Ptx
Will pass – growing bipartisan support
Sargent 10/29 (Greg, columnist for the Washington Post. “Immigration reform is sort of undead”
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013/10/29/immigration-reform-is-sort-ofundead/)
We now have two House Republicans on record supporting the immigration reform bill introduced by
House Democrats, a version of the Senate bill that gets rid of one border security amendment disliked by House Dems and replaces it
with another security measure that has House bipartisan support. Which is to say that immigration reform is just a bit more
undead than it was yesterday. GOP Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida today signed on to the Democratic bill, after GOP Rep. Jeff
Denham did the same over the weekend. This measure is unlikely to get a vote in the House. But Dems have not given up on the
possibility that House Republicans will allow a vote on something immigration related this year. Proreform Republicans are also not giving up. Here is what GOP Rep. Denham told my Post colleague Peter Wallsten: As for
whether his party leadership would let votes happen on any immigration proposals, Denham said he expects the House will get the chance to
address the issue in some fashion. “They’ve told me that we’re going to have this [issue] on the floor by the end of the year.” I followed up with
Denham’s office for more clarification, and got back this quote from Denham: “I’ve
spoken with various members of
leadership on this issue. They have told me and said publicly that they expect to see a vote on this
issue by the year’s end.”
Lifting embargo would be controversial and Obama would have to be pushing the plan
Leogrande 13
William M. LeoGrande is professor in the Department of Government, School of Public Affairs at
American University in Washington, D.C.¶ The Danger of Dependence: Cuba's Foreign Policy After Chavez
4-2-13¶ http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12840/the-danger-of-dependence-cubas-foreignpolicy-after-chavez¶ Are U.S.-Cuban Relations Poised for Change?
In his first public statement after assuming Cuba's presidency in 2006, Raúl Castro held out an olive branch to Washington, declaring his
readiness to sit down and negotiate the differences between the two countries. Obama
came to office in 2009 declaring that
U.S. policy toward Cuba amounted to 50 years of failure and that it was "time to try something new." The stage
appeared set for a tectonic shift in U.S.-Cuban relations, long locked in a state of perpetual hostility.¶ Obama took some early steps that
augured well. In April 2009, he ended restrictions on Cuban-American remittances and family travel and subsequently eased regulations
limiting cultural and academic exchange. At Washington's initiative, the United States and Cuba resumed bilateral talks on migration,
suspended by President George W. Bush in 2004. The two governments also began discussions on other issues of mutual interest, such as Coast
Guard cooperation and drug interdiction.¶
But the momentum in Washington soon dissipated in the face of more
pressing foreign policy priorities, opposition from Congress, even among some Democrats, and
resistance from an inertial State Department bureaucracy more comfortable with the familiar policy of
the past -- its failure notwithstanding -- than the risk of trying something new. As a former senior State Department official explained,
high-visibility foreign policy changes of this magnitude only happen if the president demands that
they happen, and Obama's attention was focused elsewhere. In December 2009, Cuba's arrest of Alan Gross, a
consultant for the U.S. Agency for International Development's "democracy promotion" programs, brought all progress to a halt. At the end of
Obama's first term, relations with Cuba were not much better than at the start.¶
Obama’s PC is key to passing immigration – needs to keep the pressure on the GOP
Balz 10/17 (Dan, journalist at The Washington Post, where he has been a political correspondent since
1978. “Can Obama seize the moment and make Washington work?”
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/can-obama-seize-the-moment-to-make-washingtonwork/2013/10/17/d84c1934-3753-11e3-80c6-7e6dd8d22d8f_story.html?tid=pm_politics_pop)
The two other legislative priorities the president cited were immigration reform and passage of the farm bill. No one can say what the
prospects are for passage of an immigration bill. Much of that still depends on how House GOP leaders decide whether it is
in the party’s long-term interest to pass it. Obama did not mention what should be his other major priority, the health-care law, whose
implementation has gotten off to a stumbling start, to put it mildly. All of that is on the table. Meanwhile, there
is a question of how
engaged Obama will be in the grinding work of trying to produce compromise with potentially willing
Republicans. Leon Panetta, who served in Obama’s Cabinet, in Bill Clinton’s White House and as a member of the House before that, told a
breakfast held by the Wall Street Journal that past failures are no reason for the White House to disengage. “In
this town, you’ve got to stay with it and stay at it,” he said. It’s possible that the divisions in the Republican Party and the
determination of its tea party wing to continue its fight against the health-care law and the president’s agenda will doom any prospects for
more effective governance for the duration of Obama’s term. But the
shutdown battle has given the president a fresh
opportunity to show what he is prepared to do to produce the kind of bipartisanship he long has
promised.
Visas are key to cybersecurity preparedness
McLarty 9 (Thomas F. III, President – McLarty Associates and Former White House Chief of Staff and
Task Force Co-Chair, “U.S. Immigration Policy: Report of a CFR-Sponsored Independent Task Force”, 7-8,
http://www.cfr.org/ publication/19759/us_immigration_policy.html)
when you look at the table of the top 20 firms that are H1-B visa
requestors, at least 15 of those are IT firms. And as we're seeing across industry, much of the hardware and software that's used in this country
is not only manufactured now overseas, but it's developed overseas by scientists and engineers who were educated here in the
United States. We're seeing a lot more activity around cyber-security , certainly
noteworthy attacks here very recently. It's becoming an increasingly dominant set of requirements across not only to the Department of
Defense, but the Department of Homeland Security and the critical infrastructure that's held in private hands. Was there any
discussion or any interest from DOD or DHS as you undertook this review on the security things about what can be
done to try to generate a more effective group of IT experts here in the
United S tates, many of which are coming to the U.S. institutions, academic institutions
from overseas and often returning back? This potentially puts us at a competitive
disadvantage going forward. MCLARTY: Yes. And I think your question largely is the answer as well. I mean, clearly we have
less talented students here studying -- or put another way, more talented students studying in
other countries that are gifted, talented, really have a tremendous ability to develop these kind of
technology and scientific advances, we're going to be put at an increasingly disadvantage. Where if they come here -and I kind of like Dr. Land's approach of the green card being handed to them or carefully put in their billfold or
purse as they graduate -- then, obviously, that's going to strengthen , I think, our system, our security
needs.
We have seen,
¶
¶
Cyber-vulnerability causes great power nuclear war
Fritz 9 Researcher for International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament [Jason,
researcher for International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, former Army
officer and consultant, and has a master of international relations at Bond University, “Hacking Nuclear
Command and Control,” July, http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Jason_Fritz_Hacking_NC2.pdf]
This paper will analyse the threat of cyber terrorism in regard to nuclear weapons. Specifically, this research will use open source knowledge to identify the
structure of nuclear command and control centres, how those structures might be compromised through computer network operations, and how doing so would fit within
If access to command and control centres is obtained,
terrorists could fake or actually cause one nuclear-armed state to attack another, thus
provoking a nuclear response from another nuclear power. This may be an easier alternative
for terrorist groups than building or acquiring a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb themselves.
This would also act as a force equaliser, and provide terrorists with the asymmetric benefits
of high speed, removal of geographical distance, and a relatively low cost. Continuing
difficulties in developing computer tracking technologies which could trace the identity of
intruders, and difficulties in establishing an internationally agreed upon legal framework to guide responses to computer network operations, point
towards an inherent weakness in using computer networks to manage nuclear weaponry.
This is particularly relevant to reducing the hair trigger posture of existing nuclear arsenals.
All computers which are connected to the internet are susceptible to infiltration and remote control. Computers which operate on a closed
network may also be compromised by various hacker methods, such as privilege escalation,
roaming notebooks, wireless access points, embedded exploits in software and hardware, and
maintenance entry points. For example, e-mail spoofing targeted at individuals who have access to a
closed network, could lead to the installation of a virus on an open network. This virus could then be
carelessly transported on removable data storage between the open and closed network. Information found on the internet may also
reveal how to access these closed networks directly. Efforts by militaries to place increasing
reliance on computer networks, including experimental technology such as autonomous
systems, and their desire to have multiple launch options, such as nuclear triad capability,
enables multiple entry points for terrorists. For example, if a terrestrial command centre is impenetrable, perhaps isolating one nuclear
armed submarine would prove an easier task. There is evidence to suggest multiple attempts have been made by
hackers to compromise the extremely low radio frequency once used by the US Navy to send
nuclear launch approval to submerged submarines. Additionally, the alleged Soviet system known
as Perimetr was designed to automatically launch nuclear weapons if it was unable to
establish communications with Soviet leadership. This was intended as a retaliatory response
in the event that nuclear weapons had decapitated Soviet leadership; however it did not
account for the possibility of cyber terrorists blocking communications through computer
network operations in an attempt to engage the system. Should a warhead be launched, damage could be further enhanced
through additional computer network operations. By using proxies, multi-layered attacks could be engineered.
Terrorists could remotely commandeer computers in China and use them to launch a US
nuclear attack against Russia. Thus Russia would believe it was under attack from the US and
the US would believe China was responsible. Further, emergency response communications could
be disrupted, transportation could be shut down, and disinformation, such as misdirection,
could be planted, thereby hindering the disaster relief effort and maximizing destruction.
Disruptions in communication and the use of disinformation could also be used to provoke
uninformed responses. For example, a nuclear strike between India and Pakistan could be
coordinated with Distributed Denial of Service attacks against key networks, so they would
have further difficulty in identifying what happened and be forced to respond quickly. Terrorists
could also knock out communications between these states so they cannot discuss the situation. Alternatively, amidst the confusion of a
traditional large-scale terrorist attack, claims of responsibility and declarations of war could
be falsified in an attempt to instigate a hasty military response. These false claims could be posted directly on
established cyber terrorists’ capabilities, strategies, and tactics.
Presidential, military, and government websites. E-mails could also be sent to the media and foreign governments using the IP addresses and e-mail accounts of
government officials
. A sophisticated and all encompassing combination of traditional terrorism and
cyber terrorism could be enough to launch nuclear weapons on its own, without the need for
compromising command and control centres directly.
T
A. The aff fails to specify the exact mechanism for economic engagement – this model
of debate crushes education and justifies an unfair expansion of the topic
Hayden 13 (Dr. Craig Hayden is an assistant professor in the International Communication Program at
American University's School of International Service. “Engagement” is More Convenient than Helpful:
Dissecting a Public Diplomacy Term.”, http://intermap.org/2013/06/20/engagement-is-moreconvenient-than-helpful-dissecting-a-public-diplomacy-term/
I think this tension is readily apparent in efforts to use social media for public diplomacy.Case in point – how does the use of
Facebook or Twitter constitute engagement? Does the larger base of people who “Like” an embassy
page indicate a successful campaign of engagement? Or, does it reflect a productive use of advertising techniques to recruit
“likes,” while not necessarily providing the implied more meaningful connections that social networks can sustain? When an
ambassador uses Twitter, does this constitute a robust effort to sustain dialogue with publics, or, does it
represent a kind of performance that humanizes the chief of mission? I’m not suggesting one is better than the other. What I am saying
is that there a few clear parameters for what constitutes “engagement.” In my research on US digital public
diplomacy, I have heard a lot of critiques about what is being done from a practical standpoint, but not so
much on the bigger question of “why.” What does this mean for practitioners?For starters, it makes it
harder to design the kind of formative research needed to plan an effective public diplomacy program that
takes into account both the contextual factors and the strategic needs that the program will serve. The
conceptual ambiguity also makes it difficult to pin down how and when a program can be deemed
effective in post hoc evaluation.While I readily acknowledge that measurement and evaluation imperatives can ultimately distort
the practice of public diplomacy or even conceal the less democratic forms of communication involved in public diplomacy outreach, I think
it’s also important to acknowledge that the ambiguity of a term like “engagement” makes it potentially
about everything – all the touch-points, communications, and connections that are involved in public
diplomacy. I don’t think this helps practitioners, policy-makers, or commentators. Instead, it perpetuates
jargon, and elides more persistent questions about both the purpose and the operative theories that
underscore efforts to reach foreign publics.
B. Voting issue –
1. Limits – not requiring the aff to specify explodes the literature base – it frees them
from having to find specific solvency advocates or defenses of particular engagement
strategies and allows them to dodge links through vagueness
2. Ground – if they don’t specify, it prevents us from accessing most of the literature
written against engagement which is geared towards contrasting strategies – they’ve
destroyed legitimate CP ground
3. This turns solvency – specificity key to prevent subverting implementation
Thompson 2000 (Anne, FAO, Sustainable Livelihoods Approaches at the Policy Level
Paper prepared for FAO e-conference, March, http://www.livelihoods.org/pip/pip/tho2-fao.doc)
(emphasis in original)
Policy itself can be analysed conceptually at a number of different levels. In its broadest sense, the term policy can be used to
include projects, programmes, strategies, plans and their implementation, in fact every element of public or collective decisionmaking. Although it is a rather artificial simplification, policy can be divided into content and the process of policy formulation, in other words
the way in which that content is arrived at. The
way in which policy is implemented can change the effective
content of policy, either because policy interactions have not been fully understood, or because the policy is subverted by
those responsible for implementing it.
CP
The United States federal government should normalize its trade relations with Cuba
if and only if the Cuban government implements, through a bilateral framework,
economic liberalization reforms, including engaging international financial
institutions, reducing restrictions on foreign direct investment, and admittance into
the Organization of American States.
The United States federal government should then make all conditions reversible, as
per our 2nd Perez evidence.
Only the counterplan solves Cuban growth and democracy – US engagement in
economic liberalization ensures stable transition post-Castro, and they’d say yes.
David A. Perez, Yale Law School, JD, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, Spring,13 Harv. Latino L. Rev.
187, America’s Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State
Department, p. 216-7//ts
The United States should recognize that economic change is a precursor to political change . To that
end, the Obama Administration should craft its Cuba policy to emphasize and encourage
economic liberalization , rather than focusing on political conditions. (4A) Economic Liberalization Precedes
Political Liberalization American policymakers should adopt another type of Copernican shift: instead of placing political reforms
(i.e., free elections) at the center of our Cuba policy, the U.S. should make economic reforms the
gravitational locus of our diplomatic efforts. This shift would not lose track of or diminish the
importance of political change, but would simply acknowledge that such political change necessarily
orbits economic change, and not the other way around. Put differently, changing our point of view does not change our objectives
– it only changes the means by which we pursue our objectives. The notion of offering a quid pro quo – easing restrictions for genuine irreversible reform – has
always been impossible because of Fidel’s stubborn personality. Once he is out of the picture permanently, there would be no other leader who could maintain such
rigidity in the face of genuine and constructive engagement from Washington. Reform-oriented leaders will feel less pressure to remain silent, while the
government itself will feel more pressure from the populace to address the growing concerns on the island. While Fidel Castro has always exuded confidence in his
leadership, in the immediate wake of his death the Cuban regime is sure to feel a tremendous amount of insecurity, which, if handled properly and respectfully,
could strengthen Washington’s political hand. At that point, the best – indeed, the only – way to have leverage in Cuba, is for America to engage the island directly.
However,
Washington’s policy for the last fifty years has focused almost exclusively on the political
situation (i.e., free and fair elections). This myopic approach has ignored the possibility of doing an end-run
around Castro’s political recalcitrance by simply giving the Cuban people (and government) an offer
they can’t refuse: economic success. As long as the political arena remains the battlefield upon which
Washington and Havana wage their ideological war, there will always be stalemate. Transitions from other
Cold War-era governments demonstrate that economic liberalization helped facilitate political liberalization. In Poland,
the labor unions flourished before political parties were finally established after the fall of the Soviet Union; in Russia, mass privatization paved the way for
moderate political freedoms; in Vietnam, the government started to embrace market-based reforms in the mid to late-1980s; and finally, in China, an unmistakably
capitalist society has emerged, although elections have still not been held. Cuba will be no different. In early 2009, the Cuban government approved the largest land
distribution since the revolution when it handed out 45,500 land grants to the private sector .
Another reason economic reforms are
likely to precede political reforms is that the population seems hungrier to see an economic respite
after decades of austerity. This may also be a result of their belief that the Cuban regime will try to
maintain its monopolistic grip on politics for as long as possible, even if it loosens its grip on the
economy. When Raul Castro began his version of a “listening tour” around the island he also initiated a series of debates. During one of these town hall
meetings Ricardo Alarcon, the leader of the National Assembly as of April 2009, was barraged with questions that focused on the economy – specifically Cuba’s
dual-currency system. Although such intimate private-public participation has been rare on the totalitarian island, once the window of opportunity was opened, a
burst of activity flowed through.
Reloading the diplomatic cannon by encouraging economic reform, rather than
focusing on political reform, would represent a more dynamic approach to U.S.-Cuban relations. (4B)
Washington’s Policies Should Encourage Economic Liberalization The importance of this argument
cannot be overstated. The fact that economic reforms will precede political reforms means at least
two things. First, given this ordering, any quid pro quo from Washington should provide due credit to any
economic liberalization that the island may implement, however piecemeal. For example, when the
Cuban government privatizes parcels of agricultural land, or when it allows its tourist industry to engage in the dollar
economy, or when it allows its taxi drivers to charge their own rates, these reforms should be seen as the economic
equivalent of allowing small-scale political pluralism. When economic reforms are implemented, they
should be praised – not belittled – and followed by positive reinforcement by Washington. Second, since
these economic changes will be prerequisites for any significant political reforms on the island,
Washington should focus its short-term diplomatic efforts on an open Cuban market, rather than an
open Cuban polity. This might mean easing or restructuring, though not necessarily fully eliminating, restrictions
on trade, travel, and remittances, in order to encourage more private economic activity. In these
ways, the U.S. can help awaken Cuba’s nascent economic society, providing the necessary impetus for
political reform. Another method Washington can use to lure Cuba into economic reform is membership into the international financial
community. The World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the Inter-American Development Bank each have rules for borrowing money
and can encourage liberalization in Cuba by making their respective funds available as a carrot to incentivize liberalization. These regional and
global economic organizations have rules and procedures that are technically independent of the U.S. Congress.
By couching these
reforms in terms of obligations to transnational financial organizations, any economic progress can
be insulated from the anti-American rhetoric that would otherwise follow their painful
implementation. Ending the U.S. opposition to the reengagement of the international financial
community with Cuba would go a long way toward promoting economic liberalization. (4C) The Economic
Transition Will Be Slow Policymakers in Washington must realize that Cubans will not wake up the day after Fidel Castro
dies and experience broad-based attitudinal changes. Therefore, while economic reform is sure to preface political reform, the
Cuban government will have to move slowly on the former so as not to alienate the population, which would truncate the latter. At first, a successor regime may
think that choosing between Castroism and economic liberalization is a Faustian choice: economic doldrums with continuity versus economic revitalization with
instability. Indeed, continuing Castroism embraces the history and normative values attached to the Revolution, but would forestall any economic recovery. On the
other hand, liberalizing the economy by adopting market reforms would promote economic growth, but could also alienate large segments of the population still
enamored by Castro’s revolutionary zeal. For example, one possible market reform would be to lay off the excess workforce that has cluttered the state-controlled
enterprises and rendered them inefficient and virtually useless. Embracing deep cuts in the public employment might be efficient, but it certainly will not be
popular. For decades Cubans have enjoyed job security, universal education, and universal healthcare. If market reforms are interpreted as a wholesale rejection of
the normative and ideological underpinnings that have dominated Cuban discourse for the last fifty years, they will no doubt alienate influential ideologues in the
Communist Party, the military, the Ministry of the Interior, and many others in the general population. When a state takes control of the economy, it also takes
responsibility for it when it performs poorly. A strong state could surely implement these reforms and survive the ensuing backlash; but to do so would require deft
political maneuvering, and a careful patience to not try to change everything all at once. A poorly managed state-led economic opening can quickly become
unmanageable, and create instability. Given
these concerns, a slow and methodical economic transition , rather
than an overnight toppling of the state-sector, would be a far more pragmatic approach for the
Cuban government . China and Vietnam have both introduced market reforms that dwarf any that the Cuban regime has introduced so
far. Given that China has been on the path of liberalization for over thirty years yet the state still controls wide swaths of the economy, one
might expect Cuba’s economic transformation to also move lethargically – especially at first. The stronger the parallel with Asia becomes, the
more methodical Cuba’s opening will be. Expectations that assume a quick economic turnaround should be correspondingly adjusted. Thus,
the United States should recognize that the Cuban government has little choice but to move at a
relatively glacial speed, and instead work assiduously to make the economic transition as smooth as
possible. To that end, it is absolutely crucial that our policies not be used as a way to settle political
grudges. For example, if America moves to regain the properties taken by the Cuban government fifty
years ago as a way to “encourage” market reforms, the entire effort will be short-circuited before it
takes off the ground. Some will argue that focusing on market liberalization, while putting political
reforms to the side, endangers Cuba’s long-term prospects for liberty and freedom. This is a valid
concern. Nevertheless, in normative terms, market reforms will vastly improve the lives of the Cuban
people . The improved living conditions will give fringe groups with few resources the ability to focus
their own efforts on political reform from within. Improved economic conditions, if used as a
prerequisite to political reform, may also prevent a costly civil war during the inevitably
painful transition .
Conditionality and reversibility are key – Plan fails without the threat of returned
sanctions – government repression, instability and chaos would be the result
David A. Perez, Yale Law School, JD, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, Spring,13 Harv. Latino L. Rev.
187, America’s Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State
Department, p. 216-7//ts
After conducting some initial discussions, both countries can then move on to the embargo. No one argues
that the embargo is an effective foreign policy, because it has clearly failed to bring about real reform on the island; the only argument
for maintaining the embargo is that it can be used as a bargaining chip for more dialogue
–
not
that in its current state it can lead to a better situation . Put differently, the embargo is only valuable to
the extent that its removal can be part of a quid pro quo strategy – not that its maintenance will lead
to fundamental reform on the island. This reveals a bifurcated myopia that affects both sides of the
debate. On the one hand those who support the embargo as a negotiating chip often gloss over the fact that its continuation will not lead to
regime change. On the other hand, those who focus on the embargo’s inability to topple the regime and instead
support lifting the embargo unconditionally, generally give too little weight to the embargo’s
value during diplomatic negotiations . The Helms-Burton legislation lays out the rather onerous conditions that must
be met on Cuba’s end before the U.S. can begin restoring diplomatic relations. The significance of Helms-Burton’s restraints cannot be
overstated: while a particular president’s rhetoric or a particular resolution’s wording might chill diplomatic relations between two countries,
Helms-Burton’s arduous provisions freeze relations. The onus to thaw that freeze is properly placed upon Washington, rather than Havana. It is
therefore incumbent upon the United States to change its own laws before any rapprochement with Cuba can begin. Invariably the debate
surrounding America’s embargo revolves around its solvency: has it worked? The question should instead be reworded to ask: will current U.S.
policy work from here on out to achieve certain definable interests? The United States sold the island over $ 700 million in goods in 2008,
accounting for 40% of the island’s agricultural imports. That number seems to indicate that Cuba’s trading relationship with the U.S. is not of
trivial importance to the island’s leadership. However, the
strength of this relationship may steadily diminish relative
to other trading partners in the next few years. For example, over the next five to seven years Cuba will have an
increased energy productivity stemming from its coastal drilling operations that will bring it closer to Spain,
Canada, Norway, Brazil, and India. With these relatively stable flows of capital, Cuba will increasingly become insulated from
U.S. economic pressure. The moment to decisively influence Cuba’s government through economic pressure may have never existed,
but if it did, it has surely passed. The notion that the U.S. can intricately craft Cuba’s governmental and
domestic policies by applying a combination of economic and political pressure must be rejected either as categorically
false, or as an anachronism of the early 1990s. During her confirmation hearings, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said “that it is not
time to lift the embargo on Cuba, especially since it provides an important source of leverage for
further change on the island.” Secretary Clinton is correct: the embargo definitely provides a valuable
bargaining chip during negotiations, and should not be lifted unconditionally . But given this evidence, the
Obama Administration should be suspect of claims that the embargo gives the U.S. decisive leverage over Cuba. (5G) These Diplomatic
Overtures Are Both Sequential and Reversible These first few steps would then allow the United
States to begin by engaging Cuba in a multi-lateral framework. The model can mirror the six-party talks held
with North Korea, which provide a structure for direct American engagement with the North Korean government. n87
The Cuban government will likely participate since the United States has so much to offer, including the
reduction of sanctions, various security guarantees, the promise of normalized relations, and an
eventual end to Cuba’s isolation. Combined with these carrots, the United States will also have the stick
of increased sanctions, and a reversion back to diplomatic isolation. Policymakers in America often emphasize that
any change on America’s end must be met with irreversible change on Cuba’s end, based on the idea that the United States might be offering
irreversible carrots for nothing. The underlying premise of that notion is simply wrong: there is
no reason to believe that once
the United States changes parts of its Cuba policy, it cannot reverse those changes in response to
negative behavior in Havana. Concessions the United States makes on many of these issues can be
reversed: targeted sanctions can be reapplied after they have been removed; travel bans can be
reinstituted after they have been lifted; diplomatic relations can be re-severed after they have been
re-established. If the United States normalizes relations with the Cuban government, only to witness the
Cuban government imprison or execute hundreds of dissidents, there is no reason why our
government could not respond strongly, and even consider reverting back to hostile relations.
Establishing relations between Washington and Havana is not an end in itself , nor is it a right that has
been taken away from Havana. Instead, normalized relations should properly be seen as a privilege that
Cuba has to earn before it is once again offered by the United States. But even if it is offered to Cuba,
by no means are any overtures on Washington’s end irreversible.
An unstable transition causes Caribbean terrorism, regional instability, and turns the
case
Gorrell 2005
[Tim, Lieutenant Colonel, “CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?” 3/18, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074]
Regardless of the succession, under the current U.S. policy, Cuba’s problems of a post Castro transformation only
worsen. In addition to Cubans on the island, there will be those in exile who will return claiming authority.
And there are remnants of the dissident community within Cuba who will attempt to exercise similar
authority. A power vacuum or absence of order will create the conditions for instability and civil war .
Whether Raul or another successor from within the current government can hold power is debatable. However, that
individual will nonetheless extend the current policies for an indefinite period, which will only compound the Cuban
situation. When Cuba finally collapses anarchy is a strong possibility if the U.S. maintains the “wait and see” approach.
The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast. In the midst of this chaos, thousands
will flee the island.
During the Mariel boatlift in 1980 125,000 fled the island.26 Many were criminals; this
time the number could be
several hundred thousand flee ing to the U.S., creating a refugee crisis. Equally important, by adhering to a negative
containment policy, the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems. Cuba is along the axis
of the drug-trafficking flow into the U.S. from Columbia. The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In fact, Cuba’s
actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing
seizure of drugs – 7.5 tons in 1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.27 While there may be individuals within the government and outside who
engage in drug trafficking and a percentage of drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, the Cuban government is not the path of
least resistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S.
could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably. In the midst of an
unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region increases. If
these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere then
the war against this extremism gets more complicated . Such activity could increase direct attacks and
disrupt the economies, threatening the stability of the fragile democracies that are budding
throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy military
forces to Cuba, creating the conditions for another insurgency . The ramifications of this action could very well fuel
greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas. A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems.
U.S. domestic political support is also turning against the current negative policy. The Cuban American population in the U.S. totals 1,241,685 or 3.5% of the
population.28 Most of these exiles reside in Florida; their influence has been a factor in determining the margin of victory in the past two presidential elections. But
this election strategy may be flawed, because recent polls of Cuban Americans reflect a decline for President Bush based on his policy crackdown. There is a clear
softening in the Cuban-American community with regard to sanctions. Younger Cuban Americans do not necessarily subscribe to the hard-line approach. These
changes signal an opportunity for a new approach to U.S.-Cuban relations. (Table 1) The time has come to look realistically at the Cuban issue. Castro will rule until
he dies. The only issue is what happens then? The
U.S. can little afford to be distracted by a failed state 90 miles off its
coast. The administration, given the present state of world affairs, does not have the luxury or the resources to
pursue the traditional American model of crisis management. The President and other government and military leaders have
warned that the GWOT will be long and protracted. These warnings were sounded when the administration did not anticipate operations in
Iraq consuming so many military, diplomatic and economic resources. There is justifiable concern that Africa and the Caucasus region are
potential hot spots for terrorist activity, so these areas should be secure. North Korea will continue to be an
unpredictable crisis in waiting. We also cannot ignore China . What if China resorts to aggression to
resolve the Taiwan situation? Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan? Additionally, Iran could conceivably be the next
target for U.S. pre-emptive action. These are known and potential situations that could easily require
all or many of the elements of national power to resolve. In view of such global issues, can the U.S. afford to
sustain the status quo and simply let the Cuban situation play out? The U.S. is at a crossroads: should the policies of the
past 40 years remain in effect with vigor? Or should the U.S. pursue a new approach to Cuba in an effort to facilitate a manageable transition to post-Castro Cuba?
K
The topic is a red herring – US imperialism creates the illusion of consensus – as long
as Latin American diplomacy remains a tool used to defend the empire, any
benevolent intent becomes whitewashed as colonial violence becomes more
destructive
Petras 12 (James, is a retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University adjunct
professor at Saint Mary's University “The Empire’s Ideology: Imperialism and “Anti-Imperialism of the
Fools”,” http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-empire-s-ideology-imperialism-and-anti-imperialism-of-thefools/28456)
The imperialist use of “anti-imperialist” moral rhetoric was designed to weaken rivals and was directed to
several audiences. In fact, at no point did the anti-imperialist rhetoric serve to “liberate” any of the colonized
people. In almost all cases the victorious imperial power only substituted one form colonial or neocolonial rule for another. The “anti-imperialism” of the imperialists is directed at the nationalist
movements of the colonized countries and at their domestic public. British imperialists fomented
uprisings among the agro-mining elites in Latin America promising “ free trade” against Spanish
mercantilist rule; they backed the “self-determination” of the slaveholding cotton plantation owners
in the US South against the Union; they supported the territorial claims of the Iroquois tribal leaders
against the US anti-colonial revolutionaries … exploiting legitimate grievances for imperial ends.
During World War II, the Japanese imperialists supported a sector of the nationalist anti-colonial movement in India against the British Empire .
The US condemned Spanish colonial rule in Cuba and the Philippines and went to war to “liberate” the
oppressed peoples from tyranny….and remained to impose a reign of terror, exploitation and colonial rule…
The imperial powers sought to divide the anti-colonial movements and create future “client rulers” when and
if they succeeded. The use of anti-imperialist rhetoric was designed to attract two sets of groups. A
conservative group with common political and economic interests with the imperial power, which shared their
hostility to revolutionary nationalists and which sought to accrue greater advantage by tying their fortunes to a rising
imperial power. A radical sector of the movement tactically allied itself with the rising imperial power, with the idea of using the imperial power
to secure resources (arms, propaganda, vehicles and financial aid) and, once securing power, to discard them. More often than not, in this game of
mutual manipulation between empire and nationalists, the former won out … as is the case then and now. The imperialist “anti-
imperialist” rhetoric was equally directed at the domestic public, especially in countries like the US
which prized its 18th anti-colonial heritage. The purpose was to broaden the base of empire building
beyond the hard line empire loyalists, militarists and corporate beneficiaries. Their appeal sought to
include liberals, humanitarians, progressive intellectuals, religious and secular moralists and other “opinionmakers” who had a certain cachet with the larger public, the ones who would have to pay with their lives and
tax money for the inter-imperial and colonial wars. The official spokespeople of empire publicize real and
fabricated atrocities of their imperial rivals, and highlight the plight of the colonized victims. The corporate
elite and the hardline militarists demand military action to protect property, or to seize strategic resources; the
humanitarians and progressives denounce the “crimes against humanity” and echo the calls “to do something concrete” to
save the victims from genocide. Sectors of the Left join the chorus and, finding a sector of victims who fit in with their abstract ideology, plead for the
imperial powers to “arm the people to liberate themselves” (sic). By lending moral support and a veneer of respectability
to the imperial war, by swallowing the propaganda of “war to save victims” the progressives become
the prototype of the “anti-imperialism of the fools”. Having secured broad public support on the
bases of “anti-imperialism”, the imperialist powers feel free to sacrifice citizens’ lives and the public
treasury, to pursue war, fueled by the moral fervor of a righteous cause. As the butchery drags on and
the casualties mount, and the public wearies of war and its cost, progressive and leftist enthusiasm turns to
silence or worse, moral hypocrisy with claims that “the nature of the war changed” or “that this isn’t the kind
of war that we had in mind …”. As if the war makers ever intended to consult the progressives and left
on how and why they should engage in imperial wars! In the contemporary period the imperial “anti-imperialist wars” and
aggression have been greatly aided and abetted by well-funded “grass roots” so-called “non-governmental organizations” which act to mobilize
popular movements which can “invite” imperial aggression. Over the past four decades US imperialism has fomented at least
two
dozen “grass roots” movements which have destroyed democratic governments, or decimated
collectivist welfare states or provoked major damage to the economy of targeted countries. In Chile
throughout 1972-73 under the democratically elected government of Salvador Allende, the CIA financed and provided major
support – via the AFL-CIO–to private truck owners to paralyze the flow of goods and services .They also funded a
strike by a sector of the copper workers union (at the El Tenient mine) to undermine copper production and exports, in the lead up to the coup. After
the military took power several “grass roots” Christian Democratic union officials participated in the purge of elected leftist union activists. Needless
to say in short order the truck owners and copper workers ended the strike, dropped their demands and subsequently lost all bargaining rights! In the
1980’s the CIA via Vatican channels transferred millions of dollars to sustain the “Solidarity Union” in Poland, making a hero of the Gdansk shipyards
worker-leader Lech Walesa, who spearheaded the general strike to topple the Communist regime. With the overthrow of Communism so also went
guaranteed employment, social security and trade union militancy: the neo-liberal regimes reduced the workforce at Gdansk by fifty percent and
eventually closed it, giving the boot to the entire workforce.. Walesa retired with a magnificent Presidential pension, while his former workmates
walked the streets and the new “independent” Polish rulers provided NATO with military bases and mercenaries for imperial wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq . In 2002 the White House, the CIA, the AFL-CIO and NGOs, backed a Venezuelan military-business – trade union bureaucrat led “grass roots”
coup that overthrew democratically elected President Chavez. In 48 hours a million strong authentic grass roots mobilization of the urban poor backed
by constitutionalist military forces defeated the US backed dictators and restored Chavez to power .Subsequently oil executives directed a lockout
backed by several US financed NGOs. They were defeated by the workers’ takeover of the oil industry. The unsuccessful coup and lockout cost the
Venezuelan economy billions of dollars in lost income and caused a double digit decline in GNP. The US backed “grass roots” armed jihadists to
liberated “Bosnia” and armed the “grass roots” terrorist Kosova Liberation Army to break-up Yugoslavia. Almost the entire Western Left cheered as,
the US bombed Belgrade , degraded the economy and claimed it was “responding to genocide”. Kosova “free and independent” became a huge
market for white slavers, housed the biggest US military base in Europe, with the highest per-capita out migration of any country in Europe . The
imperial “grass roots” strategy combines humanitarian, democratic and anti-imperialist rhetoric and paid and trained local NGO’s, with mass media
blitzes to mobilize Western public opinion and especially “prestigious leftist moral critics” behind their power grabs. The Consequence of Imperial
Promoted “Anti-Imperialist” Movements: Who Wins and Who Loses? The historic record of imperialist promoted “anti-imperialist” and “prodemocracy” “grass roots movements” is uniformly negative. Let us briefly summarize the results. In Chile ‘grass roots’ truck owners
strike led to the brutal military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet and nearly two decades of torture,
murder, jailing and forced exile of hundreds of thousands, the imposition of brutal “free market
policies” and subordination to US imperial policies. In summary the US multi-national copper
corporations and the Chilean oligarchy were the big winners and the mass of the working class and
urban and rural poor the biggest losers. The US backed “grass roots uprisings” in Eastern Europe
against Soviet domination, exchanged Russian for US domination ; subordination to NATO instead of the Warsaw
Pact; the massive transfer of national public enterprises, banks and media to Western multi-nationals. Privatization of national
enterprises led to unprecedented levels of double-digit unemployment, skyrocketing rents and the
growth of pensioner poverty. The crises induced the flight of millions of the most educated and skilled workers and the elimination of
free public health, higher education and worker vacation resorts. Throughout the now capitalist Eastern Europe and USSR highly organized criminal
gangs developed large scale prostitution and drug rings; foreign and local gangster ‘entrepeneurs’ seized lucrative public enterprises and formed a new
class of super-rich oligarchs Electoral party politicians, local business people and professionals linked to Western ‘partners’ were the socio-economic
winners. Pensioners, workers, collective farmers, the unemployed youth were the big losers along with the formerly subsidized cultural artists. Military
bases in Eastern Europe became the empire’s first line of military attack of Russia and the target of any counter-attack. If we measure the
consequences of the shift in imperial power, it is clear that the Eastern Europe countries have become even more subservient under the US and the
EU than under Russia . Western induced financial crises have devastated their economies; Eastern European troops have served in more imperial wars
under NATO than under Soviet rule; the cultural media are under Western commercial control. Most of all, the degree of imperial control over all
economic sectors far exceeds anything that existed under the Soviets. The Eastern European ‘grass roots’ movement succeeded in deepening and
extending the US Empire; the advocates of peace, social justice , national independence, a cultural renaissance and social welfare with democracy were
the big losers. Western liberals, progressives and leftists who fell in love with imperialist promoted “anti-
imperialism” are also big losers. Their support for the NATO attack on Yugoslavia led to the breakup of a multi-national state and the creation of huge NATO military bases and a white slavers
paradise in Kosova. Their blind support for the imperial promoted “liberation” of Eastern Europe
devastated the welfare state, eliminating the pressure on Western regimes’ need to compete in
providing welfare provisions. The main beneficiaries of Western imperial advances via ‘grass roots’
uprisings were the multi-national corporations, the Pentagon and the rightwing free market neoliberals. As the entire political spectrum moved to the right a sector of the left and progressives
eventually jumped on the bandwagon. The Left moralists lost credibility and support, their peace
movements dwindled, and their “moral critiques” lost resonance.
Our alternative is to divorce Latin American diplomacy from the empire and rebuild
our understanding from the perspective of the colonized
Radcliffe, 7 (Sarah, Professor of Latin American Geography and Fellow of Christ's College Management Committee, Centre of Latin American
Studies, “Forum: Latin American Indigenous Geographies of Fear: Living in the Shadow of Racism, Lack of Development, and Antiterror Measures”,
JStor, http://www.jstor.org.turing.library.northwestern.edu/stable/pdfplus/4620268.pdf?acceptTC=true&)
Geographies of Fear and Hope in Neoliberalism and Postdevelopment By exploring one set of politics of redistribution and recognition, this article
highlights a number of points that assist us in outlining a geographical perspective on the field of development thinking and policy. Especially
outside the discipline of geography, perspectives can be highly polarized between neoliberal
approaches and postdevelopment. Drawing on the grounded theorization of development from
Latin American indigenous development perspectives, this section extends the dis- cussion of a
geographical perspective. As described, neither neoliberalism nor postdevelopment does justice to
existing specific forms of develop- ment problems faced by indigenous populations whose
disempowerment in development terms lies at the intersection of political economic structuring of
livelihood and inequality, together with cultural politics that set the terms for claims. Markedly
distinct in their theoretical and normative frameworks, neoliberalism and postdevelopment are
equally ill-equipped to address the development factors that lie behind indigenous geographies of
fear and lack of livelihood security. Speaking past each other from markedly polarized the- oretical
and epistemological positions, postdevelopment and neoliberal approaches constitute an antinomy, a contradiction between conclusions
that seem on the surface to be equally logical, reasonable, or necessary. Between them, these different perspectives offer con- tradictory frameworks
for development in theory and practice. Yet, in other respects, postdevelopment
and neoliberalism share certain
underlying similarities. In their more utopian forms, neoliberal and postdevelop- ment agendas-as
utopias in general-are presented as if they were mere organizational matters, neutral articu- lating statements of
alternatives to the status quo (Parker 2002). As highlighted by the example of indigenous geogra- phies of fear and hope, it is hard to work in
the messiness of everyday practice from a utopian vision of development, regardless of its
theoretical origins. Development must instead be understood as a contested negotiation over space
and place, a series of contingently constituted material and discursive relationships around which
aspirations can be realized. Development from a geographical perspective then is not a question of
"getting the economics right" or looking to popular culture, but lies in recognition of an imminently
spatially embedded political process, with its roots in the intertwining of state-citizen relations
(sometimes contingently fixed in social pacts), the formal and informal rules of political cultures (in
forms that cannot hope to be captured by the terminology of democracy yet are rooted in civil
action, public spaces, and discursive negotiation), and shifting international geopolitical contexts.
One key strand of this intertwining is the need to recognize the postcolonial violence-epistemic and
material-on which many of these grounds of political engagement are constructed. Indeed, one key strand in
recent geography and development studies has been a focus on geopolitical conflicts, failed states, exclusionary forms of governance, and the limits of
formal democracy (e.g., Watts 2003; Sylvester 2006). Such
work directs our attention to the political terms on which
challenges to exclusionary po- litical cultures are made, to exploring in detail the nature of "thin"
democracies, and the ways in which macro- economic decision-making can occur in societies driven
by class, ethnic, and location divisions. A key strand in development geography has to be precisely the socio- spatial nature of
democratic governance and the insti- tutionalization of citizenship rights. A geographical perspective also brings a crucially important perspective on
the spatiality of development. This is not to say that space-place is absent in other development models: neoliberal models increasingly ex- amine the
place-specific histories of capitalist develop- ment; postdevelopment articulates a discursive North- South divide and talks about local communities.
For geographers, by contrast, society and space are mutually constituted, not along lines of marketled drivers or by shared grassroots cultures, but in relation to a continu- ous process of negotiation
over the nature of society in space. Doreen Massey argues that place is only a "tem- porary
constellation of trajectories" (2005, 153) in which place is defined more by its "politics of
interconnectivity" (p. 154) than its static location on a local-global grid. As society and space are
produced insofar as they are negotiated around contingent connections and a multiplic- ity of social
groupings, we return again to the centrality of the political nature of development. Speaking gener- ally, the "conceptualization of spatiality then
reciprocally raise[s] the question of the ... spatialities of politics, and the spatialities of responsibility, loyalty, care" (Massey 2005, 189). By examining
and analyzing these spatialities, geography emplaces development issues firmly in the terrain of analysis of multiple scales, points of connection,
constructed identities, and the contested- and often postcolonially violent-negotiations around its meanings and practices
1NC Multilat
They can’t solve Multilateralism—Syria and Iran
Johnson 9-4 Scott - reporter and analyst powerline news"A THIN CASE FOR ACTION"
www.powerlineblog.com/archives/2013/09/a-thin-case-for-action.php
The strongest argument in favor of military action seems to be its necessity to preserve our credibility
under the circumstances. Many commentators have made this point including, most recently, the Weekly Standard’s Philip Terzian.
The question of credibility is most acute with respect to Iran and its nuclear program . See the account of
Obama’s phone call with the rabbis linked above.¶ I think that our enemies in Iran (and elsewhere) have had Obama’s number
since approximately mid-2009. They have him sized up as a foolish fellow. They view him with contempt and treat him
accordingly. They note that he has great difficulty distinguishing friends from enemies . They understand that his
words are more or less meaningless. They mean to take advantage of his debilities. My judgment is that action against Syria at
this point will do nothing to change that. Not in the least.¶ Indeed, I think the mullahs have already put their centrifuges into “overdrive,” to
borrow the language quoted by Paul from the column by Rep’s Tom Cotton and Mike Pompeo in today’s Washington Post and Obama has
the United States has lost its credibility
as a great power looking out for the interests of its friends. Taking action against Syria now will not
alter the assessment of our enemies that Obama has forfeited the credibility of the United States as a
great power. We will not regain it until we have a president who believes in it himself and calls on us
reportedly prevented Israel from doing anything about it.¶ My own assessment is that
to restore it.
That having been said, it won’t help to leave Obama hanging on that limb he walked out onto. Thus my ambivalence.
Obama can’t utilize multilateralism – Tarnishes American image – plan wouldn’t
change squo credibility
Carafano 8-17 James - vice president for foreign and defense policy studies at The Heritage
Foundation. "Obama's Shredded Foreign-Policy Playbook" nationalinterest.org/commentary/obamasshredded-foreign-policy-playbook-8904?page=2
The White House also got serious about substituting soft for hard power. A drawdown in Iraq was a forgone
conclusion. During the intervention in Libya, the administration proudly described its strategy as "leading
from behind." Even before the Budget Control Act of 2011 mandated reduced levels of federal spending, Obama okayed reducing
resources for the armed forces by nearly half a trillion dollars. He gave commanders in Afghanistan less than half the
forces they needed for the surge, then ordered additional force reductions before their job was half
done.¶ There was much to-do on the international engagement front, too. The United States led the cheer leading for new global-warming
initiatives. Obama embraced the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, pressing the Senate to ratify it. The White House also championed the
"global zero" initiative, signing the New START agreement with Russia and trumpeting the effort as the first step in ridding the world of nuclear
weapons .¶
Reality Bites¶ Unfortunately , the Obama Doctrine has created more problems than it has
solved.¶ The push to “talk things out” has given the White House little to talk about. After trying to “engage”
with Assad, the Administration now finds itself in the awkward role of calling for his removal. The president passed up a chance to champion
Iran's Green Revolution, lest it jeopardize talks with the regime. In the end, both the revolution and hopes for a deal with Tehran were crushed.
Obama would be hard pressed to point to one initiative in Latin America, the Middle East or Asia that
has really paid off.¶ The much-ballyhooed “Russian Reset” now appears to be a spectacular
“engagement” failure. The administration raised talk of goodwill to dizzying heights. But when it came to actually
agreeing on anything—missile defense, tactical nuclear weapons, further strategic-arms reductions,
Syria or sending Snowden home—Washington got absolutely nothing.¶ The staggering failure of the Russian reset is
even more overwhelming considering all the president gave up to get nothing. The administration scrapped U.S. missile-defense plans for
Europe. It championed Russia joining the WTO. It lobbied for repeal of Jackson-Vanik. In the biggest gift of all, Obama signed a New START
treaty that required the United States to cut warheads and delivery systems, while requiring Russia to cut, well, pretty much nothing—not even
its huge advantage in tactical nukes.¶ Not only has Moscow shown Washington little deference, it seems have gone out of its way to be as
annoying as possible, banning adoptions by American citizens and extending Snowden's extended leave of absence.¶ In canceling Obama’s
scheduled meeting with Russian president Vladimir Putin ahead of next month’s G-20 summit, the administration cited lack of "recent
progress." That was understatement. Even the administration admits the reset is dead. The president quipped on Late Night television that they
Soft-power solutions have not fared much better. Everywhere the
United States has pulled back, trouble has followed. Obama trumpeted the withdrawal from Iraq as a
signature success. But without a U.S. military presence, the country has slipped back to pre-2007 levels of
violence. The withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan does not portend a better outcome.¶
were acting like they were back in the Cold War.¶
Meanwhile, the Europeans are grumbling about our increasingly indifferent military presence in Europe. For NATO's largest military exercise,
Steadfast Jazz, Washington will send only about one hundred troops—about the same number as that massive military power, Estonia.¶ Even
Obama's most muscular military move, the "Asia Pivot," has proved mostly hollow. China has been pressing its territorial claims more
aggressively than ever, hectoring Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia and India all at the same time. Apparently, Beijing believes it has a
legitimate historical claim anywhere a shard of ancient Chinese pottery is found in Asia. In part, the Chinese are so expansive because they—
and our Pacific region allies—can count. They know the U.S. military—current and planned—is too small to support any kind of pivot that would
change the balance of power in Asia.¶ The
president's declaration of victory in the war on terror fails to convince
as well. In a May speech at the National Defense University, he bragged about bagging bin Laden and scattering Al Qaeda. A few months
later, he is shuttering embassies and ramping up drone strikes in fear of a new Al Qaeda offensive. So
much for having the bad guys on the run.¶ Nor has Obama been a very successful internationalist. The
three trade pacts Congress passed were holdovers from the Bush days. Obama has failed to excite any appetite for
endorsing international conventions like the Law of the Sea Treaty or the Disabilities Treaty. And American leadership on global
warming has proved tepid.¶ After Disaster¶ In the end, however, Obama’s failure to live up to his anticipatory Nobel isn’t what killed his
foreign-policy doctrine. After all, his failing foreign-policy record was on the table in the 2012 election, and the electorate didn't seem to care.
If the president's reelection mandate meant anything, it meant he could continue to pretend for the
next four years that his way of dealing with the world was working. But the Obama Doctrine is now
dead, and what killed it was Benghazi.¶ Libya was meant to be the signature achievement of Obama's way of war. He was out to prove that,
with a light touch and tiny footprint, he could accomplish what George Bush couldn't with divisions of troops and trillion-dollar budgets.¶ The
successful attack on the U.S. diplomatic facility in Benghazi proved a transformative moment for the Obama administration. Though the White
House has been able to shield high-level officials from culpability for the disaster, it couldn't hide the fact that Benghazi was a disaster. With Al
Qaeda running amok throughout North Africa, Libya little better than a failed state and the Benghazi murderers still roaming free, the
magnitude of failure was evident to all—and the administration could not cast the blame elsewhere. It was Obama's choice to go. It was his
decision on how to go in. And it was his plan that did not survive contact with the enemy .¶
His doctrine discredited, Obama
now doesn't know what to do. Post-Benghazi, he has become incredibly risk averse. The goal now
seems to be to just get through the last three years without another disaster that can be laid at the
White House doorstep.¶ So the president continues to dither over what the United States should do in
Afghanistan, post-2014. The favored option seems to be the zero option: withdraw all U.S. troops. That
way, when the Taliban come back, the White House can claim it’s not their fault, since “everything was
fine when we left”—a replay of the Iraq gambit.¶ Likewise, the administration struggles to find a Syria
policy that makes sense. It doesn’t want to risk another Libya, but it’s also sensitive to the criticism of
doing nothing. So far, the White House has pursued minimal-risk maneuvers—like asking the Russians to help or
sending a few arms to the rebels. Neither gesture is likely to amount to much. It appears we have a Syrian version of the zero option.¶ Further,
the administration's alarmist response to the latest Al Qaeda threat smacks more of panic than prudence. Fear of another Benghazi moment
led the White House to shutter a huge chunk of its “smart power” infrastructure on the basis of terrorist “chatter.”
Turn—plan destroys multilateralism—fetishizing legitimacy and democracy
undermines cooperation with China and Russia
Kupchan – from the 1ac, 2012 (Charles, professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the
Council on Foreign Relations, “No One's World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn”, Kindle edition (no page numbers)
“ Democratic principles have their roots in universal norms and values."- Such statements affirm
Robert Kagan's observation
that elites in the West "have operated on the ideological conviction that liberal
democracy is the only legitimate form of government and that other forms
of government
are not only
illegitimate but transitory .'' This stance is morally compelling and consistent with values deeply held
among the Atlantic democracies. But the equation of legitimacy with democracy undermines the
West's influence among emerging powers. Even countries like Brazil and India, both of which are
stable democracies, tend to view the West's obsession with democracy promotion as little more than
uninvited meddling in the affairs of others. The backlash is of course considerably harsher in
autocracies such as China and Russia
Soft power is useless—no impact to boosting U.S. credibility
Miller 10 [2/3/2010, Aaron David, public-policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center
for Scholars, Foreign Policy, “The End of Diplomacy?”
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/03/the_end_of_diplomacy?page=full]
Back in the day, there was a time when American diplomacy did big and important things. No more, it seems.
The world's gotten complicated, America is a good deal weaker, and the U.S. administration is handicapping itself
with a dysfunctional bureaucratic setup that makes it harder to focus and find its footing. Effective American
diplomacy may well be going the way of the dodo, and the sad fact is there may be little Barack Obama can do about it. Lamenting the absence
of great men years before his own shining moment, Winston Churchill wrote that in England, once upon a time, "there were wonderful giants
of old." There's always a danger in idealizing what once was or seemed to be in order to make a point about the present. Still, looking back over
the last 60 years, you really do have to wonder whether America's best diplomacy and foreign policy are behind it. America
never ran
the world (an illusion the left, right, and much of the third and fourth worlds believe; but there were moments (1945-1950, the early 1970s,
1988-1991) when the United States marshaled its military, political, and economic power toward
impressive ends. There were, or course, disasters and plenty of dysfunction during these years, including the Vietnam War and out-ofcontrol CIA operations. But there were also brilliant achievements: the Marshall Plan, NATO, effective Arab-Israeli diplomacy, détente with the
Russians, opening to China, a competent American role in the acceleration and management of the end of the Cold War, and the first Gulf War.
For most of the last 16 years, however -- under Bill Clinton and George W. Bush -- America has been in a
diplomatic dry patch. In the face of terrorism, nuclear proliferation, wars of choice, and nasty regional
conflicts, conventional diplomacy has either not been tried or not been very successful. The image of
the shuttling secretary of state pre-empting crises or exploiting them to broker agreements, doggedly
pursuing Middle East peace, achieving dramatic breakthroughs with spectacular secret diplomacy
seems a world away. The Obama administration wants to do this kind of stuff. And it has done pretty well in managing the big
relationships with Russia and Europe, though it has had its share of problems with China. But frankly, these are the easy ones. It's not from
the big that the president's problems come; it's from the small. In garden spots like Iraq, Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Yemen, and Somalia, the problems are four parts military, five parts nation-building, and maybe
one part diplomacy. And America is unlikely to prevail in any meaningful sense of the word where
corrupt, extractive regimes are unable to control their own territory and cut deals with anti-American
elements and place their security and political concerns first. Even in areas where diplomacy might
seem to work on paper -- Kashmir, Arab-Israeli peacemaking -- the United States is hampered by conflicts
driven by deep ethnic and religious hostility and by internal politics in which its own allies (Israel, Pakistan,
and India) can't be of much help. And in one of the cruelest ironies of all, the U.S. president who has gone further to engage Iran than
any of his predecessors is watching any hope for diplomacy being ground up by a regime under siege in Tehran. What's more, the power
of the small is being matched by the weakening of the big. You don't have to be a declinist (I'm not) to see how far the
image of American power has fallen. Forget the economic meltdown, which has much of the world wondering about what kind of
great power the United States really is. America's currently fighting two wars where the standard for victory is
not whether it can win but when it can leave. Whether it's an inability to get tough sanctions from the
international community against Iran, bring Tehran to heel, make North Korea play ball, get the Arabs
and the Israelis to cooperate, or push the Pakistanis to hit the Taliban and al Qaeda in a sustained way, the
world has gotten used to saying no to America without cost or consequence. And that's very bad for a great
power. Finally, there's the issue of how the country organizes itself. A new bureaucratic flowchart won't replace skill and luck, better marshal
American power, or create genuine opportunities for success abroad. But if you don't have the right structure, it makes success all that much
harder. And the
United States has departed from the one model that has proven successful: the strong
foreign-policy president empowering the strong secretary of state who rides herd over subcabinet-level envoys in
real time and in close coordination with the president on strategy. Instead, the Obama administration has created an empire of envoys
with power concentrated in the White House but without real purpose or strategy. The nation's top diplomat (the
secretary of state) seems to be everywhere and nowhere in terms of owning issues and finding a way to take on some of the nastiest
challenges, which is what secretaries of state are supposed to do. It's still early, and maybe the Obama administration will get lucky. Perhaps
the Iranian regime will collapse or the Arabs and Israelis will do something good by themselves. But the
next several years are
more likely to be tough ones for American diplomacy. And the image that comes to mind isn't a
terribly kind one: America as a kind of modern-day Gulliver tied up by tiny tribes abroad and hobbled
by its inability to organize its own house at home.
There is no correlation between trade and war
Friedman, 96
(George Friedman, founder and chairman of Stratfor, The Future of War, 1996, p. 7-9)
The argument that interdependence gives rise to peace is flawed in theory as well as in
practice. Conflicts arise from friction, particularly friction involving the fundamental interests of
different nations. The less interdependence there is, the fewer the areas of serious friction.
The more interdependence there is, the greater the areas of friction, and, therefore, the greater the
potential for conflict. Two widely separated nations that trade little with each other are
unlikely to go to war—Brazil is unlikely to fight Madagascar precisely because they have so
little to do with each other. France and Germany, on the other hand, which have engaged in
extensive trade and transnational finance, have fought three wars with each other over
about seventy years. Interdependence was the root of the conflicts, not the deterrent. There
are, of course, cases of interdependence in which one country effectively absorbs the other or in
which their interests match so precisely that the two countries simply merge. In other cases,
interdependence remains peaceful because the economic, military, and political power of one
country is overwhelming and inevitable. In relations between advanced industrialized countries
and third-world countries, for example, this sort of asymmetrical relationship can frequently be
seen. All such relationships have a quality of unease built into them, particularly when the level of
interdependence is great. When one or both nations attempt, intentionally or unintentionally, to
shift the balance of power, the result is often tremendous anxiety and, sometimes, real pain. Each
side sees the other’s actions as an attempt to gain advantage and becomes frightened. In the end,
precisely because the level of interdependence is so great, the relationship can, and frequently does,
spiral out of control. Consider the seemingly miraculous ability of the United States and Soviet
Union to be rivals and yet avoid open warfare. These two powers could forgo extreme
measures because they were not interdependent. Neither relied on the other for its
economic well-being, and therefore, its social stability. This provided considerable room for
maneuvering. Because there were few economic linkages, neither nation felt irresistible
pressure to bring the relationship under control; neither felt any time constraint. Had one
country been dependent on the other for something as important as oil or long-term
investment, there would have been enormous fear of being held hostage economically. Each
would have sought to dominate the relationship, and the result would have been catastrophic. In
the years before World War I, as a result of European interdependence, control of key
national issues fell into the hands of foreign governments. Thus, decisions made in Paris had
tremendous impact on Austria, and decisions made in London determined growth rates in the
Ruhr. Each government sought to take charge of its own destiny by shifting the pattern of
interdependence in its favor. Where economic means proved insufficient, political and
military strategies were tried.
No Russia-China war -- mutual interests ensure cooperation.
Hille and Anderlini 12
Financial Times correspondents in Beijing (Kathrin and Jamil, “Russia and China to strengthen
trade ties,” Financial Times, 6/5/12, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d8999462-af27-11e1-a8a700144feabdc0.html#axzz1zrBVCIMo, MMarcus)
The presidents of Russia and China laid out ambitious plans on Tuesday to tie their countries
into a closer strategic and economic partnership as both Beijing and Moscow seek to use
each other to balance their relationship with the US. The two presidents set a goal of more
than doubling bilateral trade from $83.5bn last year to $200bn in 2020, Hu Jintao, China’s
president, said after talks with Vladimir Putin, the Russian president. The ambitious target was
announced together with a slew of investment and trading deals. It was held up by the two leaders
as a sign of new heights for the relationship between two powers to be reckoned with on issues
ranging from global trade to the international response to Syria. Mr Hu said that through closer cooperation China and Russia would “set the global political and economic order in a more fair
and rational direction”. Chinese state media feted Mr Putin, a fairly frequent visitor to Beijing
who had last been in town in October 2011, praising close and growing bilateral co-operation
and consultation of the two nations on the world stage. People’s Daily, the ruling Communist
party’s mouthpiece, even ran a long piece by Mr Putin himself in which he talked up ties with China.
“Without the participation of Russia and China, without considering Russia and China’s interests, no
international matter or issue can be discussed and implemented,” he wrote. Moscow and Beijing
have angered western countries with their refusal to back an international intervention in the
brewing civil war in Syria. But Russian and Chinese analysts say the two countries are still far away
from a close alliance. “The reason the Chinese media are hyping the visit like this is that a
significant portion of the Chinese leadership, including the military . . . hope to build Russia
into an ally to help push back against the US,” said Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie
Moscow Center. “But for Mr Putin the focus is mainly on strengthening the economic
relationship.” And, he cautioned, historical suspicions lingered. “There remains a lack of trust
between the two sides, and none of the two wants a true alliance.”
1NC Ethanol
Transition to Cuban ethanol destroys domestic production
Specht, 2013 (Jonathan, Legal Advisor, Pearlmaker Holsteins, Inc. B.A., Louisiana State University, 2009, “Raising Cane: Cuban
Sugarcane Ethanol’s Economic and Environmental Effects on the United States”, Environs: Environmental Law and Policy Journal, April 24, 2013,
http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf)
Imported ethanol from non-corn sources may be an increasingly popular means of reducing U.S. fossil
fuel dependence for two reasons in particular. First, the transition from corn-based to cellulosic ethanol is
difficult. Second, the RFS caps the amount of ethanol from corn that can be blended into U.S. fuel at 15 billion gallons per year by 2022.136
In coming years the amount of ethanol imported into the United States is likely to increase by a
significant amount unless Congress revives the ethanol tariff. If both U.S. ethanol import restrictions
and the ethanol blending tax credit were eliminated (as happened at the end of 2011), imports of ethanol into
the United States would more than double.137 Unless Congress raises the RFS by a sufficient degree to absorb all domestic
ethanol production on top of these new imports, the increase in such imports would likely damage the domestic
ethanol industry. “Whatever the level or type of biofuel, increased imports (holding other factors constant)
would reduce the quantity of domestically produced biofuels, which would reduce the demand for
biofuel feedstocks.”138 Because very little ethanol is currently imported into the United States, law and policy changes that successfully
fostered the development of a Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol industry would have a significant economic impact on the United States. Such
a change would have the largest economic effect on two regions: the Midwest, which is currently the
primary source of ethanol production in the United States, and the Southeast, especially Florida. This
Part of the Article will discuss the likely economic effects of such policy changes first on the Midwest, then on Florida, then on the United States
generally
Domestic ethanol k2 US ag sector
EAA, 2008 (Ethanol Across America, non-profit, non-partisan education campaign of the Clean Fuels Foundation
and is sponsored by industry, government, and private interests, “The Impact of Ethanol Production on Food, Feed and Fuel”, A Publication of
Ethanol Across America, Summer 2008, http://www.ethanolacrossamerica.net/pdfs/FoodFeedandFuel08.pdf)
As we begin, let’s recall why the ethanol industry was created in the first place. First,
Congress wanted to create a domestic
source of energy to help offset the negative economic impact and energy security issues related to
imported oil. Second, they wanted to add value to agricultural products and increase profitability for corn
producers. We’ve made significant progress in both areas. After years of cheap corn, American farmers are finally seeing
the fruits of their investment in the ethanol industry as corn prices have surged. For 25 years, corn farmers
have worked without getting a raise. Higher grain prices are creating an economic engine for rural America that is re-energizing
rural communities and reducing agricultural subsidies. The Financial Times reported in May 2008 that the U.S. “is starting
to break its addiction to foreign oil as high prices, more efficient cars, and the use of ethanol significantly cut the share of its oil imports for the
first time since 1977. The
country’s foreign oil dependency is expected to fall from 60 percent to 50 percent
in 2015…” The implementation of the national Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS) is a key factor in expansion of ethanol use nationally. The
RFS is also a critical cornerstone for America’s energy and economic security as we continue to find
ways to produce our own fuels and keep dollars at home. The profound effects of our nation’s dependence on
imported oil are reverberating throughout our economy—impacting everything from gas prices to manufacturing to consumer spending. While
increases in commodity prices pale in comparison with that of energy costs, there are concerns about the effect of grain demand on food
supplies and food prices. As the ethanol industry grows, increased demand for corn will create challenges and opportunities for consumers,
livestock producers, policy makers and refiners. As we navigate this sea change in agriculture, energy and economics, these issues can be
addressed without inciting emotion and distorted rhetoric
Non-unique --- Brazil is investing in Cuban sugar ethanol in the status quo and will only
increase.
Israel 12 (Esteban, Reuters Correspondent to Brazil, “Brazil to breathe life into faded Cuban sugar sector,”
Reuters, 1-30-12, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/30/brazil-cuba-sugar-idAFL2E8CUA7620120130)
SAO PAULO, Jan 30 (Reuters) - Brazilian
builder Odebrecht plans to produce sugar in Cuba , the company said
on Monday, as looser restrictions on foreign investment in the communist island raise hopes of a
recovery in the once-booming sector after decades of decline. News of the project came on the day Brazil's President
Dilma Rousseff begins a mostly ceremonial official visit to the country, which has been under communist rule since the Fidel Castro-led
revolution and an ensuing U.S. trade embargo. Odebrecht will sign a "contract of productive administration" with Cuba's state sugar company
Grupo de Administracion Empresarial del Azucar to operate the 5 de Septiembre mill in Cienfuegos province on the south coast. "The
agreement for a period of 10 years aims for an incremental increase in the production of sugar and
crushing capacity and help with an overhaul" of the sector, Odebrecht said in an email to Reuters through its press office.
The project will finally open the capital-starved Cuban sugar industry to foreign inflows after years of
failed attempts by overseas investors to gain a foothold in the sector nationalized several years after the 1959
revolution. Cuba's sugar production has fallen from a peak of 8 million tonnes in 1970 to just 1.2 million tonnes in the last harvest. The country
was once the world's top sugar supplier. Odebrecht gave no further details but a Brazilian sugar sector executive told Reuters the contract
could be signed this week during Rousseff's two-day visit, deepening Brazil's role in modernizing the island's dilapidated infrastructure. Brazil
is not only the world's top sugar producer but a pioneer in cane-derived ethanol, with flex-fuel technology
fitted to almost all new cars sold in the country enabling them to run on ethanol or gasoline or any mix of both. Odebrecht is also carrying out
work estimated at $800 million to modernize the container port at Mariel, west of Havana. The project, largely financed by Brazil's
development bank BNDES, is seen as vital for commerce should the United States lift its trade embargo with the island. Cuba
has
allowed foreign investment for more than a decade to develop other strategic industries including tourism and more recently,
oil, with a consortium led by Spain's Repsol to explore Cuban waters in the Gulf of Mexico. ETHANOL ON
AGENDA Cuba, where sugar once accounted for 90 percent of export earnings compared with under 5 percent last year, has drawn up
plans to reorganize the industry and allow foreign investment for the first time since mills were
nationalized. Its once-powerful Sugar Ministry was abolished last year, leaving it up to a new state-owned company to revamp the rusting
industry, with many mills pre-dating the revolution and some built with capital provided by the Soviet Union. Odebrecht would also
produce ethanol from sugarcane as well as electricity from the biomass that is left over when the cane is crushed, according to
the Brazilian sugar industry executive who is familiar with the details of the project. "Cuba is opening up the possibility of
producing ethanol through energy generation and Odebrecht will build a distillery there," the executive
said, adding the project is similar to one Odebrecht is developing in Angola. That is a $258 million undertaking in partnership
with Angola's Sonagol oil company to produce 260,000 tonnes of sugar, 30 million liters of ethanol and
45 megawatts of electricity. Large-scale ethanol production in Cuba has come up against opposition from former president Castro, a fierce critic
of the use of edible crops as fuel. Some experts believe that with sufficient investment, Cuba has the potential to become the world's No. 3
biofuel producer after the United States and Brazil. Ron Soligo, economist at Rice University in Houston, Texas, and an expert on the Cuban
sugar industry, calculates that the island could achieve ethanol output of 7.5 billion liters per year. Brazil, by comparison, produces roughly 20
billion liters. "But developing
the ethanol sector in Cuba will take time, since most of the (cane-growing)
land was abandoned for years," he said. Brazil, the world's No. 2 ethanol producer, has offered technical assistance to Cuba to
produce the biofuel from cane. "The subject is on the table. There are investments planned in sugar and there exists a possibility that at some
time this will be taken on board by the ethanol industry," a source at Brazil's foreign ministry told Reuters.
Lifting the embargo wont solve – doesn’t change domestic demand which is key
Specht, 13 – Legal Advisor, Pearlmaker Holsteins, Inc., B.A., LSU (Jonathan, “Raising Cane: Cuban Sugarcane Ethanol’s Economic and
Environmental Effects on the United States”, UC Davis, 4-24-13, http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf)//NG
III. THE POTENTIAL CUBAN ETHANOL INDUSTRY¶ To speak of a “Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol industry” is, at this point, largely a matter of
speculation. Thanks in large part to the anti-ethanol views of Fidel Castro (who has said that ethanol should be discouraged because it diverts
crops from food to fuel), Cuba currently has almost no ethanol industry. In the words of Ronald Soligo and Amy Myers Jaffe of the Brookings
Institution, “Despite the fact that Cuba is dependent on oil imports and is aware of the demonstrated success of Brazil in using ethanol to
achieve energy self-sufficiency, it has not embarked on a policy to develop a larger ethanol industry from sugarcane.” There is, however, no
reason why such an industry cannot be developed. As Soligo and Jaffe wrote, “In addition, Cuba
has large land areas that once
produced sugar but now lie idle. These could be revived to provide a basis for a world-class ethanol
industry. We estimate that if Cuba achieves the yield levels attained in Nicaragua and Brazil and the area
planted with sugarcane approaches levels seen in the 1970s and 1980s, Cuba could produce up to 2
billion gallons of sugar-based ethanol per year.” ¶ The ideal domestic policy scenario for the creation
of a robust Cuban sugarcane ethanol industry would be a situation in which the U.S. trade embargo on
Cuba is ended, U.S. tariff barriers have been removed (in the case of sugar) or not revived (in the case of ethanol), and the Renewable
Fuel Standard requiring that a certain percentage of U.S. fuel come from ethanol remain in place. Of course, changes in United States
policy alone, even those that ensure a steady source of demand for Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol, would not be enough to
create an ethanol industry from scratch. The country will need to decide that fostering the industry is to be a key goal of the
post-Castro era, and will need to shape its domestic policies to encourage the growth of such an industry. ¶ Given that the Cuban sugar industry
lived and died by its ties with specific foreign powers for most of the Twentieth Century, Cuba
will likely be quite wary of
investing too much in the creation of a sugarcane ethanol industry that it perceives as being largely a
creature of U.S. energy and agricultural policy. Therefore, the creation of a significant sugarcane ethanol
industry in Cuba will require a large increase in domestic demand for ethanol. One way that Cuba could
encourage domestic demand for ethanol would be to follow the Brazilian model of encouraging the purchase of Flex Fuel vehicles, which can
run on any blend of fuel between 100% gasoline and 100% ethanol. Because
Cuba has so many old automobiles,
expecting new vehicles to provide a source of demand for ethanol may be an extremely unrealistic
prospect. On the other hand, the fact that there is so much pent-up demand for new automobiles in Cuba could mean that, with sufficient
and well-directed government incentives, Flex Fuel vehicles could be adopted in Cuba at faster rates than in other countries.
SugarCane burning causes global warming
Ribeiro 08
Helena Ribeiro, Supported by the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development, “Sugar
cane burning in Brazil: respiratory health effects”, Revista de Saúde Pública February 29th, 2008
Accessed online at: http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=S003489102008000200026&script=sci_arttext&tlng=en
Despite their restrictions and cautious conclusions, the studies analyzed indicate health risks in adverse atmospheric
conditions, caused by sugarcane straw burning. These risks can be higher among children, elderly people and asthmatics,
mainly resulting in higher demand for health care. Until recently, studies on sugarcane were mostly concerned about workers in the productive
process, such as Phoolchund's investigation20 (1991), which showed that sugarcane
cutters were at higher risk of lung
cancer as a consequence of foliage burning. As the global environmental crisis worsened and people became more aware of
this issue, especially as regards climate changes resulting from polluting human activities, there has been an increase in biofuel production.
Among these fuels, sugarcane is the fastest-growing one. However, its burning has increasingly been opposed by public opinion, allegedly due
to its environmental and human health impact, even though Brazilian health organs have had little participation in this discussion. In the state
of São Paulo, due to the environmentalists' pressure, the law that foresees gradual elimination of fire utilization to facilitate sugarcane cutting,
until 2021 for mechanized areas, and until 2031 for non-mechanized areas, was approved in 2002. The few studies on the effects of sugarcane
burning hint at the health impacts on the general population, though many questions are still left unresolved. On the other hand, research on
the health effects of biomass burning, especially as regards uncontrolled forest fires (Ribeiro & Assunção21 2002), may help to define a health
policy for this issue and guide future research. Frankenberg et al8 (2005) concluded that individuals exposed to biomass smoke experienced
more difficulty in their daily activities, even though general and respiratory health effects were more difficult to interpret. Kunii et al12 (2002),
while assessing the effects of Indonesian forest fires, including interviews and pulmonary function tests in 54 people, verified that more than
90% presented with respiratory symptoms and that elderly people suffered severe deterioration of their health condition. By means of
multivariate analysis, the study showed that gender, history of asthma and frequency of mask use were associated with the severity of the
respiratory problem. Negative effects of Indonesian fires were also assessed in the Malaysian population (Sastry25 2002). Mott et al18(2005)
investigated the exposure effects on the cardio-respiratory health of hospitalized people in the Kuching region, in Malaysia. The authors
selected admissions from 1995 to 1998 to verify if hospitalizations during or after fires in neighboring countries exceeded the predicted number
of hospitalizations, in accordance with historical records. There was statistically significant increase in the number of hospitalizations due to
respiratory diseases, especially asthma and chronic obstructive diseases. Survival analysis indicated that people over 65 years of age, who had
been previously hospitalized for any reason, with any respiratory, cardio-respiratory, or chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, were more
likely to be hospitalized again after the burning period. These cited articles reveal the relationship between non-localized, cross-border
pollution caused by biomass burning and the vulnerability of some specific groups of the population, especially elderly people and those who
suffer from any of the foregoing diseases. According to Sapkota et al24(2005), in addition to affecting neighboring communities, pollution
originated from forest fires can travel thousands of miles to heavily populated urban areas . Fire effects in
Canada resulted in a high concentration episode (up to 30 times higher) of particulate matter, especially finer one, in the city of Baltimore, in
the United States. In 2003, forest fire smoke in Siberia was tracked by means of airplane and ground observations, thus indicating their
transportation to North America. This caused an increase in background pollution in Alaska, Canada and the northeast Pacific Ocean by 23-37
ppbv of carbon monoxide and 5–9 ppbv of ozone. This increase in background ozone contributed to the air quality standard for ozone being
exceeded in the northeast Pacific Ocean. According to the authors, regional air quality and health are connected to global atmospheric
processes (Jaffe et al112004). Similarly, research has pointed to the effects of sugarcane
burning on a regional scale. Nonetheless, as
this burning may have greater spatial influence, the size of the population under the risk of health effects would be larger.
According to Jacobson10(2004), the elimination of particles originated from burning may cause an increase in atmospheric temperature in the
short run, and cooling of the climate in the long run due to elimination of carbon dioxide. Analytically, biomass
burning always
leads to carbon dioxide accumulating, even when vegetation recovery and sprouting cycles are
equivalent to emission flows. Thus, Jacobson concluded that biomass energy is only partly renewable, because its burning
contributes to global warming
Warming is the most likely scenario for extinction
Deibel 7 [Terry L. Professor of IR @ National War College, 2007. “Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for
American Statecraft”, Conclusion: American Foreign Affairs Strategy Today]
there is one major existential threat to American security (as well as prosperity) of a nonviolent nature, which, though far in the future,
demands urgent action. It is the threat of global warming to the stability of the climate upon
which all earthly life depends. Scientists worldwide have been observing the gathering of this threat for three
decades now, and what was once a mere possibility has passed through probability to near
certainty. Indeed not one of more than 900 articles on climate change published in refereed
scientific journals from 1993 to 2003 doubted that anthropogenic warming is occurring. “In
legitimate scientific circles,” writes Elizabeth Kolbert, “it is virtually impossible to find evidence of
disagreement over the fun
damentals of global warming.” Evidence from a vast international scientific monitoring effort accumulates almost weekly, as this sample of newspaper reports
Finally,
shows: an international panel predicts “brutal droughts, floods and violent storms across the planet over the next century”; climate change could “literally alter ocean currents, wipe away
huge portions of Alpine Snowcaps and aid the spread of cholera and malaria”; “glaciers in the Antarctic and in Greenland are melting much faster than expected, and…worldwide, plants are
blooming several days earlier than a decade ago”; “rising sea temperatures have been accompanied by a significant global increase in the most destructive hurricanes”; “NASA scientists have
Earth’s warming climate is
estimated to contribute to more than 150,000 deaths and 5 million illnesses each year” as
disease spreads; “widespread bleaching from Texas to Trinidad…killed broad swaths of corals” due to a 2-degree rise in sea temperatures. “The world is
slowly disintegrating,” concluded Inuit hunter Noah Metuq, who lives 30 miles from the Arctic Circle. “They call it climate change…but we just call it breaking up.” From
concluded from direct temperature measurements that 2005 was the hottest year on record, with 1998 a close second”; “
the founding of the first cities some 6,000 years ago until the beginning of the industrial revolution, carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere remained relatively constant at about 280 parts per
Unfortunately,
atmospheric CO2 lasts about a century, so there is no way immediately to reduce levels,
only to slow their increase, we are thus in for significant global warming; the only debate is
how much and how serous the effects will be. As the newspaper stories quoted above show, we are already
experiencing the effects of 1-2 degree warming in more violent storms, spread of disease, mass die offs of plants
and animals, species extinction, and threatened inundation of low-lying countries like the Pacific nation of Kiribati
and the Netherlands at a warming of 5 degrees or less the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets could disintegrate,
leading to a sea level of rise of 20 feet that would cover North Carolina’s outer banks, swamp the southern third of Florida, and inundate Manhattan up
to the middle of Greenwich Village. Another catastrophic effect would be the collapse of the Atlantic
thermohaline circulation that keeps the winter weather in Europe far warmer than its
latitude would otherwise allow. Economist William Cline once estimated the damage to the United States alone from moderate levels of warming at 1-6
percent of GDP annually; severe warming could cost 13-26 percent of GDP. But the most frightening scenario is runaway greenhouse
warming, based on positive feedback from the buildup of water vapor in the atmosphere
that is both caused by and causes hotter surface temperatures. Past ice age transitions, associated with only 5-10 degree
million (ppm). At present they are accelerating toward 400 ppm, and by 2050 they will reach 500 ppm, about double pre-industrial levels.
changes in average global temperatures, took place in just decades, even though no one was then pouring ever-increasing amounts of carbon into the atmosphere. Faced with this specter, the
best one can conclude is that “humankind’s
continuing enhancement of the natural greenhouse effect is akin to
playing Russian roulette with the earth’s climate and humanity’s life support system. At worst,
says physics professor Marty Hoffert of New York University, “we’re just going to burn everything up; we’re going to heat
the atmosphere to the temperature it was in the Cretaceous when there were crocodiles at
the poles, and then everything will collapse.” During the Cold War, astronomer Carl Sagan popularized a theory of nuclear winter to describe how
a thermonuclear war between the Untied States and the Soviet Union would not only destroy both countries but possibly end life on this planet. Global warming is the
post-Cold War era’s equivalent of nuclear winter at least as serious and considerably better supported
scientifically. Over the long run it puts dangers form terrorism and traditional military challenges to shame. It is a
threat not only to the security and prosperity to the United States, but potentially to the continued existence of life on this planet.
No Solvency- Cuban Sugar cane has been had serious problems lately and may close its
mills.
Havana Times 13
Cuba Sugar Harvest Delayed in the East¶ March 15, 2013 | Print | 0 0 0 33¶ HAVANA TIMES —
The milling of sugar cane in Cuba has been hampered by the damage to refineries,
transportation problems and low crop yields resulting from Hurricane Sandy, which stuck the
east of the island this past October.¶ There have been “serious problems with the mills and
transportation in the five eastern provinces, which are responsible for over a third of the
overall national plan,” said a source “close to the industry” who asked not to be identified.¶ Other
sugar-producing provinces will have to extend their milling beyond the end of April if they are to reach
their goal of 1.7 million tons, though the national sugar enterprise plans to close mills by May to
prevent the deterioration of crop quality resulting from excessive heat and moisture
Their claims are too generalizing- no observed link between high food prices and
conflict
Ivanic and Martin 08- *PhD in agricultural economics from Purude, economist with the Agriculture
and Rural Development team of the Development Economics Research Group at the World Bank **PhD
from Iowa State, Research Manager, Agriculture and Rural Development at the World Bank(Maros and
Will, April, “Implications of Higher Global Food Prices for Poverty in Low-Income Countries,” The World
Bank Development Research Group//MGD)
Since 2005, the world has experienced a dramatic surge in the price of many staple food commodities.
The price of maize increased by 80 percent between 2005 and 2007, and has since risen further. Many
other commodity prices also rose sharply over this period: milk powder by 90 percent, wheat by 70
percent and rice by about 25 percent. Annual average prices of key staple foods are shown in Figure 1.
Clearly, such large increases in prices may have tremendous impacts on the real incomes of poor
households in developing countries. Despite widespread concern about the impacts of high food prices
on poor people and on social stability (eg FAO 2007; World Bank 2008a), little hard information appears
to be available on actual impacts on poor people. The overall impact on poverty rates in poor countries
depends on whether the gains to poor net producers outweigh the adverse impacts on poor consumers.
Whether higher food prices improve or worsen the situation of particular households depends
importantly on the products involved; the patterns of household incomes and expenditures; and the
policy responses of governments (World Bank 2008b). Existing analyses tell us that the impacts of higher
food prices on poverty are likely to be very diverse, depending upon the reasons for the price change
and on the structure of the economy (Hertel and Winters 2006; Ravallion and Lokhsin 2005). A great
deal depends on the distribution of net buyers and net sellers of food among low-income households
(Aksoy and Isik-Dikmelik 2007). Only with careful examination of outcomes at the household level is it
possible to tell whether changes in the prices of specific staple foods will help or hurt poor people.
No Solvency- Sugar production is down due to outdated factory equipment.
Hanson and Lee 13
U.S.-Cuba Relations¶ Authors: Stephanie Hanson, and Brianna Lee, Senior Production Editor Updated:
January 31, 2013 http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113
Sugar was long the primary industry in Cuba, but production has plummeted due to outdated factory
equipment. In 1989, production was more than 8 million tons, while the harvest in 2005 was only 1.3 million tons. The 2008 hurricanes
damaged sugar crops in the eastern part of the country.
Turn- High Food prices are good for producers, private investors, and farmers.- They
can also be controlled and be made sustainable.
Weijing 12
http://asia.ifad.org/web/china/blogs/-/blogs/are-high-food-prices-good-or-bad?& Are high food prices
good or bad?¶ POSTED BY WANG WEIJING ON 7/11/12 9:37 AM ¶ THIS ITEM IS VISIBLE BY The World
(e.g. Google
People normally think high food prices are bad, or at least bad to net consumers, although
good to net producers. As many small holders and the poor are the net consumers, they are vulnerable to high food prices. The
memory of 2008 food crisis is still fresh to many people: the high food prices exaggerated poverty and pushed more than 100 million
people into hunger in 2008 (WFP, 2008).¶ In the recent south-south cooperation workshop in Beijing however, it was argued that high food
prices were not always bad. When
the prices go up, it hurts farmers, but farmers will quickly have coping
strategy and produce more. They become producers and benefit from the high prices. ¶ This
opinion is likely to be consistent with Chinese government’s food prices policy. The objective of food price policy is to
keep the food prices growing moderately. The rationale is to provide enough incentives for
farming, and gradually increase farmers’ income, but not too radical to cause food crisis.¶ I
think it seems a good blueprint but the question is how well for government to create an environment to allow the prices grow
moderately? And if there is a pressure of volatility of food prices , how well could the government, the community, the producers and the
consumers prevent and prepare for it?¶ Chinese government already has big state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to help smoothing market
prices. The mechanism is not complicated: when the prices are low, SOEs buy food, and
when the prices go up, they sell
foods to the market. Through the adjustment of food supply in the market, the food prices can be partly smoothed. Now these
SOEs focus on grain and pork which are the most important food for Chinese people.¶ Another prices intervention is to launch “minimum
purchasing prices” ( MPP)mechanism. Essentially every year the government issues indicative prices for wheat and rice respectively. If the
market prices are higher than the MPP, the transaction will be market based; otherwise government will buy wheat/rice by the MPP. Some
people argued that the MPP mechanism distorted the market. However, the MPP was never really launched/used because the market
prices are always higher than the MPP. So I think so far this policy is effective in providing incentive and confidence for farmers and
markets as the prices set seem lower than the equilibrium. But it is still important to have such a policy to hedge the loss of farmers.¶¶ Shall
government have policies to prepare cash transfer for the most vulnerable people like urban poor, the retirees, the rural small holders and
students when crisis comes?¶Producers must be happy with the high food prices, but it is important to raise the
awareness of market risks for them. Although the food prices index, which is composed by a basket of foods, are remaining high in the
recent years, it is not always the case of specific food commodities. Market risks are always there. Agricultural risk management including
agricultural insurance could be effective to transfer the risks out of the region and the country. I would like to highlight the importance of
risk transfer out of the region/country as food prices are highly positively correlated.¶ Households and consumers shall have their coping
strategies as well: savings, remittance, and livestock. Are there other coping strategies HHs shall be aware of and prepare?¶In
summary, high food prices could be good, as it guides agricultural investment not only
from the government but also from private sectors, and provide incentives for farmers to
produce more.
There is no threat of food wars and at worst it will only mean cooperation
Burger et al. 10 – Kees Burger Development Economics, Corresponding author, Wageningen University, Hollandseweg, Jeroen
Warner AND Eefje Derix Disaster Studies, Wageningen Universit “Governance of the world food system and crisis prevention”
http://www.stuurgroepta.nl/rapporten/Foodshock-web.pdf
Both European water and agricultural policies are based on the belief that there will always be cheap food aplenty on the world market. A
recent British report 23 reflects this optimism. Although production is now more prone to world market price shocks, their effects on farm
incomes are softened by extensive income supports (van Eickhout et al. 2007). Earlier, in a 2003 report, a European group of agricultural
economists wrote: Food
security is no longer a prime objective of European food and agricultural policy. There is
no credible threat to the availability of the basic ingredients of human nutrition from domestic and
foreign sources. If there is a food security threat it is the possible disruption of supplies by natural disasters or
catastrophic terrorist action. The main response necessary for such possibilities is the appropriate contingency
planning and co-ordination between the Commission and Member States (Anania et al. 2003). Europe, it appears, feels rather
sure of itself, and does not worry about a potential food crisis. We are also not aware of any special measures on standby.
Nevertheless a fledgling European internal security has been called into being that can be deployed should (food) crises strike. The Maastricht
Treaty (1992) created a quasi-decision-making platform to respond to transboundary threats. Since 9/11 the definition of what constitutes a
threat has been broadened and the protection capacity reinforced. In the Solidarity Declaration of 2003 member states promised to stand by
each other in the event of a terrorist attack, natural disaster or human-made calamity (the European Security Strategy of 2003).
Experimental forms of cooperation are tried that leave member-state sovereignty intact, such as pooling
of resources. The EU co-operates in the area of health and food safety but its mechanisms remain decentrslised by dint of the principle of
subsidiarity. The silo mentality between the European directorates is also unhelpful, leading to Babylonian confusion. Thus, in the context of
forest fires and floods the Environment DG refers to ‘civil protection’. The European Security and Defence Policy( ESDP) of 2006, which is hoped
to build a bridge between internal and external security policy, on the other hand refers to ‘crisis management’, while the ‘security’ concept
mainly pertains to pandemics (Rhinard et al. 2008: 512, Boin et al. 2008: 406).