משחקים ואסטרטגיה בפוליטיקה נושאים נוספים וקריאת רשות חשיבה ליניארית מול חשיבה דיאלקטית: טבעה הפרדוקסלי של האסטרטגיה.1 Edward N. Luttwak (1987). Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. pp. 3-65, 177-236. Russell A. Jones (1977). Self-Fulfilling Prophecies: Social, Psychological, and Physiological Effects of Expectancies. New York: John Wiley & Sons. Robert Jervis (1997). System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Steven J. Brams (1999). "To Mobilize or Not to Mobilize: Catch-22s in International Crises." International Studies Quarterly 43(4): 621-640. : תהליך המעבר מקונפליקט למשא ומתן.2 "(א) תנאים אסטרטגיים ופסיכולוגיים לסיום קונפליקט; מושג ה"בשלות (ב) שלבים במעבר מקונפליקט לפיוס (ג) קדם משא ומתן Janice Gross Stein (ed.) (1989). Getting to the Table. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Chs. 1 (by Zartman), 6 (by Stein). I. William Zartman (1989). Ripe for Resolution (2nd ed.). 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