THE INDIAN APPROACH TO COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS
Colonel Behram A Sahukar, The Parachute Regiment, Indian Army retired
Violence and insurgency movements confronted India almost immediately after its
independence in 1947 and the Partition of British India into East Pakistan (now
Bangladesh) and West Pakistan as a homeland for the Muslims of the subcontinent. The
ensuing communal and religious violence took the lives of over 500,000 Hindus,
Muslims, and Sikhs and sowed the seeds of future conflict. The enduring legacy of
Partition is the root cause of the festering hostility between India and Pakistan and one of
the main causes of insurgency and unrest in India’s Northeast Punjab and Jammu and
Kashmir (shortened to Kashmir throughout).
India’s experience in fighting terrorism and insurgency extends to the following major
areas:
1.
In the Northeastern States since 1956.
2.
In Punjab State from 1981-1992.
3.
In Sri Lanka from 1987-1990.
4.
In Jammu and Kashmir since 1947 against Pakistani irregulars supported by
the regular Army. From 1989, this struggle has acquired a distinct Islamist
flavor of a proxy war.
5.
Indian is also battling with domestic terrorism and violence by Naxalites mainly by militant peasants against rich landowners. The movement is based
on the Maoist-Leninist ideology has links with criminal gangs and the Maoists
of Nepal. The spread of this movement within India and escalating civilian
casualties is considered to be one of the gravest internal security threats to
India today.
1
Terrorism and insurgency-related violence in various parts of India have taken a large toll
of human life and property. Since the last two decades, the casualties of violence in India
are highlighted as follows:
1.
Over 65,000-75,000 killed.
2.
Over 760,000 persons displaced from their homes.
3.
Over 10,000 security personnel killed.
4.
Assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984 by her Sikh
bodyguards.
5.
The blowing up of Air India passenger aircraft Kanishka by Canada-based
Sikh extremists killing all 329 persons on aboard in 1985.
6.
Assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, former Primer Minister of India by a
Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) female suicide bomber in May 1991.
7.
The hijacking of an Indian Airlines aircraft with over 180 persons on board by
Pakistani terrorists from Katmandu to Taliban-held Kandahar in December
1999 and the subsequent release of hardcore Pakistani terrorists held in Indian
jails.
8.
A suicide attack on India’s Parliament to kill or hold hostage over 200
parliamentarians who were in session inside the building in December 2001.
9.
A suicide attack on the Jammu and Kashmir State Legislature building
(Srinagar) in October 2001 killing over 45.
10.
Multiple bomb attacks on economic and soft targets in Bombay in March
1993 killing 257 and injuring over 1,700; in August 2003 killing 52; and on
commuter trains in July 2006 killing 209 and injuring hundreds more.
11.
Multiple bombings in October 2005 two days before the Hindu festival of
Diwali and the Muslim festival of Eid in Delhi killing 61 and injuring over
200.
12.
Bombings on the Delhi-Lahore Samjhauta Express (India-Pakistan Peace
train) in February 2007 killing over 68. Several other unexploded bombs were
located on the train and defused by the authorities.
2
13.
Twin bombings in market places in August 2007 killing over 42 in the South
Indian city of Hyderabad. 19 other bombs were set to go off across the city but
were detected and defused by the police well in time.
14.
Various attacks on civilians in market places, towns and villages, places of
Hindu worship, and pilgrims killing hundreds all over India as a fallout of the
simmering unrest in Jammu and Kashmir and the ongoing insurgency in some
of India’s Northeastern States.
In addition to fighting insurgency and terrorism, India has also fought short conventional
wars after it became independent; with Pakistan in 1947-48, 1965, and 1971. The 1971
war led to the dismemberment of East Pakistan, and emergence of Bangladesh as new
state.
In 1999, Pakistani intruders secretly occupied the strategic heights along a broad front on
the Indian side of the Line of Control in Kargil from where they were able to interdict the
strategic Srinagar-Leh road. India had to launch a costly military operation to dislodge
the well entrenched mujahidin from the icy heights of Kargil.1
In October 1962, India fought an unsuccessful short war to repulse Chinese aggression in
Aksai Chin in Ladakh and along the disputed McMahon line in Northeastern India. While
China vacated its gains in the Northeast, it still occupies Aksai Chin.2
The Indian Army is in the forefront of India’s counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and
has strength of about 1.1 million.3 The Indian Armed Forces are very professional allvolunteer force and have remained totally apolitical. They are by far the largest and
strongest in the region. In 1998 India acquired nuclear weapons capability (as did
Pakistan). The Indian Army has always been a volunteer force, and distinguished itself in
both World Wars in every theater of operations. Indian medical units also took part in the
Korean War. 4
3
The primary role of the Armed Forces is to defend India against external threats and
aggression and to aid the civilian Government whenever required. Recently the Indian
Army has been deployed more and more to fight insurgency and terrorism and is
currently engaged in greater numbers in COIN operations in Kashmir.
Outline Organization to Fight Terrorism and Insurgency in India
India has a Federal system of government. Powers are divided between the Central and
State Governments.5 Internal security and counterinsurgency/terrorism is the prime
responsibility of the Ministry of Home Affairs in conjunction with the Ministries of
Defence and External Affairs to a large extent.
Law and order is mainly a ‘State’ subject. Each State has its own police force and
intelligence set-up. This force can deal adequately with crime and minor incidents of
terrorism, but cannot tackle an armed insurgency without substantial assistance from the
Central Government. The Central Government has a number of paramilitary forces under
its control.6 These are basically armed police forces such as the Border Security Force
(BSF), Indo-Tibet Border Police (ITBP), Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), and the
Central Industrial Security Force (CISF). Specially raised counter-terrorism forces such
as the National Security Guard (NSG), the Rashtriya Rifles (RR), and the Special Group
supplement the Central Police organisations and the Army.
The Indian experience in COIN has shown that the Police do not have the training
or the leadership to combat terrorism and insurgency without help from the Army. The
nature of the proxy war in Kashmir, and the sophisticated arms and equipment held by
the insurgents has forced India to employ its military in greater numbers in the early
stages of an insurgency.
The Armed Forces are under the strict control of the Centre (federal government).
They are by far the most efficient, disciplined and organised force in the country. The
Army is in the forefront of India’s counterinsurgency effort, especially in Kashmir and
the Northeast.
4
The paramilitary forces come under the command of the Army during counterterrorism operations. The Police retain control of the police forces and supports the Army
when the Army is playing a lead role as in Kashmir. A Unified HQ under the Chief
Minister has been established both in Kashmir and the Northeast to coordinate all
activities of the army and the police including the intelligence. A senior retired military
officer is usually appointed as the Security Advisor to the government.
If the state government cannot function normally because of wide spread violence and
insurgency, the Indian Constitution has a provision to bring the state under direct control
of the Central government (this is referred to as President’s Rule). In such situations, the
State Legislature is dissolved and constitutional power is then vested in the Governor.
The National Security Council (NSC) coordinates security affairs with the
assistance of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB). A newly formed Defence
Intelligence Agency coordinates intelligence inputs from the Army, Navy and the Air
force. It interacts with all the important ministries dealing with national security, the
Intelligence Bureau (IB) on domestic intelligence, and with the Research and Analysis
Wing (R&AW), India’s external intelligence agency. 7
Background to Insurgencies in India
The Northeast
One of the earliest insurgencies to take root in India was in the Northeast. This region
presently shares a common border with Bhutan, China, Myanmar, and Bangladesh
(erstwhile East Pakistan) and covers over 98,000 square miles. The region has large
resources of oil, natural gas, teak wood forests and tea plantations.
Under the British rule the whole region was called Assam Province and accorded a
special status. Special ‘Inner and Outer Line’ permits were needed to enter the region.
The creation of East Pakistan during Partition cut off direct road and rail connections
5
between India and deprived India’s Northeast of its only port at Chittagong (making the
area landlocked). The Northeast is now connected to the rest of India by a narrow strip of
land barely 15 miles wide called the Siliguri Corridor, squeezed between Bangladesh in
the South and Nepal in the north. Despite its rich natural resources, this region remained
relatively under developed and isolated from the rest of India. Most of the people are of
Mongoloid stock and are culturally different from the rest of India. In some states
Christianity is the predominant religion. There are no less than 160 different tribal groups
and over 400 sub-tribes all vying for political power.
Soon after Independence, the ethnic minorities did not easily merge with the newly
formed Indian Union and resorted to insurgency, terrorism, and political violence voicing
various demands including autonomy, secession and outright independence. The tribal
groups fiercely resisted any migration from other parts of India and looked upon them as
‘foreigners’. During Partition (and later after the 1971 India-Pakistan war), millions of
illegal migrants crossed over into the Northeast from East Pakistan. This upset the
demographic pattern, ethnic composition and economic opportunities of the Northeast.
Recognizing the different ethnic character of the area, Assam was sub-divided gradually
over the years to form six smaller states based on tribal and ethnic lines.8 Despite this
accommodation by the Center, the unrest did not die down and insurgency was fuelled by
weapons, funding, and training from China and East Pakistan. In addition, the
secessionist groups also took safe haven in the thick forested regions of Burma and East
Pakistan.9
Insurgency first erupted in 1956 in Nagaland demanding independence. In 1966 the
insurgency in Mizoram took root. In the late 1970s the insurgency spread to rest of the
Northeast. Many of these insurgent groups (especially in Nagaland) had fought with the
British-Indian Army against the Japanese and were battle hardened. Soon the insurgency
spread to the towns and cities and took on the color of urban terrorism with bombings,
political assassinations, kidnappings, subversion and a general breakdown of law and
order. In 1988, disgruntled groups in Assam resorted to terrorism and insurgency and
established bases and safe havens in Bhutan.
6
The Indian Response
The Indian approach has been a mix of political accommodation, economic development,
and the use of military force to restore normalcy. India initially looked upon the
insurgency as a law and order problem led by ‘misguided hostiles’ who had to be weaned
away from militancy and brought back to the fold of normalcy. The unrest was thought to
be associated with the difficulties of initial state formation. India’s approach was then
based on the classic guerrilla warfare theory of Mao Tse-Tung. Additionally, the lessons
learnt from the British army’s COIN experience in Malaya like re-grouping of villages,
isolation of the population, and area domination were applied in Nagaland and in
Mizoram with mixed success. The Indian Army’s long experience in jungle warfare and
patrolling were put to good use and kept the insurgents on the run. The induction of the
Army and the Central Police Forces was looked up on as an occupation force.
The Army was given strict instructions regarding conduct of operations. An Order of the
day to the troops being inducted to the Naga Hills read:
You must remember that all the people in which you are operating are fellow-Indians…
and the very fact that they are different and yet part of India is a reflection of India’s
greatness. Some of these people are misguided and have taken to arms against their own
people, and are disrupting the peace in this area. You are to protect the mass of the people
from these disruptive elements. You are not there to fight the people in the area, but to
protect them. You are fighting only those who threaten the people and who are a danger
to the lives and properties of the people. You must therefore, do everything possible to
win their confidence and respect and to help them feel that they belong to India.10
The Army initially conducted counter insurgency operations like a conventional operationlarge operations, aimed at killing insurgents. Intelligence was compromised as the local
police had been subverted was almost non functional as was the state government. The
Army’s operations to ‘seek and destroy’ the insurgents using large forces was sometimes
termed as pointless ‘jungle bashing’. The Assam Rifles a local paramilitary force officered
7
by the Army performed well in bringing down the level of insurgency overall. Cordon and
search operations netted good results but led to accusations of human rights abuses and the
use of excessive force.11
It must be emphasized that the Army did not use its artillery, tanks, or heavy firepower
during counterinsurgency operations and operated under full civilian oversight.
Helicopters were used extensively for movement of troops, casualty evacuation and
reconnaissance as integral part of counter-insurgency operations, but the offensive use of
air power was used only on one of two occasions in Nagaland and Mizoram to extricate
an isolated post from being overrun by insurgents. Many posts were also air maintained
by airdrops of supplies and ammunition by transport aircraft from forward airfields
located in the Northeast.
The Indian government also reached a series of political ceasefire agreements with
various tribal groups and political parties to stop the violence and terrorism. In addition, a
policy of surrender and rehabilitation was introduced whereby surrendered insurgents
were given monetary compensation and included in the political process to bring peace to
the troubled region. The Armed forces were given special powers under the Armed
Forces Special Powers Act as they were operating in remote areas where the local police
was non-functional. The concept of Unified Command was tried successfully in the
Northeast for closer cooperation between the Army and the central police forces and
included intelligence sharing.
As levels of violence came down, the Central Government made a concerted effort to
increase economic aid, development projects and job opportunities. Diplomatic efforts
and coercion led to joint counterinsurgency operations between India and Burma. By
1982, China also withdrew its support to the insurgent groups and a major source of
arms, training and supplies to the militants eventually dried up. Bhutan was pressured to
act against Assamese rebel groups that had entrenched themselves on Bhutanese soil and
over 33 camps were destroyed in this operation in 2003.
8
From 1985 onwards India began to seal off the porous 2,500 miles long border with
Bangladesh by constructing a fence along its entire length which has now been completed
to a large extent. The movement of militant groups and illegal migrants into northeastern
India from safe havens in Bangladesh is expected to reduce because of more stringent
border controls. However, Pakistan continues to increase it influence and support to
groups inimical to India. It has established operating centers in Nepal and Bangladesh
and the Inter Services Directorate continues to fund and arm some groups directly.
The Present Situation and Overall Approach.
The Indian approach to COIN operations has yielded positive results. The insurgent
movements in the Northeast have gradually lost momentum and given up their demand
for independence. Many of them have begun to turn to criminal activities to intimidate,
kidnap and coerce the local population to extort money for personal monetary gain.
Factional infighting between the insurgent groups themselves reduced has their
effectiveness and unity. The Indian government has been able to strike deals with
separate groups on various issues and involve them in the peace process. On some
occasions insurgent groups even surrendered en masse.
Presently insurgency in Mizoram has been totally eradicated. In 1986, Mizoram was
given full statehood and agreed to accept Indian sovereignty without any pre conditions.
Democratic elections were held and the rebel leader elected Chief Minister. In Tripura
too the insurgents are part of a functioning government in the state. In Manipur the
insurgency has taken on more of a criminal nature and lacks unity of purpose. Due to a
large number of Naga tribes in Manipur, the unrest in Manipur is greatly affected by the
insurgency in neighboring Nagaland. The disparate groups in Manipur pose no real threat
to the State.
In Nagaland, the ceasefire agreements signed with the two major insurgent groups in
1997 and 2000 is holding and the demand for an independent Nagaland is no longer
voiced. The military operations coupled with political accommodation and compromise,
9
and economic assistance helped bring down the insurgency to manageable levels in the
entire Northeast except Assam. Large scale operations continue to be launched by the
Army (Op Rhino and Bajrang) against the two major insurgent groups the United
Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland/
Bodo Volunteer Force in Assam. The Center continues to try and reach an
accommodation with the insurgents to restore normalcy.
Insurgency and Terrorism in Punjab
Punjab shares an artificially created indefensible border with Pakistan and is now mainly
populated by the Sikhs. Punjab Province formed part of the extensive Sikh empire (under
Maharajah Ranjit Singh), and was annexed by the British after the Anglo Sikh Wars. The
Sikhs were given special privileges by the British especially for recruitment into the
armed forces. They played a big part in helping the British to suppress the 1857 War of
Indian Independence, and fought with valor in both World wars. During Partition, Punjab
Province was divided between India and Pakistan. The Sikhs lost the city of Lahore
which was capital of the Sikh empire, and the birthplace of Guru Nanak the founder of
the Sikh religion, to Pakistan. The Sikh religion was brutally persecuted by some of the
radical Muslim Mughal Emperors and the Sikhs have a past history of armed resistance,
guerrilla warfare and martyrdom in defense of Sikhism. After India was granted
independence, some Sikhs felt that they would be totally engulfed by the Hindus of
Indian and lose the unique identity that they enjoyed under the British. The demand for a
separate state based on the Punjabi speaking areas started soon after independence when
India declared Hindi to be the National Language. To accommodate some of the demands
of the Sikhs, Indian Punjab was trifurcated along linguistic lines. Punjabi speaking areas
were formed into present-day Punjab, a new state called Haryana was created from the
Hindi speaking areas, and rest of Punjab was made part of the existing State of Himachal
Pradesh.
Unrest and violence surfaced in the early 1980s because of a mix of political intrigue and
mismanagement, Sikh religious extremism, and support from the Sikh Diaspora based in
10
the United Kingdom and Canada for the creation of an independent Sikh state called
Khalistan to preserve Sikh identity and safeguard it being from being engulfed by
Hinduism. The situation was allowed to fester by political inaction until incidents of
violence increased and terrorism took root in the towns and cities of Punjab. Initially,
there was little popular support for the demand or the tactics of the extremists but the
insurgency against the government in Delhi spread. Soon the Punjab police had been
subverted and reduced to an ineffective force. Militants led by Sant Jarnail Singh
Bhindrawale brought the state machinery to a virtual standstill through terror and
violence. Political assassinations, outright murder, kidnappings, looting became a regular
feature of daily life. Amritsar was declared a ‘holy city’ and the militants gave a call to
the faithful to take to arms to fight a Dharam Yudh (war to save the religion). They
openly fortified the Golden Temple (the oldest and holiest place of Sikh worship) in
Amritsar and used it as their headquarters without any firm action being taken by the
authorities. Automatic weapons and anti tank rockets were added without any firm action
by the authorities. Between 1981 and 1984 five Indian Airline aircraft were hijacked by
Sikh militants, and yet the state government did not act to arrest the leaders from the
Golden Temple complex. By 1984 the law and order situation had deteriorated to such an
extent that the Indian government headed by Indira Gandhi finally stepped in and ordered
the Indian Army to attack the Golden Temple and kill or capture those inside who were
controlling the insurgency.
The troops went in barefoot to preserve the sanctity of the holy site (Op Bluestar). All
leather equipment was removed, and troops had orders to use minimum force to avoid
damage to the main edifice of the Temple. The difficult assault did not go as smoothly as
initially planned as the militants were much better equipped and organized than the initial
intelligence estimates. Finally the army had to use tanks and some artillery fire to
overcome the defenses causing some damage to the holy building. The leaders of the
militants including Bhindrawale were killed as were several hundreds others (militants
and civilians) who were trapped in the building.
11
The attack was seen by Sikhs as a direct attack on their religion, and resulted in a nationwide backlash. There was an upsurge in terrorism that spiraled out of control beyond
Punjab state. The unrest in Punjab refused to die down and spread to the villages and
rural areas of Punjab. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated by two of her own
Sikh bodyguards at her residence in Delhi. Hundreds of Sikhs were killed in the riots that
followed. Some Sikh Army units mutinied and went underground with their arms. Large
quantities of small arms (mainly AK 47s), and explosives were supplied to the terrorists
through the porous border with Pakistan. The following year (1985), an Air India jet
flying from Toronto to India was blown up over the Atlantic by Sikh terrorists based in
Canada killing all 329 persons on board. Clearly the Indian approach in attacking such a
holy site though it was desecrated by the militants without first ensuring that it had
popular support was the wrong one.12
In the aftermath of Operation Blue Star, India raised a special counter Terrorism Unit
called the National Security Guard in 1984/85, and introduced special legislation the
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act 1987 (commonly known as TADA)
to prosecute the growing number of persons involved in acts of sabotage, murder and
terrorism. Urgent steps were taken to modernize and invigorate the Punjab Police which
was also re-armed and infused with better leadership.
On the political side, elections were held despite the ongoing violence. Political prisoners
were released, but many of them went straight back to militancy and the government had
failed to crush the insurgency. Terrorism and insurgency continued to wreak havoc in
Punjab.
Sikh militants re-fortified the Golden Temple once again in 1988. This time the Indian
approach was to employ the specialized National Security Guard and Punjab Police in a
surgical strike before the militants could strengthen the defenses within the Temple
complex. A well planned limited operation (Operation Black Thunder II) based on
accurate intelligence was launched in full view of the media. In a gesture of
12
reconciliation, some of the military mutineers who were swayed by rumors and false
propaganda were pardoned and re-instated in the Central Police Force.
The government followed up with aggressive counterinsurgency and counter terrorism
operations jointly with the Punjab police which had been reorganized. Operation
Woodrose was launched whereby the Police and the Army worked in close coordination
and harmony with each other against the insurgency. The Punjab Police took the lead in
stamping out the insurgency. The Army was used to seal the border with Pakistan and
prevent militants from escaping. Border sealing operations also prevented the induction
of lethal arms and explosives that had sustained the militancy in Punjab. The re-vamped
Punjab Police force was used aggressively in the towns and villages of Punjab to kill or
capture the insurgents and reassert the government’s authority in the state. Police and
Army established joint intelligence centers and operational control rooms right down to
Battalion level so that there was real-time passage of information and intelligence. The
meticulous and sustained operations finally showed results and decimated the insurgents.
The people felt secure and helped the authorities in counter insurgency operations.
Operation Night Dominance made sure that offensive operations continued without
respite into the night.
This successful joint operation kept the insurgents on the run. Those that escaped the
Police cordon of the villages were hunted down and killed or captured in the open by the
Army. Soon the tables turned and the insurgency was brought down to manageable levels
by 1992. Elections in the State were held that year, and a new government was installed.
Direct rule from the Centre that was imposed intermittently because of the failure of the
state Government was permanently lifted. Normalcy was eventually restored to Punjab.
The Indian state had however, strongly resisted the demand for a separate Sikh state and
was willing to go to great lengths and fight a protracted conflict at great cost to preserve
the integrity of the Union of India.
Punjab remains one of India’s affluent states and is still called the ‘Granary of India’
because of its high agricultural output and extensive farmland. Even after normalcy was
13
restored to the Punjab, Sikh extremists continued to extract revenge from those who were
responsible for combating militancy in Punjab and those who had betrayed the Sikh call
for Khalistan. In 1986, Sikh militants gunned down retired General A.S. Vaidya (who
was the Army Chief when the Indian Army attacked the Golden Temple in June 1984) in
the city of Pune (near Bombay) as he was returning home with his wife after shopping. In
August 1995, a Sikh suicide bomber from the Babar Khalsa terrorist group killed Mr
Beant Singh the Chief Minister of Punjab in Chandigarh, Punjab’s shared capital.
The Indian Approach to the Punjab Insurgency
The following major points of the Indian approach to the insurgency in Punjab are
relevant:

The need to firmly resist any attempt to break up the Union.

The importance of joint police and military cooperation and relentless COIN
operations to bring down the level of violence.

The importance of accurate actionable intelligence and well trained specialized
forces to tackle insurgency and terrorism.

The need for anti-terrorism legislation and a transparent fearless judiciary to
enforce the law.

The need to take pre-emptive and speedy action before the situation deteriorates
to unacceptable levels.

The need to consider the religious sentiments and sensitivity of the local
population if forced to attack religious places. Pre-emptive action to contain the
expected fallout of such attacks needs to be taken and the people prepared in
advance by psychological operations.

Political accommodation does not always alleviate grievances in fact sometimes
this leads to more and more demands. The task becomes even more difficult when
political parties and religiously motivated insurgent groups work in partnership
for a common anti- national cause.
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
It was important to note that though the leadership was killed in 1984 during Op
Blue Star, the insurgency continued in Punjab and acts of international terrorism
were executed.
The Indian Counterinsurgency Experience in Sri Lanka
The Indian Army was deployed in Sri Lanka for a brief period from July 1987 to March
1990. During that time it gained valuable lessons in counterinsurgency while fighting the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). It was the first major operation of its kind
beyond India’s shores after independence. Initially the Army was inducted under the
terms of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of 1987 to act as a facilitator between the Sri
Lankan forces and the militant Tamil groups (of which the LTTE was the most feared)
which had agreed to peacefully disarm and hand over all their weapons to the Indian
Army.13 Hence this force was called the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF).
Initially a reinforced Infantry Division was inducted for the task without its heavy
weapons or heavy artillery. Within a few weeks the arrangement between the Indian
Army and the LTTE broke down and the Indian army was being attacked by the LTTE in
a classic guerrilla war. The Indian forces were not fully prepared for sudden the transition
of its role from peacekeeping to peace enforcement to
counterinsurgency and were
caught flat footed. In fact, the Indian Army was inducted for this seemingly easy task
without any proper briefing, adequate equipment, proper maps, or any form of training
for operating in the jungles or urban environment of Sri Lanka.
The troops also lacked sufficient language skills in Tamil and had no pre-induction
training or given any time to reorganize or acclimatize after their arrival in the JaffnaTrincomale sectors of Sri Lanka. The very Tamils the Indian Army had come to support
and protect from Sri Lankan excesses did not support the IPKF once it began to fight the
LTTE. Though the Army, Navy and the Indian Air Force were all involved in Sri Lanka
right from the start, there was no Supreme Commander. The Overall Force Commander
based in Madras did not really command anything. All major operations had to be cleared
15
first by Southern Command in Madras and Pune, then by Army Headquarters in Delhi,
and finally by the Central Government which exercised political control and was very
conscious of the impact on the Indian Tamil population. In addition, the India’s external
agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) had clandestinely trained and armed
the LTTE and other groups for many years, but did not give adequate intelligence on their
capabilities to the Army. The Central government was headed by the relatively
inexperienced Rajiv Gandhi who was elected on a ‘sympathy vote’ in the wake of the
assassination of his mother, Indira Gandhi in 1984. The capabilities of the Indian army
and paramilitary forces were also stretched to its limits. The Punjab insurgency was at its
peak, troops were already deployed on counterinsurgency tasks in the Northeast, and the
insurgency and unrest in Kashmir was gaining momentum. The Indian Army was also
deployed against Pakistan in the inhospitable Siachen glacier region of Ladakh from 1984
onwards. In addition, Indian troops were airlifted to the Maldives to help the government
there against an attempted coup in November 1988.
The first major operation of the IPKF was to take the LTTE stronghold of Jaffna. This
was launched with inadequate troops and insufficient firepower as mentioned above. The
use of available firepower was severely restricted to minimize collateral damage and
civilian casualties. Though the Indian army took Jaffna town in two weeks, and
controlled it thereafter, it failed to prevent the LTTE cadre from staging a tactical
withdrawal into the jungles from where it conducted unconventional warfare inflicting
heavy casualties on the Indian Army.
Eventually, three additional divisions were inducted piecemeal in the North and East of
Sri Lanka. Despite the experience in counterinsurgency in Nagaland, and the Indian
army’s experience in the jungles of Burma during World War II, counterinsurgency
operations violated the basic principles of COIN.
More troops by themselves failed to win the COIN battle for India. The LTTE were
tenacious fighters, had the support of the local population, were better armed and
equipped with a variety of modern automatic weapons suited to unconventional warfare,
16
instituted a strong communications and intelligence network, and were able to break
contact and melt away into the jungles to fight again in another sector on another day.
They had also established an efficient re-supply system, used human shields as deception,
and were brutal in their treatment of any Indians they captured. The LTTE made full use
of booby traps, mines warfare, and deployed improvised explosive devices (IEDs) with
devastating effects. They were also masters of the jungle and adept at deception and in
camouflage and concealment. They frequently ambushed Indian convoys and patrols and
caused heavy casualties. The few roads and tracks were interdicted effectively by the
LTTE, and a large detachment of troops had to be employed to keep the logistics lifeline
open. The Indian Army was also found wanting in night fighting equipment and modern
radio sets for effective communication during small scale counterinsurgency operations.
Despite the well organized resistance faced by the troops on the ground, and the
preponderance of firepower that could have been made available to the Army, the Indian
army continued to employ the principle of the use of ‘minimum force’ at great cost to
itself.
The Indian Air Force fighter jets were never used to bomb known LTTE dispositions, and
off-shore naval gunfire support was hardly ever used. Special Forces were however
employed quite effectively in the later stages of the counterinsurgency operations. The
Indian army was in effect fighting with ‘one arm tied behind its back.’ Paradoxically, the
India was fighting the very same forces it had armed and trained. After successfully
helping the Sri Lankan government to hold elections, the new government actually
worked with the LTTE to oust the IPKF from Sri Lanka.
Salient Points of the Indian Approach to Counterinsurgency Operations in Sri
Lanka
At its peak strength, the IPKF deployed four divisions and nearly 100,000 men as well as
supporting arms and services and paramilitary forces in Sri Lanka. The main deployment
of the IPKF was in northern and eastern Sri Lanka. The IPKF was the chief instrument of
India’s political strategy in 1987-90. However, there was a mismatch between the
17
political and the military aims and objectives. There was also little coordination in the
overall plan of action and optimum utilization of available resources.
Field Marshal Manekshaw had observed that there were ‘too many masters giving
different orders and different assessments.’ The IPKF was not psychologically
conditioned against the LTTE’s sudden transformation from an ally to an adversary.
There was no advanced proper political or military groundwork done before the IPKF
was inducted. The induction itself was ill planned and hastily executed with outdated
equipment unsuited to counterinsurgency operations or urban warfare. India also did not
receive the whole hearted support of the warring parties, the government or the people of
Sri Lanka for its initial intended peacekeeping role and during COIN operations.
The most important drawback of operations in Sri Lanka was the failure of the Indian
forces to effectively isolate the local Tamil population from the LTTE and to establish an
effective intelligence grid on which successful counterinsurgency operations could be
launched. The IPKF also did not have sufficient knowledge or information of LTTE
capabilities, intentions, and methods of warfare.
The IPKF failed to adapt quickly or innovate to address the rapidly changing military and
political situation on the ground. It also failed to counter or institute standard operating
procedures to the LTTE’s innovative tactics in the jungle and in urban guerrilla warfare.
While the IPKF successfully forced the LTTE out of their stronghold of Jaffna, it did not
cordon off the town to trap the retreating LTTE cadre which withdrew almost intact to
the jungles. Their leader Prabhakaran also evaded capture and continued to direct
operations against the IPKF from his jungle hideout.
The political limitations of the use of air power and heavy support weapons against the
well armed and well trained insurgents was counterproductive to the successful outcome
18
of counterinsurgency operations in this case. In the sparsely inhabited jungles of Sri
Lanka, there was little risk of civilian casualties or extensive collateral damage.
India failed to include the Sri Lankan government in counterinsurgency operations. There
was little or no support from the Sri Lankan forces in IPKF operations or in intelligence
gathering. The Sri Lankan authorities also did not take over the administrative machinery
once these were repaired and restored by the IPKF. They were also not involved in rear
area protection.
The IPKF was therefore fighting a lone battle in a foreign country with insufficient
intelligence against an elusive enemy without any popular support. This put an immense
strain on the limited resources of IPKF which was employed in virtually every aspect of
routine administration of the Tamil areas and in fighting the LTTE at the same time.
The political solution to the conflict so essential in any counterinsurgency operation was
marred by the vacillating nature of the Sri Lankan government, and the intransigence of
the LTTE who were confident of achieving their aims of ‘Eelam’ thorough armed force.
The newly elected government in Sri Lanka asked the IPKF to withdraw while it was still
fighting the LTTE. Despite the sacrifices of both life and limb made by the IPKF during
its short deployment from July 1987 to March 1990, it was looked upon as an occupying
army and an impediment to future peace and reconciliation in Sri Lanka.
The Indian government was unable to prevail upon the Sri Lankan Government to allow
the IPKF to stay and finish off the LTTE, now that modern weapons and equipment were
being provided to the Indian forces and the Indian Army was adapting to the jungle in Sri
Lanka. The IPKF was forced to withdraw in 1990 by the Sri Lankan government under a
cloud without having completed it tasks.
Though the LTTE had suffered heavy losses, it continues to remain a formidable fighting
force to this day. It has however, failed in its objective of gaining ‘Eelam’ for the Tamils
19
of Sri Lanka. No army in the world has restored normalcy in an insurgency affected area
in the short period of 32 months that the IPKF was deployed in Sri Lanka. Had the IPKF
allowed to remain longer, it would have most likely have succeeded in destroying the
LTTE in the long term which might have resulted in a workable political resolution to the
continuing crisis in Sri Lanka.
The Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir
Map of Jammu and Kashmir
Sources http://kroc.nd.edu/polbriefs/pbrief8.shtml and Embassy of India Washington DC
The long festering Kashmir issue also has its origins in the Partition of British India and
the creation of Pakistan in August 1947. The Muslim majority princely state of Jammu
and Kashmir was ruled by a Hindu ruler. Kashmir shares a common border with both
India and Pakistan but the ruler did not accede to either India or Pakistan before August
1947 requesting the Viceroy for more time to arrive at a final decision regarding
accession of his state. However, when Pakistan attacked Kashmir in October 1947, the
beleaguered ruler acceded to India legally joining the Indian Union.
20
India then sent in troops to counter the aggression and stemmed the Pakistani advance. A
ceasefire was brokered in January 1949 by the United Nations (UN) which stipulated
certain conditions for resolving the issue, the first of which was for Pakistan to withdraw
completely from Kashmir. This would then be followed by a plebiscite to determine the
wishes of the people. Pakistan continues to occupy approximately one third of Kashmir to
this day and considers the Kashmir issue to be the ‘unfinished agenda of Partition.’ In
September 1965 (Op Gibraltar) it launched another unsuccessful war to wrest Kashmir
from India banking on the mistaken notion that Pakistan had the full support of the
Kashmri people.
After a humiliating defeat in 1971 which resulted in the emergence of Bangladesh from
the ashes of East Pakistan and the surrender of over 93,000 men of the Pakistani Army at
Dacca, Pakistan and India signed the Simla Agreement in 1972 which formalized the
1949 UN ceasefire line (with minor changes) as the ‘Line of Control’. The Agreement
further stated that all outstanding issues would be resolved bilaterally without recourse to
force.
In 1988, as the Afghan Jihad was ending with a victory for the mujahidin, Pakistan
launched another attempt to invade Kashmir (Op Topac). The strategy was to ‘bleed India
by a thousand cuts’, by diverting the battle-hardened mujahidin to fight a similar jihad
against India in Kashmir-a proxy war which is still raging. Emboldened after it acquired
the nuclear bomb in May 1998, Pakistan launched the Kargil intrusion in 1999 (Op Badr)
to test India’s responses and internationalize the Kashmir issue.
This misadventure resulted in a military defeat in the face of a resolute but limited Indian
military response and a humiliating withdrawal under US and international diplomatic
pressure. However, the Pakistan-backed insurgency only intensified with increased
terrorist incidents and suicide attacks in Kashmir and beyond its borders in other parts of
India. India also had some initial difficulty in diverting its troops at short notice from
COIN tasks to launching conventional attacks in the mountains (over 18,000 feet high)
against a well entrenched enemy.14
21
The genesis of the present day insurgency in Kashmir can be traced to the alleged
electoral manipulation in the 1986 state elections which led to a loss of faith by
Kashmiris in the Central Government in Delhi and the breakdown of law and order in the
state. Pakistan began to arm and train Kashmiri youth who crossed over the Line of
Control (LOC) for training in insurgency operations against India. The terrain in Kashmir
is mainly mountainous and forested, and the LOC affords many unguarded gaps and
concealed routes through which militants can easily cross into and out of Pakistan to
wreak havoc within India. Though both armies are deployed on the LOC observation is
limited and the movement of conventional forces is slow and arduous. Over the years
India was blamed for being a soft and ineffectual state in its responses to terrorism and
insurgency in Kashmir.
For example, Indian responses have been calibrated in such a manner so as not to
radicalize India’s 140 million moderate Muslims (India has the world’s second largest
Muslim population after Indonesia) which form about 12 percent of India’s one billion
population. India also opposes any demand for secession from the Union (most
Kashmiris prefer ‘Azadi’, independence and freedom from both Indian and Pakistan). The
Indian approach also firmly resists any demands for a breakup of Union on the basis of
any one religion.
For example though the state of Jammu and Kashmir is predominantly Muslim mainly in
the Kashmir Valley, Hindus are in the majority in Jammu, and Buddhists are in the
majority in Ladakh. Many Sikhs have also made Kashmir their home. India is a secular
democratic country and was initially opposed to the partition of the country to
accommodate the Muslims of the subcontinent. It is worth noting that Islam in Kashmir
was tempered by the influence of Hinduism, Sufism and Buddhism. This amalgam of
social framework of Kashmir is sometimes referred to as ‘Kashmiriyat.’
The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) a violent separatist movement for
Kashmiri independence was responsible for much of the violence in Kashmir prior to
22
outbreak of the Islamist insurgency in 1989. In 1971 Indian airlines aircraft was hijacked
and taken to Lahore by members affiliated to the JKLF. In 1984, the group killed an
Indian diplomat in Birmingham UK when India refused to give in to the demands of the
JKLF that their political prisoners be released from Indian jails and a ransom of over $
1.8 million be paid for the release of the diplomat.
The Indian approach was much different in 1989 when Rubiya Sayeed the daughter of
India’s Kashmiri Home Minister was kidnapped by the JKLF in Srinagar. Five Kashmiri
militants were released from Indian custody for her safe return. Soon after, the number
of terrorist incidents and kidnappings increased. The government then took a hard-line
policy on hostage negotiations. However in 1991, a senior Indian Oil Corporation official
was abducted while on a visit to Srinagar. The government entered into a deal with the
terrorists and again released terrorists held in Indian jails for the release of the official
being held hostage. In 1995, six foreign tourists (American, British, Norwegian and
German) were abducted in Kashmir by Al Faran a group associated with Harkat ul
Ansar. The release of 22 terrorists in Indian jails was demanded but was not agreed to
by the Indian government despite prolonged negotiations. One of the hostages escaped
while another was beheaded and his body dumped in the woods. The fate of the others is
still not known. The government of India had stood firm this time. In 1999 however, it
gave in to the hijackers of an Indian Airlines (IC 814) aircraft when three hard core
Pakistani terrorists were released by India for the safe return of over 155 passengers and
crew being held hostage in Kandahar by Pakistani terrorists. The Indian approach has
been inconsistent in its approach to negotiating with terrorists and giving in to their
demands.
The Indian the initial Indian response to the incipient insurgency was the use of force to
quell the disturbances in the Kashmir Valley. The police and paramilitary forces were
inducted into Kashmir and had little sympathy for the Kashmiris. The Central Police
Forces were also not trained or equipped to control mass demonstrations or in
unconventional warfare.
Human rights abuses and the indiscriminate use of force
coupled with wide-spread arrests and allegations of torture alienated the population and
23
spurred the militancy. Frequent political interference by the Central government and
rampant corruption by the state government worsened the situation.
The local state police was subverted and became ineffective. Pakistani infiltration across
the LOC increased as did the number of insurgent attacks on soft targets, religious places
and security forces alike. Additional training camps were opened up in Pakistan and
foreign mercenaries were inducted in larger numbers to augment the strength and the
fighting capabilities of the local insurgents. Hindus living in the Muslim dominated
Srinagar Valley were terrorized and targeted to force them out Kashmir. There were
indiscriminate grenade attacks on market places and buses, places of worship including
mosques and Hindu temples, and on political leaders and innocent bystanders. In 1993
JKLF armed militants took over the Hazrat Bal Mosque in Srinagar and in 1995 another
mosque the Chara e Sharif dedicated to a Sufi saint, was taken over by Afghan militants
and destroyed before they escaped.15 The attacks spilled over into the rest of India.
Suicide attacks were launched against Hindu temples in Gujarat, the Indian parliament
and the Red Fort in Delhi, economic targets in Bombay and in other major cities of India
such as Hyderabad, Varanasi, Coimbatore and Gauhati. The ‘no war, no peace’
insurgency scenario prevailing in the sensitive region of Kashmir has posed a serious
challenge to India, particularly in framing a viable counterinsurgency strategy. The
transformation of the Kashmir insurgency to an Islamist jihad in 1989 makes India’s
approach to counter insurgency in Kashmir all the more delicate to tackle.
At any one time there are about 2,500 Pakistan-backed insurgents operating in Kashmir.
The major terrorist groups are the Lashkar e Taiba, the Jaish e Muhammad, Hizbul
Muhjahidin, and the Harkat ul Mujahidin. The Northern Army Commander, responsible
for the counterinsurgency operations in the whole of Kashmir stated in June 2007 that
only about 80,000 India Army troops are actually involved in active counterinsurgency
operations. About 25,000 troops are guarding the rear administrative areas while about
40,000 are deployed to guard the LOC, the Siachen glacier and the border with China
(statement to the Press June 17, 2007 in HQ Northern Command). Other estimates put
the total troops including the paramilitary forces as high as about 300,000.
24
Following the September 11 attacks against the US, the number of terrorist attacks
against India by Islamist extremists actually increased. The suicide attacks against India’s
Parliament in December 2001, followed by another suicide attack in Kashmir in May
2002 targeting the families of soldiers deployed in Kashmir galvanized India into
mobilizing its armed forces for a punitive military retaliation against Pakistan. General
Musharraf’s statements in January and May 2002 that he would act against the extremists
in Pakistan that were targeting India and intense international diplomatic pressure to
prevent a war that could lead to a nuclear exchange restrained India from going to war
against Pakistan. The troops pulled back in October 2002.
The Indian Approach to Countering Insurgency and Terrorism in Kashmir
Lt General SK Sinha the present Governor of Kashmir said that India has been working
on a three pronged strategy to combat insurgency in Kashmir- coordinated operations,
economic development, and psychological initiatives. A functioning
Unified
Headquarters has been established to coordinate functioning of the security agencies,
intelligence agencies and the civil administration. The Security Advisor to the
Government normally a senior retired Army officer helps ensure that the common aim of
defeating the insurgency is not lost sight of. Combined with a unified strategy, the
aggressive counterinsurgency operations based on hard accurate intelligence has been
yielding good results. The incidence of violence has been reducing every year. In 2007,
the reduction of casualties has been brought down by 55 percent from 2006. As per the
Governor, the strength of the insurgents has been reduced to about 1800 from 3400 in the
past few years. In addition the leadership of the insurgent groups has been hit hard by
successful operations by the security forces. The organization of the counterinsurgency
killing ground into interlocking grids and in tiers from the LOC to the hinterland along
with an effective surveillance of the newly constructed fencing along the LOC has
brought down levels of violence and reduced the reach of the insurgents. Based on the
three pronged strategy,
25
India’s response to terrorism in Kashmir is multi-dimensional to include the military
response to tackle violence, border management to prevent infiltration, political dialogue
and negotiations with all parties that have given up violence, economic measures to
improve the living conditions and job prospects of the local population, diplomatic
initiatives towards peace to include confidence building measures with Pakistan, and
international counter-terrorism cooperation with friendly countries.
Continuation of the Democratic Process and Elections. India has ensured that despite the
turmoil and instability in Kashmir, the democratic process is functional. Elections have
been held regularly when due, and these are both free and fair. Though over 800 people
were killed by terrorists in the 2002 elections to the Kashmir State Assembly, over 28
percent in the Valley, and 70 percent in Ladakh voted. In the April 2006 by-elections to
the State Legislature over 70 percent voted. In the February 2005 elections to 63 urban
civic bodies there was an average of 48 percent voter turn out. Surprisingly, in many of
the terrorism affected areas of Srinagar, over 80 percent of the registered voters cast their
vote.16 The transparency of the electoral process has done much to restore the faith of the
people in good governance and fairness and allowed the Kashmiris to choose their own
leaders.
Military and Civic Aspects
The Army’s Northern Command has the prime responsibility of tackling terrorism and
insurgency in Kashmir. After the Kargil war of 1999, an additional Corps HQ was set up
to control operations in eastern Kashmir and Ladakh sectors. India has approximately
300,000 troops in Kashmir. It is willing to reduce this number if Pakistan shuts down the
58 existing terrorist training camps in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, and stops Islamic
extremists from using Pakistan as a launch pad for terrorist activities against India.
The whole area has been divided into an interlocking and mutually supporting ‘Counter
Insurgency grid’. The size of each grid varies on the lie of the ground and the terrain.
Normally each grid is looked after by a battalion or a brigade-sized formation and it is
responsible for operations within the grid. These areas of responsibilities have been
26
subdivided laterally into (three) tiers extending rearwards in depth so that any terrorists
that manage to evade the first tier or second tier are subsequently trapped in the rear
areas, and apprehended or killed.
Operations of the Army, police, and the paramilitary forces are coordinated by a Unified
Headquarters. The Paramilitary forces include the Border Security Force, Central Reserve
Police Force and Special Forces. In addition, the Rashtriya Rifles (RR) a specially
organized force to deal specifically with counter insurgency has been very successful in
neutralizing the insurgents. 17
Pre-induction COIN Training. Theater and Corps Battle Schools have been set up in
Kashmir for mental and physical pre-induction training to units as a whole. They impart a
four week syllabus in which the units are ‘fine tuned’ to the peculiarities of waging a
successful counter terrorism and counter insurgency campaign in Kashmir. A doctrine on
‘Sub Conventional Operations’ dealing specifically with Counter Insurgency was
released in December 2007.18
Specialized Training. The Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (CIJW) in
Mizoram in India’s North East lays special emphasis on the importance of winning
popular support and respecting human rights in Counter Insurgency operations. In many
cases the Army units have to ‘un-learn’ the lessons of conventional warfare, and change
not only their way of functioning in war but also their mental attitude to fighting in an
insurgency-prone area which is rural and semi-urban.19 Joint training between the US and
Indian Special Forces and many other countries has been conducted at the CIJW School
and also in the Ladakh sector of eastern Kashmir. These exercises brought out valuable
lessons in counterinsurgency operations for both sides. Recently India also conducted
joint counterinsurgency exercises with Russia and China.
Employment of Surrendered Militants in COIN operations
A policy for the voluntary surrender and rehabilitation of misguided Indian Kashmiri
militants was introduced in August 1995. The main objective of this policy is to offer
monetary rewards and incentives to Kashmiri militants want to give up the gun.
27
Additional incentives are offered for turning in weapons, and for providing actionable
real-time intelligence against their former colleagues. Vocational training for future
gainful employment is also offered.
Volunteers of surrendered insurgents have been organized into a Special Operations
Group called the Ikhwanis and have been employed in the forefront of
successful
offensive operations that have killed or captured militant leaders and unearthed caches of
arms, explosives and ammunition.
Counter Infiltration and Border Management.
The key to the Indian approach to counterinsurgency operations in Kashmir is to stop the
movement of insurgents from launch pads and training camps in Pakistan across the LOC
and the between gaps in the International Border. It is estimated that at any given time
there are about 3000 militants operating inside Kashmir and about 300 trained militants
are waiting to infiltrate into India from Pakistan. The prevailing conditions along the
LOC are ideal for small armed groups to move freely from their bases in Pakistan into
Kashmir. To plug the major infiltration routes, India has recently fenced the entire 470
miles of the LOC, and deployed surveillance radars, ground sensors, thermal imaging
devices, night vision devices and early warning detectors are deployed to form a
surveillance grid which is superimposed on the counterinsurgency grid. Unmanned aerial
vehicles are able to monitor any hostile movement and concentrations of insurgent
activity.
To secure the rear areas, retired Army soldiers from the local villages have been
organized into Village Defense Committees. They have been banded into a lightly armed
force to prevent terrorists from gaining a foothold in the vulnerable villages in the
hinterland. Terrorists are therefore, forced out of the semi-urban areas into the
inhospitable open terrain where they can be hunted down by the security forces.
Modernization and Training of the Security Forces
28
India has initiated an extensive modernization plan for its Armed Forces and units
engaged in counterinsurgency operations. These include the raising of additional Special
Forces units and introduction of modern communications, night fighting equipment, and
lightweight body armor. Large scale import of defense equipment has been ordered from
the United States, Israel, Russia and other friendly countries. Concurrently, a concerted
effort has been made to modernize, expand, train and re-equip the Jammu and Kashmir
police, Central Reserve Police Force, the Border Security Force and the Rashtriya Rifles
with the latest weapons and equipment to ensure inter-operability with the Army.
Improved pay scales and increased benefits for the families of those killed in action,
coupled with intensive counter insurgency joint training have raised the morale,
discipline and working ethos of the police.
Intelligence Reorganization.
Intelligence agencies have been reorganized and allotted additional funding to make them
more reliable in providing actionable real-time intelligence. The Defense Intelligence
Agency has been newly raised as recommended by the Kargil Review Committee to
coordinate military intelligence inputs.20 Successful relentless small and large scale
offensive operations based on accurate, actionable intelligence, have raised the morale of
the Security Forces and decimated the leadership of the terrorist organizations operating
within Kashmir. Enhanced surveillance of the LOC has reduced the infiltration across the
LOC. Though sporadic incidents of grenade throwing and car bombings continue, the
overall incidents of violence have reduced from 3479 incidents in 2003 to 2586 in 2004, a
reduction of 26 percent, while the comparative figures between 2004 and 2005 show a
reduction of 34 percent. In 2007 the level of violence in Kashmir has comedown by 55
percent from previous years. The daily rate of killings including security forces, civilians
and terrorists fell from 10 per day in 2003, to 7 in 2004 and 3 in 2005. The estimated
terrorist strength has been reduced to 1800 from about 3000. During the last few months,
over 75 top leaders of various militant groups have been killed by the security forces.21
Special Legislation to Empower the Security Forces and Protection of Human
Rights
29
The Indian approach in Kashmir is very sensitive to allegations of human rights abuses.
Several areas of Kashmir have been declared as “disturbed areas” and the Security forces
have been given special legal powers of search and arrest in such areas. They have
limited immunity from prosecution under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (1990).
Judicial review and oversight has ensured that any alleged excesses are promptly
investigated and the guilty promptly punished.
The security forces and the Army in particular are very conscious of the human rights of
the civilians and the rights of captured insurgents. India has learnt a great deal from the
negative publicity generated against the US in the Abu Ghraib incident and the
Guantanamo Bay detention facility, and has issued strict instructions to treat captured
insurgents as humanely as possible, and leave formal interrogation to specialists. The
central and state governments have been very mindful of the actual conduct of its soldiers
in COIN operations. The local police now accompany the Army on all cordon and search
operations, and female police are being used to search and interrogate women suspects.
Any misuse or abuse of power by the security forces has been dealt with severely under
the law. The Governor of Kashmir stated recently that in the past 16 years, 134 personnel
of the Army had been convicted on charges of human rights abuses in Kashmir. They
were given punishments ranging from life imprisonment to dismissal from the Service
and civil imprisonment. Gen NC Vig, a former Army Chief records that from 1990-2000,
there were 1340 cases of alleged human rights abuses by the army, but only 33 were
substantiated by any evidence. On investigation by the Army, 71 personnel were
punished for various human rights violations including lack of proper supervision and
direct involvement.22
A Human Rights Cell has been operating for years at the Discipline and Vigilance
Directorate at Army Headquarters which oversees all aspects of this subject in
conjunction with the Legal Branch. In addition, the Army has laid down its version of the
“Ten Commandments” to be carried on person by every soldier and implemented by all
ranks deployed on COIN operations. They include “no rape, no molestation or torture, no
meddling in civil administration, respect for human rights, develop interaction with the
media, restriction in the use of excessive force, upholding the code of conduct and
30
honored traditions of the military, avoiding indiscriminate firing or harassment of
civilians, impartiality during cordon and search operations, no acceptance of presents or
gifts for performance of duty or otherwise, acting within the bounds of the law, avoiding
the ‘body count’ approach in counter insurgency operations and maintaining relentless
offensive pressure against terrorists.”
At the national level, the National Human Rights Commission has been established since
1993. It has limited judicial powers and acts as a watchdog to safeguard the human rights
of all concerned.23 A similar organization (the State Human Rights Commission) has
been established in each state. The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 2004 recently
replaced the more draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) of 2002. The new Act
introduces several provisions for appeal by the accused and limits its misuse for political
gain or for settling personal scores. This has boosted the confidence of the public in the
rule of law and the fairness of the judicial system.
Improving Media Relations and Perception Management
A concerted effort has been made to improve the Army’s image in the media (especially
the local language papers) so that an accurate and unbiased picture of military operations
is reported. The Ministry of Defence publishes the Sainik Samachar which covers all
aspects of the Armed Forces and its interaction with the local population throughout
India.
To counter malicious propaganda against the conduct of the security forces, and repudiate
false rumors, a Public Information Directorate has been established at Army HQ. Public
Relations Officers are being posted in the forward Corps HQ and in the Defence Ministry
to act as spokesmen for the Army. Journalists from the print and the electronic media,
and diplomatic personnel are now conducted on regular visits to forward locations to
familiarize themselves with the actual situation in Kashmir. They are also shown
captured arms, ammunition, and explosives. Proof of Pakistani involvement in terrorism
is also produced in the form of captured documents and photographs. The Army has also
incorporated the media in projecting a positive and friendly image of the security forces.
31
Some programs highlight the sacrifices the forces make everyday in fighting terrorism
and to ensure the safety and security of Kashmir and its inhabitants. The Army is also
involved in using the Internet in neutralizing jihadi websites and has its own website to
counter Islamist ideology and highlight the positive aspects of the Indian approach.
An Information Warfare Directorate has been established and this looks into all facets of
cyber security and use of the cyberspace. Journalists and the Army jointly attend
seminars and short courses where the importance of honest and responsible reporting
especially on issues related to the conduct of COIN operations is emphasized. The media
has also been involved in a big way in neutralizing the erroneous perception of the local
population that the security forces are ‘oppressors’ rather than ‘protectors’ of the local
population.
India has also taken steps to remove the erroneous perception broadcast daily by the
Pakistani media that India is anti-Islam and that Indian Muslims are subjugated and
denied freedom of worship throughout India. A broad cross section of Kashmiris of all
age groups and from various walks of life is taken at government expense to tour the
major cities and towns of India. They are encouraged to see for themselves the real
multicultural, secular India that openly allows freedom of worship and encourages
freedom of speech. Recently local village headmen, senior citizens and Muslim religious
teachers have also been included in this effort. They are encouraged to worship at various
mosques around India, and pay their respects at important Muslim holy sites. They are
also taken to see the Indian Parliament in session, and also sit in at the meetings of village
parliaments (panchayat) in other towns and villages of India. These visits have done a lot
to make Kashmiris feel that they are an integral part of India and have helped
considerably to dispel the distorted image that India is an anti-Muslim entity. A wide
range of Indian films and entertainment programs showing the rich cultural and religious
diversity and unity of the nation have been a great success in Kashmir and have helped in
healing communal disharmony and allaying suspicion.
32
Winning Hearts and Minds- Operation Sadbhavna
India has actively employed the Indian Army in a large scale “winning hearts and
minds” campaign (Op Sadbhavna) to improve the living conditions and educational
standards of the locals by establishing schools and computer learning centers, vocational
training centers, organizing health camps and medical treatment centers in far flung areas,
constructing and repairing bridges and houses damaged by enemy action or by the
weather, assisting in farming by providing pumps for irrigation and provision of drinking
water, adopting children orphaned by terrorist violence, providing veterinary cover for
farm livestock, and offering assistance in the provision of radios, television sets, and
computers.
The Army and the Air Force have always helped the local population in a big way during
natural calamities such as heavy snowfalls, floods, drought and earthquakes. Operation
Sadbhavna and disaster management assistance by the Armed Forces, and good
governance by the civilian district authorities have projected a people-friendly approach
and successfully changed the resentful attitude of the people toward the security forces.
There is considerable improvement and security in the daily life of the local population
and there is little support for the violence and insurgency.
Assistance in Economic Development
The Central government has infused millions of dollars to give a boost to the flagging
economy of Kashmir which has been ravaged by terrorism. As a special case, the Central
government has loaned Kashmir 100 percent of the State’s budget since 1990. In
November 2004, the Central government announced a reconstruction plan for Kashmir
involving an outlay of approximately $5.3bn to expand the economic infrastructure and
provide basic services, imparting a thrust to employment, income generation and
providing relief and rehabilitation to the displaced and families of the state. Infrastructure
sectors include power generation, construction of roads, education, health, civic
amenities, tourism, agriculture and food processing, and generation of employment. In
addition, $1.3bn has been earmarked to extend the existing railway network from Jammu
33
to Srinagar in the Kashmir Valley. This project is expected give a big boost to the
economy of the region and is expected to be completed soon. Despite Kashmir’s natural
resources and potential for large scale investment in its economic development, terrorism
and instability have kept private Indian business houses and foreign investors away for
the time being. The number of tourists visiting Kashmir has also increased over the years
because of the improvement in the insurgency situation.
International Cooperation and Diplomatic Pressure
India strongly supports the United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution 1373 and
has signed all 12 UN Conventions on Terrorism. It is also a signatory to the 1987 South
Asia Association of Regional Cooperation Convention on Suppression of Terrorism.
India has Joint Working Groups on Terrorism with over 25 countries which include USA,
UK, Israel, Germany, France, Canada, Russia, the European Union and China. This
includes bilateral cooperation in criminal matters, drug trafficking, exchange of
information about terrorist groups and joint anti-terrorism training.
Diplomatic pressure has worked to some extent on Pakistan’s leadership for it to crack
down on the terrorist infrastructure within Pakistan. The US has confirmed that terrorist
groups on its list of “Foreign Terrorist Organizations” such as Lashkar e Taiba, Jaish e
Muhammad, and Harkat ul- Mujahidin have bases in Pakistan, in addition, “other
terrorist groups” such as Al Badr Mujhahidin, Harkat ul Jihad e Islami and the Jamat ul
Mujhahidin also operate from within Pakistan.24
Peace Initiatives and Confidence Building Measures with Pakistan.
Several peace initiatives and confidence building measures have being initiated by India
to bring down the level of mistrust between India and Pakistan. In November 2003 there
has been a ceasefire along the LOC between the two armies which is still holding. In
2006 India and Pakistan set up a joint Anti-terror Mechanism. However, Pakistan has not
yet been able to dismantle the infrastructure of terror directed against India or disarm the
various terrorist groups operating against India. The current turmoil and instability in
Pakistan is being closely watched by India and steps have been taken to ensure that
34
extremists do not take advantage of the situation by launching catastrophic attacks against
Indian targets.
Both Pakistan and India have now taken a pragmatic approach to the Kashmir issue
which has brought down insurgent activity. Several projects to enable movement on both
sides of the LOC have been launched. The Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service was
flagged off in April 2005. This is now a regular service and has re-united many families
on either side of the LOC. Additional routes linking other towns have been planned.
There is also a train service connecting Delhi to Lahore. The LOC has been transformed
into a ‘soft border’, and people to people contact across it has been encouraged.
Consequently, popular support for violence and an armed struggle is expected to wane
leading to a drop in insurgent activity.
Open Dialogue with Separatist Groups. The Indian government has initiated talks with
several political parties in Kashmir with the support of the State government and allowed
them to visit Pakistan for talks with Pakistani officials. A senior bureaucrat has been
nominated specially as the government interlocutor on Kashmir. India has also offered to
talk directly with separatist groups if they give up violence. Two round table meetings
have been held with various groups in the past two years, though no real breakthrough
has been achieved so far. Pakistan too, has been more flexible in its approach, and is
willing to discuss other matters in addition to Kashmir (which was earlier the “core issue”
between India and Pakistan).
India’s COIN Doctrine
The 77 page “Doctrine for sub Conventional Operations” emphasizes that the Army must
follow the philosophy of an ‘Iron Fist in a Velvet Glove’ and conduct COIN operations
keeping in mind “a humane and people-centric approach, which underscores the need for
scrupulously upholding the laws of the land, deep respect for human rights and minimum
use of kinetic means to create a secure environment without causing collateral damage.”
25
It also advocates the use of overwhelming force against foreign and hardcore terrorists
35
while giving a fair opportunity to others to shun violence, surrender, and join the
moderate mainstream of the nation. The Doctrine re-emphasizes the soldier’s ‘Ten
Commandments’ and ‘Dos and Don’ts’ while exercising powers under the Armed Forces
Special Powers Act in ‘disturbed areas’. The doctrine also emphasizes the importance
training to change the mindset of all personnel from fighting a conventional war to
fighting ones own people in COIN operations. The importance of upkeep of all civic
action projects is highlighted, as is gaining and keeping popular support which is crucial
both to the insurgent and for COIN operations. Projects that address the aspirations of the
people and also target the youth, create jobs, and improve education and afford health
care are particularly important. The role of the armed forces is to act as a facilitator to
bring down the level of violence and enhancing civilian control in the area of operations,
so that the political process can be initiated. Military operations should aim firstly at
neutralizing all hostile elements in the conflict zone that oppose or retard the peace
initiatives and secondly at transforming the will and attitude of the people to bring about
a realization that fighting the government is a ‘no win’ situation and delay the
normalization process and stresses that this process can take years or decades to change.
Isolation of the conflict zone from ‘external material assistance’ and the interception of
external support at the borders are also stressed. The doctrine states that the number of
terrorist killed or captured cannot help military commanders gauge overall success of
their operations. This must also be measured by the groundswell for peace that operations
generate within the populace. Regarding personal behavior of military soldiers engaged
in COIN operations, the doctrine touches upon the fact that the Army ‘draws its strength
from its ethos traditions and culture that have shaped the organization’s thinking over
centuries.’
This document has attempted to formalize the conduct of COIN operations and has
emphasized that all military in COIN operations all actions must people-centric, confirm
to the laid down laws, use minimum force and aim at restoring civilian control, while at
the same time acting aggressively against those elements who receive foreign support and
are bent on confronting the government and exploiting the laws of war.
Conclusions
36
1.
Indian approach to COIN has been a mix of political accommodation, economic
development and the use of force. 26
2.
Demands for secession or independence from the Union are put down firmly
and not accepted. India is willing to wear down the insurgents until this demand
is dropped or modified.
3.
India is willing to talk to separatist groups and its neighbors even though they
support cross border terrorism and insurgency.
4.
While India is willing to create new states within the Union to accommodate
ethno-nationalist aspirations and tribal boundaries, it is not willing to create
additional states based solely on any one religion.
5.
India has been very particular not to use indiscriminate force, aerial
bombardment and heavy firepower in COIN despite its conventional and
nuclear superiority in the region.
6.
COIN operations in Kashmir have been very particular to minimize the impact
on India’s 140 million moderate Muslims.
7.
Despite proof of external support, India has always conducted its COIN within
its own borders.
8.
India COIN approach follows the strategy of ‘an iron fist in a velvet glove,’
adopting an aggressive military approach towards hard-core insurgents and a
humane face towards the local population.
9.
India’s COIN approach has been aimed at using the security forces to create
conditions for a political solution to restore normalcy in the insurgency affected
area.
10.
Human rights and weaning the population away from supporting the insurgents
is the major plank of India’s COIN operations. To achieve this a multidimension approach to include, people-centric civic action programs, economic
development, perception management programs, cultivating a responsible
media, training of troops for COIN operations, force modernization, good
governance, the rule of law, accountability and transparency, diplomatic and
international cooperation and support, and a functioning corruption free
37
democracy form parts of the comprehensive Indian approach to COIN
operations.
11.
India has the capability to stay the course and fight an insurgency in a protracted
low intensity conflict to wear down the insurgencies and its supporters however,
it prefers to resolve the legitimate grievances and welcome its citizens into the
democratic process as quickly as possible.
12.
In Kashmir, the Indian approach has been based on three major thrust lines to
wean away Kashmiri support to the insurgency and restore normalcy; first, cut
off the insurgents from their support base in Pakistan and destroy them within
India to provide security to the state, improve the socio-economic structure of
the state by increasing development projects, ensuring good governance, and
improving the daily life of the people ravaged by decades of insurgency and
terrorism, psychological initiatives to win the hearts and minds of the people
and initiate a genuine dialogue with all parties to the conflict restore India’s
credibility within Kashmir and arrive at a just resolution within the Union.
The current Indian approach to COIN operations has evolved over decades of its
experience in fighting insurgency and terrorism. Kashmir has taxed the recourses of
India like no other COIN campaign. External support to the insurgents and their
religious fervor make winning the COIN war against them a very difficult and
protracted operation. India has both the will and the staying power to continue
fighting; keeping the paramount principles of its approach to COIN- minimum force
and acting in good faith.
1
Many accounts have been written on the Kargil Conflict; for one of the earliest accounts see Jasjit Ed,
Kargil 1999: Pakistan’s Fourth War for Kashmir, Knowledge World , New Delhi, 1999 and From
Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report, Sage Publications New Delhi, 2000.
2
For one account of the war see, DK Palit, War in the High Himalaya: The Indian Army in Crisis-1962,
Palgrave Macmillan , 1992.
3
See The Military Balance 2006, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, p.230
4
For an excellent account of the Indian Army up to the Second World War see, Philip Mason, A Matter of
Honour: An Account of the Indian Army, its Officers and Men, EDB Educational Pvt Ltd, Dehra Dun,
1988. India formed part of the International Control Commission at the end of the war in Indo-China in
1954 and the Neutral Nations Repatriation Committee after the Korean War Armistice in 1953. Indian
38
Armed Forces and Police forces are one of the largest contributors to United Nations Peace Keeping
Operations.
5
India presently has 28 states and 7 Union Territories.
6
The total strength of the Paramilitary forces is about 1.7 million.
7
The Kargil Review Committee was followed by a complete overhaul of India’s security organization
which included reform of the intelligence and national security system. It was also recommended that there
should be one force to guard India’s land borders and a separate force to fight insurgency and terrorism so
that the Armed Forces can revert to their primary role. The Central Reserve Police Force has been
designated this force. See Reforming the National Security System: Recommendations of the Group of
Ministers, published by the Government of India Press, New Delhi, 2001.
8
Sometimes referred to as the ‘seven sisters’, these are Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Meghalaya,
Arunachal Pradesh, Tripura and Assam .
9
For an overview see Lawrence E. Cline, The Insurgency Environment in Northeast Indian, Small Wars
and Insurgencies, Vol. 17, No. 2. June 2006, pp. 126-147.
10
Cited in Robert Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History, Macdonald and Jane’s, London
1975, p.147, quoted in Sankaran Kalyanaraman, ‘The Indian Way in Counterinsurgency’, in Efraim Inbar,
Ed, Review of International Affairs, Vol 2, No.2, Spring 2003.
11
Also see Rajesh Rajagopalan, ‘Restoring Normalcy: The Evolution of the Indian Army’s
Counterinsurgency Doctrine’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 11, No. 1, Spring 2000 pp. 44-68.
12
For one account of the build up in Punjab see, Mark Tully and Satish Jacob, Amritsar: Indira Gandhi’s
Last Battle, Rupa, New Delhi, 2006. The book was first published in 1985. For an account of the attack on
the Golden Temple see, KS Brar, Operation Blue Star: The True Story, South Asia Books, 1993.
13
See Lt General Depinder Singh, The IPKF in Sri Lanka, South Asia books, 1992, The Indian Army in Sri
Lanka 1987-1990 at <http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1987/index.html>
and C. Christine Fair, Urban Battle Fields of South Asia: Lessons Learnt from Sri Lanka, India, and
Pakistan, RAND, 2004.
14
The difficulties in this transition are very well covered in Marcus P. Acosta, ‘The Kargil Conflict:
Waging War in the Himalayas’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol 18, No. 3, September 2007, pp. 397415.
15
For the Indian approach to handling the crisis see Wahahat Habibullah, ‘Siege: Hazrat Bal, Kashmir
1993’, India Review, Vol 1, No. 3, July 2002, pp. 73-98. Also see Ron E. Hassner, ‘Fighting Insurgency on
Sacred Ground’, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2006, pp. 149-166, wherein the inherent difficulties of
attacking mosques held by insurgents in Iraq is analyzed.
16
Figures compiled from Annual Reports of the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs 19992006.
17
See Rajesh Rajagopalan,’ Innovations in Counterinsurgency: the Indian Army’s Rashtriya Rifles,’
Contemporary South Asia, 13 (1) March 2004, pp. 25-37.
18
The Doctrine can be downloaded at <www.indian army.nic.in/indar_doctrine.htm>
19
Also see C. Christine Fair, Urban Battle Fields of South Asia: Lessons Learnt from Sri Lanka, India, and
Pakistan, RAND Arroyo Center, 2004.
20
See The Kargil Review Committee Report released December 15, 1999 and re-published in book form,
K Subrahmanyam, From Surprise to Reckoning, New Delhi, Sage Publications, 2000, and Reforming the
National Security System: Recommendations of the Group of Ministers, New Delhi, February 2001.
21
Lt Gen (retd) SK Sinha, Governor of Jammu and Kashmir during an address to the United Service
Institution (USI) of India , New Delhi, reproduced as “Jammu and Kashmir: Past ,Present and Future”, The
Journal of the USI of India, no. 560, (April –June 2005), 182-199.
22
See US State Department website<www.state.gov/g/drl/frl/hrrpt/2005/61707.htm>, and Lt Gen SK
Sinha, Note 17 ante, and website<http;//mod.nic.in/samchar/jan15-03/html/ch/htm>. Also see Prabhu
Ghate, “Kashmir, The Dirty War”, Economic and Political Weekly, January 26, 2002, 313-322.
39
23
See website at <http;//nhrc.nic.in/>
Ibid. Also see US Department of State, “Patterns of Global Terrorism,” Year 2003 onwards.
For a very well discussed analysis of the Doctrine see Gautam Navlakha, ‘Doctrine for Sub-Conventional
Operations: a Critique,’ Economic and Political Weekly, April 7, 2007 from whom I have borrowed freely.
26
Also see Rajesh Rajagopalan, ‘ Force and Compromise: India’s Counter-Insurgency Grand Strategy,’
South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol XXX, No. 1, April 2007, pp. 75-91.
24
25
40