PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE: Emerging Concepts for the Future
Chapter 11—Michael Herman
Intelligence Doctrine for International
Peace Support
Michael Herman
T he
peace support considered here is assumed to take the form of
international military operations of some kind under UN leadership or
authorization, with a multinational command structure akin to that of NATO,
or NATO plus other associated countries. The problem these operations pose is
simple enough. They depend heavily on good intelligence; but intelligence is
essentially a national activity. Intelligence for them therefore comes from a
combination of national collection with international pooling of the product.
Sometimes this pooling exists in formal, regular ways, as through NATO’s
long-standing intelligence arrangements, but this rarely applies outside NATO;
and even in NATO the pooling is incomplete. The most important intelligence
flows everywhere are either purely national ones to national actors, or those
available internationally only on a limited ‘eyes only’ basis within multilateral
intelligence ‘clubs’, principally the UK-US-Old Commonwealth one (though
there may be other less well-established ones). Items from these restricted
services are of course sometimes released to other nationals, but mainly on an
ad hoc basis as part of the policy lobbying of key foreign players who would
not otherwise see them. Similarly the tasking of intelligence collection in these
international peace support operations remains mainly a matter for individual
nations and the intelligence alliances to which they belong. All this works up
to a point, especially when the Americans are the ringmasters with British
assistance, as has usually been the case. Nevertheless post-mortems on peace
support have regularly asked for something better. General Wesley Clark’s
comment on Kosovo reflects the disparaging view about alliance intelligence:
‘It (NATO) had no collection and little analytic capabilities’.1 Governments
and peoples outside NATO regard intelligence with even deeper distrust; as
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something secret, threatening and best not discussed. The UN will only talk
officially about ‘information’ and ‘military information’. Hence the problem:
can national intelligence be made more useful in these international operations?
This chapter suggests contributions to an international intelligence doctrine that
does not yet exist.
Intelligence Outlined
For this purpose two aspects of intelligence’s definition can be sidestepped. The
first is the nature of intelligence itself, and the semantic distinctions between it
and the general run of other information-providers, including the other
components of the American military ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance) and British ISTAR (ISR plus Target Acquisition). The same
applies to the definitional differences between Sigint and ESM (electronic
support measures). These all raise fascinating issues, and are important for
budgeting and command-and-control purposes. But in the context of
international peace support intelligence can be considered here simply as a
specialist activity in information-gathering, processing, production and
marketing, whose distinctive subject is ‘them’, and not ‘us’; or in military terms
‘Red’ and not ‘Blue’. Peace support also involves intelligence on collaborating,
neutral and environmental ‘White’ and ‘Grey’ targets, but they can be treated
here as if they were all ‘Red’.
The second is the relevance of the conventional ‘politico-strategic’, ‘strategic’,
‘operational’ and ‘tactical’ labels often used in explaining military intelligence.
As applied in this way they denote three things: the levels of command that
intelligence serves, the kinds of decisions it supports, and the levels at which
intelligence is itself controlled, and the three get horribly confused. Prime
Ministers at the highest politico-strategic level also take short-term as well as
longer-term decisions and for them often need ‘tactical’ as well as ‘strategic’
intelligence. So-called ‘strategic’ intelligence assets, such as American
intelligence satellites centrally controlled at the ‘national’ level, supply product
for use at all levels in the command hierarchy; for targeting and other front-line
peace support operations as often as for the top level. The resulting
misunderstandings can be multiplied. So only two levels of command are
considered here: the ‘national capital’ and ‘theatre’ levels, and no attempt is
made to distinguish between the types of intelligence the two require.
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Instead, for intelligence itself I differentiate between two kinds. Most
intelligence is a flow of information; not ‘raw data’, but single-source or allsource product processed and validated in some way. The other, much less
voluminous flow is of product geared to specific decision-taking issues,
typically by seeing a particular situation though the target’s eyes,
understanding his relevant capabilities, and forecasting developments. This is
the concept of the intelligence appreciation, assessment, or estimate; for
convenience here I use ‘assessment’. (American usage favours ‘estimate’, but
in the UK this has some connotations of routine order-or-battle and similar
publications). It is the ‘Red’ part of the military ‘assessment of the situation’.
British military doctrine describes it rather well as ‘applied intelligence’, or
‘intelligence which is tailored to provide direct support to the decision making
process’.2
This is familiar to military men, but hard for others to grasp, particularly for the
kind of mixed political and military (‘pol-mil’) assessments now needed for
peace support. Outside UK-US-Old Commonwealth circles, few civilians in
government acknowledge the difference between an intelligence assessment,
close to policy but steering clear of explicit recommendation, and the policy
planning or decision-taking which draws on it. Fewer people anywhere
appreciate the difference between the main intelligence flows and an
assessment of them, or distinguish for example between a Situation Centre’s
daily brief on what is happening and the assessment of its significance. The
distinction resembles that between two kinds of historians: those who tell
history as narrative, and those who try to ‘understand’ or ‘explain’ it. One can
argue about the nature of historical understanding and explanation, and
similarly about the characteristics of an intelligence assessment; but we
recognize one when we see it.
A Peace Support Doctrine
On that basis five points of international doctrine can be suggested.
Thus

Command gets its intelligence from a specialist staff,
distinct from others.
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
All information on ‘'them’ flows into this staff, whether
collected by special intelligence means or by others, such
as normal military observation.

Assessments produced by the staff are regular inputs to
decision-taking.

The staff tasks national intelligence collection and all other
sources of information to meet its needs.

The whole system depends on an ability to handle
information confidentially, and the staff therefore
incorporates intelligence’s defensive security role of
protecting this information from attack.
Of these the intelligence assessment is the heart of the process. Decisiontaking at any level needs to be served by it. Miscellaneous information about
‘Red’ may do more harm than good if it does not receive proper assessment.
At theatre level this seems a statement of the obvious. The task of command
there may not be straightforward; it may well be confused by the roles of the
UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative and other alliance
representatives alongside the commander, and it always has to cope with the
national ‘red cards’ possessed in practice by all the national military
contingents. These have combined with other factors to produce intelligence
shortcomings at that level that can be discussed later. But at least there
normally is an international Force Commander with a recognizable intelligence
structure under him, geared at least notionally to assessing, even if intelligence
has to be called ‘information’ and the actual quality of assessment is variable.
This does not apply at the top government level. Here no comparable
intelligence structure exists, and the search for an intelligence doctrine for
peace support needs to start there.
Top Level Assessments
Decisions are agreed at this level by governments in negotiations in national
capitals, and in and around the appropriate international forums—the Security
Council, the NATO Council and its subsidiaries, and perhaps its equivalents in
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the EU and elsewhere—with the UN and NATO Secretaries-General (and
sometimes the EU High Representative and others) as important operators.
Negotiation and decision-taking here is a diffuse and difficult process. The
more this applies, the more it would benefit from having agreed intelligence
assessments on which it could be based. Inter-governmental agreement is
difficult in any circumstances, but is more achievable if there is concurrence
about the relevant facts and forecasts.
Here the original historical precedent can be found in intelligence support for
UK-US Grand Strategy in the Second World War. The transatlantic exchanges
of Sigint and other covert intelligence are well known, but less publicity has
been given to the evolution of agreed inter-governmental assessments.
Churchill’s wartime dictum that ‘Ministers should not have to argue about
statistics’ was applied equally to the development of the national Joint
Intelligence Committee (the JIC), and after the US entry to the war to intergovernmental planning. Hence the UK-US Combined Intelligence Committee
was created in 1942 as part of the machinery of the Combined Chiefs of Staff,
and by the autumn of that year this intelligence committee was meeting daily. 3
There were elaborate arrangements for exchanging assessments, but one gets
the impression that the British ones carried the day.
This sprang from two features of the wartime British system. The authority of
JIC product came partly through reconciling different interpretations to produce
agreed conclusions, and inter-service agreement of this kind came rather more
easily to the British than to the American army and navy. But the British
product was more than just a lowest common denominator of consensus; it had
an rigour about it that was derived from its wartime drafters, the Joint
Intelligence Staff (JIS), whose able and independently-minded civilians in
uniform developed a corporate independence from single-service party lines.
These features were carried over into the peacetime British system, and
replicated in the post-war emergence of the American National Intelligence
Estimates (NIEs). These reflected interdepartmental disagreements more clearly
than their British equivalents, but were still single, agreed assessments and
owed much in their quality to CIA’s calibre and non-departmental status. In
both countries the idea that assessments are products of argument and intellect,
and are not tied to the court politics of power—or should not be—became part
of the mental furniture, and has remained so.
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The Second World War left one other legacy. Grand strategy was a matter for
Britain and the US; there was no need to share strategic assessments with the
Western European governments in exile, and good reasons for not doing so.
This was entirely understandable at the time, but was a factor in formulating
NATO’s postwar doctrine that intelligence is essentially a national matter. The
alliance has of course its intelligence structure and its formal assessments for
force planning purposes, and its Intelligence Division in Brussels now has
official roles of assessment, current intelligence and warning. But one gets the
impression that the Division’s impact is determined by its place within the
International Military Staff, and not by any requirement to provide pol-mil
assessments for use by the Secretary-General and the Divisions of Political
Affairs and Defence Planning and Operations, and as a basis for collective
alliance discussion in the NATO Council and its subsidiaries. It may be
significant that in the current NATO Handbook references to intelligence occur
on only two pages out of 536, and the NATO Intelligence Committee is not
mentioned. NATO as a body still seems to feel, as in the Cold War, that
intelligence is a suspect national activity, on which exchanges should remain a
matter for select groups behind green baize doors, unacknowledged in the
mainstream of the alliance.
The UN attitude is like NATO’s, only much more so. A small assessment group
(the Information and Research Cell) evolved in the 1990s within its Situation
Centre, made up at one stage of British, American, French and Russian
representatives with some access to national material; five officers and one
NCO are said to have been working there in 1997.4 But its role was still to
write assessments for the Secretary General and UN staff, an important function
indeed, but not for circulation to the Security Council members; and its
members were on secondment from their nations, and not permanent
international staff. In 2000 the Secretary-General established an Information
and Strategic Analysis Secretariat in the Department of Political Affairs, but
with assessment and policy analysis still apparently combined. Something of
the same combination is suggested by the title of the EU’s Policy Planning and
Early Warning Unit.
Of course national assessments are circulated behind the scenes, bilaterally and
multilaterally. Britain has certainly developed its service of selected JIC reports
to some counries outside its main UK-US-Old Commonwealth circle, and on
issues such as Saddam Hussein’s acquisition of WMD the US’s international
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use of intelligence has probably been even more extensive. It may also be
assumed that key items get shown to the UN Secretary-General and other
selected international officials, in the UN and elsewhere. All this is against a
wider background in which international exchanges on terrorism greatly
increased after September 2001, and indeed were mandated by Security
Council Resolution 1373 at that time.
Nevertheless on assessments, where intelligence most closely bears on policy,
the impression is still of irregular international exchanges, linked with specific
policy issues; and perhaps also of one-way services, in which there is little
reciprocal return for what the UK and US provide to those outside the UK-USOld Commonwealth club. Certainly there are no international staffs, at the UN
and elsewhere, specifically charged with putting different national assessments
together and producing their own, non-national judgements, and no formal
mechanism through which national leaders can discuss assessments collectively
before arguing about decisions and policy.5
No doubt quite a lot is achieved informally, and the practical difficulties about
introducing new machinery should not be underestimated. Nevertheless
governments have not yet latched properly on to the advantages of making
exchanged intelligence more useful through devising a routine for discussing
what it means. The British JIC procedure and the device of the American
National Estimate provide well-tried national mechanisms of this kind for
adaptation for multilateral and international use. It is easy to despise the
importance of formal machinery and routines, but they can be useful in
stimulating new inter-governmental habits. Their establishment might be aided
by explicit doctrine that intelligence assessment should be a preliminary to
international decision-taking whenever possible.
Theater-level Assessment
The doctrinal-procedural gap just discussed does not apply at the theatre level,
where intelligence staffs exist and are in a position to produce assessments. The
picture given by those with experience there is of practical deficiencies: small
staffs with no previous experience of working together; limitations in the
amount of national intelligence supplied to international commanders; the
plethora of flows on a ‘national eyes only’ basis, so that no one has a complete
picture of who knows what;6 and national shortcomings in intelligence training,
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exacerbated by the problems of finding a common working language, and
reflected in the quality of some of those appointed to the international staffs.7
I do not suggest remedies for these deficiencies here, though practical questions
can be posed on one aspect. If adequate intelligence training is a serious
problem, does NATO now run intelligence courses for its members and partner
countries? If not, why not? And should the UN not consider the development
of similar training for intelligence (or ‘military information’) as part of its
preparation for international peace support?
Doctrinally, however, the British JIC philosophy may have something to offer
to the theatre as well as the top level. The JIC is often thought of as a Whitehall
system, but was in fact reproduced on a smaller scale after 1945 in regional
JICs (and sometimes Local Intelligence Committees) in the British colonies and
other areas where forces were deployed. Some of this machinery may still exist.
Its rationale was to bring different elements together, typically the military
services, police, colonial authorities and political advisers, all acting in an
intelligence and not a policy mode. A version of the system was even
developed to cope with terrorism in Northern Ireland.
Such a committee does not fit easily into a conventional military framework;
but international peace support is not a conventional military operation, and
intelligence for it diverges from a classical military pattern. As at the top level,
the main theatre-level intelligence inputs are from national sources, often with
national caveats on distribution. Peace support in the former Yugoslavia
therefore saw the proliferation of what had already been recognized in the later
stages of the Cold War: the National Intelligence Cells (NICs) established by
the main intelligence nations to combine inputs to NATO with providing their
own ‘eyes only’ services to their own national commanders and national
officers in international staffs. One recollection of Bosnia is of virtually a
caravanserai of NICs surrounding and outnumbering the international
intelligence staff whose members they were servicing; rather as if having a NIC
had become a national status symbol.8 Some rationalization came, however,
when the four Nordic NICs combined to provide a single input to KFOR. There
is also anecdotal evidence of a local American suggestion at Sarajevo that all
the NICs there should save time by joining with the international staff for
exchanges of information and interpretations; a suggestion that in the event
regrettably received no support. Nevertheless it points to the logic and potential
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value of an in-theatre JIC to encourage pooled national inputs and international
discussion.
This ‘local JIC’ approach, not to be confused with the American development
in recent years of their rather more integrated national Joint Intelligence
Centers, also abbreviated as JICs, might also help with the political dimension
of peace support assessments. In particular the UN Special Representative
could participate; perhaps he should actually run the committee, or at least be
represented on it or in the drafting staff. The same might apply, mutatis
mutandis, to the NATO Secretary General’s and other political advisers.
Accounts of operations in the former Yugoslavia all emphasize the importance
of regular meetings of all kinds between different nations and authorities for
information exchanges and problem-solving. Thus UNPF (United Nations
Peace Force) Headquarters at one stage ‘served as an official analytical working
group that met once a week to discuss developments in the situation in
Yugoslavia and the coordination of coming activities’.9 It might be only a small
step for this lesson about meetings to be applied specifically and formally to
intelligence. In short, the concept of intelligence structure at theatre level could
incorporate a JIC-like committee approach, under the commander’s chief
intelligence officer (or the UN representative), to weld together not only the
variety of national inputs potentially available but also the important nonmilitary dimension.
Cosmetics
These ideas of moving towards the regular production of international
assessments seem ambitious. It is true that intelligence is becoming an
increasingly international commodity, for use by communities of states against
‘non-states’ such as Al-Qaeda, and by ‘civilized’ states (however defined)
against international pariahs. Yet it remains deeply wedded to its national
character by its need for secrecy for source protection, the political sensitivity
of covert collection, the limited worldwide understanding of the concept of
objective intelligence assessment, and the general distrust of powerful
intelligence as a manifestation of imperialism or authoritarianism, or both.
This is not the place to discuss how intelligence as a whole may evolve in this
century.10 However one purely semantic change can be suggested to ease the
acceptance of what is advocated here. ‘Assessment’ instead of ‘intelligence’ has
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crept in slowly over the last thirty years as a description of one of intelligence’s
roles. In the UK the JIS was succeeded by the JIC’s Assessments Staff in 1968.
Subsequently the Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee became the
Intelligence Assessment Committee. More recently the intelligence-producing
part of the British Defence Intelligence Staff became the Defence Intelligence
Assessment Staff. Perhaps this move could go further. For its main function the
JIC is actually a Joint Assessment Committee; and CIA’s Directorate of
Intelligence is similarly a Directorate of Assessment (or analysis and
assessment). Changes of this kind might have little national significance. But
there would be some cosmetic value if the international cooperation just
advocated were labelled ‘assessment’ rather than ‘intelligence’.
Collection and Security
This leaves the last two of the suggested five points of doctrine. These are both
concerned with intelligence as a whole rather than assessment, though they still
apply to it. Both need longer discussion than is possible here, but brief
observations can be offered.
Intelligence is collection as well as analysis and estimating. Collection should
reflect what Force Commanders need, translated into the practicalities of
collection by their intelligence staffs. In peace support operations these staffs
can presumably guide operational, non-intelligence units in their Force on the
kinds of observation and other reporting required. But they also need to have
some specialized intelligence collection geared to meeting their needs, plus an
ability to state requirements authoritatively to other intelligence collectors.
Meeting these requirements has always been difficult to reconcile with the
NATO-derived assumption that intelligence collection is national, and
unsuitable for international command. Intelligence collectors deployed in the
theatres of operation have therefore tended to remain under national control,
with services to local commanders and staff of other nationalities limited by
whatever national ‘eyes only’ rules are applied to them.
In fact some ‘internationalization’ of these in-theatre intelligence units has
occurred from time to time. Blue-helmeted tactical Sigint and photographical
interpretation units developed in the UN force in the Congo in 1960 under UN
control.11 SFOR in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s had its ‘Allied Military
Intelligence Battalion’ as an international unit of the same kind. Some national
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units there were put formally under international control, and there was
extensive informal cooperation from others in a common cause; personal
relationships and bottles of whisky sometimes circumvented the letter of the
law about national ‘eyes only’ restrictions. In future operations it may be
possible to put rather more national intelligence units formally under the
international commanders of their areas. Some local imagery interpretation, for
example, might lend itself quite well to this more international approach, and
possibly some relatively simple Comint and Elint for immediate operational
use.
Nevertheless it would be realistic to expect that most of the in-theatre
intelligence collection will remain under national control. For the foreseeable
future the important thing may therefore be to develop means by which a
theatre commander can state his intelligence requirements to all the appropriate
national authorities, with some expectation that they will be met, without
seeking to control national units. To take what at present may still seem an
extreme case: a joint NATO-Russian operation with a UN mandate. How under
present routines would an American force commander tell his Russian partner
what intelligence he seeks from Russian sources, and vice versa if the positions
were reversed? Working out answers to such questions may be more fruitful
than seeking to put all in-theatre collection under formal command.
The same applies equally at the top level. It is difficult to think of more
important intelligence customers than the UN Secretary-General and, too a
lesser degree, his NATO colleague. But can they and their representatives give
nations their intelligence requirements and priorities? At present they probably
feel it improper to seek to drive national intelligence in this way, and remain
thankful for anything they get. To sum up, enabling national collection to
respond to Force Commanders and other senior international requirements
seems almost as important as encouraging international assessment of what is
collected.
Like almost everything else in this paper this turns, however, on progress in
solving the problem NATO wrestled with throughout the Cold War: how to
reconcile the international dissemination of intelligence with the imperatives of
national source protection. The development of techniques for the ‘sanitisation’
of national reports, as by the ‘tear off’ procedure for removing source details, is
part of the answer; so too is the encouragement of realism about the degrees of
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source protection actually needed, and the discouragement of unnecessary ‘eyes
only’ compartmentation. But progress in these directions depends on continued
efforts, on the lines already developed in NATO and the EU, to develop
minimum security standards for nations aspiring to participate in peace support.
The changes since the end of the Cold War in information security threats have
made this effort all the more necessary, yet more difficult. The main threat is
no longer from Russian espionage. Threats may still sometimes be of a
battlefield, tactical kind, as in the examples often cited of the insecure
communications of peace support contingents in the 1990s being exploited by
warring parties to get tactical information about their adversaries.12 In the
main, however, the threat to sources now comes not from the intelligence
collection of states and contesting protagonists, but from the media’s coverage
on what are regarded as transparent operations, at all levels from the top
downwards. Doctrine for intelligence in peace support cannot be separated, in
fact, from a complementary doctrine for the related information security and
press handling.
Conclusions
Intelligence will remain mainly a national activity, and no ready-made solution
is available to the problems of harnessing it properly to international peace
support; but some points can be suggested. Nations should aim to make their
national product available for international assessment, and assessment of this
kind should be a standard ingredient of international decision-taking. Such
assessments should be produced by a combination of international staff plus
provision for collegial discussion by decision-taking nations, and should be polmil, reflecting political as well as military factors. The British and American
models of the JIC and the National Intelligence Estimate provide templates for
meeting these requirements at varied levels of command. The most urgent need
is for some movement towards their adoption at top inter-governmental levels
such as those represented in the Security Council and NATO Council, but they
would also be applicable at theatre level. The complement to this use of
national material for international assessment would be procedures to ensure
that international officials and commanders could place intelligence
requirements upon national collectors.
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All this depends on changing international attitudes to intelligence’s security:
dispelling unnecessary mystery about it, while ensuring protection for real
national secrets. For too long intelligence issues of this kind have been regarded
as unsuitable for respectable international discourse. Hence the desirability of
formulating international intelligence doctrine, as a means of discussing the
formerly undiscussable.
Endnotes
The author is grateful to John Harrison and Stan Carlson for comments on drafts.
1
.General Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of
Combat (Oxford: Public Affairs, 2001), p.431.
2
.Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, Joint Operational Intelligence, Joint Warfare
Publication 2-00 (1999), Glossary-1, expanded on p.1A-3. Note however that the
descriptions of intelligence used in this paper reject the military distinction quoted on
p.1A-1 of the same official publication between information (‘unprocessed data of
every description’) and intelligence (‘the product resulting from the processing of
information’).
3
F.H.Hinsley with E.E.Thomas, C.F.G.Ransom, and R.C.Knight, British Intelligence in
the Second World War Vol.2 (London: HMSO 1981), pp.42-44.
4
Pasi Välimäki, Intelligence in Peace Support Operations (Helsinki: National Defence
College, 2000), p.70.
5
UNSCOM and its successor UNMOVIC developed analytic staffs for their particular
targets of Iraqi WMD development. UNMOVIC is said to have taken greater care than
its predecessor to employ staff as international officials free of national allegiances.
6
As described by a speaker at the Netherlands Intelligence Studies Association (NISA)
conference at which this paper was given, ‘this is the fog of war in peace support; you
don't know what you don't know and what others know’. An example quoted by
Välimäki was when General Nambiar, the first commander of UNPROFOR, was
refused NATO intelligence support because he was an Indian (note 4 above, p.111)
7
A graphic picture of shortcomings at theatre level in the 1990s was given by a
Canadian officer with experience of UNPROFOR; see Paul Johnston, ‘No Cloak and
Dagger Required: Intelligence Support to UN Peacemaking’, Intelligence and National
Security vol.12 no.4 (October 1997). A compatriot with similar experience took issue
with the article, but mainly to argue that intelligence handling at UN Headquarters New
York was even worse (Thomas Quiggin, ‘Response to No Cloak and Dagger Required:
Intelligence Support to UN Peacemaking’, Intelligence and National Security, vol.13
no.4 (winter 1998)). These authors anticipated some of the conclusions of the present
paper. A permanent intelligence staff in New York ‘could ensure that sound
intelligence doctrine was institutionalized within the UN’ (Johnston, p.111). ‘At the
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operational level, leaders such as the Force Commander and Special Representative of
the Secretary-General needed as much, and frequently more, political and economic
intelligence as they did military’ (Quiggin, p.203).
8
Impression from speakers at the NISA conference.
9
Välimäki, Intelligence in Peace Support Operations, p.137.
10
For the author’s views see ‘11 September: Legitimizing Intelligence?’, International
Relations vol.16 no.2 (August 2002), and chapters 1 and 13 of Intelligence Services in
the Information Age: Theory and Practice (London: Cass, 2001).
11
A.Walter Dorn, ‘The Cloak and the Blue Beret: Limitations on Intelligence in UN
Peacekeeping’, Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence vol. 12 no. 4 (winter
1999-2000), pp.422-425.
12
For example, the Croatian army in 1995 intercepted UN Military Observer reports to
provide information about the Republic of Serb Krajina’s forces, and used them to plan
their capture of the area. (Quiggin, Response to ‘No Cloak and Dagger Required’,
p.206).
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