Aff
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Contention One: The Status Quo
The United States embargo uses food as a weapon against Cuba while constructing a narrative
of Cuban moral inferiority and American dominance
Fazzino, 10 - Assistant Professor, Department of Anthropology, University of Alaska Fairbanks. M.S., Sustainable Systems, Slippery Rock
University, December 1999; J.D., University of Florida Levin College of Law, 2007; and Ph.D., Anthropology, University of Florida, 2008 (David V.,
“WHOSE FOOD SECURITY? CONFRONTING EXPANDING COMMODITY PRODUCTION AND THE OBESITY AND DIABETES EPIDEMICS,” Drake Journal of
Agricultural Law, 15 Drake J. Agric. L. 393, LexisNexis)//HAL
It's important for our nation to build--to grow foodstuffs, to feed our people. Can you imagine a country that was unable to grow enough food to feed
the people? It would be a nation that would be subject to international pressure. It would be a nation at risk. And so when
we're talking
about American agriculture, we're really talking about a national security issue. This concern over the
relationship between food security and national security by the former President is obvious, considering that the United States has
utilized food as a weapon; perhaps the most notable example is the embargo on Cuba. n24 The
Cuban embargo has forced individual families and the Cuban government to make due with
fewer ties to global circuits of food production and distribution. n25 The embargo led to an
increase in the number of policies, programs, and measures to enhance food security by relying
on local and national food production programs. n26 Similarly, the United States has been responsible for the imposition of
Coalition Provisional Authority Order 81 in Iraq, which imposes World Trade Organization-friendly intellectual property rights, including limitations on
the rights of farmers to use seeds from the previous season's [*400] harvest. n27 Coalition Provisional Authority Order 81 could undermine food
security for farmers unable to afford required seed purchases if patented material is found among seeds which have been saved from the previous
When the operational definitions of food security are limited to measuring how much food
is created and distributed, then the United States emerges as a superior nation in terms of its
overall food security and food surpluses. n29 At the same time, the relative inability of so-called less
developed countries to meet the caloric needs of their populace--due to chronic or acute
instability in environmental, economic or political sectors--is described as vulnerability and
reflective of their inferiority. n30 Those in international development circles would also point to the poor transportation infrastructure
in these less developed countries, which limits the distribution of food to areas that may be in the greatest need of food assistance. n31 In the
United States, the temporal unfolding of science and technology is perceived as leading directly
to the continual emergence of progress. n32 Notions of this superiority are reflected in the
literature concerning food production and security where the locus of food insecurity is
consistently placed in the so-called less developed world, while the United States occupies the
role of provider and breadbasket of the world. n33 The stated superiority of the U.S. international
agro-industrial complex is intimately connected with economics and politics; it is a historically
produced discourse. n34
season.
Despite the food exemption, the US still violates international law by prosecuting companies
for selling food to Cuba
LAMRANI 5-16-2013 (Salim, academic, journalist and specialist in Cuba-US relations, “Obama's endless siege,” Morning Star, Lexis)
During his election campaign in 2007 Barack Obama declared his willingness to seek a "new beginning with
Cuba." "I think we can take the relationship between the US and Cuba in a new direction and launch a new chapter of engagement that will
continue during my tenure," he said. Obama denounced his predecessor's policy towards Cuba, which severely restricted opportunities for the Cuban
community in the United States to visit the country. "This is both a strategic and humanitarian issue," he said.
"This decision ... has had a profoundly negative impact on the welfare of the Cuban people. I will grant Cuban-Americans unrestricted rights to visit
family and send remittances to the island." Obama did keep his word on that. In April 2009 he announced the lifting of some restrictions affecting
Cubans living in the US with relatives on the island. Cuban-Americans can now travel to their homeland without any hindrance, instead of for just 14
days every three years, and send unlimited remittances to their families instead of just $100 (£66) a month. But
despite the relaxation
of travel restrictions Washington has continued to enforce economic sanctions on Cuba - with an
increasing emphasis on "extraterritorial imposition," that is, seeking to enforce its sanctions policy in all countries of
the world. US extraterritorial blockade legislation is in violation of international law. In June 2012 Dutch bank ING
received the largest penalty ever for violating economic sanctions, which have been in place since the US began the siege of the island in 1960. The
Office of Foreign Assets Control (Ofac) fined the bank $619 million (£407m) for processing dollar transactions involving Cuba. The Treasury Department
also forced the bank to sever commercial relations with Cuba. It announced that "ING assured the Office of Foreign Assets Control that it had put an
end to practices that led to today's settlement." Washington had banned a European bank from doing business with Cuba. The Cuban government
denounced this extraterritorial application of economic sanctions, which is a relatively new development. This, besides preventing all trade with the US
(except limited raw food products) constitutes the main obstacle to developing trade relations between Cuba and the rest of the world. Ofac director
Szunin Adam used the occasion to warn foreign firms against trade with Cuba. The ING fine "should serve as a clear warning to anyone considering
taking advantage of evading US sanctions," he said. Other foreign firms have also been sanctioned for trade relations with Cuba. The Swedish
telecommunications multinational Ericsson received a fine of $1.75m (£1.15m) for repairing (through a subsidiary based in Panama) Cuban equipment
worth £210,000. Three employees involved in the case were dismissed. In
July 2012 the Treasury Department imposed a
fine of $1.35m (£885,000) on US firm Great Western Malting Co for selling barley to Cuba between August
2006 and March 2009. This fine was in clear violation of international law, which prohibits any embargo
on food commodities or drugs even in wartime. And officially in any case Cuba and the US
have never been in conflict. In France two directors of the US travel agency Carlson Wagonlit Travel (CWT), Mano Giardini and Valerie
Adilly, were fired for selling tour packages to Cuba. The company runs the risk of receiving a fine of $38,000 (£25,000) per trip sold - angering some
employees who could not understand the situation. "Why did Carlson not withdraw the Cuba tours from our reservation system if we had no right to
sell them?" asked one. CWT directors said: "Under these conditions we must apply the US rule that prohibits journeys to Cuba, even for subsidiaries." A
US subsidiary based in France is required to abide by US law on economic sanctions against Cuba, ridiculing national legislation. More unusual
economic sanctions prohibit Cubans from using some functions of the Google search engine, such as Google Analytics, which calculates the number of
visits to a website and their origin, Google Earth, Google Desktop Search, Google Toolbar, Google Code Search, Google AdSense and Google AdWords.
This deprives Cuba of access to these new technologies and many downloadable products. Google spokeswoman Christine Chen explains: "We had it
written in our terms and conditions. Google Analytics cannot be used in countries subject to embargoes." At the same time that Washington imposes
restrictions on the use of Google's digital services in Cuba and prohibits Havana from connecting to its fibre-optic internet cable, the US State
Department announced that it would spend $20m (£13m) on "human rights activists, independent journalists and independent libraries on the island"
for the purpose of disseminating "digital democracy," via USAid. So
far from adopting a "new beginning with Cuba,"
the Obama administration continues to impose economic sanctions which affect the most
vulnerable sections of Cuban society, including women, children and the elderly. It does not
hesitate to violate international law by applying extraterritorial measures to punish foreign
companies. It refuses to listen to the unanimous demand of the international community,
which this year condemned for the 21st consecutive year the imposition of an anachronistic
and cruel blockade which remains the main obstacle to Cuba's development.
The United States violates the moral order—there is a worldwide consensus that American
policies violate the right to food
XINHUA 2012 (Chinese envoy says US embargo brings "huge sufferings" to Cubans BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific - PoliticalSupplied by BBC
Worldwide Monitoring November 14, 2012, Lexis)
The economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States on Cuba has brought "huge
sufferings" to its people, said a Chinese UN envoy here on Tuesday.
Wang Min, China's deputy permanent representative to the UN, made the remarks while addressing the UN General Assembly on voting
a resolution, which calls for an end of the US embargo on Cuba.
The resolution, which condemns the US blockade of Cuba and urges Washington to end its half-century embargo against
the Caribbean island country, was approved by the 193-nation Assembly with 188 votes for, three against and two
abstentions. China voted for the resolution.
This is the 21st year in a row that the UN General Assembly has adopted the resolution by an
overwhelming majority of votes to condemn the US embargo on Cuba.
Wang said the embargo has caused shortage of commodities and dealt a heavy blow to Cuba's
economy. It also stands as the major stumbling block for Cuba's economic development and
social progress.
"Such embargo has brought huge sufferings to the Cuban people and violated their
fundamental human rights including the rights to food, health and education as well as their rights to survival and
development," he said.
The Chinese diplomat noted that one
of the most prominent features of the embargo in the last year has
been "interference with Cuba's international financial transactions".
"This has not only hit Cuba's economy hard, but also affected the normal economic,
commercial and financial interactions between other countries and Cuba and hence impairing
the interests and sovereignty of third countries," Wang said.
The US still maintains financial restrictions that deny Cuban access to American food
exports—these should be lifted
CUBA NEWS 4-1-2013 (“Illinois advocacy group pushes soybean exports to Cuba,” Lexis)
Agroup of Illinois soybean farmers recently traveled to Cuba, where they saw with their own eyes how much business they're
losing because of the U.S. trade embargo.
In Havana, they met with officials of Cuban state food agency Alimport to gauge the island's current demand for soy-based products.
The high-profile group included Bill Wykes, chairman of the Illinois Soybean Association; Craig Ratajczyk, the association's CEO, and Mark Sprague, its
director.
"Although agricultural products are exempt from the embargo, we are losing significant
market share on our soy exports to Cuba because of restrictions the U.S. imposes on financial
transactions with Cuba," Wykes said in a press statement upon his return.
In 2006 -- only five years after the embargo was loosened to allowU.S. food exports to the island -- the United States had become the main source of
soymeal and soybean oil for Cuba. Exports to Cuba thatyear came to 164,390 metric tons of soymeal worth $26.6 million and 35,673 tons of soybean oil
worth $20.9 million, according to the U.S.Commerce Department.
By 2011, Cuban imports had taken a dramatic turn, with the United States exporting just $9.8 million (25,299 tons) of
soymeal but no soybean oil into Cuba. Meanwhile, Brazil had exported 264,634 tons of soymeal worth $112.5 million, and 82,596 tons of soybean oil
worth $100.4 million to the island.
"More tourism and prosperity for Cuba will likely lead to greater demand for soybeans and products," said Wykes. "Illinois is well positioned to be
Cuba's best supplier, given our logistical advantages and a commitment to quality. We don't want to lose the opportunity."
Another trade group, the Missouri-based American Soybean Association, said Brazilian soymeal and oil suppliers are outselling their U.S. rivals in Cuba
because Alimport has been able to buy on credit.
Doug Winter, another Illinois soybean farmer who previously visited Cuba, said the fact Brazil can offer Cuba a 60-day line of credit on farm purchases
knocks U.S. growers out of the competition. "Prepaying
for ag products can really put a business in a difficult
cashflow situation," Winter told the trade publication FarmProgress.com.
For this reason, ASA is urging Washington to lift agricultural trade, financial and travel
restrictions for Cuba and make it eligible for agribusiness-friendly initiatives like the Foreign Market
Development (FMD), Market Access Programs (MAP) and the U.S. Export Credit Guarantee program (GSM). Illinois lawmakers such as State Rep. Jack
Franks (D-Marengo) are among those also supporting agricultural credits for Cuba.
Yet most observers say it's unlikely to happen anytime soon, even though other farm-belt states have long urged Washington to allow such trade
financing, in order to generate food exports to Cuba.
"Until the U.S. government frees up banking with Cuba, it's a no-go," said Marvin Lehrer, senior advisor on
Cuba for the USA Rice Federation. He told CubaNews that along with programs containing direct U.S. funding, GSM is a bank-to-bank program, where
3rd-country banks that process Cuba's agricultural purchases would need to provide financing. But because of Cuba's dubious credit record, especially
with Western Europe, Lehrer dismisses this possibility.
"They
end up holding the stick," he said. Lehrer mentioned the risk that such banks would be taking in extending credit to Cuba,
addingthat the Obama administration feels it has already done enough with Cuba diplomatically.
"Everybody is waiting for Cuba to change," Lehrer told CubaNews.
Plan
Plan: the United States Federal Government should normalize its food trade with Cuba.
Contention Two: Morality
Access to food is a moral responsibility—we are obligated to ensure it even in the face of
human extinction
WATSON 1977 (Richard, Professor of Philosophy at Washington University, World Hunger and Moral Obligation, p. 118-119)
These arguments are morally spurious. That food sufficient for well-nourished survival is the equal right of every human individual or nation is a
specification of the higher principle that everyone has equal right to the necessities of life. The moral stress of the principle of equity is primarily on
equal sharing, and only secondarily on what is being shared. The higher moral principle is of human equity per se. Consequently, the
moral
action is to distribute all food equally, whatever the consequences. This is the hard line apparently
drawn by such moralists as Immanuel Kant and Noam Chomsky—but then, morality is hard. The conclusion may be
unreasonable (impractical and irrational in conventional terms), but it is obviously moral. Nor should anyone purport
surprise; it has always been understood that the claims of morality—if taken seriously—supersede those of conflicting
reason. One may even have to sacrifice one’s life or one’s nation to be moral in situations where
practical behavior would preserve it. For example, if a prisoner of war undergoing torture is to be a (perhaps dead) patriot even
when reason tells him that collaboration will hurt no one, he remains silent. Similarly, if one is to be moral, one distributes available
food in equal shares (even if everyone then dies). That an action is necessary to save one’s life is no excuse for behaving
unpatriotically or immorally if one wishes to be a patriot or moral. No principle of morality absolves one of behaving immorally simply to save one’s life
or nation. There is a strict analogy here between adhering to moral principles for the sake of being moral, and adhering to Christian principles for the
The moral world contains pits and lions, but one looks always to the highest light. The ultimate
test always harks to the highest principle—recant or die—and it is pathetic to profess morality if
one quits when the going gets rough. I have put aside many questions of detail—such as the
mechanical problems of distributing food—because detail does not alter the stark conclusion. If
every human life is equal in value, then the equal distribution of the necessities of life is an extremely
high, if not the highest, moral duty. It is at least high enough to override the excuse that by doing it one would lose one’s life. But
many people cannot accept the view that one must distribute equally even in f the nation collapses or all people die. If
everyone dies, then there will be no realm of morality. Practically speaking, sheer survival comes first. One can adhere
to the principle of equity only if one exists. So it is rational to suppose that the principle of survival is morally
higher than the principle of equity. And though one might not be able to argue for unequal distribution of food to save a nation—
sake of being Christian.
for nations can come and go—one might well argue that unequal distribution is necessary for the survival of the human species. That is, some large
group—say one-third of present world population—should be at least well-nourished for human survival. However,
from an individual
standpoint, the human species—like the nation—is of no moral relevance. From a naturalistic standpoint, survival does
come first; from a moralistic standpoint—as indicated above—survival may have to be sacrificed. In the
milieu of morality, it is immaterial whether or not the human species survives as a result of individual
behavior.
This equality is a side constraint—regardless of consequences, we cannot take any course of
action if it is unjust
RAWLS 1971 (John, philosopher, A Theory of Justice, p. 3-4)
Justice is the first virtue of social institutions as truth is of systems of thought. A theory however
elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; likewise laws and institutions no
matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust. Each
person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole
cannot override. For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a
greater good shared by others. It does not allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few are
outweighed by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed by the many. Therefore in a just society the liberties of
equal citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to
the calculus of social interests. The only thing that permits us to acquiesce in an erroneous theory is the lack of a better one;
analogously, an injustice is tolerable only when it is necessary to avoid an even greater injustice. Being first virtues of human
activities, truth and justice are uncompromising.
Even if Cuba can get food elsewhere this does not resolve our responsibility to act
AITKEN 1977 (William, teaches philosophy at Chatham College, World Hunger and Moral Obligation, p 93-94)
Some have maintained that there is a fourth minimal condition which a potential helper of a person in need must satisfy in order to be
obligated to act—the condition of being the ‘last resort’. Richard Brandt suggests such a condition in his book, Ethical Theory. He specifies that it is
only in cases where “we are the only one in a position to help” that we have a moral obligation
to assist a person in dire need and that the person in need has a right to our assistance. There is a danger in adopting this
‘last resort’ condition since it poses an additional epistemological difficulty, that is, the
determination of whether or not I am the last resort. Beyond this, it is an undesirable condition
because it will justify inaction where more than one person could act but where no one is acting.
In most emergency situations there is more than one potential assistor. For instance, five
persons may simultaneously come across a drowning child. Each would be obligated to act if he were the last resort,
but since no single one is the last resort, then all five may refuse to act, claiming that it is not their
duty to act any more than it is the duty of the other four and so each one would be justified in
not acting. If this condition is placed on the right to be saved, the child could drown and none of
the five spectators could be held morally accountable. But surely the presence of another
person at an accident site does not automatically relieve me of a moral duty to assist the victim
in need, any more than the presence of one police officer called to the scene of a bank robbery relieves other officers in the area from attempting
to apprehend the suspects. The condition of last resort is too strong; it is not a minimal condition for
obligation.
We must refuse to sacrifice one group to prevent a bad consequence—intervening actors
mean that our responsibility does not extend to the effects of the plan—only the moral act of
feeding hungry people
GEWIRTH 1983 (Alan, philosopher, Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Applications, p 230-231)
A third distinction is between respecting other persons and avoiding bad consequences. Respect for persons is an obligation so
fundamental that it cannot be overridden even to prevent evil consequences from befalling some persons.
If such prevention requires an action whereby respect is withheld from persons, then that action
must not be performed, whatever the consequences. One of the difficulties with this important distinction is that it is
unclear. May not respect be withheld from a person by failing to avert from him some evil
consequence? How can Abrams be held to respect the thousands of innocent persons or their rights if he lets them die when he could have
prevented this? The distinction also fails to provide for degrees of moral urgency. One fails to respect a person if one lies to him or steals from him;
but sometimes the only way to prevent the death of one innocent person may be by stealing from or telling a lie to some other innocent person.
In
such a case, respect for one person may lead to disrespect of a more serious kind from some
other innocent person. 7. None of the above distinctions, then, serves its intended purpose of defending the absolutist against the
consequentialist. They do not show that the son’s refusal to tortures his mother to death does not violate the other persons’ rights to life and that hes
is not morally responsible for their deaths. Nevertheless, the distinctions can be supplemented in a way that does serve to establish these conclusions.
The required supplement is provided by the principle of the intervening action. According to this principle,
when there is a causal connection between some person A’s performing some action (or inaction)
X and some other person C’s incurring a certain harm Z, A’s moral responsibility for Z is removed if,
between X and Z, there intervenes some other action Y of some person B who knows the relevant circumstances of his action and
who intends to produce Z or show produces Z through recklessness. The reasons for this removal is that B’s intervening
action Y is the more direct or proximate cause of Z and, unlike A’s action (or inaction), Y is the sufficient
condition of Z as it actually occurs. An example of this principle may help to show its connection with the absolutist thesis. Martin Luther
King Jr. was repeatedly told that because he led demonstrations in support of civil rights, he was
morally responsible for the disorders, riots, and deaths that ensued and that were shaking the American Republic
to its foundations. By the principle of the intervening action, however, it was King’s opponents who
were responsible because their intervention operated as the sufficient conditions of the riots
and injuries. King might also have replied that the Republic would not be worth saving if the
price that had to be paid was the violation of the civil rights of black Americans. As for the rights
of the other Americans to peace and order, the reply would be that these rights cannot
justifiably be secured at the price of the rights of blacks.
Intervening actors will solve their impact but not ours
SHIELDS 1995 (David, research associate, Peace and Conflict Studies Program at UC Berkeley, The Color of Hunger: Race and Hunger in National
and International Perspective, p. 1-2)
Imagine, for a moment, that unknown terrorists have detonated a crude atomic device in a large urban area. One
hundred and fifty thousand people are instantly incinerated, about the same number that died in the bombing of Hiroshima. Moreover, immediate
Then, just three
days later, a second atomic device is detonated spreading a similar level of death and destruction to another city. And then,
death is only the tip of the tragic iceberg; hundreds of thousands more are left with various debilitating injuries and diseases.
after three more days, yet another bomb explodes. Let us take our thought experiment one step further. Imagine, now, how the world would respond
Picture the massive human and economic resources that would be
marshaled. A monumental, highly coordinated, and unanimously supported effort would be galvanized, aimed at achieving one goal—finding
and eliminating the terrorists. World attention would be riveted to the crisis; a massive public outcry would
demand effective action and would settle for nothing less than an end to the threat. Politicians the
world over would talk of little else. The above scenario, of course, is fiction. Well, partly. It is fiction only with respect to
the instrument of death and the quality of the response. In reality, hunger is the weapon, and it claims the
lives of more people every three to four days than died in the bombing of Hiroshima. But the response to this massive crisis is
shocking in its near nonexistence, leading some to refer to hunger as the “silent emergency.”
Despite its unparalleled infliction of misery, suffering, and death, hunger is calmly dispassionately accepted
within the citadels and cathedrals of power as simply part of the present world order.
to such an unparalleled crisis.
Even if consequentialism is generally good, we must have moral side constraints—some
immoral actions must never be allowed no matter what the consequences are
NAGEL 1979 (Thomas, Philosopher, Mortal Questions, p 58-59)
Many people feel, without being able to say much more about it, that something has gone seriously wrong when certain
measures are admitted into consideration in the first place. The fundamental mistake is made
there, rather than at the point where the overall benefit of some monstrous measure is judged
to outweigh its disadvantages, and it is adopted. An account of absolutism might help us to understand this. If it is not
allowable to do certain things, such as killing unarmed prisoners or civilians, then no argument about what will
happen if one does not do them can show that doing them would be all right. Absolutism does
not, of course, require one to ignore the consequences of one’s acts. It operates as a limitation
on utlitiarian reasoning, not as a substitute for it. An absolutist can be expected to try to
maximize good and minimize evil, so long as this does not require him to transgress an absolute
prohibition like that against murder. But when such a conflict occurs, the prohibition takes complete
precedence over any consideration of consequences. Some of the results of this view are clear enough. It requires us to
forgo certain potentially useful military measures, such as the slaughter of hostages and prisoners or indiscriminate attempts to reduce the enemy
population by starvation, epidemic infectious diseases like anthrax and bubonic plague, or mass incineration. It means that we
cannot
deliberate on whether such measures are justified by the fact that they will avert still greater
evils, for as intentional measures they cannot be justified in terms of any consequences whatever.
Someone unfamiliar with the events of this century might imagine that utilitarian arguments, or arguments of national
interest, would suffice to deter measures of this sort. But it has become evident that such
considerations are insufficient to prevent the adoption and employment of enormous
antipopulation weapons once their use is considered a serious moral possibility. The same is
true of the piecemeal wiping out of rural civilian populations in airborne antiguerrilla warfare. Once the door is
opened to calculations of utility and national interest, the usual speculations about the future of
freedom, peace, and economic prosperity can be brought to bear to ease the consciences of
those responsible for a certain number of charred babies.
Utilitarianism may be generally correct, but moral side constraints are critical for the theory to
work—otherwise it violates its own framework by descending into large-scale murder
NAGEL 1979 (Thomas, Philosopher, Mortal Questions, p 56)
In the final analysis, I believe that the dilemma cannot always be resolved. While not every conflict between
absolutism and utilitarianism creates an insoluble dilemma, and while it seems to me certainly
right to adhere to absolutist restrictions unless the utilitarian considerations favoring violation
are overpoweringly weighty and extremely certain – nevertheless, when that special condition is
met, it may become impossible to adhere to an absolutist position. What I shall offer, therefore,
is a somewhat qualified defense of absolutism. I believe it underlies a valid and fundamental
type of moral judgment – which cannot be reduced to or overridden by other principles just as
fundamental, it is particularly important not to lose confidence in our absolutist intuitions, for
they are often the only barrier before the abyss of utilitarian apologetics for large-scale murder.
The argument that survival outweighs sharing food relies on a misunderstanding of moral
agency and justifies infinite atrocities—because no such agent as “the human species” exists,
we are responsible only to individuals who are starving
WATSON 1977 (Richard, Professor of Philosophy at Washington University, World Hunger and Moral Obligation, p. 121-123)
Given that the human species has rights as a fictional person on the analogy of corporate rights, it would seem to be rational to
place the right of survival of the species above that of individuals. Unless the species survives,
no individual will survive, and thus an individual’s right to life is subordinate to the species’ right to survival. If species survival depends
on the unequal distribution of food to maintain a healthy breeding stock, then it is morally right for some people to have plenty while others starve.
Only if there is enough food to nourish everyone well does it follow that food should be shared equally. This
might be true if corporate
entities actually do have moral status and moral rights. But obviously, the legal status of
corporate entities as fictional persons does not make them moral equals or superiors of actual
human persons. Legislators might profess astonishment that anyone would think that a corporate person is a person as people are, let alone a
moral person. However, because the legal rights of corporate entities are based on individual rights, and because corporate entities are treated so
much like persons, the transition is often made. Few theorists today would argue that the state of the human species is a personal agent. But all this
means is that idealism is dead in theory. Unfortunately, its influence lives, so it is worth giving an argument to show that corporate entities are not real
persons. Corporate
entities are not persons as you and I are in the explicit sense that we are selfconscious agents and they are not. Corporate entities are not agents at all, let alone moral
agents. This is a good reason for not treating corporate entities even as fictional persons. The distinction between people and
other things, to generalize, is that people are self-conscious agents, whereas things are not. The possession
of rights essentially depends on an entity’s being self-conscious, i.e., on its actually being a person. If it is self-conscious, then it has a right to life. Selfconsciousness is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for an entity’s being a moral equal of human beings; moral equality depends on the entity’s
also being a responsible moral agent as most human beings are.
A moral agent must have the capacity to be
responsible, i.e., the capacity to choose and to act freely with respect to consequences that the agent does or can recognize and accept as its
own choice and doing. Only a being who knows himself as a person, and who can effect choices and accept consequences, is a responsible moral
agent. On these grounds, moral
equality rests on the actuality of moral agency based on reciprocal rights
and responsibilities. One is responsible to something only if it can be responsible in return.
Thus, we have responsibilities to other people, and they have reciprocal rights. If we care for things, it is because people
have interests in them, not because things in themselves impose responsibilities on us. That is, as stated early in this essay, morality essentially has to
do with relations among people, among persons. It is nonsense to talk of things that cannot be moral agents as having responsibilities; consequently,
it is nonsense to talk of whatever is not actually a person as having rights. It is deceptive even to talk of legal
rights of a corporate entity. Those rights (and reciprocal responsibilities) actually pertain to individual human beings who have an interest in the
The State or the human species have no rights at all, let alone rights superior to those of individuals.
The basic reason given for preserving a nation or the human species is that otherwise the milieu of
morality would not exist. This is false so far as specific nations are concerned, but it is true that the existence of individuals depends on
the existence of the species. However, although moral behavior is required of each individual, no principle
requires that the realm of morality itself be preserved. Thus, we are reduced to the position
that people’s interest in preserving the human species is based primarily on the interest of each
corporate entity.
in individual survival. Having shown above that the principle of equity is morally superior to the
principle of survival, we can conclude again that food should be shared equally even if this means the
extinction of the human race. Is there no way to produce enough food to nourish everyone well? Besides cutting down to the
minimum, people in the West might quit feeding such nonhuman animals as cats and dogs. However, some people (e.g., Peter Singer) argue that mere
sentience—the capacity to suffer pain—means that an animal is the moral equal of human beings. I argue that because nonhuman animals are not
moral agents, they do not share the rights of self-conscious responsible persons. And considering the profligacy of nature, it is rational to argue that if
nonhuman animals have any rights at all, they include not the right to life, but merely the right to fight for life. In fact, if people in the West did not
feed grain to cattle, sheep, and hogs, a considerable amount of food would be freed for human consumption. Even then, there might not be enough to
nourish everyone. Let me remark that Stone and Singer attempt to break down the distinction between people on the one hand, and certain things
(corporate entities) and nonhuman animals on the other, out of moral concern. However,, there is another, profoundly antihumanitarian movement
All over the world, heirs of Gobineau, Goebbels, and Hitler practice
genocide and otherwise treat people as non-human animals and things in the name of the State. I am afraid
that the consequences of treating entities such as corporations and nonhuman animals—that are not moral
agents—as persons with rights will not be that we will treat national parks and chickens the way
we treat people, but that we will have provided support for those who would treat people the
way we now treat nonhuman animals and things. The benefits of modern society depend in no small part on the institution of
also attempting to break down the distinction.
corporate law. Even if the majority of these benefits are to the good—of which I am by no means sure—the legal fiction of corporate personhood still
elevates corporate needs above the needs of people. In the present context, reverence
for corporate entities leads to the
spurious argument that the present world imbalance of food and resources is morally justified in the
name of the higher rights of sovereign nations, or even of the human species, the survival of which is said to be more
important than the right of any individual to life. This conclusion is morally absurd. This is not, however, the fault of morality. We
should share all food equally, at least until everyone is well-nourished. Besides food, all the necessities of life should be shared, at least until everyone
is adequately supplied with a humane minimum. The hard conclusion remains that we
should share all food equally even if
this means that everyone starves and the human species becomes extinct. But, of course, the human race
would survive even equal sharing, for after enough people died, the remained could be well-nourished on the food that remained. But this grisly
prospect does not show that anything is wrong with the principle of equity. Instead, it shows
that something is profoundly wrong with the social institutions in which sharing the necessities
of life equally is “impractical” and “irrational.”
Utilitarianism does not apply to hunger—accepting starvation undermines our status as moral
actors
SHIELDS 1995 (David, research associate, Peace and Conflict Studies Program at UC Berkeley, The Color of Hunger: Race and Hunger in National
and International Perspective, p. 49)
One of the great myths about hunger is that it can be adequately studied objectively. In the academic halls of the great universities, hunger, when
it is not ignored, is turned into a topic, a problem to be investigated. It is subjected to theoretical analysis, statistical manipulation, and policy review.
Scientific papers are delivered at professional meetings, dissertations are written, and careers are made in the study of hunger. In the corridors of
government, hunger, when it is not ignored, is turned into a topic for partisan debate. Politicians issue position statements,
bureaucrats shuffle papers and people, and technocrats design assistance programs like an architect designs a building. I am not suggesting that these
are entirely barren efforts, but by themselves they
fail to come to grips with the most basic challenge posed by the
To genuinely know hunger, one must break with the objectivist mode of knowing,
returning to it only after experiencing the subjective immediacy of hunger’s threat. Hunger is ugly and
tragic. The hungry person, simply by virtue of his or her existence, is a fundamental protest against the moral
integrity of our society and culture. More basic yet, the ravaged bodies of the hungry call into question
our own humanity. How can we claim full personhood when we have allowed such a situation of massive
suffering to go uncorrected? Hunger cannot be studied objectively because our very soul is called into question by the approaching
victim of hunger. Until we are grasped in our innermost core by the wrenching protest of the walking death called hunger, until we are
pulled into a struggle of solidarity and militant resistance, until we are ready to burst with an anguished
outcry of “Stop, this can’t go on!” then we cannot understand hunger. We misunderstand hunger when we turn
existence of hunger.
the hungry person into one more object of study.
The threat of extinction cannot outweigh morality
CALLAHAN 1973 (Daniel, institute of Society and Ethics, The Tyranny of Survival, p. 91-3)
The value of survival could not be so readily abused were it not for its evocative power. But
abused it has been. In the name of survival, all manner of social and political evils have been
committed against the rights of individuals, including the right to life. The purported threat of Communist
domination has for over two decades fueled the drive of militarists for ever-larger defense budgets, no matter what the cost to other social needs.
During World War II, native Japanese-Americans were herded, without due process of law, to detention camps. This policy was later upheld by the
Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States (1944) in the general context that a threat to national security can justify acts otherwise blatantly
unjustifiable. The
survival of the Aryan race was one of the official legitimations of Nazism. Under the
banner of survival, the government of South Africa imposes a ruthless apartheid, heedless of the most
elementary human rights. The Vietnamese war has seen one of the greatest of the many absurdities tolerated in the name of survival: the destruction
of villages in order to save them. But it is not only in a political setting that survival has been evoked as a final and unarguable value. The main rationale
B. F. Skinner offers in Beyond Freedom and Dignity for the controlled and conditioned society is the need for survival. For Jacques Monod, in Chance
and Necessity, survival requires that we overthrow almost every known religious, ethical and political system. In
genetics, the survival of
the gene pool has been put forward as sufficient grounds for a forceful prohibition of bearers of
offensive genetic traits from marrying and bearing children. Some have even suggested that we do the cause of
survival no good by our misguided medical efforts to find means by which those suffering from such common genetically based diseases as diabetes can
live a normal life, and thus procreate even more diabetics. In the field of population and environment, one can do no better than to cite Paul Ehrlich,
whose works have shown a high dedication to survival, and in
its holy name a willingness to contemplate
governmentally enforced abortions and a denial of food to surviving populations of nations
which have not enacted population-control policies. For all these reasons it is possible to
counterpoise over against the need for survival a "tyranny of survival." There seems to be no
imaginable evil which some group is not willing to inflict on another for sake of survival, no
rights, liberties or dignities which it is not ready to suppress. It is easy, of course, to recognize the danger when
survival is falsely and manipulatively invoked. Dictators never talk about their aggressions, but only about the need to defend the fatherland to save it
from destruction at the hands of its enemies. But my
point goes deeper than that. It is directed even at a legitimate concern
for survival, when that concern is allowed to reach an intensity which would ignore, suppress or
destroy other fundamental human rights and values. The potential tyranny survival as value is
that it is capable, if not treated sanely, of wiping out all other values. Survival can become an
obsession and a disease, provoking a destructive singlemindedness that will stop at nothing. We
come here to the fundamental moral dilemma. If, both biologically and psychologically, the need for survival is basic to man, and if survival is the
precondition for any and all human achievements, and if
no other rights make much sense without the premise of a
right to life—then how will it be possible to honor and act upon the need for survival without, in
the process, destroying everything in human beings which makes them worthy of survival. To put it
more strongly, if the price of survival is human degradation, then there is no moral reason why an
effort should be made to ensure that survival. It would be the Pyrrhic victory to end all Pyrrhic
victories.
Number of people killed is a bad ethical calculus
HOLT 2006 (Jim, frequent NYT contributor, “Math Murders,” New York Times, March 12)
Counting the dead is a paradoxical business. Suppose I told you that around 150 million people have died over the last century in wars,
genocides, man-made famines and other atrocities. This number might evoke in you a certain horror. But it is, of course, only a wild guess.
Its very vagueness lends it an air of unreality. Yet what purpose would be served by making it
more precise? Where mass death is concerned, the moral significance of scale seems to be one
of those things that our brains aren't equipped to handle. A single life may have infinite value,
but the difference between a million deaths and a million and one strikes us as negligible. The moral
meaning of death counts is further obscured by their apparent lack of objectivity. Take the war in Iraq. How many Iraqi civilians have died as a
consequence of the American invasion? Supporters of the war say 30,000, a number that even President Bush finally brought himself to utter late last
year. Opponents of the war say more than 100,000. Surely there must be a fact of the matter. In practice, though, there are only competing
methodologies and assumptions, all of which yield different numbers. Even if we could put politics aside and agree on
one, it would be hard to say what it meant. Does it matter, for instance, that the higher estimate of 100,000 is the same order of magnitude as the
number of Iraqi Kurds that Saddam Hussein is reckoned to have killed in 1987 and 1988, in a genocidal campaign that, it has been claimed, justified his
forcible removal? ''It is painful to contemplate that despite our technologies of assurance and mathematics of certainty, such
a fundamental
index of reality as numbers of the dead is a nightmarish muddle,'' wrote Gil Elliot in his 1972 volume, ''The
Twentieth Century Book of the Dead.'' Figuring out the number of man-caused deaths is rarely as straightforward as counting skulls in a mass grave.
You can kill people with bombs, guns and machetes, but there are also more indirect ways: causing them to die of starvation, say, or of exposure or
disease. (The disease need not be indirect -- witness the radiation victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.) Of the nearly two million Cambodians killed by
the Khmer Rouge, for instance, perhaps half were executed outright. By contrast, in the ongoing civil war in the Congo -- the deadliest conflict since
World War II -- 2 percent of the estimated 3.9 million victims have died of direct violence; the rest perished when their subsistence-level lives were
disrupted by the war. Quantifying man-made death thus means, at the very least, having
an idea of the rate at which
people die naturally. And that entails recordkeeping. In 17th-century Europe, registers kept by church parishes -- dates of baptisms,
marriages and burials -- made it possible to gauge the devastation caused by the Thirty Years' War, which was deadlier for civilians than for soldiers.
The last century, strange to say, has not always matched this level of demographic sophistication. Even
in the case of Nazi Germany,
supposedly a model of efficiency, the implementation of the Final Solution was so chaotic that the number of victims
can be known only to the nearest million. If our methodology of counting man-made deaths is crude, our
moral calculus for weighing the resulting numbers is even cruder. Quantification, it is often
thought, confers precision and objectivity. Yet it tells us very little about comparative evil. We
feel that Hitler was every bit as evil as Stalin, even though Stalin was far more successful in
murdering people (in part because he had a longer run). Mao may have been more successful still; in their recent
book, ''Mao: The Unknown Story,'' Jung Chang and Jon Halliday estimate that the Chinese leader was responsible for ''well over 70 million deaths,''
which would come to nearly half of the total number of man-made deaths in the 20th century. In
relative terms, however, Mao is
easily eclipsed by Pol Pot, who directed the killing of more than a quarter of his fellow Cambodians. Raw death numbers
may not be a reliable index of evil, but they still have value as a guide to action. That, at least, is the
common-sense view. It is also part of the ethical theory known as utilitarianism, which holds that sacrificing x lives to save y
lives is always justified as long as y is greater than x. This utilitarian principle is often invoked, for example, in defense of President Truman's decision to
drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which killed between 120,000 and 250,000 Japanese civilians, on the assumption that the death toll
would have been worse had the war been prolonged. Yet
some thinkers (like the British philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe) have
questioned whether, morally speaking, numbers really count. In a choice between saving 5 lives
and saving 10, they ask, why should we be dutybound to act in behalf of the greater number? Because,
you say, it would be worse for 10 people to die than for 5 people. They reply: Worse for whom?
Arithmetic misleads us into thinking that deaths aggregate the way numbers do. Yet in reality
there are only individuals suffering. In a dilemma where the deaths of one group of people or
another is unavoidable, why should someone have to die merely by reason of being in the
smaller group? This sort of skepticism about the significance of numbers has some perverse consequences. It implies that all atrocities have an
equal command on our moral attention, regardless of scale. Yet a refusal to aggregate deaths can also be ethically
salubrious. It helps us realize that the evil of each additional death is in no way diluted by the
number of deaths that may have preceded it. The ongoing bloodbath in Darfur has, all agree, claimed an
enormous number of victims. Saying just how many is a methodological nightmare; a ballpark figure is a quarter of a million, but
estimates range up to 400,000 and beyond. Quantitatively, the new deaths that each day brings are absorbed
into this vast, indeterminate number. Morally, they ought to be as urgent as those on the first
day of the slaughter. ''What is the moral context in which we should see those killed by violence? There exists a view that one violent death
has the same moral value as a thousand or a million deaths. . . . The killer cannot add to his sin by committing more than
one murder. However, every victim of murder would claim, if he could, that his death had a separate
moral value.'' Source: ''The Twentieth Century Book of the Dead,'' by Gil Elliot (1972)
These ethical rules apply to states, not just individuals
NAGEL 1979 (Thomas, Philosopher, Mortal Questions, p 89-90)
Both of these sources of public morality generate limits to what a public official may do in the conduct of his office,
even if he is serving institutional interests. It is easy to forget about those limits, for three reasons. First, restrictions against the
use of public power for private gain can seem like a moral cushion that insulates whatever else is done officially from moral reproach. Second, the
fact that the holder of a public office takes on an obligation to a particular group may foster the
idea that he is obliged not to consider anything except the interest of that group. Third, the impersonal
morality of public institutions, and the moral specialization that inevitably arises given the complexity of public actions, lead naturally to the
establishment of many roles whose terms of reference are primarily consequentialist. Lack of attention to the context that is necessary to make these
roles legitimate can lead to a rejection of all limits on the means thought to be justified by ever greater ends. I have argued that these are all errors. It
is important to remember that they are moral views: the opinion that in certain conditions a certain type of conduct is permissible has to be criticized
Even if public morality is not
substantively derivable from private, it applies to individuals. If one of them takes on a public
and defended by moral argument. Let me return finally to the individuals who occupy public roles.
role, he accepts certain limitations on what he may do. As with any obligation, this step involves a risk
that he will be required to act in ways incompatible with other obligations or principles that he accepts.
Sometimes he will have to act anyway. But sometimes, if he can remember them, he will see that the limits imposed by public
morality itself are being transgressed, and he is being asked to carry out a judicial murder or a war of unjust aggression. At this
point there is no substitute for refusal and, if possible, resistance. Despite the impersonal character
of public morality and its complex application to institutions in which responsibility is partly
absorbed by the moral defects of the institution through which he acts; but the plausibility of that excuse
is inversely proportional to the power and independence of the actor. Unfortunately this is not reflected in our
treatment of former public servants who have often done far worse than take bribes.
This is particularly true in the case of food
KENT 2005 (George, Freedom From Want: The Human Right to Adequate Food, p 1)
People have a right to adequate food, and to be free from hunger, as a matter of international law. The
right is articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and several other international instruments. States and
the governments that represent them, and other parties as well, have obligations to ensure that
the right is realized. States that are parties to these agreements have made a commitment to
ensure the realization of the right.
Contention Three: No Predictions
Expert predictions are wrong—we can’t know the future
MENAND 2005 (Louis, “Everybody’s an Expert,” The New Yorker, December 2005,
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/12/05/051205crbo_books1?currentPage=1)
It is the somewhat gratifying lesson of Philip Tetlock’s new book, “Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?” (Princeton; $35),
that people
who make prediction their business—people who appear as experts on television, get quoted in newspaper
no better than the rest of us. When
they’re wrong, they’re rarely held accountable, and they rarely admit it, either. They insist that they were just
articles, advise governments and businesses, and participate in punditry roundtables—are
off on timing, or blindsided by an improbable event, or almost right, or wrong for the right reasons. They have the same repertoire of self-justifications
that everyone has, and are no more inclined than anyone else to revise their beliefs about the way the world works, or ought to work, just because they
made a mistake. No one is paying you for your gratuitous opinions about other people, but the experts are being paid, and Tetlock claims that the
better known and more frequently quoted they are, the less reliable their guesses about the future are likely to
be. The accuracy of an expert’s predictions actually has an inverse relationship to his or her self-confidence, renown, and, beyond a certain point, depth
of knowledge. People who follow current events by reading the papers and newsmagazines regularly can guess what is likely to happen about as
accurately as the specialists whom the papers quote. Our
system of expertise is completely inside out: it rewards bad
judgments over good ones. “Expert Political Judgment” is not a work of media criticism. Tetlock is a psychologist—he teaches at
Berkeley—and his conclusions are based on a long-term study that he began twenty years ago. He picked two hundred
and eighty-four people who made their living “commenting or offering advice on political and economic trends,” and he started asking them to assess
the probability that various things would or would not come to pass, both in the areas of the world in which they specialized and in areas about which
they were not expert. Would there be a nonviolent end to apartheid in South Africa? Would Gorbachev be ousted in a coup? Would the United States
go to war in the Persian Gulf? Would Canada disintegrate? (Many experts believed that it would, on the ground that Quebec would succeed in
seceding.) And so on. By the end of the study, in 2003, the experts had made 82,361 forecasts. Tetlock also asked questions designed to determine how
they reached their judgments, how they reacted when their predictions proved to be wrong, how they evaluated new information that did not support
their views, and how they assessed the probability that rival theories and predictions were accurate.
Tetlock got a statistical handle on his task by putting most of the forecasting questions into a “three possible futures” form. The respondents were
asked to rate the probability of three alternative outcomes: the persistence of the status quo, more of something (political freedom, economic growth),
or less of something (repression, recession). And he
measured his experts on two dimensions: how good they were at
guessing probabilities (did all the things they said had an x per cent chance of happening happen x per cent of the time?), and how
accurate they were at predicting specific outcomes. The results were unimpressive. On the first scale, the experts
performed worse than they would have if they had simply assigned an equal probability to all three outcomes—if they had given each possible future a
thirty-three-per-cent chance of occurring. Human
beings who spend their lives studying the state of the world, in
poorer forecasters than dart-throwing monkeys, who would have distributed their picks evenly over the
three choices. Tetlock also found that specialists are not significantly more reliable than non-specialists in guessing
other words, are
what is going to happen in the region they study. Knowing a little might make someone a more reliable forecaster, but Tetlock found that knowing a lot
can actually make a person less reliable. “We reach the point of diminishing marginal predictive returns for knowledge disconcertingly quickly,” he
reports. “In this age of academic hyperspecialization, there is no reason for supposing that contributors to top journals—distinguished political
scientists, area study specialists, economists, and so on—are any better than journalists or attentive readers of the New York Times in ‘reading’
emerging situations.” And the more famous the forecaster the more overblown the forecasts. “Experts in demand,” Tetlock says, “were more
overconfident than their colleagues who eked out existences far from the limelight.” People who are not experts in the psychology of expertise are
likely (I predict) to find Tetlock’s results a surprise and a matter for concern. For psychologists, though, nothing could be less surprising. “ Expert
Political Judgment” is just one of more than a hundred studies that have pitted experts against
statistical or actuarial formulas, and in almost all of those studies the people either do no better
than the formulas or do worse. In one study, college counsellors were given information about a group of high-school students and
asked to predict their freshman grades in college. The counsellors had access to test scores, grades, the results of personality and vocational tests, and
personal statements from the students, whom they were also permitted to interview. Predictions that were produced by a formula using just test
scores and grades were more accurate. There are also many studies showing that expertise and experience do not make someone a better reader of
the evidence. In one, data from a test used to diagnose brain damage were given to a group of clinical psychologists and their secretaries. The
psychologists’ diagnoses were no better than the secretaries’. The experts’ trouble in Tetlock’s study is exactly the trouble that all human beings have:
we fall in love with our hunches, and we really, really hate to be wrong. Tetlock describes an experiment that he witnessed thirty years ago in a Yale
classroom. A rat was put in a T-shaped maze. Food was placed in either the right or the left transept of the T in a random sequence such that, over the
long run, the food was on the left sixty per cent of the time and on the right forty per cent. Neither the students nor (needless to say) the rat was told
these frequencies. The students were asked to predict on which side of the T the food would appear each time. The rat eventually figured out that the
food was on the left side more often than the right, and it therefore nearly always went to the left, scoring roughly sixty per cent—D, but a passing
grade. The students looked for patterns of left-right placement, and ended up scoring only fifty-two per cent, an F. The rat, having no reputation to
begin with, was not embarrassed about being wrong two out of every five tries. But Yale students, who do have reputations, searched for a hidden
order in the sequence. They couldn’t deal with forty-per-cent error, so they ended up with almost fifty-per-cent error. The expert-prediction game is
not much different. When television pundits make predictions, the more ingenious their forecasts the greater their cachet. An arresting new prediction
means that the expert has discovered a set of interlocking causes that no one else has spotted, and that could lead to an outcome that the
conventional wisdom is ignoring. On shows like “The McLaughlin Group,” these experts never lose their reputations, or their jobs, because long shots
are their business. More serious commentators differ from the pundits only in the degree of showmanship. These serious experts—the think tankers
and area-studies professors—are not entirely out to entertain, but they are a little out to entertain, and both their status as experts and their appeal as
performers require them to predict futures that are not obvious to the viewer. The producer of the show does not want you and me to sit there
listening to an expert and thinking, I could have said that. The
expert also suffers from knowing too much: the more
facts an expert has, the more information is available to be enlisted in support of his or her pet theories, and the more chains of
causation he or she can find beguiling. This helps explain why specialists fail to outguess nonspecialists. The odds tend to be with the obvious. Tetlock’s experts were also no different from the rest of us when it came to learning from their
mistakes. Most people tend to dismiss new information that doesn’t fit with what they already believe. Tetlock found that his experts used a double
standard: they were much tougher in assessing the validity of information that undercut their theory than they were in crediting information that
supported it. The same deficiency leads liberals to read only The Nation and conservatives to read only National Review. We are not natural
falsificationists: we would rather find more reasons for believing what we already believe than look for reasons that we might be wrong. In the terms of
Karl Popper’s famous example, to verify our intuition that all swans are white we look for lots more white swans, when what we should really be
looking for is one black swan. Also, people
tend to see the future as indeterminate and the past as inevitable.
If you look backward, the dots that lead up to Hitler or the fall of the Soviet Union or the attacks on
September 11th all connect. If you look forward, it’s just a random scatter of dots, many potential
chains of causation leading to many possible outcomes. We have no idea today how tomorrow’s invasion of a foreign
land is going to go; after the invasion, we can actually persuade ourselves that we knew all along. The result seems inevitable, and therefore
predictable. Tetlock found that, consistent with this asymmetry, experts routinely misremembered the degree of probability they had assigned to an
event after it came to pass. They claimed to have predicted what happened with a higher degree of certainty than, according to the record, they really
did. When this was pointed out to them, by Tetlock’s researchers, they sometimes became defensive. And, like most of us, experts
violate a
fundamental rule of probabilities by tending to find scenarios with more variables more likely. If
a prediction needs two independent things to happen in order for it to be true, its probability is
the product of the probability of each of the things it depends on. If there is a one-in-three
chance of x and a one-in-four chance of y, the probability of both x and y occurring is one in
twelve. But we often feel instinctively that if the two events “fit together” in some scenario the
chance of both is greater, not less. The classic “Linda problem” is an analogous case. In this experiment, subjects are told, “Linda is
thirty-one years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of
discrimination and social justice and also participated in antinuclear demonstrations.” They are then asked to rank the probability of several possible
descriptions of Linda today. Two of them are “bank teller” and “bank teller and active in the feminist movement.” People rank the second description
higher than the first, even though, logically, its likelihood is smaller, because it requires two things to be true—that Linda is a bank teller and that Linda
is an active feminist—rather than one. It was no news to Tetlock, therefore, that experts got beaten by formulas. But he does believe that he
discovered something about why some people make better forecasters than other people. It has to do not with what the experts believe but with the
way they think. Tetlock uses Isaiah Berlin’s metaphor from Archilochus, from his essay on Tolstoy, “The Hedgehog and the Fox,” to illustrate the
difference. He says: Low scorers look like hedgehogs: thinkers who
“know one big thing,” aggressively extend the
explanatory reach of that one big thing into new domains, display bristly impatience with those who “do not get it,”
and express considerable confidence that they are already pretty proficient forecasters, at least in the long term. High scorers look like foxes: thinkers
who know many small things (tricks of their trade), are skeptical of grand schemes, see explanation and prediction not as deductive exercises but rather
as exercises in flexible “ad hocery” that require stitching together diverse sources of information, and are rather diffident about their own forecasting
prowess. A
hedgehog is a person who sees international affairs to be ultimately determined by a
single bottom-line force: balance-of-power considerations, or the clash of civilizations, or
globalization and the spread of free markets. A hedgehog is the kind of person who holds a great-man theory of history,
according to which the Cold War does not end if there is no Ronald Reagan. Or he or she might adhere to the “actor-dispensability thesis,” according to
which Soviet Communism was doomed no matter what. Whatever it is, the
big idea, and that idea alone, dictates the
probable outcome of events. For the hedgehog, therefore, predictions that fail are only “off on timing,” or are “almost right,” derailed
by an unforeseeable accident. There are always little swerves in the short run, but the long run irons them out.
Empirical evidence doesn’t matter—history does not predict the future
SHERDEN 1998 (William, business consultant, The Fortune Sellers, p. 199)
History does not repeat itself. The evolution of society is continually new, novel, and full of
surprises, with no recurring cycles. Wars, revolutions, trends, and movements are as different
from one another as snowflakes. “One must expect that events of an intrinsically new character
will emerge,” wrote Popper. “Every single event in social life can be said to be new, in a certain sense. It may
be classified with other events; it may even resemble those events in certain aspects; but it will
always be unique in a very definite way…Belief in historical destiny is sheer superstition.”
War is particularly unpredictable
FONT AND RÉGIS 2006 (Joan Pere Plaza i Font UAB – Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona – Spain Dandoy Régis UCL – University of Louvain
– Belgium “Chaos Theory and its Application in Political Science” IPSA – AISP Congress Fukuoka, 9 – 13 July 2006
http://www.sciencespo.site.ulb.ac.be/dossiers_membres/dandoy-regis/fichiers/dandoy-regis-publication18.pdf)
Betts (2000) observed a useful application of chaos to strategy and international security. In his view, doubts
about government’s
capacity to cause intended effects through strategy are reinforced by the chaos theory, given
the fact that the strategy results do not follow plans. The complexity and the contingency preclude
controlling causes well enough to produce desired effects and little connection between the
design and the denouement of strategies is observed. The author stressed that, in this case, the chaos theory emphasizes
how small, untraceable events produce major changes, referring to the ‘butterfly effect’ characteristic.
Chaos theory sees war as a nonlinear system that produces ‘erratic behaviour’, through
disproportionate relationships between inputs and outputs or synergies, and in which the whole
is not equal to the sum of the parts (Beyerchen, 1992). However, Betts conceded that chaotic nonlinearity is common in war
strategies, but neither absolute nor pervasive. “If chaos theory meant that no prediction is possible, there would be no point in any analysis of the
conduct of the war” (Betts, 2000: 20). Those who criticize social science approaches to strategy for false confidence in predictability cannot rest on a
rejection of prediction altogether without negating all rationale for strategy. Finally, one should mention that the nonlinear perspective misrepresents
the structure of the problem as the military strategy seeks disequilibrium, a way to defeat the enemy rather than to find a mutually acceptable price for
exchange. More precise but still rhetorical examples of the application of the chaos theory in the field of the international relations can be found in the
example of the spontaneous and mass revolutions as the Iranian revolution of 1978-79 that is considered a massive rupture of chaotic uncertainties
and bifurcations into unpredictable dynamical changes in a political system (Farazmand, 2003:341), similarly to the predictions made on the post-castro
environment in Cuba (Radu, 2000). A
single man – Adolf Hilter – was considered as the ‘butterfly’s wing’ that
could cause the German system to bifurcate from democracy to totalitarism (Peled, 2000:31). Similarly, the
events of September 2001 in the United States, the appearance of the Macedonian Alexander that ruled the Persian Empire
are assessed as good examples of how small scale chaotic events can lead to large scale chaotic
consequences with far reaching implications. (Farazmand, 2003:353). But political scientists do not only use metaphors for
describing political and IR phenomena. For example, Saperstein (1988) studied empirically whether the development of SDI in the United States
would lead to a transition from an offensive to a defensive mode of strategy from ICBM attacks. His complex model appears to be sensitive to noise and
even chaotic. The
outcomes of the system clearly show erratic oscillations and predict an undesired
escalation of risk of strategic intercontinental nuclear war in the case of the development of SDI. They confirmed that,
in the political science field, the transition from predictability to chaos in deterministic mathematical system is possible.
Chaotic interactions are the only possibility for a nuclear war
MILLIKEN 2001 (Jennifer, The social construction of the Korean War: conflict and its possibilities, google books)
Schelling (1966: 55), commenting on the possibility of a 'major nuclear war', claimed that It could only result 'from a
process that is not entirely foreseen, from reactions that are not fully predictable, from decisions that
are not wholly deliberate, from events that are not fully under control'. I have not been examining the prospect of a
major nuclear war (which was not materially a possibility in 1950), but rather how the Korean War could have become a more generalised war than it
already was. The routes to general war that I have traced none the less show that Schelling's comments also applied in this Cold War context. A
general war was then not fully predictable either it could have resulted from decisions not to fight that type of
conflict, but rather to do other things. But - the point to my counterfactual scenarios - these processes were 'foreseeable',
meaning here embedded in the conflict grammars of participants in the Korean War and how they could have interacted with one another.
Various world systems exist in a critical state where sudden and unpredictable collapse is
possible at any time—it is literally impossible to learn from history or identify a cause of war
even minutes before it breaks out
BUCHANAN 2002 (Mark, Ubiquity: Why Catastrophes Happen, p. 62)
This book is not only about earthquakes. It is about ubiquitous patterns of change and organization that run through
our world at all levels. I have begun with earthquakes and discussed them at some length only to illustrate a way of thinking and to
introduce the remarkable dynamics of upheavals associated with the critical state, dynamics that we shall soon see at work in other settings. "When
it comes to disastrous episodes of financial collapse, revolutions, or catastrophic wars, we all
quite understandably long to identify the causes that make these things happen, so that we
might avoid them in the future. But we shall soon find power laws in these settings as well, very possibly
because the critical state underlies the dynamics of all of these different kinds of upheaval. It
appears that, at many levels, our world is at all times tuned to be on the edge of sudden, radical
change, and that these and other upheavals may all be strictly unavoidable and unforeseeable,
even just moments before they strike. Consequently, our human longing for explanation may
be terribly misplaced, and doomed always to go unsatisfied.
Contention Four: No Impact
Great power war is obsolete and small conflicts will not escalate
MANDELBAUM 1999 (Michael, Professor of American Foreign Policy, Johns Hopkins University; Director, Project on East-West Relations,
Council on Foreign Relations, “Transcript: is Major War Obsolete?” Transcript of debate with John Mearsheimer, CFR,
Feb 25, http://www.ciaonet.org/conf/cfr10/)
My argument says, tacitly, that while this point of view, which was widely believed 100 years ago, was not true then, there are reasons to think that it is
true now. What is that argument? It is that major war is obsolete. By major war, I mean war waged by the most powerful members of the
international system, using all of their resources over a protracted period of time with revolutionary geopolitical consequences. There have been four
such wars in the modern period: the wars of the French Revolution, World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. Few though they have been, their
consequences have been monumental. They are, by far, the most influential events in modern history. Modern history which can, in fact, be seen as a
series of aftershocks to these four earthquakes. So if I am right, then what has been the motor of political history for the last two centuries that has
been turned off? This war, I argue, this kind of war, is obsolete; less than impossible, but more than unlikely. What do I mean by
obsolete? If I may quote from the article on which this presentation is based, a copy of which you received when coming in, “ Major war is obsolete in a
way that styles of dress are obsolete. It is something that is out of fashion and, while it could be revived, there is no present demand for it. Major
war is obsolete in the way that slavery, dueling, or foot-binding are obsolete. It is a social practice that was
once considered normal, useful, even desirable, but that now seems odious. It is obsolete in the way that the central planning of economic activity is
obsolete. It is a practice once regarded as a plausible, indeed a superior, way of achieving a socially desirable goal, but that changing conditions have
made ineffective at best, counterproductive at worst.” Why is this so? Most simply, the costs
have risen and the benefits of major
war have shriveled. The costs of fighting such a war are extremely high because of the advent in the middle of this century of nuclear
weapons, but they would have been high even had mankind never split the atom. As for the benefits, these now seem, at least from the
point of view of the major powers, modest to non-existent. The traditional motives for warfare are in retreat, if not
extinct. War is no longer regarded by anyone, probably not even Saddam Hussein after his unhappy experience, as a
paying proposition. And as for the ideas on behalf of which major wars have been waged in the past, these
are in steep decline. Here the collapse of communism was an important milestone, for that ideology was inherently bellicose. This is not to
say that the world has reached the end of ideology; quite the contrary. But the ideology that is now in the ascendant, our own,
liberalism, tends to be pacific. Moreover, I would argue that three post-Cold War developments have made
major war even less likely than it was after 1945. One of these is the rise of democracy, for democracies, I believe, tend to be
peaceful. Now carried to its most extreme conclusion, this eventuates in an argument made by some prominent political scientists that democracies
never go to war with one another. I wouldn’t go that far. I don’t believe that this is a law of history, like a law of nature, because I believe there are no
such laws of history. But I do believe there is something in it. I believe there is a peaceful tendency inherent in democracy. Now it’s true that one
important cause of war has not changed with the end of the Cold War. That is the structure of the international system, which is anarchic. And realists,
to whom Fareed has referred and of whom John Mearsheimer and our guest Ken Waltz are perhaps the two most leading exponents in this country and
the world at the moment, argue that that structure determines international activity, for it leads sovereign states to have to prepare to defend
themselves, and those preparations sooner or later issue in war. I argue, however, that a
post-Cold War innovation counteracts
the effects of anarchy. This is what I have called in my 1996 book, The Dawn of Peace in Europe, common security. By common
security I mean a regime of negotiated arms limits that reduce the insecurity that anarchy inevitably produces by
transparency-every state can know what weapons every other state has and what it is doing with them-and through the principle of
defense dominance, the reconfiguration through negotiations of military forces to make them
more suitable for defense and less for attack. Some caveats are, indeed, in order where common security is concerned. It’s
not universal. It exists only in Europe. And there it is certainly not irreversible. And I should add that what I have called common security is not a cause,
but a consequence, of the major forces that have made war less likely. States enter into common security arrangements when they have already, for
other reasons, decided that they do not wish to go to war. Well, the third feature of the post-Cold War international system that seems to me to lend
itself to warlessness is the novel distinction
between the periphery and the core, between the powerful states and the less
powerful ones. This was previously a cause of conflict and now is far less important. To quote from the article again, “ While for
much of recorded history local conflicts were absorbed into great-power conflicts, in the wake of the Cold War, with the
industrial democracies debellicised and Russia and China preoccupied with internal affairs, there
is no great-power conflict into which the many local conflicts that have erupted can be
absorbed. The great chess game of international politics is finished, or at least suspended. A pawn is now
just a pawn, not a sentry standing guard against an attack on a king.”
No accidental wars and irrationality doesn’t support their impact
MUELLER 2009 (John, prof of poli sci at Ohio State, Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda, p. 101)
Robert Jervis points out that "when
critics talk of the impact of irrationality they imply that all such
deviations will be in the direction of emotional impulsiveness, of launching an attack, or of taking actions that are
terribly risky. But irrationality could also lead a state to passive acquiescence." In moments of high
stress and threat, people can be said to have three psychological alternatives: (1) to remain calm and
rational, (2) to refuse to believe that the threat is imminent or significant, or (3) to panic, lashing out frantically and
incoherently at the threat. Generally, people react in one of the first two ways. In her classic study of
disaster behavior, Martha Wolfenstein concludes, "The usual reaction is one of being
unworried."52
In addition, the historical record suggests that wars simply do not begin by accident . In his extensive survey
of wars that have occurred since 1400, diplomat-historian Evan Luard concludes, "It is impossible to identify a single
case in which it can be said that a war started accidentally; in which it was not, at the time the war broke out, the
deliberate intention of at least one party that war should take place." Geoffrey Blainey, after similar study, very much agrees: although
many have discussed "accidental" or "unintentional" wars, "it is difficult," he concludes, "to find a
war which on investigation fits this description." Or, as Henry Kissinger has put it dryly, "Despite popular myths,
large military units do not fight by accident."33
Nuclear winter studies are bad science and arsenals have shrunk too much anyway
DUNNING 2011 (Brian, Computer Scientist and award-winning science writer/blogger, “Nuclear War and Nuclear Winter,” Skeptoid #244, Feb
8, http://skeptoid.com/episodes/4244)
Other cataclysmic events have proven that the nuclear winter scenario is not at all far-fetched. The eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in the
Philippines, also in 1991, threw some 17 million tons of particulates into the upper atmosphere that caused global temperatures to drop by about a
degree for several months. Sunlight dropped by 10%. This temperature drop did
not, however, have any long-term effect on
agriculture.
Pinatubo was only a blip compared the the K-T extinction event of some 65 million years ago, when a theorized
asteroid hit us with one hundred million megatons of destructive force, lighting virtually the entire world on fire. The evidence of this is called the K-T
boundary, a layer of clay found all around the world. Sunlight was reduced by 10-20% for ten years, which caused a massive cascading extinction of
species from plants to herbivores to carnivores.
But we shouldn't expect anything like this to happen from a nuclear war. Times continue to
change, including the nature of warfare. Nations no longer stockpile the megaton class weapons
popular in the 1950s and 1960s; typical yields now are a fraction of a megaton. The United States'
conventional capability is now so good that it can effectively destroy an entire nation's ability to
wage large-scale war overnight, using only conventional weapons. But that doesn't mean the nuclear forces are
no longer needed. Should a superpower strike first against the United States with nuclear weapons, the response would more than likely be nuclear,
bringing Mutually Assured Destruction into play. But what about a small nation striking first? What about nukes in the trunks of cars parked in major
cities? In
the modern era, it's much less clear that any superpower would necessarily have anyone
to shoot back at.
Increasingly, non-superpower nations are building nuclear stockpiles. India and Pakistan might get into it with one another. Israel's foes might surprise
it with nuclear weapons. Who knows what North Korea and Iran might do. Smaller regional nuclear wars remain a very real possibility. According to the
worst-case estimates in the TTAPS papers, about one million tons of smoke would be expected from the fires resulting from each nuclear strike. And
these smaller regional nuclear combats are expected to use about 50 nuclear weapons (compare this to 150 nuclear weapons for a broader global
nuclear war). Thus, today's
most likely nuclear scenario would be expected to produce climate effects
similar to three Pinatubo events, according to the worst estimates, and still many orders of
magnitude less than the K-T extinction.
And so, while the nuclear winter scenario is a good prediction of the effects of a worst-case scenario, when all the variables are at their least favorable,
the strongest probabilities favor a much less catastrophic nuclear autumn; and even those
effects depend strongly on variables like whether the war happens during the growing season. A
bomb in Los Angeles might result in history's worst firestorm, while a bomb in the mountains of Pakistan might create no fires at all. The simple fact is
that there
are too many unpredictable variables to know what kind of climate effects the smoke
following nuclear fires will produce, until it actually happens. Obviously we're all very mindful of the many terrible implications of
nuclear combat, and if it ever happens, the prospect of a nuclear autumn will likely be among the least of our concerns. The physicist Freeman Dyson
perhaps described it best when he said "(TTAPS is) an absolutely atrocious
the public record straight... Who wants to be accused of being in favor of nuclear war?"
piece of science, but I quite despair of setting
Even if there’s full-scale nuclear winter, their authors admit that won’t cause extinction
ROBOCK 2010 (Alan, Department of Environmental Sciences, Rutgers University, “Nuclear Winter,” WIREs Climate Change, May/June, Wiley
Online Library via University of Michigan Libraries)
While it is important to point out the consequences of nuclear winter, it is also important to
point out what will not be the consequences. Although extinction of our species was not ruled
out in initial studies by biologists, it now seems that this would not take place. Especially in
Australia and New Zealand, humans would have a better chance to survive. Also, Earth will not be
plunged into an ice age. Ice sheets, which covered North America and Europe only 18,000 years ago and were more than 3-km thick,
take many thousands of years to build up from annual snow layers, and the climatic disruptions would not
last long enough to produce them. The oxygen consumption by the fires would be
inconsequential, as would the effect on the atmospheric greenhouse by carbon dioxide
production. The consequences of nuclear winter are extreme enough without these additional effects, however.
No environmental change can cause extinction–humanity is resilient
WFC COURIER 5-30-04 (Experts:Disaster film is cinema, not science,
http://www.wcfcourier.com/articles/2004/05/30/news/top_news/afb195339636e12986256ea400138a72.txt)
"The public is already primed for severe global warming in the future, though the scientific view is pretty shaky," said
Spencer. "I am willing to believe things are maybe about one degree warmer now than they were 100 years ago. But it's not at all clear what's due to
human activity and what is just coming out of ice ages of centuries past. The
climate is always changing, and we're always
looking at changes as something we're causing. We're forgetting the environment does change
itself." Kenneth J. DeNault, an associate professor of geology at UNI, said what the Earth will do is
unpredictable, but chances are humans will survive it. "I have no crystal ball, but humans are incredibly
adaptable. All sorts of things change up and down," said DeNault. "New Orleans is already under
water. There have been a lot of Greek cities around the Mediterranean that have been under
water and are dry again. It's part of living in a dynamic planet. If Earth were like Mars, it would be very inhospitable."
Even if extinction is possible, no single impact could do it
TONN 2005 (Bruce, Futures Studies Department, Corvinus University of Budapest, “Human Extinction Scenarios,”
www.budapestfutures.org/downloads/abstracts/Bruce%20Tonn%20-%20Abstract.pdf)
The human species faces numerous threats to its existence. These include global
climate change, collisions with near-earth
objects, nuclear war, and pandemics. While these threats are indeed serious, taken separately they fail to
describe exactly how humans could become extinct. For example, nuclear war by itself would most
likely fail to kill everyone on the planet, as strikes would probably be concentrated in the
northern hemisphere and the Middle East, leaving populations in South America, South Africa,
Australia and New Zealand some hope of survival. It is highly unlikely that any uncontrollable
nanotechnology could ever be produced but even it if were, it is likely that humans could develop effective, if
costly, countermeasures, such as producing the technologies in space or destroying sites of runaway nanotechnologies with nuclear
weapons. Viruses could indeed kill many people but effective quarantine of â ̃healthyâ ™ people could be
accomplished to save large numbers of people. Humans appear to be resilient to extinction with
respect to single events.
“Any risk” logic is wrong—results in paralysis
POSNER 2004 (Richard, US Court of Appeals judge and Senior Lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School, Catastrophe: Risk
and Response 19)
The reason for the hedge in “essentially” is that I want to avoid making claims of metaphysical certainty. From a scientific standpoint,
anything is possible. But some possibilities really are too remote to be worth worrying about,
such as the possibility that my next breath will create a black hole or that the entire human
population will be persuaded to commit suicide. To put this differently, we have to be selective in
responding to the catastrophic risks because if we allow our imaginations to multiply their
number indefinitely we’ll end up doing nothing about any of them.
Extremely low probabilities should count as zero—even if there’s some risk, policy decisions
can’t be justified by vanishingly small probabilities
RESCHER 2003 (Nicholas, Prof of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, Sensible Decisions: Issues of Rational Decision in Personal Choice
and Public Policy, p. 49-50)
On this issue there
is a systemic disagreement between probabilists working on theory-oriented
issues in mathematics or natural science and decision theorists who work on practical decisionoriented issues relating to human affairs. The former takes the line that small number are small
numbers and must be taken into account as such—that is, the small quantities they actually are. The latter tend to take
the view that small probabilities represent extremely remote prospect and can be written off. (De
minimis non curat lex, as the old precept has it: in human affairs there is no need to bother with trifles.) When something is about as probable as a
thousand fair dice when tossed a thousand times coming up all sixes, then, so it is held, we
can pretty well forget about it as a
worthy of concern. As a matter of practical policy, we operate with probabilities on the principle that when x ≤ E, then x =
0. We take the line that in our human dealings in real-life situations a sufficiently remote
possibility can—for all sensible purposes—be viewed as being of probability zero. Accordingly, such
remote possibilities can simply be dismissed, and the outcomes with which they are associated
can accordingly be set aside. And in “the real world” people do in fact seem to be prepared to
treat certain probabilities as effectively zero, taking certain sufficiently improbable eventualities
as no long representing real possibilities. Here an extremely improbable event is seen as something we can simply write off as
being outside the range of appropriate concern, something we can dismiss for all practical purposes. As one writer on insurance puts it:
[P]eople…refuse
to worry about losses whose probability is below some threshold. Probabilities
below the threshold are treated as though they were zero. No doubt, remote-possibility events
having such a minute possibility can happen in some sense of the term, but this “can” functions
somewhat figuratively—it is no longer seen as something that presents a realistic prospect.
Embargo is the cause
The US caused the food crisis in Cuba- even before the embargo US policies
created dependence that structurally decimated the country (read the right to
food includes domestic ability card)
Collins et al., 89 (Joseph Collins- the cofounder of the Institute for Food and
Development Policy, Michael Scott- researcher on agrarian reform and director of
overseas programs for Oxfam America, Medea Benjamin- nutritionist with the
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and the Swedish International
Development Agency, “No free lunch: food & revolution in Cuba today”, Institute
for Food and Development Policy, Jun 1, 1989, 11-24, jld)
Dependence on the United States
Up to now we have only hinted at what was a major stumbling block for Cuba’s development: its extreme
dependency on the United States. The Platt Amendment, forced into the Cuban constitution in 1901 during U.S. military
occupation, gave the United States the right to intervene whenever it decided a government was
not ‘adequate.” The United States landed troops in Cuba in 1906, 1912, and 1917. Even alter the Platt Amendment was
eliminated from the constitution in 1934, the U.S. government remained the dominant influence in
internal Cuban politics, “Until the advent of Castro, the United States was so overwhelmingly influential that [ . . the
American Ambassador was the second most Important man in Cuba, sometimes even more important than the president Cuban
dictator Batista],” former Ambassador Farl E. T. Smith later testified. Much
of the Cuban economy was in the
hands of U.S. companies and U.S. investments ran the gamut: manufacturing, commerce, petroleum
refining, agriculture, mining, transportation, electricity, tourism. On the eve of the revolution, there were
over one billion dollars in U.S. corporate holdings In Cuba’’—or one-eighth of the total U.S. investment in Latin America, making
Cuba second only to Venezuela. U.S. firms directly employed about 160,000 workers in Cuba itself. Americans owned nine of Cuba’s
ten largest sugar mills in 1955, produced 40 percent of the island’s sugar, and controlled 54 percent of the total grinding capacity.’°
Cuban branches of U.S. banks held almost a quarter of all bank deposits.” ‘The telephone service was a monopoly of American
Telephone and Tele graph.” The U.S-owned Cuban Electric Company had a virtual monopoly on electric power—and charged rates
even higher than those in the United States. ‘ Standard Oil, Shell. and Texaco refined imported crude ail. Procter and Gamble.
Colgate-Palmolive, Firestone. Good1” Goodyear. Coca-Cola, Pepsi-Cola, Canada Dry, and Orange Crus1’ all had subsidiaries in Cuba.
U.S. citizens, often connected to the Mafia, also owned many of the island’s hotels and ran the thriving gambling casinos and drug
trade. “A
relatively small group of American businessmen have In their grasp vast economic
power by the mere act of making business decisions,” declared a study of U.S. investments in Cuba on the eve
of the revolution, Every year the U.S. Congress made the single most important decision to the Cuban economy—the “quota” of
Cuban sugar that could be imported into the U.S. market at the relatively high prices of tJ.S. domestic producers. Over
a 35
year period, Cuba exported about 60 percent of its sugar production to the United States.
Cuba’s economy was not only dependent on a single crop but on a single customer. Cuba’s
potential to produce consumer goods for its own people was undercut by the U.S. sugar
quota. Cuba was granted preferred entry into the US. market for some of its sugar, its rum, and its leaf tobacco; in exchange, Cuba
had to open its doors to US. goods. Duties were abolished for many U.S. goods and lowered on many
more; internal taxes on goods of U.S. origin were lowered or lifted; and quantity restrictions
on imports of US. goods were virtually eliminated. Restrictions on the conversion of pesos into dollars were
prohibited so that profits made on the Cuban market could readily be taken “home” to the United States.5’ Not only did an
average of 80 percent of Cuba’s imports come from a single trading “partner,” but the Cuban
economy also became totally dependent on imports. “Every conceivable type of goods was
imported,” noted OflC LIS, economist, “from corn flakes to tomato paste; from nails and tacks to tractors, trucks. and
automobiles; from thread to all types of clothing; from goods for Sears and other department stores to accessories for the home,
fertilizers and insecticides for agriculture, and materials and equipment for Industry and construction.” A 1934 memorandum by liS.
Secretary of State C4rdell Hull argued that U.S.
policy should actively discourage Cuba’s agricultural
diversification in order to maintain it as a favorable market for U.S. foods and raw materials .”
But the subsequent U.S. sugar quota system made “active” discouragement unnecessary for the realization of Hull’s goal.
Enforced dependency on the United States gave rise to a number of the ironies of
underdevelopment that marked pre- revoluton Cuba. An exporter of raw sugar, Cuba
imported candy.” Cuba exported tomatoes but imported virtually all its tomato paste. Cuba
exported fresh fruit and imported canned fruit, exported rawhide but imported shoes. It produced vast quantities of tobacco but
imported cigarettes. (So many Ameri can brands were imported that in 1959, nine of Cuba’s twenty- four cigarette factories were
not functioning. )‘ To add insult to injury, even “Havana” cigars were increasingly manufactured in the United States; Cuba exported
leaf tobacco as raw material for the US. cigar companies that shifted manufacturing operations from Cuba to Florida in part because
of high US. tariffs on Cuban manufactured cigars.’ Rather
than develop Its productive capabilities,
investments shifted to nonproductive areas like tourism, real estate, and import-export. Cuba
became a market to be milked for all it was worth. Little was invested in its future; In fact, between
1952 and 1958 there was a net disinvestment of $370 million and the per capita gross national product declined. Under the US.
quota system Cuba received a comparatively good price for its sugar (though for only a part of its total production). But there was
little prospect that Cuba’s share of the US. market would grow. Indeed, throughout the l940s and 1950s, the amount of Cuban sugar
purchased by the United States consistently declined. At the same time, the
quota system undercut any movement
toward food self-reliance. More impor tant, the concentration of control over the nation’s
agricultural resources, as well as the economy as a whole, prevented the creation of jobs that
could have meant food security for the hun dreds of thousands of poor Cuban families.
The US created the condition for a food crisis- supply cycles, sabotage,
structural capacity
Collins et al., 89 (Joseph Collins- the cofounder of the Institute for Food and
Development Policy, Michael Scott- researcher on agrarian reform and director of
overseas programs for Oxfam America, Medea Benjamin- nutritionist with the
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and the Swedish International
Development Agency, “No free lunch: food & revolution in Cuba today”, Institute
for Food and Development Policy, Jun 1, 1989, 11-24, jld)
Supply Lags Behind Demand
But supply failed to keep pace with the growing demand. Overall agricultural production was
handicapped by the flight to the United States of administrative and technical personnel, an
elite unwilling to adjust to the new changes. The consequent lack of organization and technical
experience on the newly created people’s (arms and cooperatives lowered production. The Eisen howcr
administration’s 1960 embargo on most exports to Cuba seriously disrupted the island’s agriculture, which had become
dependent on the United States for farm machinery, fertilizers, pesticides, seeds, and other
inputs. In addition, the Central Intel ligence Agency fostered acts of sabotage, including burning
fields and slaughtering cattle, Such sabotage, as well as repeated military attacks culminating In the Bay of Pigs
invasion in April 1961, forced Cuba to divert scarce human and material re sources into defense,
exacting a toll on production. As if all nus were flot enough, a severe drought in 1962 rurttier aggravated food
production problems (See chapter 9 for further discussion of production problems in the early years.) In a reversal of the pre- 19i9
pattern, shortages became more chronic in the cities than in the cournryside. Finding
ever fewer consumer goods to
buy, especially imports from the United States, tenants and sharecroppers had little need for
cash and thus produced less for the market.’ Consequently, there was less food In the cities.
Viandas in particular began disappearing from city marketplaces. Plantains (cooking bananas) were no longer trucked in daily to
Havana bw consumed in the eastern provinces where they were grown.” Shortages
often triggered more shortages
since the lack of one item meant greater demand for others. By mid-1961. when taro, a usually abundant
root crop, became scarce, people bought out sweet potatoes, putting pressure on the supply of white pota toes, and so on.” The
disruption of normal imports further aggravated supply problems, As we discussed in chapter 1, Cuba had bccome de pendent on
the import of large quantities of food—wheat, rice, beans, lard, poultry, dairy products, and eggs. even onions and garlic. With
over 70 percent of these imports coming from the United States.2” the abrupt embargo on
U.S. trade with Cuba left the country in dire straits. Taicc the case of pork lard. While such an example might
seem odd, the fact is that Cuba consumed prodigious quantities of lard, importing about 85 percent of it from the United States.2’ In
a desperate search for substitute suppliers, the Cuban govern. ment found to its dismay that not only were prices significantly higher
elsewhere (partly due to steeper transpon costs) but no where outside of the United States could enough lard be found On such
short notice!2 The U.S. embargo created a myriad of additional import prob. ‘ems. Since Cuba ‘as so chj to the United States, its
ports and Warehouses had been designed for frequent short hauls by small ferryboats from
florida and New Orleans. Once those sources of SuPply were cut off, Cuba found itself illequipped for trans oceanic trade.
The US blockade is responsible for rationing and destruction of food choices in
Cuba
Alvarez, 2k, University of Florida, Department of Food and Resource Economics (Jose Alvarez
“Overview of Cuba's Food Rationing System” 10/28/00
http://www.fred.ifas.ufl.edu/cubanag/sugar.php) //NG
While many supporters of the Cuban regime blame the U.S. economic sanctions (that the Cubans refer to as a blockade) against
Cuba as the main culprit, almost all of the detractors place the burden on the inefficiencies of the socialist system. Given the
importance of this issue in terms of the hardships it has represented to the population on the island for more than 40 years, the two
points of view deserve careful analysis. As stated above, for supporters of the Cuban regime, the United States is the culprit. The
following quote is very revealing because it blames the United States for the suffering of the Cuban people under the rationing
system, and because it states (for the first time, to our knowledge) the cost of administering such a system: As
a consequence
of the U.S.-imposed economic blockade, Cuba was forced to establish a rationing system for
basic food and industrial products. This has brought serious limitations to consumers and their
choice availability. Since the establishment of the economic blockade, consumers have had to adapt
themselves to the limits of quantity and of choice offers that are available, instead of choosing
according to preference and custom. Cuba also had to establish a whole Government-agency
organization, called Consumer's Register Control Office, to keep accurate records of consumers,
quotas and ration booklets all over the country. The operation of this control system results in an increase in
annual budget expenditures of 7,000,000 Cuban pesos, not including control expenditures over wholesale and retail commerce, to
ensure compliance with the established regulations (León Cotayo, 1991, pp. 59-60). Thus, the cost of administering the food
rationing system around 1990 is set at seven million Cuban pesos (around US$300,000), which must be larger now. At any rate, the
figure represents a high monetary price the Cubans have to pay to support a rationing system that has been in effect for more than
40 years. In terms of the additional costs of the economic sanctions, the Cuban government has provided some figures. For example,
in an official report submitted to the United Nations, it is reported that, in the year 2000, Cuba had to pay an additional 38 million
dollars to purchase food as a result of the price differentials between the United States and alternative markets. In addition, the
costs of financing around 63% of the food imports in the same year demanded expenses greater than $50 million. Under normal
conditions, these expenses would not have been greater than $19 million (this information is contained in a report the Cuban
government sent to the United Nations on July 17, 2001, and placed on the La Nueva Cuba website). The previous report was
rebutted by a Cuban independent journalist (Espinosa Chepe, 2001). According to him, Cuba devotes between $800 million and $900
million, more than 20% of its import capacity, to the purchase of food that could be very easily produced in the country. Such
purchases, which do not satisfy the needs of the population, are made abroad as the result of the inefficiency that exists in the
agricultural sector. That state of affairs, he says, is not the result of any embargo but a consequence of the commanding
incompetence. There is no question about the unequivocal damage that U.S. economic sanctions have had on the Cuban economy.
However, they are far from being the main reason for the current state of affairs. One has to distinguish between the Cuban
economy in general and “a rationing system for basic food and industrial products” as quoted above. To blame U.S. economic
sanctions for the existence of a rationing system of basic food products is not a very sound argument to justify Cuba's socialist
system. It is an admission that Cubans cannot even produce what grows very easily on Cuban soil. If one lists the food products that
have been rationed since 1962, it becomes evident that almost all of them were in abundance before the 1959 revolution and were
produced domestically. Granted, some Cubans
have been unable to consume a wide variety of food
products because of the high prices under the rationing system, but there have been periods
in which the abundance of several products have demonstrated the feasibility of returning to
a stable and ample food supply. Examples include the proliferation of FrutiCuba (a chain of
government stores) which was devoted exclusively to selling fruits and vegetables in the mid1960s, free farmers' markets in the 1980s, the free agricultural markets after 1994, and the
new food outlets. These testify to the ability of Cuban farmers to produce abundant food supplies despite U.S. economic
sanctions. Domestic production could do away with the food rationing system. It is very relevant to recall
that, when the Soviet bloc was subsidizing the Cuban economy to the tune of five billion dollars per year, food was still rationed in
Cuba.
Status quo ensures Cubans starve
Roman, 13 (Alexis Romay, Translating Cuba provides translation of Cuba blogs 4/11/13 “The
Cuban Diet and the Politics of Hunger” http://translatingcuba.com/the-cuban-diet-and-thepolitics-of-hunger-alexis-romay/ )//NG
Today I didn’t need my morning coffee. I woke up to a pair of articles about the profound socio-economic
crisis in Cuba, which became acute in the early nineties with the collapse of the socialist bloc. What those
champions of euphemism called “The Special Period.” One of the articles, in Spanish, was published by that usually faithful friend of
Cuba’s Granma newspaper, El País, from Madrid; the other, in English, appeared in The Independent, from London.¶ Both
were
based on a study published today by the British Medical Journal. About what? Hunger. But not
the infamy of starving a population. That’s in poor taste. About hunger as a cure for obesity. The thesis that unites them
is simple: while we ate cabbage as appetizer, main course and dessert —the first person plural is intentional:
I experienced this first-hand—, we were doing a favor to the nutritionists and cardiologists of the first world, who then would go
around shouting to the four winds that the lower the body weight, the lower the cardiovascular mortality. “A textbook example in
real life,” declared a Spanish scientist who wasn’t part of the “experiment,” although what he really wanted to say is: “they were
dying of hunger, but not of heart disease.Ӧ It
turns out that when Cubans were fainting on their bikes, or
being overcome by polyneuritis —a severe inflammation of multiple nerves— or simply dying
from lack of food, this was part of a long-range plan: to demonstrate to the British Medical
Journal, to the international press —and to the world at large— that if you take food and transportation
away from a population, the trouser sizes of men and women will be drastically reduced. One can’t but wonder why they don’t also
recommend trying bulimia and anorexia.¶ Although separated by language, both articles have in common a contempt for the Cuban
people, and they remind one of the great achievements of tropical totalitarianism: The Castro brothers have not only
created a theme park so that those who love far off utopia have an island as a point of reference and place to visit; even before that,
they have
made Cuba into a giant laboratory where every human being is a guinea pig .
Current food sanctions are wreaking havoc on Cuba
Alternative Insight, 7 - presents articles on world issues, (“The Politics of Starvation: An
Updated Survey” July 2007 http://www.alternativeinsight.com/Politics_of_StarvationRecent.html)//NG
The United States imposed an embargo against Cuba almost immediately after the 1960 Cuban revolution. Forty plus years
of embargo have not succeeded in accomplishing the policies for which the United States
claims it instituted the embargo - compensation to U.S. firms nationalized by Cuba and the overthrow of the Castro regime.
The only result of the embargo has been deprivation of the unfortunate Cuban people. Cuban
expropriation of American property and its land reform policies motivated the United States into
decreasing Cuba's sugar subsidy and implementing an embargo that intended to deny Cuba of spare parts for the U.S.
machinery that powered the Cuban economy. The Soviet Union aided Cuba in these unfortunate years by
purchasing sugar at inflated market prices and forwarding strategic materials to the island.
Cuba's alliance with the Soviet Union strengthened Uncle Sam's determination to cripple Cuba
by the use of embargo. Although the reasons for the embargo faded with the years and became totally unnecessary after
the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States' determination to overthrow the Castro government
increased its economic warfare. In 1992, congress passed The Cuba Democracy Act, which
forbade United States subsidiaries to trade with Cuba and deprived the island of $700 million
in trade, 70% of which had been in food and medicine. The Act also prohibited U.S. citizens to spend money in
Cuba, but allowed private groups to deliver food and medicine. Although the United Nations General Assembly on November 2,
1995, voted 117 to 3 to recommend an end to the U.S. embargo against Cuba, President Clinton on March 12, 1996 signed into law
The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, otherwise known as The Helms-Burton Act. This Act imposed penalties on foreign
companies doing business in Cuba, permitted U.S. citizens to sue foreign investors who make use of American-owned property
seized by the Cuban government and denied investors in Cuba all entry into the U.S. A tightened embargo reinforced Cuba's
suffering after Russia withdrew subsidies. The pre-90's Cuba has been credited with eliminating hunger and malnutrition and wiping
out infectious diseases. The World Health Organization (WHO) complimented Cuba for its public health system. Cuba of the mid-90's
portrayed another image. The American Association
for World Health and the American Public Health
Association determined that the embargo caused significant deterioration in Cuba's food
production and health care:
 Cuba was banned from purchasing nearly 1/2 of new drugs on the market.
 Physicians had access to only 890 medications, down from 1,300 in 1989.
 Deterioration of water supply increased water borne diseases.
 Daily caloric intake dropped by 33% between 1989 and 1993.
New Jersey Congressman Torricelli predicted that his Cuban Democracy Act would bring Castro's
downfall within one year. That did not happen. Humanitarians, such as Congressman Torricelli, have been eager
to take advantage of the sufferings of the Cuban people for political purposes rather than affording the people a means to recover
from their tragedy.
No alt causes – The Cuban embargo is the biggest contributor to starvation
Kirkpatrick 96, MD; 32 years of experience and practices in Anesthesiology - Pain Medicine; (Anthony F. Kirkpatrick,
November 30, 1996, The Lancet “Role of the USA in shortage of food and medicine in Cuba” Vol. 348, Pg. 1491)//JES
This argument rings hollow. First, even if Cuba can buy food elsewhere, the inclusion of food in
the US trade embargo remains in violation of international law. Second, a small amount of
food is donated by US organisations, 4.10 but that is a poor substitute for removing provisions
that prohibit its sale. Third, although Cuba can buy food elsewhere, it must often pay higher
transportation costs than would be the case with the nearby USA. Fourth, in 1992, the US
Government ignored the warning of the American Public Health Association that the
tightening of the embargo would lead to an abrupt cessation of supplies of food and medicine
to Cuba resulting in widespread “famines”.4 In fact, 5 months after the passage of the Act the
worst epidemic of neurological disease this century due to a food shortage became
widespread in Cuba.12 More than 50 000 of the 11 million inhabitants were suffering from
optic neuropathy, deafness, loss of sensation and pain in the extremities, and a spinal disorder
that impaired walking and bladder control. 11–13 Furthermore, as recently as November, 1995,
WHO reported more people with neurological disease in Cuba due to malnutrition.14
Embargo causes food shortages in Cuba and increases costs of medicine
Garfield 97 - the American game designer who created Magic: The Gathering; professor of public health and
nursing at Columbia University; visiting professor at the London School of Tropical Medicine and
Hygiene in the U.K. and Karolinska Institutet in Sweden (Richard Garfield, February 1st 1997, The
Lancet “USA and shortage of food and medicine in Cuba” Volume 349, Issue 9048, Page 363
http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736%2805%29628711/fulltext)//JES
Kirkpatrick (Nov 30, p 1489)1 outlines the difficulties of economic embargoes, which have
been much used in hostile foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. Although humanitarian
exemptions to most embargoes exist on paper, they are seldom observed. Most globalised
drugs, as Kirkpatrick points out, are available only from US sources. More pervasively, transport
and market dislocations cause increased costs for all medicines that are purchased: in Cuba
this is calculated to be equivalent to a 30% surcharge than if there were no embargo. US and
Cuban-American groups claim that it is not the embargo but Cuba's economic limitations that
reduce access to medical supplies. If this were the case, they would not demand on-site
verification or prosecute pharmaceutical companies that provide humanitarian goods to Cuba.
The burden of proof is not on Cuba that the embargo threatens health and wellbeing. The
chain of events that results in unnecessary deaths is long and no so-called smoking gun may
exist to prove an embargo to be the sole cause. We did not wait for proof of deaths to act in the
embargo against the regime in Haiti. The USA provided food and medicines for up to a quarter
of all Haitians at the height of that embargo. If an embargo is the right tool in the USA's fight
against Cuba, then the USA should demonstrate that it is doing everything possible to limit
collateral effects among the general population.
Even if food restrictions don’t directly cause crisis – Other embargo aspects
make them even worse
Garfield and Santana 97 – professor of public health and nursing at Columbia University.[1]
He has been visiting professor at the London School of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene in the
U.K. and Karolinska Institutet in Sweden AND Sarah gets to write with the guy who made magic
the gathering (Richard Garfield & Sarah Santana, January 1997, American Journal of Public
Health, “The Impact of the Economic Crisis and the US Embargo on Health in Cuba” Vol. 87, No.
1 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1380757/pdf/amjph00500-0017.pdf)//JES
We examined trends in health and health care in Cuba during the 1990s. Only changes in the cost of medicine and
the unavailability of medicines produced in the United States can specifically be ascribed to
the embargo. However, there are temporal trends that further suggest that the embargo
contributes to increasing health threats and the decline of some health indicators. While not
the sole cause of these ills, the embargo is shown to make the supply of essential goods more
costly, more difficult, and more time- consuming to procure and maintain.
The Cuban embargo is a has promoted suffering and death for decades
AAWH 97 - founded in 1953 as a private, nonprofit charitable and educational organization, and serves as the US.
Committee for the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). Its purposes are
to inform the American public about major health challenges that affect people both here and abroad, and to promote
cooperative solutions thatemphasize grassroots involvement. In carrying out its mission, AAWH works with a variety of
public and private health-related organizations, including the Department of Health and Human Services/Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, as well as with WHO and PAHO. Guidance is provided by the association’s officers and board of
directors (American Association for World Health, March 1997, “Denial of Food and Medicine: The Impact Of The U.S. Embargo On
The Health And Nutrition In Cuba" http://www.cubasolidarity.net/aawh.html)//JES
After a year-long investigation, the
American Association for World Health has determined that the
U.S. embargo of Cuba has dramatically harmed the health and nutrition of large numbers of
ordinary Cuban citizens. As documented by the attached report, it is our expert medical opinion that the
U.S. embargo has caused a significant rise in suffering-and even deaths-in Cuba. For several decades
the U.S. embargo has imposed significant financial burdens on the Cuban health care system. But since 1992 the number of unmet
medical needs patients going without essential drugs or doctors performing medical procedures without adequate equipment-has
sharply accelerated. This trend is directly linked to the fact that in 1992 the
U.S. trade embargo-one of the most
stringent embargoes of its kind, prohibiting the sale of food and sharply restricting the sale of
medicines and medical equipment-was further tightened by the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act.
Defense of should
Whats that? A solvency advocate? Maybe
FWN, 09 (Future World News, Dow Jones Commodities News Select via Comtex,
“DJ US Sen Lugar: Time To Rethink US Sanctions On Cuba – Report”, Feb 22, 2009,
http://www.comtexnews.com, galegroup, jld)
The
time is right for reevaluating U.S. sanctions on Cuba, the top Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee says in a new report, calling for allowing Cuba to buy U.S. goods on credit, U.S. media reported
Sunday.
Republican Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana's opinions are attached to a report due to be released Monday that could add fuel to
momentum toward change in almost five decades of U.S. policy seeking to isolate Cuba, the Americas' only communist country.
The United States and Cuba do not have full diplomatic relations. And Washington has had a full economic embargo on Havana since
1962.
Former U.S. president George W. Bush in recent years, however, allowed Cuba to purchase U.S. food, as long as it was purchased in
cash. U.S. food sales to Cuba have surged, but U.S.
farm producers would sell much more if Cuba could get
credit for its purchases.
The report due out Monday stops short of recommending an end to the U.S. embargo, The
Washington Post reported.
Lugar supports "lifting Bush administration restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba, reinstituting formal bilateral
cooperation on drug interdiction and migration, and allowing Cuba to buy U.S. agricultural products on
credit," the Post said.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has promised a "review" of Cuba policy without providing details.
U.S. President Barack Obama has said he would speak with all foreign leaders, in sharp contrast to successive U.S. administrations
which have sought to isolate Havana.
But he has offered few details on how far he might be willing to go in reaching out to Cuba.
During his campaign for the presidency, Obama said the Cuba embargo had not helped bring democracy to the island, led by
President Raul Castro, 77.
But so far Obama
has said only that he would end some sanctions on Cuban-Americans traveling
to the island, and eliminate limits on their remittances to relatives in Cuba.
Lawmakers in the U.S. House of Representatives earlier this month introduced a bill to permit U.S. citizens
unrestricted travel to Cuba.
The "Freedom To Travel to Cuba Act," which would overturn the 46-year-old U.S. policy strictly limiting travel to the Caribbean
island, will be subject to debate after being referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Point of discussion
Questions of food are windows into a nation and its actions --- specifically in
the context of Cuba and the embargo
Collins et al., 89 (Joseph Collins- the cofounder of the Institute for Food and
Development Policy, Michael Scott- researcher on agrarian reform and director of
overseas programs for Oxfam America, Medea Benjamin- nutritionist with the
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and the Swedish International
Development Agency, “No free lunch: food & revolution in Cuba today”, Institute
for Food and Development Policy, Jun 1, 1989, xi-x, jld)
The Focus on Food
The subject of this book, Cuba’s food situation today, is hotly debated. Cubans who have come to the United
cite food shortages, even hunger, as a
reason for leaving. We told a Cuban- American at the Miami airport that we were going to Cuba to WIIW about the food
situation. “Food In Cuba?” he laughed, ‘Is there any left?’ Yet Cuban government publications maintain there
are no food shortages and that food ¡s available in greater abundance all the time.2 Our purpose in
States during the various waves of emigration since the revolution often
writing this book was to get beyond polemics ‘ to Investigate firsthand the food realities in Cuba today. We wanted to study the
achievements, problems, and issues raised by Cubas agricultural and food especially. Observers of
virtually every
political stripe agree that there have been dramatic changes in the ways food Is produced and
distributed in Cuba, Many speak of the “Cuban model” of development, some with admiration others with horror. We
believe that the debate about the Cuban revolution’s successes and failures—and the lessons to be learned about eradicating
hunger and promoting development—can be more fruitful when grounded in fresh and substantive data and analysis. In a world
where as many as one billion people go hungry, food justice Is the primary Issue for most third world people As the Institute for
Food and Development Policy’s book Food First asserts. ‘Whether
or not people are hungry appears to us as
the primary test of a just and effective social and economic system.” A society’s food system
(from production through consumption) is so fundamental to its functioning that food serves as a “window”
through which we can observe a great deal of any society’s makeup. The fond window can also make a
country more understandable to a broad range of people since everyone seems to take some interest in food. In the case of Cuba
there are several additional reasons for focusing on food. One, the US government has sought
to starve Cuba into submission through an embargo on trade. A second reason is that surprisingly
little has been written about food or farming realities in postrevolution Cuba. No comprehensive
work based on firsthand research had been published since the late 1960s—and there have been important developments in food
and agriculture since then. Finally, food issues are what we know best. They have been at the heart of the work of each of us for
many years: Michael Scott as researcher on agrarian reform and director of overseas programs for Oxfam America, the private
development agency; Joseph Collins as the cofounder of the Institute for Food and Development Policy and author of a number of
books on food policy and rural development; and Medea Benjamin as a nutritionist with the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization and the Swedish International Development Agency in several third world countries.
State key
The state is key to take action
Künnemann and Epal-Ratjen, 4 – Rolf is the Human Rights Director of FIAN International
Sandra is the Coordinator for UN Affairs at FIAN International (Rolf, Sandra, “The Right to Food:
A Resource Manual for NGOs,” AAAS Science and Human Rights Program,
http://shr.aaas.org/pubs/pdfs/RT_Food.pdf)//HAL
Fulfilment-bound obligations require the state to take necessary measures to guarantee
deprived groups’ access to adequate food and food-producing resources. Obligations to fulfil
therefore come into play in situations where individuals and/or communities lack adequate food or foodproducing resources. Part A dealt with people who are vulnerable because their access to food or resources is threatened. Part Be
now enters the realm of the (already) hungry and malnourished. The
absence of hunger and malnutrition was
identified as the core content of the right to food. There is every reason to give them priority in the struggle for
the right to food. In most cases, hunger and malnutrition are the results of poverty—not of a general lack of
food in a country or area. India, for example, the nation with the largest number of malnourished—has huge amounts of grain
rotting in the godowns, because the starving people next door cannot buy them. People could, of course, plant food for
themselves—but they lack the resources: Land, inputs and an agrarian policies supporting small holder agriculture. Instead
agribusiness is about to displace even more peasant farmers. People could, of course, work to earn money. In most countries,
however, jobs providing a decent pay are lacking. Moreover, some people won’t be able (or should not be expected) to work even if
they had the chance to do so (the elderly, children, labor-scarce households)—and therefore need transfers. This background is the
reason why the following section deals with income poverty much more than with the general availability of food. General
availability of food is, of course, a human rights issue as well, but it is secondary in the current context, as there
is more than
enough food available in general—but not for the poor who lack the land, the capital, the jobs and the state
policies which would allow them to feed themselves. Ultimately the human right to food includes
guaranteeing access to food for each person. For persons and groups who cannot provide for
themselves this implies a states’ obligation to provide food or—better—income which buys whatever is
needed most, including food. The right to food implies more—it implies providing access to land and other
resources, and it requires in addition facilitating policies so that people can make use of these
resources to feed themselves. Human rights are an individual concept. For this matter judges must eventually be
able to adjudicate to an individual malnourished claimant access to food and resources and
provide immediate relief. This implies the existence of specific transfer programs—in terms of land, work, income and
food. These programs are a necessary part of implementing the human right to food for the largest and most severely affected
“vulnerable group”—the hundreds of millions of landless and jobless. Considering
the necessity and urgency of the
task the state is under an obligation to organize society-wide sharing of food and resources.
Restrictions
Its credit
Lack of credit impedes the ability to import
Sullivan, 13 (Mark P., specialist in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional
Research Service, “Cuba: U.S. Policy and Issues for the 113th Congress”, June 12,
2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43024.pdf, jld)
U.S. exports to Cuba declined considerably from 2009 through 2011, but began to increase again in 2012 (see
Figure 5). In 2009, U.S. exports amounted to $533 million (25% lower than the previous year), and in 2010 U.S. exports declined
further to $368 million (a 31% drop). In 2011, U.S. exports to Cuba declined by just 1.2% to $363 million.50 Among
the
reasons for the decline, analysts cite Cuba’s shortage of hard currency; credits and other
arrangements offered by other governments to purchase their countries’ products; and Cuba’s
perception that its efforts to motivate U.S. companies, organizations, local and state officials, and Members of Congress to
push for change in U.S. sanctions policy toward Cuba have been ineffective.51 In 2012, the level of
U.S. exports to Cuba rose to $465 million, a 28% increase over the previous year, but still lower than export levels to Cuba in 2008
and 2009. Part of the
increase in 2012 can be attributed to an increase in Cuba’s import needs because of
damage to the agricultural sector in eastern Cuba caused by Hurricane Sandy in October. Looking at the
composition of U.S. exports to Cuba in recent years, the leading products have been cereals (especially corn and to a lesser extent
wheat), poultry and pork, soybeans, prepared animal feed, and edible vegetables. So far in 2013, U.S. exports to Cuba amounted to
$145 million in the first quarter of the year, almost 12% less than the same period in 2012.
Food restrictions are untouched and make access impossible
French, 10 (Anya Landau, director of the U.S.-Cuba Policy Initiative at the New
America Foundation, “Boost agricultural trade with Cuba”, The Atlanta Journal Constitution [Atlanta, Ga] 04 June 2010: A.17, proquest, jld)
The Cuba embargo and its intended target, Fidel Castro, have now survived 11 U.S. presidents. Though Barack Obama relaxed
nearly all restrictions on travel and remittances for Cuban Americans last fall, he has
so far done little for U.S.
agriculture interests looking to expand the Cuban market.
In 2000, Congress authorized food and medicine sales to Cuba, and since then, U.S. exporters sold an average of $350 million a year
in food to the island. U.S. food sales to Cuba peaked in 2008 at about $700 million.
But then they fell to $528 million in 2009, and fell another 60 percent in the first quarter of 2010. This drop
can largely be
attributed to Cuba's liquidity crunch during the worldwide economic downturn. But there are
other important factors at play, and they emanate from Washington, not Havana.
The embargo prohibits U.S. government or private institutions from providing any credits for
these food sales, and so Cuba must pay either by "cash in advance" or get a foreign bank
letter of credit to transact payment. The embargo also requires Cuban payments to be routed
through a third country bank. In 2005, Washington made these strict conditions even tougher
when they redefined "in advance" so narrowly as to kill all the cash-based sales . Each of these
restrictions makes U.S. exporters less competitive in what should be a natural market for the United States.
Explanation of laws for reference
Federal Register, 01 (DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Bureau of Export
Administration, Commerce., “Exports of Agricultural Commodities, Medicines and
Medical Devices”, Vol. 66, No. 134/Thursday, July 12, 2001/Rules and
Regulations, jld)
This rule establishes a new License Exception Agricultural Commodities (AGR) in § 740.18 of the EAR. License Exception AGR
authorizes exports and certain reexports of agricultural commodities provided that they are classified as
EAR99 and meet all the other criteria of License Exception AGR, including the prior notification requirements described below.
License Exception AGR is not applicable for items controlled under a specific Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) on the
Commerce Control List (CCL). To be eligible for AGR, shipments
of agricultural commodities must be made
pursuant to a written contract and must take place within one year of the signing of a
contract, unless the shipment is a commercial sample or donation in which case the contract requirement does not apply.
Agricultural commodities are defined in part 772 (Definitions of Terms) of the EAR and must
be classified as EAR99 to be eligible for License Exception AGR. Transactions that do not satisfy
all the criteria of License Exception AGR require a license from BXA.
The government cant solve- the embargo causes a perpetual decline in Cuban
health
Kirkpatrick, 96 (Anthony F, MD, “Role of the USA in shortage of food and
medicine in Cuba”, The Lancet, Vol 348 • November 30, 1996,
http://www.cubasolidarity.net/Kirkpatrick-lancet.pdf, jld)
In June, 1993, a delegation sponsored by the American Public Health Association travelled to Cuba to assess the impact of the
embargo on the public health of the Cuban people. The Association’s report notes that the
policies of the Castro regime
give a high priority for health care, which has contributed to a large reduction in infant mortality and improvements in
health. However, the Association found that the tightening US embargo, through the enactment of the
CDA, has been associated with a decline in the health of the Cuban people.15
GAO, 09 (The Honorable Charles B. Rangel, Chairman, Committee on Ways and
Means House of Representatives, The Honorable Jeff Flake, House of
Representatives,The Honorable Barbara Lee, House of Representatives, “Subject:
U.S. Embargo on Cuba: Recent Regulatory Changes and Potential Presidential or
Congressional Actions”, September 17, 2009, jld)
The
President is authorized to suspend or end the embargo in the event of certain political
changes in Cuba. Under the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, on determining that a
transition Cuban government is in power, the President may take steps to suspend the
embargo, including its implementing regulations restricting financial transactions related to travel, trade, and remittances. He
may also suspend enforcement of several legislative measures related to the embargo. LIBERTAD also requires that on determining
that a democratically elected Cuban government is in power, the President must take steps to end the embargo, including the
implementing regulations, and that once he has made such a determination, certain listed embargo-related legislative measures are
automatically repealed.
Absent a presidential determination of a democratically elected Cuban government, the President
could end the embargo only if Congress were to amend or repeal LIBERTAD and various other
embargo-related statutes, including provisions in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Food Security Act of 1985, the
Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1999, and the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement
Act of 2000 (TSRA). Such provisions
include, for example, section 908(b)(1) and 910(b) of TSRA that require payment
of cash in advance or third country financing for agricultural exports to Cuba and prohibit Treasury
from authorizing travel to Cuba for tourist activities by persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction.
Impact
Genocide
AP, 99 (Nicole Winfield, San Antonio Express-News, “Cuba says embargo
genocidal”, Sunday, September 26, 1999, NewsBank, jld)
Cuba has laid out the legal argument for its recent call
to sanction the United States for its embargo , citing
international human rights conventions that bar the deprivation of food for civilians during
wartime.
Foreign Minister Felipe Perez Roque said Friday the island nation is justified in referring to the embargo as "
genocidal " because the international Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines
the term as "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group."
Furthermore, a protocol to the Geneva Conventions stipulates "starvation of civilians as a method of warfare
is prohibited," Perez Roque argued.
Citing genocide, the Cuban National Assembly issued a declaration last week calling for U.S. officials responsible for the embargo to
be prosecuted by Cuban courts and sentenced to up to life in prison if found guilty of the charge.
In a speech to the U.N. General Assembly, Perez Roque said the
measure has become necessary because the
United States has refused to respond to calls by the international community to end 40 years
of American sanctions that bar U.S. companies from pursuing trade relations with Cuba 's communist
government.
Deputy U.S. Ambassador Peter Burleigh rejected the classification of the embargo as an act of genocide, saying the sanctions are
being applied to pressure Cuban leader Fidel Castro to respect human rights and enact democratic national reforms.
Moral rejection
The Cuba embargo is uniquely harsh – food restrictions violate the basic
tenants of human rights perservation
AAWH 97 - founded in 1953 as a private, nonprofit charitable and educational organization, and serves as the US.
Committee for the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). Its purposes are
to inform the American public about major health challenges that affect people both here and abroad, and to promote
cooperative solutions thatemphasize grassroots involvement. In carrying out its mission, AAWH works with a variety of
public and private health-related organizations, including the Department of Health and Human Services/Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, as well as with WHO and PAHO. Guidance is provided by the association’s officers and board of
directors (American Association for World Health, March 1997, “Denial of Food and Medicine: The Impact Of The U.S. Embargo On
The Health And Nutrition In Cuba" http://www.cubasolidarity.net/aawh.html)//JES
Finally, the AAWH wishes to emphasize the stringent nature of the U.S. trade embargo against
Cuba. Few other embargoes in recent history - including those targeting Iran, Libya, South
Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Chile or Iraq - have included an outright ban on the sale of food.
Few other embargoes have so restricted medical commerce as to deny the availability of lifesaving medicines to ordinary citizens. Such an embargo appears to violate the most basic
international charters and conventions governing human rights, including the United Nations
charter, the charter of the Organization of American States, and the articles of the Geneva
Convention governing the treatment of civilians during wartime.
Withholding food is morally intolerable
Peffer, 3 – Professor in Philosophy from UC San Diego, PhD from University of Arizona in
Moral, Social and Political philosophy (Rodney, “WORLD HUNGER, MORAL THEORY, AND
RADICAL RAWLSIANISM,” Special Issue: “Topics in International Moral Theory,” International
Journal of Politics and Ethics, vol. 2, no. 4, 2003)//HAL
Hunger, starvation, malnutrition, under-nutrition, and absolute poverty are widespread
phenomena on our planet. Recent estimates are that, on average, each year about one million
people (mostly children) starve to death, about 10 million succumb to complications from severe
malnutrition or under-nutrition (often dying from infections easily warded off when not malnourished or undernourished), and some 1.2 billion people live in absolute poverty (i.e. poverty so severe that their basic needs for
adequate nutrition, potable water, minimally decent housing and clothing, and basic health care and sanitation are not met on a
continuing basis). But, by all reliable accounts, there
is presently more than enough food to feed everyone
on our planet and – in almost all cases of large-scale famine – more than enough food to meet
everyone's nutritional needs in the very countries or areas suffering famine.i Yet people
continue to starve, to be malnourished, and otherwise to live in absolute poverty. This is morally appalling - and
intolerable.
Food restrictions to Cuba are specifically unethical – even the author of the
credit amendment agrees
Library of Congress, 09 – Quoting senator bryan Dorgan, democrat of North Dakota; a Bachelor of Science from the
University of North Dakota in 1964 and a Master of Business Administration from the University of Denver in 1966; co-chair of
Government Relations Practice for the Washington, DC law firm Arent Fox (Congressional Record
111th Congress (2009-2010), October 5th, 2009, Library of Congress, “FREEDOM TO TRAVEL -- (Senate - October 05, 2009)”
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?r111:S05OC9-0012:)//JES
We also had this trade embargo for all of these years. I was one who, some years ago, lifted that embargo
slightly to be able to sell food and medicine into Cuba. I think it is fundamentally immoral to use food as a
weapon. We had an embargo against selling food to Cuba. The Europeans were selling into Cuba, the
Canadians were selling into Cuba; the American farmers were told you can't sell food into Cuba. As a result of my amendment, the
amendment I offered with then Senator Ashcroft, that
amendment opened just a bit the sale of food into
Cuba and allowed medicine to go into Cuba as well, but that is the only thing that has
happened in all of these years. Senator Enzi and I have offered a bipartisan piece of legislation that would allow travel,
allow the American people the freedom to travel in Cuba. My colleagues in this Chamber talk a lot about freedom. What about the
freedom of the American people to travel? Why is it we have decided to punish the Cuban regime by restricting Americans'
freedoms?
Culture
Lifting restrictions on food is key to the Cuban culture
PAPONNET-CANTAT, 3 –PhD in Latin American Studies from Simon Fraser University,
member of Cuba’s CESOC (Centro de Estudios Socio-Culturales), and Honorary Professor at the
University of Cienfuegos (Christiane, “The Joy of Eating: Food and Identity in Contemporary
Cuba,” Caribbean Quarterly, Vol. 49, No. 3 (September, 2003), pp. 11-29, : University of the
West Indies and Caribbean Quarterly, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40654408)//HAL
It is important to bear in mind that the Special Period has led to changes not only in dietary habits but
also in social practices. La temporada de vacaflaca, or the "skinny cow period" as it is referred to in Cuba, has
brought a high level of food anxiety. At the height of the crisis, people turned away from sharing to providing only to
their own immediate families. The arrival of a visitor to the household was seen as a chaotic situation: si una visita no avisa, es un
caos politico; no sepuede atender de la manera que quieres (an unannounced visit is a political chaos; it can't be looked after as
one would wish it). Not only has eating become a constant preoccupation but it represents
a moral dilemma as
people are torn between feeding their family or sharing with friends and neighbours. Frequently,
feelings of shame are expressed at not having sufficient food to offer as a form of hospitality - a
social gesture that has long defined the Cuban sense of honourable behaviour. Although
competition has increased, so have local strategies to obtain quality produce at affordable prices, and to gain access to
reliable sources of food. That the Special Period has led to social tensions is undeniable; however, in terms of dietary habits, it has
created as well an opening for new possibilities that are entirely consistent with the Cuban cultural character of continuous
dietary practices that
parallel changing social relations. In the case presented here, food changes display a process of
transculturation at work. Cuba's cultural stew, be it the republican ajiaco or the revolutionary caldoza is the
paradigm for a continuing collective struggle for self-definition. If Cuban cuisine owes its exist
ence to the forced encounters between races and cultures which colonization engenders, it
has also become a strong expression of strands of cultural identity. Although current food
shortages present the potential threat of social disruption, the sharing of a Cuban meal remains for the
cocedura. Conclusion To summarise, this case study highlights how historical moments affect
islanders one of the greatest sources of pleasure, celebration, and connection.
Imperialistic
The food restrictions on Cuba are an act of using food as a weapon—it is
imperialistic
Fazzino, 10 - Assistant Professor, Department of Anthropology, University of Alaska Fairbanks.
M.S., Sustainable Systems, Slippery Rock University, December 1999; J.D., University of Florida
Levin College of Law, 2007; and Ph.D., Anthropology, University of Florida, 2008 (David V.,
“WHOSE FOOD SECURITY? CONFRONTING EXPANDING COMMODITY PRODUCTION AND THE
OBESITY AND DIABETES EPIDEMICS,” Drake Journal of Agricultural Law, 15 Drake J. Agric. L. 393,
LexisNexis)//HAL
It's important for our nation to build--to grow foodstuffs, to feed our people. Can you imagine a country that was unable to grow
enough food to feed the people? It would be a nation that would be subject to international pressure. It would be a nation at risk.
And so when
we're talking about American agriculture, we're really talking about a national
security issue. This concern over the relationship between food security and national security by the former President is
obvious, considering that the United States has utilized food as a weapon; perhaps the most notable
example is the embargo on Cuba. n24 The Cuban embargo has forced individual families and
the Cuban government to make due with fewer ties to global circuits of food production and
distribution. n25 The embargo led to an increase in the number of policies, programs, and
measures to enhance food security by relying on local and national food production
programs. n26 Similarly, the United States has been responsible for the imposition of Coalition Provisional Authority Order 81 in
Iraq, which imposes World Trade Organization-friendly intellectual property rights, including limitations on the rights of farmers to
use seeds from the previous season's [*400] harvest. n27 Coalition Provisional Authority Order 81 could undermine food security
for farmers unable to afford required seed purchases if patented material is found among seeds which have been saved from the
When the operational definitions of food security are limited to measuring how
much food is created and distributed, then the United States emerges as a superior nation in
terms of its overall food security and food surpluses. n29 At the same time, the relative inability of
so-called less developed countries to meet the caloric needs of their populace--due to chronic
or acute instability in environmental, economic or political sectors--is described as
vulnerability and reflective of their inferiority. n30 Those in international development circles would also point to
previous season.
the poor transportation infrastructure in these less developed countries, which limits the distribution of food to areas that may be in
the greatest need of food assistance. n31 In
the United States, the temporal unfolding of science and
technology is perceived as leading directly to the continual emergence of progress . n32 Notions
of this superiority are reflected in the literature concerning food production and security
where the locus of food insecurity is consistently placed in the so-called less developed world,
while the United States occupies the role of provider and breadbasket of the world. n33 The
stated superiority of the U.S. international agro-industrial complex is intimately connected
with economics and politics; it is a historically produced discourse. n34
Neuropathy
So bad
really don’t know what neuropathy is but can be explained as akin to a war crime
Roman, 95 (Gustavo C., M.D., Director at the Nantz National Alzheimer Center,
“Epidemic Neuropathy in Cuba: A Plea to End the United States Economic
Embargo on a Humanitarian Basis”, Journal of Public Health Policy, Vol. 16, No. 1
(Spring, 1995), pp. 5-12, Jstor, jld)
The clinical
manifestations included retro bulbar optic neuropathy with bilateral and symmetric cecocentral scotomata,
sensorineur deafness, predominantly sensory and autonomic peripheral neuropathy, and dorsolateral
myelopathy. Less often, dysphonia, dysphagia, and spastic paraparesis were present. Mixed forms were frequent.
Neurologic symptoms were usually preceded by weight loss, lack of appetite, and
manifestations reminiscent of the chronic fatigue syndrome with loss of energy and drive, irritability, sleep
disturbances, and difficulties with concentration andmemory. The syndromes were identical to those observed
during World War II in prisoners of war from tropical prison camps and clinically described by,among
others, Cruickshank(z), Denny-Brown(3), and Spillane(4), as well as neuropathologically by Fisher(5) under the name
"Strachan's disease."
Neurological disease
Kirkpatrick, 96 (Anthony F, MD, “Role of the USA in shortage of food and
medicine in Cuba”, The Lancet, Vol 348 • November 30, 1996,
http://www.cubasolidarity.net/Kirkpatrick-lancet.pdf, jld)
This argument rings hollow. First, even
if Cuba can buy food elsewhere, the inclusion of food in the US
trade embargo remains in violation of international law. Second, a small amount of food is donated by US
organisations,4,10 but that is a poor substitute for removing provisions that prohibit its sale . Third,
although Cuba can buy food elsewhere, it must often pay higher transportation costs than
would be the case with the nearby USA. Fourth, in 1992, the US Government ignored the warning of the American
Public Health Association that the tightening of the embargo would lead to an abrupt cessation of
supplies of food and medicine to Cuba resulting in widespread “famines”.4 In fact, 5 months after
the passage of the Act the worst epidemic of neurological disease this century due to a food
shortage became widespread in Cuba.12 More than 50000 of the 11 million inhabitants were
suffering from optic neuropathy, deafness, loss of sensation and pain in the extremities, and a
spinal disorder that impaired walking and bladder control.11–13 Furthermore, as recently as November, 1995, WHO
reported more people with neurological disease in Cuba due to malnutrition.14
Economic war
Food sanctions is a form of economic warfare representative of the politics of
starvation that causes mass atrocities – outweighs suffering caused by war
Alternative Insight, 7 - presents articles on world issues, (“The Politics of Starvation: An
Updated Survey” July 2007 http://www.alternativeinsight.com/Politics_of_StarvationRecent.html)//NG
The powerful can't always use military might to suppress adversaries . Their own citizens and world
opinion may react unfavorably and undermine a military adventure. Logistics may not favor it. Beside, they have other
means. One of these means is economic warfare; a method that can silently crush an adversary without
firing a shot. Gone to its extreme, economic warfare has the force of a neutron bomb: It disables the
nation's infrastructure and debilitates its population.¶ Economic warfare requires preparation before
implementation.¶ First, the "grieved" country accuses its adversary of intended crimes of aggression.
The adversary is powerless to defend itself and becomes marked with the adjective "rogue
state." Since the "rogue state" cannot ameliorate the crimes of which it is accused, being that they may
not exist, and since these states are usually proud and will not compromise with their national integrity (one reason for their fate)
further action must be taken against them. The next step is isolation. This step has several stages.¶ Although
contrary to law in democratic countries and contradictory to the criticism made by the democratic countries against a policy of the
former Soviet Union, which imposed travel restrictions on its citizens, the "grieved" country cautions and sometimes forbids all its
citizens, except its intelligence services, to travel to the "rogue state." The
"grieved" nation then uses enforcement
procedures that bypass its own constitutional laws. These include actions such as heavy fines,
harassment, embarrassing airport searches, letting the neighbors know, and calls from the
internal revenue department. The reasons mentioned for these undemocratic actions are: to protect travelers from
being contaminated with "rogue" germs, shield them from vicious propaganda and prevent them from being kidnapped for ransom
and from accusations of spying. These are valid reasons, The unmentioned reasons are: to assure the "rogue country "doesn't
acquire tourist dollars that might enable it to survive, make certain that travelers don't learn that all they have read and heard from
their government is propaganda and prevent rogueidization in which a happy citizen suddenly sympathizes with the rogue and
acquires rogue traits.¶ In
the final stage, the "rogue state" is isolated from international agencies,
relief efforts, finances and communications. After the "rogue state" is forced into an isolation it
doesn't desire, it might achieve the adjective "hermit kingdom." That denomination signifies it is ready
for the great strike, economic warfare. The economic warfare punch has many shapes. Sanctions that
are not used against favored countries, although these nations might arouse the wrath of the world community, are used with
impunity against the disfavored country. If
the preferred sanctions cannot be implemented then an illegal
embargo is enforced by warships that arrive close to the beaches and dwarf the rowboats of
the "rogue country," or by airplanes that guard against infiltration of military weapons, such
as water pumps, medicines and construction materials. Sometimes explosive mines and
cluster bombs are dropped on the rogue's territory to complete the embargo. If the embargo proves
insufficient for the cleansing task, then the "grieved" country might arm surrogate warriors inside or close to the "rogue country"
and have them add human catastrophes to the natural catastrophes that inflict the "rogue country." Although the laws of the
"grieved" country might prohibit this rash action, the laws are conviently circumvented.¶ Rogues that have special qualifications
earn the title of terrorists. This title sticks to their names like velcro. It appears in all articles, headlines, dispatches, reports and
news, as if the word terrorist followed by the country name is one word. The "terrorist nation" earns this title by committing an evil
deed that is usually in response to the tens of evil deeds committed against it. No matter! Economic warfare leads to the final step in
whipping a "terrorist nation "back into shape - borderline starvation. If the food supply dwindles then certainly the poor unfortunate
citizens of the "terrorist nation" will act as those who proclaimed "Liberte," "Egalitie" and "Fraternitie" in the French revolution.
They will storm the gates of their oppressors, take away their cake and demand bread. The United States has implemented political
policies that have harmed diets in several countries. Despite the punitive measures, the leaders of the "terrorist" nations still eat
cake while the populations suffer greatly from economic deprivation and, in some cases, operating at a subsitence level. ¶ Since
WWII, the United States participated in sanctions against approximately 35 countries.¶ "Of 104 sanctions episodes from World War
II until 1990, when the United States was the undisputed Western superpower, Washington was a key player two-thirds of the time.
In 80 percent of U.S.-imposed sanctions, the policy was pursued with no more than minor cooperation from its allies or international
organizations, i.e., unilaterally. The enormous growth in U.S. power after the collapse of the Soviet Union becomes evident when we
consider that during the four years of President Bill Clinton’s first term alone, U.S. laws and executive actions imposed new unilateral
economic sanctions sixty-one times on a total of thirty-five countries. These countries were home to 2.3 billion people, or 42 percent
of the world’s population, and they purchased exports of $790 billion, or 19 percent of the global export market." - Contemporary
Conflicts¶ First think South Africa; then think Libya, Nicaragua, Burma, Sudan, Iran, Angola, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia,
Yugoslavia and expect others. Intentional interferences and disruptions to a nation's economy and business operations occur often
from many sources, and are part of the "white collar" crime that affects the world. Economic
warfare, of which
sanctions are one part, is certainly more serious than "white collar" crime, and people suffer
greatly from this warfare. Intentional severe reduction of living standards of people, due to
interference by a foreign source, is the most serious aspect of economic warfare. It is a major
crime and another form of terrorism.¶ The most punishing sanctions by the United States, until
sanctions against Iran, have been against Cuba, North Korea and Iraq.
AT medical alt causes
Malnutrition has played a huge effect in rising death tolls – it turns all there
medical alt causes.
AAWH 97 - founded in 1953 as a private, nonprofit charitable and educational organization, and serves as the US.
Committee for the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). Its purposes are
to inform the American public about major health challenges that affect people both here and abroad, and to promote
cooperative solutions thatemphasize grassroots involvement. In carrying out its mission, AAWH works with a variety of
public and private health-related organizations, including the Department of Health and Human Services/Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, as well as with WHO and PAHO. Guidance is provided by the association’s officers and board of
directors (American Association for World Health, March 1997, “Denial of Food and Medicine: The Impact Of The U.S. Embargo On
The Health And Nutrition In Cuba" http://www.cubasolidarity.net/aawh.html)//JES
Taken together, these four factors have placed severe strains on the Cuban health system. The
declining availability of food stuffs, medicines and such basic medical supplies as replacement parts for thirty-year-old
X-ray machines is taking a tragic human toll. The embargo has closed so many windows that in some instances Cuban
physicians have found it impossible to obtain life-saving medicines from any source, under any circumstances. Patients have died. In
general, a relatively sophisticated and comprehensive public health system is being systematically stripped of essential resources.
High-technology hospital wards devoted to cardiology and nephrology are particularly under
siege. But so too are such basic aspects of the health system as water quality and food security. Specifically, the AAWH's team of
nine medical experts identified the following health problems affected by the embargo: Malnutrition: The outright ban
on the sale of American foodstuffs has contributed to serious nutritional deficits, particularly
among pregnant women, leading to an increase in low birth-weight babies. In addition, food
shortages were linked to a devastating outbreak of neuropathy numbering in the tens of
thousands. By one estimate, daily caloric intake dropped 33 percent between 1989 and 1993.
Consequentialism
o/ws
Individual liberty outweighs all other consequences
Callahan, 73 – Fellow at the Institute of Society and Ethics (Daniel, The Tyranny of Survival,
Pages 91-93, JSTOR)//JES
The value of survival could not be so readily abused were it not for its evocative power. But abused it has been. In the name of
survival, all manner of social and political evils have been committed against the rights of individuals, including the right to life.
The purported threat of Communist domination has for over two decades, fueled the drive
of militarists for ever-larger defense budgets, no matter what the cost to other social need s.
During World War II, native Japanese Americans were herded, without due process of law, into
detention camps. This policy was later upheld by the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States (1944) in a general
consensus that a threat to national security can justify acts otherwise blatantly unjustifiable. The survival of the Aryan
race was one of the official legitimizations of Nazism. Under the banner of survival, the
government of South Africa imposed a ruthless apartheid, heedless of the most elementary
human rights. The Vietnamese war has been one of the greatest of the many absurdities
tolerated in the name of survival, the destruction of villages in order to save them. But it is not only in
a political setting that survival has been evokes as a final and unarguable value. The main rationale B.F. Skinner offers in Beyond
Freedom and Dignity for the controlled and conditioned society is the need for survival. For Jaques Monod, in Chance and Necessity,
the survival of the
gene pool has been put forward as grounds for a forceful prohibition of bearers of offensive
genetic traits from marrying and beating children. Some have suggested we do the cause of survival no good by
survival requires that we overthrow almost all known religious, ethical, and political system. In genetics,
our misguided medical efforts to find means to find means by which those suffering from such common genetically based diseases
as diabetes can live a normal life and thus procreate more diabetics. In the field of population and environment, one can do no
better than to cite Paul
Ehrlich,
whose
works have shown
a high dedication to survival, and in its holy name
a
willingness to contemplate governmentally enforced abortions and a denial of food to
starving populations of nations
which have not enacted population-control policies For all these reasons, it is possible
There seems to be no imaginable evil
which some group is not willing to inflict on another for the sake of survival, no rights, liberties
or dignities which it is not ready to suppress. It is easy, of course, to recognize the danger when survival is falsely
and manipulatively invoked. Dictators never talk about their aggressions, but only about the need to
defend the fatherland, to save it from destruction at the hands of its enemies. But my point
goes deeper than that. It is directed even at legitimate concern for survival, when that concern
is allowed to reach an intensity which would ignore, suppress or destroy other fundamental
human rights and values. The potential tyranny of survival as a value is that it is capable, if not treated
sanely, of wiping out all other values. Survival can become an obsession and a disease, provoking a
destructive singlemindedness that will stop at nothing. We come here to the fundamental moral dilemma. If,
both biologically and psychologically, the need for survival is basic to man, and if survival is the precondition for any and
all human achievements, and if no other rights make much sense without the premise of a right to life - then how will it
be possible to honor and act upon the need for survival without, in the process, destroying
everything in human beings which makes them worthy of survival. To put it more strongly, if the price
of survival is human degradation, then there is no moral reason why an effort should be make to
ensure that survival. It would be the Pyrrhic victory to end all Pyrrhic victories.
to counterpoise over against the need for survival a "tyranny of survival."
Risk assessment
The DA internal links are flawed—reject them or paralysis
HERBECK AND KATSULAS, 92 - Professor of Communication and Director of the Fulton
Debating Society at Boston College, Dale and John, Debate Coach at Boston College (The Use
and Abuse of Risk Analysis in Policy Debate, Paper Presented at the 78th Annual Meeting of the
Speech Communication Association, p. 10-12,
http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED354559.pdf)//HAL
First, and foremost, we need to realize that some risks are so trivial that they are simply not
meaningful. This is not to argue that all low probability/high impact arguments should be ignored, but rather to suggest that
there is a point beneath which probabilities are meaningless. The problem with low probability
arguments in debate is that they have taken on a life of their own. Debate judges routinely accept
minimal risks which would be summarily dismissed by business and political leaders . While it has
been argued that our leaders should take these risks more seriously, we believe that many judges err in assessing any weight to such
speculative arguments. The
solution, of course, is to recognize that there is a line beyond which
probability is not meaningfully evaluated. We do not believe it is possible to conclude, given current evidence and
formats of debate, that a plan might cause a 1 in 10,000 increase in the risk of nuclear conflagration.17 Further, even if it were
possible, we
need to recognize that at some point a risk becomes so small that it should be
ignored. As the Chicago Tribune aptly noted, we routinely dismiss the probability of grave impacts
because they are not meaningful: It begins as soon as we awake. Turn on the light, and we risk
electrocution; several hundred people are killed each year in accidents involving home wiring or appliances. Start
downstairs to put on the coffee, and you're really asking for it; about 7,000 Americans die in home falls each year.
Brush your teeth, and you may get cancer from the tap water. And so it. goes throughout the day -- commuting to work, breathing
the air, working, having lunch, coming home, indulging in leisure time, going back to bed.18 Just
as we ignore these risks
in our own lives, we should be willing to ignore minimal risks in debates. Second, we must
consider the increment of the risk. All too often, disadvantages claim that the plan will
dramatically increase the risk of nuclear war. This might be true, and still not be compelling, if the original risk was
itself insignificant. For example, it means Hale to double the probability of nuclear war if the original probability was only 1 in one
million. To avoid this temptation, advocates should
focus on the initial probability, and not on the
marginal doubling of the risk claimed by the negative.
Consequentialism Fails
Consequentialism is dehumanizing – especially in the context of policymaking
Kokoski, 12 holds a BA in philosophy from McMaster University in Hamilton (Paul Kokoski
“The Bad Fruit of Consequentialism” 4/11/12 http://catholicexchange.com/the-bad-fruit-ofconsequentialism/)//NG
The so-called goal of Consequentialism is to maximize the good of humanity. It operates on
the Utilitarian principle that “the ends justify the means”. As a result human beings are often
treated in an impersonal way i.e. not for their own sake but for the utility that can be derived from them.¶ Moral
philosopher Bernard Williams criticized Conseqentialism on the grounds that the central idea of Consequentialism is that the only
kind of thing that has intrinsic value isstates of affairs.
For the consequentialist human acts have no value in
and of themselves but only insofar as they produce the best states of affairs. The right act is
the act, of those available to choose from, that brings about the best consequences while
supposedly maximizing the overall good of everyone’s self interest.¶ Williams also objected to
the doctrine of “negative responsibility” that follows from Consequentialism’s assigning ultimate value
to states of affair. This doctrine holds that one is just as responsible for the things that he
allows to happen or fails to prevent as he is for the things he brings about. Consequentialism,
then, does not take seriously the distinctiveness of persons but rather treats them impartially. It
totally subordinates the individual to the collectivity. This deprives persons of their identity and
integrity.¶ Consequentialism is a dehumanizing formula for it reduces human beings to material
objects which can be exploited and to commodities that can be bought and sold. It reduces them to beings whose
free will has effectively been abrogated – beings upon whom a judgment of moral good or evil
cannot validly be passed. Such a philosophy ends up poisoning the social structures and human
relations it purports to strengthen – defeating, in turn, its own purpose.¶ Some like Peter Railton advanced Consequentialism to
a stage that supposedly allows the individual person the freedom to pursue personal goals of happiness while remaining, at the
same time, subject to the collectivity. This “sophisticated consequentialist” is not always bound to consequentialist calculating, to
rules or to directly seeking the goal of maximizing the good. Instead, he may at times find it more advantageous to indirectly
maximize the good by cultivating certain, necessary areas of personal interest such as human relationships – relationships whose
intimacy and friendship are not subject to suffer the “loss” and “alienation” that often comes with direct consequentialism. This
would mean that on an act to act basis the sophisticated consequentialist will sometimes do the wrong thing according to his
criterion of right in order to achieve the overall good. Here we have the clear justification for claiming that the ends justify the
means. We also have the foundation for moral relativism.¶ This theory necessarily entails the cultivation of certain dispositions or
character traits that are the product of moral, emotional, sociological and psychological inconsistency. These include a certain
weakness of will, indecisiveness, rationalization and guilt. More precisely it involves a certain form of self-deception that enables the
consequentialist to live a double life.¶ At the level of morality however, the conscience, being one and indivisible, does not permit
the acting out of parallel lives. Scripture has it that “no man can serve two masters” (Matt. 6: 24). Railton’s sophisticated
consequentialist serves as a psychological artifice to disguise this fact in order to allow the consequentialist the opportunity to live
comfortably in a fictitious world of his own choosing.¶ How often do we see this charade being played out in the real world with our
Catholic politicians and even our Catholic bishops?¶ Politicians, in order to get elected will first compartmentalize and separate their
private life from their public life – claiming, in effect that one can lead an authentic Christian life while sustaining two different
realities of existence. They will claim, for example, that one can privately oppose abortion, in unison with his or her Catholic faith
while politically supporting, at the same time, a woman’s right to choose. The longer this facade is upheld and sustained the more
the conscience is degraded at its most core level to that of a mechanism producing excuses for one’’s conduct. Incrementally, one
begins to construct a wall of resistence to anyone who might oppose this parallel existence. As one’’s guilt is pushed beneath the
level of the specific judgement pronounced by conscience to that level of neglect of one’s own being one becomes dulled to the
voice of truth and eventually incapable of any longer hearing the voice of conscience. This explains how our catholic politicians like
U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, and Kathleen Sebelius can publically, and out of a hardened conviction, confuse the Catholic
Church’’s teachings on such serious issues as contraception, when life begins, and abortion.¶ Ultimately, Consequentialism is
something morally
and psychologically debilitating. It eventually ends up poisoning all of society for
when its’ gravely immoral policies make their way into law, they begin to incrementally,
surreptitiously, almost invisibly, impose themselves on society by both coercion and force –
marginalizing in the process both religion and those of religious faith.
Rule Consequentialism Fails
Rule consequentialism fails – causes irrational decision-making
Ameson, 5 professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of California, San
Diego since July, 1973 – He received the Ph.D. degree from the University of California, Berkeley,
1975; Co-Director of the Institute for Law and Philosophy at the School of Law, University of San
Diego.isiting professor at the University of California, Davis and worked at the Program in Ethics,
Politics, and Economics at Yale University (Richard J. Arneson “Sophisticated rule
consequentialism: some simple objections”
http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/rarneson/BradHooker2.pdf) //NG
The sophisticated rule consequentialist understands the utopianism worry. The worry is that rule consequentialism identifies the
rules that one ought here and now to obey with the rules that would produce the best reasonably expected consequences if it were
the case that they were taught to and accepted by almost everyone. This means rule
consequentialism identifies
what it is morally right here and now to do with conformity to rules that would work out for
the best in counterfactual circumstances. In the actual circumstances the agent faces, it may be the
case that no one or hardly anyone is following these ideal rules, and the results of the agent’s here
and now conforming to them might be anything at all—good, bad, or ugly. The sophisticated rule
consequentialist has sophisticated replies to the worry. Unfortunately, the replies do not succeed.¶ One suggested
gambit is to insist that the ideal code of rules must contain a consequentialist escape clause that
says: “Above all, avoid disaster.” This says that if following the set of ideal rules (apart from the disaster avoidance rule
itself) would reasonably be expected to lead to an avoidably disastrous outcome, one ought to choose a course of action that avoids
the looming disaster. “Above all” indicates that this rule trumps other rules with which it conflicts, the ones that in the agent’s
circumstances are heading to disaster.¶ To
see the inadequacy of this response to the utopianism worry, consider
that it might turn out that in a great many decision problems faced by agents, following the
ideal code of rules would result in near disaster or bad consequences in the neighborhood of a
near disaster. This problem arises so far as I can see, pretty much independently of how the rule
consequentialist understands the vague idea of a “disaster.” 6 Wherever one draws the line of disaster, the
question will arise, what should be done when following the ideal code would give rise to bad consequences below the threshold of
disaster. Sophisticated
rule consequentialism with the disaster avoidance rule set in place must
hold that the moral agent ought to soldier on and follow the ideal code and bring about expectably
bad consequences. The act consequentialist will say that sophisticated rule consequentialism here reveals itself
guilty of rule reverence, a paler version of the superstitious rule worship that critics claimed was the underlying normative
motivation of simple rule consequentialisms. If following the ideal code of rules even when doing so leads
to disaster is irrational and morally wrong, why shouldn’t we agree that following the
sophisticated ideal code of rules even when doing so leads to near disaster is also irrational
and morally wrong?¶ The sophisticated rule consequentialist has further replies. These are supposed
to block the conclusion of the argument of the previous paragraph. One reply is that standing fast by the ideal code of rules even
when doing so does not produce the best consequences in the circumstances accords with common sense moral judgment. Indeed,
critics of act consequentialism have urged that consequentialism allows and even requires acting against important moral rules just
on the bare ground that doing so would produce better consequences in the agent’s actual circumstances. Common sense morality
takes a contrary position. According to common sense morality, the moral obligation to tell the truth, keep one’ s promises, and in
general to conform to significant moral rules continues to hold and should constrain the conduct of the morally conscientious agent
even when lying or breaking one’s promise or the like would bring about somewhat more good than standing fast by the moral
rules. If sophisticated rule consequentialism accords with common sense morality on this point, this is a point that supports rule
consequentialism, not a stinging criticism of it.¶ This
reply fails. The problem is that the sophisticated rule
consequentialist position does not imply recommendations for conduct that coincide with the
recommendations of common sense morality, so even if we have reason to accept the latter,
that still leaves us with good and sufficient grounds to reject the former. Here I am not endorsing the
position of common sense morality, which I shall suppose to be roughly equivalent to the intuitionist ethics of W. D. Ross. I am
making the point that agreement
with common sense morality on the point at issue does not
generate reason to support rule consequentialism. This is so because sophisticated rule
consequentialism with its disaster avoidance component tells us to obey the ideal code of rules in
scenarios in which common sense morality would rebel from this conclusion.¶ Consider situations in which the ideal code of rules, or
at least the portion of it that is in question on this occasion, is not in fact accepted by most people and not followed by most people.
Consider a rule that would produce ideal consequences if everybody or nearly everybody conformed
their behavior to it, but would produce no good consequences otherwise. Here is a simple example: In
war, soldiers fighting for a just cause ought to stand by their post when attacked, unless
outnumbered by attacking enemy so that even stout defense would be futile. Suppose this
rule, followed by nearly everybody, would produce ideal results. But the rule in fact is not
internalized by the military forces fighting for a just cause in a particular war. The enemy have
attacked and most of your fellow troops have run away. You can stand and fight, in
conformity with the ideal rule, or you can run and live to fi ght another day. The consequences
of conformity to the rule would not be disastrous, but would be decidedly negative. You will
die and gain very little if anything for your side. 7 What should you do? Common sense
morality, which holds that the obligation to obey hypothetically useful rules is sensitive to the actual degree to which others are
complying here and now, surely says one should run and live to fight another day. Act
consequentialism to its credit says the same. Rule consequentialism, even consequentialism to its credit says the same.
Rule consequentialism, even sophisticated rule consequentialism with the disaster avoidance proviso added, would
have to hold that one ought to stand and fight and die. So much the worse for sophisticated
rule consequentialism. Here it is revealed to be Quixotic in a bad sense.
AT
People starve other places
Cuba is distinct from other situations of starvation- it is not an issue of
inequality of income but they literally can not access the food- that is unique
Collins et al., 89 (Joseph Collins- the cofounder of the Institute for Food and
Development Policy, Michael Scott- researcher on agrarian reform and director of
overseas programs for Oxfam America, Medea Benjamin- nutritionist with the
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and the Swedish International
Development Agency, “No free lunch: food & revolution in Cuba today”, Institute
for Food and Development Policy, Jun 1, 1989, 11-24, jld)
In the capital cities of virtually every third world : country, many people go hungry, even every day.
Yet no one goes hungry because of a shortage of food. Usually, you can just go to the store—in
some Countries, to the US style super market—and buy as much as you want, If you have the money. The
widespread hunger in Mexico City is not because food is scarce—Mexico is a major exporter of food—but
because some people arc too poor to buy as much as they need. Income, not food supply, is
the major limiting factor. The same, of course, is true in the United States. Our country is by no means, free from hunger,
but one look at our super markets and warehouses makes it clear that the problem is not a lack of food. In most marketeconomy countries, food is sold at the highest price the market will bear. In other words, those
with enough income can buy whatever they want, while those without sufficient income are
left to go hungry. But suppose all of a sudden many people, especially the poor majority, had
more money. This was the situation in Cuba in the first several years of the revolution. The revolution’s leadership viewed
inadequate income as the reason why people were undernourished so it set into motion policies designed to boost the earnings of
the poorer half of society as well as to enlarge the share of their earnings they could afford to spend on food But
once people
had more money to spend on food, It became clear that there was not enough food to go
around- how could the government deal with the shortages? One simple solution would have been to let prices rise, thereby
reducing the number of Cubans able ro buy thc food. That would have dealt with the shortages but not with people’s hunger. As
Prime Minister Castro recalled several years Later, “A price policy to compensate for this imbalance Ibct’n supply and demand) ...
would have been nothing short of a ruthless sacrifice of that part o(the popu lation with the lowest income.” Such a policy was
acceptable for luxury and nonessential goods “but never for necessities,” he added. Not only would high food prices have
contradicted the eWdI’ tarlan philosophy of the new government, but it would have been counterproductive to winning the
broadest possible support for the revolution. “What should we do with what we have, which Is more than we had before but still
isn’t enough? The answer is simple: we must distribute it better.” Fidel proposed.’ in an attempt to find a more equitable form of
distribution—by need rather than income—the government opted for rationing Money in More Pockets But let’s take a closer look
at the developments leading up to the decision to Implement a rationing system, starting with efforts to increase the incomes of the
poor. Above
all, the government sought to generate fuller employment. Job opportunities for
farmworkers soared with the large estates converted into “people’s farms” by the first
agrarian reform law, there were one hundred and fifty thousand year.round jobs on these land.s by August 1962 compared
to fewer than fifty thousand ¡n L939. Sugar plantation workers, previously unemployed during the long “dead season,”
now found steady work on the construction projects that seemed lo be springing up
everywhere—roadS, schools, clinics, government offices, bouS’ ing, etc. Early on, the government raised the minimum wage if1
agriculture.6 but then fought against further wage increases lest there be less money for job creation. These and other measures
made their mark: more and more of even
the poorer farmworkcrs had higher incomes than before the
revolution. While only 29 percent of rural workers earned more than 75 pesos a month as of April 1958, two years later 44
percent did.” Thanks to the new government’s policies, many poor farmers also found thcmselves
with more money. By granting generous tracts of land to some one hundred thousand tenant farmers, sharecroppers and
squatters, the first agrarian reform of 1959 freed farmers from the obligation to hand over to absentee land lords as much as 40
percent of the value of their crops9 Morc• over, they could now obtain cheap credit from the government, as well as count on
stable prices for their produce.”' [n urban areas, many workers won substantial wage increases. thanks to the strength of their
unions. No longer did workers’ demands for a larger share of the wealth their labor produced run up against the violent repression
of the Batista dictatorship.”
Ag reforms solve
Domestic attempts at solving have failed
Reuters, 12 (Marc Frank, “Cuba growing less food than 5 ys ago despite
agriculture reforms”, Fri Aug 31, 2012 1:57pm EDT,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/31/cuba-foodidUSL2E8JVAUU20120831, jld)
HAVANA, Aug 31 (Reuters) - Cuba
is producing less food than it did five years ago despite efforts to
increase agriculture production, the government reported on Friday.
Some export crops and farm output aimed at substituting food imports registered minor gains, but overall output last year
remained below 2007 levels, according to a report issued by the National Statistics Office ().
The government has also reported that food prices rose 20 percent in 2011.
Cuban President Raul Castro has made increasing food production a priority since he took over as president from his ailing brother,
Fidel, in 2008.
Politics
Farm lobbies push
Diaz, 10 (Kevin, Star Tribune, “Farmers push for Cuban markets: Minnesota
lawmakers look to help ease trade rules with the communist nation.”, 15 Mar
2010, proquest, jld)
WASHINGTON - Nearly a decade after then-Gov. Jesse Ventura met with Fidel Castro in Cuba, a
new wave of Minnesota
politicians is leading efforts to end travel and trade restrictions with the communist island
nation.
Much like Ventura's 2002 Havana trade mission, the political muscle is being provided by Midwestern
farmers and agricultural interests in search of new markets for exports.
"It's a very promising market," said House Agriculture Committee Chairman Collin Peterson, D-Minn., the sponsor of a bill that would
cut through the red tape farmers face in trying to sell food to the nation of 11 million people.
Lugar pushes and its bipartisan
WP, 09 (Karen DeYoung, “Lugar, GOP Senate Report Urge Fresh Look at Relations
With Cuba”, February 21, 2009, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-0221/politics/36798608_1_review-of-cuba-policy-trade-embargo-travel-andremittances, jld)
The views of Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.) are appended to a report by minority committee staffers that calls
for lifting
Bush administration restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba, reinstituting formal bilateral cooperation on drug
interdiction and migration, and allowing Cuba to buy U.S. agricultural products on credit. Scheduled for
release Monday, the report stops short of proposing that the 47-year-old U.S. trade embargo
against Cuba be lifted.
A bipartisan congressional majority has long favored easing at least some of the restrictions but
was repeatedly thwarted by the Bush White House and the Republican leadership. President Obama pledged
during the campaign to lift the travel and remittance restraints, and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said in written
responses to Senate confirmation questions that the administration planned an overall "review" of Cuba policy.
Squo solves/allows
Donations aren’t sustainable and even if they are the embargo makes the
ineffective
AAWH 97 - founded in 1953 as a private, nonprofit charitable and educational organization, and serves as the US.
Committee for the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). Its purposes are
to inform the American public about major health challenges that affect people both here and abroad, and to promote
cooperative solutions thatemphasize grassroots involvement. In carrying out its mission, AAWH works with a variety of
public and private health-related organizations, including the Department of Health and Human Services/Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, as well as with WHO and PAHO. Guidance is provided by the association’s officers and board of
directors (American Association for World Health, March 1997, “Denial of Food and Medicine: The Impact Of The U.S. Embargo On
The Health And Nutrition In Cuba" http://www.cubasolidarity.net/aawh.html)//JES
Humanitarian Aid: Charity is an inadequate alternative to free trade in medicines, medical
supplies and food. Donations from U.S. non-governmental organizations and international
agencies do not begin to compensate for the hardships inflicted by the embargo on the Cuban
public health system. In any case, delays in licensing and other restrictions have severely
discouraged charitable contributions from the U.S.
No plans to lift food restrictions
French, 10 director of the U.S.-Cuba Policy Initiative at the new America Foundation in
Washington (Anya Landau French “Boost agricultural trade with Cuba” 6/3/10
http://www.ajc.com/news/news/opinion/boost-agricultural-trade-with-cuba/nQgZP)//NG
When Gov. Sonny Perdue, a free-trade Republican, heads a Georgia agriculture trade delegation to Cuba next week, what should he
expect to accomplish? Until Washington gets out of the way, probably not much.¶ The
Cuba embargo and its intended
target, Fidel Castro, have now survived 11 U.S. presidents. Though Barack Obama relaxed
nearly all restrictions on travel and remittances for Cuban Americans last fall, he has so far
done little for U.S. agriculture interests looking to expand the Cuban market.¶ In 2000,
Congress authorized food and medicine sales to Cuba, and since then, U.S. exporters sold an
average of $350 million a year in food to the island. U.S. food sales to Cuba peaked in 2008 at
about $700 million.¶ But then they fell to $528 million in 2009, and fell another 60 percent in the
first quarter of 2010. This drop can largely be attributed to Cuba’s liquidity crunch during the worldwide economic
downturn. But there are other important factors at play, and they emanate from Washington, not Havana.¶ The
embargo prohibits U.S. government or private institutions from providing any credits for these
food sales, and so Cuba must pay either by “cash in advance” or get a foreign bank letter of credit to transact payment. The
embargo also requires Cuban payments to be routed through a third country bank. In 2005,
Washington made these strict conditions even tougher when they redefined “in advance” so narrowly as to
kill all the cash-based sales. Each of these restrictions makes U.S. exporters less competitive in
what should be a natural market for the United States.¶ Just as the governor heads to Cuba, the House
Agriculture Committee is expected to consider a bill to ease these restrictions, though it would not allow any credit for Cuba, and lift
the broad restrictions still in place against most Americans’ travel to Cuba. While easing restrictions on agricultural exports is an easy
sell in Congress, some have asked, why do agriculture interests want to lift the Cuba travel ban?¶ As John Block, President Ronald
Reagan’s secretary of agriculture, told Congress last month, travel will boost demand for U.S. food not just in tourism but also for
average Cubans, as their income increases. And, naturally, it’s hard to expect your buyer to pay you in cash when you’re working to
limit what cash they can have.¶ Texas
A&M University estimates that lifting these restrictions would boost
U.S. exports by $365 million, and spur an additional $1.1 billion in related economic activity.
But if Congress fails to act, the U.S. will continue to lose market share to competitors in Brazil, Vietnam and elsewhere, who offer
Cuba generous credit terms.¶ Supporters of America’s last travel ban — we can travel to Iran and North Korea — consider it a kind of
leverage over the Castros that shouldn’t be relinquished without first extracting concessions from their regime. After all, they argue,
giving Americans their freedom to travel to Cuba would enrich a regime that is now, truly, finally on the edge of collapse. Except that
it’s not.¶ Setting aside the obvious inappropriateness of bargaining American citizens’ rights with foreign countries, what leverage do
we have over Cuba when 2 million other tourists from around the world already visit the island, and when our own government now
allows nearly unlimited travel by hundreds of thousands of Cuban-Americans? Maintaining a “hyphenated” travel policy, in which
our government gives unlimited travel rights to one ethnic group while keeping the rest of us out of Cuba, is hypocritical and ill
serves American values.¶ For Congress to continue a policy of trying to bankrupt a nation of 11 million people 90 miles off our shores
ignores America’s own best interests — more jobs and exports — and what’s really best for the Cuban people.¶ As Perdue is about
to discover, the Cuban people are facing serious economic difficulties, and working in tourism helps many average Cubans to make
ends meet. Cuban dissidents on the island and respected human-rights watchdogs have called on Washington to lift the U.S. travel
ban.¶ That’s because American travelers could offer the Cuban people increased access to hard currency, valuable cultural
connections and, finally, the hope that not all governments stay the same for 50 years.¶ If Sonny Perdue hopes to gain more Cuba
trade for Georgia, he might have better luck traveling to Washington this summer than to Havana.
Ks
The only approach is through the social approach combined with international
institutions
Peffer, 3 – Professor in Philosophy from UC San Diego, PhD from University of Arizona in
Moral, Social and Political philosophy (Rodney, “WORLD HUNGER, MORAL THEORY, AND
RADICAL RAWLSIANISM,” Special Issue: “Topics in International Moral Theory,” International
Journal of Politics and Ethics, vol. 2, no. 4, 2003)//HAL
[2]
I contend that the world hunger/absolute poverty problem can only be solved through the
social approach. Due to the limits of people's altruism as well as to social co-ordination problems (such as the assurance
problem and the free-rider problem) the individual approach of contributing money and/or time to
various charities is not, by itself, going to solve it, although it is not morally insignificant if it can help alleviate it
to some degree. As Henry Shue writes: Individual donations by individual donors – I give $50 to Wanda, who is already
malnourished – are at best too little, too late, too unco-ordinated. They may also be myopically off-target by focusing too directly on
food itself; for many Third World countries, more or less food assistance, or even agricultural development aid, is far less important
than some solution to their staggering burdens of debt to foreign, rich-country banks, which is one of the main forces driving the
diversion of land and other resources out of the production of food. … The design of effective institutions for food security [is what is
necessary to solve the world hunger problem].ii In addition, it is usually not the case that there are individually identifiable people in
need whom more affluent people have a specific obligation to aid. Nor are there determinate limits on how much one is required to
give in aid. Moreover, it is arguable that the
individual approach does not sufficiently focus on the dignity
(and, possibly, the rights) of the individuals in need of aid. Finally, this approach all too easily lets people
off the hook, both because some people may delude themselves into thinking that a pittance they
may contribute to a charity is sufficient to meet their moral duties or obligations, and because it can misdirect the
attention of people – even generous people – away from justice of the social arrangements, institutions, policies, and programs that
are usually the cause of these severe depravations.iii To quote William Aiken from a slightly different context, the individual
approach disregards other potential causes for the starvation such as the economic factors within that nation (for example,
production and distribution of wealth, land, and capital ownership, effective social services), the political factors within that nation
(for example, expenditure on arms development is given priority over food or population control programs), and the social factors
within that nation (for example, the maintenance of an affluent elite at the cost of the impoverished masses).iv As Frederic Bender
observes: "(t)he
causes of world hunger are primarily, although not entirely, social and economic
in origin and typically are perpetuated through political and institutional violence, i.e., through the
violation of human rights of the impoverished."v If this is true (which I believe the evidence shows) and if private charitable efforts
have not succeeded in solving this problem (as they most surely have not) then, if one is really serious about solving it, the only
reasonable thing to do is to concentrate on establishing social arrangements that can do so. This is not to say that direct charitable
aid is unimportant but, rather, to say that establishing more just social and economic arrangements that will assure people food
security is – in the long run – even more important. This is, in fact, part of OXFAM's philosophy and program.vi Another important
issue is whether it is primarily national governments of developing counties that are responsible for eliminating hunger and absolute
poverty in their own territories or whether this responsibility falls more or less equally on governments in the developing world,
wealthier nations, and international organizations (such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, World
Trade Organization, or their future analogues). James Nickels claims that responsibilities for upholding the right to adequate food
lies primarily with national governments, but recognizes that they may be unwilling or unable to meet their responsibilities. Every
government has the duty to protect its people from hunger and starvation by adopting policies and creating institutions that make it
possible for people to provide for themselves and their families, and to assist those who are unable to provide for themselves.
Which government has the main responsibility to provide food assistance depends on which territory one is in. The people of a
particular country share in the responsibility of creating and maintaining an economic and political system that facilities selfprovision and adequately assists people to provide for themselves.vii On the other hand, Radhika Balakrishnan and Uma Narayan
The primary responsibility of guaranteeing the basic welfare
rights of all individuals falls on the national and international institutions – economic institutions,
nation states, and international bodies – whose policies and choices are responsible for the occurrence of
world hunger and poverty, and who have the means to act so as to guarantee these rights. …
National and international institutions that have primary responsibility for many economic
decisions and development policies need to recognize that the provision of basic economic
and social welfare rights to all is a binding moral and political obligation, one that cannot be
overridden for reasons of economic convenience.viii That the social approach is the only reasonable one can be
divide this responsibility more or less equally:
even more easily seen if we compare the morality of protecting people from severe deprivation (e.g. starvation) with the morality of
protecting them from serious physical harm directly inflicted by other humans. While there is, admittedly, the disanalogous feature
that the former is usually not intentionally caused while the latter is, the point I am making is that no one would claim that the
morality of protecting people from murder in a modern mass society begins and ends with our abiding by the duty not to murder
people, a duty to be discharged only as private citizens, individuals aiding other individuals who are in imminent danger of being
murdered (at least if we can do so without substantial risk of serious harm to ourselves). Instead, it is obvious that we also need
institutions – including a criminal justice system – to help protect us against murder and other crimes and, further, that social
Since nonvoluntarily starving to death is as serious a harm as being murdered it is absurd to claim that
we should approach the former solely from an individual point of view and the latter from
both an individual and a social point of view. In fact, this is usually recognized in most modern societies, although
revenues can legitimately be raised (through a fair taxation system or other fair means) to fund these institutions.
it is certainly not the case that all societies have successfully created and maintained the institutions necessary to meet their
populations' subsistence needs. Moreover, it is probably easier for people in one state to help people in severe deprivation than it is
for them to help ensure foreign people's security rights.
K SLAYER?
Heldke, 13 – B.A. Gustavus Adolphus College (Music, Philosophy), M.A. and Ph.D.
Northwestern University, Professor in Philosophy and Gender, Women and Sexuality Studies
(Lisa. "Historical background of food scholarship in philosophy and major theoretical approaches
in use." Routledge International Handbook of Food Studies (2013): 135, Google Books)//HAL
Philosophy has conic to the food studies table rather more reluctantly than some other humanities disciplines. But while it has been
slow to embrace the formal study of food, Western
philosophy has always been concerned, in peripheral ways,
with matters of eating and drinking. From Plato to Hume to Nietzsche, philosophers have reflected upon humans’
relationships to food and drink, even if only to dismiss these concerns as inconsequential or base. As contemporary philosophers
have begun to make food a topic of serious and concentrated study, they have also begun to revisit these earlier thinkers, in order to
ask: how
does our understanding of historic philosophers deepen when we consider their
discussions of food as something more or other than casually chosen illustrations, examples
and metaphors? Some contemporary philosophers of food believe that such work can fundamentally reshape
the discipline: that beginning philosophy with questions about humans’ relations to food not
only will bring us to new understandings of historic figures, hut also will invite us to reconsider
the most fundamental, perennial problems of philosophy. What does it mean to be a person?
What does it mean to know? What are our obligations to others? If we begin with the
unavoidable fact of our being as eaters, and not just as thinkers, such fundamental rethinking
inevitably follows. Contemporary philosophers have conic to study food for reasons both internal and external to the
discipline. Internally, questions of humans’ relations to food have arisen quite naturally, even
necessarily, for theorists challenging a certain historical prejudice against the body practice,
ordinary everydayness, and temporality. It has come to seem odd, even unthinkable, that
philosophy—the discipline that, more than any other, concerns itself with questions of meaning and value in human life—
would be silent about food, a primary source of meaning and value. Philosophers working in this
framework have, for instance, explored the aesthetic significance of food—showing how food reveals the
impoverishment of the notion of “art,” and the need for a more expansive definition of “the aesthetic” (see Korsmeyer, 1999).
Others have used the niodel of the parasite (the “co—eater” or ‘table Illate”) to reconceptualize a
fundamental ontological concept: substance (see Serres, 2007; Boisvert, Parasite). Still others have found in
recipes an instance of theory making that resists arbitrary and invidious distinctions between reason and emotion, theory and
practice (see, e.g., Heldke, “Recipes”). And others, acknowledging the presence of culture in agriculture, have looked to it as a way
to revisit notions of community (see, e.g.. Thompson 2010. 2007, 1994; Kirschenmann 2010). One significant external reason f0r the
rise in philosophical interest iii food is the surge of public interest in, and attention to, food. Philosophers
in the
classroom have found in the subject an important lens through which to examine
philosophical problems, particularly in ethics and environmental philosophy. Several anthologies have
been created, partly in an eflbrt to address the needs of such courses; examples include works by Fritz AlIhoif and Dave Munroe; Ben
Mephain; Gregory Pence; and David Kaplan. Philosophers committed
to public philosophy, and to expanding its
role in public life, have
found their insights valued in public debates about the safety of our food,
the future of our food system, and the cultural meanings of our foods. However, while philosophy is
welcomed into public conversations, it is the task of philosophers to push these conversations beyond formulaic moral dichotomies
(“organic foods: yes or no?” “are genetically engineered seeds good or had?”). Arguably, the
chief contribution
philosophy can make to discussions of food—in the public sphere and the academy—is to
reveal underlying assumptions that bind and limit those discussions. Philosophy best contributes to
public conversations about food not by solving or resolving ethical or aesthetic conundrums, but by problematizing the terms of
those conundrums.
Carrying capacity
Carrying capacity is fundamentally inaccurate—proves life boat ethics are
morally wrong
Peffer, 3 – Professor in Philosophy from UC San Diego, PhD from University of Arizona in
Moral, Social and Political philosophy (Rodney, “WORLD HUNGER, MORAL THEORY, AND
RADICAL RAWLSIANISM,” Special Issue: “Topics in International Moral Theory,” International
Journal of Politics and Ethics, vol. 2, no. 4, 2003)//HAL
[1]
Although "carrying capacity" is ambiguous, I believe that on any coherent rendering of the concept it is
demonstrably false that the earth has exceeded its carrying capacity or will do so in the near future (barring some
unforeseen catastrophe), as Garrett Hardin and other Neo-Malthusians contend.ix Perhaps the most devastating
argument against the Neo-Malthusians' position, however, exposes a crucial blurring of a vital
distinction from which they illegitimately proceed to derive their conclusion that wealthier
countries ought not to aid starving people in the poorest societies (since they have exceeded
their "carrying capacity"). As William Aiken has elegantly argued, the position often fails to distinguish between the
"biological limit" definition of this expression and the "socio-economic limit" definition. While there is a strongly
established – and relatively clear – "carrying capacity" thesis in population dynamics theory within the discipline of
biology, this cannot be directly extended to the "carrying capacity" of humans since human survival
and health are vastly effected by the overall socio-economic arrangements within which they
live: from the local village or neighborhood to international social, economic, and political arrangements. As Aiken states:
International purchasing power extends a nation's carrying capacity because this is not a biological limit – it is a complex social,
economic and political limit. It is not fixed by "nature" but by trade practices (for example, protective tariffs, currency exchange
rates, concessionary prices, multinational corporation interests, militarily motivated "loans") by the international market in terms of
who has what to sell (goods, resources, alliances), who wants to buy it, what price you can get for what you have to sell, and by the
influence of international interests on indigenous production and distribution (for example, neo-colonialism with its emphasis upon
If oil is discovered within its territory, the supposed limit on
population suddenly bolts upward to whatever extent the oil reserves last. A nation's carrying
capacity is a by-product of the market [or other prevailing economic arrangements] – nothing more. It is
never merely a biological limit.xi Moreover, as Amartya Sen and others have demonstrated, it is hardly ever the case that
mass starvation occurs from a literal lack of food within particular societies.xii As they argue, famines and starvations are
not the consequence of lack of food but of lack of social entitlements to food; i.e. the lack of an
adequate entitlement system to adequate nutrition. In fact, many countries have actually exported significant
amounts of food during the very periods in which starvation was occurring.xiii These facts are
extremely important since they disprove Hardin's argument that we on this planet are now in a
"lifeboat" situation and that "lifeboat ethics" permits (or even requires) those who are fortunate
enough to be in the lifeboats – i.e. those in the wealthy countries (or, more accurately, the wealthy wherever they may
live) – not to aid the starving, especially the starving in the worst-off nations.
the mass production of nonfood export crops).x
Shunning
Human rights justifications for the embargo are hypocritical and falsified
Kirkpatrick, 96 (Anthony F, MD, “Role of the USA in shortage of food and
medicine in Cuba”, The Lancet, Vol 348 • November 30, 1996,
http://www.cubasolidarity.net/Kirkpatrick-lancet.pdf, jld)
The US Government often speaks of violations of human rights in Cuba. Such claims should perhaps be
viewed against the background of an Amnesty International report, which catalogues human-rights abuses in
the USA, such as torture, ill-treatment of prisoners, and excessive use of force by police.16 In
addition, it should be noted that Washington has been deemed to have exaggerated Cuba’s abuses of
human rights, to the extent of codifying such claims into US law.17 These reports should be borne in mind
when the US blockade of food and medicine to Cuba is considered.
Food Ethics
General
Restricting food toward Cuba through the embargo is unethical – it fails to
promote democracy anyway
Eliason, 08 - Legal Intern at U.S. Department of Justice; Law graduate at University of
Michigan; Brigham Young University in bioinformatics (Brent Eliason, October 27, 2008, BYU
Political Review “It’s Time to End the Cuban Embargo” http://www.byupoliticalreview.com/wpcontent/uploads/2011/08/Oct-20081.pdf)//JES
Despite the widening gap with Communist ideology, the embargo still stands higher than
during the Cold War. The 1962 embargo was strengthened by the Helms-Burton Act of 1996. Meant to encourage “a
peaceful transition to a representative democracy and a market economy in Cuba”, the act punishes foreign
companies that do business in Cuba and places more restrictions on interaction with the
country . This strategy of starving the Cubans into assimilation is not only unethical , but no
longer possible. Cuba’s food shortages were worst in the early 1990’s. They had already passed privatizing reforms
and increased trade with Europe when the Helms-Burton Act was passed.
The Embargo is the product of legislative corruption – aimed at unethically
starving the Cuban population
Franklin, 12 - Research Fellow at the Institute for Public Policy Research (Jane Franklin, July o7,
2012, Progreso-Weekly, “Sending off the 23rd Friendshipment Caravan” http://progresoweekly.com/2/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3411%3Asending-off-the23rd-friendshipment-caravan&catid=38%3Ain-the-united-states&Itemid=55)//JES
Washington could have declared that it approved of Cuba’s achievement of free health care and free education for its people and
therefore would help Cuba maintain that standard of living by opening trade and travel with Cuba. But instead Congress tightened
the trade embargo by passing the Torricelli Act in October 1992. That
law is named for its main sponsor, whom
many of us in New Jersey remember well – Robert Torricelli, who was then a New Jersey
Representative in the House and later became a senator until his corruption forced him to
resign his Senate seat. The law was aimed, in Torricelli’s own words, to “wreak havoc on that
island.” In other words, to continue the policy of trying to starve the Cuban people into
submission.
Historical analysis proves – The Embargo is a unethical policy aimed to starve
Cuba into submission
Franklin, 12 - Research Fellow at the Institute for Public Policy Research (Jane Franklin, July o7,
2012, Progreso-Weekly, “Sending off the 23rd Friendshipment Caravan” http://progresoweekly.com/2/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3411%3Asending-off-the23rd-friendshipment-caravan&catid=38%3Ain-the-united-states&Itemid=55)//JES
In the United States people hear that it is Cuba’s economic system, not the trade embargo,
that hurts the Cuban people. Yet the genesis of the trade embargo was explicitly to starve
Cubans into submission.
Six months after the triumph of the Cuban Revolution, an extremely wealthy Texan, Robert
Kleberg, owner of the King Ranch in Texas – one of the largest ranches in the world, was worried about his cattle ranch in Cuba so he
met with Secretary of State Christian Herter. According
to a State Department memo, he told Herter that
depriving Cuba of its sugar quota would cause “widespread further unemployment” meaning
that “large numbers of people thus forced out of work would begin to go hungry.” The Secretary of
State cautioned that such a policy would be “economic warfare” in peacetime. Which would Washington choose? Warfare or
State Department official sent another memo
pointing out that the “majority of Cubans support [Fidel] Castro” and concluding that the
“only foreseeable means of alienating internal support is through disenchantment and
disaffection based on economic dissatisfaction and hardship.” Therefore “it follows that every
possible means should be undertaken promptly to weaken the economic life of Cuba….to
bring about hunger, desperation and overthrow of government.” So the Eisenhower
Administration terminated Cuba’s sugar quota and launched “economic warfare” which
turned into a State of Siege that continues more than half a century later.
Peacetime? The answer came in less than a year when a
Providing food is an a-priori – integration of food ethics into politics is
necessary to move towards a world worth living in
Mepham et al, 96, Director of the Centre for Applied Bioethics at Nottingham University. He has published widely in the
fields of bioethics and applied biology. (Ben Mepham, Andrew Belsey – Centre for Applied Ethics, University of Wales, Ruth
Chadwick – Center for Professional Ethics, University of Central Lancashire Michael Crawford, Director of the Institute of Brain
Chemistry at Queen Elizabeth Hospital for Children; Nigel Dower, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen; Keb
Ghebremeskel studied chemistry at the University of Addis Ababaa and received his doctorate in nutritional biochemistry at the
University of Wales; Leslie Gofton is Lecturer in Behavioral Science at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne. John S. Marsh CBE is a
graduate of Oxford and Reading Universities. Between 1957 and 1977 he was successively Research Economist. Erik Millstone is
Senior Lecturer in Science and Technology Policy at Sussex University. “Food Ethics” 1996)//NG
It is hardly a matter of contention that there are ethical issues related to food. We all need
food, in adequate quantity and of adequate quality, to survive and maintain health. The fact that
millions of people in the world are severely malnourished, often to the point of starvation, while
others devote substantial time and effort to losing weight by dieting, is evidence enough that
something is awry with the ethics of food provisioning. But ethical concerns are by no means confined to such
striking examples of injustice. The production of food in modern agricultural practice often has damaging effects on the
environment, in terms of soil erosion, chemical pollution and loss of species. The exploitation of animals for food is thought by some
to be ethically unacceptable under any conditions and by others to seriously infringe their welfare when animals are reared in
intensive systems. Food production, processing and marketing also have significant effects on its safety for human consumption, and
such concerns are compounded by the adoption of modem biotechnologies which offend the public sense of propriety. Food
is
so basic a human need that it readily becomes the focus or means of expression of a whole
range of other human concerns, both beneficent and maleficent. Thus, food habits serve both to
strengthen cultural bonds and to emphasize intercultural differences: food supply is an
important element of foreign aid, but trade in food can also be a means of subordination, or
even a weapon of war. Food is essential to the sustenance of life, but it can be a source of
disease and death. The underlying assumption motivating the compilation of this collection of essays is that the
interrelatedness of such concerns and their centrality to human well-being merits the promotion of an interdisciplinary approach to
food which has an explicitly normative objective. Consideration
of 'food ethics` might thus promote more
appropriate ways of thinking about human well-being and autonomy, and facilitate the
practical and political changes which need to be introduced if we are not only to achieve a
more just global society, but indeed if we are to hand onto our successors a world which is
worth inheriting. Each of the chapter authors has addressed his subject by first identifying the social, economic or scientific
issues and then proceeding to analyse their ethical dimensions. (The absence of women authors is incidental: none of those invited
to contribute was able to accept.) All authors have concluded their chapters with suggestions for changes in line with the ethical
principles discussed. Readers are not. However, presented with a set of ‘codes of ethical practice'. Rather, they are encouraged to
reflect on the ethical implications of those aspects of the food industry with which they are most directly concerned, and with their
relationships to other aspects of the food chain, with a view to informing sound ethical judgements. ‘Ethics’ can be considered at
several levels, from abstruse meta-ethical theory, at one extreme, to codes of practice, at the other. The aim here is to occupy the
middle ground in which ethical theory is applied to practical concerns: but such insights need to be interpreted more explicitly in the
contexts of professional practice. Nigel Dower considers the question of global hunger from the perspective of people in Western
developed countries, and in the light of FAO (Food and Agriculture Organisation) predictions that
by 2010 AD chronic
malnutrition will continue to afflict over 600 million people. The persistence of hunger
presents a major moral challenge not only because it undermines human welfare and dignity,
but because its existence is clearly avoidable. Dower examines several ‘theories of obligation’,
each of which supports the claim that we have a moral duty to ameliorate world hunger. However, as indicated by John Marsh, the
ways in which we address that task are by no means unproblematical. Food
trade, being perceived as a largely selfserving activity, might seem to be ethically less worthy than provision of aid, which ostensibly
expresses altruistic motives. In practice, the complications of both aid and trade undermine this
simple distinction and imply that there is need for close analysis of the motives and effects of
both, if we are to make progress in the alleviation of world hunger.
Starvation is inevitable but we have an obligation to act – the 1AC’s public
sharing of values creates moral education
Mepham et al, 96, Director of the Centre for Applied Bioethics at Nottingham University. He has published widely in the
fields of bioethics and applied biology. (Ben Mepham, Andrew Belsey – Centre for Applied Ethics, University of Wales, Ruth
Chadwick – Center for Professional Ethics, University of Central Lancashire Michael Crawford, Director of the Institute of Brain
Chemistry at Queen Elizabeth Hospital for Children; Nigel Dower, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen; Keb
Ghebremeskel studied chemistry at the University of Addis Ababaa and received his doctorate in nutritional biochemistry at the
University of Wales; Leslie Gofton is Lecturer in Behavioral Science at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne. John S. Marsh CBE is a
graduate of Oxford and Reading Universities. Between 1957 and 1977 he was successively Research Economist. Erik Millstone is
Senior Lecturer in Science and Technology Policy at Sussex University. “Food Ethics” 1996)//NG
At a recent conference, the prediction
was made that in 2010 AD chronic malnutrition in the 93
developing countries would afflict about 637 million people. This was seen as an improvement on the figure
of 781 million in 1988/9 (and 941 million in 1969/71).’ It is, in fact, a quite shocking statistic. It represents an awful lot of
people who in the next fifteen years will be malnourished or starving, many dying prematurely of these causes. We have to
ask ourselves the following question: if this level of malnutrition remains in fifteen years’ time,
will it be there because we cannot avoid it, or because we allow it to continue? To put it in away
reminiscent of Augustine`s question about God and the existence of evil in the world: will it exist because we cannot prevent it or
because we will not prevent it? By ‘will’ here I do not mean ‘deliberately aim at’, of course, but more modestly *allow to happen
because of policies which we know have unwanted but preventable consequences`. I
am not saying that all poverty
and hunger in the future could be prevented. But insofar as the trends in the future depend
upon earlier decisions-individual, institutional, political-we have to ask: could those decisions
have been different so that there would have been less hunger? If they could have been,
should they have been? In this chapter, I suggest that the prediction above relies on an unduly pessimistic assessment of
the possibility of generous human motivation. Delegates at the United Nations Summit in Copenhagen (March l995) on "˜social
development` agreed, since they adopted a ten-year plan to meet the basic needs of virtually every human being on earth. The
prediction is based on a number of assumptions-about food production, new methods of agriculture, new areas of co-operation,
inputs from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and levels of giving by private individuals. Reductions in global hunger will
certainly be seen as the goal of many agents, for example, food scientists and aid officials, but also the general outcome of other
developments, economic and technological. The key question to be asked is: in addition to the efforts already being made to reduce
world hunger, and assumed in the prediction, by governments, agencies, international bodies, NGOs and concerned individuals,
could significantly more be done to bring about further reductions? I want to argue that much
more could be done and
given that it could be done, ought to be done, Governments, international organisations and businesses
could do a lot more. But, beyond a small but significant degree of latitude within which officials can work, what they can do
depends upon certain conditions. International organisations could make hunger/poverty reduction an
even higher priority in their activities if governments agreed that they should. Governments
could do a lot more if their citizens wanted them to do so. Business companies could do a lot more (for
example. to make sure that their economic activities did not causes poverty or hunger) if those they are answerable to-their
shareholders-determined that they should do so, and consumers of their products sent signals by their consumer preferences. Can
people, then, act in ways that will improve on the prediction above? I suggest that they can. because
the prediction is based on the premise that, whatever efforts are currently envisaged for
reducing hunger, there is a continued commitment to affluence in the North. i.e. in the rich
countries of the world, and thus to levels and kinds of aid programme consistent with this
commitment. But if people were to accept the following three propositions, then there could be significant action (beyond that
assumed in the prediction).3 The three propositions are:
 that as moral beings we have significant duties to help other people who suffer:
 that hunger is a particularly extreme form of suffering; and
 that we should see the scope of our obligations as global.
This chapter defends these three propositions. But, it may be thought, almost everyone already accepts all
three, and as a result of this a certain amount is done and supported, as indicated above. This, however, is questionable.
First, to the extent that we accept them, we may still for a variety of reasons show moral
weakness and do nothing or very little. Whatever theorists may say about the nature and reality of "˜free will`, there
is an obvious sense in which people choose whether to act morally or to act otherwise, out of selfinterest or immediate inclination. Second, we may not have fully grasped the implications of our
moral ideas. And this is partly why an explicit enquiry such as this is of use in sharpening our
understanding. Both moral motivation and moral understanding are, in any case, strengthened by
reciprocity, solidarity and publicly shared values. Third, there are a significant number of thinkers who
do not accept one or other of the propositions, who reject or marginalise the duty to help others, who
do not see hunger as of particular moral importance, or who deny the global scope of our
obligations. Whether we see such views as false or as merely unacceptable, the point remains that if such thinkers were
persuaded otherwise, the potentiality for action would be much improved. The practical
importance of moral education for global citizenship needs to be recognized, not just because
of global poverty but because of the need for peace and sustained environmental protection.
Starvation dehumanizes
Mepham et al, 96, Director of the Centre for Applied Bioethics at Nottingham University. He has published widely in the
fields of bioethics and applied biology. (Ben Mepham, Andrew Belsey – Centre for Applied Ethics, University of Wales, Ruth
Chadwick – Center for Professional Ethics, University of Central Lancashire Michael Crawford, Director of the Institute of Brain
Chemistry at Queen Elizabeth Hospital for Children; Nigel Dower, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen; Keb
Ghebremeskel studied chemistry at the University of Addis Ababaa and received his doctorate in nutritional biochemistry at the
University of Wales; Leslie Gofton is Lecturer in Behavioral Science at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne. John S. Marsh CBE is a
graduate of Oxford and Reading Universities. Between 1957 and 1977 he was successively Research Economist. Erik Millstone is
Senior Lecturer in Science and Technology Policy at Sussex University. “Food Ethics” 1996)//NG
Before we look directly at the question of why we ought to do something about hunger, we
need to consider a prior question: what is it about hunger which makes it a bad state of affairs
to be in?¶ The evils of hunger¶ We can identify the following factors, all of which are bad. Hunger
involves physical pain and suffering, loss of vitality and energy, lack of health in the body, in
particular current illnesses and diseases, and a proneness to these conditions. It leads to
maldevelopment, physically and mentally, especially in children, early death, directly or via
diseases and illness or greater proneness to accidents, loss (or lack) of control over one’s life to
a high degree, plus associated feelings of helplessness. Because of its primacy in terms of the
need to avoid hunger, it involves an extreme form of poverty through lack of resources for
pursuing meaningful activities in life. It involves loss/ lack of dignity/self-respect.
Hunger is a unique form of suffering – the fact that its avoidable and a prerequisite to wellbeing makes it a moral imperative
Mepham et al, 96, Director of the Centre for Applied Bioethics at Nottingham University. He has published widely in the
fields of bioethics and applied biology. (Ben Mepham, Andrew Belsey – Centre for Applied Ethics, University of Wales, Ruth
Chadwick – Center for Professional Ethics, University of Central Lancashire Michael Crawford, Director of the Institute of Brain
Chemistry at Queen Elizabeth Hospital for Children; Nigel Dower, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen; Keb
Ghebremeskel studied chemistry at the University of Addis Ababaa and received his doctorate in nutritional biochemistry at the
University of Wales; Leslie Gofton is Lecturer in Behavioral Science at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne. John S. Marsh CBE is a
graduate of Oxford and Reading Universities. Between 1957 and 1977 he was successively Research Economist. Erik Millstone is
Senior Lecturer in Science and Technology Policy at Sussex University. “Food Ethics” 1996)//NG
Reasons for the special status of alleviating hunger
Two kinds of reason may be given for saying that hunger
has a special moral status. Neither, on its own, shows hunger
combination gives it a special status so far as the normal
setting of priorities for action ought to be concerned.¶ First, if people are hungry, they are in a condition
which undermines the possibility, or at least the likelihood, of their achieving other aspects of human
well-being; that is, not being hungry is one of the preconditions (normally) of achieving other aspects of
human well-being-enjoyable activities, control, relatively little suffering and the exercise of
choices.¶ Second, there is an important sense in which the evil of hunger is more readily avoidable than
most other evils. If a person is hungry because he or she does not have access to food, it only
takes others to provide it. Except for famine situations ‘lifeboat scarcity’ situations or other forms of isolation, it takes
only the intervention of others who are aware of the situation to enable a person to have
food. Within a community where there is enough food for all, and an awareness of who is or may be going
hungry, the evil of hunger can be alleviated by the actions of others: indeed in most societies in the past,
to be uniquely different from other kinds of evil, but the
which by modern standards were not materially affluent, that at least would have been done, however much uncontrollable
diseases may have afflicted and killed many.¶ The
irony is that in the modern world, with our extensive
knowledge of global hunger, our extensive communication and transportation systems and
the existence of food surpluses, we do not seem to be able to replicate the practices of past
smaller societies of at least trying to ensure that everyone has enough of the one crucial thing
it is in the power of others to provide—namely food. It is as though we have the technical ability to
do so, but lack the psychological and institutional capacities. This is, of course, an over-simplification, but it suggests that there are
two related factors which are missing. We do not see ourselves morally as a global community or society
in which those who are well-off have at least a minimum commitment to ensure, as far as is
possible, that all have access to this precondition of human well-being—adequate food. Second, the
reason why we are psychologically and institutionally unable to meet the challenge is because most of us are not sufficiently
persuaded by a moral vision that tells us that this is really a pressing thing to do. What
we need is a global ethic which
spells out the idea that we have serious obligations towards all other human beings,
obligations which cross societal and national frontiers.7
Starvation decimates agency
Mepham et al, 96, Director of the Centre for Applied Bioethics at Nottingham University. He has published widely in the
fields of bioethics and applied biology. (Ben Mepham, Andrew Belsey – Centre for Applied Ethics, University of Wales, Ruth
Chadwick – Center for Professional Ethics, University of Central Lancashire Michael Crawford, Director of the Institute of Brain
Chemistry at Queen Elizabeth Hospital for Children; Nigel Dower, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen; Keb
Ghebremeskel studied chemistry at the University of Addis Ababaa and received his doctorate in nutritional biochemistry at the
University of Wales; Leslie Gofton is Lecturer in Behavioral Science at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne. John S. Marsh CBE is a
graduate of Oxford and Reading Universities. Between 1957 and 1977 he was successively Research Economist. Erik Millstone is
Senior Lecturer in Science and Technology Policy at Sussex University. “Food Ethics” 1996)//NG
Onora O’Neill has presented a modern Kantian approach which can be summed up as follows: hunger
and extreme
poverty undermine the proper development and exercise of rational agency.8 They do so because
the very poor are often subject to coercion and deception (which fails to respect their rational
agency) and more generally because extreme poverty deprives the poor of real autonomy. This
requires us as moral beings to respect the poor as fellow rational agents in two ways: first, we
must not deceive or coerce them, or be beneficiaries of others (such as multi-national companies) who
deceive or coerce them, and we must take action to prevent such coercion and deception (via,
for example. political action). Second. we must act so as to enable the poor to develop and exercise
their rational autonomy by appropriate action (political as well as individual acts of helping ) —
this is what is required by material justice. The difficulty with this appealing position is that it locates the evil of hunger in the lack or
loss of rational agency. Now this
is clearly an important part of what hunger does to the poor (a part
often neglected), but it is equally distorting to omit mention of the sheer physical suffering,
disease, physical malfunctioning and disability, which are themselves also inherently evil.
Food is a fundamental right and restriction of food is immoral
Islam, 81 – Associate Professor at the Faculty of Administration, University of Ottawa (Nasir,
“Food Aid: Conscience, Morality, and Politics,” : International Journal, Vol. 36, No. 2, Food and
Fuel (Spring, 1981), pp. 353-370, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40201960)//HAL
Whether starving people (particularly in distant lands) have a moral right to food and whether the rich have
a moral obligation to provide it are very complex questions. The literature on the moral aspects of food scarcity tends to be vague,
confusing, and often rhetorical. The fundamental problem as posed by Regan applies as well to food aid decisions: what are the
correct moral principles which might guide the decisions (or actions) of free, rational beings?8 The question has preoccupied
philosophers and moralists since the dawn of civilization, and it is not possible to deal with it here in any truly satisfactory manner.
At the risk of being overly simplistic, however, it could be said that this fundamental question of normative ethics has been dealt
with from two basically different philosophical approaches: the consequentialist and the non-consequentialist. The former, which is
also called the technological approach, emphasizes the results of an action and regards an action to be wrong only if its
consequences are wrong or harmful to someone. There are at least three types of technological ethical theories: ethical egoism in
which the only consequences that should be taken into consideration are those for the actor himself; ethical altruism where moral
right or wrong depends on consequences to others (not the actor); and utilitarianism where the consequences to everyone
concerned are the determinant of a moral act. The utilitarian principle calls for the greatest pos- sible balance of intrinsic good over
intrinsic evil for everyone concerned.9 Non-consequentialist theories are often referred to as deontological because they
emphasize duty (deon). They state that moral
right or wrong is not determined solely by results or
consequences. Adherents of these theories point out that the consequentialist approach does not deal
with injustice - the wrong done to the individual (or a particular group) - in putting emphasis on the balance of
intrinsic good as compared to intrinsic evil. Many deontologists, following Kant, have argued that when someone is
treated as a means and not an end, injustice is being done. Others simply be- lieve that injustice involves
violation of basic moral rights. Moral rights are distinguished from legal rights in terms of their univer- sality, inalienability, and
equality. Laws may be unjust, consequent- ly legal justice (enforcement of laws) is different from moral justice. Different concepts
or rights, for example, rights as entitlements or claims, imply a justified constraint upon how others may act.10 Freedom from
hunger is frequently regarded as a basic moral right which is not derived from any other moral principle. A World Food Council
document declares: 'Food
is the most fundamental human need. Its availability to all persons is a
basic tenet of civilization/ Nick Eberstadt maintains that freedom from hunger is essential for global
food security. It must therefore be considered as the most basic of human rights. Although the
consequent alleviation of hunger may give some satisfaction to the donors, it must be considered as an altruistic act without its
reinforcing con- sequences. According to William Aiken, dire needs create rights. Involuntary deprivation must be mitigated
particularly when the means to do so are available. This right may only be denied if the costs are unreasonable. It is evident that
no other rights can exist prior to freedom from hunger. Starving people cannot think of any
other rights and duties.11 The affluent also have rights. They have a right to pursue their own goals and not provide aid.
Aiken responds that the duty to benevolence is overriding, and consequently the right of the starv- ing to be aided takes
precedence. Even if failing to help does not violate the right of the starving the affluent are obligated to do so.12 This emphasis on
rights alone sometimes appears to be rather misplaced. People
tend to ignore that rights entail duties and
obligations. When rights are violated, conscience becomes indignant, but the duties and
responsibilities which must be fulfilled to alleviate the conditions that lead to violation of
rights are forgotten. Humanity does not have a good record of respecting moral rights. The mere establishment of freedom
from starvation as a moral right without any mechanism of enforcement will not, in my opinion, help the starving people. Because
moral rights, even if established, are difficult to en- force, some writers have focussed on the moral obligations of the affluent to
the starving poor.
From the perspective of the fortunate, we never see the negative consequences
of our actions
LaFollette, 3 – PhD in Philosophy from Vanderbilt, Cole Chair in Ethics at the University of South
Florida (Hugh. "World hunger." A companion to applied ethics (2003): 238-53, Google
Scholar)//HAL
WE CAUSED THEIR PLIGHT The same economic, social, and political Interdependences that explain our mutual vulnerabilities
suggest that we likely partially caused the starving people’s plight. Decisions
in one part of the world have
economic ripples elsewhere. Some ripples become tidal waves. We have no doubt about this
when those waves crash on to our own economic shores. When OPEC hikes gasoline prices, it increases our
costs of living and we are Infuriated. When Japan boosts tariffs, it hits our wallets. When we are on the short end of
the economic stick, we quickly recognize that others’ decisions to sell or withhold goods or to
Increase tariffs negatively impacts on our economies. Yet we conveniently forget the impact of
our economies on others. That Is a factual and moral mistake. For as potent as the actions of
others arc on us, our actions are even more significant for them. The West is economically so
powerful that even seemingly Insignificant actions can have dramatic effects, especially on Third
World countries. These effects reveal two different ways in which we arguably cause the suffering of the world’s
Impoverished peoples. Consider two variations on a single analogy. In the first, place unwilling gladiators into an arena with lions.
When some are killed, I cannot wash my hands of their deaths. Although the lions — and not 1 — were the Immediate cause of their
deaths, L am responsible since I placed them In this vulnerable position. Two. I do not place gladiators into this arena. Rather. L
“offer” men in the region the “option” of becoming gladiators. I do so knowing full well that my arena Is the only source of income In
the area. 1 assuage my guilt by claiming that since these men have volunteered to fight the lions, then I am not responsible for their
deaths. None the less, by using their extreme vulnerability to get them to do what no sane person would do If
they had an
option, then I am still responsible for any harm that results. Again, we have no problem acknowledging this
If we are the vulnerable parties; why should we deny it when we are the exploiters? Arguably,
we (partially) caused the plight of the starving in one of these senses. We are highly advantaged
people whose economic, social, and political institutions are “causally deeply entangled in the
misery of the poor” (Pogge, 1997: 505; 2000). Moreover, our relative social starting positions “have emerged from a single
historical process that was pervaded by grievous wrongs’ (Pogge, 1997: 509). That b why: “We should not tolerate such
radical inequalities.
The aff is a prerequisite to any impact—food distribution comes prior to
survival
Watson, 77 - Professor of Philosophy @ Washington U, PhD from University of Iowa (Richard,
World Hunger and Moral Obligation, p. 118-119)//HAL
These arguments are morally spurious. That food sufficient for well-nourished survival is the equal right of
every human individual or nation is a specification of the higher principle that everyone has
equal right to the necessities of life. The moral stress of the principle of equity is primarily on
equal sharing, and only secondarily on what is being shared. The higher moral principle is of human equity per se.
Consequently, the moral action is to distribute all food equally, whatever the consequences . This is
the hard line apparently drawn by such moralists as Immanuel Kant and Noam Chomsky—but then, morality is hard. The
conclusion may be unreasonable (impractical and irrational in conventional terms), but it is obviously moral. Nor
should anyone purport surprise; it has always been understood that the claims of morality—if taken seriously—
supersede those of conflicting reason. One may even have to sacrifice one’s life or one’s nation to be moral in
situations where practical behavior would preserve it. For example, if a prisoner of war undergoing torture is to be a (perhaps dead)
patriot even when reason tells him that collaboration will hurt no one, he remains silent. Similarly, if
one is to be moral,
one distributes available food in equal shares (even if everyone then dies). That an action is
necessary to save one’s life is no excuse for behaving unpatriotically or immorally if one
wishes to be a patriot or moral. No principle of morality absolves one of behaving immorally simply to save one’s life or
nation. There is a strict analogy here between adhering to moral principles for the sake of being moral, and adhering to Christian
principles for the sake of being Christian. The moral world contains pits and lions, but one looks always to the highest light. The
ultimate test always harks to the highest principle—recant or die—and it is pathetic to profess morality if one quits when the going
gets rough. I have put aside many questions of detail—such as the mechanical problems of distributing food—because detail does
If every human life is equal in value, then the equal distribution of the
necessities of life is an extremely high, if not the highest, moral duty. It is at least high enough to
not alter the stark conclusion.
override the excuse that by doing it one would lose one’s life. But many people cannot accept the view that one must distribute
equally even in f the nation collapses or all people die. If everyone dies, then there will be no realm of morality. Practically speaking,
sheer survival comes first. One can adhere to the principle of equity only if one exists. So it is rational to suppose that the principle
of survival is morally higher than the principle of equity. And though one might not be able to argue for unequal distribution of food
to save a nation—for nations can come and go—one might well argue that unequal distribution is necessary for the survival of the
human species. That is, some large group—say one-third of present world population—should be at least well-nourished for human
survival. However, from an individual standpoint, the
human species—like the nation—is of no moral
relevance. From a naturalistic standpoint, survival does come first; from a moralistic standpoint—as indicated
above—survival may have to be sacrificed. In the milieu of morality, it is immaterial whether or not the
human species survives as a result of individual behavior.
It is unethical not to restrict food
Mitchell, 7 - Ph.D. in philosophy, Professor of Philosophy at Brooklyn College and Pace
University (Len. World Poverty and Moral Obligations, 2007, ProQuest)//HAL
In my discussion I will briefly consider, as a threshold issue, reasons that have been given for why we have no duty to help people
who are starving, but I will conclude that none of these reasons hold up to scrutiny. If
one believes that helping the
poor is not the right approach because, for instance, it only perpetuates the problem of poverty
for future generations, then they have an obligation to help in some other way, such as with
population control efforts. It is not ethical to do nothing while people die of preventable
causes and we have the ability to help. Assuming then that we do have duties in regard to the desperately poor. I
take up my main issue, described below. Embedded in my concept of beneficence is respect (or the dignity of Individuals as persons,
recognizing that such respect is subject to vanous Interpretations. Some may argue that merely saving a life Is Insufficient (and
maybe even inappropriate) if it is not done with the right motive, such as love for the person. For purpose of this discussion, I
assume that life-saving is the primary good to be achieved, with life quality enhancement as a very desirable secondary goal. I will
also assume that it is wrong to allow people to suffer and die of preventable causes when we have the ability to help, unless we
investigate and conclude that our help is counterproductive. I recognize that others
may take the view that better
long-term consequences result if we leave people alone and let them work out their problems
in their own way, and intervene only if it becomes obvious that aid is warranted and wanted
by the needy. Along with Singer and others. I advocate a proactive approach, assuming that help is morally required
unless empirical evidence proves otherwise.
Food key to VTL
Künnemann and Epal-Ratjen, 4 – Rolf is the Human Rights Director of FIAN International
Sandra is the Coordinator for UN Affairs at FIAN International (Rolf, Sandra, “The Right to Food:
A Resource Manual for NGOs,” AAAS Science and Human Rights Program,
http://shr.aaas.org/pubs/pdfs/RT_Food.pdf)//HAL
Lack of access to adequate food is one of the most fundamental forms of human deprivation.
An individual can survive its worst form—the complete lack of food—for only a few weeks. In the case of lack of water, death will
occur within a few days. Providing oneself with access to food has therefore always been one of the most fundamental human
activities. Secure
access to adequate food and food-producing resources is a basic standard to
which every human being is entitled. Hunger and malnutrition are the worst forms of severe
food deprivation. There are less extreme forms as well. Consuming food that is inadequate food in quantity or quality can ruin
one’s health and lead to premature death. Inadequate food makes people unhappy, and unable to lead active and
fruitful lives. Food, moreover, is a source of pleasure. No wonder most people want not just food, but also good food.
They want secure and sustainable access to this food to protect them from the horrifying prospect of hunger and food borne
diseases. Access to food on a strictly individual basis, as was the case for Robinson Crusoe, alone on his desert island, is something
that almost never happens. This is an individualistic myth celebrating the “self-made man”, who, in reality, consumes the products
of current society and earlier generations. Access
to food is part of the life of one’s family, group,
community, society, and state, and of global society and the community of states. Therefore, there
is always a lot of interference with the food and food-producing resources of other people.
Willingly withholding food is oppression—it kills individual liberty
Künnemann and Epal-Ratjen, 4 – Rolf is the Human Rights Director of FIAN International
Sandra is the Coordinator for UN Affairs at FIAN International (Rolf, Sandra, “The Right to Food:
A Resource Manual for NGOs,” AAAS Science and Human Rights Program,
http://shr.aaas.org/pubs/pdfs/RT_Food.pdf)//HAL
On the one hand people co-operate and assist one another to obtain access to food and food-producing resources. On the other
hand there is negative interference when people are in competition to feed themselves. In
the worst case some people
or groups push others into food deprivation or keep them there: This is a form of food-related
oppression. Control over the access to food and food-producing resources of other people
and peoples is one of the most fundamental sources of power over them. For an act to be
called oppressive, however, it is not necessary that deprivation be its purpose. It is sufficient
that the actors could reasonably be expected to foresee the resulting deprivation and could
have known that deprivation was the likely result or by-product. People experience foodrelated oppression differently from food deprivation, which results from natural calamities or
resource limitations. Deprivation that is free of oppression does not necessarily affect people’s dignity. This usually not the
case for food-related oppression. Oppression is usually experienced as demeaning. Freedom refers to the absence of
oppression—and, in the context of this manual, it means the absence of foodrelated
oppression. Oppression refers to pushing people down to a point below the minimum human standard and/or keeping them
there. Food-related oppression therefore comes in two different categories. The first category entails concerns acts that destroy
people´s access to food or food-producing resources. The second category refers to acts or omissions that keep people excluded
from food or food-producing resources. These two forms of food-related oppression are described in the sections that follow.
The rich and powerful continue to suppress food destroying liberty—the DA is
an excuse for continued oppression
Künnemann and Epal-Ratjen, 4 – Rolf is the Human Rights Director of FIAN International
Sandra is the Coordinator for UN Affairs at FIAN International (Rolf, Sandra, “The Right to Food:
A Resource Manual for NGOs,” AAAS Science and Human Rights Program,
http://shr.aaas.org/pubs/pdfs/RT_Food.pdf)//HAL
Many people in the South, and also to some extent in the North, continually lack access to food and
foodproducing resources. Their access to adequate food and resources cannot be destroyed because it does not exist in
the first place. To satisfy their food needs, they require access to the food available within the
society as a whole. Beyond that, they need to be able to access food-producing resources, in the form of natural resources,
capital, and skills, in order to feed themselves. For people living in hunger and destitution, or forced to
consume unhealthy or otherwise inadequate food, this is one of the most essential freedoms.
The freedom of the hungry and malnourished and other deprived people to gain access to
food and food-producing resources is all too often rejected and suppressed by the rich and
powerful. Usually this is done in the name of efficiency, productivity, development and growth.
Resources which would allow people to feed themselves are withheld from them, using the argument that poor and deprived people
make inefficient use of these resources, and that granting them this access such moves would lower the overall productivity of
society, and slow down growth. Excluding
deprived people from the freedom to access food and
resources existing elsewhere in society is an act of oppression—it means keeping them in a
state of deprivation.
A utopian view of food ethics generates political innovation
Meinhardt and Ingensiep, 10 (Marc, Hans Werner, “Food Ethics” -Food Ethics in
a Globalized World – Reality and Utopia, April 15, 2010, pgs 1-14, SpringerLink,
jld)
On the other hand it
is obvious that we need something like an utopian view concerning global food
problems. The word “utopia” leaves a bitter taste in a world of around a billion starving people. It is time to remember that
utopias were and still are timeless generators for future societies. Utopia delivers political
innovation and ethical impulses for reflection. Therefore, in the second part of this contribution we will review
some utopian seeds and dreams by authors stretching from the past to the present. Their contributions enable heuristic
comparisons for students and experts and allow constructive criticisms based on real facts . The
third part gives a short reflection on the special problem of justice from a modern philosophical point of view. But now we introduce
with a summary of the contributions to this book into the wide field of real problems in Food Ethics in a globalized world.
Women
Restriction of food disproportionately affects women
Künnemann and Epal-Ratjen, 4 – Rolf is the Human Rights Director of FIAN International
Sandra is the Coordinator for UN Affairs at FIAN International (Rolf, Sandra, “The Right to Food:
A Resource Manual for NGOs,” AAAS Science and Human Rights Program,
http://shr.aaas.org/pubs/pdfs/RT_Food.pdf)//HAL
Women are particularly susceptible to food-related oppression, because of the severe
discrimination they face in their access to and control over food-producing resources. Women
are frequently denied the right to ownership of land, and often they do not even enjoy full legal
status. In many countries women do not have the right to inherit property. Women are discriminated against in terms of access to
land, credit, education and training, and social facilities. They have fewer opportunities for employment, and when they do find a
job, they are often paid less than men, even though most of the time women provide for the subsistence of the family. At
the
same time women also carry most of the family responsibilities. In most cultures, women
have primary responsibility for providing food for the whole family. In all societies, women provide
food for babies, and in many societies, they grow food for immediate family needs, prepare it and ensure
that the food the family eats is safe and nutritionally sound. According to FAO statistics, women farmers produce 80 to 90 percent of
the food in sub-Saharan Africa, 50 to 90 percent in Asia and 30 percent in Central and Eastern Europe. Women’s
responsibility to provide food for their family is often culturally ingrained. Men rarely
contribute to the food budget, even when women are unable to provide sufficiently. When
traditional subsistence farming changes to cash crop farming, the nutritional levels of women and children often
deteriorate because they lack access to the cash generated by this type of agriculture. In nearly 20 percent of households in the
South, women are the sole source of support for the children. Studies show that the poorest households are those that are headed
by women. The
“feminisation” of poverty is a new phenomenon, which has been observed in
both the North and South. More women than men are found in the poorest groups of the
population.
AT- Life boat ethics/harding
Life-boat ethics are racist, yo
Clark, 10 – CNS journal writer (John Clark, September 2010, CNSJournal, “The Tragedy of Common Sense Part One: The Power
of Myth” http://www.cnsjournal.org/articles/Sep2010/Clark%20CNS%20Sep%202010.pdf)//JES
The racist ideology and the racist imaginary that objectify domestic minority groups as lazy,
criminal, breeding animalistically, greedy for handouts, parasitical — and, of course, dirty — is
enormously powerful. Such ideological and imaginary processes famously resulted in almost
identical images of scavenging survivors of the Katrina disaster being labeled images of
“looters” in the case of blacks and images of “finders” in the case of whites. The racist
concepts and images of Blacks and Latinos/Latinas, with all their accompanying baggage of
fear and resentment, are easily transferred to and projected on the poor, largely non - white
masses of the global South. We will consider how such transference is relevant to the generation of
the ideological world of “lifeboat ethics.”
AT- can get food now
The right to food is distinct from being ‘fed’
Hirsch et al., 10 (Armin Paasch, Frank Garbers, and Thomas Hirsch, “Food Ethics”Agricultural Trade and the Human Right to Food: The Case of Small Rice
Producers in Ghana, Honduras, and Indonesia, April 15, 2010, pgs 119-135,
SpringerLink, jld)
Access to adequate food is a basic human right for every person. It is enshrined in article 25 of the General
Declaration of Human Rights and article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (UN
1976). The right
to food, according to the authoritative interpretation of the UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural
not to be inter- preted in the narrow sense of being fed, but rather means access
at all times – physical and economic – to “adequate food” and the ability to procure it. Food
must be adequate in terms of quantity and quality, as well as being culturally accept- able. And
the enjoyment of the right to food must not threaten the “attainment and satisfaction of
other basic needs” such as health, housing, and education (UN 1999).
Rights (CESCR), is
AT- Not the US’s obligation
Obligations are not domestic but extraterritorial
Hirsch et al., 10 (Armin Paasch, Frank Garbers, and Thomas Hirsch, “Food Ethics”Agricultural Trade and the Human Right to Food: The Case of Small Rice
Producers in Ghana, Honduras, and Indonesia, April 15, 2010, pgs 119-135,
SpringerLink, jld)
States’ obligations do not only refer to the people within the respective state’s national
borders, but also have an international dimension. Brot für die Welt, the German Church Development Service
(EED), and the FoodFirst Information and Action Network (FIAN) have proposed the term “extraterritorial obligations”
(ETO) to describe the international dimension of states’ obligations, which are part of the ICESCR. This
international dimension applies for the same levels of obligations as within national borders, but especially for the
“minimum obligation” to respect, which, according to human rights experts, is already part of existing human rights
legislation. Hence, no State shall do harm to the right to adequate food of people living in other
countries
(Windfuhr 2005).
Neg
Consequentialism
Must consider multiple levels
Actions consist of multiple underlying principles – each must evaluated to
determine it’s ethical nature – especially with food ethics
O’Neill, 13 - studied philosophy, psychology and physiology at Oxford University; doctorate at
Harvard, with John Rawls as supervisor; she taught at Columbia University, New York; at the
University of Essex, she was Professor of Philosophy; a Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the
University of Cambridge; a former President of the British Academy and chaired the Nuffield
Foundation; founding President of the British Philosophical Association (BPA); the Principal of
Newnham College, Cambridge; chairs the Equality and Human Rights Commission (Baroness
O'Neill of Bengarve, 2013, Ethical Theory: An Anthology “Kantian Approaches to Some Famine
Problems” Ed. 2 pg. 511-512)//JES
To understand this principle we need in the first place to understand what Kant means by the term ‘maxim’. The maxim of an
act or policy or activity is the underly-ing principle of the act, policy, or activity, by which
other, more superficial aspects of action are guided. Very often interpretations of Kant have
supposed that maxims can only be the (underlying) intentions of individual human agents. If
that were the case it would limit the usefulness of Kantian modes of moral thought in dealing with world hunger and famine problems . For it is
clear enough that individual action (while often
A moral theory that addresses only
individual actors does not have adequate scope for dis- cussing famine problems. As we have seen,
one of the main attractions of utilitarianism as an approach to Third World poverty is
that its scope is so broad: it can be applied with equal appropriateness to the practical
deliberations of individuals, of institutions and groups, and even of nation states and
international agencies. Kantian ethical thinking can be interpreted (though it usually isn’t) to have equally broad scope.
important) cannot deal with all the problems of Third World poverty.
Since maxims are underlying principles of action, they may not always be obvious either to the individu-als or institutions whose
We can determine what the underlying principles of some activity or
institution are only by seeing the pat- terns made by various more superficial aspects of acts,
policies, and activities. Only those principles that would generate that pattern of activity are
maxims of action. Sometimes more than one principle might lie behind a given pattern of
activity, and we may be unsure what the maxim of the act was. For example, we might
wonder (as Kant does) how to tell whether somebody gives change accurately only out of
concern to have an honest reputation or whether he or she would do so anyhow. In such
maxims they are, or to others.
cases we can sometimes set up an “isolation test” – for example, a situation in which it would be open to somebody to be dishonest
without any chance of a damaged reputation. But quite often we can’t set up any such situation and may be to some extent unsure
which maxim lies behind a given act. Usually
we have to rely on whatever individual actors tell us
about their maxims of action and on what policymakers or social scientists may tell us
about the underlying principles of institutional or group action . What they tell us may well be
mistaken. While mistakes can be reduced by care and thoughtfulness, there is no guarantee that we can always
work out which maxim of action should be scrutinized for purposes of judging what others do.
On the other hand, there is no problem when we are trying to guide our own action: if we can find
out what duty demands, we can try to meet those demands. It is helpful to think of some examples of
maxims that might be used to guide action in contexts where poverty and the risk of famine are issues. Somebody who
contributes to famine-relief work or advocates development might have an underlying
principle such as, “Try to help reduce the risk or severity of world hunger.” This commitment might
be reflected in varied surface action in varied situations. In one context a gift of money might be relevant; in another some political
activity such as lobbying for or against certain types of aid and trade might express the same underlying com-mitment.
Sometimes superficial aspects of action may seem at variance with the underlying maxim they
in fact express. For example, if there is reason to think that indiscriminate food aid damages
the agricultural econ-omy of the area to which food is given, then the maxim of seeking to
relieve hunger might be expressed in action aimed at limiting the extent of food aid. More
lavish use of food aid might seem to treat the needy more generously, but if in fact it will
damage their medium- or long-term economic prospects, then it is not (contrary to
superficial appearances) aimed at improving and securing their access to subsistence. On a
Kantian theory, the basis for judging action should be its fundamental principle or policy, and superficially similar acts may
be judged morally very different. Regulating food aid in order to drive up prices and profit from them is one matter; regulating
food aid in order to enable local farmers to sell their crops and to stay in the business of growing food is quite another. When we
want to work out whether a proposed act or policy is morally required we should not try to find out whether it would produce more
happiness than other available acts. Rather we should see whether the act or policy is required if we are to avoid acting on
maxims that use others as mere means and act on maxims that treat others as ends in themselves. These two aspects of
Kantian duty can each be spelled out and shown to have determinate implications for acts and policies that may affect the
persistence of hunger and the risk and course of famines.
Deo bad
Deontology makes you a slave to a set of rules and their argument doesn’t
assume rule util
Vuletic, 94 Ph.D Philosophy, University of Illinois at Chicago, M.A. Philosophy, University of
Illinois at Chicago, B.A. Philosophy, University of California, Irvine, (Mark I. Vuletic
“Deontological Objections to Consequentialism” 1994
http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/mark_vuletic/objection_to_consequentialism.html)//N
G
To reason (a), one may respond that if the consequentialist makes himself a "slave of utility
maximization," then the deontologist makes himself a slave of a set of rules. Is there any a
priori reason why a commitment to utility maximization should be morally inferior to a
commitment to a set of absolutist rules? It does not seem that there is, unless one begs the
question by approaching it from a deontological viewpoint. For reason (a) to stand would
necessitate an indisputable argument showing a non-consequentialist system of ethics to be
the right system, as Kant tries to formulate - but judging from the depth of controversy in moral philosophy today, it seems
rather doubtful that such an argument exists. Reason (a) also ignores the existence of rule-ofthumb-utilitarianism, in which the element of personal decision certainly is present. The ruleof-thumb-utilitarian has no grand moral calculator to churn out a spreadsheet commanding
him to a certain course of action, nor does he have a set of inflexible rules to constrain him to
a single course of action, as the deontologist does. The rule-of-thumb-utilitarian consults the collective
utilitarian wisdom of the centuries, but the ultimate decision as to what course of action he takes - even while remaining
within the framework of consequentialism - is the agent's personal responsibility.
Rule Util
rule util solves
Vuletic, 94 Ph.D Philosophy, University of Illinois at Chicago, M.A. Philosophy, University of
Illinois at Chicago, B.A. Philosophy, University of California, Irvine, (Mark I. Vuletic
“Deontological Objections to Consequentialism” 1994
http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/mark_vuletic/objection_to_consequentialism.html)//N
G
***we do not endorse gendered language
To reason (b), one may respond that the consequentialist believes the sacrifice of one for the benefit of the many to sometimes be
the morally correct thing to do - the consequentialist would no doubt argue that the ethical systems of consequentialism's
deontological critics allow an agent to rationalize away the atrocity of not injuring one person for the greater good. Briefly speaking,
the exact nature of an "atrocity"
is a matter of perspective. Granting this, the deontologist may reply
that, indeed, one person must sometimes be sacrificed for the greater good, but that at least the
deontologist will recognize the sacrifice of the one person to be morally distasteful, whereas
the consequentialist will simply drop the ax on the poor man and go merrily along his way. But
such an objection is not without problems. In the first place, if we mean by "morally distasteful"
that the action should evoke a sense of guilt in the perpetrator, then there is no reason to
assume that the consequentialist, simply in virtue of his system of ethics, will not find his actions morally
distasteful. Even if the consequentialist believes that he is "right" to choose the lesser of two
evils, what is to prevent him from inwardly longing for a non-existent third alternative that
makes everyone happy? There are clearly independent psychological grounds from which guilt
springs, such that a person can believe what he did to be right - given the options available to him at the
time - yet nevertheless suffer nightmares due to a plagued conscience. It is not clear that an agent
must even be in part a deontologist for this to happen to him. But if by "morally distasteful" we mean that
the action is in fact not right, how are we to say this in any meaningful way? In the first place, it seems silly to presume
that given two actions, one of which is better than the other, and better than doing nothing at all, that
performing that action is wrong - even if it is conducive to guilt. Secondly, to insist steadfastly upon this
position would amount to question-begging, as it starts off with the assumption that the deontological notion of rightness and
wrongness.¶ It is especially simple to see that consequentialism
does not imply a sacrifice of responsibility
when one considers rule-of-thumb-utilitarians once again. The rule-of-thumb-utilitarian, while as much
concerned with utility maximization as any good consequentialist, is personally responsible for how he evaluates
each particular situation. If, through a misevaluation of the situation, he performs actions that produce a very bad state of
affairs, he cannot say "I was just following orders." The deontologist may insist that the rule-of-thumb-utilitarian
can always say "oh well, I tried my best," but the deontologist who produces bad states of affairs can clearly say the same thing - in
fact, the ability to shrug off negative consequences so long as one's motives or intentions were pure is one of the luxuries commonly
associated with deontological ethics. To
the consequentialist, it would seem that it is deontological ethics that
frees one from personal responsibility, not consequentialist ethics. To (c), the consequentialist responds
in the same way as the did to (b) - there are grounds independent of one's ethical system from which guilt springs, and from which
the consequentialist might perhaps even encourage guilt to spring so as to discourage other consequentialists from being lax with
their calculations. The
consequentialist, no less than the deontologist, is concerned with doing the
right thing, even if he has a different analysis of what the right thing is. And once again, if the
consequentialist can shrug off disastrous results that result from following his moral calculus,
the deontologist can certainly shrug off disastrous results that result from following his rules in fact (once again) this ability is even more pronounced for the deontologist, since it is with actions, and not consequences, that the
deontologist is concerned. The
accidental performing of an act with disastrously wrong consequences
could easily be more morally damaging to the consequentialist, who cares about results, than
to the deontologist, who cares about motivations.
Deontology and all ethical systems are also a refuge for the morally
irresponsible and rule util solves
Vuletic, 94 PhD Philosophy, University of Illinois at Chicago, M.A. Philosophy, University of
Illinois at Chicago, B.A. Philosophy, University of California, Irvine, (Mark I. Vuletic
“Deontological Objections to Consequentialism” 1994
http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/mark_vuletic/objection_to_consequentialism.html)//N
G
It has been established that devotion to a consequentialist system of ethics does not necessarily entail a shunting of personal
responsibility onto a moral calculus of utility. The question remains whether those who choose consequentialism in fact do so in
order to avoid personal responsibility. The answer to this question is very brief: there
is no reason to assume that
consequentialists wish to avoid responsibility. Rather, it is clear that many choose a consequentialist
system of ethics because they perceive it to be the right one. Such people may well view
deontology as blind "rule worship" - as the blatant discarding of personal responsibility of which the deontologist
accuses the consequentialist. For those who assert that consequentialists make themselves into
unthinking, mechanical extensions of the principle of utility maximization, there is the response
that the deontologists make themselves simple mechanical extensions of a set of perhaps
arbitrary rules. If someone adopts a system of ethics in order to absolve himself of moral
responsibility, then that person is reprehensible on almost every account. Granted, such a person could
fit into a consequentialist scheme (excluding rule-of-thumb-utilitarianism) quite well, but he could fit
into a deontological system equally well. Throwing around charges about which system the irresponsible flock to is
pointless. As J.J.C. Smart points out, "it may well be that there is no ethical system which appeals to all people,
or even to the same person in different moods"[1], and no doubt it is also the case that
consequentialists and deontologists can each be sincere in believing their system to embody
"goodness and niceness"[2] and the other's to embody "evilness and rottenness"[3]. In this light,
assertions by deontologists about consequentialists denying their true moral obligations by
voluntarily becoming extensions of some impersonal calculus, are seen to be without merit. We can
say that the principle of utility maximization and the rules of deontological ethics can each be
employed to absolve oneself of personal responsibility, but that people operating within both
frameworks are likely to be trying their utmost to be decent, moral human beings.
Util Good
Util Good
Shafer-Landau, 13 - professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin–Madison; PhD @ University of Arizona; citing
John Stuart Mills (Russ Shafer-Landau, 2013, Ethical Theory: An Anthology “Utilitarianism” Ed. 2 pg. 435)//JES
The objectors to utilitarianism cannot always be charged with representing it in a discreditable light. On the contrary,
those among them who entertain anything like a just idea of its disinterested character, sometimes find fault with its standard
as being too high for humanity. They
say it is exacting too much to require that people shall always
act from the inducement of promoting the general interests of society. But this is to
mistake the very meaning of a standard of morals, and to confound the rule of action with
the motive of it. It is the business of ethics to tell us what are our duties, or by what test we
may know them; but no system of ethics requires that the sole motive of all we do shall be a
feeling of duty; on the contrary, ninety-nine hundredths of all our actions are done from
other motives, and rightly so done, if the rule of duty does not condemn them. It is the more
unjust to utilitarianism that this particular misappre hension should be made a ground of objection to it, inasmuch as
utilitarian moralists have gone beyond almost all others in affirming that the motive has nothing to do with the morality of
He who saves a fellow creature from drowning
does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty, or the hope of being paid for his
trouble: he who betrays the friend that trusts him, is guilty of a crime, even if his object be to
serve another friend to whom he is under greater obligations. 1 But to speak only of actions done from
the action, though much with the worth of the agent.
the motive of duty, and in direct obedience to principle: it is a misapprehension of the utilitarian mode of thought, to
conceive it as implying that people should fix their minds upon so wide a generality as the world, or society at large. The
great majority of good actions are intended, not for the benefit of the world, but for
that of individuals, of which the good of the world is made up; and the thoughts of
the most virtuous man need not on these occasions travel beyond the particular persons
concerned, except so far as is necessary to assure himself that in benefiting them he is
not violating the rights – that is, the legitimate and authorized expectations – of any one
else. The multiplication of happiness is, according to the utilitarian ethics, the object of virtue: the
occasions on which any person (except one in a thousand) has it in his power to do this on
an extended scale, in other words, to be a public benefactor, are but exceptional; and on these
occasions alone is he called on to consider public utility; in every other case, private utility, the interest
or happiness of some few persons, is all he has to attend to. Those alone the influence of whose actions extends to society
in general, need concern themselves habitually about so large an object. In the case of abstinences indeed – of things which
people forbear to do, from moral considerations, though the consequences in the particular case might be beneficial – it
would be unworthy of an intelligent agent not to be consciously aware that the action is of a class which, if practised generally,
would be generally injurious, and that this is the ground of the obligation to abstain from it. The amount of regard for the public
interest implied in this recognition, is no greater than is demanded by every system of morals; for they all enjoin to abstain
from whatever is manifestly pernicious to society.
Ends justify means
The ends justify the means
Isaac 2 (Jeffrey, Professor of PoliSci @ Indiana-Bloomington, Director of the Center for the
Study of Democracy and Public Life, PhD Yale, “Ends, Means, and Politics,” Dissent Magazine Vol
49 Issue 2)//JES
As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of
"aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan
is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power
What
should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means
through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask:
are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important;
they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by
any account of how diplomacy or international law [it] can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers
no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral
goodness is of limited utility.
Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a
dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world.
Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To
accomplish anything in the political
world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means
is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible
to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught,
an
unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility .
The concern may be
morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's
intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring
violence or refusing to make common
cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics
entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean
conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral
purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is
why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially
immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect;
and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions;
it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the
alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of
it is equally important,
always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in
pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It
alienates those who are not true believers.
communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic;
Singer, 82 – Ira W. DeCamp Professor of Bioethics at Princeton University, and a Laureate
Professor at theCentre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at the University of Melbourne
(Peter, “Practical Ethics,” Cambridge University Press, 1982)//HAL
Thc question cannot be dealt with by invoking the simplistic formula: ‘ehe end never justifies the means’. For all but the
strictest adherent of an ethic of rule, the end sometimes does justify the means. Most people
think that lying is wrong, yet think it right w lie in order in avoid causing unnecessary offence
or embarrassment — for instance, when a relative gives you a hideous vase for your birthday,
and then asks if you really like it. If this relatively trivial end can justify lying, it is even more
obvious that some important end — preventing a rnui-der, or saving animals from
unnecessary suffering — can justify lying. Thus the principle that the end cannot justify the
means is easily breached. The diflicult issue is not whether the end can ever justify the means, but which means
arejustified by which ends. In particular: do the ends argued for in previous chapters olihis book — ends like equal consideration of
interests irrespective of race, sex or species, liberal abortion laws, voluntary euibariasia, and the reduction of absolute povrrty justify the use of any means that may bring about the desired end?
AT- util unethical
Utilitarianism is not anti-ethical—in fact, it is the only practical way to decide
ethics
Singer, 82 – Ira W. DeCamp Professor of Bioethics at Princeton University, and a Laureate
Professor at theCentre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at the University of Melbourne
(Peter, “Practical Ethics,” Cambridge University Press, 1982)//HAL
Can we use this universal aspect of ethics to derive an ethical theory which will give us guidance about right and
wrong? Philosophers from the Stoics to Hare and Rawls have attempted this. No attempt has met with
general acceptance. The problem is that if we describe the universal aspect of ethics in bare, formal
terms, a wide range of ethical theories, including quite irreconcilable ones, are compatible
with this notion of universality; if, on the other hand, we build up our description of the universal aspect of ethics so
that it leads us ineluctably to one particular ethical theory, we shall be accused of smuggling our own ethical beliefs into our
definition o’ the ethical — and this definition was supposed to be broad enough, and neutral enough, to encompass all serious
candidates for the status of ‘ethical theory’. Since so many others have tailed to overcome this obstacle to deducing an ethical
theory from the universal aspect of ethics, it would be bolhardy to attempt to do su in a brief introduction to a work with a quite
different aim. Nevertheless I shall propose something only a little less ambitious, The
universal aspect of ethics, I
suggest, does pro vide a persuasive, although not conclusive, reason for taking a broadly
utilitarian position. Mv reason for suggesting this is as follows. In accepting that ethical judgments must be made from a
universal point of view, I am accepting that my own interests cannot, simply because they are’rnv interests, count more than the
interests of anyone else. Thus my very natural concern that my own interests be looked after must, when I think ethically, be
extended to the interests of others. Now, imagine that I am trying to decide bctwcrn two possible courses of action —any example
would do. Imagine, too, that I am deciding in a complete ethical vacuum, that I know nothing of any ethicaL considerations — T am,
we might say, in a pre-ethical stage ofihinking. How would 1 make up my mind? One thing that would be still relevant would be how
the possible courses oí action will affect my interests. Ijitleed, if we define ‘interests’ broadly enough, so that we count an thing
people desire as in their interests (unless it is incom patible with another desire or desires) then it would seem that at this peeethical stage, only one’s own interests can be relevant to the decision. Suppose I then begin to think ethically, to the extent
recognizing that uiy own interests cannot count for more. simply because they arc my own than the interests of others. In place of
my own interests, I now have to take account of the interests of all those affectcd by my decision. This
requires me to weigh up all these interests and adopt the course ol’action mos likely to maximize the interests of those affected.
I must choose the course of action which has the best consequences, on balance, for all
affected. This is a form of utilitarianism. It differs from classical utilitarianism in that ‘best consequences’ i’ understood as
Thus
meaning what, on balance, furthers the interests of those affected, rather than merely what increases pleasure and reduces pain. (It
has, however, brett suggested that classi cal utilitarians like Beritham and John Stuart Mill used ‘pleasure’ and ‘pain’ in a broad sense
which allowed them to include achieving what one desired as a ‘pleasure’ and the reverse as a ‘pain’. If this interpretation is correct,
the difference between classical utilitarianism and utilitarianism based on interests disappears.) %rhat does this show? It
does
not show that utilitarianism can be deduced from the universal aspect of ethics. There arc other
ethical ideals — like individual rights, the sanctity of life, ju.ti,ç purity and sóbn- which arc universal in the required se sc,šL. with
utilitarianism, It does show that we very swiftly arrive at an initially utilitarian position once we apply the universal aspect of ethics
to simple, pre-ethical decision making. This, 1 believe, places the onus of proof on those who seek to go beyond utilitarianism. The
utilitarian position is a minimal one, a first base which we reach by universalizing selfinterested decision making. We cannot, if we are to think ethically, refuse to take this step. If we
arr to be persuaded that we should go beyond utihtariariism and accept non-utilitarian moral rules or ideals, we nerd to be provided
with good reasons for taking this further step. Until such reasons are produced, we have some grounds for remaining utilitarians.
This tentative argument for utilitarianism corresponds to the way in which I shall discuss practical issues iii this book. I am inclined to
hold a utilitarian position, and to sorne extent the book may be taken as an attempt to indicate how a consistent utilitariantsm
would deal with a number of controversial prob lems. But I shall not take utilitarianism as the oniy ethical position worth
considering. I shall try to show the bearing of niher views, of theories ol’rights, ofjustice, of the sanctity of life, and so on, on the
problems discussed. In this way readers will be able to come to their own conclusions about the relative merits of utilitarian and
non-utilitarian approaches. and about the whole issue of the role of reason and argument in ethics.
AT- kills VTL
Even if utilitarianism treats humans as a means that doesn’t kill their value to
life
O’Neill, 13 - studied philosophy, psychology and physiology at Oxford University; doctorate at
Harvard, with John Rawls as supervisor; she taught at Columbia University, New York; at the
University of Essex, she was Professor of Philosophy; a Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the
University of Cambridge; a former President of the British Academy and chaired the Nuffield
Foundation; founding President of the British Philosophical Association (BPA); the Principal of
Newnham College, Cambridge; chairs the Equality and Human Rights Commission (Baroness
O'Neill of Bengarve, 2013, Ethical Theory: An Anthology “Kantian Approaches to Some Famine
Problems” Ed. 2 pg. 511-512)//JES
Utilitarians do not deny that their moral reasoning raises many questions of these sorts. But the imprecision of our
knowledge of consequences often blurs the answers to these questions. As we peer through the
blur, we can see that on a utilitarian view lives must be sacri-ficed to build a happier world if
this is the most efficient way to do so, whether or not those who lose their lives are willing.
There is nothing wrong with using another as mere means, provided that the end in view is a
hap- pier result than could have been achieved any other way, taking account of the misery
the means may have caused. In utilitarian thinking, persons are not ends in them- selves. Their
special moral status, such as it is, derives from their being means to the production of
happiness. But they are not even necessary means for this end, since happiness can be
located in nonhuman lives. It may even turn out that maximal happiness requires the sacrifice
of human for the sake of animal lives. In utilitarian thinking life has a high but derivative
value, and some lives may have to be sacrificed for the sake of greater happiness or reduced
misery in other lives. Nor is there a deep difference between ending others’ lives by not
helping (as some Malthusians sug-gest) and doing so as a matter of deliberate intervention or policy.
Util is ethical – impartiality turns their arguments about individual rights and
ethics
Shafer-Landau, 13 - professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin–Madison; PhD @ University of Arizona; citing
John Stuart Mills (Russ Shafer-Landau, 2013, Ethical
Theory: An Anthology “Utilitarianism” Ed. 2 pg. 435)//JES
I must again repeat, what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to
acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in
conduct, is not the agent ’ s own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his
own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as
a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we
read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as one would be done by, and to love
one’s neighbour as oneself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality. As the
means of making the nearest approach to this ideal, utility would enjoin, first, that laws and
social arrangements should place the happiness, or (as speaking practically it may be called)
the interest, of every individual, as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the
whole; and secondly, that education and opinion, which have so vast a power over
human character, should so use that power as to establish in the mind of every individual an
indissoluble association between his own happiness and the good of the whole; especially
between his own happiness and the practice of such modes of conduct, negative and positive,
as regard for the universal happiness prescribes: so that not only he may be unable to
conceive the possibility of happiness to himself, consistently with conduct opposed to
the general good, but also that a direct impulse to promote the general good may be in every
individual one of the habitual motives of action, and the sentiments connected therewith
may fill a large and prominent place in every human being ’ s sentient existence. If the
impugners of the utilitarian morality represented it to their own minds in this its true
character, I know not what recommendation possessed by any other morality they could
possibly affirm to be wanting to it: what more beautiful or more exalted developments
of human nature any other ethical system can be supposed to foster, or what springs of
action, not accessible to the utilitarian, such systems rely on for giving effect to their
mandates.
Util doesn’t kill morality – it’s inclusive nature of good compliments ethical
action
Shafer-Landau, 13 - professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin–Madison; PhD @ University of Arizona; citing
John Stuart Mills (Russ Shafer-Landau, 2013, Ethical
Theory: An Anthology “Utilitarianism” Ed. 2 pg. 435)//JES
The same considerations dispose of another reproach against the doctrine of utility,
founded on a still grosser misconception of the purpose of a standard of morality, and of
the very meaning of the words right and wrong. It is often affirmed that utilitarianism
renders men cold and unsympathizing; that it chills their moral feelings towards
individuals; that it makes them regard only the dry and hard consideration of the
consequences of actions, not taking into their moral estimate the qualities from which those actions emanate. If the
assertion means that they do not allow their judgment respecting the rightness or wrongness of an action to be influenced by their
opinion of the qualities of the person who does it, this
is a complaint not against utilitarianism, but against
having any standard of morality at all; for certainly no known ethical standard decides an action to be good or
bad because it is done by a good or a bad man, still less because done by an amiable, a brave, or a benevolent man, or the
there is nothing in the
utilitarian theory inconsistent with the fact that there are other things which interest us in
persons besides the rightness and wrongness of their actions. The Stoics, indeed, with the paradoxical
contrary. These considerations are relevant, not to the estimation of actions, but of persons; and
misuse of language which was part of their system, and by which they strove to raise themselves above all concern about
anything but virtue, were fond of saying that he who has that has everything; that he, and utilitarianism 419 only he, is rich, is
Utilitarians are
quite aware that there are other desirable possessions and qualities besides virtue, and
are perfectly willing to allow to all of them their full worth. They are also aware that a right
action does not necessarily indicate a virtuous character, and that actions which are
blameable often proceed from qualities entitled to praise. When this is apparent in any particular case, it
modifies their estimation, not certainly of the act, but of the agent. I grant that they are,
beautiful, is a king. But no claim of this description is made for the virtuous man by the utilitarian doctrine.
notwithstanding, of opinion, that in the long run the best proof of a good character is good actions; and resolutely refuse to
consider any mental disposition as good, of which the predominant tendency is to produce bad conduct. This makes them
unpopular with many people; but it is an unpopularity which they must share with every one who regards the distinction between
right and wrong in a serious light; and the reproach is not one which a conscientious utilitarian need be anxious to repel. If no
more be meant by the objection than that many utilitarians look on the morality of actions, as measured by the utilitarian
standard, with too exclusive a regard, and do not lay sufficient stress upon the other beauties of character which go towards
Utilitarians who have cultivated their
moral feelings, but not their sympathies nor their artistic perceptions, do fall into this
mistake; and so do all other moralists under the same conditions. What can be said in excuse for other
making a human being lovable or admirable, this may be admitted.
moralists is equally available for them, namely, that if there is to be any error, it is better that it should be on that side. As a
matter of fact, we may affirm that among utilitarians as among adherents of other systems, there is every imaginable degree of
rigidity and of laxity in the application of their standard: some are even puritanically rigorous, while others are as indulgent as can
But on the whole, a doctrine which brings
prominently forward the interest that mankind have in the repression and prevention of
conduct which violates the moral law, is likely to be inferior to no other in turning the
sanctions of opinion against such violations. It is true, the question, What does violate the moral law? is
possibly be desired by sinner or by sentimentalist.
one on which those who recognise different standards of morality are likely now and then to differ. But difference of opinion on
moral questions was not first introduced into the world by utilitarianism, while that doctrine does supply, if not always an easy, at
all events a tangible and intelligible mode of deciding such differences.
The problems with Util are products of conflicting obligations which apply to
your framing too – Util is still comparatively better
Shafer-Landau, 13 - professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin–Madison; PhD @ University of Arizona; citing
John Stuart Mills (Russ Shafer-Landau, 2013, Ethical Theory: An Anthology “Utilitarianism” Ed. 2 pg. 435)//JES
The remainder of the stock arguments against utilitarianism mostly consist in laying to its charge the common infirmities of
We are
told that an utilitarian will be apt to make his own particular case an exception to moral
rules, and, when under temptation, will see an utility in the breach of a rule, greater than
he will see in its observance. But is utility the only creed which is able to furnish us with
excuses for evil doing, and means of cheating our own conscience? They are afforded
in abundance by all doctrines which recognise as a fact in morals the existence of
conflicting considerations; which all doctrines do, that have been believed by sane persons. It is not the
fault of any creed, but of the complicated nature of human affairs, that rules of conduct
cannot be so framed as to require no exceptions , and that hardly any kind of action can safely be laid
down as either always obligatory or always condemnable. There is no ethical creed which does not
temper the rigidity of its laws, by giving a certain latitude, under the moral
responsibility of the agent, for accommodation to peculiarities of circumstances ; and under
every creed, at the opening thus made, self- deception and dishonest casuistry get in. There exists no moral
system under which there do not arise unequivocal cases of conflicting obligation. These are
human nature, and the general difficulties which embarrass conscientious persons in shaping their course through life.
the real difficulties, the knotty points both in the theory of ethics, and in the conscientious guidance of personal conduct.
They are overcome practically with greater or with less success according to the intellect and
virtue of the individual; but it can hardly be pretended that anyone will be the less qualified for dealing with
them, from possessing an ultimate standard to which conflicting rights and duties can be referred. If utility is the
ultimate source of moral obligations, utility may be invoked to decide between them when
their demands are incompatible. Though the application of the standard may be difficult, it is
better than none at all: while in other systems, the moral laws all claiming independent
authority, there is no common umpire entitled to interfere between them ; their claims
to precedence one over another rest on little better than sophistry, and unless
determined, as they generally are, by the unac- knowledged influence of considerations of utility, afford a free
scope for the actions of personal desires and partialities. We must remember that only in these cases of
conflict between secondary principles is it requisite that first principles should be appealed to. T here is no case of
moral obligation in which some secondary principle is not involved; and if only one, there can
seldom be any real doubt which one it is in the mind of any person by whom the principle
itself is recognised.
Alt causes
The plan doesn’t even begin to address the problem – several components
must be repealed for productive change
AAWH 97 - founded in 1953 as a private, nonprofit charitable and educational organization, and serves as the US.
Committee for the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). Its purposes are
to inform the American public about major health challenges that affect people both here and abroad, and to promote
cooperative solutions thatemphasize grassroots involvement. In carrying out its mission, AAWH works with a variety of
public and private health-related organizations, including the Department of Health and Human Services/Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, as well as with WHO and PAHO. Guidance is provided by the association’s officers and board of
directors (American Association for World Health, March 1997, “Denial of Food and Medicine: The Impact Of The U.S. Embargo On
The Health And Nutrition In Cuba" http://www.cubasolidarity.net/aawh.html)//JES
Recently four factors have dangerously exacerbated the human effects of this 37-year-old
trade embargo. All four factors stem from little-understood provisions of the U.S. Congress' 1992 Cuban Democracy Act (CDA):
A Ban on Subsidiary Trade: Beginning in 1992, the Cuban Democracy Act imposed a ban on subsidiary trade with Cuba.
This ban has severely constrained Cuba's ability to import medicines and medical supplies
from third country sources. Moreover, recent corporate buyouts and mergers between major U.S.
and European pharmaceutical companies have further reduced the number of companies
permitted to do business with Cuba. Licensing Under the Cuban Democracy Act : The U.S. Treasury
and Commerce Departments are allowed in principle to license individual sales of medicines and medical supplies, ostensibly for
humanitarian reasons to mitigate the embargo's impact on health care delivery. In practice, according to U.S. corporate executives,
the licensing provisions are so arduous as to have had the opposite effect. As implemented, the
licensing provisions
actively discourage any medical commerce. The number of such licenses granted-or even
applied for since 1992-is minuscule. Numerous licenses for medical equipment and medicines
have been denied on the grounds that these exports "would be detrimental to U.S. foreign
policy interests.” Shipping Since 1992 :The embargo has prohibited ships from loading or
unloading cargo in U.S. ports for 180 days after delivering cargo to Cuba. This provision has
strongly discouraged shippers from delivering medical equipment to Cuba. Consequently
shipping costs have risen dramatically and further constricted the flow of food, medicines,
medical supplies and even gasoline for ambulances. From 1993 to 1996, Cuban companies spent an additional
$8.7 million on shipping medical imports from Asia, Europe and South America rather than from the neighboring United States.
More alt causes
AAWH 97 - founded in 1953 as a private, nonprofit charitable and educational organization, and serves as the US.
Committee for the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). Its purposes are
to inform the American public about major health challenges that affect people both here and abroad, and to promote
cooperative solutions thatemphasize grassroots involvement. In carrying out its mission, AAWH works with a variety of
public and private health-related organizations, including the Department of Health and Human Services/Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, as well as with WHO and PAHO. Guidance is provided by the association’s officers and board of
directors (American Association for World Health, March 1997, “Denial of Food and Medicine: The Impact Of The U.S. Embargo On
The Health And Nutrition In Cuba" http://www.cubasolidarity.net/aawh.html)//JES
Water Quality: The embargo is severely restricting Cuba's access to water treatment
chemicals and spare-parts for the island's water supply system. This has led to serious
cutbacks in supplies of safe drinking water, which in turn has become a factor in the rising
incidence of morbidity and mortality rates from water-borne diseases. Medicines &
Equipment:
Of the 1,297 medications available in Cuba in 1991, physicians now have access to only 889 of these same
medicines - and many of these are available only intermittently. Because most major new drugs are developed by U.S.
pharmaceuticals,
Cuban physicians have access to less than 50 percent of the new medicines
available on the world market. Due to the direct or indirect effects of the embargo, the most
routine medical supplies are in short supply or entirely absent from some Cuban clinics.
Medical Information : Though information materials have been exempt from the U.S. trade embargo since 1 988, the
AAWH study concludes that in practice very little such information goes into Cuba or comes
out of the island due to travel restrictions, currency regulations and shipping difficulties.
Scientists and citizens of both countries suffer as a result. Paradoxically, the embargo harms some
U.S. citizens by denying them access to the latest advances in Cuban medical research,
including such products as Meningitis B vaccine, cheaply produced interferon and
streptokinase, and an AIDS vaccine currently under-going clinical trials with human
volunteers.
Squo solves
Food Aid
Food aid is inevitable in our current economic and political system
Islam, 81 – Associate Professor at the Faculty of Administration, University of Ottawa (Nasir,
“Food Aid: Conscience, Morality, and Politics,” : International Journal, Vol. 36, No. 2, Food and
Fuel (Spring, 1981), pp. 353-370, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40201960)//HAL
POLITICAL REALITIES OF FOOD AID Moral rhetoric - both supportive and critical - aside, the global food system allocates
food on the basis of calculated decision-making, using economic and political criteria. Hopkins and
Puchala have effectively summed up the situation. According to them, the global food system is composed of
surplus and deficit nations. Food is allocated through a commercial or concessional channel (aid). The United
States and Canada are price leaders. Respect for the free market is the fundamental norm. The
conces- sional channel (aid) has received qualified acceptance, first for relief purposes, later for dumping. There is a lack of
concern for chronic hunger. Alleviation of hunger and malnutrition are weighed against profit
maximization, market stability, and political gains, and the latter generally take precedence. Internal food
diplomacy is based upon respect for sovereignty. Thus internal production, distribution, and
consumption are largely controlled by governments - even under famine conditions. Food
policies are formulated under pluralistic pressure politics. Multinationals, scores of international
organizations, and national governments constantly interact with each other. Internal conflict between vari- ous groups
and their constituencies often leads to inconsistency in policy. Under this system, food aid is generally given only
when food cannot be disposed of through ordinary commercial channels. As the demand for food in
rich countries has increased, less food has been available through concessional channels. In fact, it seems that when food aid
is most needed, it is least available, as was evident during the famines in Bangladesh and the Sahel in 1972-4. In 1957,
33 per cent of all United States exports of grain was given via Public Law 480 in aid. In 1974 at the peak of the famine in Bangladesh
and the Sahel, pl 480 disbursements fell to only 4 per cent of exports.32 Wallerstein presents solid evidence that food aid is based
on political considerations - at least as far as United States bilateral assistance is concerned. From 1970 to 1974 humanitarian aid
accounted for about a quarter of the total aid given through pl 480. The rest was given largely for security and political reasons.83
He documents (quite effectively) the view that pl 480 food
aid was used for regime support, leverage in diplomatic negotiations,
as a stick and carrot during the Cold War.
Stevens corroborates this finding. According to him, food aid is a foreign policy tool and United States food
aid is skewed in favour of fourteen coun- tries closely linked to the United States. During 1974,
political enticement, and political sanctions. It was frequently used
South Viet- nam, Cambodia, Jordan, and Israel received 63 per cent of the total title 1 (pl 480) programme assistance.
The revolution worked
Hunger has been eliminated in cuba- multiple indicators- the rev was pretty
dandy
Collins et al., 89 (Joseph Collins- the cofounder of the Institute for Food and
Development Policy, Michael Scott- researcher on agrarian reform and director of
overseas programs for Oxfam America, Medea Benjamin- nutritionist with the
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and the Swedish International
Development Agency, “No free lunch: food & revolution in Cuba today”, Institute
for Food and Development Policy, Jun 1, 1989, 11-24, jld)
As these reports indicate, there are conflicting answers to a central question of this hook: Is
there hunger in Cuba
today? Our own view, based on more than a dozen visits to Cuba bi the three authors over the past fifteen years. plus the four-v
car stay of one of the authors (ilutri tionist Medea Benjamin), is that hunger has been eliminated in Cuba, with
very few exceptions. Cubans may not have the kind of foods they want, or even as much as
they want, but few suffer from lack of calories or protein. Moving to Cuba after years o working wIth
malnourished children in Latin America and Africa. Medea took one look at the Cuban population and realized—to her delight—that
in Cuba her skills were obsolete. Even the 19)42 report prepared for the
Joint Economic Committee of the US
Congress acknowledged that Cuba had achieved a “highly egalitarian redistribution of in come
that has eliminated almost all malnutrition, particularly among young children.” In Our
investigation of hunger in Cuba. we used three approaches to the question. First we looked at Cubas
total food supply. Then we examined key health indicators and patterns. Finally, We
investigated studies on the incidence of malnutrition.
Exceptions
Status-quo solves – exceptions ensure food gets to Cuba
Smith, 12, spent more than 30 years covering Sunbelt agriculture, master’s degree in English
(Ron Smith “Cuba trade holds promise for U.S. agricultural exports, Texas A&M economist says”
12/6/12 http://southwestfarmpress.com/markets/cuba-trade-holds-promise-us-agriculturalexports-texas-am-economist-says) //NG
Cuba relies on imports for 75 percent of its food, creating a huge potential market for U.S. farmers and ranchers,
says Parr Rosson, head, Texas A&M Agricultural Economics Department and AgriLife Extension economist.¶ U.S. producers
have been able to take advantage of some of that demand with the passage of a 2000 law
allowing limited trade with Cuba, in spite of a trade, travel and economic embargo that has been in place
since 1962.¶ Rosson, speaking at the Texas Plant Protection Association’s annual conference today in Bryan, Texas, said ag
exports to Cuba could reach $450 million for 2012, short of the more than $700 million exported to Cuba in
2008, when numerous hurricanes hammered the island nation and increased the need for imported food.¶ Rosson said key U.S. ag
exports to Cuba include corn, poultry, soy and soy products, feeds, pork and wheat. Potential exists for increased export of higher
quality cuts of beef, which currently are limited to use in the Cuban tourist industry.¶ Since
2000, U.S ag suppliers fill
Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, “created
exceptions,” Rosson said. The act permits exports of food, medicines and some chemicals into
Cuba although the embargo remains in place for most trade. Also banned are imports from Cuba, including
some of those needs.¶ The
Cuban cigars. U.S. banking with Cuba is prohibited as is tourism and spending money in Cuba.¶ Reforms do allow exporters to travel
to Cuba.¶ “The United States is stringent about the embargo,” Rosson said. ¶ And that embargo is likely to remain in place, he added,
“as long as a Castro is in power.”¶ With the easing of restrictions, Cuba has become one of the U.S. top 35 trading partners. The
U.S. supplies a significant percentage of Cuba’s food supply.¶ Rosson said Cuba is a decent trading partner.
Terms of the trade reform require cash payment before delivery, for instance, so credit is not an issue.¶ Rosson said Cuba’s
population, 11 million, has been stagnant or declining for the past few years, due to a lower birth rate and people leaving the
country, “when they can sneak out.”¶ But Cuba trade also presents challenges. Wages are relatively low. “Most Cubans work for the
government, for about $20 per month. But about 60 percent of the population is involved in the tourist industry—hotel workers, taxi
drivers, etc.—and have access to tips.¶ Also, anything that has to do with food or agriculture is controlled by the government. “Cuba
is a Communist country,” Rosson said.¶ Tourism, nickel and remittances make up the key economic foundation for Cuba. Canadians
are the top country for the Cuban tourist industry. Europe accounts for the second largest tourist block and Latin America is next.¶
The nickel industry has been good at times but prices have declined in recent years. Remittances, money sent back to Cuba from
relatives who have moved to other countries, also add significantly to the Cuban economy, Rosson said.¶ Oil and gas exploration has
not been successful so far.¶ No commercial flights are currently available from the U.S. to Cuba. Some charters are available and it is
legal to fly to Mexico and then to Cuba. “Travel and business restrictions are typically imposed by the U.S., not Cuba,” Rosson said.¶
The U.S. has no embassy in Havana but does maintain a “U.S. interest section.”¶ He said farmers
markets are popular
but that grocery store shelves are sparsely stocked. Cubans receive food ration cards and can
use those to buy from national stores, where prices are cheap, 1 cent per pound for rice
compared to 35 cents per pound in commercial markets. But when Cuban citizens use up their ration cards
they have to buy the more expensive goods from the local economy.¶ The trade reform act has improved Cuban trade but not to the
position that existed before the embargo. “Prior to the embargo, 25 percent of all the arable land in Cuba was owned by U.S.
interests. The U.S. was THE major player in Cuba.”
Sustainable ag
U- good now
U.S. embargo strengthened Cuban agricultural industry – checking starvation
Kinser, 08 – B.S., Science, Technology & International Affairs @ Georgetown University; masters in urban planning at
University of Michigan; (Corinne
Kisner, December 2008, Climate Institute “Green Roofs for Urban
Food Security and Environmental Sustainability” http://www.climate.org/topics/internationalaction/urban-agriculture/havana.htm)//JES
Following the fall of the Soviet Union in 1990, Cuba lost the market for its sugar and the
favorable terms of trade for oil. The country was plunged into an economic crisis called the
“periodo especial” (special period) characterized by an intense lack of food, fuel, fertilizer,
chemicals, spare parts and other industrial and agricultural inputs. During the special period, average
caloric, protein and vitamin intake dropped by 30%. Average caloric intake dropped from 2908 to 1863 in five years, and the
average Cuban lost 20 pounds during that time. By necessity, Cubans made use of the available resources and created urban
The U.S. embargo plunged Cuba into intense economic hardship but
gave the government the opportunity to enact agricultural policies counter to the existing
neoliberal model, protecting Cuban farmers against competition from the extremely
subsidized agricultural industry in the U.S. and E.U. Cuba shifted from export-oriented,
chemical-intensive monoculture to organic agriculture and food production for the domestic
market. With over three quarters of the country’s population living in cities, urban agriculture played a central
role in achieving food security and took many forms, depending on local circumstances. By 2003,
farmers had converted over 300,000 backyard patios to gardens and hope to reach half a
million in the future. Organopónicos are a unique feature of Havana’s urban agriculture. These raised bed containers are
gardens to prevent starvation.
filled with nutrient-rich compost and installed on previously paved or infertile lots, in order to achieve intense vegetable production
state farms became cooperative agricultural
production units (UBPCs) in 1993 to increase efficiency and provide incentives for
productivity. By 1997, UBPCs comprised 42% of the agriculture sector. The break-up of state farms made
individuals or small teams responsible for production, rewarding efficiency and tying their
incomes to the output. Additionally, urban agriculture provides employment and income: in 2003, 22% of all new jobs in
the Cuban economy were in this sector. By 2002 Cuba had met the goal of providing every settlement
of over fifteen houses with its own food production capacity, either through organopónicos,
community gardens or individual plots. There are environmental and social benefits in addition to economic ones.
Intercropping improved the soil fertility, resulted in diversified diets and strengthened food
security. Between 1994 and 1999, production of vegetables quadrupled, production of root
crops and plantains tripled, potato production increased by 75% and cereals by 86% . (Meanwhile
sugar dropped from 70% of export revenue in 1992 to 39% in 1998.) A lack of fuel and tractors forced farmers to
use oxen labor, resulting in stark reductions in greenhouse gas-producing petroleum products.
In 2003 the Ministry of Agriculture used “less than 50% of the diesel fuel it used in 1989, less
than 10% of chemical fertilizers and less than 7% of synthetic insecticides.” Furthermore, “the Havana
City Government passed a law prohibiting the use of chemical pesticides in agriculture within the city limits. Thus, the crops are
grown almost entirely using active organic methods.” Socially, urban gardens boost cooperative involvement
in urban settings of poor soil or asphalt. On a larger scale,
and dedication to the community. Gardeners often make food donations to the neighborhood, and especially to schools and
food
availability in Cuba again reached 2,600 calories daily per capita, proving that a country can
achieve food security for its population through organic means, and providing an example for
other third world countries.
daycare centers.
In terms of the country’s health, urban agriculture has been tremendously successful.
By 2000,
Cuba’s food system is best in the world
Parker, 10 – Masters from the School of Health and Human Performance at Dalhousie
University (Joanne, “MORE THAN SUBSISTENCE: SMALL-SCALE URBAN AGRICULTURE AND
HOUSEHOLD LIVELIHOODS IN HAVANA, CUBA,” Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia,
August 2010,
http://dalspace.library.dal.ca/bitstream/handle/10222/13066/Parker,%20Joanne,%20MA,%20H
PRO,%20August%202010.pdf?sequence=1)//HAL
Amidst widespread malnutrition, high inequality, and generally poor health and social indicators in the Global South (and specifically
in Latin America), Cuba
stands out as one country that has achieved ―first-world health status
despite its low income (Evans, 2008; Franco et al., 2007; Rosset, 2000). Due to its political isolation – most
significantly the disappearance of its primary trading partners in Europe and Asia, and the US trade Embargo – Cuba
has remained on the sidelines of globalization since the early 1990s. Moved by ideology and necessity, Cuba dramatically
shifted its production, trade and consumption patterns toward fulfilment of its own needs, striving for selfsufficiency. It is now in a unique position: a nation that has achieved a high level of food
security and remarkable health outcomes (such as maternal and infant mortality, life expectancy, eradication of
infectious diseases) and social outcomes (including literacy and education levels better than many developed countries)
while remaining a low-income country. Cuba is one of only three countries in Latin America (along with Guyana and
Peru) to have met (or in Cuba‘s case, exceeded) the WFS‘s target of cutting in half the number of undernourished people from 1990
to 2015 (FAO, 2006). Various
national programs guarantee a minimal standard of nutrition for all
Cubans. Extensive supports for urban and rural agriculture have dramatically increased smallscale productivity and thus the food supply (Rosset, 2000; Weis, 2007b). A rationing system called la canasta
básica (basic food basket) ensures that everyone has access to basic foods, such as milk, sugar, meat and vegetables at greatly
subsidized prices (Koont, 2005; Spiegel & Yassi, 2004) – this system is described in more detail in the forthcoming section
―Household livelihoods in Cuba‖. In times of shortage, priority has been given to pregnant and nursing women, children and the
elderly (Franco et al., 2008; Spiegel & Yassi). The state also distributes significant quantities of food to hospitals, daycare centres,
and schools (Gonzáles Novo & Murphy, 1999; Koont, 2005; Premat, 2003). By the end of 2000, food
availability in Cuba
reached daily per capita figures of 2,600 calories and more than 68 grams of protein;
according to the UN‘s Food and Agriculture Organization, an adequate diet consists of 2,400
calories and 72 grams protein per day (Koont, 2005).
Cuban urban ag is sustained through Cuba’s government
Parker, 10 – Masters from the School of Health and Human Performance at Dalhousie
University (Joanne, “MORE THAN SUBSISTENCE: SMALL-SCALE URBAN AGRICULTURE AND
HOUSEHOLD LIVELIHOODS IN HAVANA, CUBA,” Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia,
August 2010,
http://dalspace.library.dal.ca/bitstream/handle/10222/13066/Parker,%20Joanne,%20MA,%20H
PRO,%20August%202010.pdf?sequence=1)//HAL
Cuba‘s Urban Agriculture Since the Special Period, ―Cuba has developed one of the most successful
examples of urban agriculture in the world. (Koont, 2009, n.p.). The goal of the urban agriculture movement in
Cuban cities is ―to maximize the production of diverse, fresh, and safe crops from every patch of previously unused urban land‖
(Companioni & Hernández, 2002, p. 220). Planning for urban agriculture in Cuba emphasizes its 19 uniform distribution throughout
the country, and is based on three principles: organic methods that do not contaminate the environment; the rational use of local
resources; and the direct marketing of produce to consumers (Companioni & Hernández). Because its resurgence during the Special
Period coincided with the disappearance of petrochemical inputs (such as fertilizers and pesticides) from Cuban markets, urban
production is essentially all organic, generally using only biological fertilizers such as those
produced through vermicomposting, and biological pest control techniques (Altieri et al., 1999;
Koont, 2009; Weis, 2007b). These include wasps, flies, bacteria and fungi specially developed and used for their ability to target
selected agricultural pests (Auld, 1999). Urban
agriculture in Cuba is managed and supported through a
complex decentralized decision-making and extension system overseen by the Ministry of
Agriculture (Koont, 2009). The National Urban Agriculture Group (GNAU) is complemented by 14 corresponding provincial
organizations and 169 municipal organizations; these organizations are responsible for setting policies and promoting and
supervising local farming efforts (Koont). State ―Urban Farm‖ enterprises, of which there are roughly one per municipality (and
sometimes more in larger cities) oversee and participate in training for farmers and gardeners; ensure transfer of information
regarding, for example, new varieties or technologies; provide access to needed inputs (such as seeds and tools); and oversee
marketing activities (Koont). Urban
agriculture‘s continued expansion and government support
demonstrate that it was not only a survival strategy to weather the economic crisis of the 1990s; urban agriculture
has become a key pillar in Cuba‘s strategy to enhance food security and development
throughout the country. Urban food producers donate substantial amounts of food to the
state and its service providers, including local community institutions such as schools, daycare centres and hospitals. These
donations extend the benefits of this food production model to some of the most vulnerable
members of the population, who might otherwise have little access to nutritious fruits and vegetables (Gonzáles Novo &
Murphy, 1999; Killoran-McKibbin, 2006; Premat, 2003). Some of these donations are spontaneous, and productive gardeners also
share their produce with friends, family and neighbours (Koont, 2005; Moskow, 1999). In other cases local governments ―more or
less insist on ‗voluntary‘ contributions to local schools and hospitals, as a kind of social rent they feel 20 justified in charging,
because the use of land was given at no charge‖ (Koont, 2005, n.p.). The amounts donated vary with respect to the amounts
produced and the inputs provided by the state. Urban
gardening is widely promoted by the Cuban
government, whose calls for participation and production are visible throughout Havana
through social marketing (e.g., murals, billboards) and in past public appeals by Fidel Castro himself,
and more recently, Raúl Castro (Auld, 1999; Castro Medel & Carballo, 2009; Premat, 2003).
Cuban ag production high now
Kinser, 08 – B.S., Science, Technology & International Affairs @ Georgetown University; masters in urban planning at
University of Michigan; (Corinne
Kisner, December 2008, Climate Institute “Green Roofs for Urban
Food Security and Environmental Sustainability” http://www.climate.org/topics/internationalaction/urban-agriculture/havana.htm)//JES
Havana, the capital of Cuba, is a port city with a year-round tropical climate. The population within
the city is 2.1 million, and in the surrounding urban area, 3.5 million. Urban agriculture in Cuba developed under unique
circumstances of economic hardship and isolation.
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1990,
Cuban imports and exports collapsed, leaving the country to fend for itself and make use of all
available domestic resources for food production. Without access to oil, tractors, fertilizers,
pesticides or other inputs, Cubans adopted organic agriculture to grow the food necessary to
feed their families. Today, over 26,000 gardens cover 2,439 hectares in Havana and produce
25,000 tons of food annually. 40% of households are involved in urban agriculture in
Havana. Organic urban agriculture evolved from a survival mechanism to a popular means of
supplementing income, diversifying diets, and achieving independence and self-sufficiency in
a city setting.
Lack of food imports has shifted Cuba to sustainable living
PETERS, 10 – LMM from University of Arkansas School of Law, Graduate Program in
Agricultural and Food Law; J.D. 2010, University of Oregon School of Law (Kathryn, “Creating a
Sustainable Urban Agriculture Revolution,” Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation, 2010
University of Oregon, LexisNexis)//HAL
In response to the food shortage crisis, Cubans in urban areas faced two options: starvation or selfsufficiency without reliance on chemical or mechanical technologies. n170 Havana, with a population of 2.2 million, did not
have a food production infrastructure and virtually no land had been dedicated to foodproduction, which made the city particularly
vulnerable to the threat of mass starvation. n171 Independent of government action, Havaneros
"spontaneously
began to plant food crops in the yards, patios, balconies, rooftops and vacant land sites near
their homes." n172 Those who had space began to raise chickens, rabbits, and pigs; neighborhoods came together to plant
crops without the use of chemical inputs and machinery. n173 Thus a sustainable, organic agricultural system
was born within the urban areas of Cuba. Several years after the spontaneous development of urban gardens by
Cuban residents, the Cuban Ministry of Agriculture created the Urban Agriculture Department to
develop a state-supported infrastructure to aid and support urban gardens. n175 The goal was to
cultivate all of the city's open land and provide extension services and [*233] resources for the newborn urban gardens. n176 The
Urban Agriculture Department works with Cuba's agricultural research sector to develop information and resources to foster smallscale, sustainable urban agriculture. In order to ensure an adequate supply of land for urban farming, the Urban Agriculture
Department adopted city laws to permit public and private vacant lots to be officially sanctioned as farms and gardens. n178 Most of
this land has been handed over in usufruct, which grants urban farmers the free and indefinite right to derive profits and benefits of
farming the land without having ownership of the land. n179 While Cuba's urban farm yields are supplemented with crops grown on
the island's former sugar cane fields, as of 2002 more than 86,450 acres of urban Cuban land was dedicated to intensive farming,
producing more than 3.2 million tons of food. n180 The
Urban Agriculture Department assisted Cuba's urban
farmers in developing organic and sustainable farming methods. n181 The Department
established a network of extension agents, usually women who live in the neighborhoods in which they work, to
assist local growers. n182 These extension agents teach farmers how to employ sustainable farming methods and practices
such as biofertilization, composting, companion planting, crop rotation and permaculture methods. n183 The Department
also set up seed houses that sell seeds, plants, garden inputs, tools, books, organic fertilizers
and pest controls, and other necessary inputs. n184 The Department works with the agricultural
research sector to develop new techniques and provide information to promote small-scale,
sustainable urban agriculture. There is great diversity among the urban gardens in Cuba. Some gardens are
grown by urban residents in small backyard or individual plots; larger gardens are grown by institutions and workplaces; other,
[*234] still larger farms are owned by the state and run as cooperatives, where workers share in profits. n186 Foodgrown
in
the urban farms is sold directly to residents at neighborhood farmstands, eliminating the need
for packaging and transportation. n187 Excess food is given to local schools, retirement homes, and
hospital kitchens. While urban agriculture was a response to a dramatic crisis in Cuba's history ,
through the development of a community-based system of cultivation on previously vacant
lots employing organic farming techniques, Cuba has created a sustainable food production
system. n189 As of 2005, Havana was producing over ninety percent of the perishable produce consumed in its city as well as a
significant portion of its milk and meat. n190
Solves good stuff
That solves CO2 emissions, food insecurity, carrying capacity, V2L, and is
modeled globally
PETERS, 10 – LMM from University of Arkansas School of Law, Graduate Program in
Agricultural and Food Law; J.D. 2010, University of Oregon School of Law (Kathryn, “Creating a
Sustainable Urban Agriculture Revolution,” Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation, 2010
University of Oregon, LexisNexis)//HAL
With government support, the urban gardens have become a profitable economic enterprise
for many Cubans. n191 Local access to fresh foods has added diversity to the Cuban diet and reduced the carbon
footprint associated with its food supply by reducing the transportation and chemical input required to grow
and transport the food. n192 The development of urban farming has also ensured food security for
Cuba. n193 The success of Cuba's system has established the country as a model for the urban
production of sustainable agriculture around the world. In transitioning to a sustainable urban agricultural
system, Cuba has drastically reduced its harmful impacts on the environment. Cubans have been
able to significantly reduce their carbon footprints as their food supply is no longer shipped
across oceans and Cuban residents can walk to local markets for fresh produce rather than drive [*235] to grocery
stores. n195 Reduced mechanization in food production further reduces carbon emissions. Increased urban vegetation also
mitigates the impact of climate change because vegetation has a cooling effect when air temperatures are high. n196 Because much
of Cuba'surban land is now vegetative, surface temperatures in Cuba may remain cooler due to the thermoregulation created by the
vegetation cover. According to Dr. Nelso Camponioni Concepcion, the Cuban government, through its urban agricultural program,
aims "to gain the most food from every square meter of available space." n198 By
utilizing available urban space for
sustainable food production, Cuba is reducing its impact on the planet's carrying capacity. The
organic urban gardening techniques do not consume greenspace or harm the environment; therefore, measuring the true cost of
externalities is not an issue. The growth of the urban gardens has created an increasing food supply and a new economy for many
Cubans without negatively impacting the environment or society. Urban
gardens in Cuba promote social equity in
many ways. Perhaps most important, urban gardens have enriched the quality of life in urban
neighborhoods. As neighbors share plants, gardening techniques, and food, and as farm stands have become a part of the
neighborhood, community life has been enriched. The Cuban diet has also been enriched; Cubans now have
access to a greater variety of fresher, healthier food at lower cost. n199 Buying fresh, organic,
locally grown food exemplifies ethical consumerism and self-reliance within communities.
Equally important, the current generation of urban gardeners will leave future generations fertile,
nutrient-rich land on which they can produce food for themselves. Cuba's urban gardening
system is the result of a breach to its national security. n200 Due to the development of the
urban gardens, Cuba is no longer reliant onfood and oil imports; an energy crisis or oil
shortage would not impact Cuba's food production system. The availability of fresh food and
gardening inputs within neighborhoods further ensures Cuba's national security, as an attack
on the transportation infrastructure would not significantly affect Cuba's fooddistribution
system.
Cuban urban ag is key to stopping patriarchy
Parker, 10 – Masters from the School of Health and Human Performance at Dalhousie
University (Joanne, “MORE THAN SUBSISTENCE: SMALL-SCALE URBAN AGRICULTURE AND
HOUSEHOLD LIVELIHOODS IN HAVANA, CUBA,” Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia,
August 2010,
http://dalspace.library.dal.ca/bitstream/handle/10222/13066/Parker,%20Joanne,%20MA,%20H
PRO,%20August%202010.pdf?sequence=1)//HAL
In recent decades, significant progress toward gender equality has been made across Latin America and the Caribbean (UNIFEM,
2009), especially in terms of education (UN & ECLAC, 2005). Formally, gender equality and civil rights for women have been
instituted across the region. However, gender discrimination persists and women are still unable to reap the same economic and
social rewards as men, largely due to their disproportionate share in household work and child care (United Nations, 2005). Cuba
in particular has
made dramatic achievements in protecting women‘s rights and promoting
equality since the Revolution of 1959. Cuban women have constitutional rights guaranteeing them equal opportunity and pay,
and Cuba has been a world leader in terms of gender equity in education and technical/professional employment (Luciak, 2005).
Currently women fill more than two-thirds of technical, scientific and professional positions across the country (García Sampedro &
Legañoa Martínez, 2006). Cuba
is also the 3rd -highest-ranked country in the world in terms of
women‘s representation in politics, at 43% (CBC News, 2009). The average proportion of women in parliament across
Latin America and the Caribbean is only 18% (UNIFEM). High levels of education and technical/professional
employment have positioned Cuban women with more authority in the home than they
enjoyed prior to the Revolution: a 1995 article reported that more than half of Cuban women interviewed made
household decisions jointly with their husbands (reprinted as Safa, 2002). The Family Code, incorporated into the Cuban constitution
in 1975, set the official goal of shared responsibility within the household (Safa, 2002; Stoltz Chinchilla, 1977), and was generally
Despite the Family
Code and women‘s increasing decision-making authority in the workforce (Luciak, 2005) and
reportedly in the home (Safa, 2002), changes in the gendered household division of labour have
seemingly been much slower to materialize – childcare and household tasks are generally still
viewed as ―women‘s work. (Caram, 2005; Díaz, 2007; Safa, 2002). ―While men accept the idea that their wives work
aimed at strengthening the family, which is seen as the primary unit of social reproduction (Safa, 2002).
and probably also welcome the added income, most of them do not share in the housework or child care, nor do their wives seem
to encourage them to do so‖ (Safa, 2002 p. 55). It has been argued that although women‘s social and public lives changed
significantly in the years following the Revolution, patriarchy was never fully eradicated in the home (Pagés,
2008; Toro-Morn, Roschelle & Facio, 2002). Attempts to legislate gender equality have been incredibly effective in women‘s
education, employment and representation in positions of power, including parliament. However these changes have not yet been
reflected in domestic ―practices and identities... that remain strongly associated with femininity or womanhood‖ (Pertierra, 2008,
p.744; Caram León, 2005; Safa, 2002). Female-led
households are also increasing in Cuba in recent
decades, leaving more women with the full responsibility of providing economic, nutritional,
and emotional sustenance for children and/or seniors (Zabala Argüelles, 2005). As in many countries, Cuban
women frequently face a ―double work day‖ as they complete many hours of both paid employment and unpaid domestic work
(Maldonado Villavicencio, 2009; Pagés). Nationally, women comprise 49.9% of the overall Cuban workforce, but only 17% of the
paid agricultural workforce (García Sampedro & Legañoa Martínez, 2006). Because of the diversity of participation, i.e. the
prevalence of informal or unwaged work, ―it is difficult to obtain statistics on the number of women engaged specifically in urban
women represent approximately 55%
(2009) puts the overall figure at about 25%. The
agriculture‖ (Killoran-McKibbin, 2006, p. 57). According to Killoran-McKibbin,
of urban agriculture employees in Havana. Koont
difference may be in the distinction between waged and unwaged unemployment; neither author specifies which types of work are
included in these statistics. However, women‘s
role in urban agriculture in Havana is increasing as
traditional notions of agriculture as ―men‘s work‖ gradually change (Murphy, 1999). Nonetheless, most
of the producers in Havana‘s community gardens are men (Chaplowe, 1996; Murphy, 1999); women in Havana fill only 16-21% of
positions related to food production (Gonzáles Novo, 2003). Women are more highly represented among technical, scientific and
administrative roles; they are estimated to fill 35-66% of these positions (Koont, 2009; Gonzáles Novo, 2003). Across
Cuba,
women fill 70% of technical positions in grassroots government bodies of the Ministry of
Agriculture, working as inspectors, extension agents, coordinators and educators (KilloranMcKibbin, 2006). Therefore in Havana and other Cuban cities, while most producers are men, wo men are the primary
promoters and educators for urban agriculture
(Gonzáles Novo, 2003; Pinderhughes et al., 2000). Although
women do not represent the majority of food producers in Havana, according to Killoran-McKibbin (2006),
urban
agriculture has had a definite impact on the lives of women and their families. The Special Period
was particularly challenging for women: as the traditional household food providers, they struggled to put food on the table and
their workload increased as state services such as child care were drastically cut back (Pagés, 2008). The
state‘s provision
of food and support for urban agriculture as a means of accessing both food and income
opportunities during and following the Special Period was a societal response to a food crisis,
―rather than simply placing an additional burden on women, the traditional caregivers, to
face their hungry families. (Killoran-McKibbin, p. 57). Now through state organization, women‘s role in
promoting food security has expanded beyond their families to entire neighbourhoods and
regions through their work as extension agents and educators (Gonzáles Novo, 2003; KilloranMcKibbin;
Pinderhughes, 2000).
Turns the aff
Allowing US to import food to Cuba destroys Cuban urban agriculture
Crawford, 3 - Associate Professor, Georgia State University College of Law, member of the
faculty of Thomas Jefferson School of Law, San Diego, California (Colin, “Necessity Makes the
Frog Jump: Land-Use Planning and Urban Agriculture in Cuba,” Summer 2013, Tulane
Environmental Law Journal, LexisNexis)//HAL
On September 26, 2002, the largest-ever U.S. trade show in Cuba was held in a Havana suburb. Its purpose was to showcase U.S.
food and agriculture. The sponsors included a dazzling list of U.S. agri-industrial superstars - from the makers of highly processed
foods like Spam, M & M chocolate candies, and Sara Lee cakes, to the products of [*780] agribusiness giants like Archer Daniels
Midland, Cargill, ConAgra, and Tyson Foods. The next day, The New York Times plastered a picture on its front page of Cuban
President Fidel Castro at the show, gingerly fingering a plate containing a hamburger and french fries, a chocolate milk shake nearby.
One could hardly imagine a more vivid illustration of the challenges
Cuban agriculture will face when the U.S.
embargo is lifted. Specifically, United States and other foreign agribusiness giants, eager to enter
the Cuban market, anxiously await the time they can press everything from processed foods
to genetically modified seeds and chemical fertilizers on the Cuban market. Despite Cuban
claims that they will resist this onslaught just as they have resisted the attempts to meddle
with their internal politics since the Revolution, the expansion of agricultural markets could
well prove an unstoppable juggernaught. In a country where food purchases can require as
much as two-thirds of an average Cuban's salary, the lure of comparatively cheap agricultural
inputs and even cheaper food could easily lead to social unrest if not permitted by the
government. n225 In short, the pressure to accept cheaper U.S. and other foreign agricultural
products, could well prove to be the necessity that next prods the Cuban frog to jump.
Lifting the food embargo forces cheap imports exploiting Cuba’s sustainable
agriculture strategies now
Gonzalez, 3 - Assistant Professor, Seattle University School of Law (Carmen G., “SEASONS OF
RESISTANCE: SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY IN CUBA,” Tulane Environmental
Law Journal, Summer, 2003, LexisNexis)//HAL
It is unclear how the Cuban government will respond to the immense political and economic pressure from the United States
to enter into bilateral or multilateral trade agreements that would curtail Cuban sovereignty and erode
protection for Cuban agriculture.n416 If Cuba accedes to the dictates of agricultural trade
liberalization, it appears likely that Cuba's gains in agricultural diversification and food selfsufficiency will be undercut by cheap, subsidized food imports from the United States and other
industrialized countries. n417 Furthermore, Cuba's experiment with organic and semi-organic agriculture may
be jeopardized if the Cuban government is either unwilling or unable to restrict the sale of
agrochemicals to Cuban farmers - as the Cuban government failed to restrict U.S. rice imports in the first half of the
twentieth century. Cuba is once again at a crossroads - as it was in 1963, when the government abandoned economic diversification,
renewed its emphasis on sugar production, and replaced its trade dependence on the United States with trade dependence on the
socialist bloc. In the end, the future of Cuban agriculture will likely turn on a combination of external factors (such as world market
prices for Cuban exports and Cuba's future economic integration with the United States) and internal factors (such as the level of
grassroots and governmental support for the alternative development model developed during the Special Period). While this Article
has examined the major pieces of legislation that transformed agricultural production in Cuba, and the government's
implementation of these laws, it is important to remember that these reforms had their genesis in the economic crisis of the early
1990s and in the creative legal, and extra-legal, survival strategies developed by ordinary Cubans.n419 The [*732] distribution of
land to thousands of small producers and the promotion of urban agriculture were in response to the self-help measures undertaken
by Cuban citizens during the Special Period. As the economic crisis intensified, Cuban citizens spontaneously seized and cultivated
parcels of land in state farms, along the highways, and in vacant lots, and started growing food in patios, balconies, front yards, and
community gardens. Similarly, the opening of the agricultural markets was in direct response to the booming black market and its
deleterious effect on the state's food distribution system. Finally, it was the small private farmer, the neglected stepchild of the
Revolution, who kept alive the traditional agroecological techniques that formed the basis of Cuba's experiment with
organic agriculture. The survival of Cuba's alternative agricultural model will therefore depend, at least in part, on whether this
model is viewed by Cuban citizens and by the Cuban leadership as a necessary adaptation to severe economic crisis or as a pathbreaking achievement worthy of pride and emulation. The history of Cuban agriculture has been one of resistance and
accommodation to larger economic and political forces that shaped the destiny of the island nation. Likewise, the transformation of
Cuban agriculture has occurred through resistance and accommodation by Cuban workers and farmers to the hardships of the
Special Period. The
lifting of the U.S. economic embargo and the subjection of Cuba to the full
force of economic globalization will present an enormous challenge to the retention of an
agricultural development model borne of crisis and isolation. Whether Cuba will be able to resist the reimposition of a capital-intensive, export-oriented, import-reliant agricultural model will depend on the ability of the Cuban
leadership to appreciate the benefits of sustainableagriculture and to protect Cuba's alternative agricultural model in the face of
overwhelming political and economic pressure from the United States and from the global trading system.
If the plan results in the collapse of local agriculture it is a violation of the right
to food
Hirsch et al., 10 (Armin Paasch, Frank Garbers, and Thomas Hirsch, “Food Ethics”Agricultural Trade and the Human Right to Food: The Case of Small Rice
Producers in Ghana, Honduras, and Indonesia, April 15, 2010, pgs 119-135,
SpringerLink, jld)
This obligation
is especially relevant when it comes to development aid, interna- tional
investment, or trade. Dumping or forced market opening, when they lead to the destruction of
local market access, the income basis and food security of peas- ants, are possible examples of
extraterritorial violations of the right to food. The obligation to respect the right to food abroad does not only
refer to bilateral relations but also includes decisions within international organizations such as the World Bank, International
Monetary Fund (IMF), or World Trade Organization (WTO). According to the CESCR, “states should, in international agreements
whenever rel- evant, ensure that the right to adequate food is given due attention and consider the necessary development of
further international legal instruments to this end.”
Food Ethics
Bad
Food ethics invite moral regression to the point of absurdity endangering all of
humanity
Hardin, 74 – received a B.S. in zoology from the University of Chicago in 1936 and a PhD in
microbiology from Stanford University in 1941. Moving to the University of California, Santa
Barbara in 1946, he served there as Professor of Human Ecology from 1963 (Garret Hardin,
1974, "Lifeboat Ethics: the Case Against Helping the Poor" pgs. 86-76)//JES
Clearly, the concept of pure justice produces an infinite regression to absurdity . Centuries ago, wise
men invented statutes of limitations to justify the rejection of such pure justice, in the interest
of preventing continual disorder. The law zealously defends property rights, but only relatively recent property rights.
Drawing a line after an arbitrary time has elapsed may be unjust, but the alternatives are
worse. We are all the descendants of thieves, and the world's resources are inequitably
distributed. But we must begin the journey to tomorrow from the point where we are today. We cannot remake the past. We
cannot safely divide the wealth equitably among all peoples so long as people reproduce at
different rates. To do so would guarantee that our grandchildren and everyone else's
grandchildren, would have only a ruined world to inhabit. To be generous with one's own possessions is
quite different from being generous with those of posterity. We should call this point to the attention of those
who from a commendable love of justice and equality, would institute a system of the
commons, either in the form of a world food bank, or of unrestricted immigration. We must
convince them if we wish to save at least some parts of the world from environmental ruin.
Single Instances bad
Single instances of ethical action only serve to satisfy guilt-addicts while
reducing the need to change the ethics of the environment
Hardin, 74 – received a B.S. in zoology from the University of Chicago in 1936 and a PhD in
microbiology from Stanford University in 1941. Moving to the University of California, Santa
Barbara in 1946, he served there as Professor of Human Ecology from 1963 (Garret Hardin,
1974, "Lifeboat Ethics: the Case Against Helping the Poor" pgs. 86-76)//JES
“I feel guilty about my good luck,” say some. The reply to this is simple: Get out and yield your place to
others. Such a selfless action might satisfy the conscience of those who are addicted to guilt
but it would not change the ethics of the lifeboat. The needy person to whom a guilt-addict
yields his place will not himself feel guilt about his sudden good luck. (If he did he would not climb
aboard.) The net result of conscience-stricken people relinquishing their unjustly held positions is
the elimination of their kind of conscience from the lifeboat. The lifeboat, as it were, purifies
itself of guilt. The ethics of the lifeboat, persist, unchanged by the momentary aberrations .
Not first
Food ethics can be second to environmental and economic problems that affect
food
Bruan and Brown, 3 - Director of the Center for Development Research (ZEF) and Professor
for Economic and Technological Change at University of Bonn, Germany, PhD from the
University of Stuttgart-Hohenheim (“Ethical Questions of Equitable Worldwide Food Production
Systems,” Author(s): Joachim von Braun and Mary Ashby Brown, Source: Plant Physiology, Vol.
133, No. 3 (Nov., 2003), pp. 1040-1045, Published by: American Society of Plant Biologists
(ASPB), Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4281419)//HAL
Land distribution (e.g. farm size), access to land, and natural resource use are essential components of an equitable food production
system, because access to these factors for food production are key to pov- erty reduction. However, resource depletion, loss of
biodiversity, pollution, and climate change are reali- ties that have contributed to rising concerns about the effects of agriculture on
ecosystems, especially in developing countries, where population growth has risen dramatically without a concomitant strengthening of institutional systems designed to manage and conserve natural resources (Hayami, 2001). In poor countries, farmers are
oftentimes forced to extend their farm boundaries, frequently moving to more ecologically fragile areas, such as mountainsides,
rainforests, and wetlands. It is estimated that approx- imately 400 million hectares of agricultural land are degraded worldwide,
composing 19% of the world's total farm area. Six percent or 130 million hectares are considered irrevocably degraded and cannot
be used for future farming (de Haen, 1997). From
a sustainable perspective, the human right to food and
to a healthy natural environment are inextricably related, because environmental degradation
jeopardizes the world's capacity to meet rising food needs. In addition, as the opportunities for
agricul- tural production decline because of the depletion of natural resources, communities
in the developing world that depend on agriculture as their primary source of income face the
loss of broader economic development opportunities. In a long-term view, eq- uitable food production and
ethical principles-the rights of humankind to a healthy environment, the rights of future
generations to inherit natural re- sources, and the human right to food-are therefore
overlapping and complementary. In the short-term, however, there can be trade-offs between
environmental sustainability and food secu- rity needs, and complicated ethical questions ensue. What if, for
example, the banning of deforestation in western China or an area of the Brazilian Amazon meant that local communities could not
clear the land for food production and could not sell the timber from the forest for desperately needed income? In- deed,
"conservation systems are bound to be strongly resisted by the current users who fear that their income will decline, especially [for]
the poor who already live at a near-subsistence level" (Hayami, 2001). This apparent contradiction of rights is a con- troversial
debate in economic development strate- gies. Does one ethical principle "trump" another, especially if intensive
agriculture results in irrevoca- ble degradation of the natural environment? How can it be ethical, however, to force poor
communities into food insecurity and greater poverty? Access to land and natural resources and the cre- ation of property rights is
closely tied to this issue (Otsuka and Place, 2001). The ability to own and retain agricultural farmland is an essential compo- nent of
preventing natural resource damage, along with enabling consistent food production and hence ameliorating poor smallholder's
livelihoods. When populations increase, there is a related demand for farmland. Without clear and legally enforced prop- erty rights
to agricultural land, food production suf- fers, and farmers are unable to invest in their land in a sustainable way. Ethical issues
emerge when debating the methods of achieving equitable land acquisition systems, es- pecially concerning the costs and benefits
between traditional, communal land inheritance systems and market-led land distribution. Views on how property rights are best
distributed vary tremendously be- tween different cultures. On the whole, in communal tenure systems, land is distributed more
equitably between community members. However, communal property rights systems, which frequently incorpo- rate land
inheritance from family to family as a prin- ciple, can contribute to environmental degradation; for instance, farms may be gradually
reduced in size as the land is parceled out to family members. If there are economies of scale-meaning, if larger farms are more
productive than smaller ones for certain crops-this will then reduce the overall efficiency of land use and labor, contributing to the
loss of income and thus creating inequity. However, when property rights are individual- ized-meaning, they are subject to market
transac- tions-what are the implications for equity and hu- man rights? There is a danger that the poorest members of a community
will not be able to afford to purchase land, and their food security may be dramat- ically reduced. Further, market-based land
distribu- tion can increase inequity for female farmers, if women are accorded little voice and community rights. However, migrant
laborers, who often face dis- crimination in finding and keeping land in communal tenure systems, may have easier access in
obtaining property rights through renting in market-based sys- tems (Otsuka and Place, 2001). In addition, because market
development plays a crucial role in poverty reduction, a system of market-based land rights
may improve equity through encouraging trade and mar- ket development in the agricultural
sector. There are thus trade-offs in terms of both equity and ethics for these two approaches to land
acquisition.
Combination key
Combining consequences and rights-based principles is key to effective policy
Machan ’10 – PhD, professor emeritus of philosophy at Auburn University, adjunct scholar at
the Cato Institute (Tibor, “A Misguided Distinction-or Not?” A Passion for Liberty, 9/28/10,
http://tibormachan.rationalreview.com/tag/deontology/)//JES
Is this a good, useful distinction? I have my doubts. For one, no one can tell for sure what the result or
consequence of a course of action or public policy will be down the line, not certainly in any detail.
And when it is possible to tell, it is because we have discovered that following some principle
is likely to bring forth a given result. The actual actions or policies are not available for
inspection until after they have been tried. So if we are to be guided by anything, it cannot be the
results, which lie in the future and are mostly speculative. It would have to be certain rules or principles that
we have found to be helpful in the past when we deployed them. On the other hand, principles are
always limited by the fact that they were discovered during the past that may not quite be like
the present and future or, even more likely, the scopes of which are limited by what we know so far. Thus, for example,
take the U. S. Constitution that contains a set of principles (especially in the Bill of Rights). It is
subject to amendments in part so as to update these principles in light of new knowledge and
new issues in need of being addressed. Once amendments are seen as possible, even necessary,
strict reliance on the principles is admittedly hopeless. So then what about the two kind of approaches,
deontological versus consquentialist? Neither is really adequate to what human beings need to guide
their lives. Yes, they will have to identify certain ethical, political, legal and other principles–
e.g., in medicine, engineering, or automobile driving–but once they have done so they will still need to keep
vigilant so as to make sure they aren’t missing some good reason for updating these. However,
focusing entirely on the consequences of their actions and policies will not do the job either since those are not yet here to deal
with. They will have to ease up to them with the help of the principles, more or less complete, that they have found to be soundly
based on their knowledge of the past. Fortunately, although our knowledge is rarely complete–and never final–about anything that
surrounds us in the world, the world itself tends to be fairly steady and predictable (once one has studied it carefully, without bias or
prejudice such as wishful thinking).
It is not possible to escape the need to balance reasonably well
established principles and expected consequences. With these in hand, many of our tasks and challenges are
likely to be managed pretty well although we need also to be prepared for surprises. There is no substitute for paying close
attention.
Extremism bad
Extremes in the right to food are bad and a middle path is better
Mepham et al, 96, Director of the Centre for Applied Bioethics at Nottingham University. He has published widely in the
fields of bioethics and applied biology. (Ben Mepham, Andrew Belsey – Centre for Applied Ethics, University of Wales, Ruth
Chadwick – Center for Professional Ethics, University of Central Lancashire Michael Crawford, Director of the Institute of Brain
Chemistry at Queen Elizabeth Hospital for Children; Nigel Dower, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen; Keb
Ghebremeskel studied chemistry at the University of Addis Ababaa and received his doctorate in nutritional biochemistry at the
University of Wales; Leslie Gofton is Lecturer in Behavioral Science at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne. John S. Marsh CBE is a
graduate of Oxford and Reading Universities. Between 1957 and 1977 he was successively Research Economist. Erik Millstone is
Senior Lecturer in Science and Technology Policy at Sussex University. “Food Ethics” 1996)//NG
The most fundamental dilemma is this: how far are those of us who are not hungry, especially
the rich in the Northern hemisphere, prepared to limit our rights to economic and other forms
of liberty in order to facilitate the reduction of hunger? ¶ At one extreme, there is the response
of an uncompromising economic libertarian: we have no duty to help alleviate the ills of
others, either general ills or hunger in particular. Beyond our duty not to harm others actively, we have
liberty to pursue our own interests- whether as individuals, organisations or nation-states. A variation of this is: the
best way to reduce poverty and hunger is to stimulate general economic activity, and this happens by Adam Smith’s ‘hidden hand’
that is, if we all pursue our own economic interests and let ‘trickle down’ do the rest.¶ At
the other extreme, someone
may argue that we all ought to do all we can to alleviate hunger (or more generally alleviate serious ills, of
which hunger is a major part). Such an approach, which would be taking to its logical conclusion the
sentiment many feel ‘hunger ought not to be allowed to exist where it can be avoided’, would
require a radical transformation to the way we live our personal and public lives. In the
middle, there is the approach according to which we have significant duties to reduce
suffering, especially hunger and extreme poverty. But not an overburdening duty to do all we
can. It is this middle position which I shall be defending in this chapter.
Dignity
Food aid bad – undermines dignity
Mepham et al, 96, Director of the Centre for Applied Bioethics at Nottingham University. He has published widely in the
fields of bioethics and applied biology. (Ben Mepham, Andrew Belsey – Centre for Applied Ethics, University of Wales, Ruth
Chadwick – Center for Professional Ethics, University of Central Lancashire Michael Crawford, Director of the Institute of Brain
Chemistry at Queen Elizabeth Hospital for Children; Nigel Dower, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen; Keb
Ghebremeskel studied chemistry at the University of Addis Ababaa and received his doctorate in nutritional biochemistry at the
University of Wales; Leslie Gofton is Lecturer in Behavioral Science at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne. John S. Marsh CBE is a
graduate of Oxford and Reading Universities. Between 1957 and 1977 he was successively Research Economist. Erik Millstone is
Senior Lecturer in Science and Technology Policy at Sussex University. “Food Ethics” 1996)//NG
However, option (iii) is of limited value, except in emergency situations such as famines or natural disasters. For there
are
immense (non-monetary) costs involved in food aid or even the simple transfer of money for
food. For instance, they create dependency, undermining development/self-reliance in the long
run and distorting local markets, as well as challenging the dignity and self-respect of the hungry
themselves. Hunger may be an evil, but so is the loss of dignity involved in seeking food aid.
Just receiving it, even if it is not begged for, can undermine self-respect.
Moral obligation bad
Evaluating food in moral obligation sense increases suffering and endangers
future populations
LaFollette, 3 –PhD in Philosophy from Vanderbilt University (Hugh. "World hunger." A
companion to applied ethics (2003): 238-53, Google Scholar)//HAL
We should not aid the starving Most of us think that feeding the starving Is good even if ills not something that we do. We think it is
good because (a) we think it relieves human suffering and most accounts of morality hold that (b) relieving human suffering is at
least permissible and perhaps morally required. Hardin disagrees. He thinks that (a) is false, and therefore concludes that we
should not feed the starving. Both the duty and the charity views. Hardin claims, assumes that
our ability to feed people Is boundless. It ¡s not. “A nation’s land has a limited capacity to support
a population and as the current energy crisis has shown us. In some ways we have already exceeded the carrying capacity of our
land” (Hardin, 1996/1974: 12). Given these limitations, some
countries are like overcrowded lifeboats. Their land
cannot support the current population - and certainly not future generations given current population growth rates. Although
feeding these starving people may temporarily keep more of them alive, In the long run, It will
Increase the population to the point where we can no longer feed them, even If we wanted.
That will Increase suffering and endanger future generations. That Is why assistance Is morally
wrong. Here’s an example to illustrate Hardin’s point. At the time Hardin first wrote about the subject in the early 1970s,
India had a population of 650 million people. Despite the Large number of people dying from
starvation, Its population was growing at a rate of 2.6 percent per year. At that rate, India’s population
would double every twenty-seven years. The problem was even more acute in Colombia, Ecuador, and Pakistan, which had annual
population growth rates of more than 3 percent. At that pace, their populations would double every twenty-one years. If
those
countries were unable to feed their current populations, how could they possibly feed a
population twice or four times that size — even with massive assistance from more affluent
nations? Hence, although our initial impulse Is to feed the starving, we should not. We should
recognize just “how wrong generosity can be” (Fletcher, 1977: 105).
For educational purposes only
Sharks
This is simply a Public Service Announcement to make sure everyone is aware of the intricacies
of the shark debate as they go through their careers. My colleague Mr. Soyinka has provided this
service for the betterment of future generations, enjoy
-Jeron D.
Suggested uses
- Catchy small talk whilst commuting
- Secret code to recognize fellow members of an exclusive club consisting of the Most
Interesting People in the World
- Sample file for novices
- Secret back file for the oceans topic in 2019 (obvi)
Extinction
Sharks lead to extinction – recent commentary paper proves; their ev doesn’t
assume smaller sharks
Grey 12, user on carnivoraforum with over 2,000 posts; Member #35 (Grey, Carnivoraforum “Can Livyatan melvillei
kill a Blue Whale?” http://carnivoraforum.com/topic/9655110/7/)//JES
Does GWS lead to extinction smaller sharks ? Or does smaller sharks lead to extinction
the weak C.carcharias species ?
10 millions years old that GW exists, why orcas don't have outsmarted them first as more direct and easier rival ? Last Megalodons
vanished at the very beginning of the Pleistocene, I need to see where you saw they were already enough large and skilled to hunt
sharks. I saw
among orcas.
in one recent commentary paper that hunting on big sharks seems to be a recently evolutive behavior
Uncontrolled sharks cause extinction – Our ev cites fisheries biologists
Exit Stage Right 07 10/10/2007, “West Africa’s Sharks Risk Extinction,”
http://exitstageright.wordpress.com/2007/10/10/west-africas-sharks-risk-extinction/)//JES
Dakar, Senegal – The uncontrolled catching of sharks in West Africa may cause the extinction of some of the
species, according to Mika Diop, Fisheries Biologist and Co-ordinator of the Sharks Sub-regional
Action Plan (PSRA-Sharks).
Defense
Sharks don’t cause extinction – lions are like 47 times more dangerous
Tumblr ’12 – #Marine_Ecosystem; personal analysis from savingsharks.com (August 29, 2012
http://www.tumblr.com/tagged/marine%20ecosystem)//JES
People killed in shark attacks: 5
People killed by lions/tigers: 100
People killed by drug abuse: 20 000
Shark Add-on
[Insert plan solves shark finning]
Over fishing sharks for fin soup cause shark extinction – Gordon Ramsay proves
Milk and Cookies ’11 website name sounds cool (http://milkandcookies.com/link/284115)//JES
Gordon Ramsay Slams Shark Fin Soup
Gordon Ramsay introduces the problem with over fishing shark which could lead to
extinction.
Sharks are k2 humanity – we reject the use of gendered language in this card
Tumblr ’12 – #Marine_Ecosystem; personal analysis from savingsharks.com (August 29, 2012
http://www.tumblr.com/tagged/marine%20ecosystem)//JES
Sharks are more scared of us than we are of them. They are the kings of the ocean. The ocean is the home of
80% of life on the planet. Shark extinction will eventually lead to our own extinction if we don’t
strive to maintain this precious ecosystem.
AT: Gordon Ramsay Unqualled
The Chef risked his life for his facts – the detective life isn’t all it’s gassed up to
be
Canoe 11 – the website design is red (Jan 3. 2011, Showbiz “Ramsay held at gunpoint”
http://jam.canoe.ca/Television/2011/01/03/16738631-wenn-story.html)//JES
Celebrity chef Gordon Ramsay was doused in gasoline and held at gunpoint as he tried to
uncover the dark world of illegal shark fin trading for a new TV show.
Sharks Fun Facts
Here are some fun facts about sharks
Saving Sharks 12 – informative website protesting finning (August 29, 2012 http://www.savingsharks.com/)//JES

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Sharks have been around for more than 400 million years
There are 375 shark species
Sharks are intelligent and can be trained
100 million sharks are killed each year for their fins
The largest shark is the Whale shark, averaging 9 metres (30 feet) in length—the size
of a large bus
Whale sharks are not aggressive. They eat zooplankton, small fish and squid.
When a shark loses a tooth, a new one grows in its place
Mako and Blue sharks are the fastest swimming sharks
Sharks can take hours or even days to die after being finned
Sharks are a critical part of marine ecosystems
Unethical
Allowing shark finning is unethical – They also have a pretty bad K/D ratio
Sunshinele 11, over 52 profile views (Sunshinele, Blogspot, February 03, 2011, “Diving in Manado Made Me Even More
Eco-Friendly” http://sunshinele.blogspot.com/)//JES
Sharks are not as dangerous as some people may think. The dive center guests were lucky to have shark
conservationist Brendon Sing (www.sharkguardian.org) in town to discuss the misconceptions of the shark species and how
we can save them. “Sharks kill less than 3 people a year, yet people kill over over 100 million sharks
a year,” Brendon announced during his presentation. This escalated number is largely due to the high demand for shark fin soup
in Asian restuarants throughout the world. Shark poachers cut fins off live sharks, then throw the still-living sharks back into the
ocean. Unable
to swim, these sharks sink to the ocean bottom and die a slow death by being
eaten alive or dying of starvation. This treatment is unethical and some countries have
banned shark finning.
To help, I am going to avoid eating at restaurants that serve shark fin soup.
Democracy and heg collapse
Democracy and heg are collapsing due to the dark forces of shark armies
Giroux ‘10 (Henry, Professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, previous professors at BU,
Miami U, and Penn State “Memories of Hope in the Age of Disposability”, published 9/28/2010, accessed online 7/2,
http://archive.truthout.org/memories-hope-age-disposability63631)//JES
The working-class neighborhood of my youth never gave up on democracy as an ideal in spite of how much it might have failed us.
As an ideal, it offered the promise of a better future; it mobilized us to organize collectively in order to fight against injustice; and it
cast an intense light on those who traded in corruption, unbridled power and greed. Politics was laid bare in a community that
expected more of itself and its citizens as it tapped into the promise of a democratic society. But like many individuals and groups
democracy is now also viewed as disposable, considered redundant, a dangerous
remnant of another age. And yet, like the memories of my youth, there is something to be found in those allegedly
outdated ideals that may provide the only hope we have for recognizing the anti-democratic politics,
power relations and reactionary ideologies espoused by the new barbarians. Democracy as
both an ideal and a reality is now under siege in a militarized culture of fear and forgetting. The importance of
today,
moral witnessing has been replaced by a culture of instant gratification and unmediated anger, just as forgetting has become an
active rather than passive process, what the philosopher Slavoj Zizek calls a kind of "fetishist disavowal: 'I know, but I don't want to
The lights are going out in America ; and the threat comes not
from alleged irresponsible government spending, a growing deficit or the specter of a
renewed democratic social state. On the contrary, it comes from the dark forces of an economic
know that I know, so I don't know.'"(16)
Darwinism and its newly energized
armies of
right-wing financial
sharks , shout till-you-drop mobs, reactionary ideologues,
powerful, right-wing media conglomerates and corporate-sponsored politicians who sincerely hope, if not yet entirely believe, that
the age of democratization has come to an end and the time for a new and cruel politics of
disposability and human waste management is at hand.
i
See Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1981); Amartya Sen and Jean Dreze, Hunger and Public Action (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1989); Amartya Sen and Jean Dreze, The Political Economy of Hunger (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1990); and Frances Moore Lappe, et al., World Hunger: Twelve Myths, 2nd ed.
(New York: Grove Press, 1998).
ii
Henry Shue, "Solidarity among Strangers and the Right to Food" in William Aiken and Hugh
LaFollette (eds.), World Hunger and Morality, 2nd edition., op cit. See also: Henry Shue, Basic
Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2nd edition (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1996).
iii
See Mark Evans's contribution to this collection, in which this problem is formulated in terms
of "imperfect obligation."
iv
William Aiken, "The Carrying Capacity Equivocation," op cit., p. 23.
v
Frederic L. Bender, "World Hunger, Human Rights, and the Right to Revolution," Social Praxis, 8
(1981), p. 6.
vi
Three of OXFAM's beliefs relevant here are: [1] people's vulnerability to poverty and suffering
is increased by unequal power relations based on, for example, gender, race, class, caste and
disability; [2] women, who make up a majority of the world's poor, are especially disadvantaged;
[3] working together we can build a just and safer world, in which people take control over their
own lives and enjoy their basic rights. To overcome poverty and suffering involves changing
unjust policies and practices, nationally and internationally, as well as working closely with
people in poverty. See
http://www.oxfam.org.u,/atwork/mission.html
vii
James Nickels, "A Human Rights Approach to World Hunger," in William Aiken and Hugh
LaFollette (eds.), World Hunger and Morality, op cit., pp. 177-178.
viii
Radhika Balakrishnan and Uma Narayan, "Combining Justice with Development: Rethinking
Rights and Responsibilities in the Context of World Hunger and Poverty," in William Aiken and
Hugh LaFollette (eds.), World Hunger and Morality, op cit., p. 242.
ix
See Garrett Hardin, "Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor," in William Aiken and
Hugh LaFollette (eds.), World Hunger and Morality, op. cit. and "Carrying Capacity as an Ethical
Concept," in George Lucas and Thomas Olgetree (eds.), The Moral Dilemmas of World Hunger
(New York: Harper and Row, 1976).
x
William Aiken, "The 'Carrying Capacity' Equivocation," in William Aiken and Hugh LaFollette
(eds.), World Hunger and Morality, op. cit., pp. 23-24.
xi
Ibid., p. 20.
xii
See the works cited in n. 1, especially Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, op. cit., pp. 160188.
xiii
See Sen, Poverty and Famines, op cit., p. 161 on Bangladesh's exports during the 1973 famine
and pp.131-153 for his analysis of that famine which, among other things, notes that the United
States stopped food aid shipments to Bangladesh on the grounds that Bangladesh was selling
jute (used to make gunny sacks) to Cuba. As Sen states, "only after Bangladesh gave in and
sacrificed its trade with Cuba was the flow of American food resumed. By then the autumn
famine was largely over": p. 136. Although this probably was a relatively small contributory
cause of the starvation that occurred at that time, it does seem to have been part of the cause,
with whatever moral culpability that may imply.