there are any genuine
factual issues that can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either
party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
4 Affidavits supporting (and opposing) summary judgment must be made on personal knowledge, must set forth
admissible statements of fact, and must show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters
stated therein. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). A verified complaint, [*15] to the extent it is based on a plaintiff's personal
knowledge, meets the affidavit requirement. McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 198 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987).
Under this standard, the mere existence of an alleged factual dispute between the parties will not withstand summary
judgment. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007). A factual dispute qualifies as "material" only if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law[.]" Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (noting that "the substantive law will identify
which facts are material" and that "[f]actual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary" in relation to the legal elements of
the claims "will not be counted"); S.E.C. v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1982)("A material issue of fact
is one that affects the outcome of the litigation and requires a trial to resolve the parties' differing versions of the
truth.")(citation omitted). A "dispute about a material fact is 'genuine' ... if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Harris, 550 U.S. at 380 ("Where the record
taken as a whole would not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial").
In determining whether a triable issue of material fact exists, the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1134 (9th Cir. 1991). However, summary judgment
[*16] cannot be avoided by relying solely on conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d
1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). More than a "metaphysical" doubt is required to establish a genuine issue of material fact.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Mere reliance on the pleadings and
conclusory allegations are insufficient to preclude summary judgment. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. A party opposing
a properly supported motion for summary judgment "... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247, citing First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Services Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968).
Finally, where the evidence conflicts, questions of credibility and motivation generally present an issue of material
fact inappropriate for resolution on summary judgment. See, Allen v. Scribner, 812 F.2d 426, 435, 437 (9th Cir. 1987),
amended on other grounds, 828 F.2d 1445 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1139,
1140 (9th Cir. 1989)(genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether defendants committed the alleged retaliatory
acts). Thus, when a plaintiff presents evidence on which the trier of fact could reasonably resolve a material factual issue
in her favor, summary judgment for defendants is not appropriate. See, Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1206 (1992); see also Neely v. Feinstein, 50 F.3d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995).
A. Plaintiff and Defendants' Requests for Judicial Notice.
Defendants have requested the Court take judicial notice pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201 of a number of
documents contained in Exhibits 11-15, all constituting court [*17] records. The request is unopposed.
Plaintiff seeks judicial notice for the following documents: Exhibit 1: San Luis Obispo County Sheriff's Department
Court Tracking Sheet; Exhibit 2: San Luis Obispo County Sheriff Operational Directive - Use of Force; Exhibit 3: San
Luis Obispo County Sheriff's Operational Directive - § 306.00, et seq. - Searches on Inmates; Exhibit 5: Law Library
Operational § 1103.00, et seq.; Exhibit 6: Assembly Bill No. 382; Exhibit 7: San Luis Obispo County Jail Custody Post
Log; and Exhibit 8: Declaration of Custodian of Records of San Luis Obispo County Sheriff.
To be judicially noticeable, a fact must not be subject to a reasonable dispute because it must be either generally
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court or "capable of accurate and ready determination by sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Fed.R.Evid. 201. "Materials from a proceeding in another tribunal are appropriate for judicial notice." Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 916 n.3 (9th Cir. 2003)(taking judicial notice of the transcript of a habeas petitioner's hearing before the Board of Prison Terms); see also United States ex. rel. Robinson
Rancheria Citizens Counsel v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992)(holding that courts may take judicial notice
of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have [*18] a
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direct relation to matters at issue"); Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987)
(holding that it is proper for a court to take judicial notice of the contents in court files in other lawsuits), cert. denied, 486
U.S. 1040 (1988).
Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants' request to take judicial notice of the state court records in Plaintiff's
criminal case and medical malpractice case. See Defendants' Exs. 11-15. However, Plaintiff's request for judicial notice of
Exhibits 1 through 8 is denied. As noted, Courts may only take judicial notice of adjudicative facts that are "not subject to
reasonable dispute." Fed.R.Evid. 201(b). Plaintiff's Exs. 1 through 8 do not fit the requirements of Rule 201.
DISCUSSION
For all of the following reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment or Partial Summary Judgment should be
granted in part and denied in part.
A. Section 1983 Requirements.
In order to state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the defendants were acting under color of
state law at the time the complained of acts were committed; and (2) the defendants' conduct deprived plaintiff of rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988);
Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1988); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354
(9th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986). Liability under section 1983 is predicated upon an affirmative link [*19] or connection between the defendants' actions and the claimed deprivations. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423
U.S. 362, 372-73 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980).
Plaintiff's claims against Defendants are in their individual and official capacities. An individual defendant is not
liable on a civil rights claim unless the facts establish the defendant's personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or a causal connection between the defendant's wrongful conduct and the alleged constitutional deprivation. See
Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1984). A plaintiff "must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show an
individual was personally involved in the deprivation of her civil rights." Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1154 (1999); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (stating that a complaint
must contain more than legal conclusions to withstand dismissal for failure to state a claim).
B. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Against Defendants Sheriff Parkinson in His Individual or Official Capacity or
the County of San Luis Obispo.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants County of San Luis Obispo and Sheriff Parkinson violated her rights under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff alleges she was unable to complain without retaliation from Defendants. (FAC at
p. 7.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants County of San Luis Obispo and Sheriff Parkinson make the jail policies. Specifically, Plaintiff contends [*20] that Defendant County of San Luis Obispo provided the budget to the jail, and Defendant
Sheriff Parkinson made the policy and custom to eliminate the law library. (Plaintiff's Opposition at pp. 6-8.) However,
Plaintiff has provided no admissible evidence that the law library was cut from the budget. Further, Plaintiff was not a pro
per plaintiff within the class of litigants that is constitutionally entitled to law library access. As noted in Plaintiff's First
Amended Complaint, she "was denied access to [her] own legal material to prepare for her civil trial, so [she] could file
motions, get ready for witness [sic], court rules." (FAC at ¶ 27.) According to Plaintiff, her claims relate to the denial of
access to her file material relating to the Kuntz Case.
A claim against a local government official in her official capacity is construed as being asserted directly against the
local government entity, not the named individual defendant. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165
(1985)("Official capacity suits ... generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which the
officer is an agent")(quoting Monell v. Department of Social Service of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55
(1978)). Where the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond to the official capacity [*21] suit,
"[The] suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at
166 (citation omitted).
A local government entity may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted wholly by its employees or agents.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Instead, it is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers
or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an
entity is responsible under § 1983. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; see also Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d
1175, 1185 (9th Cir. 2002)(describing "two routes" to municipal liability, where municipality's official policy, regulation
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or decision violated plaintiff's rights, or alternatively where a municipality failed to act under circumstances showing its
deliberate indifference to plaintiff's rights)(citations omitted), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1106 (2003).
The Court has construed the First Amended Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Even so, Plaintiff has
failed to state a plausible claim that Defendant Sheriff Parkinson could be held liable for Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff does
not allege that Defendant Sheriff Parkinson had any direct contact with Plaintiff, but rather premises her claims against
him on his actions as a supervisor [*22] of the jail. Supervisory personnel generally are not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
on any theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability in the absence of state law imposing such liability. See Redman
v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1443-44 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1074 (1992). A supervisory
official may be liable under § 1983 only if he or she was personally involved in the constitutional violation. See Id. at
1446-47. A plaintiff who wishes "[t]o premise a supervisor's alleged liability on a policy promulgated by the supervisor ...
must identify a specific policy and establish a direct causal link,' between that policy and the alleged constitutional deprivation." City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).
Here, Plaintiff contends that several policies at the County Jail violated her constitutional rights giving rise to Defendant Sheriff Parkinson's liability individually, and in his official capacity as the creator of the budget and the policies.
Plaintiff states that the rules surrounding the use of the law library and the alleged lack of a grievance process violated her
constitutional rights. However, Plaintiff had no constitutional right to access the law library and the jail had a grievance
process.
The Ninth Circuit has consistently held that a confined person in Plaintiff's situation could state a claim for a supervisor's [*23] liability under § 1983 against a warden, sheriff, director of corrections, or other jail administrator, for
example, if he supplies sufficient specific allegations that the supervisor personally (1) set in motion a series of acts by
others, or knowingly refused to terminate a series of acts by others, which they knew or reasonably should have known
would cause others to inflict constitutional injury; (2) [committed] culpable action or inaction in training, supervision or
control of subordinates; (3) ... acquiesce[d] in the constitutional deprivation by subordinates; or (4) [engaged in] conduct
that shows a "reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others." Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 675 F.3d 1213, 1231
(9th Cir. 2012)(quoting Al Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 965 (9th Cir. 2009)(quoting Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946
F.2d 630, 636 (9th Cir. 1991).)
As the Supreme Court made clear in Iqbal, "a government official, regardless of his or her title, 'is liable only for his
or her own misconduct.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. Thus, "a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official
defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution." (Id. at 676.) The Ninth Circuit has
concluded that, notwithstanding Iqbal, when an Eighth/Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claim is governed by the "deliberate indifference" standard, "a plaintiff may state a claim against a supervisor for [*24] deliberate
indifference based upon the supervisor's knowledge of and acquiescence in unconstitutional conduct by his or her subordinates." Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2101 (2012).
In Starr, the Ninth Circuit considered a § 1983 claim brought against the Sheriff of Los Angeles County (Baca) and
found the allegations of the complaint to be sufficient to state a "supervisory liability claim of deliberate indifference
against Sheriff Baca." Starr, 652 F.3d at 1217. More recently, in Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2012), the
Ninth Circuit explained that the complaint in Starr contained detailed factual allegations identifying what Baca knew or
should have known and what Baca did or failed to do, as well as "sufficient facts to plausibly suggest Sheriff Baca's
'knowledge of' and 'acquiescence in' the unconstitutional conduct of his subordinates." (Hydrick, 669 F.3d at 941 (citing
Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207, 1209.) These detailed allegations were related to, among other things, a letter and weekly reports
received by Baca that discussed inmate abuse; a memorandum of understanding into which Baca entered with the Department of Justice by which Baca agreed to address constitutional violations to which inmates were subjected; a subsequent Department of Justice report, which found that Baca had failed to comply with the Memorandum of [*25]
Understanding; an incident in which Baca was specifically informed about the failure to investigate a deputy's attack on an
inmate that resulted in the inmate's death; another incident in which (pursuant to the approval of the settlement of a civil
action) Baca was made aware of attacks on inmates by other inmates and of the failure to provide reasonable security;
seven or more other incidents in which Baca was apprised, after the fact, of inmate beatings and killings that resulted from
the failure of deputies to provide reasonable security; and several reports provided to Baca by a special counsel, which
noted inmate abuse and problems at the jail. Starr, 652 F.3d at 1209-11; see also Hydrick, 669 F.3d at 941.
In contrast here, the allegations of the First Amended Complaint are wholly bald and conclusory and assert merely
that Defendant Sheriff Parkinson knew or should have known that Plaintiff's rights would be violated by the conditions of
her confinement at the jail. Plaintiff does not allege any facts that plausibly suggest Defendant Sheriff Parkinson knew of
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any constitutional deprivations occurring at the San Luis Obispo County Jail. The mere fact that Defendant Sheriff Parkinson is the Sheriff of San Luis Obispo, and thus is [*26] the top official with respect to the administration of the Jail, is
not an adequate factual predicate for stating a § 1983 claim against him based on the subject matter of the First Amended
Complaint. As in Hydrick, "[T]he absence of specifics is significant," because Iqbal has made clear that a complaint
against a government official must show that the official's own individual actions violated the Constitution. Hydrick, 669
F.3d at 941-42 (finding allegations of a complaint challenging the conditions of confinement, which was filed by civilly
committed sexually violent predators against supervisors at a state hospital and elsewhere, to be bald and conclusory,
"devoid of specifics" sufficient to plausibly suggest that defendant's knowledge of and/or acquiescence in the allegedly
unconstitutional conduct (retaliation) by subordinate employees and thus inadequate to state a claim for monetary damages under § 1983).
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint does not provide allegations describing why and how Defendant Sheriff Parkinson "reasonably should have known" that his rank and file employees were engaged in some "series of acts" (which he
did not initiate, command or encourage) which would cause constitutional injury to Plaintiff [*27] if Defendant Sheriff
Parkinson did not terminate that "series of acts," Larez, 946 F.2d at 636. Nor does the First Amended Complaint supply
specific allegations describing, in more than conclusory fashion, how Defendant Sheriff Parkinson might have "set [] in
motion a series of acts by others" (Larez, 946 F.2d at 636), that he knew or reasonably should have known would cause his
subordinates to inflict constitutional injury on Plaintiff. Without a factually based, non-conclusory allegation that Defendant Sheriff Parkinson actually knew of the conditions to which Plaintiff refers, as a matter of law it cannot be said that
Defendant Sheriff Parkinson "acquiesced" in those conditions or that his conduct exhibited "reckless or callous indifference to the rights of" Plaintiff. Accordingly, Defendants Sheriff Parkinson and the County of San Luis Obispo are
entitled to summary judgment.
C. Plaintiff's § 1983 Claim Based on Alleged Violations of Her Fourteenth Amendment Rights Fails.
Plaintiff was not a pretrial detainee while at the County Jail and is not a member of a protected class. Plaintiff claims,
in part, that she was physically assaulted as retaliation for seeking a Court Order for access to the law library from the
Judge in her medical malpractice case [*28] and that she was further assaulted due to her transgender status. Plaintiff
claims that Defendants' conduct was "deliberately indifferent" to her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Because
Plaintiff is a convicted felon, and was at the County Jail in the middle of serving a sentence, Plaintiff's due process rights
arise from the Eighth Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amendment. See Simmons v. Navajo County, Arizona, 609 F.3d
1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010); Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1242 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Hudson v.
McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992)(Eighth Amendment due process is applied to inmates, while Fourteenth Amendment due
process applies to pretrial detainees). To the extent Plaintiff is bringing her § 1983 claims for violation of her due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, they fail as a matter of law.
Plaintiff also alleges her equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated because of her
transgender status. Transgender is not a protected or suspect class giving rise to equal protection. An equal protection
claim may be established in two ways: the first requires a plaintiff to "show that the defendants acted with an intent or
purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class." Barren v. Harrington, 151 F.3d
1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff has put forth no evidence that her status as a transgender qualified her as a member of
a protected class. Further, there are no cases in which transgender persons constitute a "suspect class." See Braninburg v.
Coalinga State Hospital, 2012 WL 391190 at *8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2012); [*29] Jamison v. Davue, 2012 WL 996383 at
*3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2012)(holding that transgender individuals do not constitute a suspect class).
If the claims do not involve a suspect classification, a plaintiff can establish an equal protection "class of one" by
alleging that he "has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis
for the difference in treatment." Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). To prevail under this theory,
a plaintiff must show that (1) he is a member of an identifiable class; (2) he was intentionally treated differently from
others similarly situated; and (3) there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. Village of Willowbrook, 528
U.S. at 564. "Intentional discrimination means that a defendant acted at least in part because of a plaintiff's protected
status." Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003)(emphasis in original)(quoting Maynard v. City of San
Jose, 37 F.3d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff has set forth no evidence supporting a finding that other similarly
situated individuals were treated differently from her, and has presented no evidence establishing that there was no rational basis for such different treatment. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
D. Defendants Are Entitled to Qualified Immunity on Certain Claims.
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Defendants contend they are entitled to qualified immunity because [*30] Plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to
plead constitutional claims. Specifically, Defendants contend that Plaintiff did not have a constitutional right to access the
law library and if she did the right was not clearly established; that confinement in administrative segregation is not a
violation of a civil right; that Plaintiff was not denied meals, showers, clothing or yard time; and that Plaintiff's alleged
assaults are subject to immunity.
"The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials 'from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'"
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)(citation omitted). "[Q]ualified immunity shields the arresting officer from
suit when she or she 'makes a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing the circumstances.'" Smith v. Almada, 640 F.3d 931, 937 (9th Cir. 2011)(quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S.
194, 198 (2004)). Qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
To determine whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court must decide whether the facts alleged
show the official's conduct violated a constitutional right; and, if so, [*31] whether it would be clear to a reasonable
officer that her conduct was unlawful in the situation she confronted. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001),
overruled in part on other grounds by Pearson, 555 U.S. at 223. The prongs may be analyzed in the order selected by the
court. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
To survive a claim of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show that the official's actions violated a constitutional
right, and that the right was "clearly established" at the time of the conduct at issue. Nelson v. City of Davis, 685 F.3d 867,
875 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007)("Courts are required to resolve a threshold question:
taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show that the officer's conduct
violated a constitutional right?"); Estate of Ford v. Ramirez Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002)(clarifying the
qualified immunity analysis for a claim under the Eighth Amendment). If no constitutional right would have been violated
if the facts were as alleged, then "there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity." Saucier, 533
U.S. at 201.
If the official's actions did not violate a constitutional right, there is no violation of § 1983 and qualified immunity is
not implicated. Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 915 (9th Cir. 2012). If the official violates a constitutional right,
but that right was not "clearly established," then the official is protected by qualified immunity. (Id.) "Only when an
officer's conduct [*32] violates a clearly established constitutional right - when the officer should have known she was
violating the Constitution - does she forfeit qualified immunity." (Id.)
The Court will discuss each of Plaintiff's claims below.
1. Defendants Are Entitled to Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's First Amendment Retaliation Claim.
Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner's First Amendment rights to speech or to petition the Government may
support a §1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985). See also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866
F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). "Within the prison context, a viable claim
of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) an assertion that a state actor took some adverse action
against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's exercise
of her First Amendment rights and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal." Rhodes v.
Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). An allegation of retaliation against a prisoner's First Amendment right to
file a prison grievance is sufficient to support a claim under §1983. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003).
Adverse action is action that "would chill a person of ordinary firmness" from engaging in that activity. Pinard v.
Clatskanie School District, 467 F.3d 755, 770 (9th Cir. 2006). Both litigation in court and filing inmate grievances are
protected activities and it is impermissible for prison officials to retaliate against inmates for [*33] engaging in these
activities. However, not every allegedly adverse action will be sufficient to support a claim under §1983 for retaliation. In
the prison context, cases in this Circuit addressing First Amendment retaliation claims involve situations where the action
taken by the defendant was clearly adverse to the plaintiff. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d at 568 (arbitrary confiscation
and destruction of property, initiation of a prison transfer, and assault and retaliation for filing grievances); Austin v.
Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004)(retaliatory placement in administrative segregation for filing grievances).
A plaintiff asserting a retaliation claim must demonstrate a causal nexus between that alleged retaliation and plaintiff's protected activity (i.e., filing a legal action). McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 18 (1st Cir. 1979); see Mt. Healthy City
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School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). A plaintiff must submit evidence, either direct or circumstantial,
establishing a link between the exercise of constitutional rights and the alleged retaliatory action. Pratt, 65 F.3d at 806.
The timing of events surrounding the alleged retaliation may constitute circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent. (See
Id.)
There is no free standing constitutional right to law library access; however, prisoners have a constitutional right of
access to the courts. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). This right of
access to the Courts requires prison [*34] authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal
papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law. Bounds,
430 U.S. at 828. The right, however, "guarantees no particular methodology but rather the conferral of capability - the
capability of bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts ... that is the
touchstone of the right of access to the courts." Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356-357. Prison officials may select the best method to
insure that prisoners will have the capability to file suit. See id. at 356.
To establish a violation of the right of access to the courts, a prisoner must establish that he or she has suffered an
actual injury. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349. An "actual injury" is "actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing
litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim." Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348. The right of access
to the courts is limited to nonfrivolous legal claims such as direct criminal appeals, habeas corpus proceedings, and § 1983
actions. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353 n.3 and 354-355; see also Phillips v. Hust, 588 F. 3d 652, 655 (9th Cir. 2009) (to
succeed on denial of access claim, a plaintiff must show that official acts or omissions hindered efforts to pursue a
non-frivolous [*35] legal claim). The right of access to the courts is only a right to bring complaints to the federal court
and not a right to discover such claims or to litigate them effectively once filed with the Court. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at
354-355.
Here, Plaintiff's allegations fail to state a First Amendment violation. Prisoners involved in civil lawsuits that do not
present constitutional questions challenging conditions of confinement or attacking a conviction are not afforded mandatory access to legal research, facilities, or law libraries, as the purpose in Bounds was not to create litigating engines
capable of filing everything from shareholders derivative actions to slip and fall claims. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355-356.
Decisions by prison officials to regulate the number of inmates who can access a law library and its resources does not, by
itself, constitute a denial of access to the courts. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 361; Lindquist v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 776 F.2d 851, 858 (9th Cir. 1985). Prison officials are afforded the authority "in structuring when and who can
access prison law libraries." Lindquist, 776 F.2d at 851.
Plaintiff claims that she had a constitutional right to access a law library to prepare for the Kuntz trial. She claims this
right was denied. The Kuntz Case was a medical malpractice case. It did not present a challenge to the conditions of
confinement or [*36] criminal sentence. (DSUF 10 and 11.) Therefore, the Kuntz Case did not present claims giving rise
to a constitutional right to access legal research and a law library and therefore no constitutional right could have been
violated.
Even if Plaintiff had a constitutional right to have access to a law library relating to her medical malpractice lawsuit,
the cases from the Supreme Court suggest otherwise, such that a right is not clearly established for a reasonable officer to
know he was violating a right by depriving Plaintiff access to the law library. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity regarding this claim.
Plaintiff also alleges Defendants violated state law regarding law library access. "To the extent that the violation of a
state law amounts to the deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the federal Constitution, [s]ection 1983 offers no redress." Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997), quoting
Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 370 (9th Cir. 1996). Only if the events complained of rise to the level of
a federal statutory or constitutional violation may Plaintiff pursue them under § 1983. Patel v. Kent School Dist., 648 F.3d
965, 971 (9th Cir. 2011). There is no independent cause of action for a violation of Title 15 regulations. See Davis v.
Kissinger, 2009 WL 256574, *12 n.4 (E.D. Cal. 2009). Thus, complaints where prison officials violated [*37] state
regulations regarding law library policies or Title 15 will not support a § 1983 claim.
2. Plaintiff's Claim That Confinement in Administrative Segregation Violated Her Rights Fail.
When Plaintiff arrived from CDCR, she had a designation of Administrative Segregation Protective Custody. County
Jail, complying with Plaintiff's already established classification, placed her in Administrative Segregation. (DSUF 9, 44.)
Plaintiff's contention that she was retaliated against by being placed in Administrative Segregation fails as she was placed
there upon arrival on March 19, 2011 and remained there until April 4, 2011. (DSUF 9, 44.) Plaintiff argues that she was
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placed in Administrative Segregation because she is transgender and requested law library access. However, Plaintiff was
placed in Administrative Segregation before she obtained the March 23, 2011 Order from the Superior Court in the Kuntz
Case. Consequently, confinement in Administrative Segregation could not be retaliatory.
In general, a prisoner has no liberty interest in avoiding transfer to more restrictive conditions of confinement, such as
a transfer from the general population to segregation, unless he can show an atypical [*38] and significant hardship in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221-23 (2005); Sandinv. Connor, 515
U.S. 472, 484 (1995). "Typically, administrative segregation in and of itself does not implicate a protected liberty interest." Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003); May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir.
1997)(administrative segregation falls within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a sentence). Administrative segregation may implicate due process if the confinement imposes an atypical and significant hardship. See, e.g.,
Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 223-24 (inmates' liberty interests were implicated by their indefinite confinement in highly restrictive "supermax" prison, where the inmates were deprived of almost all human contact and were disqualified from
parole consideration); Serrano, 345 F.3d at 1078-79 (placing disabled inmate, without his wheelchair, in segregation unit
not equipped for disabled persons gave rise to a liberty interest).
Because there was no constitutional right violated by Plaintiff's placement in Administrative Segregation, there is no
need to analyze and discuss whether the right was clearly established so that a reasonable officer would have known the
conduct violated Plaintiff's rights. It is reasonably clear that an officer would believe that placing Plaintiff in Administrative Segregation was not a constitutional violation. [*39] Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity
on this claim.
3. Defendants Are Entitled to Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Claims Regarding Meals, Showers, Clothing and
Yard Time.
a. Meals.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants denied her adequate meals. In Plaintiff's FAC on p. 6, ¶ 37 she alleges she missed a
total of eight meals, then on p. 11, Plaintiff alleges she "was denied dinners for 14 days out of the 34 stayed in the San Luis
Obispo County Jail." (DSUF 2.) Defendants contend that during the period of March 19, 2011 through April 4, 2011,
Plaintiff was provided meals on a daily basis. (DSUF 20, 26.)
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects prisoners not only from inhumane methods of punishment but also from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041,
1045 (9th Cir. 2006)(citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 847 and Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
Prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical care and personal safety.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. "Adequate food is a basic human need protected by the Eighth Amendment." Kennan v. Hall, 83
F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 1996)(citing Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d at 1246), amended by 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998).
"While prison food need not be tasty or esthetically pleasing it must adequate to maintain health" (Id.), quoting Lamaire v.
Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1456 (1993); see also Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812-13 (9th Cir. 2009)(prisoner allegation
that officials deprived her of 16 meals over a 23-day [*40] period, leading to weight loss and dizziness was sufficient to
state a claim).
Here, Plaintiff does not allege that meals were withheld compromising her health, nor did Plaintiff mention denial of
meals to the Superior Court Judge. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
b. Shower Time.
Plaintiff was at County Jail for over a two-week period of time. While the Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from
cruel and unusual punishment, there is no discernable constitutional right to frequent showers. "[I]t is hardly inhuman or
uncivilized to shower less commonly, as any intentional tourist can attest." Clark v. Williams, 2011 WL 304585 *2 (D.
Nev. 2011); see also Baptisto v. Ryan, 2005 WL 2416356 (D. Ariz. 2005); Davenport v. DeRobertis, 844 F.2d 1310, 1316
(7th Cir. 1988)(holding that inmate experiencing a 90-day lockdown had no right to three showers per week, with Judge
Posner noting that "importance of a daily shower to the average American is cultural rather than hygienic").
Here, even if Plaintiff can show that she was deprived of showers, any deprivation does not arise to a constitutional
violation, or a violation of federal law. "Section 1983 is 'a method for vindicating federal rights,' not rights imparted by the
state or county." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). As such, for the short length of time Plaintiff was at
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County Jail, even if she did not participate in showers, there is no [*41] constitutional violation supportive of a § 1983
claim.
c. Clothing.
Plaintiff's claim that she was denied "clothing exchanges" is unsupported. On March 20, 2011, Plaintiff was issued
County Jail clothing upon arrival to County Jail. (DSUF 36.) Plaintiff was only at County Jail for 16 days and she admits
to receiving clothing during the trial. (DSUF 36.) "The denial of adequate clothing can inflict pain under the Eighth
Amendment." Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1421 (9th Cir. 1994)(overruled on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner,
515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995)). Conditions of confinement must be more than uncomfortable, however, to violate the
Eighth Amendment. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. For there to be a constitutional violation relating to clothing, Plaintiff had to
go without new clothing for weeks or months which is impossible with the facts presented; therefore, there can be no
constitutional right violated. See Rainwater v. McGinniss, 2012 WL 3276966 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2012)(citing Toussaint v.
McCarthy (N.D. Cal. 1984), 597 F.Supp. 1388, 1410-11, reversed in part on other grounds, 801 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir.
1986)(holding the Eighth Amendment is violated when weeks to months pass without a clothing exchange).
d. Yard Time.
Plaintiff alleges she was denied yard time from March 19, 2011 to April 15, 2011. (FAC at p. 11.) 5 Defendants
contend that Plaintiff was not held at the County Jail for a long enough period of time to give rise to a deliberate indifference claim for withholding outside exercise for extended periods of time.
5
[*42] As noted, Plaintiff was transferred from San Luis Obispo County Jail to CDCR on April 4, 2011.
Exercise is one of the basic human necessities protected by the Eighth Amendment. See LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d
1444, 1457 (9th Cir. 1993); Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Touissaint v. Yockey, 722
F.2d 1490, 1492-93 (9th Cir. 1984). Some form of regular exercise, including outdoor exercise, "is extremely important to
the psychological and physical well being of prisoners." See Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 199 (9th Cir. 1979). Determining what constitutes adequate exercise requires consideration of "the physical characteristics of the cell and jail and
the average length of stay of the inmates." Housley v. Dodson, 41 F.3d 597, 599 (10th Cir. 1994). Although the Ninth
Circuit did not specify the "minimum amount of weekly exercise that must be afforded to detainees who spend the bulk of
their time inside their cells," the Court held that ninety minutes per week of exercise, which is the equivalent of less than
thirteen minutes per day, does not comport with Eighth Amendment standards. Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d
1190, 1212 (9th Cir. 2008). The Pierce court eventually required that if detainees spent 22 hours per day in their cells, that
they then be provided with at least two hours of exercise per week. Id. at 1213.
Here, Plaintiff cannot state a constitutional violation regarding lack of yard time. The main jail exercise yard log
shows that on Thursday, March 31, 2011, Saturday, April 2, 1011, Monday, April 4, 2011, [*43] Plaintiff participated in
yard time. (DSUF 28.) Furthermore, Plaintiff was at a trial, in civil court, attending trial on March 23, 2011, March 24,
2011 and March 28, 2011 through April 1, 2011. Thereafter, Plaintiff was not deprived of any significant amount of
outdoor exercise is she was deprived at all and there is no clearly established law surrounding a brief deprivation even for
the entire duration of Plaintiff's stay at the Count Jail, which amounted to just over two weeks. Accordingly, Defendants
are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
4. Defendants Are Not Entitled to Summary Judgment Concerning the Alleged Assaults on Plaintiff on March 23,
2011 and April 4, 2011.6
6
Plaintiff in her Opposition contends that the assault occurred on April 1, 2011, not April 4, 2011.
Plaintiff alleges she was physically assaulted by Defendants in retaliation for obtaining the March 23, 2011 Court
Order regarding law library access and again on April 1, 2011. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges when returning from court on
March 23, 2011 she was subjected to a body search. 7 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants refused to feed her and started
pushing Plaintiff, calling her "faggot, queer with tits." [*44] (FAC at ¶ 33.) Defendant Deputy Ulloa smacked Plaintiff in
the face and head, calling her a "rat-ass-faggot." (Id.) Defendant Sgt. Rushing was laughing and kicked Plaintiff, saying
"we are the real thing, not no correctional officer." (Id.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant Sgt. Rushing then ordered Defendants
Deputies Adams and Mayes to strip Plaintiff naked in the middle of the hall. Plaintiff was then punched by Defendants.
Sgt. Rushing then said, "No budget, no law library." (Id.)
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2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79343, *
7 Plaintiff alleges that she was subjected to body searches on March 23, 2011 and April 4, 2011. (FAC at p. 9.)
The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ..." The right against unreasonable
searches and seizures extends to incarcerated prisoners. Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1227 (9th Cir. 2010);
Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir. 1988)(applying the Turner standard to prisoner allegations of
Fourth Amendment violations). Turner provides that "when a prison regulation impinges on a prisoner's constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Turner, 482
U.S. at 89. "So long as a prisoner is presented with the opportunity to obtain contraband and a weapon while
outside [*45] of her cell, a visual strip search has a legitimate penological purpose." Michenfelder v. Sumner,
860 F.2d at 333. Moreover, "in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have
exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such
matters." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540 n.23 (1979).
As in Bell, Defendants have presented evidence that body searches are conducted for reasons of institutional
security, something that Plaintiff has not countered. This is a legitimate penological objective. Michenfelder, 860
F.2d at 333; see also Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.
On April 1, 2011, while Plaintiff was returning from Court Defendants Deputies Ulloa, Mayes, Manpal, Adams and
Sgt. Rushing got Plaintiff naked and started to punch, strike and kick Plaintiff and called her a "rat faggot" and then denied
her medical care. (FAC at ¶ 36).
Defendants contend they did not physically abuse Plaintiff or call her names at any time. (DSUF 25.)
To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison conditions must involve
"the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). When a prison official
stands accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth
Amendment, the question turns on whether the force was applied in a good faith [*46] effort to maintain or restore
discipline, or maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of causing harm. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. at 7 (citing
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)). "In determining whether the use of force was wanton and unnecessary,
it may also be proper to evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of
force used, the 'threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials' and 'any efforts made to temper the severity of the
forceful response.'" Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321).
"When prison officials use excessive force against prisoners, they violate the inmates' Eighth Amendment right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment." Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2002). As with any Eighth
Amendment violation, Plaintiff must prove the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319-20.
Neither accident nor negligence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, because "[i]t is obduracy and wantonness, not
inadvertence or error in good faith that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause." (Id.)
Not "every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S.
at 9. "The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional
recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant [*47] to the
conscience of mankind." (Id. at 9-10) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In a case such as this one, where the
force is alleged to have resulted from a personal altercation rather than from disciplinary action, the "core judicial inquiry"
is not whether a certain quantum of injury was sustained, but rather "whether force is applied ... maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010); see also Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7; Oliver v. Keller, 289
F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002)(Eighth Amendment excessive force standard "examines whether the use of physical force is
more than de minimis").
Thus, an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim is not foreclosed simply because an inmate suffers injury that is
not serious and/or is de minimis. Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37. The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that the absence of
serious injury is not irrelevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, as such an absence may "provide some indication of the
amount of force applied." (Id.) The question under the Eighth Amendment is whether the use of physical force is more
than de minimis, resulting in the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Oliver, 289 F.3d at 628. If it was not, there is
no constitutional violation. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10.
Defendants seek summary judgment on the excessive force claims alleging the incidents did not occur. However,
Plaintiff has set forth facts that Defendants maliciously [*48] and sadistically assaulted her on March 23, 2011 and April
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1, 2011 to cause Plaintiff harm. (See FAC at ¶¶ 33, 36) Plaintiff further pled that the force used by Defendants was more
than de minimis. The Court finds a genuine dispute exists as to whether Defendants used force maliciously and sadistically
for the purpose of causing harm to Plaintiff. Defendants are therefore not entitled to summary judment.
E. Plaintiff Has Failed to State a Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985.
Section 1985 proscribes conspiracies to interfere with certain civil rights. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Department, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). To plead a claim for conspiracy under § 1985, the complaint must allege that
Defendants (1) conspired (2) to deprive any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, and that (3) at
least one of the conspirators did any act in furtherance of the conspiracy (4a) causing injury to his person or property or
(4b) depriving the person of any right or privilege of an American Citizen. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03
(1970). 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) has two parts: the first proscribes conspiracies to interfere with the administration of justice in
federal courts; the second applies to conspiracies to obstruct the course of justice in state courts. See Dooley v. Reiss, 736
F.2d 1392, 1395 (9th Cir. 1984).
The statute contains language requiring that the conspirators' actions be [*49] motivated by an intent to deprive their
victims of the equal protection of the laws. Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719 (1983). The deprivation of rights must be
motivated by a racial, or otherwise class-based, discrimination animus. Sever Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536
(9th Cir. 1992). A mere allegation of conspiracy without factual specificity is insufficient. Jaco v. Bloechle, 739 F.2d 239,
245 (6th Cir. 1984). Moreover, "bare" allegations and "rank" conjecture are insufficient to support a claim under § 1985
for a civil conspiracy. See Mahaney v. Warren County, 206 F.3d 770, 772 (8th Cir. 2000).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to set forth any meaningful and competent facts to suggest that Defendants' purpose of
denying Plaintiff access to the law library was in retaliation and discrimination of Plaintiff's transgender orientation and
was done to deprive Plaintiff of equal protection. (FAC at ¶¶ 4-5.) Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to assert any allegations that Defendants acted in concert, or had a "meeting of the minds" to deprive Plaintiff of her constitutional rights.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985.
To state a claim for conspiracy, Plaintiff must allege specific facts showing two or more persons intended to accomplish an unlawful objective of causing Plaintiff harm and took some concerted action in furtherance thereof. Gilbrook
v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 1999); Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 822 (9th Cir.
1989)(conclusory allegations [*50] of conspiracy insufficient to state a valid § 1983 claim); Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d
850, 852 (9th Cir. 1998)(to state a claim for conspiracy under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege facts showing agreement of the
alleged conspirators to deprive her of her rights. A conspiracy allegation, even if established, does not give rise to a liability under § 1983 unless there is a deprivation of civil rights). Plaintiff has failed to plead facts that establish that each
member of the conspiracy acted in concert and came to a mutual understanding to violate Plaintiff's civil rights and that
one or more of the Defendants committed an overt act to further it. See Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg, W. Va., 81 F.3d 416,
421 (9th Cir. 1996). A conspiracy is not established by simply alleging that the conspiring officers knew of an intended
wrongful act; rather, the plaintiff must allege that conspiring officers agreed, expressly or tacitly, to achieve it.
Plaintiff has failed to plead any facts that would suggest that Defendants acted with some sort of discriminatory
animus. See United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 610, AFL-CIO v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825,
834-35 (1983); see also Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980)(holding that section 1985 conspiracy
claim was properly dismissed because plaintiff had failed to allege facts establishing invidious discrimination). Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
F. Plaintiff Has Failed to State a Claim [*51] Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1986.
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants knew of the policy that violated Plaintiff's civil rights and had the power to
prevent the violations but refused and neglected to do anything. (FAC at ¶ 10.)
42 U.S.C. § 1986 provides a cause of action against parties who fail to prevent conspiracies to violate the civil rights
of other people. Specifically, any person who knows of a conspiracy to violate civil rights (as defined by 42 U.S.C. §
1985) and who has the power to prevent the violation but refuses or neglects to do so, is liable to the person injured. 42
U.S.C. § 1986. Thus, in order to state a claim under § 1986, a complaint must contain a valid claim under § 1985. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988); Trerice v. Pedersen, 769 F.2d 1398, 1403 (9th
Cir. 1985).
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2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79343, *
There are no facts asserted in the First Amended Complaint to support a § 1986 claim, as there is no basis to assert
that any of the alleged conduct on the part of Defendants was racially motivated or class based under the analysis of §
1985. Where the allegations pertaining to an underlying violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 are meritless at their
core, and where there are no facts to state liability for any wrongful conduct, the 42 U.S.C. § 1986 claim must be dismissed with prejudice. Accordingly Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
RECOMMENDATION
For all of the foregoing reasons, IT [*52] IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the District Court issue an Order:
(1) approving the findings of the United States Magistrate Judge; (2) granting in part Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment with respect to (a) dismissing Plaintiff's claims against Defendants' Sheriff Parkinson and the County of San
Luis Obispo; (b) dismissing Plaintiff's § 1983 claim based on alleged violations of her Fourteenth Amendment rights; (c)
dismissing Plaintiff's claim regarding constitutional right of access to the law library; (d) dismissing Plaintiff's claim
regarding confinement in Administrative Segregation; (e) Plaintiff's claims regarding denial of meals, showers, clothing
and yard time; (f) Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim; (g) Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1986 claim; and (3) denying Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment regarding Plaintiff's excessive force claims.
DATED: March 31, 2015
/s/ VICTOR B. KENTON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE