Injustice: the Root of Conflict in Mindanao

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Injustice: the Root of Conflict in Mindanao
GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement
By Archbishop Orlando B. Quevedo, OMI
(Note from MindaNews. This paper was delivered by Cotabato Archbishop Orlando
B. Quevedo, O.M.I., also president of the Catholic Bishops Conference of the
Philippines during the 27th General Assembly of the Bishops’ Businessmen’s
Conference in Taguig, Metro Manila, on July 8).
The Roots of Insurgency - the Government’s View
The government’s “National Strategy to Overcome
Insurgency” is “restricted information”. Since government
officials presented some of the contents in at least two public
conferences, I suppose I am free to speak about it.
The Estrada government called the National Strategy to
Overcome Insurgency a “Strategy of Total Approach.” A “left
hand effort” addresses the “roots of insurgency” and a “right
hand effort” aims at militarily dismantling insurgent forces.
The present government updated the national strategy and
now calls it “The Strategy of Holistic Approach” in order to
“deter and resolve insurgency.” By insurgency, the
government refers to the CPP/NPA-NDF, the MILF/BIAF, Abu
Sayyaf Group (ASG), and other insurgent threats.
The government’s holistic approach has four fundamental
components: political, legal, and diplomatic component;
socio-economic-psychosocial component; the peace and
order and security component; and information. It retains
the idea of a “left hand approach” and a “right hand
approach.” The national strategy admits that cutting down
“the tree of discontent” will not solve the insurgency
problem. Its roots must be addressed.
It is not my purpose to critique the strategy. At the moment
it suffices for me to say that there is an outstandingly
significant alternative approach called the “Human Security”
approach. And I am glad that Mr. Paul Oquist of the UNDP
will speak on this approach at this conference later this
morning.
My present interest is in the government’s analysis of the
roots of insurgency. The most recent version of National
Strategy identifies four main roots of insurgency, namely:




Poverty, which includes low productivity, criminality,
marginalization, environmental degradation;
Ignorance, which includes poor resource base and low
quality education;
Disease, which includes malnutrition, poor delivery of
health services;
Injustice, which includes human rights violations,
GRP-MILF Agreements
Joint Statement
15th CCCH Meeting
August 09, 2003: Joint
Statement
Government's Draft of the
GRP-MILF Final Peace
Agreement
March 28, 2003: Joint
Statement
May 07, 2002: Implementing
Guideline on Rehabilitation
May 06, 2002: Joint
Communique
June 22, 2001 GRP-MILF
Tripoli Agreement
August 7, 2001 Implementing
Guidelines
August 7, 2001 Joint
Communique
GRP-NDF Agreements
THE SECOND OSLO JOINT
STATEMENT
3 April 2004
Oslo Joint Statement
Comprehensive Agreement on
Respect for Human Rights and
International Humanitarian
Law Between the Government
of the Republic of the
Philippines and the National
Democratic Front of the
Philippines.
The Cost of War
Part 1: Economic cost of
'never ending conflict" is P30M daily
Part 2: Money for
development or war?
Part 3: Arroyo's promise of
"all-out peace"
Part 4: Rehabilitation to win
hearts and minds?
Part 5: Rehabilitation and the
Morolands
Part 6: Conclusion: Ignoring
the invisible effects of war
graft and corruption, land conflicts.
Following the above framework and analysis a government
briefing on injustice as the 4th root cause of insurgency
would logically proceed to tackling the issues of human
rights violations, graft and corruption, land conflicts.
An Alternative Perspective.
But my own reading and analysis of the insurgency in the
South would be substantially different. The main difference is
the place of history and culture.
Let me clarify. I am a Christian and a priest. Though born in
Ilocos Norte I grew up in Marbel, Koronadal, Cotabato in the
late 40s and early 50’s. My parents were public school
teachers who migrated from the crowded North to the vast
and spacious South. I worked as a priest-educator in
Cotabato City for 12 years, as a parish priest in Jolo for
almost two years, as Bishop of Kidapawan for 6 years, and
as the present Archbishop of Cotabato for the past four
years.
Through the years I have gained some understanding of the
Moro viewpoint that has significantly influenced, even
altered, my Christian viewpoint. The change came not only
from reading books authored by either Christian or Muslim
scholars but most importantly from teaching, advising,
observing, conversing and being with Muslim students and
professionals for many years, even as I accompanied my
fellow Christians in their own journey through on-going
history. Surely somewhere in my subconscious I still have
my own prejudices about Muslims. But such prejudices I
hope do not prevent me from entering the worldview of
Moros and striving to see reality as many of them would see
it.
The Root of Moro Conflict - Injustice.
From such a perspective then may I state my central
conviction -- that the root cause of insurgency in the South
is injustice. This injustice has several sub-roots that are the
major factors at the heart of the contemporary Moro
movement for freedom. I refer to the movement’s historical,
cultural, social, economic, political, and religious dimensions.
Nowhere in the national strategy as I have read it and as
government spokesmen have explained it to me do I see
these fundamental dimensions of the Moro struggle.
To clarify the thesis let me treat just three injustices among
Statements and
Resolutions
Mindanao Leaders Manifesto
for Peace
Unity Statement of "Peace in
Minda-NOW Conference"
Ceasefire: An Urgent
Imperative in Mindanao
The MILF response to CBCP: A
positive sign
Muslim-Christian Interfaith
Conference
Peace Talk
Reflections on Public
Participation in Peace
Processes in Mindanao
by Fr. Roberto C. Layson, OMI
Deaths and diseases, tears
and fears, anger and hunger
By Bishop Romulo Valles, DD
Christian-Muslim Dialogue in
Mindanao Amidst
Uncertainties
By Fr. Roberto Layson, OMI
Re-establishing Order in the
Community and its Connection
with Biodiversity Conservation
by Rudy B. Rodil
Injustice: the Root of
Conflict in Mindanao
By Archbishop
Orlando B. Quevedo, OMI
JUST PEACE: Understanding
the frameworks document
By Michael O. Mastura
the several that I see.
Injustice to the Moro Identity.
My understanding of the Moro struggle from the late 1960’s
to the present hinges on this most fundamental issue of
Moro identity. It is from this basic issue of Moro identity that
the other issues at the heart of the Moro struggle are
derived. [Although I assume responsibility for the
interpretative synthesis, I acknowledge my indebtedness for
the historical data to the excellent book of Salah Jubair,
Bangsamoro: A Nation Under Endless Tyranny, 3rd edition,
IQ Marin SDN BHD, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 1999, 364 pp].
Bangsamoro (from bangsa, nation) as a term may be a
recent social and political construct, but the reality behind
the term goes back to the early 14th century when Islam
was introduced to the animist Indo-Malayan inhabitants of
Mindanao and Sulu through “the missionary activities of Arab
traders and teachers or Sufis who came along the trade
routes” [Jubair, p. 6]. Toward the end of the 14th century a
Muslim community was already flourishing in Sulu. By the
middle of the 15th century a Muslim sultanate was already
established in Sulu. Islamic missionary efforts in the 15th
and 16th centuries also succeeded in establishing sultanates
in the Lanao and Cotabato areas. In the last years of the
15th century, Islam had reached out to the north, where
Muslim rajahs such as Rajah Sulaiman Mahmud, Rajah
Matanda, and Rajah Lakandula ruled over what is known as
Manila today.
Islamic groups spoke different languages and demonstrated
great differences in customs and traditions. What brought
the communities together into a distinct and identifiable
social group was the common religious bond of Islam that
totally governed their social structures, their relationships,
their values, their way of life. Such unity in diversity was
already a reality long before the term “Filipinos” came to
describe the indios colonized by the Spaniards in the second
half of the 16th century.
The Muslim communities shared a common political and
governmental structure based on the sultanates, with their
own defined territories. They also shared a common history
of resistance against Spain and later against the Americans.
In the 16th to the 18th centuries, the Muslim communities
might not have had a sense of distinct political “nationhood”
(as understood today), but they certainly considered
themselves quite distinct from everyone else by reason of
their adherence to Islam. By the 19th century, Muslim
leaders and thinkers were convinced that the Moros
constituted one nation, a belief that they impressed on the
American colonizing government always with passion and
often with violence.
One may argue about investing the Moro social and political
community with the name “nation” but one cannot escape
the fact that during the first century of Spanish colonization,
the Islamic peoples of Mindanao, Visayas, and Luzon, had a
socio-cultural and political identity distinct and separate from
the Spaniards and the Christian indios. Thus, even without
pressing the argument of nationhood, there was by the end
of the 16th century among the Islamic communities a
developed sense of religious and cultural unity and identity
to which one might give at least seminally the name
bangsamoro. Such sense of “nation” certainly matured when
from the very beginning and for more than 300 years they
resisted waves of military campaigns by Spanish military
forces and their Christian Indio subordinates and later by
American troops.
In contrast, Christian Filipinos asserted their nationhood only
when the revolution against Spain was launched in 1896.
When this sense of nationhood among Filipinos began to be
firmed up under American rule, the leaders and thinkers of
the Muslim communities resisted the attempts to put them
under Filipino rule.
It is in the light of the above social, political, and cultural
history based on their common Islamic belief that I make the
following assertion. The various campaigns, military and
otherwise, by Spanish, American, and Filipino governments
to subjugate, assimilate and integrate the Bangsamoro into
the mainstream body politic, apparently without regard to
their historical and cultural make-up, is an injustice to the
bangsamoros’ religious, cultural and political identity [see
also Jubair, pp. 123-27].
Injustice to Moro Political Sovereignty
Even before the Spaniards arrived in 16ht century the
Muslim communities in Mindanao already had their own
structures of political governance centered on their datus,
rajahs, and sultans. They had recognizable territorial
boundaries. They were free to govern themselves in their
own way, according to their customs, traditions, and the
precepts of their religion. They possessed political
sovereignty. They waged numerous wars against Spanish
forces to defend their homeland and their religion. The death
of Rajah Sulaiman, the last Muslim ruler of Manila, at the
battle of Bangkusay, off the shore of Tondo in 1571, was an
initial chapter of the resistance that the Moro people waged
against those that threatened their sovereignty.
The Moro-Spanish conflict would drag on for more than 320
years without any decisive result except to constrict to a
little extent the territorial boundaries of Moro sovereignty, as
Spain erected garrisons in key places in Mindanao as in
Cotabato, Zamboanga and Sulu. Particularly in the 17th
century, the Sultanate of Maguindanao headed by Sultan
Dipatuan Muhammad Qudarat wielded power and influence
over a wide swath of Mindanao territory, including Cotabato,
Lanao, Davao, Misamis, Bukidnon and Zamboanga (Salah
Jubair, p. 44). Even after his defeat by Gov. General Hurtado
de Corcuera in Lamitan [now Baras, Malabang, Lanao del Sur
according to Cesar Adib Majul, see Jubair, chapter 3, ftnote
17, p. 272] in 1637, Sultan Qudarat held sovereignty over
his territory as did the Sultan of Sulu over his. For the next
two centuries, the Spaniards could not gain any victory
decisive enough to wrest this sovereignty.
Dynastic dissensions weakened the Sultanates of Sulu and
Maguindanao in the 18th and 19th century. The decline of
the Sultanates, the political symbol of Moro sovereignty,
reached its nadir with the final Spanish assault on Jolo in
1876. Other Sultanates continued to flourish such as in
Lanao, Buayan, Talayan, Buluan, and Kabuntalan.
Meanwhile, though weakened, the Sulu Sultanate maintained
its sovereignty.
Before American troops landed in Mindanao and Sulu, Moro
military forces strengthened Moro sovereignty by attacking
Spanish garrisons in Cotabato, Zamboanga, Sulu, and Lanao.
They also dislodged Katipuneros in Cotabato who tried to fill
the political vacuum that the Spanish evacuation from
Mindanao created.
In 1899 Brigadier Gen. John C. Bates and Sultan Jamalul
Kiran II of Sulu successfully negotiated the Kiram-Bates
Treaty. Informal agreements were also made with the other
Moro leaders of Mindanao. The treaty gave due recognition
to the Moro religion, customs, and traditions. On
sovereignty, two versions of the treaty exist. The English
version states: “The sovereignty of the United States over
the archipelago of Jolo, and its dependencies is declared and
acknowledged.” The Moro version says otherwise: “The
support, the aid, and the protection of the Sulu Island and
archipelago are in the American nation” [see Juabair, p. 61].
However, the Kiram-Bates treaty paved the way for the
American occupation of Mindanao and Sulu. In 1903 the
Moro Province consisting of the districts of Sulu, Zamboanga,
Lanao, Cotabato and Davao was created and was placed
under the direct supervision of the Civil Governor of the
Philippine Islands and the Philippine Commission. In 1904
Pres. Theodore Roosevelt unilaterally declared the treaty null
and void. In 1912, Brig. Gen. John C. Pershing, head of the
Moro Province, created the first Christian colony of settlers in
Mindanao. He was also responsible for the disarmament of
the Moros, but not without a fight as the massacre at Bud
Bagsak in 1913 demonstrates.
From 1899 to 1941 there were many Moro military uprisings
against the Americans. But through military, political and
educational stratagems the American government gradually
gained de facto sovereignty over the Moro people. Moreover,
the introduction of Christian settlers to Mindanao that began
under General Pershing in 1912 eventually made the once
dominant Moro population into a minority and marginalized
them [In 1913, the estimated population of Mindanao was
the following: 324,816 Moros; 193,882 non-Moros. The Moro
people constituted a 76% majority. Twenty-six years later, in
1939, the Moro population was only 34% of the total
Mindanao population; in 1990, only 19% of the total
Mindanao population of 14,269,456; see Jubair, pp. 130-31,
using 1990 Census of Population and Housing]. Many Moro
leaders vehemently resisted being called Filipinos. They
protested against the independence movement of the
Filipinos, preferring even to remain under the American flag
rather than be independent and yet be under “Christian
Filipinos” [see Jubair, pp. 86-94, 108-10].
It is on the basis of the historical record that I come to the
following conclusion: for the bangsamoro the gradual loss of
their sovereignty to the American government and later to
the Philippine government was a fundamental injustice, even
though some of their leaders who served in government
might have acquiesced [For this acquiescence, see Jubair,
pp. 115-16].
Injustice to Moro Integral Development.
With the loss of political sovereignty came the loss of great
chunks of Moro ancestral lands. Much of the loss resulted
from a long series of legal enactments by the Philippine
Commission, the Commonwealth government, and the postindependence government. Moro writers call this “legalized
land grabbing.” Land registration, declaration of public land,
mining, cadastral surveys, creation of agricultural colonies,
procedures for land ownership, land settlements - all these
legal realities, often without the proper understanding of the
Moro people, drastically reduced the areas of ancestral
domain and benefited the Christian population [see Jubair,
pp. 95-97, 102-04, 119-24]. By 1976 Moros owned less than
17% of the Mindanao land they once owned almost
exclusively before the Spaniards came [see Jubair, p. 121,
quoting Aijaz Ahmad (1982), p. 7].
The loss of land was compounded by government neglect of
the Moro right to integral development during the
Commonwealth and post-independence governments. In all
dimensions of human development, political, economic,
educational, and cultural, the Moro population continues to
lag far behind its Christian Filipino counterparts. The latest
national census bears this out in terms of educational
improvement, political participation, and economic
development. This is truly a tragic plight.
Indeed the bangsamoro is at the lowest tier of Philippine
development when one uses the framework that the Estrada
government used to portray the root causes of insurgency.
These root causes are maldistribution of wealth and poverty
(double standard of justice, low quality education, low
productivity, malnutrition, low purchasing power, criminality,
and disease; maldistribution of the fruits of the land (land
conflicts, marginalization, socio-eco mainstream,
environmental degradation, poor resource base; plutocracy
or government of, by, and for the few (poor delivery of
services, patronage politics, government inefficiency, human
rights violations, rigged elections, graft and corruption,
cronyism).
The central government in Manila can be justly faulted for
this underdevelopment. But one cannot escape the
impression that through the years many Moro leaders who
served in the government have also failed their own people
[For confirmation of this impression, see Jubair, pp. 257-59].
Today’s Prospects for Peace
Given the injustices that I have described, where do we go
from here? Will the fighting ever stop? Will the evacuees
ever return home? Will integral development of the
bangsamoro ever seriously start?
The root answer to those questions is simple. Justice to the
Moro identity and sovereignty must be seriously respected.
But this task is far from simple. Prejudices and biases have
to be overcome. Muslim and Christian religious leaders have
a major role in this. Both the Koran and the Bible teach
respect, understanding, reconciliation, and love.
On May 5, 2003 the Permanent Council of the Catholic
Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines issued on an open
letter of appeal to President Macapagal-Arroyo and Chairman
Salamat Hashim to declare a ceasefire and to resume peace
negotiations. The Bishops’ immediate concern was the
worsening humanitarian crisis afflicting more than 300,000
evacuees, mostly Moros, in various evacuation camps in
Central and Southern Mindanao.
Supported by other peace advocates, notably Tabang
Mindanaw, the Bishops’ letter started a flurry of
communications between the Bishops, the MILF leadership,
and key government officials mandated by the President to
explore the avenues of peace. As of today despite the
provocative rhetoric that various officials spout in the media,
the prospects for peace in Mindanao are real. New
negotiations have reopened at least informally. Unless
terrorism manages to sabotage the peace process, I believe
that soon the two parties will resume discussions on
substantive peace agenda.
I am particularly encouraged by one of the concluding
reflections of Salah Jubair:
 The Moros are not asking for the whole of
Mindanao, because circumstances have superseded
some facts of history. They just want a parcel of it,
especially where they predominate. This will enable
generations after them to live in peace and piety, as
Islam enjoins all believers. The indigenous peoples,
whom the Visayans call Lumads may opt to join their
blood-brothers, the Moros, and they are welcome.
After all, the two peoples are inseparable in the
history of Mindanao and Sulu. Is this too much a price
for peace, development and prosperity for all?
[p. 263].
It is the what and the how of this just and fundamental Moro
aspiration for freedom within the context of circumstances
that “have superseded some facts of history” that must be at
the heart of all political negotiations for a lasting peace.
[Note: After I completed writing this talk, I noticed that
Salah Jubair has a note near the front of his book: “No part
of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by
any means without permission from the author.” It is too late
for me to contact the author. I hope he understands. But
once again let me note that I assume full responsibility for
the interpretation that I give to the historical data].
(NOTE FROM MINDANEWS: MindaNews was able to reach Salah Jubair and he
said he does not mind Archbishop Quevedo's quoting parts of his book).
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