AAP 7001.054
Annex D to
Sect 2 Chap 12
Enclosure 4
Criticality1
DAL2
Fit
II
-
101
I,S,A,T4
Function
I
-
102
I,S,A,T
Proc Validation 32/-33/-34
II
-
102
I, T
Loads
I
-
131 / 141 / 200 / 253
S, A, T
Vibrations
II
-
151 / 221
S, A, T
Aeroacoustic
II
-
152 / 222
S, A, T
HERO
I
-
153
S, A, T
EMI/EMC
I
-
154 / 224
S, A, T
Temperature
I
-
155 / 223
S, A, T
Carrier Suitability
I
-
132 / 260
S, A, T
Aeroelasticity
Aeroelastic
I
-
120 / 143 / 210
S, A, T
Captive
Carriage, Flying
Qualities &
Performance
Flying/Handling
Qualities
I
B
142 / 230 / 251
S, A, T
Performance &
Drag
III
B
240
S, A, T
Employment
and Jettison5,6
Release / Firing
Dispense
I
A
110 / 144 / 271 / 274
S, A, T
Launch
I
A
110 / 161 / 272
S, A, T
Gun Firing
I
A
162 / 273
S, A, T
Jettison
I
A
110 / 280
S, A, T
Freestream
Coefficients &
Ballistics
I7
A
141 / 291 / 292 / 293
S, A, T
System or
Discipline
Supporting
Discipline
Fit & Function
Structural &
Environmental
Ballistic & OFP
V&V
MIL-HDBK 1763
Test
Mode3
In-Range
Envelope V&V
Table D1 Summary of Failure Criticality & Design Assurance Levels
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
See Table D2 Categories of Mishap Severity
Design Assurance Levels are iaw RTCA/DO-178 and RTCA/DO-254. See application principles of SAE ARP 4754 and Figure C1.
S = Similarity, A = Analysis, I = Inspection, T = Test
To be completed prior to Source Selection.
Sufficient analyses and testing shall be accomplished such that the safety of the employment and selective jettison system presents an
improbable hazard to the releasing aircraft and ground based personnel and facilities during the life of the aircraft stores capability.
Sufficient analyses and testing shall be accomplished such that the safety of the emergency jettison system presents an improbable hazard to
the releasing aircraft and ground based personnel and facilities during the mission.
Traceability of models, wind tunnel, ground and flight test to Minimum Safe Separation, Minimum Safe Release Height and Safety Templates is
required.
12D-1
Draft Copy as of 11 Nov 02
AAP 7001.054
Annex D to
Sect 2 Chap 12
Enclosure 4
CONDUCT ADVERSE EFFECT REVIEW
Compile a list of air armament systems to determine if they are
essential or non-essential to safe operations.
Does the operation of the
installed equipment
adversely affect equipment
essential to safe operation?
CONCEPTUAL/FUNCTIONAL
DESIGN REVIEW *
Functional Baseline
Yes
Unacceptable
No
No
Does the operation of the
installed equipment
adversely affect nonessential equipment?
Does a means exist to inform the
users of the effect via visual
(flags, lights, displays) or aural
methods (horns, bells, voice)?
Yes
No
Yes
CONDUCT FUNCTIONAL HAZARD ASSESSMENT
PRELIMINARY DESIGN REVIEW *
“Design-to” Baseline
Will any probable failure or
malfunction result in a
CATASTROPHIC or CRITICAL failure
condition?
Yes
Significant
Design Change
No
Will any probable failure or
malfunction result in a
MAJOR failure condition?
No
Non-Significant
Design Change
Yes
Yes
Do ADF AEO or ASCENG
have experience with this
technology?
No
Is system
complexity HIGH?
Yes
No
CONDUCT SAFETY ANALYSIS
These failure consequences will impose design constraints
CRITICAL DESIGN REVIEW *
“Build-to” Baseline
Qualitative &
Quantitative Analyses *
Qualitative
Analyses *
FHA
Summary
Safety
Analysis
LEVEL A / B
LEVEL C
LEVEL D
DO-178 Design Assurance Levels - based on failure levels = levels of engineering rigour
* See also Hazard Matrix and Approval Levels at Tables D3 and D4
Figure D1 Air Armament System Safety Assessment Program
12D-2
Draft Copy as of 11 Nov 02
AAP 7001.054
Annex D to
Sect 2 Chap 12
Enclosure 4
Mishap Severity Categories
Description
Environmental, Safety, Cost8 and Health Result Criteria
Category

Catastrophic
I
Critical
II
(Hazardous)
Marginal
III
(Major)
Negligible
IV
(Minor)
Effect on Aircraft & Occupants of failure condition
Could result in death, permanent total disability, loss exceeding $1M, or irreversible
severe environmental damage that violates law or regulation.
 Prevention of continued safe flight or landing of the aircraft
 Loss of aircraft and/or fatalities
Could result in permanent partial disability, injuries or occupational illness that may
result in hospitalisation of at least three personnel, loss exceeding $200K but less than
$1M, or reversible environmental damage causing a violation of law or regulation.
 Reduction of aircraft or crew ability to cope with adverse operating conditions
 Large reduction in safety margins
 Physical distress or workload such that the flight crew can not be relied upon to perform
its tasks accurately or completely
 Serious injury or death of a relatively small proportion of the occupants
Could result in injury or occupational illness resulting in one or more lost work day(s),
loss exceeding $10K but less than $200K, or mitigatible environmental damage without
violation of law or regulation where restoration activities can be accomplished.
 Reduction of aircraft or crew ability to cope with adverse operating conditions
 Significant reduction in safety margins
 Reduction in the ability of the flight crew to cope with adverse operating conditions
impairing their efficiency
 Injury to occupants
Could result in injury or illness not resulting in a lost work day, loss exceeding $2K but
less than $10K, or minimal environmental damage not violating law or regulation.




No significant degradation of aircraft or crew ability
Slight reduction in safety margins
Slight increase in crew workload
Physical effects but no injury to occupants
Mishap Probability Levels
Description
Frequent
Level
A
Probable
B
Occasional
C
Remote
D
Improbable
E
Extremely
Improbable
-
Specific Individual Item
Likely to occur often in the life of an item, with a probability of
occurrence greater than 10-1 in that life.
Will occur several times in the life of an item, with a probability
of occurrence less than 10-1 but greater that 10-2 in that life.
Likely to occur some time in the life of an item, with a
probability of occurrence less that 10-2 but greater than 10-3 in
that life.
Unlikely but possible to occur in the life of an item, with a
probability of occurrence less than 10-3 but greater than 10-6 in
that life.
So unlikely, it can be assumed occurrence may not be
experienced, with a probability of occurrence less than 10 -6 in
that life.
Unlikely to occur with a probability of occurrence is less than
10-9 in that life
Fleet or Inventory
Continuously
experienced.
Will occur frequently.
Will occur several
times.
Unlikely, but can
reasonably be expected
to occur.
Unlikely to occur, but
possible.
Unlikely to occur.
Table D2 Mishap Severity Categories And Probability Levels
8
The cost figures are based on MIL-STD-882D and are therefore indicative values for planning purposes.
12D-3
Draft Copy as of 11 Nov 02
AAP 7001.054
Annex D to
Sect 2 Chap 12
Enclosure 4
Severity
Probability
Catastrophic
Critical
Hazardous
Marginal
Major
Negligible
Minor
Frequent / Probable
Extreme
Extreme
High
Medium
Occasional
Extreme
High
Medium
Low
Remote
High
Medium
Medium
Low
Improbable
Medium
Medium
Low
Low
Extremely
Improbable
Medium
Low
Low
Low
Table D3 Air Armament Hazard Matrix9
Risk Level
Description
Approval Level
Extreme
Unacceptable Risk.
Imperative to suppress risk to
an acceptable level.
AA
High
Acceptable with risk
mitigation strategy.
Operation requires written,
time limited waiver.
Medium
Acceptable with risk
mitigation strategy.
Low
Routine in-service operations.
HS(Aero) – Acquisition / D/AT&E10
CDR ARDU – D/A/OT&E (via Test Plan)
WSMGR / OAAR / TAR – OT&E / In-service (via ASCCERT)
DASCENG / OAAR Delegate11 / DAR CENGR– OT&E / Inservice (via ASC Clearance & ASCCERT)
DASCENG / COAST / COASE – D/A/OT&E (via ASC Clearance
& Test Plan)
Approval based on Design Engineer Judgement of Significance
Table D4 Assumed Approval Levels Based on Consequence of a Probable Event
9
10
11
Further guidance with respect to Aviation Risk Management is at DI(AF) OPS 1-19
For uncertified aircraft store combinations (ie pre ASCCERT) an Issues Paper would seek authority acceptance during systems development.
OAAR Delegate = as approved by FEGCDR iaw DI(G) OPS 2-2 - WGCDROPS typically
12D-4
Draft Copy as of 11 Nov 02