IML@ News
(Issue No. 28, May 25, 2005)
U.S. Supreme Court
Court Rejects Agins in Takings Case Lingle v. Chevron U. S. A. Inc., 2005 WL
1200710 (U.S. May 23, 2005) (No. 04-163) Concerned about the effects of market
concentration on retail gasoline prices, the Hawaii Legislature passed Act 257, which
limited the rent oil companies could charge dealers leasing company-owned service
stations. At the time, only two refineries and six gasoline wholesalers were doing
business in the State. Chevron, then one of the largest oil companies in Hawaii,
controlled 60 percent of the market for gasoline produced or refined in the State, and 30
percent of the wholesale market on the State’s most populous island. Chevron sued,
seeking a declaration that the rent cap effected an unconstitutional taking of its property
(its profits) and an injunction against application of the cap to its stations. The district
court found that the cap would not actually reduce retail gas prices and, applying Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (where the Court declared that government
regulation of private property "effects a taking if [it] does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests") held that the rent cap effected an uncompensated taking in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because it did not substantially
advance Hawaii’s asserted interest in controlling retail gas prices. The Ninth Circuit
affirmed. On May 23, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Justice O’Connor
delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court; Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion.
"This case requires us to decide whether the ‘substantially advances’ formula announced
in Agins is an appropriate test for determining whether a regulation effects a Fifth
Amendment taking. We conclude that it is not." Noting that this was the Court’s "first
opportunity to consider the [Agins formula] as a free-standing takings test," it concluded
the formula "prescribes an inquiry in the nature of a due process, not a takings, test, and
that it has no proper place in our takings jurisprudence." The "substantially advances"
formula suggests a means-ends test – whether a regulation of private property is effective
in achieving some legitimate public purpose – but reveals nothing about the magnitude or
distribution of the burden that the regulation imposes upon property rights. This approach
was "doctrinally untenable" as it ignored both the basis of the Takings Clause and the
justification for allowing regulatory actions to be challenged under the Clause. The facts
in this case, the Court noted, were particularly apt in illustrating the flaws of the
"substantially advances" formula: Chevron had failed to argue or establish that it had
been "singled out to bear any particularly severe regulatory burden." Moreover, the Agins
formula undermined deference to legislative judgments and presented the courts with the
practical difficulty of second-guessing state and federal legislation, "a task for which
courts are not well-suited." The opinion can be accessed at the Supreme Court’s website
at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/04slipopinion.html IMLA, in conjunction
with several other entities, filed an amicus brief supporting Hawaii in the case. The brief
was authored by Timothy J. Dowling of the Community Rights Center on behalf of the
State and Local Legal Center and its member organizations.
Case Law Update
Here’s a brief look at some decisions of interest since the last Newsletter. Other case
summaries are available at the What’s New page at www.imla.org
"Excusable Neglect" Dimmitt v. Ockenfels, No. 04-1618 (1st Cir. May 12, 2005)
Dimmitt filed suit alleging excessive force on the part of the town’s police officers. The
defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, as well as the required statement of
material facts. While the plaintiff’s counsel submitted a timely opposition to the motion,
the accompanying statement of material facts (setting forth his putative evidence relating
to the use of excessive force) did not comply with Local Rule 56(c), which required that
the counterstatement expressly admit, deny or qualify each paragraph of the defendants'
statement of material facts. When the defendants filed a motion to strike the the
counterstatement as noncompliant with the local rules, Dimmitt's counsel raised
"excusable neglect" (see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 (b)) in response, claiming inexperience and
unfamiliarity, and pointing to a "good-faith effort" to comply. The district court granted
the motion to strike and in the absence of a timely counterstatement, it granted summary
judgment for the defendants. On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed. Although the
"excusable neglect" inquiry involved "a significant equitable component" and was to give
due regard to the totality of the relevant circumstances, the district court did not abuse its
discretion. Even under the flexible standard required, "counsels' inattention or
carelessness, such as a failure to consult or to abide by an unambiguous court procedural
rule, normally" did not constitute "excusable neglect." See
http://laws.lp.findlaw.com/1st/041618.html
Section 1983 - No "Seizure" DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, No. 03-4892 (3d Cir.
May 12, 2005) The plaintiffs, two candidates for office in the defendant municipality,
were campaigning when police told them to stop campaigning at that location as their
signs were blocking motorists’ views. They refused and were cited for defiant trespass.
After all charges were dismissed, the plaintiffs brought a Section 1983 action for
malicious prosecution, claiming that having to attend their trials for defiant trespass
constituted an unreasonable seizure. After the jury found that the officer had no probable
cause to issue the defiant trespass summons, and acted for a purpose other than bringing
the plaintiffs to justice, the judge entered judgment for defendants. He ruled that having
to attend pretrial and trial hearings did not constitute a government "seizure" in a Section
1983 malicious prosecution action predicated on the Fourth Amendment. On appeal and
cross appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed. While pretrial custody and some onerous types
of pretrial, non-custodial restrictions constituted a Fourth Amendment seizure, in this
case, the plaintiffs’ liberty was restricted only during the Municipal Court trials. The
Fourth Amendment did not extend beyond the period of pretrial restrictions. See
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/3rd/034892p.pdf
City Policies and FMLA Leave Callison v. City of Philadelphia, No. 04-2941 (3d Cir.
May 19, 2005) Callison, a city employee, was diagnosed with "deep anxiety reaction and
stress." After he missed a significant amount of work due to sick leave, he was placed on
a Sick Abuse List. Listed employees were required to "call in": notify the city when
leaving home and upon return while being on sick leave. He failed to do so. He obtained
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave and, during the course of this leave, also
failed to comply. He received two suspensions and sued, claiming the enforcement of
city's call-in policy while he was on FMLA leave interfered with his substantive FMLA
rights. The FMLA provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with,
restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this
subchapter." 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). It was undisputed that he was entitled to the benefits
of the FMLA. The district court held that the FMLA was not compromised by the policy
because it "neither prevents employees from taking FMLA leave nor discourages
employees from taking such leave. It simply ensures that employees do not abuse their
FMLA leave." On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed. The city provided the plaintiff with
the entitlements in the FMLA, and nothing in that Act preempted the "call-in" policy.
There was no right in the FMLA to be "left alone" while on leave. See
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/3rd/042941p.pdf
Establishment Clause – "In God We Trust" Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm'rs, No. 04-1753
(4th Cir. May 13, 2005) Two attorneys sued, alleging that the County Board of
Commissioners violated the Establishment Clause when it authorized the phrase, "In God
We Trust," to be inscribed on the facade of the county’s government building. The
district court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim, finding no First Amendment
violation upon applying the test in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). The
plaintiffs appealed, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The complaint failed to sufficiently
allege that the display had no legitimate secular purpose; that it had the effect of
advancing or endorsing religion; or that it resulted in an excessive entanglement of
government and religion. Assessing the Board’s use of the national motto in its full
context – "as a statement with religious content, and as one with legitimate secular
associations born of its consistent use on coins and currency, and as the national motto,"
the Board’s use of the phrase did not contravene the Establishment Clause. See
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/4th/041753p.pdf
Search and Seizure - Motion to Suppress U.S. v. Santiago, No. 03-30786 (5th Cir.
May 18, 2005) Police investigating a burglary attended at Santiago’s home as he was
allegedly the "fence" for the stolen goods. He allegedly allowed officers to enter and
acquiesced to a search of the home. Firearms and stolen goods were found. To get
Santiago to sign a written statement admitting he had purchased the items, the deputies
promised Santiago that he would not be arrested, and never informed him of his Miranda
rights. Santiago was subsequently indicted and moved to suppress the evidence of the
items and the statement. The district court denied the motion, finding no Fourth
Amendment violations. While Santiago was not advised of his Miranda rights, any
potential taint of the search was removed by his testimony that he was familiar with his
rights. On appeal, the court affirmed. The district court’s assumed finding that Santiago
invited the deputies into his home and consented to their search was reasonable and wellsupported by the record; as a consequence, the discovery and seizure of the firearms was
lawful. The statement was not rendered involuntary merely because the suspect was
promised leniency if he cooperated with police. Santiago had prior familiarity with the
law, and the statement was not the product of either duress or undue coercion;
accordingly, the district court appropriately determined that the statement was not
rendered involuntarily. See http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/5th/0330786p.pdf
Section 1983 – Denial of Qualified Immunity Sample v. Bailey, No. 04-4174 (6th Cir.
May 9, 2005) Police responding to a security alarm found Sample on the business’s
premises carrying a computer. Sample "took off" and was found hiding in a cabinet. The
defendant officer claimed Sample did not heed his commands, but reached inside his
jacket, at which point the officer shot him seven times. Another officer said he never saw
Sample reach inside his jacket. Sample apparently told officers later he was reaching for
his cigarettes. The district court denied the officer’s motion for summary judgment on the
ground of qualified immunity as, when the facts were taken in the light most favorable to
Sample, he had alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. On appeal,
the court affirmed. Under the facts alleged by Sample, the officer was not faced with a
serious threat of physical harm to himself or his partner which would necessitate the use
of deadly force. This case did not present a novel factual circumstance such that an
officer would be unaware of the constitutional parameters of his actions: it had been
"clearly established in this circuit for the last twenty years" that a criminal suspect had "a
right not to be shot unless he [was] perceived to pose a threat to the pursuing officers or
to others during flight." See http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/6th/044174p.pdf
Trespasser Has No Legitimate Expectation of Privacy U.S. v. Hunyady, No. 04-1325
(6th Cir. May 17, 2005) Hunyady had broken into, and was living in, the home of his
deceased father under a notice to vacate given by the personal representative of his
father’s estate, who had been given control of the house. The representative informed
agents that he had seen two machine guns and a silencer at the home and agreed to let
them search the premises. Agents found the firearms and silencer that belonged to
Hunyady and he was subsequently convicted of firearm offenses. He appealed the district
court’s rejection of his motion to suppress the evidence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed,
finding that Hunyady had no legitimate expectation of privacy at the property. Although
the district court held he was a tenant by sufferance, this was a misapprehension of the
relationship in which Hunyady, in fact, was a trespasser. Because Hunyady’s presence on
the property was wrongful, and because he had a tenuous connection to an otherwise
empty house, he had no legitimate expectation of privacy. See
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/6th/041325p.pdf
Search Warrants - Good Faith Exception U.S. v. Laughton, No. 03-1202 (6th Cir.
May 17, 2005) Police obtained a search warrant based on the investigating officer’s
affidavit stating a confidential informant had made "multiple purchases of
methamphetamine." It did not say explicitly that the informant had purchased the
narcotics from the suspect, the defendant, and, although it stated the informant had
observed "controlled substances at or in the residence or located on the person of" the
suspect, it did not indicate where that residence was or when these observations were
made. On the defendant’s motion to suppress, the district court denied, finding that the
warrant, while issued without probable cause, was nevertheless valid under the "good
faith" exception to the exclusionary rule announced by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), based upon the fact that the deputy had taken the
information to a magistrate and was "able to furnish more than what has been deemed
bare bones or a mere conclusion." The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule was not applicable to the circumstances surrounding
the search and that the evidence seized should have been suppressed. The warrant failed
to establish any nexus between the residence to be searched and the criminal activity
attributed to the defendant in the affidavit; the affidavit also failed to indicate any
connection between the address given, the criminal activity that occurred there, and the
defendant. "No reasonable officer could have believed that the affidavit was not so
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to be reliable." See
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/6th/031202p.pdf
Section 1983 - Inmate Medications – Municipal Liability Calhoun v. Ramsey, No.
03-3036 (7th Cir. May 17, 2005) The jail’s medical policy required that medication
prescribed to inmates prior to incarceration had to be verified and approved before it
could be administered to the inmate, and any medication in the possession of a detainee at
admission was to be withheld until verification of its proper use. The verification was to
be made as soon as possible, within the time interval specified for administration of the
medication on its container. The plaintiff unsuccessfully sought to obtain this verification
prior to being admitted to the jail. The first of his eight medications was to be taken upon
going to sleep, which meant no earlier than 10 p.m. at the jail. Shortly after 9:00 p.m., he
was found in need of medical attention and hospitalized. In his Section 1983 action, he
claimed deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. The district court dismissed and the Seventh Circuit affirmed over his
challenges to jury instructions on municipal liability and the introduction of certain
evidence. See http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/7th/033036p.pdf
Interference With City Communications System U.S. v. Mitra, No. 04-2328, 2005
WL 949084 (7th Cir. Apr. 18, 2005) The city used a computer-based radio system for
police, fire, ambulance, and other emergency communications. The "Smartnet II" system
spread traffic across 20 frequencies, one of which was designated for control. A radio
unit (mobile or base) used the control channel to initiate a conversation. Computer
hardware and software assigned the conversation to an open channel. Mitra was charged
and convicted of intentional interference with computer-related systems used in interstate
commerce, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(5), after he was found to have blocked or jammed the
control channel. Once the control channel was interfered with, remote units were unable
to communicate. The statute made it an offense to cause transmission damage
(impairment or impediment to data, a program, or a system) of a "protected computer," as
defined. Mitra appealed, arguing that even if the radio system contained a computer, his
conduct did not violate § 1030, or that if it did, the statute exceeded Congress’s
commerce power. The court disagreed. The Smartnet II was a protected computer
because it contained a chip that performed high-speed processing in response to signals
received on the control channel and, as a whole, was a "communications facility directly
related to or operating in conjunction" with that computer chip, and was a "protected
computer" because it was used in interstate communication. The fact that technology had
changed since the statute was enacted (for example, by the inclusion of "computers" in
iPods and cell phones) did not justify giving the statute a meaning other than as it was
written. "Legislation is an objective text approved in constitutionally prescribed ways; its
scope is not limited by the cerebrations of those voted for or signed it into law," and there
was no constitutional obstacle to enforcing a broad, but clear statute. See
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/IZ0V3TOY.pdf
Warrantless Entry - Emergency U.S. v. Martinez, No. 04-30098 (9th Cir. May 16,
2005) In this case, the Ninth Circuit ruled a domestic disturbance constituted an
emergency sufficient to justify a warrantless entry into a home, in the circumstances
presented in the case. Police were responding to a call about an "out of control" male, and
had responded to domestic disturbance calls, with observable injury, at the address
before. Police found the female caller outside the house, and entered the premises
because of angry yelling inside. They noticed two rifles and a shortened barrel shotgun
resting on the couch, which the defendant stated he was trying to hide. The district court
denied his suppression motion, and on appeal, the court affirmed. "The volatility of
situations involving domestic violence make them particularly well-suited for an
application of the emergency doctrine." The requirements of the emergency doctrine
were satisfied in this case, justifying the officer’s warrantless entry into the home and
subsequent seizure of the firearms. See
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0430098p.pdf
Arrest Warrant and Identity Theft Fulgencio v. City of Los Angeles, No. 03-56501
(9th Cir. May 23, 2005) The Ninth Circuit has held that the fact that an arrestee's identity
had been stolen was irrelevant to the determination of whether a warrant was sufficiently
specific. Fulgencio sued the city and police officers under Section 1983, claiming that his
constitutional rights had been violated when he was arrested pursuant to a warrant that
mistakenly identified him as the suspect, and when he was imprisoned without
investigation of his claims of innocence. The district court entered summary judgment for
the city and officers, and on appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The fact that the real
suspect had made use of Fulgencio's stolen identity was irrelevant in determining whether
the arrest warrant was sufficiently specific; the arrest was based on probable cause; and
his due process rights were not violated by his five-day detention. "Because the warrant
identified a suspect with Fulgencio's exact name, date of birth, driver's license number,
height, hair color, eye color, and with a weight only five pounds different than
Fulgencio's, a reasonable police officer could easily have believed that Fulgencio was the
suspect." However, given the discrepant race and birthplace, and because Fulgencio was
already detained by INS when city police officers arrived to arrest him, the officers could
have taken more care to ascertain whether he was in fact the named suspect. The court, in
concluding, noted that "in light of the growing problem of identity theft, law enforcement
officers must take seriously claims of stolen identity."
Beware: Litigation Involving a Minor Baumann v. Capozio, No. 041908 (Va. April
22, 2005) Tyler, a 17-year-old, was injured during a fight with the defendant Capozio.
Tyler’s parents sued as next friends of Tyler, alleging that Tyler incurred medical bills
and other damages. An itemized list of medical bills that the parents incurred on behalf of
Tyler totaled over $25,000. Upon reaching the age of majority, Tyler settled his claims
against Capozio before trial and the court entered an order dismissing the case with
prejudice. He executed a full release of "all known injuries and damages, as well as those
unknown and unanticipated, resulting from said incident....", although neither parent was
a party to the release. The parents then sought to recover medical expenses, interest and
costs that they had incurred on behalf of their son arising from the fight. The defendant
argued the claim was barred by accord and satisfaction, waiver, release and estoppel. The
circuit court concluded that the plaintiffs had waived their claims to recover medical
expenses in favor of their son. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court reversed. In cases
involving an injury to a minor, two causes of action ordinarily arise: one for the minor’s
damages for pain and suffering, permanent injury and impairment of earning capacity
after attaining majority; the other is on behalf of the parent for loss of services during
minority and necessary expenses incurred. The only issue was whether the parents had
impliedly waived their claim. The parents "lost control of that litigation when their son
reached the age of majority and signed a release that resulted in the settlement of that
lawsuit. Plaintiffs in this appeal were not parties to the release" and were able to recover.
See http://www.courts.state.va.us/opinions/opnscvwp/1041908.pdf
People and Places
Welcome to New Members!
Joseph L. Howard, Jr., County Attorney, Stafford County, Virginia
Glenn Klein and Jerome Lidz of Harrang Long Gary Rudnick, P.C., Eugene, Oregon
Wesley C. Maness and William P. Remington, of Shannon Gracey Ratliff & Miller,
LLP Thomas P. O'Donnell, Law Director, Highland Hills, Ohio
Christine B. Simpson, Town Attorney, Cary, North Carolina
Other Member News
Sona Pancholy We regret to advise members that Sona Pancholy, IMLA Associate
Counsel, is leaving IMLA effective June 17, 2005, to work with IMLA Past President,
Iris Jones, in the client services area of the Akin Gump law firm in Washington, D.C.
We are sorry to lose this valued and talented employee, and wish her all the best in her
new position. IMLA will begin recruiting to fill this vacancy immediately. Sona’s work is
primarily in the program planning, legislative advocacy, and International Committee
areas of IMLA. Should any of you know of individuals who you feel may be well suited
for this position, please let us know. The position will be advertised shortly with a closing
date of June 30, 2005. The salary pay range is $55,000 to $75,000 per annum. For further
information, please contact IMLA General Counsel/Executive Director, Henry
Underhill, at hunderhill@imla.org
Help Wanted IMLA is looking for a writer on a First Amendment topic for the
September/October 2005 issue of the Municipal Lawyer magazine. The article deadline is
July 18. Please contact me, Sophia Stadnyk, at sstadnyk@imla.org for further details!
Federal Update
Anticipated Transportation Bill Includes Rights-of-Way and Predatory Towing
Protections The current extensions of the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century
(TEA-21) expire on May 31. The House bill, H.R. 3, passed in March and the Senate
version, S. 732, is expected to be adopted very soon. One provision of particular
relevance to IMLA members concern local governments' power to regulate their public
rights-of-way with regards intelligent transportation systems (ITS). The ITS program
established under TEA-21 was particularly favorable to one key private company
providing this technology and allowed intelligent transportation contractors access to
rights-of-way on roadways, even if this meant trumping local regulations. However, the
substitute language, supported by National League of Cities and U.S. Conference of
Mayors, "narrows this exemption and closes a potentially dangerous loophole affecting
state and local authority to manage and preserve public rights-of-way, as Congress begins
to rewrite federal telecommunications law." (Source: www.nlc.org). The second key
language includes important protections from predatory tow truck operators, an issue
IMLA has followed closely. Although it is limited, the provision seeks to restore local
restore local control over towing and to clear confusion resulting from the Federal
Aviation Administration Authorization (FAAA) Act of 1994, codified at 49 U.S. C.
Section 14501(c). The proposal would grant state and local governments limited authority
to regulate tow operations from private property that occur without permission from the
property owner.
Spotlight On ... VoIP
FCC Order on 911 Access/VoIP On May 19, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) issued an Order on so-called "web phones" or VoIP (Voice over
Internet Protocol), which will set strict new 911 requirements for most Internet phone
providers. "The Order places obligations on interconnected VoIP service providers that
are similar to traditional telephone providers in that they enable customers to receive calls
from and terminate calls to the public switched telephone network (PSTN). It does not
place obligations on other IP based service providers, such as those that provide instant
messaging or Internet gaming services, because although these services may contain a
voice component, customers of these services cannot receive calls from and place calls to
the PSTN." Interconnected VoIP providers must:
– deliver all 911 calls to the customer’s local emergency operator. This must be a
standard, rather than optional, service feature.
– provide emergency operators with the call back number and location information of
their customers (i.e., E911) where the emergency operator is capable of receiving it.
Although the customer must provide the location information, the VoIP provider must
provide the customer a means of updating this information, whether he or she is at home
or away from home.
– by the effective date, inform their customers, both new and existing, of the E911
capabilities and limitations of their service.
– incumbent LECs are required to provide access to their E911 networks to any
requesting telecommunications carrier. Interconnected VoIP providers must comply with
these requirements, and submit to the FCC a letter detailing such compliance, no later
than 120 days after the effective date of the Order. Rates are not specified.
The FCC stated its intention to adopt, in a future order, an advanced E911 solution that
includes a method for determining the customer’s location without the customer having
to self-report this information. The May 19 Order must first be published in the Federal
Register and becomes effective 120 days afterwards. For the FCC News Release, see
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-258818A1.pdf and
http://www.fcc.gov For an article on the Order, see http://www.internetnews.com/busnews/article.php/3506356
At the same time, lawmakers in both the U.S. Senate and House introduced similar
legislation to the FCC’s Order: The IP-Enabled Voice Communications and Public Safety
Act requires VoIP providers to ensure that 911 and Enhanced 911 (E911) services are
available to customers. Sen. Conrad Burns (R-Mont.) is sponsoring the bill in the Senate
along with co-sponsors Bill Nelson (D-Fla.) and Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-N.Y.). Rep.
Bart Gordon (D-Tenn.) is the House sponsor.
Canadian CRTC Ruling The Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications
Commission (CRTC) ruled on May 12 that it would regulate VoIP service only when it is
provided and used as local telephone service. Charles Dalfen, Chairman of the CRTC,
stated, "Why did we find that VoIP is a telephone service? Because Canadians use it as a
telephone service, it's being sold as a telephone service and it functions as a telephone
service. It provides two-way real-time voice communications to and from anyone with a
telephone number on the public switched telephone network anywhere in the world. This
decision is consistent with the focus in the Telecommunications Act on services rather
than technologies." Due to concerns for public safety-related to access to emergency
services by users of VoIP services, the Commission addressed the matter of 911 and
Enhanced 911 (E911) service in advance of the other issues dealt with in the May 15
ruling (see Emergency service obligations for local VoIP service providers, Telecom
Decision CRTC 2005-21, 4 April 2005 at
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/archive/ENG/Decisions/2005/dt2005-21.htm). For a copy of the
CRTC decision, see http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/NEWS/RELEASES/2005/r050512.htm
Endnotes
Mosque Loses Suit Against City According to a recent news report, a Muslim group,
the Al Salam Mosque Foundation, lost its suit against the city of Palos Heights, Illinois.
The suit arose after the foundation sought to convert a Christian church into a mosque
and city council offered to pay the foundation $200,000 to drop its plan so the city could
buy the church and convert it into recreation space. The foundation agreed, but the
buyout fell apart when the mayor vetoed the deal. The group then sued, alleging a
violation of the state’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act, a breach of contract, and
other claims. Last week, a jury in the federal district court case reportedly found the city
did not violate the group’s civil rights. See http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ats-
ap_top16may21,1,2351122.story and
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=5767
Taser: New Study Stun gun maker Taser International recently reported that an
independent study found that its Taser X26 gun had little effect on the heart functions of
healthy people. The complete study will be presented at the Society of Academic
Emergency Medicine in New York starting this week. See
http://news.findlaw.com/ap/f/66/05-13-2005/c8cf000b76d0bf57.html Taser’s stun guns
have been in the news this year after Amnesty International released a report questioning
the safety of the guns (see http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engamr511392004).
Smoking Bans Smokers’ rights groups, bar and tavern owners, and others are calling for
a donation boycott of some major charities on the basis that the charities lobby for more
restrictive smoking laws. Funding these charities (like the American Cancer Society),
they claim, indirectly results in lost revenue to small businesses and smoker harassment.
See http://news.findlaw.com/ap/o/632/05-12-2005/298400104cf712a7.html
For additional legal news, please see the "What's New" page at the IMLA website,
www.imla.org!
Talk to Us!
Please contact me, Sophia Stadnyk, with your news, questions, and comments at
sstadnyk@imla.org If we can be of assistance, please e-mail info@imla.org or call us at
(202) 466-5424.