Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies
REDES 2002
Research and Education in Defense and Security Studies
August 7–10, 2002, Brasilia, Brazil
Panel: Relaciones Civiles-Militares en Centro América y la Región Andina
An Analysis of U.S. Strategic Policies in Central America and their Impact on
Civil-Military Relations
Orlando J. Pérez, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
Central Michigan University
234 Anspach Hall
Mount Pleasant, MI 48858
1-989-774-3430
orlando.j.perez@cmich.edu
Key Words:
Civil-Military Relations, Democratization, Public Opinion, Central America, Counternarcotics, Civic
Action Programs
Abstract
This paper examines civil-military relations in post-authoritarian Central America by focusing on the
impact of US strategic and military policies on the reorientation of the region’s armed forces toward
civic action programs and fighting transnational crime. The effect of this policy is to broaden the
missions entrusted to the armed forces at the very moment that the effort to establish civilian
supremacy has led to significant reductions in military budgets and personnel. Certain missions, such
as fighting crime and civic-action projects, tend to increase the prestige and visibility of the armed
forces vis-à-vis civilian authorities. As social and economic problems multiply and civilian
authorities are--or are perceived to be--incapable of dealing with such problems, the public may
demand a greater role for the armed forces, thus weakening civilian supremacy.
1
This paper examines civil-military relations in post-authoritarian Central America by focusing on the
impact of US strategic and military policies on the reorientation of the region’s armed forces toward
civic action programs and fighting transnational crime. The vision statement of the United States
Southern Commandi seeks to promote “A community of democratic, stable, and prosperous nations
successfully countering illicit drug activities and other transnational threats; served by professional,
modernized, interoperable security forces that embrace democratic principles, demonstrate respect for
human rights, are subordinate to civil authority, and are capable and supportive of multilateral
responses to challenges”ii United States policy has emphasized the reorientation of the region’s armed
forces in the direction of fighting transnational crime, such as drug trafficking and money laundering,
along with efforts to promote national development and provide assistance during national disasters.
The effect of this policy is to broaden the missions entrusted to the armed forces at the very moment
that the effort to establish civilian supremacy has led to significant reductions in military budgets and
personnel. Certain missions, such as fighting crime and civic-action projects, tend to increase the
prestige and visibility of the armed forces vis-à-vis civilian authorities. As social and economic
problems multiply and civilian authorities are--or are perceived to be--incapable of dealing with such
problems, the public may demand a greater role for the armed forces. Elite factions may then decide
to politicize the military in order to advance partisan political interests, thus weakening military
professionalism and autonomy. Under these circumstances civilian supremacy may decline.
At least since the republics were formed, the military institution has had a permanent presence in
Latin American countries. Throughout the twentieth century, their influence has been decisive in
shaping the political and institutional life of most of the region's nations. To a great extent, at least
until the end of the 1980s, the Latin American states were configured under the shadow of military
power, whose influence became particularly strong starting in the mid-60s. In the 1980s, domestic
economic failures, international pressure, and popular demands for democratization led to a series of
transitions in which, by the end of the decade, virtually all the governments of the region had
established civilian-led regimes through competitive elections.iii The process of democratization led
scholars to focus on the nature of civil-military relations, and on the role, if any, for the armed
institution in a democratic society.iv
A key problem facing new democracies is the transformation of the military from an active
participant in politics to one that focuses exclusively on security matters. This process is made more
difficult as the definition of "security issues" is expanded to include counterinsurgency, drug
interdiction, and development functions. Therefore, the role that civilian leaders construct for the
military may determine whether or not the armed forces will have the capability or the willingness to
intervene in the political system. In other words, some roles will place the military in a unique
position to take advantage of public discontent with democracy in general, and incumbent
governments in particular. The major options for Latin American militaries at this time seem to
involve some combination of (1) conventional defense of territorial integrity; (2) international
peacekeeping; (3) internal security, which includes counterinsurgency, drug interdiction, and fighting
crime; and (4) civic action and national development. This paper will focus on the two missions that
are at the heart of US strategic policy in the region: counternarcotics and civic action programs.
1. Counternarcotics Efforts
In the wake of the Cold War, United States strategic planners have shifted their attention to the war
on drugs. A July 1994 report published by the White House identified terrorism, narcotics trafficking,
rapid population growth and refugee flows among the most important “transnational” threats to U.S.
security.v General Wilhelm stated before Congress that “[t]he illicit drug industry has become a
corrosive force without precedent, relentlessly eroding the foundations of democracy in the region,
2
corrupting public institutions, poisoning youth, ruining economies, and disrupting the social order.”vi
While U.S. policymakers saw these threats as “nonmilitary,” they continued to see the Central
American militaries as the most effective–if not the only–institutions capable of responding to
them.vii The United States has encouraged foreign militaries to take an active role in efforts to combat
illicit drug production and trafficking, but such efforts have almost universally met strong initial
resistance from military leaders. A typical response was given by a Salvadorian Colonel who said,
“Involvement in drug interdiction weakens military professionalism and increases the likelihood of
corruption. Besides, we do not have the technology or resources to battle a multi-billion dollar
business.”viii The Strategic Assessment published by the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the
National Defense University in 1999 said, “Most [officers in the region] are reluctant to participate in
counterdrug operations.”ix Offers of military and economic assistance, however, have frequently
proven too tempting to refuse and Latin American military capabilities have been enhanced in the
name of counternarcotics operations. Efforts to fight drug trafficking, and its corollary crimes of
money laundering and arms smuggling, increase corruption by penetrating national institutions,
including the armed forces. In fact, history has shown that elements in the militaries themselves are
engaged in trafficking.x The largely U.S.-inspired push to “militarize” anti-narcotics activities may
endanger gains in civilianization.xi As stated by the an official of the GAO before Congress,
“Narcotics-related corruption is a long-standing problem affecting U.S. and foreign governments'
efforts to reduce drug-trafficking activities. Over the years, U.S. officials have identified widespread
corruption problems in Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and the countries of Central America and
the Caribbean--among the countries most significantly involved in the cultivation, production, and
transit of illicit narcotics.”xii
The U.S. international counternarcotics efforts are carried out though a variety of programs. xiii The
International Narcotics Control (INC) program administered by the Department of State’s Bureau for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) is the lead agency for international drug
control. The program provides aid and training to the governments and security forces of countries in
which drugs are produced and transported. The funding for INC programs in Latin America doubled
from 1998 to 1999, from $179 million to $430 million.xiv Funding for Central America included $36
million ($12 million per year for 1999, 2000, and 2001) to increase the capabilities of local coast
guards and port control authorities in Belize, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua.
U.S. policymakers have expressed concern about the potential spillover of drug trafficking and
political instability from Colombia into Central America. They most frequently cite Panama, which
borders Colombia’s highly conflictive Urabá region and hosts the Panama Canal. The U.S. military,
which was present at several bases in Panama since the beginning of the 20th century, left Panama at
the end of 1999 in compliance with the Torrijos-Carter treaties. General Barry McCaffery warned in
November 2000 that, “Panama is being tested by violent incursions into the Darién and San Blas
regions by Colombian guerrillas and paramilitaries.” Gen. McCaffery went to say, “Panama's
inadequately trained and equipped police forces are no match for the insurgents.” xv The Southern
Command’s Gen. Charles Wilhelm acknowledged that Colombia’s armed groups “present no
immediate and direct threat to Canal operations,” but warned, “The insurgents could easily
overwhelm the limited capability of the Panamanian National Police stationed along the border.”xvi
The Bush Administration's foreign aid request for 2002 included $948 million for the INC program’s
worldwide activities, with over $762.25 million for Latin America. Much of this will go to a
proposed "Andean counter-drug initiative" for Colombia and its neighbors. The request included $11
million for Panama.
3
Table 1
International Narcotics Control (INC) Program, Central America
(In US$)
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
Guatemala*
1,525,000
1,210,000 1,378,000 2,328,000 3,000,000 3,000,000
Panama*
Included in the Central American Regional 4,987,000 1,363,000
Program
1,168,000 1,100,000 4,875,000 2,600,000 2,996,000
Central American* 1,805,000
Regional Program
Source: Just the Facts, Report by the Latin American Working Group and Center for International
Policy, <http://www.ciponline.org/facts>. * Funds include training. Note: The 1999 and 2000 funds
do not include $12 million for coast guard and port control authorities authorized by WHDEA.
Section 124 of Title 10, U.S. Code was introduced in 1989 and designates the Department of Defense
as the “single lead agency” in the war on drugs. The section does not authorize the provision of
assistance to other nations. Instead, it permits the use of funds for drug-interdiction operations such as
radar sites, surveillance flights, and intelligence gathering, carried out by U.S. military personnel
stationed in Latin America. In 2000, this program authorized $123 million for Latin America.
According to the Just the Facts report, Panama and Honduras were the only two countries in Central
America where the United States spent Section 124 dollars. Expenditures in Honduras amounted to
$295 thousand in 1998 and $35 thousand in 2000. The amounts spent in Panama were $252 thousand
in 1998 and $895 thousand in 2000. It is assumed, however, that some of the money spent though the
“Latin American Regional Program”– up to $22 million in 2000– went to assist drug interdiction
programs in Central America.
Section 1004 was originally part of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1991 and has been
renewed until 2002. This program expanded the role of the US military in counternarcotics efforts by
allowing training of foreign militaries and supplying military and communications equipment and
parts. In addition, this provision allowed for direct support by the US military to local lawenforcement agencies. Table 2 shows the breakdown of Section 1004 expenditures for Central
American nations.
4
Table 2
Section 1004 Counternarcotics Funding for Selected Central America Nations
and Regional Programs (in US$)
1997
1998
1999
2000
2,384,000
2,591,000
638,000
645,000
Honduras
294,000
370,000
73,000
223,000
Guatemala
743,000
869,000
787,000
1,087,000
El Salvador
166,000
271,000
17,000
355,000
Nicaragua
0
0
0
10,000
Caribbean
Regional
11,729,000
9,166,000
14,873,000
14, 937,00
Latin American
Regional
50,979,000
54,553,000
37,346,000
48,092,000
Panama
Source: Just the Facts, Report by the Latin American Working Group and Center for International
Policy, <http://www.ciponline.org/facts>.
Another program is Emergency Drawdown Authority, which allows the president to transfer
weapons, parts, equipment, services or training in cases of “unforeseen emergencies.” The provision
most commonly used in Latin America is subsection 506(a)(2), which authorizes yearly drawdowns
of as much as $150 million for international narcotics control, disaster assistance, or migration and
refugee assistance. In 1999, the president authorized $148 million for drawdowns, of which $75
million went for disaster relief in the wake of Hurricane Mitch, and the rest, including $450 thousand
for Panama, went for counternarcotics efforts. In 1998, Guatemala received $600 thousand and
Honduras $2 million worth of drawdown equipment, both for counternarcotics.
Table 3, shows the approximate total amount of military and police assistance provided by the United
States since 1997. The amounts include those already mentioned above, plus those allocated through
the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, including Expanded IMET. xvii
5
Table 3
Total Military and Police Aid (in US$)
1997
1998
1999
2000
Panama
2,534,000
2,591,000
4,597,570
2,745,000
Guatemala
2,158,000
2,847,000
3,115,000
3,247,000
El Salvador
621,000
783,000
550,999
2,355,000
Nicaragua
201,000
74,000
200,000
210,000
719,000
2,923,404
803,303
723,000
Honduras
Source: Just the Facts, Report by the Latin American Working Group and Center for
International Policy, <http://www.ciponline.org/facts>. Note: These figures represent the best
estimates given the available information. These figures do not include military sales made
through the Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales programs, which amount to
several million dollars of additional weapons to the region’s armed forces.
The region is receiving a fraction of what it did in the 1980s, when the United States was concerned
about insurgency movements in El Salvador and Guatemala and stability in Panama. The entire
region is now receiving, on average, as much aid as El Salvador alone received in a month in 1984. In
1999, the programs that directly support counternarcotics training – the State Department’s
International Narcotics Control (INC) program and the Defense Department’s “section 1004”
activities – were active only in Belize, Costa Rica, Guatemala and Panama. Counternarcotics did not
appear to be a major training mission in El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua. xviii One of the main
reasons for the decline is the almost total elimination of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) assistance
to the region. FMF is used to provide grants and loans to help countries buy US weapons and
equipment. Instead, military equipment is reaching Central America through Foreign Military Sales,
which are government-to-government purchases of weapons.
Counternarcotics, however, is the rationale behind the first new U.S. military installation in the
region in years. A Forward Operating Location (FOL) at El Salvador’s Comalapa airport will host
U.S. aircraft detecting maritime drug trafficking, especially in the Pacific. The FOL – similar to
facilities recently established at Manta, Ecuador and Aruba and Curacao, Netherlands Antilles – will
station small numbers of U.S. military, DEA, Coast Guard and Customs personnel to support the U.S.
aircraft and to coordinate communications and intelligence.
In March 2000, the U.S. and Salvadoran governments signed a ten-year agreement for the Comalapa
facility, which was ratified by the legislature on July 7. The FOL will host four medium-sized
aircraft, such as E-2 and P-3, or ARL reconnaissance planes or C-130 cargo planes. While it is
capable of accommodating the larger AWACS radar planes, there is no plan to station them at
Comalapa for the time being. The Colombia aid package signed into law in July 2000 included $1.1
million for planning and design of the El Salvador FOL. The Defense Department plans to request
funding for improvements, such as paving and support facilities, in its 2002 military construction
appropriations request to Congress. The only other long-term U.S. military presence in Central
America is Joint Task Force Bravo, a Southern Command component and a semi-permanent presence
stationed since 1983 at the Enrique Soto Cano air base, a facility near Comayagua, Honduras. The
United States has signed treaties with Belize and Costa Rica that allow U.S. forces on
counternarcotics missions to enter national waters or airspace to board ships suspected of smuggling,
to pursue fleeing vessels or aircraft, and to overfly national territory. The United States and Panama
have signed a “shiprider” treaty, which allows Panamanian law enforcement officials to ride on U.S.
vessels, authorizing actions that the vessels may take.xix
6
General Wilhelm justified US policy in the region in these terms, “Military-to-military contacts,
combined training, equipment transfers, foreign military financing, seminars, and exchange programs
provide near-term development and enhance cooperation with security forces in the region. Resident
professional military education at U.S. schools and the foreign military sales program enable us to
shape and influence events in the region for the long term.”xx
A major problem with U.S. policy is that it tends to undermine key elements of the processes of
democratization in the region. Peace accords signed in Guatemala in 1996 and in El Salvador in 1992
focus heavily on demilitarization as a necessary step toward creating a viable democracy.
Nevertheless new civilian police forces charged with combating common crime and drug trafficking
continue to defer to the army. The Guatemalan Congress has approved deployment of 10,000 troops
in the streets to help combat crime. In El Salvador, the military is currently conducting "joint patrols"
with the police in rural areas.
In Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, a central theme of discussion are the new roles
of the armed forces, accompanied by an extensive citizen interest in making sure that civilian control
prevails over military institutions.
The Guatemalan case is paradigmatic. The Accord on Strengthening Civil Power and the Role of the
Army in a Democratic Society signed on September 19, 1996 reads, “The mission of the Guatemalan
Army is defined as the defense of the country's sovereignty and the integrity of its territory; it will not
be assigned other functions and its participation in other fields will be limited to tasks of
cooperation.” Efforts to combat narcotic trafficking have been justified as part of “the defense of the
country’s sovereignty.” President Arzú, gave this broad interpretation during a graduation ceremony
for the Kaibil Special Forces, when he described the battle against drug activity as one of the army's
tasks. The President said “Today, this new army of peace will face a new enemy probably much more
powerful than that which we faced during these years, since we are dealing with drug traffickers and
delinquents who want to destroy this country.” The “new enemy,” which is no longer defined as
either foreign or domestic, as in the terminology of the recent past, is better armed, equipped and
trained, “than the guerrilla forces of the URNG.” Thus in the absence of a coherent military doctrine
that defines what are the new external and internal threats faced by Guatemala, counternarcotics has
become by default, and under pressure from the United States, a new raison d’etra of the armed
forces. The same has occurred in the other countries of the region.
Counternarcotics, however, carries some significant dangers for the armed forces. First, the vertical
and hierarchical structures of the military reduce the possibility of controls, a commonplace in the
military is the statement that orders are to be obeyed and not questioned. This structure means that
when an officer is corrupted, there is a greater danger that many under his command will be
corrupted as well. Backed by the institution's "esprit de corps,” which tends to defend members of a
unit under investigation, the system can encourage impunity. Second, low salaries for officers, while
not a new problem, increases the likelihood that narcotrafficking could permeate the armed
institution. Third, there is evidence that at the same time counter-narcotic efforts have intensified, the
region, aside from being a bridge, has also become a warehouse and a growing local market for
narcotics. Fourth, among the other drug-related phenomena are the growing infiltration of “narcodollars” in politics, and the laundering of drug money by means of private businesses. Fifth, at a
moment when militaries in the region are reconfiguring their missions, force levels, and budgets,
counternarcotic efforts tend to involve the armed forces in functions better suited for local police. In
the end, success in combating drug traffickers is a function of enhanced investigative skills involving
sophisticated communication technology, the ability to track financial transactions, and improved
customs procedures.
Finally, the success of U.S. interdiction efforts has coincided with an increase in local drug
7
consumption, especially cocaine, which has become a new challenge for authorities in charge of
combating drug trafficking as well as for those concerned with the impact of drug use on the region's
societies. To a certain degree, the increase in cocaine consumption in the region is linked to the
payment “in kind” by the drug cartels, in which cocaine is paid to transporters for their services, thus
promoting the drug in the regional market.
2. Civic Action Programs
As the definition of national security has expanded to include environmental concerns, social
problems, economic crises, and natural disasters, the involvement of the U.S. military in addressing
these issues has correspondingly increased. Civic-action programs, also known as Humanitarian
Civic Assistance, have become a key component of U.S. political and military policy in Central
America. The Pentagon’s rationale for these programs is based on the premise that they “enhance not
only the national security posture of a country, but its social cohesiveness, and economic
development as well...(and) would also serve to improve the standing of the military within the
population.” The most frequently conducted civic-action program in Central America has been the
Nuevos Horizontes (New Horizons) series of exercises, and its predecessor Fuertes Caminos (Strong
Roads). Both have been carried out over the past several years in Belize, Panama, Guatemala, El
Salvador and Honduras. In a typical Nuevos Horizontes exercise in May 1996, U.S. and Honduran
troops built six schools, two dental clinics, four wells for water, and rebuilt bridges and twenty
kilometers of highway.xxi In late 1998 and 1999, as a result of Hurricane Mitch, U.S. Humanitarian
Civic Assistance was increased substantially. For example, in Nicaragua the U.S. military personnel
carried out 19 medical campaigns, repaired 134 kilometers of roads, built a clinic, and purified
680,000 gallons of water. Similar efforts were carried out in Guatemala and El Salvador. More than
23,000 Guardsmen and Reservists from 45 states were deployed into the region in two-week
increments from February to August 1999. Collectively, the Guardsmen and Reservists built 7
bridges, 6 low water crossings, 15 culvert bridges, 27 schools, 1 community center, 5 dikes, and 240
km of roadway. They also drilled 21 water wells, diverted two rivers into their normal beds, and
provided medical treatment to more than 262,000 people. In a statement to Congress, General Charles
Wilhelm, Commander of US Southern Command, justified civic action programs because they help
the United States “support emerging democracies and project a benevolent image of the U.S. in the
eyes of the most deprived citizens of these nations.”xxii
Although many people believe the military should not stand aside in the aftermath of a natural
disaster or humanitarian crisis, there are many problems with depending on the U.S. military to take a
lead role in relief operations. And though it may seem nonsensical to object to U.S. troops building
schools in El Salvador, many questions go unasked about why the military is undertaking civilian
tasks and what effects this has on the host country.
Troops are "ill-suited to humanitarian operations, and their participation can be counterproductive in
situations that so seldom have military solutions," writes the Center for Defense Information. xxiii
Military personnel are trained first and foremost to kill people and destroy things; such intrinsically
aggressive and violent behavior is incompatible with most relief work. Furthermore, military-based
relief efforts tend to cost significantly more than civilian relief efforts. To many observers it appears
the U.S. military has taken on the humanitarian mission, not because the military is especially
prepared to do so, but because such a mission can be used to inflate military budgets and justify force
sizes. Humanitarian operations provide militaries with favorable media exposure to win the hearts
and minds of people in the United States and abroad. This is something many militaries believe they
need after years of human rights abuses.
8
Nobel Peace Laureate Rigoberta Menchú stated that "while they [U.S. military officials] say the
troops are in Guatemala for social projects, like road construction, their presence is perceived as
support for the repressive policies of the Guatemalan army." In general, the presence of foreign
armed forces in a host country tends to undermine that country's sovereignty. Perhaps the most
dangerous aspect of humanitarian and civic action programs for the consolidation of democracy in
Latin America is that they expand the military's role at a time when civilian governments are trying to
limit and control this role.
Civic-action programs may seem to be a good and humanitarian way of utilizing the resources of the
armed forces. However, development missions pose four inherent dangers. First, these projects
encourage the military to supplant the civilian government in one of its main roles: the provision of
basic services. If civilian institutions are not delivering the goods, then they must be reformed, not
replaced by soldiers. Militarizing the national development efforts is no way of ensuring civilian
supremacy or enhancing democratic consolidation. Second, the danger of military development
projects is that they can easily lead to a military role in other aspects of civic life. If the military can
provide state services better than civilians, then why should civilians govern at all? If the military is
more organized and disciplined, should it not set economic policy, keep internal order, judge cases, or
carry out diplomacy? These same calculations were instrumental in precipitating the military coups of
the 1960s and 1970s. Third, heavy involvement in development projects can reduce readiness, the
military’s ability to respond to security threats. Extensive involvement in civic action means less
training and resources for national defense. If the nations of the region face so few threats that
thousands of troops can carry out development projects with no effect on readiness, then the military
may be ripe for cutbacks. In an era of budgetary constraints civic action projects may provide the
military some resources in the short-term, but in the long-term politicians may question the need to
pour money into an institution that cannot fulfill its fundamental mission. A mission, by the way,
than many see as anachronistic.xxiv
Fourth, development projects have the potential for undermining the essence of subjective civilian
control. Subjective control requires a convergence between military officers and civilian leaders on
the meaning of democracy and the nature of the political system. Civic action projects bring the
military, particularly junior officers, in close contact with the poorest sectors of society. Officers
involved in these projects tend to develop an identification with the plight of disadvantaged
communities, historically neglected by civilian authorities. In doing so, they may begin to question
not only the effectiveness of civilian institutions, but also the very definition of democracy. On the
one hand, liberal democracies emphasize procedures embodied in competitive elections and
horizontal accountability. On the other hand, junior officers may develop a definition of democracy
that focuses on substantive matters such as equitable distribution of resources and social justice. To
the extent that officers are alienated from civilian authorities on the essence of democracy they will
be less willing to accept a subordinate role in what they consider a “corrupt” system. xxv In turn, the
public may see the military as more effective than civilian institutions and may demand a greater role
for the armed forces. A typical response from officers, particularly those commanding rural based
regiments, is that “we perform many tasks, from environmental to public security missions…the
public comes to us all the time for help because they see the incapacity of civilian institutions…we
work everyday, twenty-four hours a day without complaining.”xxvi
3. Effects on Civilian Supremacy
In a sober assessment of the status of democratic consolidation in Latin America, General Wilhelm
stated that “[d]uring the past year [1999], I have detected a growing malaise in attitudes toward
democratic reform which is fueled and compounded by the adverse social, economic, and political
conditions, spawned wholly or in part by drug trafficking and the other transnational threats that it
breeds. These forces are weakening the fabric of democracy in the region.”xxvii This statement begs
9
the question: Are U.S. policies helping to solve or to deepen this “malaise”? This section of the paper
will explore this question by focusing on public attitudes toward democracy and authoritarianism.
First, however, the section will explore the question of civil-military relations from a theoretical
perspective. A necessary condition for democratic governance is the subordination of the military and
police organizations to civilian elected authorities. By its very nature, the military institution is nondemocratic. The armed forces are organized hierarchically, specialization of roles and command
structure are identified by different uniforms and rank, commands are issued by those in higher
positions and are to be followed unquestionably by subordinates, and decisions, at least theoretically,
are reached with the goal of furthering the primary missions of the institution which traditionally are
success on the battlefield and defense of the territorial integrity of the nation. Democracy is based on
negotiation, compromise, and popular sovereignty exercised through free and competitive elections.
Often democracies are inefficient and disorderly, qualities antithetical to the military ethos.
Felipe Agüero has defined civilian supremacy as “the ability of a civilian, democratically elected
government to conduct general policy without interference from the military, to define the goals and
general organizations of national defense, to formulate and conduct defense policy, and to monitor
the implementation of military policy.”xxviii Civilian supremacy should be seen as a continuous
variable since the degree of control will vary according to the policy area, the institutional structures
of the state, and the historical relations between civilians and soldiers. Civilians may have little or no
say in matters related to the integrity of the military institution such as promotions, formulation of
military doctrine, internal discipline, salaries, equipment and armaments, and the formulation of
defense policy and strategic goals. In some instances, civilians may lack the expertise and even
interest to influence national defense, security, and related policies. Even in cases where civilian
supremacy is high, elected leaders often consult with military advisors on security and defense issues.
Institutionally, if congressional oversight is weak or non-existent and the executive fails to hold the
military accountable, or historically, if military participation in politics and policymaking is expected,
civilian supremacy will not be exercised effectively. This has been the case in most Latin America
nations.
The question then is how to achieve civilian supremacy. Samuel Huntington in The Soldier and the
State (1957) develops a framework based on two dimensions of civilian control: subjective and
objective. Subjective civilian control aims to reduce the power of the armed forces through
ideological and programmatic convergence between the armed forces and civilian leaders. To achieve
this, civilian groupings try to persuade the military to identify with their particular interests or adhere
to their political and ideological points of view. As Huntington explained, “subjective control
achieves its ends by civilianizing the military, making them a mirror of the state.” xxix The success of
subjective control requires a military that is internally unified on the basic ideas underlying the nature
of the political regime, a civilian leadership that is relatively stable and cohesive, and a convergence
between the armed forces and civilian leaders on the basic definition of democracy. If the armed
forces are divided on the basic structures of the regime, or on the role they should play within it,
military discipline is compromised, coups become more likely, and civilian supremacy is
jeopardized.xxx Additionally, if the military and civilian leaders differ on the meaning of democracy
civil-military conflict may be inevitable.
Objective control, on the other hand, seeks to differentiate the military from civilian leaders.
According to Huntington, “Objective civilian control achieves its end by militarizing the military,
making them the tool of the state.”xxxi The success of objective control is to maximize military
professionalism by providing better training, equipment, and organizational autonomy. To the extent
that the military has sufficient resources to carry out their main mission, to defend the nation from
external enemies, it will have no need to meddle in politics. Moreover, it is assumed that a highly
professional corps of officers will have the ability to subordinate themselves to the decisions of
10
legitimate state authorities. Objective control renders the military “politically sterile and neutral.”xxxii
The success of objective control, however, requires a balance between military professionalism and
civilian oversight. As the military becomes more professional it develops a deeper attachment to its
own mission and a greater corporate mentality. Since their principal mission is to defend the nation
against external enemies they may come to regard political infighting among civilian leaders as
harmful to national security, requiring the armed forces to assume a “moderating” role or, in extreme
cases, direct control of the state. In addition, a highly professionalized military may be very
protective of its institutional prerogatives and view civilian oversight as inappropriate “meddling” in
matters that are the exclusive domain of the armed forces. Additionally, militaries whose primary
functions are domestic rather than external defense will tend to use their increased professionalism to
involve themselves deeper into civilian areas, thus undermining civilian supremacy.
The key to civilian control, therefore, is a balance between military professionalism and ideological
convergence.xxxiii Professionalism must be accompanied by active and informed civilian oversight,
particularly through congressional scrutiny of the military budget and a civilian-led ministry of
defense. Convergence should occur around norms that promote democracy rather than partisan
political interests. Ultimately, civilian control rests on the legitimacy and support that civilian leaders
obtain from the general public. In the seminal work on the breakdown of democratic regimes, Juan
Linz defines legitimacy as "the belief that in spite of shortcomings and failures, the existing political
institutions are better than any others that might be established...”xxxiv According to Linz, the
“efficacy” and “effectiveness” of the political system play a major role in determining its legitimacy.
Efficacy refers to the ability of a regime to formulate adequate and acceptable policies for the nation's
problems. Effectiveness is the capacity to implement those policies.xxxv When the inability to
formulate or implement adequate policies combines with a disloyal opposition, democratic
governments tend to collapse.xxxvi To the extent that individuals view the job performed by
democratic governments as effective, they will be less inclined to support an increase role for the
armed forces. However, when legitimacy declines citizens may be receptive to new political
alternatives, even those that would radically alter the political system. A military would incur
considerable reputational damage, which could result in material losses, in forcefully opposing a
government with strong public support. Conversely, it would enjoy public support by opposing
unpopular governments.
Thus, a key question is the extent to which people perceive the armed forces as more legitimate than
civilian institutions.
Table 4
Support for a Military Coup:
Mass Opinions in El Salvador and Nicaragua
(percentage that said coup was justified)
El Salvador
Nicaragua
Do the following problems justify
a military coup?
1991
Unemployment
33.0
26.2
Student Strikes
21.9
17.1
11.8
41.3
30.3
Labor Strikes
24.4
17.8
10.6
46.5
32.9
1995
1999
27.4
Social Protests
32.1
Delinquency
55.2
11
1991
14.7
1997
32.8
1999
24.0
Source: University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project. xxxvii Blank spaces reflect
the fact that the “problem” was not included among the questions for that year’s survey.
Table 4 indicates that in El Salvador and Nicaragua a significant minority exhibits support for a
military coup. In Nicaragua, where the military has been identified with the Sandinista movement,
from a third to two-fifths of those surveyed support a military coup under certain circumstances.
Significant increases in support for a coup occurred after the 1990 defeat of the Sandinista-led
government. The good news is that support for military intervention has come down since 1997. The
most striking finding is that in the 1999 survey over half of the respondents in El Salvador support a
military coup under conditions of high crime. Given the increasing problem of crime in this Central
American country, among the most violent in the world, this is a major concern for the future of
democracy.
Table 5
Respondents Supporting a Military Coup
by Socioeconomic Variables, El Salvador 1999
(percent)
Variables
Support Military Coup
Gender
Male
49.4
Female
61.1
Age
18-20
56.8
21-30
56.1
31-40
55.5
41-50
51.4
51-95
55.1
Education
None
65.4
Elementary
62.3
High School
56.2
University
38.1
Income
None
68.1
Less than 1,000 colones
63.3
1,001-2,000
62.3
2,001-3,000
49.5
3,001-4,000
46.6
4,001-5,000
43.7
5,001-6,000
32.3
12
More than 6,001
35.6
Table 5 shows that women, those with low education, and those with low income are the most
supportive of a military coup under the circumstances of high crime. Two results merit highlighting:
First, how education has a linear and inverse relationship to support for a coup. Attending university
reduces significantly support for a coup. Second, there is also an almost linear and inverse
relationship between income and support for a coup. It is worth noting that income levels and
education have a positive relationship and are highly correlated themselves.
The Nicaraguan 1997 survey included a number of “special groups,” including teachers, judges,
police, and soldiers. These groups constitute an elite sample and are especially important for the
growth of democracy. Table 6 shows the extent to which these groups support a military coup. Nearly
half of the police interviewed support a coup in the event of labor strikes. A disturbing finding is the
percentage of teachers who would support a coup. Public school teachers are more supportive of a
coup than those at private institutions.
When the sample of soldiers is disaggregated, we find that those of lower ranks involved in skill
training for foot soldiers (tropa) are the most supportive of a coup. Military officers are the next most
supportive of a coup, and cadets in an officer training academy are the least supportive. While it is
encouraging that officers or would-be officers exhibit less support for a coup, the high number of foot
soldiers that support a coup, up to 52.4 percent in the case of labor strikes, represents a clear danger
to democratic stability in Nicaragua.
Table 6
Support for a Military Coup:
Selected Groups in Nicaragua
(percentages supporting a coup)*
Do the following Judges
problems justify
a military coup?
Police
Soldiers**
Teachers***
Unemployment
11.5
32.2
22.5
25.3
Student Strikes
18.1
41.0
28.7
40.8
Labor Strikes
24.7
49.3
31.2
43.5
Source: University of Pittsburgh Central America Public Opinion Project (1997 survey).
* The table only reflects the percentages of valid responses that support a coup.
** The soldiers include three sub-groups: 1. Cadets in an officer-training academy; 2. Cadets in a
skills training school for foot soldiers; and 3. Officers.
*** The sample of teachers includes those from private and public schools.
If we look at other polling data from El Salvador we find significant majorities supporting
authoritarian views.
13
Table 7
Attitudes Related to Authoritarianism in El Salvador
(percentages)*
Agree
Disagree
1. What El Salvador needs is a
strongman who can bring order.
86.6
11.3
2. The politicians who win the
elections should be more like
General Martínez Hernandez.
44.1
32.3
3. The country’s situation is so bad,
that the only way of improving
things is by eliminating with a
strong hand those that cause
problems.
75.1
21.3
4. Instead of human rights what the
85.1
12.2
country needs is more law and
order.
Source: National probability survey (N=1247) conducted by the Instituto Universitario de
Opinion Pública, Universidad Centroamericana “José Simeón Cañas.”
* Percentages do not reflect undecided or those that refused to answer.
While the responses in table 7 may not translate into direct support for increased military
involvement in politics, they do reflect a yearning for strong and decisive leadership. In the context,
of rising crime and decreasing economic opportunities many in the population exhibit attitudes that
are, in my opinion, incompatible with democracy.
Table 8 compares the levels of trust people have toward various institutions of government. Trust is a
fundamental element of legitimacy. The good news is that key institutions such as the presidency and
the judiciary can claim greater support among the people than the military. However, the low level of
trust for congress and political parties vis-à-vis the army is a disturbing trend.
Table 8
Levels of Trust for Various Institutions
(percent expressing some or a lot of trust)
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Nicaragua
Panama
Army
35
36
41
24
24
Congress
31
21
46
19
23
Political Parties
23
20
22
16
19
Judiciary
36
27
41
24
28
Presidency
42
34
56
23
24
Police
41
26
xxxviii
Source: Latinobarometro, 1998
35
28
39
14
How does the public view democracy as a political system? Juan Linz illustrates the importance of
this question when he defines legitimacy as “the belief that in spite of shortcomings and failures, the
existing political institutions are better than any others that might be established...” (Linz 1978, 6).
Table 9 shows that large majorities support the idea that democracy is the “best” form of government.
However, if we aggregate those who are indifferent with those that support authoritarianism we find
substantial minorities in each country that are susceptible to authoritarian appeals. Additionally,
Table 10 indicates that most Central Americans are not satisfied with democracy. The results from
Guatemala are puzzling since that country has arguably moved more slowly toward democracy than
the rest of the region.
Table 9
Attitudes Toward a Democratic Government
(percentages)
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Nicaragua
Panama
Democracy is preferable to 79
any other type of government.
54
57
72
71
authoritarian 10
can
be
29
9
9
8
To people like me it does not 10
matter whether we have a
democratic government or not.
Source: Latinobarometro 1998
16
21
14
16
On occasions,
governments
preferable.
Table 10
Satisfaction with Democracy
(percentages)
Satisfied
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Nicaragua
Panama
48
57
37
27
34
43
52
70
66
Not Satisfied 52
Source: Latinobarometro 1998
4. Conclusions
Despite the early optimism about the twilight of military intervention, some scholars have argued that
the new democracies emerged from processes that left the military with a great deal of power. Brian
Loveman has used the term “protected democracies” to characterize the new regimes.xxxix Loveman
states, “Nowhere in Latin America did transition to elected civilian government eliminate the
principle constitutional, juridical, and political impediments to consolidating civilian-controlled
constitutional democracy.”xl These impediments have been in place since the birth of the Latin
American republics, and are a legacy of the colonial legal practices. xli Moreover, in many countries
the military has retained significant control over key policy areas, as well as natural resources.xlii In
many countries, for example, a uniformed member of the armed forces runs the defense ministry. In
countries such as Peru, Bolivia, Guatemala, and Colombia, either because of drug interdiction,
guerrilla war, or both, large areas of the national territory have been turned over to military control.
15
Non-combatants living in those areas have no other contact with the national government but that
which is provided by the armed forces, thus delegitimizing the civilian authorities.
In contrast, other scholars have minimized the potential for military coups by pointing to both the
institutional safeguards implemented by civilian leaders, as well as the military's aversion to further
interference in light of the earlier experiences. For example, Juan Rial points to the “negative
consequences” of the recent military governments as leaving the armed forces "highly disinclined to
return to power."xliii Wendy Hunter argues that “Over time, democratically elected politicians have
successfully contested the power of the military over a broad range of issues and narrowed its sphere
of influence.”xliv In a study of the recent democratization efforts in South America, David Pion-Berlin
concludes that “While a reversion to past practices of military intervention cannot be discounted, data
used in this study do not support the view that South America is simply experiencing another 'turn of
the political cycle'.”xlv Samuel Huntington in a piece that praises the ability of “Third Wave”
democracies to transform civil-military relations, argues that “The danger to new democratic
governments from coups has been overestimated.”xlvi
Whether or not the “danger” to the democracies of the region has been “overestimated” may depend
ultimately on evaluations of the alternative regimes. As James Malloy has stated "Democracy in
contemporary Latin America, as in other historical contexts, [emerged] as a result of negative
consensus in which democracy is a second-best option in relation to absolutism [emphasis
added].”xlvii
The specter of the military still lingers. The military continues to fight to preserve many of its
traditional prerogatives. Congressional oversight of military budgets is virtually non-existent and
civilian leaders lack the knowledge or willingness to forcefully engage the military in a debate over
national defense policy. Additionally, to the extent that elected civilian governments are unable to
deal effectively with the myriad of economic and social problems that face their countries, the
legitimacy of democracy vis-à-vis authoritarianism will diminish. On the one hand, the loss of
legitimacy may lead to public clamoring for the "strong" leadership of the military. On the other
hand, the military may take public discontent with the current governments as a green light to expand
its reach into more areas of domestic politics. Additionally, efforts by the United States to increase
the capability of the region’s military in order to fight drugs, along with increasing involvement in
civic action programs, may have the unintended consequence of providing more visibility, prestige,
and resources to the armed forces at the very moment that civilian authorities are under attack. As the
Strategic Assessment, 1999, said “The ‘uniformados’ continue to see themselves as the symbol of the
nation and custodian of its values, the core of national security, and a vital element in national
development.”xlviii Thus, inadvertently, U.S. policy may be fueling the “growing malaise in attitudes
toward democratic reform” that General Wilhelm was so concerned about in his congressional
testimony.
16
NOTES
i. Within the Pentagon’s Unified Command Structure, the United States Southern Command
(USSOUTHCOM) is responsible for providing strategic and operational command control of
assigned U.S. land, sea and air forces within Central and South America and the Caribbean.
ii. United States Southern Command, “Posture Statement of General Charles E. Wilhelm, United
States Marine Corps Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command,” delivered before the
House Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, March 23, 2000
<http://www.house.gov/hasc/testimony/106thcongress/00-030-23wilhelm.htm>.
iii. For an analysis of the transitions from authoritarian governments, see Guillermo O'Donnell,
Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule:
Comparative Perspectives, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); James M.
Malloy and Mitchell A. Seligson, eds., Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin
America, (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987); Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and
Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Democracy in Developing Countries: Volume 4, Latin America,
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1989); John Higley and Richard Gunther, eds., Elites and Democratic
Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe, (Cambridge University Press, 1992); and
Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe
and Latin America, (Cambridge University Press).
iv. For a review of civil-military relations in Latin America, see Linda Alexander Rodríguez, ed.,
Rank and Privilege: The Military and Society in Latin America, (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly
Resources, 1994); Gabriel Marcella, ed., Warriors in Peacetime: The Military and Democracy in
Latin America-New Directions for U.S. Policy, (Frank Cass, 1994); Paul W. Zagorski, Democracy
vs. National Security: Civil-Military Relations in Latin America, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,
1992); Karen L. Remmer, Military Rule in Latin America, (Unwin Hyman, 1989); Brian Loveman
and Thomas M. Davies, Jr., eds., The Politics of Antipolitics: The Military in Latin America, Revised
and Updated, (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1997); Louis W. Goodman, Johanna S.R.
Medelson and Juan Rial, eds., The Military and Democracy: The Future of Civil-Military Relations in
Latin America, (Lexington, KY: Lexington Books, 1990); Augusto Varas, ed., Democracy under
Siege: New Military Power in Latin America, (New York: Greenwood, 1989); James M. Malloy and
Mitchell A. Seligson, eds., Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America,
(Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987). For a review essay, see David Pion-Berlin,
"The Armed Forces and Politics: Gains and Snares in Recent Scholarship, " Latin American Research
Review, Volume 30, Number 1 (1995): 147-162.
v. The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, (U.S.G.P.O.,
July 1994), p. i-1.
vi. United States Southern Command, Op. Cit.
vii. See, Adam Isacson, Altered States: Security and Demilitarization in Central America,
(Washington, D.C.: Center for International Policy, 1997), p. 153.
viii. Author’s Interview with a Colonel in the Salvadorian Army, San Salvador, El Salvador, July 15,
1999.
17
9. Institute for National Strategic Studies, “Strategic Assessment, 1999,” National Defense
University, Washington, DC., 2000, p. 182.
x. In Panama, General Manuel Noriega, a former CIA asset, and many of his close collaborators
within the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) were involved in numerous illicit activities. Recent
reports have highlighted the intensive participation of Guatemalan military officers in drug
trafficking. In fact, DEA documents have referred to Guatemala as “la bodega” or the “warehouse.”
At least half of all cocaine that reaches the U.S. market goes through Guatemala. (See, Frank Smyth,
“Guatemala’s Narco-military,” IntellectualCapital.com, November 18, 1999 (found at
http://intellectualcapital.com/issues/issue320/item7246.asp).
xi. See, Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Clear and Present Dangers: The U.S.
Military and the War on Drugs in the Andes, (Washington, D.C.: WOLA, 1991); Washington Office
on Latin America (WOLA), “U.S. International Drug Control Policy: A Guide for Citizen Action,”
Report. (Washington, D.C.: WOLA, May 1999).
xii. Statement of Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Assistant Comptroller General, National Security and
International Affairs Division Before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps,
Narcotics, and Terrorism, Committee on Foreign Relations; and the Caucus on International
Narcotics Control, U.S. Senate. Wednesday, September 16, 1998, GAO/T-NSIAD-98-249
GAO/NSIAD-98-249.
xiii. Information for this section was obtained primarily through, Adam Isaacson and Joy Olson, Just
the Facts: 1999 Edition, A civilian guide to U.S. defense and security assistance to Latin America and
the Caribbean, A project of the Latin America Working Group in cooperation with the Center for
International Policy (Washington, DC: LAWG, 1999). See also the 2001 edition at
<http://www.ciponline.org/facts>.
xiv. The increase was part of a supplemental appropriation bill named the Western Hemisphere Drug
Elimination Act (WHDEA).
xv. Barry R. McCaffrey, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy, Remarks to the Academia
Diplomática de Colombia (Bogotá, Colombia: November 20, 2000)
<http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/aid/112001.htm>.
xvi. United States Southern Command, “Posture Statement Of General Charles E. Wilhelm, United
States Marine Corps Commander In Chief, United States Southern Command,” delivered before the
House Armed Services Committee, March 23, 2000
<http://www.house.gov/hasc/testimony/106thcongress/00-03-23wilhelm.htm>.
xvii. IMET pays for the training of foreign military personnel in weapons handling, helicopter and
airplane repair, counterinsurgency tactics, and human rights protection among many others.
Expanded IMET was created to increase training related to civil-military relations and human rights.
18. United States, Department of State, Department of Defense, “Foreign Military Training and DoD
Engagement Activities of Interest In Fiscal years 1999 and 2000, Volume I,” Washington, DC,
March 1, 2000 <http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/fmtrain/toc.html>
19. Ana Maria Salazar, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug Enforcement Policy and
18
Support, testimony before the United States House Of Representatives Committee On Government
Reform, Subcommittee On Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, June 9, 2000
<http://www.usinfo.state.gov/topical/global/drugs/canal.htm>.
xx. United States Southern Command, “Posture Statement of General Charles E. Wilhelm, United
States Marine Corps Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command,” delivered before the
House Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, March 23, 2000
<http://www.house.gov/hasc/testimony/106thcongress/00-030-23wilhelm.htm>.
xxi. Boletin informativo del Comisionado Nacional de Derechos Humanos de Honduras. No. 317:
May 17, 1996. Available via Internet at http://www.ciponline.org/cdh/960517.htm.
xxii. United States Southern Command, Op. Cit.
xxiii Peter Zirnite, "The Militarization of the Drug War in Latin America," Current History, April
1998, p. 166.
xxiv. Virtually all military officers interviewed by the author in 1999 and 2002, along with many
military publications, insist that the potential for external conflict still exists in the region. For some,
maintaining an effective national defense posture is a matter of pride, “Territorial integrity is the most
important mission of the national state. Throughout its history, it has been the military institution the
one who has preserved the integrity and identity of the nation” (Interview, July 5, 1999, San
Salvador, El Salvador). The constitutions of Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador all
say that the armed forces are a “permanent” institution of the state.
xxv. See Deborah Norden, “Democracy and Military Control in Venezuela: From Subordination to
Insurrection.” Latin American Research Review 33 (2): 143-165, for an examination of how
involvement in extensive civic action projects assisted in the collapse of the Venezuelan political
system by alienated junior officers from civilian leaders.
xxvi. Brigadier General, interviewed by author May 28, 2002, San Miguel, El Salvador.
xxvii. United States Southern Command, “Posture Statement of General Charles E. Wilhelm, United
States Marine Corps Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command,” delivered before the
House Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, March 23, 2000
<http://www.house.gov/hasc/testimony/106thcongress/00-030-23wilhelm.htm>.
xxviii. Felipe Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative
Perspective. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), p. 19.
xxix. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military
Relations. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 83.
xxx. See Philip J. Williams and Knut Walter, Militarization and Demilitarization in El Salvador’s
Transition to Democracy. (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997); Deborah Norden,
“Democracy and Military Control in Venezuela: From Subordination to Insurrection.” Latin American
Research Review 33 (2): 143-165.
xxxi. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 83.
xxxii. Ibid.
19
xxxiii. Recent studies have analyzed civil-military relations by focusing on specific policy areas
within which civil and military authorities interact. These analysts argue that in order to understand
civil-military relations we must differentiate among the various policy sectors that comprise
government action, and then examine the specific institutional mechanisms that shape civil-military
relations in each sector. This way, a more subtle and nuance picture of civil-military relations will
emerge. See, Richard H. Kohn, “How Democracies Control the Military.” Journal of Democracy 8
(1997): 140-153; Harold Trinkunas, “Ensuring Democratic Control of the Armed Forces in Asia.”
East-West Center Occasional Papers: Politics and Security Series 1 (October 1999); and David PionBerlin and Craig Arceneaux, “Decision-Makers or Decision-Takers? Military Missions and Civilian
Control in Democratic South America.” Armed Forces & Society 26, 3 (Spring 2000): 413-436.
xxxiv. Juan J. Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, & Reequilibration.
(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), p. 16.
xxxv. Ibid, pp. 18-23.
xxxvi. Ibid, pp. 27-38.
xxxvii. The samples are of multi-stage stratified design. The 1991 surveys are of the leading urban
areas. In El Salvador the sample included greater metropolitan San Salvador, including the city of
San Salvador (divided into 14 zones) and the eight surrounding municipios (N=900). In Nicaragua
the sample includes the cities of Managua, Granada, and León (N=704). The 1995 (N=1409), 1997
(N=2,500), and 1999 (N=2,914) Salvadorian samples are of national probability design. As are the
Nicaraguan 1997 (N=2500) and 1999 (N=2,500) samples. The author wishes to thank Dr. Mitchell A.
Seligson, director of the University of Pittsburgh Latin America Public Opinion Project, for providing
access to the surveys. For El Salvador, we also wish to thank the assistance and generosity of Dr.
Ricardo Córdova, director of the Fundación Guillermo Manuel Ungo (FUNDAUNGO), co-sponsor of
the Salvadorian survey.
xxxviii. The Latinobarometro is sponsored by the Inter-American Development Bank and is
conducted by MORI-Chile. The survey is conducted in each of the seventeen Spanish and
Portuguese-speaking mainland countries of Latin America. The samples vary in size and level of
representativeness. For Central America, the samples are of national probability with an N=1000 in
each country.
xxxix. Brian Loveman, "'Protected Democracies': Antipolitics and Political Transitions in Latin
America, 1978-1994," In Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, Jr., eds., The Politics of AntiPolitics: The Military in Latin America, Revised and Updated (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly
Resources, 1997), pp. 366-397.
xl. Ibid, p. 369.
xli. For an historical examination of the constitutional impediments to democracy in Latin America,
see Brian Loveman, The Constitution of Tyranny: regimes of Exception in Spanish America
(Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993).
xlii. In Chile, for example, 10 percent of copper earnings must go to the military.
xliii. Juan Rial, Armies and Civil Society in Latin America, p. 48.
20
xliv. Wendy A. Hunter, "Politicians Against Soldiers: Contesting the Military in Post-Authoritarian
Brazil," Comparative Politics, Vo. 27, No. 4 (July 1995), p. 427.
xlv. David Pion-Berlin, "Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America,"
Comparative Politics, Vol. 25, No. 1 (October 1992), pp. 99-100.
xlvi. Samuel P. Huntington, "Reforming Civil-Military Relations," In Larry Diamond and Marc F.
Plattner, eds., Civil-Military Relations and Democracy (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1996), p. 9.
xlvii. James Malloy & Seligson M.A. (Eds.). Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in
Latin America. (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997), p. 253.
xlviii. Institute for National Strategic Studies, “Strategic Assessment, 1999,” p. 181.
21