The European Union / The New Europe
R. James Ferguson © 2004
Week 7:
The French Perspective on European and Global Affairs
Topics: 1. France’s Contemporary Challenges: No Longer the Exception?
2. France: A Great Nineteenth Century Power
3. The Shaping of French Policy
4. Maintaining Independence: The Costs of Prestige
5. France as an Independent but Global Power
6. France and Assertive Diplomacy: Europe and Beyond
7. Bibliography and Further Reading
1. France’s Contemporary Challenges: No Longer the Exception?
France has often been viewed as a ‘special nation’, positioning itself in an exception
in relation to patterns of Europeanisation, globalisation, and U.S. style market neoliberalism (see Sadran 2003). This was expressed by Lionel Jospin’s view: ‘Yes to a
free market economy, no to a free market society’ (in Sadran 2003, p57), a policy that
may be hard to sustain. Influenced by a strong Republican tradition and a sense of
itself as a ‘great power’ within the international system, France through the late 20th
century also sought to retain strong features of a centralised state, unified culture
and strong welfare system that would provide the basis for social cohesion within a
very diverse and vigorous political life (Hayward 2003). By the 21st century many of
these assumptions have come to be challenged, even while some of these policies
live on in government policy and popular imagery. Thus, through the new millennium,
the government sought to portray the country as ‘a socially diverse yet solidaristic
France, aware of its special national identity in an era of globalization’ (Milner &
Parsons 2003, p1). As a result, several key tensions have emerged over how France
should position its domestic policies within the wider pattern of an integrating
Europe and a progressively more intrusive pattern of globalisation: 1) In the past, France sought to enhance its ‘room to manoeuvre’ through a
strongly independent, globally oriented foreign policy and assertions of
sovereignty in a ‘Europe of the nations’, but this has now been partially limited in the
strengthening of European level institutions, and particular the hope to
develop a strong Common Foreign and Security Policy (Hayward 2003, p38).
From the early 1950s, then again from the 1970s, and again from 1996-2004 (Milner
& Parsons 2003, p5), France has accepted the reality of European integration as a
way of maintaining its standard of living and its relative power globally. It some areas
EU membership may enhance government policy making (Sadran 2003, p51), but
only if strong influence is maintained on the future direction of Europe. Even as
France makes strong policy statements in some areas, e.g. resistance to U.S. directed
engagement in Iraq, this means it still has the problem of how Europe can speak with
1
one voice on these issues. Likewise, France over the last decade has moved to closer
military integration with NATO and the European Defence Initiative, leading
to a strong engagement in peacekeeping in the Balkans and Kosovo in particular, as
well as a keen desire to see the European Rapid Reaction Force more deeply engaged
in wider peacekeeping roles.
2) In the past, France relied on the ‘Franco-German’ engine to push ahead the
European agenda, thereby limiting the relative power and dominance of Germany. In
an expanding EU of 25, this is no longer possible. At least for the time being, there
has been some effort at trilateral cooperation via the regular meetings with the UK,
and Germany (Strategic Comments 2004; see lectures 5 and 7).
3) Through 2001-2004, this factors have meant that France has been one of the key
counter-balances to U.S. global and regional dominance, and has tended to pull
Atlanticist concerns towards a stronger European focus, leading to tension with the
Bush and Blair administrations. Although this tension reduced through 2003-2004,
France remains reluctant to see NATO more directly engaged in Iraq, in contrast to
support for extended stabilisation forces going in Afghanistan (rising from
approximately six to then thousand through the 2004).
4) In the post-WWII period down through the 1970s the French government at first
played a strong economic strategic role (via 5-year ‘indicative plans” in building,
owning and maintaining reconstructed industries, areas of high technology, energy
production, and military technology (Milner & Parsons 2003, p6; see further below).
Privatisation, proceeding again through 1997-2002 period (leading to mass public
sector strikes through 2002), has greatly reduced these roles, with the state now
viewed as having a very limited regulative role, bringing it into line with wider
European trends. The current trend has been circumscribed and regulatory, but not
‘minimalist’ as in the UK’s New Labour approach (Milner & Parsons 2003, p8).
Likewise, through 2003, France has made some moderate moves in the direction
of greater decentralisation, giving departments and regions (e.g. recognition of
some legislative powers for Corsica, but not a formal definition as a ‘Corsican people’
as a political identity) greater economic and planning policy in a range of areas
(Sadran 2003, p55). From 2001, France has also sought to balance the number of
men and women candidates, a trend that has only begun to bite in municipal
elections (Milner & Parsons 2003, pp8-9).
5) France developed a strong welfare and superannuation system, in part to chart a
moderate socialist path, and it part because of the strong role accorded the state in
areas such as education, health, and welfare. Although elements of this have
been retained, in part through deficit spending, this remains a serious challenge for
government policy. Key areas of policy such as the 35 hour working week, with
some partial exemptions for very small businesses made in 2002 (Ewing 2004), have
been made on the basis of productivity and flexibility agreements, leading to some
greater intensity of work, and to only a moderate impact on unemployment (see
Escalle 2003). The aim was to improve the quality of life and reduce unemployment,
first applying the law to companies with more than 20 employees, then smaller
operations (Escalle 2003, pp143-144). Impact on unemployment was limited, with
152,000 new jobs created through 2000, a little reduction among a hard core of youth
unemployment (Escalle 2003, pp146-147). The ability to enshrine a new basis for
social participation based on this leisure has also been limited (Escalle 2003, p147).
Likewise, the aging population and demographic of France has made the
maintenance of pension and early retirement schemes problematic (Hayward 2003,
p39). In general, these issues seem a ‘time-bomb’ for the future of social security in
France as a whole (Hayward 2003, p40).
2
6) In related areas, there has been an effort by France to retain and use its unique
culture as a focus for national integration and for international prestige. This
has focused on the promotion of French, protecting the ‘purity’ of the language, and
supporting the idea of a francophone global community. Likewise, French film,
television, news shows, and media have been viewed as representing a balance to
‘Americanisation’ and to a loss of national identity. On this basis, too, tensions have
emerged in the WTO over whether some exceptions need to be made for cultural
products that a not just commodities, with efforts to have some of these trends to
be supported by UNESCO (United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural
Organization) and agreements on cultural diversity (the UNESCO Convention on
Cultural Diversity) to support national TV and movie industries, a move resisted by
the U.S. (which has recently returned to UNESCO membership) in ongoing
negotiations through 2003-2005 (see further Edwards 2003; Bennett & Pryor 2003).
Here, some layering of French and European levels may become importantly,
especially among younger generations, though problematic among conservative
groups (Hanley 2003, p30).
7) Within France, one key political group have been farming lobbies that have via
protest and political activity been able until recently to retain strong leverage on
French and some degree EU level agricultural policies, including the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP), which has sought to first strengthen, and then regulate and
rationalise European agricultural production. These policies have since been
modified with greater agricultural subsidies being directed to new EU member states,
especially in Eastern Europe. Likewise, patterns of indirect protectionism have been
made against both France, the EU and US, complicating recent WTO rounds on
agriculture through 2001-2003 (see Schott 2003; for recent U.S. bans on French beef
products, see Hagstrom 2004). There have been hopes that these tensions might be
moderated at the 2004 G-8 (Group of Eight meeting), so that later WTO meetings
might come to stronger dialogue on agriculture in pursuit of the objects of the Doha
Round through January 2005 (Finance CustomWire 2004), and also allow a great
space for the openning export of food products from developing countries.
8) Within France, the issue of the meaning of being a French citizen and its
cultural content has become debated, especially as France moves to a reality of
being multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and in a de facto sense, multi-cultural. In this
setting, recent election trends do suggest some alienation and disenchantment
with the current political system. (Milnes & Parsons 2003, p14).
9) Following on from this, has been the debate of the role of immigrants, guest
workers, and particular migrations flows form Algeria and north Africa. This
groups have not easily assimilated in the image of French mainstream culture, a trend
which has been exaggerated by recent security concerns. At the broader level, this has
raised the issue of which French national and republican policy can really deal with
the diversity of multiculturalism of modern Europe. In this setting, for example,
Islam emerges as the second largest religion in France, and when compared with the
8-9% of highly active Catholics, this has worried conservative commentators (Hanley
203, p28). At the broader level, it can also be asked in the post-2001 whether France
and Europe as a whole is really willing and able to protect the rights of its
Muslim Minorities, in spite of the legal requirement to do so. The issue of the
division between Church and State, a core tenant of French republican tradition
(see further below), has also be re-iterated through February 2004 with the National
Assembly banning all religious symbols in state schools, including headscarves,
turbans, skullcaps, and large crosses (Milner & Parsons 2003, p12).
3
10) Part of the landscape is the continued voice of the extreme right, including the
Front National, to claim the dangers of immigration, a desire to return to a traditional
view of a more nationalist and uni-cultural France. Even if elections through 2002
suggest more a partial collapse of the appeal of socialist candidates rather than the
true popularity the far right, it shows that there is also a pool of discontent and
protest concerning current government strategies (Milner & Parsons 2003, p1),
perhaps also reflected in the municipal elections in March 2004 in which Chirac’s
UMP (= Union for the Presidential Majority) party performed poorly. Continued
poor electoral performance in June 2004 European level elections has put increased
pressure on the public performance of PM Jean-Pierre Raffarin.
11) These factors have also meant that France is one of the key supporters of the
Euro-Mediterranean dialogue process, alongside Spain and Italy. On this basis, it
seeks positive dialogue and development with all North African and Mediterranean
countries, thereby reducing the push factor in illegal migration, as well as hoping for
sustained stabilisation in Morocco, Algeria, and Libya. This is part of the wider
Mediterranean Regional Program of the European Union (EU), with targeted
development funds going into the region (see further below).
Officially, France presents itself as a global leader based on ‘diversity, solidarity,
urbanity and universalism’ – underneath this, however, France has been ‘remade’
in several ways over the last decade (Milner & Parsons 2003, p2). Likewise,
European integration and expansion remains controversial for France in that it
reduces the areas of state and national intervention (‘economic, social and defence
policy’), and remains based on benefits (economic, political and social) from access to
the expanding EU (Milner & Parsons 2003, p10). We might ask whether the France is
the ‘leopard’ of Europe (staying the same while changing its spots), or whether a
fundamental transition has occurred underneath apparently consistent national policy
(see Milner & Parsons 2003, pp10-11; Sadran 2003, p56). This ‘balancing act’ can be
seen a statement of Lionel Jospin in 1999: Generally speaking, I believe that France needs to assert itself more on the
international scene. Not because of its power, or the lessons that it could give, but
because it sees a certain number of international realities in a different light. Although
a friend of the United States, it does not systemically share the views of that great
nation. Furthermore, France expresses itself as a deeply European culture, enabling it
to reconcile national interest and European ambition . . . . The world needs a France
that is not like everyone else, that does not follow one unique way of thinking in the
international community. (in Sadran, p57)
2. France: A Great Nineteenth Century Power
France is a unique country which has tried to retain a Great Power tradition but
at the same time push forward a cohesive vision of cooperative Europe. In one
session it will not be possible to do justice to the enormous impact and influence of
France on European history from the Middle Age down through the 19th century.
Suffice it to say that France gradually emerged as a great power in European affairs,
eventually uniting its individual provinces again Norman and British claims, with the
state playing a major role in forging a sense of the French nation (Milner & Parsons
2003, p3). France emerged in the 17th and 18th centuries as one of the great powers in
Europe, and a major counterbalance against the Habsburg (sometimes also written as
4
Hapsburg) dynasty in Austria. The glories of French culture seemed pre-eminent in
the time of Louis XIV and the 'glorious' reign of this 'Sun King' showed that France
was a great power on the world stage. It was in France, however, that the pressures of
the Old Regime, and particularly its extractive and greedy aristocracy, forced a
revolution which swept aside the rights of the nobility and eventually the king, and
ushered in the Age of Revolution, and the themes of citizen rights and Republicanism.
Prior to this democratic demands had only partially emerged in the intellectual
thought of intellectuals such as Rousseau, Locke and Paine, and in partially
democratic systems in small states such as Florence, Venice and in parts of
Switzerland. Yet this legacy of democracy and 'Rights of Man' did not leave an
unmixed tradition - the Terror, in which Republican rights turned into license and
state terror were also a legacy of this period (some 35,000-40,000 died as a 'security
threat' to the revolution, Moore 1969 p103).
This Republican tradition remained a feature of French history and politics down to
the 21st century, with as oscillation between 'Republics' and more autocratic forms of
rule under restored kings or emperors (e.g. the restored Bourbons from 1815-1830).
Some implications of this republican commitment have been spelled out by Michel
Wieviorka: This was manifest most clearly in education and the welfare state. The republican
ethos was defined by universalism that extolled egalitarian values. Public schooling free and mandatory - was intended to create the citizens of the future by offering, in
principle, the same chances to each child, regardless of social origin. And the welfare
state was supposed to compensate for the most severe social inequities by helping
the unemployed, ensuring public health and medical progress, and extending access
to such programmes. (Wieviorka 1994, pp248-9).
However, a rise in French power in the heart of Europe was also the indirect outcome
of this tradition. Napoleon was able to take command of huge 'citizen' armies
(Haswell 1973), and his effort to unite Europe during the early 19th century in a new
order resulted in one of the most destructive cycles of wars Europe had ever seen,
creating the system of states we see on the map today. Though France could challenge
the other Great Powers such as England, Austria and Russia, she was unable to beat
them in coalition. It was France, too, who would suffer from a unified German
power, which would invade her in 1870-71 (taking the region of Alsace and
Lorraine), and then involving her in the enormously destructive Great War (19141918). Even though France, Britain and the United States won this war, the cost to
France was enormous. Millions of men died, the industry and agriculture of large
sections of the north were destroyed, and France was for the first time forced to accept
that if Germany was allowed to grow powerful, then an unaided France would be
unable to contain her. Furthermore, France was deeply splintered within, with large
communist, socialist and right-wing parties, whose politics could lead to strikes and
street violence, e.g. in one case in 1934 extreme right-wing organisations clashed with
police in Paris, leading to some 15-20 killed and 1000-2000 injured (Price 1993,
pp236-7). These trends were only partly stopped by the creation of a Popular Front
government of all political parties committed to maintaining the democratic republic
of France, which took office in June 1936, lead by Léon Blum (Price 1993, pp238242).
5
These realities explain some rather unusual emphasis in French foreign policy from
the 1920s onward. While Britain was beginning to reconsider her role as coloniser and
leader of empire, France turned outward to seek an active role in creating and
maintaining a world empire including territories in Asia (Indo-china), Africa
(Algeria, Côte d'Ivoire), the Indian Ocean, the Pacific (Noumea, French Polynesia), as
well as French interests in Lebanon and Syria, and in parts Latin America (French
Guiana, Guadeloupe, and Martinique in the Caribbean). These regions were partly
held for their resources, benefits in trade, and for the advantage of French elites who
found richer and more exciting lives in these regions (for the modern legacy of this
imperial impulse, see Johnson 1995). Yet the French army and navy, though
concerned about insufficient forces to protect the heart of France, was also actively
engaged in expanding and protecting these imperial domains. The strategic reason
behind this was straightforward. Within Europe, France by herself could not be certain
of remaining stronger than Germany (in spite of the severe clauses of the Versailles
Treaty which held Germany responsible for World War I, forced her to yield
reparations, and in spite of occupation forces temporarily controlling the Ruhr Valley).
Therefore the aim was to great a Greater France (la plus grande France), which by
using the resources of empire, could result in a 100 million strong population who
would come to metropolitan France's defence in the advent of a new war (Kupchan
1994, p246, pp255-7, pp285-6). On this basis, the impact of World War I was to
rekindle 'the imperial impulse among the French elite' (Kupchan 1994, p213).
This idea was not illogical, but it did turn out to have numerous problems. Firstly, it
placed a heavy military burden on a France itself recovering from World War I.
Secondly, it would involve France in resisting national struggles around the world,
and fighting in wars of independence she would be unable to sustain after World War
II. It would also place French foreign policy somewhat out of step with the emerging
view of Britain and the United States that the age of imperial colonies was over and
new states should be allowed to slowly emerge in Asia and Africa.
6
Modern France (Map Courtesy PCL Map Library)
3. The Shaping of French Policy
After World War I most French people did not want another war and many were not
keen to too actively resist the expansion of German claims during the 1930s. This
resulted in a rather defensive policy in the 1930s. Although France had set up
alliances with Eastern European states such as Czechoslovakia and Poland, she largely
relied on a joint British/French policy to restrain German expansionism under Hitler.
Furthermore, France had built a huge fortification in depth, the Marginot line, with
automated guns and underground railways, to resist any future German aggression.
This line had not been extended to cover the Belgium border, even after this country
had decided to become neutral in 1936 (Price 1993, p247). It was only in 1938-1940
that the French began to consider defending this region in depth, hoping that her
forces there would be sufficient to block any German advance. Likewise, the
Ardennes region was viewed as too wooded and rough for large scale forces to move
through was not fully protected. In general, France was developing an army heavy in
defensive weaponry (antitank and anti-aircraft guns), but one that was 'extremely
limited in terms of both mobility and offensive capability' (Kupchan 1994, p220).
The German blitzkrieg (mobile armoured warfare) when it came was exactly through
the lightly defended region of the Ardennes, pushing through French lines with
astonishing speed. In 1940, after only a few weeks of determined but outmoded
fighting, the French army was forced to surrender (for vivid accounts of this
campaign, see Rommel 1984; Hart 1970). The Germans took 1,850,000 prisoners,
7
92,000 French troops had died (indicating intense fighting), and more than 6-7 million
refugees flooded roads to travel southward (Price 1993, p248). Paris was taken by
German forces, with German troops marching through the streets of Paris in victory, a
vision never to be forgotten by French leaders. An armistice was set up, with the north
of France being directly governed by the Germans, and the south being controlled by a
largely puppet government at Vichy, lead by the conservative Marshal Pétain, who
seemed to have hoped to avoid the excesses of German control, to maintain public
order, and probably avoid any take-over by communists and socialist elements. His
authoritarian motto of 'Work, Family, Homeland', was to replace the Republican
theme of liberty, fraternity and egality (Price 1993, p253). The defeat of the French
army, the armistice, the Vichy collaboration, the occupation of France, and the later
liberation by allied and resistance forces, were all to leave profound marks on
French politics, French strategic doctrine, and on the way France approached
European affairs. Thenceforward, French leaders vowed that France would never be
invaded again - she had to make herself inviolable.
The first effect was a sense of great vulnerability (Kupchan 1994, p296). Within
Europe, France had been defeated twice in less than a hundred years, and its one
victory in World War I had been an incredibly expensive one. The case of World War
II not only gave the free French forces and their leaders (General de Gaulle) great
prestige, but also largely tipped French politics towards nationalist, socialist and
'Radical' parties and away from the conservative groups (Price 1993, pp306-7).
Indeed, many socialists were almost 'unthinking nationalists' after their experiences in
the French Resistance during World War II (Kupchan 1994, p293). Hence, between
December 1945 and May 1946 major segments of economic and industrial
infrastructure in France were nationalised, including most banking and insurance
companies, gas, electricity, coal-mines, as well as major firms like Renault (partly
because some of the previous directors had been involved in collaborating with the
German or Vichy governments, Price 1993, p276). Furthermore, French politics at this
stage firmly believed in interventionist economics (government regulation of the
economy), and relied on elements of a welfare state to ensure that France did not veer
towards communism. Under the 1946 Constitution, social security was recognised as a
right, and protection was given 'against sickness, old age and accidents at work' and
women were given the vote (Price 1993, p290, p302). Fear of social revolution
remained a strong force in French politics, and in this context even moderate socialist
parties would take strong actions against strikers and demonstrations, e.g. the 60,000
riot police mobilized against striking miners in 1947 (Price 1993, pp308-9). These
policies in basic outline lasted down till the 1980s (Price 1993, p277).
The experience of war, defeat and occupation also left the French examining their role
in the war. Acts of both collaboration and bravery could be found, but a great
uncertainty about the unity of French social life, and about a 'betrayal' of the
Republic remained. These splits in the perception of France and what its should mean
and do as a nation, remain one of the driving forces of French policy down till today.
France was left with a sense not just of military weakness, but of a nagging moral
weakness (Kupchan 1994, p286). It is not surprising that since the end of the war a
number of politicians and military leaders have returned to images of French
greatness and grandeur as the basis of a new vision for a unified France. Indeed, the
8
nationalism card has been played in direct ways by current leaders such as President
Chirac (see below).
Likewise, the policy of maintaining a foreign empire would soon run into great
difficulties. At the end of the war against Japan in the Pacific, French forces marched
back into Indo-China (Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos) in order to reassert French
control. Both U.S. and British sources tried to suggest that the time for overseas
empire was now over, but France saw Indo-china as an integral part of their security as
a great power in the world stage. From this point of view, to lose one part was to lose
all parts, and to be perceived as the 'sick man' nation of the 20th century (a view
expressed by General de Lattre in 1951, in Kupchan 1994, p288). As a result, France
reinforced its troops in the region, fighting against the dogged Viet Minh forces led by
Ho Chi Minh, who received supplies from China, and waged a skilful People's War
largely based on the nationalist tendencies of the Vietnamese people. Soon France was
losing more officers than could be graduated from her military academies, and even
sent letters to retired officers around the world (even those who had emigrated to other
countries), asking them if they would return to active service. Even with the aid of
considerable supplies of U.S. material (the French did not want too much of a U.S.
presence, Kupchan 1994, p280), the French could not avoid being worn down and
then taken to the conventional stage of people's war. They were defeated in the major
battle Dien Bien Phu in 1954. In total, some 92,000 servicemen were lost, and
Vietnam was partitioned along the 17th parallel, with the French expeditionary force
withdrawing from the country (Price 1993, p311).
But this was only one problem area in the empire. The second major problem emerged
in Algeria, which was viewed as even more central to France's interests. Large
numbers of French citizens had settled in Algeria, and a cosmopolitan culture had
emerged in Algeria's cities. From 1954 serious strife began in Algeria, with these
issues spilling over into French politics. Yet by 1962 the French were engaged in a
desperate war of liberation against forces who also used guerilla tactics and were
supported by secret urban networks. Many French intellectuals, and segments of the
socialist parties, were opposed to the war, which had led to atrocities on both sides.
On the other hand, leaders as diverse as Mitterand and the ex-paratrooper Le Pen
insisted that Algeria should remain part of France (Price 1993, pp312-3). Altogether,
some 400,000 troops were committed, but were still unable to control the
independence fighters (Pierre & Quandt 1995, p139). Yet when the French
government decided to withdraw from Algeria, this caused such discontent that the
home government almost suffered from a coup d'etat by disgruntled French military
commanders. It was precisely in this context that General de Gaulle stepped forward
in May 1958 to restore stability and to avoid severe fighting between different factions
within France. He convened the National Assembly, was granted energy powers for 6
months, and prepared a new constitution which was put to a referendum on 28
September, bringing the Fourth Republic to an end (Price 1993, pp317-8). De Gaulle
pulled France out of Algeria, a move that was so unpopular with the extremist Algérie
française party that the President was almost assassinated in 1962. The strong
presidential form of government that France has today is still largely a de Gaulle
legacy. Defence and foreign affairs policies, in particular, are often shaped by this
office under strong Presidents (Price 1993, pp322-3), for better or worse.
9
France also found itself, after World War II, like most Western European states,
largely reliant on the Marshall Plan and the aid provided from the U.S. to rebuild
their economies. France received some $2.6 billion in aid, of which $2.2 billion was
non-repayable (Price 1993, p305). This relative dependence was also expressed
through free access to France of American-made goods, open propagation of
American views and ideas (for this see Ellwood 1998), and via the reluctant
acceptance of the creation of an independence, centralised administration in West
Germany (Price 1993, p305). When NATO was first being established (1949-1955),
this could only lead, eventually, to the rearmament of West Germany and then its de
facto recognition as an independent state within this alliance, a trend which worried
France but seemed inevitable (Price 1955, p306; Kupchan 1994, pp268-9). President
de Gaulle favoured not so much an integrated Europe, but a looser and more nationto-nation approach, i.e. Europe of the Nations (Price 1993, pp325-6).
From the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade down to 1957 (the Treaty of
Rome which helped initiate the EEC), France realised it had to link itself into the
European and then the world economy. France would find the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) of 1962 much harder to bear, and negotiated very good
terms for its vocal and comparatively numerous farming lobby (Price 1993, pp279280). In 1973, 60% of farms still had less than 20 hectares, though very small peasant
farms of the traditional type soon almost disappeared (Price 1993, p298). CAP had a
major institutional role in regulating prices and managing farm production during its
first phases: The CAP was from the outset a central institution in European integration, as
evidenced by the massive amount of resources committed to this domain. Agriculture
expenditure amounted to more than 90 per cent of the total EC budget in 1970 and
still more than 70 per cent in l985. (39) Within agriculture expenditure, productionrelated measures received the lion's share to the detriment of structural measures.
From 1970 to 1987, market policy represented on average 97.25 per cent of EU
agriculture budget; the remaining 2.75 per cent was allocated to structural measures.
Commodity regimes, formally known as Common Market Organisations (CMOs),
represented the building blocks of market policy. These CMOs provided for a 'set of
coherent and structured mechanisms, whose objective is to regulate a group of
agricultural products and the products resulting from the first transformation'. (40)
Intervention agencies were set up for each commodity regime to buy, store and, when
necessary, destroy products whenever market prices reached a floor level determined
in relation to the intervention price'. To complement this system, policy makers
created import levies and export refunds to insulate EU farmers from world market
fluctuations. Price support gave farmers incentives to produce ever more, regardless
of the environmental, market and budgetary consequences. In spite of the broad
imbalances thus created, the regime remained intact during this period. This outcome
reflected the political compromises of the 1960s, notably the decision to support farm
income by guaranteeing agricultural prices rather than by creating deficiency
payments, and it upheld the view of farmers as producers of goods for the food
industry. (Roederer-Rynning 2002)
This French farming lobby remains very active today, and through the 1990s
repeatedly organised effective strikes and demonstrations in order to make its point of
view known to Paris, Brussels and Washington (for this 'agricultural corporatism', see
Meunier 2000). Concern over this group have also helped ensure that the European
Union's agricultural policies remain firm, and somewhat limited to world access, a
point which has brought them into conflict with the United States, and to a lesser
10
extent with countries such as Australia. As new countries join the European Union,
the funding from the CAP has been partly diverted into agricultural reform in
prospective new members in Eastern Europe, once again raising concern among
smaller farmers in France and other parts of Western Europe (see further RoedererRynning 2002). Thus up to 300,000 farmers in Poland, for example, could apply for
direct funding, with total payments of up to 6 billion zlotys (Financial Times 2004).
This means that the issue of the EU budget may need serious debate and reform
through 2004-2006 (Economist 2001). By June 2002, the Netherlands and Germany
had called for a serious review of the agricultural subsidy system of the EU before
expansion to include new member begins, an issue that also has serious implications
for France, with some diversions of funds into new members in East Europe (Vinocur
2002). These policies have now been fitted into a wider agenda on sustainable
farming, environmental protection (in the past the CAP was criticized for overuse of
inputs and pesticides), and rebuilding some smaller, damaged farming communities.
This would be an even more serious issue if Turkey become a full member of the
European Union in future, or if ever Ukraine might successfully apply for members
(both are strong agricultural producers).
The Fourth Republic, born at the end of World War II, could not find a stable centre.
Its parliamentary-based system of the Fourth Republic (with a two house system, with
the uppers house and the President with weak powers) was replaced under the
leadership of Charles de Gaulle, whose popularity helped establish a presidential
system of government in which the President had great powers. These included an
independent electoral mandate, a long term of office (reduced from seven to five year
after a referendum in 2000), the right to place referenda before the republic and the
right to select a Prime Minister to form the government, though the government
remained responsible to the National Assembly, which could remove it by a vote of no
confidence (Price 1993, p303, p319). De Gaulle also attempted to establish a strong
independent line for France's foreign affairs, including withdrawing from integration
in the NATO command system, which he felt had been too dominated by American
influences, in 1966 (Adréani 1998, p25), and the creation of an independent nuclear
deterrent designed to make France inviolable. This 'nationalist' aspect was largely a
reaction against the sense of vulnerability experienced during World War II. However,
there were other key aspects of this policy. These included the maintenance of
France's strong role in Europe, an independent voice within the Europe-Atlantic
system, and some leverage within the emerging global system of trade and diplomacy.
4. Maintaining Independence: The Costs of Prestige
In the post-war period, several aspects of government policy tried to ensure that
France remained a diversified economy with a strong technological base and the
prestige of a great nation. One of the main areas was in the military sector, where
France maintained a range of industries, including the production of advanced aircraft
and nuclear weapons (see below). These were supplemented by efforts in heavy
industry, automobile production, telecommunications, and strong engagement in the
aeronautic and space industries.
There were several key areas where France tried to ensure that it could keep up with
new developments, either alone, or as part of joint European Union ventures. These
11
included the development of commercial aircraft, beginning with the Caravelle
airliner (1950s), and then going on to the Concorde (the first and only commercially
used supersonic airliner), and then the Airbus consortium (Price 1993, p281) which
remains one of the most successful jet airliners today and a major competitor for U.S.
firms such as Boeing. Other areas include scientific and commercial aerospace
ventures such as the Ariane rockets, some of which proved to reliable and costeffective satellite launchers, with such launchers contributing to the International
Space Station refuelling program (see Boniface 2000). Over the last several years
France has made a major contribution to the European space program, as well as new
satellites and satellite imagery analysis systems. As of 2002-2003, France’s major
trading partners include Germany, the UK, Spain, Italy, Belgium and the US, with
trade quite strongly focused with EU partners (see DFAT 2003). In part due to
sluggishness in the world economy, GDP growth was only 0.2% in 2003, with
estimates of low inflation at 1.4% but relatively high unemployment, in developed
country terms, of 9.2-9.4%, a trend continued in 2004 even as growth heads towards
1.8% of GDP (DFAT 2003; DFAT 2004).
Another area of particular concern to France had been its energy supply industry,
which was largely reliant on imported oil. As of 1973, 74.5% of energy
requirements relied on imported oil (Price 1993, p284), leaving the country vulnerable
to the oil crises of 1973 and 1979. More efficient energy usage, and the strong
development of nuclear power stations (which in 1987 provided 70% of domestic
electricity), helped alleviate this problem (Price 1993, p284). It also meant that France
developed an advanced nuclear power production industry, in spite of the
controversial nature of this system. Likewise, France has developed controversial
methods of nuclear waste disposal that have been challenged both within Europe and
by other countries.
Serious troubles in the French economy were slowly overcome. After slow growth
in the 1990-1996 period, GDP growth was 2.3% in 1997 and almost 3% in 1999
(Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry 2000). By this time the economic system
had reached close convergence with that of Germany, allowing it to fit into the
European monetary system and soon the European Monetary Union (Price 1993,
p287). However, during the period 1990-1995 unemployment remained high (9.312.3%), with a rise to 12.8% in 1997, and in general France has not been able to retain
a leading place in areas such as computers, information technology, or even machine
tools (Price 1993, p287; Pierre & Quandt 1995, p140). There is also a need for
continued investment in infrastructure and education. Nonetheless, France's economy
is one of the largest in Europe after Germany's, and remains one of the strongest
on the world scene (Price 1993, p288). Through 1999-2000, France had the fourth
largest economy in the world, and was the fourth largest exporter, with a GDP of
US$1,261 billion (Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry 2000). The French
economy experienced a period of strong relative growth at the very end of the 1990s,
with some rebalancing of relative economic power in relation to Germany. It has also
allowed her to continue supporting a range of strong labour, educational and
welfare provisions that are at times criticised from the neo-liberal capitalist point of
view. This has led to ongoing tensions both with the U.S. (see for example Menéndez
Weidman 2001; Frank 1998), and with provisions for competitive agreements run
12
through the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the OECD
(Wallach 1998).
France also has an interesting relationship with other nations within the European
Union. Certain traditional tensions have remained between France and Britain
(who were in many ways imperial competitors down till accords for separate zones of
influence established in 1904 and 1912, Kupchan 1994, p210). President de Gaulle
had at first in 1963 vetoed British entry into the European Community, though this
was largely on the basis of too strong an alignment of British and U.S. interests (Price
1993, p326). Moreover, after initial caution, the EC process has largely been driven by
reconciliation between France and Germany, at first relying the shared interests
and nations needs as viewed by President de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenaeuer from
1962 onwards (Adréani 1998, p22; Price 1993, p326). In large measure, similar
relations between Germany and France have continued through the 1990s, with a
surprising measure of concord between the French leadership and former Chancellor
Kohl through the 1990s. On this basis, the Franco-German understanding is seen as
the basis of deepening integration in the European system over the last four decades
(see Guyomarch et al. 1998). Relations improved in general terms between France and
the UK under the early Blair government, but underwent increasing tensions through
2002-2003 over how the war on terror should be conducted, and the degree of UK
alignment with US policy in relation to Iraq and the UN Security Council, with only
some reduction of these tensions through 2004, even though there have been efforts to
rebuild cooperation with the UK.
Aside from past unemployment, other stresses have been placed on French society.
These include a large number of immigrants, and resident foreigners, largely
coming in from former French colonies, especially Africa. Resident foreigners were
1.7 million in 1954, and rose to 4.1 million in 1975 (Price 1993, p288). In a strong
economy, such immigration can be sustained. This is much harder when
unemployment is high, when tensions existed over politics within Algeria, and when
many of these groups are Islamic, a religion which was not always understood in
France (Pierre & Quandt 1995, p140) and is sometimes stereotyped as associated with
'fundamentalist' violence. We can sense the complications for France when we note
that Islam is now France's second largest active religion, with over 4 million Muslims
in the country (see Caldwell 2000). Likewise, this can lead to real clashes in values. In
1989 the 'Islamic Scarf' case was concerned with the refusal of a junior high-school
principal to allow three Islamic girls to wear scarves in school, basically on the basis
of secularism in schools and egality in education, a debate that continued through the
1990s down to 2004 (Milner & Parsons 2003, p12; Wieviorka 1994, p250).
This ban was also part of the 'upholding of the highly valued laicité, or separation of
church and state' (Pierre & Quandt 1995, p140), which has an important place in
modern French history. Research has suggested that in fact the Muslim minority can
adapt well in France so long as they have jobs in the mainstream community, but it is
exactly this which is often lacking. Ironically, this climate of mistrust can create the
very thing it fears. This minority 'fears being scapegoated and confined in a ghetto of
suspicion and xenophobia, which fuels fundamentalist currents that today are only
marginal' (Moïsi 1995, p11). For instance, by the mid-1990s there were some 800,000
Algerians in France (less than two thirds with documentation), and many lacked
13
employment or had only low paying jobs, helping account for the showing in opinion
polls that the 16-24 year-old group were showing increased signs of 'Muslim selfidentification' (Pierre & Quandt 1995, p140). In the worst case scenario such
tensions might make militant Muslim identities more attractive, and at the least
undermines affiliation to French republican values, may generate anti-social behaviour
and patterns of negative discrimination (Milner & Parsons 2003, p13). Instead,
France in particular and Europe in general may need to rethink a more positive
vision of the role of Muslims within their communities, allowing these groups to
make a more positive contribution to the new European scene (see Ramadan 1998).
There have been some positive changes in French government policy showing
greater sensitivity to Islamic communities through 2000-2004. However, these trends
were thrown into tension after September 2001, with a continuation of strong antiterrorist laws and enhanced policing measures through the reinforced 'Vigipirate Plan'
(Xinhua 2002). At the same time, President Chirac that emphasised that military
means alone are not sufficient to cope with the problem of terrorism, and rejected the
very term 'war' on terror.
Certain extreme minority political parties, usually from the far right, are also willing
to use such facts to capitalise on xenophobic nationalism or outright racism, e.g. Jean
Le Pen's (and the National Front party’s) approach relied on French solidarity and
nationalism in the face of some 'other'. Jean Le Pen has called for the expulsion of
some 3 million immigrants (Pierre & Quandt 1995, p141) and his rhetoric may have
forced mainstream governments to take a somewhat more nationalistic stance than
would have otherwise been the case. In this context, it should be noted that a widening
gap seemed to emerge between the rich and middle class on the one hand, and a
deskilled group whose position in French society seemed to be getting worse during
the 1980s - up to 29% of families at that time were classified as relatively poor (Price
1993, p348). This is one of the grounds on which intolerance has been bred, along
with stereotyping and race prejudice.
Recent debates on immigration policy, ironically, have also given some of these
extreme groups an opportunity to publicise their views (de Brie 1997). The recent
strength of the French economy (1998-2001) has not yet solved this problem. This
was seen in the 2002 French presidential elections, where in a surprise play-off
Jean Le Pen emerged as the second runner against President Chirac. Socialist
candidate Lionel Jospin, favoured beforehand as a strong runner, 'obtained only 16.18
per cent of the vote, with a loss of 2.5 million votes over seven years' (Miguet 2002).
Although in the second round President Chirac won a crushing victory (82% voted for
him), these events did suggest that a pool of discontent and division exists within the
socialist left from which the right can draw electoral advantage (Moulson 2002) on
particular issues (this was only a partial 'swing to the right' in European affairs).
Likewise, pools of xenophobia and narrow nationalism can be mobilised by popularist
leaders (see De Angelis 2003).
Table 1: THE FRENCH PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 1997 & 2002 ( Miguet
2002)
2002
1997
14
Seats
PCF
PS
PRG
Other Left
Les Verts
UDF
UMP
DL
Other Right
Other
FN
21
140
7
6
3
29
355
2
12
2
0
Seats
38
240
12
21
7
64
135 (RPR only)
44
14
1
1
Total Left (incl. PCF, Verts) - 177 318
Total Right (incl. FN)
- 398 258
Glossary: DL = Democratie Liberale/Liberals : FN = Front National/Extreme Right : PRG = Parti Radical de
gauche/Radical Left Party : PS = Parti Socialiste/Socialist Party : UDF Union pour la Democratie
Francaise/Centre Right : UMP = Union pour la majorite Presidentielle/Union for the Presidential
Majority : RPR Rassemblement pour la Republique/Gaullist Party (after Miguet 2002)
However, in the following June 2002 National Assembly elections the far right
also lost out strongly, with the moderate right winning 'decisively' (see Pfaff 2002;
Wilson 2002; see Table 1 below). It was expected that the Socialists and Communists
might lose up to half of their prior 283 seats (Wilson 2002), with a resulting total of
177 left-oriented seats (Miguet 2002). However, this will not necessarily translate into
a new, widespread conservative mandate - about 40% of registered voters did not
bother to case a vote, indicating a widespread disillusionment with normal electoral
politics (Vinocur 2002).
Through June 2004 there was some sign again of a turn back to the left at
European level elections, though voter turnout was once again quite low: The Socialists took 28.89 pct of the vote, according to final results, up from 21.95 pct
in the last election in 1999. Chirac's conservative Union for a Popular Movement
(UMP) won 16.64 pct, up from 12.8 pct, and its junior partner in the government, the
center-right Union for French Democracy, took 11.95 pct.
The far-right National Front was fourth with 9.81 pct, up from 5.7 pct in 1999.
Turnout was just 43 pct, down from 47 pct in 1999. (AFX 2004)
Another aspect of modern France has been a certain alignment of nationalist,
republican, socialist and cultural ideas. I will not be able to do justice to this today,
but will only touch on a few themes. The first of these is the issue of social justice and
socialism, a theme which has been taken with great seriousness by French workers,
intellectuals and students, and which has led to much more vigorous political culture
than is found in Anglo-American culture. Although the communist party was dealt a
severe blow with the Constitutional structure of the Fifth Republic, this did not mean
15
that there was an end to political discontent. On the contrary, frustration and
discontent led to an outbreak of political activity which is sometimes called the
Revolution of 1968 in which students and workers for a time challenged to power of
the French states (Price 1993, pp239-330).
It must be remembered, of course, that France has a long revolutionary tradition
(e.g. 1789, 1848, 1871). In large part, of course, the events of 1968 reflected a trend
for French intellectuals to play an active part in political mobilisation, e.g. as was the
case for Jean-Paul Sartre, Michel Foucault, Simone de Beauvoir, and André Malraux.
This involvement was still largely structured by Marxist theory - one was either a
Marxist, a fellow traveller, or a non-Marxist or anti-Marxist (Wieviorka 1994, p248).
However, counter-demonstrations on the 30th May 1968 suggested that most ordinary
people were not keen on a new revolution, and De Gaulle ordered a new election in
order to secure a mandate. The result was a victory for centrist and moderate parties,
though De Gaulle's subsequent failed attempt to find a 'third way' between capitalism
and communism would result in his retiring from office in 1969 (Price 1993, pp3334). In 1981, a moderate socialist government came into office for the first time in the
Fifth Republic under François Mitterand. Aside from his personal ambition (finding
a place in history), Mitterand has attempted to balance modernisation and socialism,
the role of France as a great power, and 'a humanitarian commitment to greater social
justice and equity' (Price 1993, p344). At first this seemed to focus on national and
international justice, and a more radical foreign policy, but by the 1990s had adopted a
more pragmatic tone.
Another aspect of this national and republican policy has been a particular attitude
towards the role of culture. The height of this policy is demonstrated in Mitterand’s
bold declaration: ‘I propose to the French people that with me they be the inventors
of a culture, an art of living, in other words, a French model of civilization’ (in
Sadran 2003, p57; bold added) France has always been rightly proud of its
contribution to the fine arts, scholarship and philosophy of Europe, as well as aware of
the strengthen of its literary tradition. However, since World War II, as part of its
national rebirth, French policy has also taken a particularly vigorous stand in using
culture at two levels: encouraging the fine arts, and developing policies impacting on
the mass media and publishing industry (see Forbes 1987). Since the 1960s, there has
also been an attempt to resist Americanization and globalisation of French artistic
and intellectual life. This can be seen in several policies, e.g. the effort to reject
random borrowings of American or English words (e.g. ‘L’ Hot Dog’ is not
permitted), a conscious attempt to promote French language throughout the world,
efforts top sustain special exemptions from GATT for French cultural products
(Wieviorka 1994, p252) including French film, and a desire to promote French culture
as a unifying force (particularly notable under the Mitterand government). The French
government has a Minister for Culture, whose budget was considerable (in the early
1980s, some 0.75-0.8% of the government budget, Forbes 1987, p139). This has
resulted in certain tensions over language, cultural and broadcasting policies which
make French involvement in a shared European culture rather difficult (see Field
1996). These cultural factors have to some degree flowed in a robust foreign policy
that at time clashes with UK and US perceptions.
16
This also involved strong support for French culture, linguistic and economic
influence on former colonial and French speaking areas, i.e. the idea of a
Francophone cultural space that includes large parts of central and central-west
Africa. This trend is mainly cultural, but at times see to take on a political and
economic benefit for France. This view is summarised: French policy makers sought first and foremost to consolidate and promote
rayonnement (spread) of the most notable aspects of French culture, including the
French language and intellectual traditions. Also referred to as the promotion of
francophonie (a greater French-speaking community), this policy is best represented
by the biennial Franco-African summit attended by the leaders of France and
francophone Africa . . . . Economic interests were perceived by French policy makers
as both parallel and integral to the promotion of French culture, as witnessed by the
organization of thirteen former French colonies and Equatorial Guinea into the "franc
zone," a supranational financial system in which France serves as the central bank
and provides a common currency, the Communaute Financiere Africaine (CFA) franc,
is tied to the French franc and guaranteed by the French treasury. (Schraeder 2000)
This has led for a time to tensions with the U.S. over growing American economic
interest in cental and francophone Africa, as well as controversial engagement by
France with the problems in Rwanda and the Great Lakes region (for detail, see
Schraeder 2000). Through 2000-2003, France has been extending its trade and contact
with many African nations, as noted in the most recent Franco-African Summit: The latest Franco-African summit in Paris was further confirmation of a fresh trend
reflecting new geopolitical realities. The bi-annual summit can no longer be viewed
simply as a French-speaking club meeting. Two Anglophone countries, South Africa
and Nigeria are now France's largest sub-Saharan markets and Nigeria's exports to
France outstrip those of Cote d'Ivoire - formerly France's top trading partner in Africa.
The language divide is becoming less relevant by the week.
As the international geopolitical power structure is in flux, it was not surprising
that all African nations, with the exception of Somalia, were present in Paris. (Misser
2003)
Less controversially, France sent in small numbers of peace keepers and protection
forces operating into several parts of Africa, including Liberia (short-term
evacutation), Cote d'Ivoire and Congo in 2003, the latter as part of a joint European
force, operating out the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). France has a
total of 'some 6,000 troops in five ex-colonies in Africa to intervene in crises, join
multilateral peacekeeping forces, and ensure that defense pacts are adhered to' (Xinhua
2003), indicating a serious commitment to an extended foreign policy in the region.
However, in recent years France seems to have tried to shift this towards a more
European, multilateral orientation, rather than unilateral interventions based on
neo-colonial policies (Hayward 2003, p40).
From the late 1990s, the French government has often followed policies that reflect
this particular French tradition rather than the so-called liberal capitalist norms
favoured by the U.S. Thus France has wished to assert a strong willingness to promote
higher levels of employment through government and EU spending (with limited
success), has maintained its own unique education system that focuses on a traditional
examination system combined with an organised curriculum, has recently supported
stronger equality of access for the sexes in political representation, and also legislated
a 35 hour working week (Bulard 1999), to the enormous surprise of the U.S. These
17
factors mean that the rift between Washington and Paris can be quite strong on
occasion, and French policy often receives negative assessment in U.S. based media
(see Frank 1998). Indeed, it has been argued that France has been resisting the global
dominance of the U.S. in a number of areas, a game which it has found hard to sustain
into the 21st century. From this point of view, the particular use of culture in foreign
policy may be seen as a way of reducing vulnerability to external patterns of
globalisation, and more directly, the strong influence of the United States via various
multilateral institutions (see Meunier 2000). This reached a peak in tensions of French
criticism of the US-led intervention into Iraq, and it desire to the UNSC remain as the
main source of legitimation, and for the UN to have a strong role in monitoring the
administration of Iraq in the post-war period. Tensions began to fade through mid2003, with France keen to rebuild bridges with the US and to regain cohesion in the
Security Council. In part this was driven by French concerns over loss of trade with
the US, and a serious drop of 15-20% of American tourism into France. This resulted
in a large advertising campaign promoting France as 'friendly' launched in June 2003,
including videos featuring stars such as Woody Allen and Wynton Marsalis, among
others (IHT 2003).
5. France as an Independent Global Power
France's development and testing of nuclear weapons in the South Pacific was
designed to support a credible nuclear deterrence. This strategic policy is run as part
of an independent command structure, and although France is part of the NATO
alliance, since 1967 her military and nuclear forces are not directly integrated into the
NATO command structure. This has been largely due to fear of U.S. domination of
her military posture, though France in 1991 approved NATO's Strategic concept with
minor reservations (Yost 1994, p127). As we shall see, France for the first time
considered joining an integrated NATO command structure from 1996, but only on
the basis of it becoming much more European-centred and responsive to European
needs (see Grant 1996). Between 1996-2001 France moved closer in its NATO
cooperation, but also supported a new European defence force that would have a
separate identity and its own rapid reaction forces (the European defence initiative, see
Howorth 2000). Renewed tensions through 2001-2003once ag ain tempted France to
view towards more European-centred policies.
This historical attachment by France to a strong and independent military is not
supported by all French citizens, but it has become deeply entrenched in French
government thinking. The following will underline the importance to France of this
independent capability: A. France has experienced considerable vulnerability in the last 150 years. In the 1870-71
Franco-Prussian war, in which France lost the region of Alsace-Lorraine, while in the 1914-18
war France and her allies won but with huge manpower losses to the French. Most important
of all, France suffered a humiliating defeat by the German in 1940 and was occupied down to
1944. This defeat emphasised a sense of vulnerability, and a recognition that France would
not be able to sustain dominance of Germany without a serious revision of France's role in
world affairs, militarily, economically, and diplomatically.
18
B. Past European wars led President Charles de Gaulle in the post-war period and his
supporters to declare that an occupation of France would never happen again. This was
the basis of French military planning during the 1960s and 70s, though the threat was then
focused more on the Soviet union, and not on Germany.
C. During the 1960s a concept of France as a nuclear sanctuary develops, i.e. a country made
inviolable to nuclear attack by having a sizeable nuclear deterrence under its own direct
command, as well as cooperating with the nuclear armed U.S. and Great Britain.
D. France therefore developed strategic nuclear force based on: * long-range bombers (now also equipped with stand-off missiles),
* 18 IRBMs (Intermediate range ballistic missiles) based on the Plateau d'Albion (south-east
France, as of 1997 no longer operational),
* and 5-6 submarines each equipped with 16 SLBMs (Sea-launched Ballistic Missiles). These
were equipped with singe megaton warheads, but are being replaced with MIRVs (Multiple
Independently-Targetable Re-entry Vehicles) with six warheads per missile (Palmer 1991,
pp6-7). This force will stabilise down to four new advanced submarines (Yost 1994, p116).
Thus as of 1999 France had some 64 SLBMs in four submarines (Chipman 2000, p53)
E. This nuclear force is support by a sizeable and diversified conventional defence force.
It includes a sizeable Rapid Action Force, while as of 1991 France kept up to 35,000 troops
(out of a total of circa 460,000, see Palmer 1991, p14) abroad at any given time. By 1999,
these numbers had been trimmed slightly to an active defence force (excluding reserves) of
317,300, of whom 103,500 were then conscripts (Chipman 1999). These forces have often
played an interventionist role, especially in Africa, in support of friendly governments (e.g.
aside from the war in Algeria in 1962, later involvements include Djibouti, Chad, Zaire, Togo,
Comoro Islands, with other operations of interposition in Lebanon, Sinai, Beruit, the Red
Sea, Persian Gulf, a large peace-keeping force in Bosnia, plus a special safe-zone operation in
Rwanda). French troops also intervened in the Central African Republic, largely in support of
French interests and French citizens in the unstable Republic (for France's wider African
policy, see Mouradian 1998). However, limited ability to support a large force was shown in
the small forces deployed with the Alliance in the Gulf War, indicating the financial strains of
maintaining advanced conventional as well as nuclear forces (Price 1993, p360). From 19972001, France has slightly downsized its deployments to overseas bases and has also moved to
stop conscription, and now moved to a fully professional force structure.
F. These nuclear and conventional forces are seen as a background support for France's
claim to great power status, and to play a significant global role. De Gaulle in particular was
interested in restoring 'France's honor and international status' (Yost 1994, p129). France's
interests are often conceived of in three circles - France, then her immediate economic and
security interests embracing Europe and the Mediterranean, then a wide-ranging global role.
She has attempted to maintain a political, cultural and some military presence in the
Mediterranean, Francophone Africa, the Indian Ocean, South Pacific, and in the Caribbean.
G. Strong military forces have been backed up by maintaining an independent
technological base – in the 1980s 96% of French military procurements were built in
France (Palmer 1991, p40). This has avoided what the French call britannise, i.e. a humiliating
reliance on the U.S. for technology (Yost 1994, p123). France does use some U.S. derived
intelligence, and has access to her own as well as the Skynet satellite communications system,
but is otherwise largely independent in its military operations. It is feared that if France does
not continue to develop nuclear weapons, she will loose this technological expertise and
infrastructure (Palmer 1991, p34). Yet in the end, military planners have realised that for very
advanced systems (e.g. the Cray supercomputers needed to solve multiple warhead targeting
problems), cooperation with advanced industrial nations including the U.S. and Germany is
essential. Closer cooperation between France and the U.S. over NATO and Bosnia, has
19
allowed France access to U.S. simulation testing technology. This was outlined in a report of a
secret deal between the U.S. and France, which would allow the sharing of nuclear simulation
data (Australian 1996). Since 1996 France has begun to scale down some of this military
Research and Development, and in 1997 gained help from the U.S. in developing the
computer simulations need to do away with the underground testing of nuclear weapons.
Through 2000-2004 France has joined a European effort to improve its own satellite
surveillance abilities, as well as to continue research into aeronautics and space industries. It
also plans to develop its own integrated 'electronic battlefield' concepts, though these are
more than a decade away from application to combat situations.
H. This military and technological independence helps provides a psychological
balance in the special Franco-German relationship which is at the heart of the EU
process. This included the creation of a Franco-German military brigade, that would be later
on expanded in the Eurocorps (Adréani 1998, p26). Today, such military cooperation is also
one way of ensuring a balance of involvement among France, Germany and Britain, and in
the long run offers the possibility of offering a stronger burden-sharing partner for the U.S.
(see Kupchan 2000).
I. It can be seen that France, with a credible but not huge deterrence, is suspicious of
moves which would undermine that deterrence. Moves at arms control, as distinct from
total disarmament, have been viewed with suspicion (Palmer 1991, p28). A minimum force
level of 500-600 warheads might need to maintained to avoid a purely symbolic nuclear
arsenal (Palmer 1991, p30). This has been argued as essential in a 'fluid world' environment,
with non-European power potentially being able to retain or develop a small nuclear weapons
capability (the idea of the defence of the strong against the weak, e.g. developing nations
with chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, or via the use of international terrorism). Here
the issue of small nuclear weapons 'for operational use', verses strategic deterrence (non-use
through fear of mutual destruction, i.e. demanding a less operational approach) affects policy
planning (Yost 1994, pp114-5). France, like the U.S., has implied that in times of dire need it
might be willing to consider first use of such small nuclear weapons. President Chirac argued
in January 1996 that ‘in an ever-dangerous world, it <nuclear weaponry> acts as a weapon of
dissuasion, a weapon in the service of peace’ (One World News Service 1996). France joined
the nuclear NPT (non-proliferation treaty) during 1991-2. The then President François
Mitterand was willing to allow France to stop testing in the South Pacific in the interim test
ban. However, France did go ahead with tests again in 1995 before finally coming to support
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). However, this process was in part
dependent on the idea that all nuclear states, and all 'threshold' states (those about to be able
to build a bomb) become a party to the CTBT (Yost 1994, p123), a fact which did not
eventuate with India and then Pakistan refusing to sign on, and then challenging the treaty
with their own tests in 1998.
J. All this factors, however, have not guaranteed France’s security against new
‘transnational’ and ‘non-conventional’ threats. This includes issues such as uncontrolled,
non-documented flows of migrants, organized crime networks, and the problem of
international terrorism, a problem for France over some two decades. France had had first
tried to isolate itself from international terrorism via the ‘sanctuary doctrine’ where France
would try to take a neutral stance, and thereby not be a direct target (Shapiro & Suzan 2003,
p69). This policy was abandoned in 1986, with a move to suppression of extremist groups,
then a preventive policy based on heightened use of intelligence serves, policing and a strict
legal code that has allowed the active monitoring, prevention and pursuit of supposed
terrorists (Shapiro and Suzan 2003, p92). This is an area where the US and France have some
shared interests, and through May 2003, President Bush praised France for its anti-terrorism
efforts (Washington Post 2003).
20
In summary, it can be seen that a relatively strong defence force with power
projection capabilities and nuclear weapons are part of a strongly committed
diplomatic and security posture by France. Begun by de Gaulle (see Gordon 1993),
this posture has been largely maintained by Mitterand and if anything reinforced by
the President Jacques Chirac. France has established herself 'as an influential secondtier power with substantial European and limited global ambitions' (Zic 2000).
Elements of this policy began to deepen through 1996: in particular, conscription was
totally phased out by 2002, and France moved more closely into a Europeancoordinated defence identity. Likewise, in 1999 the French government was willing to
support the NATO move to use air-power to intervene in Kosovo, a move which
provoked strong criticism from the socialist movement within France (Ramonet
1999).
Yet behind the externals of this policy we can sense a particular concern with the
Mediterranean and African worlds. In part, this is also a concern with a new
perceived threat - that of radical Islam. Traditional French policy is concerned about
the possibility of long-term instability in the Balkans, in central and North Africa and
the Middle East. All these areas seem quite close, in terms of the direct impact on
French interests both at home and abroad. It is unfortunate that debate sometimes
conceived in terms of a war between civilisations, not a dialogue between them
(Aguirre 1994). France has also tried to mitigate and reduce conflict in the Middle
East, as well as providing sizeable aid flows to the region. Most recently, France has
called for greater EU mediation in the Middle-East conflict, as well as for a more
moderated role in the reconstruction of Iraq.
6. France and A New Confident Diplomacy: In Europe and Beyond
The election of Jacques Chirac as President of France in 1995 seemed to usher in a
new shift towards a stronger and more nationalist foreign policy (Zic 2000): indeed,
his policies have sometimes been dubbed as 'De Gaulle II', i.e. an attempt 'to resist US
domination of Europe while pursuing policies that reflected France's continuing global
aspirations' (Petras & Morley 2000, p54). Prior to this, there had been a period of
'cohabitation' between a socialist Prime Minister (Mitterand), and a more conservative
Prime Minister (Edouard Balladur) and Foreign Minister (Alain Juppé), due to the
different electoral cycles of the parliament and the presidency (Sutton 1995, p135).
When Alain Juppé became Prime Minster on 17 May 1995, however, he represented a
more coherent element of government, which largely allowed President Chirac to
maintain a strong role in foreign policy. From mid-1997, there was a return to
cohabitation, with Chirac coupled with the socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin.
Chirac was re-elected again as President in 2002, suggesting a certain likely ongoing
coherence in French foreign policy. This was strengthened even further in national
parliamentary elections in early June 2002 which saw a decided swing towards the
Right, suggesting that the period of cohabitation will be over, allowing a conservative
Prime Minister, Jean-Pierre Raffarin, to take office, though his electoral credentials
seem to drop through 2003-2004, leading to some claims that of finance minister
Nicolas Sarkozy could challenge Chirac’s leadership in future (Wilson 2002; Vinocur
2002).
21
In large measure, there are many signs of coherence and continuity in foreign policy
(Sutton 1995, p136), which in any case had veered towards nationalist and the
practical, and away from more ideal forms of internationalism, during the 1990s. It is
possible, however, that President Chirac hoped to secure internal and external support
by foreign affairs initiatives, because the internal economic requirements for France
remain constrained and difficult, which had to trim some its social agenda as it
approach deeper integration within Europe after the Maastricht treaty (Moïsi 1995,
p8). In large measure, France has sought a measure of independence from American
initiatives, while at the same cooperating within the wider European and transAtlantic setting. Specific tensions have emerged over economic and cultural politics,
e.g. over the growing penetration of U.S. economic and diplomatic policies in parts of
Africa. However, in the long term France has sought to maintain a cooperative but
independent voice in global politics.
Until the late 1990s, Economic goals were hard to attain. The government had
hoped to cut the public sector deficit percentage of GDP to 4% in 1996, a goal which
involved heavy spending cuts (Moïsi 1995, p13). This led to attempts to contain
government spending, with a direct impact on areas such as the civil service.
Contentious disputes and crippling strikes forced the government in 1996 to
somewhat reduce its cuts. Like Germany, France has had to engage in serious
government cost cutting to reach the requirements for European Monetary Union –
this involved the aim of reducing 'the combined budget and social security deficit to 3
per cent in 1997' (Straits Times 1996). The current government had hoped to gain a
mandate in the mid-1997 elections for the harsh economic policies needed to achieve
convergence to the requirements of the EMU. The socialist government under Lionel
Jospin had reiterated its commitment to EMU at a conference held in Amsterdam in
June 1997, suggesting that the French government needed to aim at a 3% deficit for
the following years. This unchanged stability pact, demanded by the German
government, meant that the European nations headed towards a new European Union
Treaty which might include the notion of qualified majority voting, rather than
absolute unity on all major policies (Henning 1997) - this would make an EU enlarged
with Eastern European members more manageable. The Jospin government had hoped
to arrange for a major release of EU controlled funds for job creation programmes, but
instead had to settle for a future conference on unemployment issues. These tensions
were eased by increased strength in the French economy from 1998 onwards, but
remain a contested issue with France (Hayward 2003, p41). From June 2002, the new
conservative government needed to struggle hard to cut income tax by 5% (as it
promised), as well as maintain a balanced budget by 2004, a commitment made to EU
partners (Wilson 2002). The deficit for 2002 was 1.3%, and may rise to 2.5%
(Vinocur 2002). Growth was low in 2003 (0.2% of GDP) in 2003, and only mild
through 2004, estimated at 1.8%, while unemployment was sustained in the 9.3 to
9.4% range (DFAT 2004). This means that high growth will not be expected to solve
these pressures on France.
In this context, it is not surprising that the French Minister of Industry signalled that
the French government would need to 'intelligently reinterpret' the rules for
budgets that the European Commission like to impose (James 2002). The Head of the
European Commission, Romano Prodi, replied 'that the commission would not
hesitate to issue a formal warning against any country that relaxed the economic
22
discipline that guarantees the stability of the euro' (James 2002). These tensions were
part of a slowing in the global and French economies: Economic growth slowed to 1.2 per cent in 2002 from 1.8 per cent in 2001. Growth is
anticipated to improve only marginally during 2003. Inflation is predicted to drop only
slightly from 2 per cent in 2002. The deterioration in economic activity in France has
also slowed job creation. The unemployment rate is rising from 9 per cent in 2002 and
is expected to average 9.4 per cent in 2003. Tax cuts and increased public
expenditure from last year's budget appear likely to push France's government deficit
above the 3 per cent GDP deficit ceiling imposed under the Economic Monetary Union
(EMU) Stability and Growth Pact.' (DFAT 2003)
Another major issue for the French government has been whether it can gain more
political influence in the European Central Bank (Henning 1997), rather than just
allowing policies of economic rationalism dominate future Europe-wide fiscal
policies. This resulted in complex manoeuvring over the leadership of the Central
Bank through April-May 1998. Mr. Jean-Claude Trichet, governor of the Bank of
France, warned the French government in June 1997 that any tendency to back away
from EMU criteria could undermine its fight against unemployment (Owen 1997). If
France is unable to meet such criteria, Trichet argued, there might be ‘the loss of
national and international confidence’ and an ‘increase in our interest rates’ which
would weaken the economy (Owen 1997). In general, the European Central Bank has
pursued the path of being strongly apolitical, but this has not always led to strong
leadership globally for the currency. In 2000, France sought to gain greater control by
the Finance Ministers of Europe over the Central Bank but this was ‘repelled as a
threat to its independence’ (Hayward 2003, p39). Through early 2003, controversy
surrounded the future leadership of the bank: French government's official candidate,
Bank of France governor Jean-Claude Trichet, has had his hopes 'stymied by a trial in
which he is accused of complicity in falsifying the accounts of former State-owned
bank Credit Lyonnais a decade ago' (Tieman 2003). However, by the 20th of June
2003 he had been acquitted, opening up his rile as President of the ECB through 2004.
In general, France’s current posture supports the expansion of the European Union
eastwards. However, the current government will need 'to ensure that this enlargement
takes place under conditions that serve not only Germany's but also France's interests'
(Sutton 1995, p136). Likewise, difference in the future structure of the EU have
emerged between Germany and France, with French leaders critical of any move
towards a truly centralised, federal European system (Daley 2001). In fact, this
tension in viewpoint goes back as far as the 1960s, suggesting that it may be a longterm issue that will not be easily resolved as Europe expands to take in new members
(Adréani 1998). This has begun to change through the 2002-2003 public 'Convention'
on the future of the European Union and its formal discussion by governments
through 2004. Former President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, who has been deeply
involved in this process, ‘neatly sidestepped any reservations or opposition from the
105-member drafting convention’, proclaiming ‘virtually unanimous support’ for a
document outlining a more integrated Europe, but such a program would need active
formal support before it could be ratified through 2006 (Watson 2003), an issue that
has become controversial for European publics through 2004.
France's interests in stabilising the Mediterranean as a whole, and ensuring
positive political outcomes in North Africa also need to be considered. During the
23
early 1990s there have been a number of international conferences on these issues, and
European aid to the Middle East and North Africa has remained quite high (planned to
increase to two thirds the EU aid levels for East Europe, during the period 1994-1999;
Pierre & Quandt 1995, p143). Through 1997, France in world terms became the
second largest giver of direct development aid. France has also supported new
associational and trade agreements being negotiated with Morocco, Tunisia, and Israel
(Sutton 1995, p137). Some would see here a division of labour between Germany and
France, with Germany having a stronger role in stabilising Eastern Europe, and France
looking more to the south and Mediterranean programs (via the Barcelona process,
from 1995). In part this ha been run through the ongoing Euro-Mediterranean
meetings (with a total of 27 states involved), with the meeting in May 2003 allocating
‘57 million euros (63 million US dollars) to the Mediterranean region to reinforce
cooperation with it in 2003. . . The fund would be provided under the Mediterranean
Regional Program of the European Union (EU)’, with ‘Middle East Peace Projects
(MEPP) 2003, accounting for nearly 15 percent of the total funding’, including peace
projects and civil society support (Xinhua 2003b). This is one part of a wider policy,
including hopes for a stronger Algeria, as a source of natural gas, and an origin for
migrants (documented and non-documented), remains of direct concern to French and
EU ‘southern’ policies. Of the 5 million Muslims in France, some 537,000 were legal
residents from Algeria in 2001 (Economist 2003).
Likewise, within France, the demands of public security forced France for a time to
control its borders within the European Union, a move which has virtually closed
with the freedom of movement negotiated under the Schengen agreement (Moïsi
1995, p11). This was concern was based on fear of terrorism, the movement of drugs
and people from Eastern Europe, but also concern about the far right (and the National
Front), which opposes the Schengen agreement (Economist 1995) Governments in
Europe are generally concerned that violence in Algeria could prompt more
immigration into Europe, and that radical political parties in Algeria might seek to
radicalise minority groups within European countries (Pierre & Quandt 1995, p131).
Since 1992, these conflicts have claimed up to 100,000 lives. Unrest continues in
Algeria through June 2001, with clashes between security forces and pro-democracy
demonstrators, this time from the Berber ethnic group (Meftahi 2001). Through 20002002 debate has raged in France about revelations concerning the use of torture by the
French army and the Algerian government, bringing up a wider discussion of France's
colonial legacy (Grandmaison 2001; Inter-Press 2002). Through 2003, President
Chirac attempted to turn this perception around, with when during a March visit he
‘also proclaimed before the Algerian parliament "a shared vision of a tolerant Islam"
and then signed, with President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, a "declaration of Algiers",
forerunner of a formal treaty to underline the two countries' "special partnership".’
(Economist 2003)
In summary, France's foreign policy will include the need 'to pursue France's special
interests in the Francophone world but with greater European cooperation on Africa;
to consolidate France's Great-Power status in the framework of the UN Security
Council and the G-8 (from 1998, the G-8); and to strengthen the European Union in
the aim of giving France and other member states a collective say in world equal to
that of the United States' (Sutton 1995, p136). In doing so, this would create automatic
balances with Germany and UK as useful partners. France specifically emphasises its
24
use of aid, humanitarian intervention, and support for human rights as part of its role
as a European and global power. More specifically, there have been signs in 19952004 of a more assertive French foreign policy, indicating a wish to gain greater
prestige in world affairs, even if this was loosely correlated with wider European
concerns. For a short period in early 2003 it seemed that France, Germany and Russia
might form a kind of foreign-policy ‘troika’ in opposition to US and UK policies.
However, there are debates about how long such a troika could be maintained, and by
June 2003 Russia seemed to have repaired an coordinated their cooperation, even
though differences over Russia’s technology trade with Iran remain problematic. This
axis of cooperation remains important between Germany and France, but there
are signals of some differences in viewpoint, e.g. certain tensions also emerged over
unilateral French plans to overhaul their defence policy, including a shift to an allprofessional army through the year 2002 (with personnel reductions of 40% but with
the same firepower), and reductions in the weapons budget (Lindeman & Buchan
1996). Generally, France has been unwilling to increase defence spending in the late
1990s, but it is not certain that Germany will be willing to spend enough to support a
truly profession and modernised force. French defence spending proposed for 20032008 of 2.6% of GDP remains in European terms quite strong, but will require
increased military efficiency to meet its equipment and training needs (Sparaco 2001).
Closer cooperation with the UK has made the European Defense Identity, but there is
no guarantee that this grouping could handle a major crisis without NATO support (to
be discussed in later lectures).
In general, Chirac has been willing to use military action 'as an essential
instrument of diplomacy' (Moïsi 1995, p9). On this basis, he has also been more
willing to take sides on issues, such as his firm statement that the responsibility for
aggression remains most heavily with the Bosnian Serbs, thereby shifting the
emphasis of action away from the supposedly neutral UN forces. France was therefore
also able to support humanitarian intervention in Kosovo in 1999, in spite fierce
internal criticism of how this was done. This debate reached fruition in November
1999 with a document issued by the French defence ministry which was highly critical
of the United States led air-attacks against Serbia, some of which it argued were
outside 'the strict framework of the Atlantic Alliance' (Rouleau 1999). It has been
argued, however, that in the long run France will be unable to resist the dominance of
the U.S. in strategic and political affairs (Petras & Morely 2000; Frank 1998), and that
France as part of the EU will have to accommodate itself to the emerging international
regulation of global trade and investment (see Bulard 1999). Through 2001-2004
France has remained actively involved in Kosovo and supported the Afghanistan
peace process including limited NATO deployment of peacekeepers, but has only
gradually through mid 2004 supported some minor role for NATO training to help
with the stabilization of Iraq (see Ames 2004).
This factors suggest a France which is willing to adapt quickly to changing
international circumstances. Whether this role of enhanced prestige can be
supported, however, depends precisely on the success of the EU process in providing
a more stable and vigorous European context. It will be interesting to see if in the next
decade these notions of humanitarianism, socialism, and nationalism can be sustained
without serious internal contradictions. At present, it seems that this unique French
vision of its role in world affairs can be sustained only the conditions of a successful
25
and prosperous Europe, and thereby a strong France (in a comprehensive and balanced
sense). Whether France will retain this balance of integration with its sense of unique
national identity will dependent in part of careful management of the European agenda
over the next decade.
7. Bibliography and Further Resources
Resources
Le monde diplomatique, which reflects one critical French orientation to European
and world affairs, has a large number of articles in English, many of which are in
a free searchable archive. The English edition will be found at
http://www.en.monde-diplomatique.fr/
A range of factual information about France and French policies will be found at
the French Embassy (Australia) website at http://www.ambafrance-au.org/index.en.htm
A range of official publications can be found through a French foreign affairs
website, including a magazine on current affairs, located through
http://www.france.diplomatie.gouv.fr/
Those of you who can read French will find Le monde a useful newspaper with
detailed coverage of France and Europe, located at http://tout.lemonde.fr/
Further Reading
CALLEO, David P. "Europe: Ambitions and Dilemmas: The Strategic
Implications of the Euro", Survival, 41 no. 1, Spring 1999, pp5-19
De ANGELIS, Richard A. " A rising tide for Jean-Marie, Jorg, and Pauline?
Xenophobic populism in comparative perspective (1)", The Australian
Journal of Politics and History, 49 no. 1, March 2003, pp75-93 [Access via
Infotrac Database]
GUYOMARCH, Alain et al. France in the European Union, N.Y., St. Martin's Press,
1998
KNAPP, Andrew & WRIGHT, Vincent The Government and Politics of France,
London, Routledge, 2001
MILNER, Susan & PARSONS, Nick (eds) Reinventing France: State and Society in the
Twenty-First Century, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2003
PETRAS, James & MORLEY, Morris "Contesting Hegemons: US-French
Relations in the 'New World Order'", Review of International Studies, 26,
2000, pp49-67 [Access via Bond University Library Databases]
PRICE, Roger A Concise History of France, Cambridge, CUP, 1993
SHAPIRO, Jeremy & SUZAN, Bénédicte “The French Experience of CounterTerrorism”, Survival, 45 no. 1, Spring 2003, pp67-98
References and Bibliography
AFX “Socialists Clear Winners in French Vote”, 14 June 2004 [Access via Nexis Database]
AGUIRRE, Mariano "Guerres de civilisations?", Le Monde Diplomatique, Décembre 1994 [Internet Access]
AMES, Paul “: U.S. and France clash over Iraq, Afghanistan and Turkey - signaling tough times ahead for
NATO”, Associated Press, 29 June 2004 [Access via Nexis Database]
26
ANDRÉANI, Gilles "The Franco-German Relationship in a New Europe", in CALLEO, David P. & STAAL, Eric
R. (eds.) Europe's Franco-German Engine, Washington, Brookings Institution Press, 1998, pp21-37
ARENDT, Hannah On Revolution, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1990
Australian "US, France in Secret Nuclear Deal", 18 June 1996, p9
BENNETT, Ray & PRYOR, Pter “EU to Defend Protections for Its Film, TV Industries”,
BONIFACE, Pascale "France: The New Channels of Power", Label France, no. 38, January 2000 [Internet Access
via http://www.france.diplomatie.gouv.fr/]
BUCHAN, David "France Presses on with Peace Efforts", Financial Times, 20 April 1996 [Internet Access]
BULARD, Martine "What Price the 35-hour Week?", Le Monde diplomatique, September 1999 [Internet Access]
CALDWELL, Christopher "The Crescent and the Tricolor", Atlantic Monthly, 286 Issue 5, November 2000
[Access via Ebsco Database]
CALLEO, David P. & STAAL, Eric R. (eds.) Europe's Franco-German Engine, Washington, Brookings
Institution Press, 1998
CHIPMAN, John (Director) The Military Balance 1999-2000, London, IISS, 1999
DALEY, Suzanne "French Premier Opposes German Plan for Europe", The New York Times, 29 May 2001, pA6
De ANGELIS, Richard A. " A rising tide for Jean-Marie, Jorg, and Pauline? Xenophobic populism in comparative
perspective (1)", The Australian Journal of Politics and History, 49 no. 1, March 2003, pp75-93 [Access
via Infotrac Database]
DE BRIE, Christian "French Immigration Policy on Trial", Le Monde diplomatique, November 1997 [Internet
Access]
DFAT "France - Country Brief", Canberra, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2003-2004 [Internet Access
at http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/france/france_brief.html]
DOYLE, William Origins of the French Revolution, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988
Economist "The Return of Triangular Diplomacy", 4 November 1995, p56
Economist "A Matter of Priorities", 359 Issue 8223, 05/26/2001-06/01/2001, pp10-11 [Access via Ebsco
Database]
Economist “Partners Again”, 8 March 2003, p50 [Access via Ebsco Database]
ELLWOOD, David "'You too can be like us:' Selling the Marshall Plan", History Today, October 1998 [Internet
Access via www.findarticles.com]
ESCALLE, Marie-Christine Kok “Reinventing Everyday Life in France: The Reduction of Working Time”, in
MILNER, Susan & PARSONS, Nick (eds) Reinventing France: State and Society in the Twenty-First
Century, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2003, pp143-155
EWING, Jack “The Lazy Men of Europe No More? Germany and France are showing welcome signs of working
harder”, Business Week, 7 June 2004, p32 [Access via Infotrac Database]
FIELD, Heather “A Common European Culture?: Citizenship, Culture and Government in the European Union”,
Paper Presented to the Culture and Citizenship inaugural Conference of the Australian Key Centre for
Cultural and Media Policy, Griffith University, Brisbane, 30 September - 1 October 1996 (Vertical File)
Finance CustomWire “G-8 Vows Utmost to Strike Global Trade Accord by End of July”, 11 June 2004 [Access
via Ebsco Database]
Financial Times "France Presses Middles East Peace Role", 1 May 1996 [Internet Access]
Financial Times “Polish Minister Tells Farmers to Apply for EU Subsidies”, 26 May 2004 [Access via Nexis
Database]
FORBES, Jill "Cultural Policy: The Soul of Man under Socialism", in MAZEY, Sonia & NEWMAN, Michael
(ed.) Mitterand's France, London, Croom Helm, 1987, pp131-165
FRANK, Thomas C. "France, an Unforgivable Exception", Le Monde diplomatique, April 1998 [Internet
Access]
GAUNT, Jeremy "Greece Pledges to Step Up Terrorism Fight", Excite News, 9 June 2000 [Internet Access]
GORDON, Philip H. A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy, Princeton,
Princeton University Press, 1993
GRANDMAISON, Olivier Le Cour "Torture in Algeria: Past Acts that Haunt France", Le Monde diplomatique,
June 2001 [Internet Access at http://www.en.monde-diplomatique.fr/2001/06/11torture2]
GRANT, Robert P. “France’s New Relationship with NATO’, Survival, 38 no. 1, Spring 1996, pp58-80
GUYOMARCH, Alain et al. France in the European Union, N.Y., St. Martin's Press, 1998
HAGSTROM, Jerry “France Considers WTO Action Over U.S. Beef Import Ban”, Congress Daily, 1 March 2004
[Access via Ebsco database]
HANCOCK, M. Donald Politics in Western Europe: An Introduction to the Politics of the United Kingdom,
France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the European Community, London, Macmillan, 1993
HANLEY, David “French Politics in the Twenty-First Century: Invention or Muddling Through?”, in MILNER,
Susan & PARSONS, Nick (eds) Reinventing France: State and Society in the Twenty-First Century,
Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2003, pp21-34
HART, B.H. Liddel History of the Second World War, London, Pan, 1970
HASWELL, Jock Citizen Armies, London, History Book Club, 1973
HAYWARD, Jack After the French Revolution : Six Critics of Democracy and Nationalism, London, Harvester
Wheatsheaf, 1991
27
HAYWARD, Jack “Reinventing the French State”, in MILNER, Susan & PARSONS, Nick (eds) Reinventing
France: State and Society in the Twenty-First Century, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2003, pp35-47
HEISBOURG, François "The British and French Nuclear Forces", Survival, 31 no. 4, July/August 1989, pp301320
HENNING, Christopher “Road to Monetary Union Cleared”, Sydney Morning Herald, 18 June 1997 [Internet
Access]
HOWORTH, Jolyon "Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative", Survival, 42 no. 2, Summer 2000,
pp33-55
IHT "Woody Allen Promotes France in Video", International Herald Tribune, 16 June 2003 [Internet Access]
Inter-Press "Rights-France: Algerian Independence Day Re-opens Old Wounds", InterPress Service English News
Wire, 21/03/2002 [Access via Ebsco Database]
JAMES, Barry "New Team in Paris to 'Reinterpret' Deficit Rule", International Herald Tribune, 19 June 2002
[Internet Access via www.iht.com]
JOHNSON, Douglas " Atolls and Atom Bombs: France's Colonial Design", History Today, December 1995
[Internet Access via www.findarticles.com]
KERNAHAN, Mel "South Sea Fallout", New Statesman & Society, 13 October 1994, pp18-19
KNAPP, Andrew & WRIGHT, Vincent The Government and Politics of France, London, Routledge, 2001
KRAMER, Steven Does France Still Count?: The French Role in the New Europe, N.Y., Praeger Publishers, 1994
KUPCHAN, Charles A. "France", in The Vulnerability of Empire, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1994, pp185296
KUPCHAN, Charles A. "In Defence of European Defence: An American Perspective", Survival, 42, no. 2,
Summer 2000, pp16-32
LAOMES, Steven & PROVIS, Michael (ed.) A Changing France in a Changing World, French Australian
Relations, 1994
LEVY, David A. "Foreign Policy: Business as Usual?" in MAZEY, Sonia & NEWMAN, Michael (ed.)
Mitterand's France, London, Croom Helm, 1987, pp166-191
LEFEBVRE, Georges The Coming of the French Revolution 1789, New York, Vintage Books, 1947
LINDEMANN, Michael "France to Reassure Kohl Over Military Co-operation", Financial Times, 9 May 1996
[Internet Access]
MAZEY, Sonia & NEWMAN, Michael (ed.) Mitterand's France, London, Croom Helm, 1987
McGUINNESS, Padraic “France’s Vote for Change was a Vote Against Change”, Sydney Morning Herald, 5
June 1997 [Internet Access]
McMILLAN, James F. Dreyfus to De Gaulle: Politics and Society in France 1898-1969, London, Edward
Arnold, 1985
MEFTAHI, Hassane "Algeria Releases 300 People", Excite News , 16 June 2001 [Internet Access]
MENENDEZ WEIDMAN, Lisa K. "Policy Trends and Structural Divergence in Educational Governance: the
Case of the French National Ministry and US Department of Education", Oxford Review of Education,
27 no. 1, March 2001 [Database Access via Ebsco Database]
MEUNIER, Sophie "The French Exception", Foreign Affairs, 79 Issue 4, July-Aug2000, p104-116 [Database
Access via Ebsco Database]
MIGUET, Arnauld " The French elections of 2002: after the earthquake, the deluge ", West European Politics, 25
no. 4, Oct 2002, pp207-231 [Access via Infotrac Database]
MILNER, Susan & PARSONS, Nick (eds) Reinventing France: State and Society in the Twenty-First Century,
Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2003
MINISTRY OF THE ECONOMY, FINANCE AND INDUSTRY (France) "France's Economic Policy", About
France, 1 August 2000 [Internet Access via www.france.net.au]
MISSER, Francois "France pulls Africa together", African Business, April 2003 pp20-22 [Access via Infotrac
Database]
MOISO, Dominique "Chirac of France: A New Leader of the West?", Foreign Affairs, 74 no. 6,
November/December 1995, pp8-13
MOULSON, Geir "Chirac's Crushing Victory over Le Pen Draws sigh of Relief Outside France, but Warnings
too", AP Worldstream, 05/06/2002 [Access via Ebsco Database]
MOURADIAN, Anne-Marie "The Lomé Convention Under Threat", Le Monde diplomatique, June 1998 [Internet
Access]
One World News Service “Unrepentant Chirac Ends Nuclear Tests”, 30 January, 1996 [Internet Access]
OWEN, David “French Bank Chief: Warning on EMU”, Financial Times, 25 June 1997 [Internet Access]
PALMER Diego A. Ruiz French Strategic Options in the 1990s, Adelphi Papers no. 260, London, IISS, Summer
1991
PALMER, R.R. Twelve Who Ruled: The Year of the Terror in the French Revolution, Princeton, N.J., Princeton
University Press, 1989
PIERRE, Andrew & QUANDT, William B. "Algeria's War on Itself", Foreign Policy, 99, Summer 1995, pp131148
MOORE, Barrington Jr. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1969
POIRIER, François Great Britain and France: A Long Confrontation, Service Culturel, Ambassade de France,
Ottawa, Canada, 1996 [Interactive Internet Access]
28
POSNER, Theodore Robert Current French Security Policy: the Gaullist Legacy, New York, Greenwood Press,
1991
PRICE, Roger A Concise History of France, Cambridge, CUP, 1993
RAMADAN, Tariq "Europe's Muslims Find a Place for Themselves", Le Monde diplomatique, April 1998
[Internet Access]
RAMONET, Ignacio "Social Democracy Betrayed", Le Monde diplomatique, April 1999 [Internet Access]
ROEDERER-RYNNING, Christilla " Farm conflict in France and the Europeanisation of agricultural policy",
West European Politics, 25 no. 3, July 2002, pp105-126
ROMMEL, Erwin The Rommel Papers, ed. by B.H. Liddel Hart et al., London, Arrow, 1984
ROULEAU, Eric "French Diplomacy Adrift in Kosovo", Le Monde diplomatique, December 1999 [Internet
Access]
SADRAN, Pierre “The French State and the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century”, in MILNER, Susan &
PARSONS, Nick (eds) Reinventing France: State and Society in the Twenty-First Century, Basingstoke,
Palgrave, 2003, pp48-62
SCHOTT, Jeffrey “Unlocking the Benefits of World Trade”, Economist, 1 November 2003, pp65-68 [Access via
Ebsco Database]
SCHRAEDER, Peter J. "Cold War to Cold Peace: Explaining U.S. French Competition in Francophone Africa",
Political Science Quarterly, 115 no. 3, Fall 2000, pp395-419
SHAPIRO, Jeremy & SUZAN, Bénédicte “The French Experience of Counter-Terrorism”, Survival, 45 no. 1,
Spring 2003, pp67-98.
SPARACO, Pierre "France Complete 6-Year Defense Plan", Aviation Week & Space Technology, 155 no. 6, 6
August 2001, pp32-34
Straits Times "France's Welfare Deficit 3 Times Higher Than Target", 11 June 1996 [Interactive Internet Access]
SUTTON, Michael "Chirac's Foreign Policy: Continuity - With Adjustment", World Today, July 1995, pp135-138
THOMAS, James P. The Military Challenges of Transatlantic Coalitions, London, IISS, Adelphi Paper 333, 2000
THOMPSON, J.M. The French Revolution, Oxford, Blackwell, 1985
TIEMAN, Ross "Race to Head Europe's Central Bank Heats Up", Evening Standard, 24 February 2003 [Internet
Access via Ebsco Database]
TINT, Herbert France Since 1918, 2nd. ed., N.Y., St Martin's Press, 1980
VINOCUR, John "Chirac Allies Win Sweeping Victory", International Herald Tribune, June 17, 2002 [Internet
Access]
WAITES, Neville "Defence Policy under Socialist Mangement", in MAZEY, Sonia & NEWMAN, Michael (ed.)
Mitterand's France, London, Croom Helm, 1987, pp192-217
WALLACH, Lori M. "A dangerous new manifesto for global capitalism", Le Monde diplomatique, February 1998
[Internet Access via http://MondeDiplo.com/]
WATSON, Rory “Blueprint for a new Europe wins wide approval”, The Times, 14 June 2003 [Access via Ebsco
Database]
Washington Post “Bush Lauds French Role in War on Terror”t, May 30, 2003 [Access via Ebsco
Database]
WINCHESTER, Hilary Contemporary France, Essex, Longman, 1993
WIEVIORKA, Michel "French Intellectuals: End of an era", Dissent, Spring 1994, pp248-252
WILSON, Peter "Voters Give Swift Kick to Arrogant Socialists", Australian, 17 June 2002, p7
Xinhua " France Maintains Reinforced Anti-Terrorist Security Measures", Xinhua News Agency, 05/06/2002
[Access via Ebsco Database]
Xinhua "France willing to build new partnership with Africa, says FM", Xinhua News Agency, June 13, 2003
[Access via Infotrac Database]
Xinhua “EU enhances cooperation with Mediterranean region in 2003”, Xinhua News Agency , 5 May 05, 2003
[Access via Ebsco Database]
YOST, David S. “Nuclear Debates in France”, Survival, 36 no. 4, Winter 1994-1995, pp113-140
YOST, David S. The US and Nuclear Deterrence in Europe, London, IISS, Adelphi Paper 326, 1999
ZIC, Zoran "French Foreign Policy Elites and the Crises in the Former Yugoslavia", Perspectives on Political
Science, 29 no. 1, Winter 2000, pp17-22
29