Taylor (C.C.W.) Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics Books II-IV. Pp. xxiv + 258. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
2006. Cased, £45 (Paper, £16.99). ISBN: 0-19-825066-5 (0-19-825067-3 pbk).
The goal of a Clarendon Aristotle volume is to provide the tools needed by a reader who lacks Greek,
but who wishes nonetheless to engage philosophically with an Aristotelian text at a high level of
accuracy and rigor. What one looks for, then, in the translation, is clarity and accuracy, and
especially nothing which would mislead the reader or obscure the meaning. The commentary has
multiple tasks, but the rule is that it should provide just what is necessary to advance a sound
philosophical understanding of the text.
One cannot say that the translation in the present volume is noteworthy for its especial accuracy. To
give a simple example, the translation frequently fails to take into account the force of a καί: “Hence
it is clear <as well> that none of the virtues of character comes to us by nature,” 1103a18; “What
happens in states <also> bears this out,” 1103b2; “So virtue <, too,> is up to us,” 1113b6; “but there
are five other states which are <also> called courage,” 1116a16; etc. This sort of inaccuracy is not
irrelevant, since Aristotle often uses καί to mark the structure of an argument or a list of
considerations, as in the examples above.
Again, one not infrequently finds a needless resort to paraphrase. For instance, ἢ οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν
τεχνῶν οὕτως ἔχει; (1105a21-22), becomes “But is it not as we say in the cases of technical skills
too?” (Compare Rowe: “Or does this fail to hold, in fact, even for skills?”) Or consider the following,
where one finds inconsistency as well as paraphrase:
τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα τὸ εὖ ἔχει ἐν αὑτοῖς· ἀρκεῖ οὖν
ταῦτά πως ἔχοντα γενέσθαι· τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα οὐκ ἐὰν
αὐτά πως ἔχῃ, δικαίως ἢ σωφρόνως πράττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ὁ πράττων
πῶς ἔχων πράττῃ, …
The products of technical skills determine in themselves whether their producer has
done well; it is enough that an output of a certain kind is produced. But in the case
of the virtues it is not the case that if the output is of a certain kind, the action is
performed justly or temperately, but also if the agent is in a certain condition when
he acts, … (1105a27-31)
Nothing in Aristotle’s text warrants “determine in themselves whether their producer has
done well” (compare Ross: “have their goodness in themselves”); the term “output,”
originating for us in the industrial revolution, is itself anachronistic and liable to be confused
by the reader with “products;” and the translation switches from “of a certain kind” to “in a
certain condition” for πῶς ἔχει, thus obscuring the argument.
Other examples of looseness include “totally decisive” for τὸ πᾶν δύναται (1105b5); “is”
for ἦν (1113b13), yet “it was, we saw” for ἦν (1117a16); “self-esteem” for ἀξίωμα
(1117a24); “equally” for ὁμοίως (1119a28); “as such” for τὸ δ' ὅλον (1119a32); “that
aspect of our nature” for τὸ συγγενές (1119b9); “and that is what reason prescribes for its
part” for οὕτω δὲ τάττει καὶ ὁ λόγος (1119b17-8). Other inconsistencies include an
unwarranted shift from rendering τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα as “particular circumstances” at
1119a28 to rendering it “particular instances” at 1119a31; and a shift from rendering ἀρετή
as “virtue” to rendering it as “excellence” within eleven lines (1103a31, b7).
This last shift is deliberate on Taylor’s part. In a Preliminary Note to the translation he
explains that, given the tradition of English usage, and the existence of a philosophy school
of “virtue ethics,” it would be inappropriate to avoid altogether rendering ἀρετή as “virtue.”
Instead he adopts the rule: when Aristotle is speaking of virtues of character in general, or
particular virtues of character, then ἀρετή gets rendered as “virtue;” but when Aristotle is
speaking of intellectual virtues, or intellectual and character virtues considered together, or
of non-moral strengths, then it gets rendered as “excellence.” The purpose of the
gerrymandered rule is apparently so that ἀρετή will be rendered as “virtue” just when it
would be natural for us to use the word; but the rule, obviously, introduces discontinuities
not present in Aristotle’s language or thought.
Moreover, it is not clear that the rule is correct even with respect to English usage. Justice
(δικαιοσύνη) for Aristotle is a virtue of character, but do we—except in special contexts—
call it a “virtue”? One may raise this point not simply as a matter of language: the very
structure of the present volume seems shaped by a consideration of what “we” would count
as virtue. It purports to cover those books of the Nicomachean Ethics where Aristotle gives
his account of “the virtues,” and yet it deals only with books II-IV, thus omitting justice, a
central moral virtue for Aristotle, and prudence (φρόνησις), one of the traditional cardinal
virtues, and inextricably related to the moral virtues.
This restriction in scope goes unexplained, and yet it seems to affect the interpretation of
the material that is included: as for instance in Taylor’s attributing to Aristotle the thesis of
the “definitional priority of the agent over the act,” viz. that ultimately virtuous actions are
to be defined in terms of a virtuous agent, not the reverse (1105b5-9, ad loc.). This thesis is
clearly false for the virtue of justice in Aristotle, and yet it cannot easily be sustained
everywhere if it is rejected somewhere.
A common complaint about Clarendon Aristotle commentaries is that they are strong on
details but weak on giving the general structure and bringing in bigger themes. Taylor’s
commentary is strong on many details: for instance, his discussions of the three “conditions
for virtuous action” in II.4 (pp. 83-96), and of “the voluntary” in III.1 (pp. 125-50) are
judicious and sophisticated. As for bigger themes, Taylor brings these in largely by aiming to
read Aristotle, in Nic. Eth. II-IV at least, as up to the same task as modern “virtue theorists.”
This, I think, is a mistake: differences at least as consequential as those Taylor notes
between Aristotle’s modern followers and books VI-X (see p. xxiv), are to be found also in
books II-IV, and it would be most valuable for a commentary to make these differences
especially salient.
It should also be said that the commentary is excellent for its explanation of the nuances of
Greek terms (e.g. ἕξις, πάθος, ἑκούσιον), and, furthermore, Taylor takes the welcome
step of referring freely not simply to recent philosophers but also to Anon., Aquinas,
Aspasius, and Heliodorus, thus placing his commentary implicitly in the context of a long
tradition.
Institute for the Psychological Sciences (Arlington, VA, USA)
MICHAEL PAKALUK