Rules of Engagement: An Overview
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: AN OVERVIEW
- - Instructor Notes Version - Note: The words below that appear in plain text also appear in the outline given to each
student (possibly translated from the English).
Words appearing in bold are for instructors’ use in making this presentation, and do not
appear in the module given to students.
[Bold text in brackets provides additional background information in responding to
students’ detailed questions.]
This module is intended as an overview of the topic of rules of engagement. The
separate module on Use of Force Policy (039b) might be included elsewhere during
the seminar in order to describe the full range of issues involved in the use of force
by the military. The LA Riots case study (224) is a good follow-on module to
illustrate use of force policy.
Faculty members who have previously taught this module note that many
developing countries do not have an established ROE mechanism for controlling the
use of force by their militaries. One member said "You can stand in front of the
class and see the light bulbs popping off in students' eyes as you lay out ROE." "It
becomes clear to many that ROE is a means to address numerous fundamental
problems in the civilian leadership of their military and the students will pursue
them with vigor."
Slide 2
I.
OVERVIEW
This presentation is based upon the U.S. military experience with rules of
engagement, with an emphasis on those aspects of ROE we believe most useful to other
militaries. Of course, how a given nation uses ROE within its military is a matter to be
decided by that nation.
We simply want to share our own experience that incorporating the use of ROE at
all levels of military planning and execution (strategic, operational, and tactical), has
enhanced command and control and improved the likelihood of accomplishing the mission
assigned.
A.
Definition- Rules of engagement (ROE) are orders issued by competent military
authority that define the extent to which a military unit may use force in selfdefense or to accomplish its mission.
The term “rules of engagement” has been defined in slightly different ways by
various countries. This definition reflects the U.S. use of the term. The key point is that
ROE are a command and control tool of the military commander and the civilian
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leadership above the commander. They are military orders which define when, where, how
much and under what circumstances forced can be used.
Note that ROE address the use of force in two different situations:1) when your
units or individual personnel are suddenly attacked or are about to be attacked and need to
defend themselves; and 2) when your units are assigned a mission to accomplish and need
guidance on the use of force in conducting that mission. These are two very different
purposes, and as we will see, the U.S. has different ROE to address each.
[This definition is derived from the ROE definition in JP 1-02, DoD Dictionary of
Military and Associated Terms: "Directives issued by competent military authority that
delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate
and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered."]
1.
"Force" can include using batons during a peace operation to massed
artillery fire in an international armed conflict.
2.
A "mission" for which rules of engagement can be established may
involve a wide range of purposes, from providing humanitarian assistance
to citizens of another nation to combat during an international armed
conflict.
The U.S. experience has been that ROE are useful command and control tools for a
wide-range of missions. Even when conducting a humanitarian mission such as providing
food, clothing and other necessities to citizens of another country affected by natural
disaster, it is useful to have established guidance on such things as what force to use to
protect military equipment or relief supplies from theft, and whether force should be used
against persons attempting to prevent you from distributing assistance.
It has also been the U.S. experience that in military operations other than war, such
as peacekeeping, "restraint" is an important principle to bear in mind. In such operations,
a single act by the units involved can have significant military and political consequences,
making the excessive use of force especially dangerous to the accomplishment of the
mission. For this reason, ROE in such operations are generally more restrictive, detailed,
and sensitive to political concerns than during international armed conflict. [JP 3-07 Joint
Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, p. II-4.]
3.
In conducting peacetime operations within the United States, U.S.
military forces are governed by "use-of-force rules" rather than ROE.
In our latest version of ROE, applying to all the armed forces (January, 2000), the
U.S. decided to use the term "rules of engagement" to apply only to orders regarding the
use of force in operations outside the United States and for military attacks upon the U.S.
For orders regarding the use of force during peacetime operations within the U.S, we use
separate "use-of-force rules". [CJCSI 3131.01A, para. 3]
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Rules of Engagement: An Overview
This presentation will discuss only ROE. [A separate module on "use-of-force
rules" may be included elsewhere during the seminar.]
The standing ROE used by the U.S. military have, since 1986, applied to all the
armed forces. [The first U.S. standing ROE were created in 1962 and defined peacetime
[i.e. self-defense] rules of engagement only for seaborne forces.]
Slide 3
B.
History of U.S. ROE
1.
The first standardized ROE for U.S. military forces were established for
maritime units in 1962.
There is no question that U.S. forces, and those of other nations, have used "rules of
engagement" going back hundreds of years. For example, in one of the earliest battles of
the American Revolution, the Battle of Bunker Hill, American militiamen were ordered
"Don't one of you fire until you see the whites of their eyes" in reference to the advancing
British regulars. This order reflected the limitations of the musket, which were not
effective at greater ranges.
This was a classic example of ROE, although such orders were not referred to as
"ROE" until the 1960s, when the United Kingdom adopted them in Malta.
In 1962, standardized ROE issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were adopted for all
U.S. maritime units in light of the growing threat of sudden attack by Soviet forces. These
ROE provided both guidance on self-defense in case of unexpected attack, and also a
standard list of supplemental measures from which a force commander could select in
planning and executing a particular military operation. These were updated in 1970 and
1981.
[Phillips, p. 5; Naval War College ROE Presentation]
2.
Standardized ROE were issued for all U.S. forces in 1986.
When a U.S. law was enacted [Goldwater-Nichols Act] which mandated a
strengthening of joint operations (at the expense of service-specific operations), U.S. ROE
were expanded to include land as well as air units operating over land. The were issued by
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on behalf of the Secretary of Defense.
3.
Standing ROE were issued in 1994, and updated in 2000.
The word "standing" was used to clarify that both the guidance on self-defense as
well as the menu of supplemental measures from which specific measures could be selected
were applicable to all U.S. forces all the time (across the entire spectrum of conflict) and
not limited just to peacetime.
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Slide 4
C.
Purpose- ROE act as a tool in providing effective command and control over
military forces.
While the military brings many capabilities to any mission assigned to it by a
nation's civilian leadership, the very essence of the military is its capability to use force.
Defining how force is to be used by the military is, in turn, central to effective command
and control of the military. National civilian leaders as well as strategic, operational and
tactical military leaders can use ROE to define for military forces how they are to use
force.
Hundreds of years ago, it was common for national leaders such as kings to
accompany their armies in the field, where they could immediately communicate their
guidance in battle. Today, despite great advances in electronic communications, national
leaders cannot be on "the battlefield" ( of which there are usually several), and involve
forces too large for one person to control on the scene. Therefore, tools such as rules of
engagement become an important means for national leaders to convey their guidance in
advance to military forces.
1.
National civilian leaders use ROE to ensure that military forces
responding in self-defense do not use disproportionate force and thereby
preclude the leadership from preventing the incident from leading to a
wider conflict.
The U.S. has found it useful to issue standing guidance to military units on how to
respond should they be attacked [hostile act] or when there has been a threat of the
imminent use of force against them [hostile intent]. [Self-defense ROE are covered in
greater detail below.]
Having standing guidance on the amount of force which can be used to respond to
an unexpected attack helps ensure that such an attack does not result in a sudden
escalation into a full-scale conflict. Such an escalation would likely prevent national
civilian leaders from assessing national policy goals involved in a wider conflict, or engage
in diplomacy with the national leaders of the attacking force. Such ROE also take into
account the possibility that an attack was the responsibility of a rogue commander acting
without orders or that it was accidental.
2.
National leaders who order military units to accomplish a specific mission
can use ROE to define when, where, in what amount, and against whom
force may be used by those units to achieve the national policy goals
underlying that mission. ROE can also specify who in the chain of
command is authorized to decide what force to use and when.
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Rules of Engagement: An Overview
In the United States, either the President or the Secretary of Defense approve rules
of engagement issued by combatant commanders at the operational level of war. [CJCSI
3121.01A, para. 6] ROE are the link between the national civilian leadership and
operational forces once that leadership has decided to use military force to accomplish
national policy goals.
ROE are an essential means of civilian control of the military. They offer a measure
of assurance that national policy will be followed during military operations. When
communications or the amount of time required for national-level decision making would
prevent guidance reaching the field, ROE serve as guide.
ROE can define when force is used. This may involve a set hour and day, or it
might involve some triggering event, such as when a unit is fired upon.
ROE can define where to use force. Thus, forces may be authorized to enter the
territory of one nation, but be prohibited from entering or even approaching within a
certain number of miles of a third nation, the neutrality of which the national leadership is
particularly concerned.
ROE can define what amount of force to use. This can include "arming orders"
(what weapons to carry and in what state of readiness); what types of weapons systems (e.g.
in a Chapter VI peacekeeping mission, pistols and rifles only).
It can also specify the extent visual confirmation of the target is required, and even
who in the chain of command is authorized to decide when to open fire (e.g. in a
peacekeeping mission, squad leaders if present) and with what weapon.
Slide 5
3.
Operational and tactical military commanders use ROE for the same
purposes. However, ROE issued at each command level must comply
with ROE issued by higher authority.
In the U.S. military, the geographic combatant commanders (such as the
Commander, U.S. European Command) are responsible for employing, designing
objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of U.S. military operations
within their area of responsibility. [JP 3-0, II-6.]
In the U.S., combatant commanders usually participate in discussions with the
President and/or the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff regarding US national strategy for a given mission. The combatant commander then
develops his military strategy and directs operations to accomplish it based upon the
guidance received from national civilian leaders. [JP 3-0, II-2]
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If national civilian leaders have issued rules of engagement, the combatant
commander may prepare his own more specific ROE. However, such ROE must comply
with the ROE issued by the national leaders. [CJCSI 3121.01A, 6b.]
U.S. Tactical commanders are subordinate to a geographic combatant commander.
They usually issue their own ROE. However, these must comply with the ROE issued by
the geographic combatant commander.
Slide 6
D.
Factors Affecting Rules of Engagement-
There are 3 things which influence any set of rules of engagement. The
accompanying slide illustrates the factors which go into the creation of a set of ROE to
accomplish a particular mission. While the circles are shown as being of equal size with
symmetrical overlap, in a given crisis the relative influence of each of the factors will vary
depending upon on the circumstances.
1.
National Policy Objectives
[This wouldn't be a professional military seminar without at least one quote from a
dead German military thinker!] In his book "On War", Carl von Clausewitz wrote "War
is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political
intercourse, carried on with other means...the political object is the goal, war is the means
of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation of their purpose."
Hence, national civilian leaders establish "the political object", what today we might
call "national policy objectives". They then apply those objectives in what Clausewitz
called "political intercourse", what we would call today "foreign relations". ROE then,
are the center-piece in the use of the military to achieve the foreign policy objectives for
which the mission has been established to achieve. [Duncan, 78.]
Of course, if the national policy objectives or the mission have not been clearly
explained by the national civilian leadership, then the senior military leadership should
seek clarification. Otherwise, the ROE and other aspects of mission planning will not
efficiently, and perhaps not effectively, achieve the goals established by national leaders.
[Duncan, 78.]
"Diplomacy" will certainly influence national policy, as other nations express
either their support or objection to a nation's national policy objectives. [Some authors
[Roach] have suggested it is a separate fourth influence, but it seems more appropriate to
view it as an influence on national policy.]
From a military perspective, including national policy as one of the factors affecting
ROE ensures that military forces will be seen by their national civilian leaders as
supporting and carrying out their established policies. [Roach]
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Rules of Engagement: An Overview
2.
Operational Situation and Requirements
ROE are prime means for a commander to direct the conduct of operations of
subordinate units in accordance with the commander's broad plan. Restrictions on
engaging particular lawful military targets may be imposed for a number of valid
operational reasons.
For example, a senior commander may want certain roads, railroad lines, and
bridges not destroyed so that they may be used in the future by the commander's own
forces.
Additionally, ROE restrictions can also serve to minimize "friendly fire" incidents,
in which units of the same armed force or coalition fire upon each other in mistake. During
the Gulf War of 1991, not a single "friendly fire" incident occurred among coalition
aircraft. Strict ROE were responsible, including a prohibition on any anti-aircraft guns or
missiles from firing on any aircraft. [Phillips, 16]
During the "pre-hostilities" phase of an operation, during which an operational
commander's forces are being built-up to a sufficient level to allow for synchronized
offensive operations, it is useful to have restrictive ROE to discourage commencement of
hostilities with enemy units until the commander is prepared and at a place and time of the
commander's choosing. This was the situation which faced General Schwartzkopf in the
fall of 1990. During this period he was briefed that there had been an incident involving an
Iraqi jet fighter which had entered the national airspace of Saudi Arabia some 6-10 miles.
The Air Force briefer told Gen Schwartzkopf that consistent with the air component ROE,
US fighter aircraft had locked on the Iraqi plane with their radar and were just about to
fire when the Iraqi turned went back across the border. General Schwartzkopf told the
Air commander that he did not want the war to start at that time, and over a single
aircraft. He then directed the air commander to revise the ROE to ensure this would not
happen. [Phillips, 4]
3.
Legal obligations established by both domestic law and international law
(such as the law of armed conflict and status of forces agreements).
In an international armed conflict, at a minimum the 1949 Geneva Conventions
and other customary international law must be studied to ensure the ROE are consistent
with them. For those nations party to 1977 Protocol I, it will apply in full. For those
nations not party to it, there are many provisions which still reflect customary
international law and thus must be followed. Other treaties such as those limiting the use
of certain weapons, such as chemical weapons or landmines must be considered for those
nations party to them. Of course, the UN Charter must also be considered.
In internal armed conflict, common article III of the 1949 Geneva Conventions will
apply. Those nations party to the 1977 Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions must
also consider whether their provisions apply in such a conflict.
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The domestic law of one's own nation will also apply. For example, it may place
restrictions on the use of military force without an authorization from the legislature.
Slide 7
Because of the added influence of policy and operational considerations, ROE
restrict military operations far more than do legal obligations. A military attorney
participating on a planning staff preparing ROE can perform a valuable service by clearly
identifying the point at which the use of force is no longer restrained by the law. Unless
justified for policy or operational reasons, ROE need not be more restrictive than the law
permits. [Roach, 47.]
That restrictive ROE are more likely to be the result of national policy than
international law can be illustrated from the ROE which were developed for the U.S. air
strike on selected terrorist-related targets in Tripoli, Libya in 1986. The strike had been
ordered by the U.S. President (Reagan) following state-sponsored terrorist attacks on
Americans in a German night club [LaBelle Discotheque, killing 2 US soldiers, wounding
229 other people, 78 of them Americans], and an airliner en route from Athens to Rome [a
TWA flight, killing 4 Americans]. Shortly after these attacks, Libya's leader Gadhafi
stated publicly "We shall escalate the violence against American targets, civilian and noncivilian, throughout the world". [Parks, 41, 45.]
The air strikes were undertaken in national self-defense as they were intended to
discourage Libya from carrying out its threats of more attacks. The President told the
military leadership involved that he wanted every reasonable effort made to minimize both
civilian incidental injuries and collateral damage, as well as risk to U.S. forces.
Based upon that policy guidance, military planners included a rule of engagement
that attacking jet aircraft would attack at night when there would be fewer people in the
street, and during which the Libyan Air Force was known to have difficulty operating.
Additionally, U.S. aircraft were required to make only a single pass over each target,
positively identify every target before releasing ordnance, and to strike all targets
simultaneously. These ROE reflected precautions not required by the law of armed
conflict, but rather the limited nature of this attack- it was not intended to destroy Libya's
war-making capability, but only convince the leadership the U.S. had the means to do so if
it persisted in its aggression. [Parks, 48, 49.]
ROE for operations in an international armed conflict will thus be influenced by the
law of armed conflict. In other operations, domestic laws of a nation to which forces are
deployed and any status of forces agreement in place will also influence ROE for mission
accomplishment.
4.
Military staffs overseeing the accomplishment of missions must
continuously assess whether changes in national policy, the operational
situation or requirements, or legal obligations have resulted in a need for a
change in the ROE.
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Rules of Engagement: An Overview
As a particular operation progresses, the situation on the ground will change
(especially as the "enemy" reacts). At the same time, the national civilian leadership may
change policy based on domestic public reaction, foreign diplomacy, or changing events on
the ground. Even the law may change, such as when a peace operation taking place with
the consent of the parties turns into an international armed conflict when consent is
withdrawn.
The key point is that military staffs must constantly monitor these three factors and
make daily assessments regarding whether or not the ROE should be changed.
The U.S. learned this lesson the hard way during peace operations in Lebanon in
1984. U.S. Marines initially went to Lebanon at the request of all the warring parties.
ROE were written to reflect the relatively low-threat and peaceful mission of the units
involved. However, as events unfolded, some of the warring parties resumed their conflict,
while at the same time U.S. policy changed to favoring the then Christian-led government
and armed forces. The military staffs overseeing the US Marine deployment failed to
request changes to the ROE in light of these change in factors. For that reason, guards at
the perimeter of the Marine compound at the airport did not have bullets in their rifles and
were unable to stop a suicide truck bomber. The bomber was able to drive past the guards
and into the barracks where most Marines were staying, killing well over 200.
[Grunawalt, 256]
5.
After reviewing these three factors in planning a given mission, a military
commander who believes he or she will be unable to accomplish the
mission with the resulting ROE must inform the national civilian
leadership of this and seek a revision in national policy.
While military commanders must carry out the lawful orders of their civilian
superiors, they also owe them their honest advice on the anticipated outcome of military
operations conducted to achieve the national policy goals established. Similarly, when the
national civilian leadership has imposed rules of engagement for a military operation,
military commanders must provide honest advice on how those rules will effect
accomplishment of the assigned mission as well as casualties among friendly forces.
Quite often, national policy will be unclear. When this occurs, military commanders
have a duty to seek a clear explanation of policy goals/objectives in order to fashion an
effective military operational plan to achieve those goals, and ROE to support that plan.
[Duncan, p. 78]
II.
U.S. ROE FOR SELF-DEFENSE
Slide 8
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A.
Unit Self-Defense: A U.S. unit commander has the inherent authority and
obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate action
to defend the unit, including elements and personnel, or other US forces in the
vicinity, against a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.
This is a direct quote from the unclassified portion of the current U.S. standing
ROE. [CJCSI 3121.01A,Enclosure A, para. 7c] It emphasizes the U.S. view that military
units are expected NOT to "take the first hit" before acting in self-defense.
To stress the importance of self-defense, the following phrase is repeated in bold
print 11 times in the U.S. Standing ROE: "These rules do not limit a commander's
inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all
appropriate action in self-defense of the commander's unit and other U.S. forces in the
vicinity". [Duncan, 81] The phrase "these rules do not limit" means that in accomplishing
a specific mission under supplemental ROE, the unit commander is still guided by this unit
self-defense ROE, even though it authorizes the use of more force than the mission
accomplishment/supplemental ROE do. [CJCSI 3121.01A, para 5a]
The phrase "use all necessary means available" means that a commander may use
all of the military capability of his or her unit, including personnel, weapons and tactics
necessary to defend against hostile acts or hostile intent. The only possible limitation is
that the President or Secretary of Defense may issued a rule of engagement restricting the
authority to order the use of certain types of weapons to a higher-level commander.
[Grunawalt, 252]
"Unit" can be the aircraft, squadron, ship, tank, squad, platoon, or even division
that constitutes the unit of that particular commander. [Grunawalt, 252]
"Other U.S. forces in the vicinity" include units of any other US forces, regardless
of service. Thus, an Air Force aircraft commander is obligated to come to the defense of a
Navy ship operating in the vicinity. Note however, that this rule does not extend to defense
of foreign military forces. A supplemental measure ROE for mission accomplishment must
be approved in order to do this. [Grunawalt, 252]
Slide 9
B.
Individual Self-Defense: A U.S. service member has the inherent right to use all
necessary means available and to take all appropriate action to defend himself or
herself and US forces in the vicinity from a hostile act or demonstrated hostile
intent. The unit commander must ensure that individuals within the unit
understand when and how to use force in self-defense.
[paraphrased from CJCSI 3121.01A, enclosure A, para. 5e] A individual service
member's right of self-defense is considered to be a subset of unit self-defense.
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Because individual self-defense is a subset of unit self-defense, it may be limited by
the unit commander for tactical reasons. For example, a squad leader orders his unit to
assume an ambush position along a road. He orders the squad members not to open fire on
approaching enemy personnel until he gives the signal, in order to ensure maximum
surprise and enemy casualties result. A private in the squad seeing the approaching
enemy, and fearing for his life, would NOT have permission under the self-defense ROE to
open fire on his own.
Slide 10
C.
In making a decision regarding whether and in what way to defend the unit, U.S.
commanders are expected to first consider the required elements of necessity and
proportionality.
While the U.S. standing ROE are designed to protect our forces from sudden attack,
they do not, as some military commentators have implied, give U.S. commanders license to
"shoot from the hip" or act like "Rambo". The ROE require a commander to consider
whether or not there is a necessity to act in self-defense, and if so to determine what
amount of force would be proportionate to the threat posed. [CJCSI 3121.01A, enclosure
a, para. 5a & 5f; Swimmerton]
1.
"Necessity" exists when either a hostile act occurs or when a force or
terrorist exhibits hostile intent.
The U.S. Standing ROE define necessity this way. [CJCSI 3121.01A, enclosure A,
para. 5f(1)]
a.
A hostile act is an attack or other use of force against US forces. It
is also force used directly to preclude or impede the mission or
duties of US forces.
[paraphrase of CJCSI 3121.01A, enclosure A, para. 5g]
b.
Hostile intent is the threat of imminent use of force against US
forces. It is also the threat of force to preclude or impede the
mission or duties of US forces.
[paraphrase of CJCSI 3121.01A, enclosure A, para. 5h]
Determining whether or not a unit faces hostile intent is a matter of professional
judgment, and necessarily a most difficult determination to make. Commanders of units of
the U.S. Navy had to face this determination twice in the Gulf in the 1980s.
In 1987, during the Iran-Iraq War, the USS STARK, a U.S. frigate, detected an
Iraqi attack jet over the Gulf apparently seeking to attack a merchant tanker headed for
Iran. The CO of the STARK failed to warn the jet of the ship's identification and location,
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and failed to prepare the ship to defend itself. The Iraqi jet mistook the STARK for a
tanker and fired a cruise missile at it. The missile struck and caused severe damage and 37
deaths. The Navy concluded the CO failed to recognize hostile intent and take measures to
defend the ship. He was relieved of command. [Hayes, 41, 54]
In 1988, the U.S. cruiser VINCENNES was engaged in operations related to
ensuring peaceful passage of neutral merchant ships in the Gulf. After its helicopter was
fired upon by Iranian forces in small boats, the cruiser got into an engagement with several
of these boats. It then detected what it concluded was an Iranian attack jet taking off from
a nearby airfield used both by military and commercial aircraft. The aircraft was on a
track that would take it directly over the VINCENNES, which issued 11 warnings to the
aircraft over military and international air distress frequencies, but got no response.
Under the stress of battle conditions (Iranian rounds were striking the bulkheads and ship
was maneuvering sharply at high speed, radar personnel mistakenly told the captain the
aircraft was descending rapidly toward the ship (in an "attack profile"). The CO
concluded the aircraft was indicating hostile intent and ordered a missile to be fired. The
aircraft turned out to be a civilian airliner, and 290 passengers and crew were mistakenly
killed. [Friedman]
Speaking at a conference on ROE after these incidents, the Navy's Chief of Naval
Operations, ADM Kelso stated "The determination of hostile intent is the single most
difficult determination to make." [Grunawalt, 253]
(1)
In determining hostile intent, a commander must consider
many factors: the capabilities and physical actions of the
person or unit presenting the threat; available intelligence
information, the political situation at the time, and specific
guidance from higher authority.
Capabilities include what weapons the threatening person or unit has and how they
are employed (such as the need to energize fire control radar). Actions can include failure
to respond to warnings, or assuming an "attack profile" such as aiming weapons.
Intelligence information may include "indications and warnings" regarding the
threatening person or unit, as well as a "threat assessment".
No one of these factors can be an automatic trigger for self-defense. For example,
during the Cold War, it was common for Soviet warships to train their weapons on U.S.
warships and even energize their fire control radars. However, because these events
occurred when the global political situation was relatively relaxed, and no intelligence
indicated an attack was being planned, U.S. commanders did not react in self-defense in
these incidents.
[Grunawalt 253, Naval War College ROE Slides]
(2)
The U.S. ROE tell commanders that if time and
circumstances permit, a threatening unit or person should
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be warned and given the opportunity to withdraw or cease
its threatening actions.
[CJCSI 3421.01A, Enclosure A, para. 8(1)] Note that a warning is only required if
the commander determines that time and circumstances permit.
(3)
The legal basis for the U.S. ROE on self-defense against
hostile intent is the inherent right of national and collective
self-defense reflected in UN Charter Article 51.
Article 51 states that "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual [that is national] or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations ...."
(4)
Many legal scholars and nations take the position that
military force may only be used after an armed attack, and
do not recognize a right of self-defense in response to
hostile intent.
Some scholars and nations take the narrow position that by this phase, force may
only be used in self-defense after a hostile act has occurred. That is, there is no right to
respond to hostile intent.
However, other scholars and nations take a more expansive view of this provision.
They assert that customary international law (that is law not written in agreements but
rather unwritten practice of nations done out of a sense of legal right or obligation) allows
for self-defense in anticipation of an imminent armed attack. That is the position taken by
the U.S., and therefore the basis for our position that a military unit is not required to
"take the first hit" before using force in self-defense.
[Phillips, 12, 13; Guindon, 6]
Slide 11
2.
"Proportionality" is the use of only that amount of force necessary to
decisively counter the hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent and to
ensure the continued protection of US forces.
[CJCSI 3121.01A, Enclosure A, para. 8a(2)] US commanders are told in the
Standing ROE that once they determine they must act in self-defense, then they should only
use that amount of force required to decisively counter the threat. By "amount" it is
meant the type of force (fire hoses against an angry crowd, or cruise missile against a
warship), the duration of its use, and the scope of the engagement (fire only on the most
threatening armed person in a group, or all of them). The ROE specifically mention the
use of nonlethal weapons if the commander considers them a "proportional" response.
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Notice that "proportionality" is not defined as using the same type of weapon as the
hostile person or force, nor is it defined as inflicting the same amount of damage in the case
of a hostile act. It doesn't mean if they killed six of us, we can kill six of them. Instead, it is
the degree of force needed to decisively counter the hostile force. [Grunawalt, 251]
a.
A U.S. commander may attack to disable or destroy a
hostile person or unit only when it is the only prudent
means to prevent or terminate a hostile act or demonstrated
hostile intent. Such an attack may continue only while the
hostile person or unit continues to commit hostile acts or
demonstrate hostile intent.
[CJCSI 3121.01A, Enclosure A, para. 8a(3)] For example, if a squad of soldiers fires
upon an armed person who was appearing to prepare to fire, and that person drops his
weapon and raises his hands, the squad leader must order firing to cease.
b.
A hostile person or unit may be pursued and engaged in
self-defense only if they continue to commit hostile acts or
demonstrate hostile intent.
[CJCSI 3121.01A, Enclosure A, para. 8b] The U.S. Standing ROE for unit selfdefense do not authorize a commander to "punish" a hostile force, or to seek "retribution"
or act in "reprisal". Those decisions are left to the President and Secretary of Defense,
who may later make the determination to order a broader attack in the exercise of national
self-defense.
The unit commander is limited to using only that force needed to protect his unit
and other US forces in the vicinity from further hostile acts or hostile intent. Once the
hostile force ceases these, the US commander must break off the engagement.
Slide 12
III.
U.S. ROE FOR MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT
Once planning or execution of a specific military mission is underway, a second set
of ROE are used by the U.S. Unlike unit or individual self-defense ROE, these involve the
exercise of national self-defense. They are therefore much less restrictive the standing
ROE for self-defense.
Once a enemy military force or terrorists are "declared hostile" by appropriate U.S.
authority, US units need not observe a hostile act or a demonstration of hostile intent
before engaging that force.
[CJCSI 3121.01A, Enclosure A, para. 6]
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Rules of Engagement: An Overview
A.
The U.S. ROE also provide a menu list of numbered "supplemental measures"
from which operational and tactical commanders may select appropriate ROE for
accomplishing a specific mission.
1.
Commanders use this list during the planning process to develop both
plans for a possible contingency as well as plans in response to a current
crisis.
We'll talk more about the difference between deliberate planning and crisis
planning in just a few minutes.
2.
Since no list can cover all possible circumstances in a military operation,
commanders may write their own supplemental measures so long as they
are consistent with the directions of higher authority and the relevant law.
3.
Commanders also use this list once a plan is executed and a mission is
ongoing, to adjust ROE as the mission progresses.
4.
There are two types of U.S. "supplemental measures".
[CJCSI 3121.01A, para. 6c; TJAGSA Oplaw Handbook, 71.]
a.
The first type involves a list of operations, tactics and weapons
which can only be approved by either the President or Secretary of
Defense, or by a Combatant Commander. This type of
supplemental measure is restrictive since military units cannot use
them without specific prior approval.
The menu list of supplemental measures in the U.S. SROE are classified, and so we
are unable to discuss them here. But to give you an example, suppose the use of artillery to
fire upon enemy forces located in a civilian town was among the list of tactics requiring a
Combatant Commander's approval. In that case, an ROE supplemental measure
authorizing that action must be ordered by such a commander.
In the U.S. armed forces, a "combatant commander" is a four-star general or flag
officer assigned by the President to a combatant command and has operational control of
all U.S. forces, regardless of service, within a geographic or functional area. Commander,
US Central Command is an example of a geographic combatant commander.
b.
The second type consists of all other lawful operations, tactic and
weapons. Subordinate unit commanders may use these unlisted
measures for mission accomplishment, which are therefore
permissive. However, any higher commander may issue a
restrictive supplemental measure placing a limit on the use of a
specific lawful operation, tactic or weapon.
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As an example, suppose the U.S. SROE did not require authorization from higher
authority before a unit commander could order soldiers to fire mortar rounds at enemy
forces. However, in a mission involving the rescue of hostages from terrorists outside the
U.S., a higher commander may choose to issue a supplemental measure restricting the use
of any weapon other than small arms or grenades due to the risk of harming the hostages.
The higher commander could then issue such a restrictive supplemental measure.
c.
The menu list of supplemental measures includes numbers which
do not have a defined meaning. These may be used to craft a
restrictive measure not included elsewhere in the list.
[ The instructor may wish to address the reality that despite the predominantly
“permissive” structure of the U.S. SROE, at least at the tactical level, U.S. commanders
continue to issue “restrictive” ROE which specify the only tactics and weapons which may
be used to accomplish the mission. Such restrictive ROE were used in Somalia and Bosnia.
]
d.
At the tactical level, commanders may issue cards to individual
military personnel explaining the ROE for the mission. These do
not use the numbered supplemental measures provided in the U.S.
ROE, but instead usually explain in simple terms what force is
authorized and when.
The numbered supplemental measures in the U.S. ROE are a command and control
tool useful for higher commanders and their staffs in preparing operational orders and the
ROE annexes which accompany them. Many U.S. commanders at the tactical level have
chosen to issue "ROE cards" to their troops which instead state in simple, direct, language
when and under what circumstances they can use specific types of force.
B.
The U.S. Standing ROE may be augmented by a geographic combatant
commander to establish pre-approved mission accomplishment ROE specific to
their area of responsibility.
Such ROE are submitted in advance through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff for approval by either the Secretary of Defense or the President. [CJCSI 3121.01A,
para. 6a]
There are also other means for U.S. combatant commanders to obtain pre-approval
of ROE within their geographic area of responsibility. This can be done through the
preparation of "deliberate plans". This is mentioned below.
Slide 13
IV.
U.S. MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT PLANNING PROCESS
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Rules of Engagement: An Overview
A.
The U.S. joint planning process involves planning by the geographic combatant
commander as well as supporting plans by the service component commands
under that commander.
1.
Deliberate planning is conducted for a possible crisis which may emerge
in the future. A military legal advisor normally assists staff officers from
the strategic plans and policy directorate of a commander's staff in
developing and integrating ROE into such plans.
The Secretary of Defense tasks each geographic combatant commander [through
the JSCAP- Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan] to plan for possible crisis which may emerge
in the commander's area of responsibility in the future. Planning is based on forces and
other resources which the Secretary tells the commander would be apportioned to him in
the event the crisis actually emerged. [CLAMO ROE Handbook, p. 1-3]
During the preparation of such plans, a military legal advisor is normally assigned
to the section within the combatant commander's staff preparing those plans. This is
normally the "plans and policy directorate [J-5]. The legal advisor's role includes advising
on developing and integrating ROE into the emerging plan. [CJCSI 3121.01A, Encl. L,
para. 2a]
The legal advisor's supporting role reflects the fact that ROE are the commander's
orders, which operational and policy as well as legal factors.
2.
Crisis action planning is conducted in response to an actual event and may
draw upon existing deliberate plans. A military legal advisor normally
assists staff officers from the operations directorate of a commander's staff
in developing and integrating ROE in such plans.
When an actual crisis emerges, planning takes place simultaneously at several levels
in the U.S. military, starting at with the geographic combatant commander, and working
down the chain of command to the various service component commands under the
combatant commander's operational control. A Joint Task Force is likely to be established
by the Secretary of Defense or a combatant commander [or by a subordinate unified
commander or even an existing JTF commander] in such a situation, the commander of
which will have delegated responsibility for operational control of forces from all the
services assigned to that JTF Commander. [CLAMO ROE Handbook 1-4; Joint Pub 3-0,
II-14]
As with deliberate planning, a military legal advisor is normally assigned to that
portion of each commander's staff preparing a crisis action plan. Usually personnel from
the Operations Directorate of a commander's staff are responsible for preparing such a
plan. An "ROE Planning Cell" may be established within the staff group conducting such
planning. But again, the military legal advisor assists rather than leads such a cell. [On a
Joint Task Force Commander's staff, this function is usually performed by a "Joint
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Planning Group".] [CJCSI 3121.01A, Encl. L, para. 2a and 3; CLAMO ROE Handbook 16]
a.
Once the President or Secretary of Defense directs a combatant
commander to plan for a military mission in response to a crisis,
they may choose to become involved in establishing ROE for that
mission at the national, operational or even tactical level.
U.S. national civilian leaders [the President or Secretary of Defense] usually give
only broad guidance initially in a crisis. For example, they might require "minimize
incidental injury and collateral damage" in carrying out the operation, but then leave
more detailed ROE to the operational [combatant commanders] and tactical commanders
to write.
However, upon approval of a combatant commander's plan or during the later
execution of the plan, if U.S. national civilian leaders think it necessary, they have the
authority to order the modification of the ROE prepared by the military leaders at the
operational level and even tactical level. This is done through interaction of the Secretary
of Defense and the geographic combatant commander, usually through the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
b.
Once a combatant commander's operational plan (and the
supporting ROE attached to it) is approved by the civilian
leadership for the conduct of an assigned military mission,
subordinate tactical commanders must establish ROE which
comply with the ROE of senior commanders above them.
[CJCSI 3121.01A, para. 6b]
[Optional Slide 14]
Any commander in the chain of command may issue supplemental measures that
place limits on the use of force for mission accomplishment. Of course, these must be
consistent with the ROE issued by senior commanders above them. [CJCSI 3121.01A,
para. 6c]
ROE mission accomplishment supplemental measures are grouped according to the
authority who approves them. The last and largest group of ROE are those which must be
prepared by commanders subordinate to the combatant commander involved. This
usually means at the Joint Task Force and/or service component commander level.
The process involves taking what ROE have been provided by higher authority,
adding your own commander's guidance (within the power delegated to him), and issuing
them to all subordinate units.
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Rules of Engagement: An Overview
The ROE as initially provided or later approved by the President or Secretary of
Defense are provided by the combatant commander to the JTF commander, or if none is
assigned, to the service component commanders. These commanders are usually delegated
authority to approve certain supplemental measures (more restrictive than those issued
above). They may then add their own, and distribute them to tactical forces.
As an example, suppose a JTF commander receives a combatant commander's ROE
and there is no restriction on indirect, unobserved fire. The JTF commander may want to
restrict its use by his forces. The JTF ROE message to the tactical units would then include
an additional supplemental measure restricting indirect, unobserved fire. [TJAGSA
OPLAW Handbook 2002, p. 5-5]
[Note: Optional PowerPoint slides 18 – 32 provide examples of strategic,
operational and tactical ROE which you can use as examples to recap in concrete terms the
material above.]
Slide 15
V.
IMPLEMENTING ROE AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL
A.
At the tactical level, several practical considerations are involved in drafting
effective ROE.
[TJAGSA Oplaw Handbook 2002, 5-5]
1.
Avoid strategy and doctrine.
ROE should not be used as a means to explain the overall strategy or military
doctrine. The commander should instead express his battlefield vision and intent through
his battle orders and personal communications with subordinates.
2.
Avoid restating the law of armed conflict except particular aspects
relevant to the specific mission.
ROE should not restate the law of armed conflict, which military personnel should
already have a basic understanding of through appropriate training at various points in
their service. There simply isn't room to provide an extensive discussion of the Hague
Regulations, the Geneva Conventions, and other relevant customary international law
[such as that in portions of 1977 Protocol] in the ROE. That said, a commander may wish
to emphasize a particular aspect of the law particularly relevant to the operation.
3.
Avoid including tactics.
Although tactics and ROE complement each other, they are not the same thing.
ROE provide boundaries and guidance on the use of force that do include either tactical
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Defense Institute of International Legal Studies
control measures. Prescribing tactics in ROE would limit flexibility. Therefore, such
matters as phase lines and control points belong in coordinating instructions.
4.
Avoid safety-related restrictions.
Certain weapons require specific safety-related steps to be taken prior to their use.
Such steps should be included in tactical or field standard operating procedures.
5.
Write ROE which are understandable, memorable, and applicable to the
units and individuals assigned.
In order to be useful, ROE must be able to be applied under high stress. They
should be directive in nature, and avoid excessively qualified language. They must be
tailored to both the mission and the unit for which they are written.
They must also be written keeping in mind that the personnel following them are
likely to encounter a wide range of different circumstances in the field. ROE must
anticipate those circumstances and provide clear guidance before the soldier, sailor,
airman or marine confronts a threat.
Slide 16
B.
Training is a critical step in the process of ensuring that military personnel will
follow the ROE.
[CLAMO ROE Handbook, 2-1 through 2-12]
Since the use of force is at the heart of the capabilities of any professional armed
force, training in ROE which control the use of force can make the difference between
mission success and mission failure.
Without adequate training, a soldier may fail to act in self-defense when
appropriate or may lack fire discipline due to a failure to apply the rules. Training
conditions soldiers (and sailors, airmen, and marines) to respond better and use force more
appropriately in actions across the entire spectrum of potential armed conflict.
1.
General ROE training should be part of the ongoing general training
program for operational units. Training in unit self-defense ROE as well
as on the significance of declaring a force "hostile", and the protection of
persons and property are key foundations upon which later missionspecific ROE can be based.
General ROE training should take place along with other the other general training
of operational units.
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Rules of Engagement: An Overview
2.
The U.S. Army has developed tactics, techniques, and procedures for ROE
for use in general training programs which help their soldiers react
appropriately in stressful situations without hesitation.
Training aids have been developed to form the basis of a standardized, on-going
ROE training program. While these are NOT ROE, they are useful training devices to
develop an understanding among personnel of ROE which they will later receive in
carrying out a specific mission.
Training in ROE must become part of command-sponsored training.
While the training aid examples I describe are obviously directly relevant only for
soldiers who speak English, it is the concept that would be useful for any professional
military.
a. R-A-M-P is used to train ROE principles:
(1)
R- Return Fire with Aimed Fire.
You always have the right to repel hostile acts with necessary force.
(2)
A- Anticipate Attack.
Use force first if, but only if, you see clear indications of hostile intent.
(3)
M- Measure the Amount of Force Used if Time and
Circumstances Permit.
Use only the amount of force necessary to protect lives and accomplish the mission.
(4)
P- Protect with Deadly Force Only Human Life and
Property Designated by the Commander.
Stop short of deadly force when protecting other property.
b.
V-E-W-P-R-I-K is used to train the concept of escalation of force
for such missions as peace operations involving minimum or
measured force and for self-defense. However, soldiers are not
required to attempt each step before using deadly force before
using the next. In some circumstances, the minimum force
necessary is deadly force.
(1)
V- Verbal Warning
(2)
E- Exhibit Weapon
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c.
(3)
W- Warning Shot
(4)
P- Pepper Spray
(5)
R- Rifle Butt stroke
(6)
I- Injure with Bayonet
(7)
K- Kill with Fire
As an alternative to V-E-W-P-R-I-K, some units use "the 5 S's":
(1)
Shout a warning to halt.
(2)
Show your weapon and demonstrate the intent to use it.
(3)
Shove as a non-lethal form of force only when it is possible
to do so.
(4)
Shoot by firing a warning shot after issuing a spoken
warning.
(5)
Shoot by firing to eliminate the threat. Continue firing so
long as the threat persists.
Both VEWPRIK and the 5 S's can be used to explain the M in RAMP.
The 5 S's should not be confused with the Army's training device for handling Pws:
Search, Silence, Segregate, Safeguard, and Speed to the rear!
d.
Hand S-A-L-U-T-E is used to teach indicators of hostile intent in
unit and individual self-defense.
(1)
Hand- What is in their hands?
(2)
Size- How many?
(3)
Activity- What are they doing?
(4)
Location- Within range?
(5)
Uniform- Are they in uniform?
(6)
Time- How soon before they are upon you?
(7)
Equipment- If armed, with what?
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Rules of Engagement: An Overview
In training Hand SALUTE, soldiers are warned that hostile intent is a subjective
determination, and this is not intended under all circumstances as a check list which must
be completed before acting in self-defense. There may not be enough time!
3.
ROE Scenario Briefings help military personnel understand how to apply
ROE in specific situations.
Briefings by military legal advisors, training officers, and non-commissioned
officers test to large and small groups help reinforce the knowledge of military personnel
concerning key ROE concepts such as unit self-defense and protection of persons and
property. The Army JAG Corps has developed scenarios for use by military legal advisors
in designing training at the unit level. [CLAMO ROE Handbook, Appendix E.]
4.
Situational Training Exercises involve soldiers going through "lanes" as a
squad or other small group to encounter a realistic scenario. Trainers play
the role of the enemy, civilians, and persons of uncertain status. Soldiers
are not briefed on what the role players will do, but are issued ROE for
their "mission" and expected to apply it.
[Pictures in Slide are from the JRTC.] The U.S. Army’s Joint Readiness Training
Center in Louisiana provides just this type of training for light infantry units headed for
Iraq. 18 “urban areas” have been created that represent Iraq, complete with mosques and
Arab street signs. They are populated by more than 1,200 costumed role players, including
200 Arab speakers, who play the roles of Baath Party loyalists, Islamic clerics, Shiite
protesters, armed tribesmen, Iraqi policemen and others. The players include hundreds of
Iraqi-Americans recruited from across the country.
Army brigades about to be sent to Iraq come to the Center for training. After being
briefed on their mission, and the ROE to be applied, they are equipped with laser
designators on their rifles. Both they and the actors they face wear laser harnesses to
record simulated gunfire “hits”. 1300 video cameras are set up throughout the training
areas to record exercises for later classroom analysis.
Brigade units are then sent into the mock Iraqi areas to test their understanding of
ROE. The units are also trained on tactics, techniques, and procedures designed to carry
out their mission while minimizing risk to themselves as well as innocent civilians. They
learn how to conduct house-to-house weapons searches while respecting cultural
sensitivities, engage in riot control, and operate a road block.
Actors playing the part of insurgents plant improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and
fire rifles and rocket-propelled grenades. Explosions are simulated with smoke generators,
pyrotechnics and other Hollywood-style special effects.
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Defense Institute of International Legal Studies
The personnel playing the role of Iraqis pose unexpected challenges to the training
units, including looting, demonstrations, funerals that turn violent, sniper attacks, and car
bomb explosions. A speeding pick-up truck also approaches the trucks bringing the units
to the village, and attempts to pass the convoy. Each of these situations tests the training
soldiers on their compliance with rules of engagement issued them for their patrol mission.
Hidden video cameras record patrolling troop reactions for later review, and all
participants wear laser-sensitive devices that beep when hit by low-energy lasers which
shoot from the rifles of patrolling soldiers instead of bullets.
[“Mock Village Helps Troops Learn Skills for Iraq Duty”, New York Times,
February 22, 2004; “What Garbage Workers and Make-Believe Iraqis Taught Our
Military”, Los Angeles Times, April 21, 2005]
US Army forces sent to Afghanistan in 2002 and 2003 [for Operation Enduring
Freedom] all received ROE "lane training" before they arrived in Afghanistan. This
turned out to be important, because once in-country, there was no opportunity for training
as forces were disbursed into small units. [Col David Hayden, "Targeting Issues in
Afghanistan", 2003 EUCOM Legal Conference, September, 2003]
Slide 17
VI. CONCLUSION
A.
ROE are a critical command and control tool which help to ensure that military
operations are conducted in accordance with the rule of law.
B.
ROE can be an effective method for ensuring civilian control of the military as
well as ensuring the military leadership that the force it uses to accomplish a
mission has the formal approval of the civilian national government in advance.
C.
ROE increase the probability for mission success as part of the overall military
planning process.
D.
As with other aspects of military planning, ROE are most often a complicated but
a vital part of the process a professional military conducts in planning and
carrying out operations.
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Rules of Engagement: An Overview
Bibliography
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Forces", 15 January 2000.
Duncan, James C. LtCol USMC, "The Commander's Role in Developing Rules of Engagement",
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Friedman, Norman, "The Vincennes Incident", Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review 1989,
72 - 80.
Grunawalt, Richard J., "The JCS Standing Rules of Engagement: A Judge Advocate's Primer",
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