Citizens with practical wisdom and citizens following what the wise rulers say
(an inquiry on Nichomachean Ethics VI, 12-13)1
I
Can citizens be called “virtuous” solely on the grounds of being obedient to the
Law and/or of abiding to what sage rulers say? Is φρόνησις a quality that an individual
might obtain by its mere acting in a φρόνιμον way, without being –at the same time–
φρόνιμος? Is there a distinction between citizens that are φρόνιμοι and citizens that are
not but act according to what φρόνησις dictates? Or, to put it otherwise, can one
distinguish between the citizen that disposes practical wisdom and the one who does not,
albeit it acts according to what practical wisdom dictates?
Addressing these questions may utterly come down to addressing the fundamental
question of whether an agent that has the quality F can be distinguished from one that has
it not but acts as if it had it. It might be argued that the very question is meaningless and
that there is no such distinction whatsoever. More precisely, it might be argued that the
distinction is meaningless on the basis of there being no empirical grounds upon which
the question might be decided – i.e. of there being no testing procedure by which one can
discern the citizen who has the quality F and the one who acts as if it had it. Ludwig
Wittgenstein’s late philosophy might be called for supporting the answer that the very
distinction collapses under this lack of any empirical way to distinguish between the
two.2 Karl Popper’s criterion of falsifability might be called for the same reason.3
Suppose there being a person claiming that another person who acts in each and
every occasion in a φρόνιμον way is not in itself φρόνιμος but acts as if it were. Is there
any empirical way to falsify that statement? Theoretically there is none! For in an action
–on the occasion this person’s action– there is no empirical way to decide whether the
person acts in that way because it has the property F, or because it just happens –by pure
coincidence– to act according to what possessing F would have dictated. The thought
experiment is here supposed to assume the presence of a φρόνιμον behavior to everything
the subject does. There is nothing contradictory in such an assumption and, therefore, it is
logically possible that such a person exists. So, how one is supposed to distinguish this
person from the “essentially φρόνιμος”? If this is impossible, the distinction –it might be
argued– collapses.
1
A substantial part of this paper was presented at a conference of the European Society for Ancient
Philosophy (Athens, 27-29 Mars 2008) on Nicomachean Ethics VI, 13. I am much indebted to all the
participants and especially to Michail Peramatzis with whom we worked together for the above mentioned
presentation. This paper would not even have being possible, without his co-operation. However we
disagree as for the κατά-μετά hierarchy (cf. parts III and IV). As for that matter, I am the sole responsible
for the view put forward in the present paper.
2
See L. WITTGENSTEIN, Philosophical Investigations, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford, 1953 (2nd
part), and Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vols. 1 and 2, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, ed.
G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, Oxford, 1980.
3
See for example K. POPPER, Conjectures and Refutations, London, 1963, pp. 33-39.
1
These kind of problems bare similarities and can in fact be reduced to the general
problem of distinguishing between rational creatures and automata. The problem being
here the lack of any criterion for distinguishing between a rational animal –say a human
being– and an automaton (robot, zombie etc) that acts as if it had rationality. If such a
criterion is lacking, the very notion of “having rationality” or indeed “having soul/mind”
is put into trial, according to some thinkers among which Wittgenstein, Popper or even
Gilbert Ryle.4
Aristotle is not to be counted among these thinkers. Although some passages of
De anima suggest that “having soul” is equivalent with being a specific tool and
functioning well,5 there is no much doubt that Aristotle’s essentialism commits him to
distinguishing between “having the quality F” (“being F”) and “having all the
characteristics that the quality F implies”. The former implies the latter, while the latter
does not. In other words, there is, for Aristotle, a distinction between being essentially
something and the bundle of properties that this “something” implies. The essence of a
thing is not (identical to) this bundle of properties.6 Consequently, there has to be a
distinction between having the property/quality of being φρόνιμος and the bundle of
behavioristic features that being φρόνιμος presupposes. The following conclusion is
straightforward: granted that there is a distinction between being essentially F and having
the bundle of properties that F implies, there has to be a distinction between being
essentially φρόνιμος (counting φρόνησις among one’s essential characteristic) and
behaving according to what this essential characteristic dictates. Now, as we have already
said, De anima III represents a kind exegetical “minority report” to the, otherwise widely
attested, Aristotle’s essentialism. But, even there, the anti-essentialist part of the doctrine
is confined to the realm of psyche. This part of the doctrine seems to suggest that there
can be no distinction between a human being that possess a mind and the statement that
this human being performs the function(s) essential to this possession. (If it doesn’t, it is a
human being by homonymia, or “it has no mind”).7
Antiessentialism in Aristotle never leaves the above specific ground of critique
for a more general one. It never leaves the specific characteristic of “having a mind” for
the more general “having (the property) F” and, consequently, “having φρόνησις”/“being
φρόνιμος”. The (essentially) φρόνιμος is to be distinguished from the citizen who acts
according to what practical wisdom dictates but does not posses it. On the occasion from
the person who abides to the Law and to what the sage rulers propose, but has no
practical wisdom of its own.
II
Granted that Aristotle is expected to distinguish between “having φρóνησις” and
“acting according to what φρόνησις dictates”, let us see whether this is confirmed by the
corpus.
4
Cf. G. RYLE, The Concept of the Mind, Oxford, 1949.
See esp. De Anima, 431b29 – 432a3, 412a19-22, 412b10-22, 408a25-31, 408b13-15.
6
See esp. Metaphysics Ζ.
7
Cf. De Anima, 412b10-22.
5
2
In Nicomachean Ethics VI, 12, we encounter a passage suggesting that it makes
no difference for the city, whether the citizen acts in a φρόνιμον way because it is
φρόνιμος, or because he does what the φρόνιμοι require him to do.
εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτων χάριν φρόνιμον ῥητέον ἀλλὰ
τοῦ γίνεσθαι, τοῖς οὖσι σπουδαίοις οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη χρήσιμος·
ἔτι δ' οὐδὲ τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ διοίσει αὐτοὺς ἔχειν
ἢ ἄλλοις ἔχουσι πείθεσθαι, ἱκανῶς τ' ἔχοι ἂν ἡμῖν ὥσπερ
καὶ περὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν· βουλόμενοι γὰρ ὑγιαίνειν ὅμως οὐ
μανθάνομεν ἰατρικήν. 8
But in the subsequent final chapter of the Nicomachean Ethics VI this schema
will be reversed (refuted) and the citizen will be required not only to act according to a
φρόνιμον way, but also to possess φρόνησις.
For example in 1144b30-33, we read:
δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων
ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κυρίως ἄνευ φρονήσεως, οὐδὲ
φρόνιμον ἄνευ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς.
and some lines bellow (1145a2-5):
δῆλον δέ, κἂν
εἰ μὴ πρακτικὴ ἦν, ὅτι ἔδει ἂν αὐτῆς διὰ τὸ τοῦ μορίου
ἀρετὴν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔσται ἡ προαίρεσις ὀρθὴ ἄνευ
φρονήσεως οὐδ' ἄνευ ἀρετῆς·
Mere obedience to the Laws and to the sage rulers suffices no more. The citizen,
in order to be virtuous κυρίως, has to have φρόνησις. In order to deliberate correctly, he
needs to have φρόνησις.
However there is an exegetical problem within this same chapter. In lines
1144b26ff Aristotle distinguishes between “being according to φρόνησις” (κατά την
φρόνησιν) and “being accompanied by (co-operating with) φρόνησις” (μετά φρονήσεως).
Prima facie he seems to suggest that the latter implies the former but not vice versa.
Some scholars9 have found problems in this understanding of the text. The problem they
think they have found is the following. Acting according to (κατά) φρόνησις does not
exclude following what φρόνησις dictates without, at the same time, being φρόνιμος – cf.
the case of the ignorant citizen following the sage ruler. Moreover, according to the
prima facie interpretation mentioned above being according to (κατά) implies either (i)
8
Nicomachean Ethics VI, 12, 1143b28-33.
See esp. J. A. SMITH, “Aristotelica”, Classical Quarterly, 14, 1920, pp. 16-22, and W. F. R. HARDIE,
Aristotle’s Ethical Theory, Oxford, 1968.
9
3
following some external rule10 or (ii) following some rule unconsciously.11 On the other
hand, Aristotle unambiguously suggests in the same passage that the human being, when
virtuous, should be μετά φρονήσεως; this necessitates that its soul disposes φρόνησις. If
so κατά should not be implied by μετά, for, if it did it, would have implied exactly the
opposite of what is required: i.e. it would imply that it does not dispose φρόνησις but that
it follows it either as an external rule, or unconsciously. In order to remedy this
contradiction of the prima facie reading, Smith and Hardie put forward some other
interpretation. We are not going to present it here. We are, instead, going to argue that the
problem these authors find in the prima facie reading emanates from the misleading
assumption that κατά means here following some external rule or following some rule
unconsciously. In the rest of this article we will argue that the weaker/trivial
interpretation of κατά as according to presents no difficulty for the prima facie
interpretation and therefore presents no problem for the thesis that μετά is here stronger
than κατά.
We will proceed as follows. First we will present the crucial passage with a
translation together with a central exegetical point about μετά not being synonymous with
ουκ ανευ in that passage. Second, we will present a Commentary on that passage, and
finally we will draw some conclusions. The paper closes with an Appendix having some
illuminating passages.
ΙII
Nicomachean Ethics VI, 13, 1144b17-30:
διόπερ τινές φασι πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς φρονήσεις εἶναι, καὶ Σωκράτης τῇ μὲν
ὀρθῶς ἐζήτει τῇ δ' ἡμάρτανεν· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φρονήσεις ᾤετο
εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ἡμάρτανεν, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἄνευ φρονήσεως, καλῶς ἔλεγεν. σημεῖον δέ· καὶ γὰρ νῦν πάντες,
ὅταν ὁρίζωνται τὴν ἀρετήν, προστιθέασι, τὴν ἕξιν εἰπόντες
καὶ πρὸς ἅ ἐστι, τὴν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον· ὀρθὸς δ' ὁ
κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. ἐοίκασι δὴ μαντεύεσθαί πως ἅπαντες
ὅτι ἡ τοιαύτη ἕξις ἀρετή ἐστιν, ἡ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. δεῖ
δὲ μικρὸν μεταβῆναι. ἔστι γὰρ οὐ μόνον ἡ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν
λόγον, ἀλλ' ἡ μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου ἕξις ἀρετή ἐστιν· ὀρθὸς
δὲ λόγος περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ φρόνησίς ἐστιν. Σωκράτης
μὲν οὖν λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς ᾤετο εἶναι (ἐπιστήμας γὰρ εἶναι
πάσας), ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ λόγου.
“For this reason, precisely, some say that all virtues are types of practical wisdom,
and Socrates in one way was in the correct path of inquiry but in another was off
the track; for insofar as he thought that all virtues are types of practical wisdom he
was mistaken, while insofar as he held that they are not without practical wisdom
Cf. J. A. SMITH, “Aristotelica”, op. cit. (The view is reported by Smith; it is not his own. For Smith’s
own view see infra.)
11
J. A. STEWART, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, 2 vols., Oxford, 1892.
10
4
he was speaking correctly. And an indication of this is the following: everybody
nowadays, when defining virtue, adds, over and above specifying the state and
what it is related to, that it [the state] is the one in accordance with the correct
reason; and correct [reason] is the one in accordance with practical wisdom. All
these theorists, then, look like they somehow divine the claim that virtue is this
sort of state, the one in accordance with practical wisdom. We must, however,
slightly modify this. For it is not the state only in accordance with correct reason
but [also] the one together with correct reason that is virtue; and the correct reason
about such things is what practical wisdom is. Socrates, then, thought that virtues
are types of reason (for [he thought that] they are all types of knowledge), while
we hold that they are together with reason”.12
I will argue here that the κατά thesis in the above passage is weaker than the μετά
thesis; that although μετά implies κατά, κατά does not imply μετά. As it will become
obvious in part IV, my reconstruction depends upon a central terminological assumption:
that ουκ ανευ as it stands in lines b21-22 is not equivalent/synonymous with μετά in lines
b28ff. This interpretation depends on the above assumption, and if the assumption is
false, my interpretation falls with it. On the other hand, the thesis that κατά is stronger
than μετά gets a great amount of help, if ουκ ανευ in lines 21-22 is synonymous with
μετά. (Smith for example, who argues for the priority of κατά over μετά, takes ουκ άνευ
to mean the same with μετά). For my part, I want to suggest that although the meaning of
μετά as it appears after line 27 is the strong/functional “in co-operation with”/“with the
help of”, the sense of ουκ ανευ is weaker and perhaps formal/definitional. It just means:
in the definition of virtue “φρόνησις” needs to occur, φρόνησις makes essential part of
κυρία virtue, as specified in line b17.
Let me mention three reasons why one should not take ουκ άνευ φρονήσεως
meaning the same as μετά φρονήσεως, and should take μετά as weaker than κατά.
The first is form the corpus. In the first passage of the Appendix one can find
strong if not irrefutable evidence that Aristotle formally distinguishes between μετά and
ουκ άνευ. The passage is about the characteristics one has to look for in happiness. What
can be unambiguously deduced from the passage is that these characteristics are either
accompanied by (μετά) or not without (ουκ άνευ) pleasure. Ergo there are things that are
not without pleasure, but they are not accompanied by pleasure. So, on the basis of (i)
having strong evidence that Aristotle does not in general use μετά and ουκ άνευ without
discrimination, (ii) the fact that this distinction as it appears in the passage seems to be
technical and standardized – I focus your attention on the fact that Aristotle makes no
explanatory comment after the passage, as he usually does when he introduces ad hoc
non standard terminological distinctions– (iii) the fact that the repeated alternative
occurrences of ουκ άνευ and μετά in our passage of Nicomachean Ethics VI are within 10
lines or so and (iv) Aristotle’s characteristic sensitivity and carefulness about the use of
terms, I find it most improbable, if not impossible, that Aristotle has here decided to
12
The translation is by Michail Peramatzis.
5
switch from what looks like a self-evident distinction both to himself and to his intended
readers in book I to an indiscernible use in book VI.
My second point. Let us grand for argument’s sake that ουκ άνευ and μετά are
used indiscernibly in Nicomachean Ethics VI, 13. The interpretation identifying these
two expressions does not solely rest upon the claim that they have the same meaning. It
also specifies the meaning of μετά as the strong/functional “in co-operation with”/“with
the help of”. Let us then also agree that μετά is not the plain “with”, but the stronger “in
co-operation with”/“by the help of”. These assumptions imply that the part of the Socratic
viewpoint that Aristotle approves of (i.e. the ουκ άνευ thesis of b20-21) means also “in
co-operation with”. However, this same part of Socrates’ viewpoint needs to be deducible
from, or at least needs to be compatible with, the rest of the Socratic thesis (i.e. that all
virtues are φρονήσεις). Now, it seems to me that it is neither compatible with it, nor a
fortiori deducible from it. If something is identical with something, it doesn’t co-operate
with that thing, nor does it get any help from it; it is that thing. The plain “not without” or
the technical “it appears within the definition of” are to be preferred.
Thirdly (this is in substance the same as the previous point), by imposing a strong
sense upon ουκ άνευ in lines 20-21 (i.e. making it synonymous with μετά), I can see no
way one can make it deducible from κατά. For the σημείον of lines 21ff seems to be
evidence of how correct Socrates was in believing (saying) that no virtue is άνευ
φρονήσεως. If the ουκ άνευ φρονήσεως of lines b20-21 means μετά φρονήσεως, how else
could the κατά την φρόνησιν of line b24 imply the correctness of Socrates’ thesis that all
virtues are ουκ άνευ φρονήσεως=μετά φρονήσεως, unless μετά is stronger than κατά?
But being in accordance with something does not necessarily mean co-operating with that
same thing, as in fact it doesn’t when the two “things” are one and the same (the Socratic
viewpoint).
Summing up. Everybody nowadays (b21) claims that all virtues are κατά την
φρόνησιν. This can be seen as partly Socratic: some of the thinkers claiming such a thing
do so because of the thesis that all virtues are φρονήσεις; the Socratic thesis. If they are
φρονήσεις, they can only be in accordance with what they are, i.e. be κατά την φρόνησιν.
This is satisfactory in a sense, because indeed it happens to be so: all virtues are κατά την
φρόνησιν. However, it is not entirely satisfactory, because they are such not on the basis
of their being φρονήσεις, but on the basis of their essentially co-operating with φρόνησις.
They are, therefore, κατά την φρόνησιν, without being φρονήσεις. Moreover, being κατά
την φρόνησιν, on the basis of being φρονήσεις, does not imply co-operating with
φρόνησις, for in such case the virtue is φρόνησις, it does co-operate with it.
According to the above understanding, the μετά thesis is stronger than the κατά
thesis, since it implies but it is not implied by it, and it is also closer to the Socratic thesis,
according to which all virtues are φρονήσεις. It can be seen as compatible with the
Socratic thesis that all virtues are φρονήσεις, while the μετά thesis cannot.
In the following part, I will present this exegetical schema in more detail.
6
IV
Commentary – Paraphrasis
Nicomachean Ethics VI, 13, 1144b16-30
[b16-21] Among the two kinds of virtue, the natural and the κύρια, the latter does not
occur without φρόνησις. And it is for exactly that reason that some –among which
Socrates himself– were saying that all virtues are φρονήσεις. Aristotle says this, because
if a virtue is φρόνησις, then it cannot be without φρόνησις, meaning here that “virtue”
makes part of its essence. This is correct, for if something is identical to something, then
it cannot be without the thing it is identical with. But it so happens that on the one hand
Socrates was right, while on the other mislead. He was right in believing that no virtue
occurs without φρόνησις. He was wrong as for the reason he thought that this is so, or
(which is the same) as for the principle upon which he based the fact that no virtue occurs
without φρόνησις. For he thought that this is so because virtues are (identical to)
φρονήσεις.
[b21-25] Further support to the claim that no virtue occurs without φρόνησις is that even
nowadays all, when defining virtue, and after having introduced the εξις and the things it
refers to (πρός α), they add <the one –i.e. έξις+the thing it refers to> “in accordance with
ορθός λόγος”. Now, in accordance with ορθός λόγος is in accordance with φρόνησις. All
seem to conjecture that this particular kind of εξις which is virtue is the one in accordance
with φρόνησις. That this is evidence of the correctness of the claim that no virtue occurs
without φρόνησις comes as follows. There is universal consensus upon all virtues being
essentially in accordance with φρόνησις. And if something is essentially in accordance
with something, then it cannot occur without the thing it is in accordance with.
[b25-28] This again is exact, but, again, the correct conclusion is (correctly) drawn from
the wrong premise. For although (i) all virtues are in accordance with φρόνησις and (ii)
no virtue occurs without φρόνησις, that (iii) they are (identical to) φρονήσεις is not the
correct explanation of the phenomenon. Yes, the latter claim implies the former two,
which are both exact. But they are not so on that basis. This is why Aristotle has said that
these people (b24) “are guessing” (μαντεύεσθαι) as for that matter. They arrive at a true
conclusion, but since their argument is not sound, it is rather a happy coincidence (a
lucky guess) that leads them to it.13 Therefore, we need for our part to ameliorate a little
bit the whole argument/thesis, and supply the correct explanation of why all virtues are in
accordance with φρόνησις and do not occur without it. They are not only in accordance
with ορθός λόγος, they are also co-operating with (together with)14 ορθός λόγος, and
ορθός λόγος on these matters –i.e. on each and every among the προς α– is φρόνησις.
Aristotle says this, because he apparently believes that if something essentially cooperates with something else, then it can never operate without the thing it essentially cooperates with, and he also believes that it will always need to operate in accordance with
that same thing; that it has been tuned (as for some parameters at least), in accordance
with that thing, and that it cannot operate (as for the same parameters), in discord with it.
The fact that it co-operates with it provides one with the correct reason why it cannot
occur without it and why it operates in accordance with it. So, both the thesis that all
13
14
I owe this point to Miira Tuominen.
Cf. passage no 2 of the Appendix.
7
virtues are φρονήσεις and the thesis that all virtues co-operate with φρόνησις imply the
required facts, but only the latter is true.
[b28-30] Socrates held the former for he held that virtues are λόγοι; he took virtues to be
επιστήμαι, and λόγοι are the intentional objects of επιστήμαι; an επιστήμη is an επιστήμη
of some λόγος. (“Επιστήμη” is systematically ambiguous: it can either mean the
knowledge of a certain thing, or the thing known in itself –here the λόγος– qua known.)15
Aristotle, however, holds that virtues essentially co-operate with λογοι, not that they are
λόγοι. Here Aristotle says λόγοι instead the ορθός λόγος, because by referring to
επιστήμη he narrows the domain of λόγοι down to the domain of ορθοί λόγοι. No one can
know a λόγος that is not ορθός.
***
Some further comments on the terms and the implications
κατά: in accordance with.16
…ουκ άνευ---: not without, essentially bound to; as for definitions: the term on the right
(…) has to appear in the definition of the item denoted by the term on the left (---).
μετά: in co-operation with.17
ουκ άνευ and κατά weaker than μετά.
being φρόνησις (Socrates’ view)
being μετά φρονήσεως (Aristotle’s view)
being κατά την φρόνησιν (universal consensus)
being ουκ άνευ φρονήσεως
(Implications are from top down. Side by side items are mutually exclusive)
A being (identical to) B implies: (i) A being κατά B, (ii) A being ουκ άνευ B, but not (iii)
A being μετά B. A in this last case in not co-operating with B it is B.
A being μετά B implies (i) A being κατά B and (ii) A being ουκ άνευ B, but not (iii) A
being (identical to) B.
Summing up: “virtue is φρόνησις” (i.e. the Socratic view), implies being in
accordance with φρόνησις (being κατά την φρόνησιν), for nothing can be in discord with
what it is identical to. Therefore, “being κατά την φρόνησιν” allows “being φρόνησις”.
On the other hand, “co-operating with φρόνησις” (Aristotle’s view) also implies being in
accordance with φρόνησις, for nothing can be in discord with what it is essentially cooperating with. Finally, they both imply being ουκ άνευ φρονήσεως, since being κατά
την φρόνησιν implies being ουκ άνευ φρονήσεως, and being κατά την φρόνησιν is
implied by them both.
So, and as for our general question about κατά/μετά: μετά is, in this context,
stronger than κατά. A virtue μετά φρονήσεως has to be κατά την φρόνησιν. However, a
15
Cf. passage no 3 of the Appendix.
Cf. LSJ, sense B.IV.
17
Cf. LSJ, sense A.II.
16
8
virtue κατά την φρόνησιν need not being μετά φρονήσεως, for if the virtue is φρόνησις,
φρόνησις is not co-operating with it, it literally is that virtue.
Nota Bene: By this interpretation μετά becomes stronger than κατά, but it is not
necessary to assume that, when Aristotle attacks the Socratic viewpoint, he attacks a
thesis that makes φρόνησις external to the individual, or that he attacks a thesis according
to which the individual is not fully conscious of the φρόνησις it has. If the individual is
virtuous, and virtue is φρόνησις, then the individual does have the ορθός λογος/φρόνησις.
It is internal to the individual and the individual is conscious of it too (cf. επιστήμη in
context). All this is trivially compatible with the κατά thesis: the virtue is in accordance
with itself. On the other hand, the μετά thesis is also compatible with φρόνησις being
internal to the individual and so with the κατά thesis; the stake is not on the
external/internal or conscious/unconscious distinction. More precisely, my argument is
that since taking κατά to be weaker than μετά does not necessarily imply the previous
two conclusions the grounds upon which κατά has to be taken as stronger than μετά are
considerably weakened. So, although this interpretation of κατά/μετά makes μετά
stronger than κατά, one needs not conclude that Aristotle –in so far as he attacks the
Socratic viewpoint and endorses the μετά thesis– attacks what he is supposed to adopt
and praises what he is supposed to criticize.
Doukas KAPANTAÏS
(Athens)
APPENDIX
1) Nicomachean Ethics I, 8, 1098b22-25
Φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα
τὰ περὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἅπανθ' ὑπάρχειν τῷ λεχθέντι. τοῖς
μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τοῖς δὲ φρόνησις ἄλλοις δὲ σοφία τις εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα ἢ τούτων τι μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς·
ἕτεροι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐετηρίαν συμπαραλαμβάνουσιν.
2) Aspasii in Eth. Nicom. (22, 17-22)
τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα, τουτέστι πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς ἢ τούτων τινά, φiλoσοφίαν ἢ φρόνησιν, εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς
συναρμόζει τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δόξαν διὰ τῶν ἑξῆς. τὸ δὲ μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ
ἡδονῆς διαφέρει τι. μεθ' ἡδονῆς μὲν οἱ λέγοντες μέρος τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ποιοῦσι τὴν ἡδονήν, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς, οὐ μέρος ἀλλ' ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ ἡ εὐδαιμονία λέγουσι τὴν ἡδονήν.
3) Eustratii in Eth. Nicom. (402, 36 – 403, 7)
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Τὴν διαφορὰν τίθησιν ἣν ἔχουσί πως αὐτὸς καὶ Σωκράτης περὶ
ἀρετῆς λέγοντες, ἵνα μή τις φαίη περιττὸν εἶναι αὐτόν, ἐπεὶ τοῦ Σωκράτους
καθάπτεται ὥς τι παρ' αὐτὸν ἄλλο λέγοντος, ἐπεὶ κἀκεῖνος καὶ οὗτος λόγον παραλαμβάνουσιν ἐν τῷ λέγειν περὶ ἀρετῆς, καί φησιν ἐκεῖνον μὲν
αὐτὸ τοῦτο λόγους λέγειν τὰς ἀρετάς, ἐπεὶ ἐπιστήμας αὐτὰς ὑπελάμβανεν
(αἱ γὰρ ἐπιστῆμαι λόγοι γνωστικοὶ τῶν ἐπιστητῶν), οὗτος δ' οὐ λόγους
ἀλλὰ μετὰ λόγου ταύτας εἶναι ἡμῖν παραδέδωκεν. ἕτερον δέ ἐστι τὸ εἶναί τι τόδε τι καὶ μετὰ τοῦδέ τινος εἶναι.
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