Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Plan Trades Off w/ Universal
Plan tradesoff with universal reform by privileging the poor over the needs of the entire population
Seekings Prof at University of Cape Town 8
(Jeremy Seekings Prof at University of Cape Town Transformation 68 2008 MUSE)
Desert – ie what someone deserves to get or should get – can be based on any one of several possible criteria (see Pojman
and McLeod 1999). A meritocratic approach would emphasise success or achievement (as in ‘she deserves a high income because she
is an outstanding singer’). A variant of this might see desert in terms of status or rank (as in ‘he deserves a high income because he is
white’). A Kantian approach emphasises intention (as in ‘a good person deserves to be happy’ or, conversely, ‘a bad person deserves
to be poor’). The Anglo-American insistence that the idle or indolent poor (or paupers) are undeserving is a variant of this Kantian
approach (as is, arguably, Marx’s labour theory of value). Rawls articulated a third approach, rooted in skepticism about free will and
responsibility, that held that people do not ‘deserve’ their talents or abilities, including the ability to make an effort. The concept of
‘social citizenship’, according citizens rights to some minimum share of national resources, is a version of this Rawlsian approach. All
three concepts of desert are combined in the tradition of Anglo- American poor laws: inequality of outcome is justified on the basis of
achievement; the idle and lazy are discriminated against in the welfare system; but even the idle are not excluded entirely from social
citizenship. The design of South Africa’s social assistance system in the early twentieth century reflected the first two criteria only.
Social assistance was provided for poor white and coloured people (and later Indian and African people also) if they were deserving,
because they were unable to work. Able-bodied white men who were willing to work were deemed to deserve publiclyfunded
employment on public works programmes or sheltered employment. But there was no income guarantee even for white men and
women, nor was there any provision at all for able-bodied African adults, whether idle or not. The post-apartheid constitution went
beyond this tradition in enshrining what appears to be a right to income security, regardless of individual achievement, intention or
effort. The constitution thus drives a needs-based conception of desert: citizens (and perhaps certain non-citizens also)
have a right to the resources that enable them to satisfy basic needs.5 The state’s justification of the shape of social
assistance, in the Roberts case (Pakade 2006), focuses on the choices the state claims to have made in order to fulfill its constitutional
obligations. The basic conceptual framework is not set out explicitly or clearly, but it seems to entail five key elements. The first three
of these set out a normative framework. First, the welfare state should be designed on the basis of desert, ie of how
deserving is any particular applicant. Secondly, desert should not be defined simply in terms of individual need
(through a means test, for example) but rather in terms of previous disadvantage, ie whether any person or category of persons had an
equitable opportunity to provide for themselves. In the state’s view, the means test alone is an insufficient measure of desert. Thirdly,
disadvantage either (a) should be defined or (b) can only be defined in terms of membership of a group of people who experienced
common disadvantage. The distinctiveness of social assistance lies in its emphasis of risks and vulnerability as the
main factors behind poverty and deprivation. In formulating social assistance strategies, it is incumbent upon
the state to identify the key risks affecting groups of people, and the policy interventions which could help such
groups prevent, ameliorate, or cope with the materialization of these risks. (Pakade 2006:22-3; emphasis added) The
elderly, for example, are regarded as a deserving group because they are disadvantaged by the worsening opportunities for
employment and worsening health associated with old age. They also remain disadvantaged because of the disadvantages experienced
in the past, which restricted their ability to provide themselves for their retirement (Pakade 2006:24-25). The final two elements of the
state’s conceptual framework concern how the normative framework is translated into practice. Fourthly, the state 41 claims that
it is currently assessing and identifying correctly which are the most deserving groups in society. Fifth, the state
claims that the disadvantage experienced by groups can be demonstrated empirically using quantitative data from surveys and
censuses, ie through the statistical profiling of groups. In summary, the state argues that it is justified in using its scarce
resources in targeting its social assistance programmes on the basis of the statistical profiling of groups and
their respective relative disadvantage and desert. The emphasis on past disadvantage can be viewed in either of two ways.
First, it could be understood as saying that people who have not been disadvantaged are undeserving, ie as a rejection
of the more universalist claims of social citizenship. People who had opportunities to provide for themselves,
but did not avail themselves of these opportunities, do not deserve tax-funded assistance in time of consequent
need. Alternatively, it could be viewed as a means of ordering claimants on public largesse. Poor but previously advantaged people
might be deserving, but they are less deserving than poor and previously disadvantaged people, and the state should prioritise the latter
over the former.
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Universal Good – Cycle of Poverty
Only universal programs can solve poverty- targeted programs create a stigma that perpetuates the
culture of poverty
Williamson ‘79 (John B. Williamson, Professor of Sociology at Boston College, The American Journal of
Sociology, Vol 84, No. 6, pp 1511-1513, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2777924.pdf)
The chapter entitled "The Stigma of Poverty" is the most important in the book. It presents the author's major
effort at an original theoretical contribution. Waxman argues that we must take into consideration the extent to
which the poor are stigmatized by the nonpoor if we are to understand the traits commonly associated with the
culture of poverty. Drawing on David Matza's conception of the "disreputable poor" and Goffman's analysis of
stigmatized persons, Waxman argues that the poor turn to some of the same strategies used by other stigmatized
persons in an effort to deal with their stigmatized status, for example, associating only with persons who share
the stigma. This stigma leads to a set of traits which appear to be self-perpetuating because they are internalized
and transmitted through socialization. However, this phenomenon is not adequately accounted for by the
cultural perspective because it ignores the interaction between the poor and the non-poor. That is, it fails to take
into consideration the stigma of poverty which sets the process in motion and keeps it from being broken.
However, a situational perspective is not adequate either. This perspective fails to account for the evidence that
many of the traits associated with the culture of poverty have been internalized and will not rapidly disappear
with a change in situation. Waxman argues that the persistence of poverty cannot be attributed to solely internal
or solely external sources. Rather, the persistence is due to both internal and external sources which are
reciprocally related; that is, the traits associated with the culture of poverty are adjustments to the stigma of
poverty which get transmitted intergenerationally through socialization. "Socialization, the internal aspect,
teaches the young how to behave in situations of stress, which are the product of the external aspect, the stigma
of poverty" (p. 98). The final chapter of the book deals with some of the policy implications of the author's
relational perspective on poverty. The goal of such policy is to break the cycle which results from the stigma
associated with poverty. He proposes that to be effective programs must act to integrate the poor into society.
The call is for universalistic programs such as a national health insurance program that provides benefits to all.
He opposes programs that single out the poor for special treatment, because such programs serve to isolate and
stigmatize the poor.
Services made available to all members of society will break the stigma of poverty and integrate the
classes.
Waxman, prof sociology Rutgers, 77
(Chaim I. Waxman, professor of sociology at Rutgers University, 1977, “The Stigma of Poverty”)
We conclude, on the other hand, that
to break the stigma of poverty the poor must be integrated, rather than
isolated, and we suggest that steps in that direction must involve the creation and expansion of services
and income maintenance that are available to all members of the society, thus affording the non-poor a
basis for identifying with and seeing self-interest in these changes. The extent to which this can be
accomplished remains in doubt; quite possibly there will never be complete integration. But along that path, services
will be made available to both the poor and the non-poor, and they will, perhaps, reduce the isolation^
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2
Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Universal Good – Stigma
“Social Services for all” is the policy that the United States should adopt – addressing all people’s needs
on one level is the key to integration and destroying classism.
Waxman, prof sociology Rutgers, 77
(Chaim I. Waxman, professor of sociology at Rutgers University, 1977, “The Stigma of Poverty”)
To effect basic change in the stigma of poverty, to
really integrate the poor, requires, as we have suggested, the
designing and implementation of policies and programs in which the non-poor can see clear benefits
for themselves and with which they can themselves identify. This means the creation of programs that
are designed for the benefit of all in the society, as a right of citizenship, if you will, and not because of
membership in a particular class (the lower class) which experiences economic "problems." This means the
availability and extension of services to all, as members of the society, rather than as members of a
particular segment of the society. Along these lines, Alfred J. Kahn and Sheila B. Kamerman (1975) have recently
argued that in the United States we must cease thinking of social services and public welfare as being limited solely to
the poor and trou-bled. Rather, we must recognize that there are essentially only two categories, "social services and
benefits connected to problems and breakdowns (and these are not limited to the poor), and social services and benefits
needed by average people under ordinary circumstances" (p. x, emphasis in original). After surveying a variety of
European social services, they suggest that we carefully develop an adequate system of "public social utilities" (p. 172)
which, like other public utilities, are available to all in the society. It is not only the poor who have needs and
problems, and the United States should, therefore, emphasize the need of "social services for all " (pp.
171ff). We would add that by doingso, not only would the needs of a much broader segment of the population be
addressed but, simultaneously, there would be services available that would serve to integrate, in place of
those that currently isolate, the poorJj
The only policies that will take a step to reducing poverty stigma are those that affect not only the poor.
Waxman, prof sociology Rutgers, 77
(Chaim I. Waxman, professor of sociology at Rutgers University, 1977, “The Stigma of Poverty”)
A basic flaw in the strategies, proposals, and policies that have thus; far been discussed is that they are
designed to assist the poor, as such, they invariably contribute to the further isolation of the poor and
enhance the1; stigma of poverty. So long as they remain "programs in aid of the poor,"! thus calling attention to
the recipient's primary role and status as poor, these programs will continue to be seen as programs that burden the"
non-poor, that the non-poor are forced to give to the poor and for which1 the non-poor receive no return. This runs
counter to what Alvin Gouldner (1960) has termed "The Norm of Reciprocity" (cf, Offenbacher, I968),and is a basic
fallacy in applying a limited conflict-theory approach. As long as the conflict limits, restricts, in accordance with the
rules of the state, as long as those generating the conflict restrain themselves by precluding political revolution, then
the non-poor retain the upper hand. Since they have vested interests in retaining their dominance, they have vested
interests in maintaining and perpetuating poverty (cf. Gans, 1972), and this provides grounds for the non-poor's
This is especially
likely to occur at times when the non-poor are experiencing economic difficulties. As has been shown, the poor are then
especially singled out as e source of problems in the economy. Being so isolated, they are the most vulnerable,
derivation of stigma-theories that rationalize their animosity for the poor-"parasites."
easily accessible scapegoats. The conclusion to be drawn from our analysis, insofar as social policy concerned, is that
the most effective means of breaking the vicious circle, ie stigma of poverty, is by creating and
implementing policies and programs that will lead to the integration of the poor with the non-poor,
'rather than to their further isolation. We would not be so bold as to suggest that we have the answer as to how this
integration is to be ^accomplished, for we are quite certain that there are no quick and easy answers; there are no
panaceas. However, our analysis does suggest direction, and we will attempt to broadly outline a number of proposals
toward that end.
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Universal Good – Stigma
Only universality can solve without stigmatizing.
Spicker, Professor and Grampian Chair of Public Policy at the Robert Gordon University, 84 [Paul Spicker,
Professor and Grampian Chair of Public Policy at the Robert Gordon University, 1984, Stigma and Social Welfare, pg. 178-179]
The focus of the debate on policy has fallen on a discussion of ‘universality’ and ‘selectivity’. It has been
argued that selective systems of welfare, which attempt to give aid to the people who are most in need, necessarily
stigmatise the recipients. Wilensky and Lebeaux (1958), for example, state that “because of its residual,
temporary, substitute characteristic, social welfare… often caries the stigma of ‘dole’ or ‘charity’ .
(p.139)” Equally, it is claimed that stigma can only be overcome by means of a universal system of
welfare. Titmuss (1968) wrote of universality: One fundamental historical reason for the adoption of this principle was
the aim of making services available and accessible to the whole population in such ways as would not
involve users in any humiliating loss of status, dignity or self-respect. … If these services were not
provided by everybody for everybody, they would either not be available at all or only for those who
could afford them, and for others on such terms as would involve the infliction of a sense of inferiority
and stigma. (p.129).
The stigma of selectivity can be avoided through universal service. Counterplan solves.
Spicker, Professor and Grampian Chair of Public Policy at the Robert Gordon University, 84 [Paul Spicker,
Professor and Grampian Chair of Public Policy at the Robert Gordon University, 1984, Stigma and Social Welfare, pg. 182]
It seems to me that Titmuss, even allowing for confusion in terminology, mistakes the issue. The main problem
caused by selectivity is that it identifies a dependent group. This can be avoided by a universal service,
like Child Benefit, which is intended to benefit the poor, but which does not distinguish them from other
people in its treatment of them. Tax forms are a means test, but most wage earners have to fill them in; again, they
do not distinguish the poor, even though the tax office does treat people on an individual basis after the form has been filled
in. The program with selection is that it separates the poor from the rest of society and makes them
aware of the separation, not that it asks for a statement of income. If selective services are based on need but
not on means, then the problem remains – whether or not the services are given as a right. Because the group is
stigmatized before it becomes dependent, the main determinant of rejection is not whether they have rights,
but whether the service draws attention to them. Unemployment Benefit, which does establish rights, is
stigmatised. The ‘universal’ health service supposedly offers a right to medical care, but mentally ill people are rejected
when they take it up.
The counterplan solves the implications of stigmatization by reconnecting society.
Spicker, Professor and Grampian Chair of Public Policy at the Robert Gordon University, 84 [Paul Spicker,
Professor and Grampian Chair of Public Policy at the Robert Gordon University, 1984, Stigma and Social Welfare, pg. 183]
Rights are still important in the context of universalist services. The effect of selectivity is to
emphasise the division of society; where someone is stigmatized morally , an outcast or a pariah, a universal
system – on which can offer benefits and services as of right – ideally can aid the process of
integration by bringing them into a relationship of gift and exchange which binds society together, and
by asserting the status of the stigmatized person as a citizen. However, although they are helpful to pariah
groups, their potential for social change should not be overestimated.
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Universal Good - Stigma
Universal programs avoid the stigma that surrounds being chosen for a selective program
Rothstein, Prof of PolySci at Gothenburg University, ‘08
(Bo Rothstein, Prof in the department of political science at Gothenburg University. August 2008. QoG Working Paper Series: “Is the
Universal welfare State the a cause or the effect of social capital?” http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/working_papers/2008_16_Rothstein.pdf)
[mary]
Many scholars have come to single out the four Nordic countries as a special type of welfare state that has been
labelled as “the universal welfare state” (Esping-Andersen, 1990). By this is meant that there is a broad range of
social services and benefits that are intended to cover the entire population throughout the different stages
of life, and that the benefits are delivered on the basis of uniform rules for eligibility. A typical example would be
universal childcare or universal child allowances that are distributed without any form of means-testing (that is., no
individual screening is carried out) Universal health care or sickness insurances are other examples. This type of
welfare policy may be distinguished from selective welfare programs that are intended to assist only those
who cannot manage economically on their own hand. In a selective program, the specific needs and the
economic situation of each person seeking assistance have to be scrutinized by some administrative
process (Kumlin, 2004). A third type of welfare state is that which benefits and services are distributed according to
status group. In such systems, privileged groups of the population are singled out to receive more than the rest of society, a
benefit originally intended as an award for loyalty to the state. The status-oriented compartmentalized social insurance
schemes in Germany, which are tailored to its specific clientele, are a case in point (Rothstein and Stolle, 2003) It should
be noted that all modern welfare states are mixes and that differences between various programs can be rather fine-grained.
It is also the case that selectivity is carried out in a number of different ways. For example, there are programs that caters to
almost the whole population except for the very wealthy and that are thus not singling out the poorest part of the
population. Other welfare states have different programs for very broad categories of citizens based, for example, on
occupational status (Mau, 2003). Nevertheless, most welfare state and social policy researchers seem to have accepted the
idea that it is reasonable to categorize different welfare states according to this universal-selectivity dimension based on
what is their typical “modus operandi”(Goodin et al., 1999; Scharpf, 2000; Huber and Stephens, 2001; Pontusson, 2005). A
number of important political and social consequences follow from how welfare states are organized.
First, since universal welfare states cater to a very large part of the population, the middle and professional
classes are included in the programs. This has important electoral and political consequences because the welfare states in
the Nordic countries are not primarily seen as only catering to the needs of “the poor” (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005).
Secondly, a universal welfare system demands a high level of taxation for the simple reason that if (almost) everyone is
included, the public coffers have to be big (Steinmo, 1993). Thirdly, a universal policy can be implemented
without the large bureaucratic apparatus that is needed for carrying out the individualized meanstesting that is needed in a selective welfare system (Rothstein, 1998). Fourthly, it is well-known that
means-testing often is perceived by clients as problematic from an integrity perspective and that social
stigma often follows from being seen as a client in a selective program (Soss, 2000).
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Universal Good - Stigma
Universal systems create both greater opportunities for income and lesser stigmatization for poor
recipients
Rothstein, Prof of PolySci at Gothenburg University, ‘08
(Bo Rothstein, Prof in the department of political science at Gothenburg University. August 2008. QoG Working Paper Series: “Is the
Universal welfare State the a cause or the effect of social capital?” http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/working_papers/2008_16_Rothstein.pdf)
[mary]
One way to illustrate the differences is to compare a person with low economic resources in these different
systems, for example a single-parent with low education (usually a woman). In a selective system, this is
usually a person that does not work because she cannot afford daycare. It follows that she and her
children have to exist on some form of selective benefits which in addition to the integrity problems
that follow from means-testing usually also carries a social stigma. This is thus a person that can be
seen as someone who does not contribute to society (not working and not paying taxes) but that survives on
special benefits. In a universal system, this is usually a person that works because her children are in the
public childcare or pre-school system as (almost) everyone else’s children. The implication is that this is a
person that is usually able to get by without applying for social assistance by combining her (low) income with the
universal benefits and services that goes to everyone. She is thus not seen as someone just benefiting from the
welfare state and as being outside the social fabric (Sainsbury, 1999). Moreover, the services and benefits
that she gets do not carry any special social stigma and her integrity is not violated by a bureaucratic
process scrutinizing her economic and social situation.1
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Universal Good - Stigma
Targeting produces high costs – including stigmas surrounding receiving aid and incentive costs
Notten and Gassmann, Profs of Econ at Maastricht Grad School, ‘08
(Geranda Notten, and Franziska Gassmann Profs of Economics at Maastricht Graduate School of Governance. Journal of European
Social Policy 2008. Page 6: “Size matters: Targeting efficiency and poverty reduction effects of means-tested and universal
child benefits in Russia” http://web.up.ac.za/UserFiles/G%20Notten%20paper.pdf)[mary]
a targeting regime which aims at poverty relief needs to use poverty indicators as a
screening device. There are, however, a number of pitfalls involved in poverty measurement that need to
be considered. One issue is that poverty is a multidimensional concept; another is that there are various ways to
measure each of these dimensions. Additionally, to determine whether a person is poor or not involves the
(subjective) choice of a poverty threshold below which a person cannot fulfil his/her basic needs, has
poor health or an unacceptable low standard of living. Firstly, this implies that it is a priori not clear who the
target group is (one first needs to determine the relevant dimension(s)). Secondly, the target group differs in size and
characteristics according to the chosen measurement method and poverty threshold. The academic
literature also identifies other targeting costs such as incentive costs, social costs and political costs
It makes sense that
(Atkinson, 1998; Barr, 1998; Coady et al, 2004, Moene and Wallerstein, 2001; Gelbach and Pritchett, 1997; Sen, 1995).
Incentive costs arise when households adjust their behaviour in order to meet eligibility criteria. These
responses can involve a cost (i.e. a household reduces labour supply such that their income falls below the eligibility
threshold) but can also be beneficial (i.e. school attendance increases because benefit eligibility requires the children to go
to school). Strict targeting might also increase social costs such as stigma and reduce the available
budget for transfers if the budget is politically determined.
Women's behaviour has become a central issue in contemporary sociology, especially in regards to gender division of paid
and unpaid work. However, women's behaviour that is related to helping spouses, parents, parents-in-law, as well as other
adult relatives in need has been less studied, even as demographic ageing has fuelled research on intergenerational
assistance and elderly care. This article contributes to the sociological debate by analysing the specific effects that old age
and disability benefits have on women's decisions about adult care giving. The poorer and lower educated women have
the greatest risk of allocating so much time to adult care that it impedes their capacity to engage in paid
work. One might infer that such an association is the result of social class inequalities in health, because the richest women
have healthier relatives. One might also infer that such association is the result of a selection effect, because women with
lower employment opportunities are more prone to staying home, and then to be available for care giving. This article
considers whether the nature of welfare benefits and their access criteria have any effect on the pattern of women's adult
care giving, and more specifically, whether targeting old age and disability benefits through means-testing is a better option
than universal provision, and whether transferring cash is better than subsidizing services. The general finding is that the
way public benefits are institutionalized influences women's time allocation to adult care.
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Universal Good – Exclusion
Without universal services exclusion is inevitable
Notten and Gassmann, Profs of Econ at Maastricht Grad School, ‘08
(Geranda Notten, and Franziska Gassmann Profs of Economics at Maastricht Graduate School of Governance. Journal of European
Social Policy 2008. Page 2: “Size matters: Targeting efficiency and poverty reduction effects of means-tested and universal
child benefits in Russia” http://web.up.ac.za/UserFiles/G%20Notten%20paper.pdf)[mary]
This paper evaluates a policy change from universal to means-tested child allowances in terms of
targeting efficiency and poverty reduction taking the introduction of means tested child benefits in Russia as a case study.
We use the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) from 2000 to 2004 to analyse the impact of the reforms and
to simulate the effects of various means-tested and universal child benefit schemes. Since the reforms in 2000, more
children receive benefits and there is improved targeting of low income households. Nevertheless,
both inclusion and exclusion errors are considerable and although the poverty reduction impact improved
marginally since the reforms, its effect on child poverty is small. Our simulations show that universal
schemes achieve additional poverty reductions in all indicators because previously excluded children
now also receive a benefit. But size matters most; only by increasing benefit levels considerably, more
substantial poverty reductions can be achieved.
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Universal Good – Errors
Universal good, fewer errors.
Notten and Gassmann, Profs of Econ at Maastricht Grad School, ‘08
(Geranda Notten, and Franziska Gassmann Profs of Economics at Maastricht Graduate School of Governance. Journal of European
Social Policy 2008. Page 2: “Size matters: Targeting efficiency and poverty reduction effects of means-tested and universal
child benefits in Russia” http://web.up.ac.za/UserFiles/G%20Notten%20paper.pdf)[mary]
Higher administrative costs, targeting errors and labour market disincentives reduce the efficiency and
effectiveness of means-tested benefits (Atkinson, 1998; Van de Walle, 1998). Proponents of universal
benefits argue that the costs related to means testing may outweigh the actual benefit. Using the
introduction of means tested child benefits in Russia in 2000 as a case study, this paper assesses the impact of a policy
change from universal to means-tested child allowances in terms of targeting efficiency and poverty reduction. We focus
on the core costs of targeting, namely leakage, exclusion errors and benefit costs, and relate these to the benefits in terms of
poverty reduction.
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Stephen Caputo, Grant Gaither, Anna Gordan, Devon Manley, Nishu Mehta, Mary Rassenfoss, Shruti Satish, Alexis Shklar, Dru Svoboda, Don Virts
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Universal Good - Risks
Targeting’s benefits are outweighed by administrative risk and the reality that all eligible persons won’t
receive care
Notten and Gassmann, Profs of Econ at Maastricht Grad School, ‘08
(Geranda Notten, and Franziska Gassmann Profs of Economics at Maastricht Graduate School of Governance. Journal of European
Social Policy 2008. Page 5: “Size matters: Targeting efficiency and poverty reduction effects of means-tested and universal
child benefits in Russia” http://web.up.ac.za/UserFiles/G%20Notten%20paper.pdf)[mary]
Under a given government budget constraint, allocating the benefits to poor children will result in a
higher benefit for each eligible child, and hence, will have a larger effect on poverty reduction. However,
targeting comes at a cost. If benefits are targeted to the poor, the policy maker will have to determine an
indicator that identifies the poor children. Governments have imperfect information about the true
welfare level of households. It is difficult to find out whether a person or household belongs to the
target group or not, and gathering such information is costly. In addition to screening costs, other
inefficiencies arise as a result of imperfect targeting: some of the benefits will flow to children outside
the target group while some children in the target group will not get a benefit. The former inefficiency is
called ‘leakage’ or ‘inclusion error’ while the latter is known as ‘exclusion error’. When screening costs are high
and there are errors of in- and exclusion, universal benefits become more attractive as a benefit allocation
mechanism. Moreover, as targeting becomes stricter in order to reduce leakage, screening costs rise
further and exclusion errors as well. Therefore, the decision between universal or targeted child benefits is
ultimately a cost benefit analysis; when do the costs of targeting outweigh the benefits in terms of poverty reduction?
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Universal Good – Equality
Universal social services allow for an equitable division of wealth
Rothstein and Uslaner, Profs at Goteberg University and University of Maryland,’05
(Bo Rothstein, Chair of Political Science at Goteberg University, Eric M Uslaner, Prof at University of Maryland - CP “All for all:
Equality,
Corruption,
and
Social
trust.”
Johns
Hopkins
University
Press
2005.
Pages
46.
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v058/58.1rothstein.html) [Mary]
Government policies have a large impact on economic equality.13 Universal social programs that cater to the
whole (or very broad sections) of society, such as we find in the Scandinavian countries, promote a more
equitable distribution of wealth and more equality of opportunity in areas such as education and the labor
market.14 Both types of equality lead to a greater sense of social solidarity—which spurs generalized trust.
Generalized trust, in turn, provides at least part of the foundation for policies (such as universal benefits) that
lead to more equality. This is not to argue that there is a monodirectional relation between independent variables
(policies) and dependent variables (norms), since we admit that there are "feedback mechanisms" and "increasing returns"
between these variables.15 Instead, we want to capture the logic of how the causal mechanisms that link these variables
work over time or what factors make the vicious and virtuous cycles cycle the way they do.
Universal social services are the key link to equality
Rothstein and Uslaner, Profs at Goteberg University and University of Maryland,’05
(Bo Rothstein, Chair of Political Science at Goteberg University, Eric M Uslaner, Prof at University of Maryland – CP. World Politics
Issue 58.1. “All for all: Equality, Corruption, and Social trust.” Johns Hopkins University Press 2005. Pages 42-43.
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v058/58.1rothstein.html) [Mary]
We argue that social trust is caused by two different, yet interrelated types of equality, namely, economic
equality and equality of opportunity.7 This argument has important implications for public policy
because universal social policies are more effective than selective ones [End Page 42] in creating both
types of equality and thereby social trust.8 However, we have a somewhat pessimistic conclusion about the political
possibilities of increasing equality by enhancing universal social policies in developing and postsocialist countries. Since
social trust is a measure of how people evaluate the moral fabric in their society, there is little reason to believe that
countries with low social trust will establish universal social programs precisely because such programs must be based on a
general political understanding that the various groups in society share a common fate. Countries with an initial level of
high inequality and with dishonest government are less likely to establish universal social programs. Such programs
increase social trust in three ways. First, they are more redistributive than means-tested programs and
thus create more economic equality. Second, since they are based on the principle of equal treatment
and minimize bureaucratic discretion, they increase the sense of "equality of opportunity" within the
population.9 Third, means-tested programs exacerbate class and often racial divisions within a society—
and thus lead to less generalized trust and more in-group trust. By contrast, universalistic programs
enhance social solidarity and the perception of a shared fate among citizens
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Universal Good – Equality
Prefer universal provisions to selectivity as they accept states of dependency and reject inequality by
breaking the stigma. Only the counterplan solves.
Spicker, Professor and Grampian Chair of Public Policy at the Robert Gordon University, 84 [Paul Spicker,
Professor and Grampian Chair of Public Policy at the Robert Gordon University, 1984, Stigma and Social Welfare, pg. 183]
The models of residual and institutional welfare are effectively distinguished, not by their methods or aims,
but by their intentions towards the people they serve. Residual welfare sees dependency as an
exception; institutional welfare treats it as an accepted feature of social life. If stigma is seen as a division of
society, its identification with residual welfare is virtually tautologous. The difference between residual and
institutional welfare is in part defined by stigma, and selectivity, which is the main distinguishing
characteristic of a residual system, relates the conditions necessary for an identification of stigmatized
groups. However, institutional welfare is not sufficient in itself to avoid stigma, because the problem is not confined
within the field of social welfare. Comprehensiveness and rights do not in themselves get around the problems of
stigmatization. In so far as dependency itself is stigmatising, universal provision is preferable to
selectivity only because it conceals or encourages the acceptance of certain states of dependency, and
sets aside policies which are degrading because they foster a structured form of inequality.
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Universal Good – Future Support
Universal policies are comparatively better at maintaining funding
Mkandawire, Director of UNRISD, 2005
(Thandika Mkandawire, director of United Nations Research Institute for Social development, December 2005, Social Policy and
Development Programme paper Number 23,
http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpAuxPages)/955FB8A594EEA0B0C12570FF00493EAA/$file/mkandatarget.p
df)
For years, this “political economy” approach has been considered to have little relevance in many situations of developing
countries with authoritarian rule. Quite a number of authoritarian regimes, especially the “developmentalist”
ones, have succumbed to the legitimation imperatives and pursued more or less universalistic
17
policies. Perhaps because of the view that in authoritarian contexts the pursuit of universalist policies depends very much
on the ideological and idiosyncratic proclivities of the ruler, such a political economy analysis has not received much
attention in developing countries. However, with a growing number of countries increasingly relying on the democratic
process to choose their leaders, politics assumes great importance. The importance of political economy even in the
developing countries is illustrated by the case of Sri Lanka: after the Sri Lankan government introduced a
targeted food stamp programme, the real value of the food stamps fell sharply during periods of high
inflation, as the interest of the middle class shifted to other issues, and public support for the
programme declined (Anand and Kanbur 1991). In the late 1970s, the cost of a universal ration programme
reached 5 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP), and the government was forced to cut costs by
replacing it with a food stamp programme that cost only 1.3 per cent of GDP.
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Universal Good – Education
Universal education programs are key to program support and expansion
Schaeffer, policy analyst, Cato’s Center for Educational Freedom, 07
(Adam B, Schaeffer, policy analyst, Cato’s Center for Educational Freedom, 12-05-2007, “The Public Education Tax Credit,” CATO
Institute, Policy Analysis No. 605)
The school choice movement’s focus on targeted programs is not a helpful short- or long-term strategy,
regardless of whether the goal is specifically to serve disadvantaged children or children from all
families. Broad-based programs are more likely to lead to long-term legislative success, program
success, program survival, and program expansion.4 And yet, targeted programs dominate the
discussion and legislative agenda. Also, under targeted programs, special regulations are often imposed
on schools that accept students supported through school choice programs. Such regulations limit those
programs’ effectiveness in delivering choice and increased student achievement, and sideline many of
the most natural allies of school choice reform. Nonetheless they are a common feature of legislation.
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Universal Good – Fear of Rejection
Fear from deviating from the norm and of subjection to eligibility assessments prevent take-up
Mood, prof of sociology at Stockholm University, ‘06
(Caprina Mood, Prof in the department of sociology, Stockholm University. European Sociological Review: June 22, 2006. “Take-Up
Down Under: Hits and Misses of Means-Tested Benefits in Australia”http://esr.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/22/4/443) [mary]
If people were motivated only by economic wealth and had the relevant information about benefits, no more than frictional
non-take-up would exist. The explanation of non-take-up must thus be sought in the knowledge about
benefits and/or in ‘costs’ of a non-economic nature. The ‘costs’ typically discussed in the literature on take-up
are stigma costs and transaction costs (e.g. Craig, 1991; Corden, 1995; van Oorschot, 1995; Currie, 2004). As regards
stigma, norms generally prescribe that people should earn their own living, and there is a positive valuation of
successful people. Benefit recipiency can be conceived of as a deviation from the work norm and as a sign
of failure and can be associated with negatively valuated groups. An individual may fear a loss of social status,
or disapproval from others, if it comes to their knowledge that he or she receives a benefit. To the extent
that a norm is internalized, an individual may also experience ‘personal costs’, or ‘mental dissonance’ from violating it. In
this case, the constraint on action is internal, and the individual will avoid violating the norm even when no one can find out
about it. For similar reasons, people may decide not to claim a benefit because of the loss of integrity
felt by being subject to the assessments of eligibility.
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Universal Good - Sustainability
Universal Welfare Programs key to to sustainable solvency
Westin, Norwegian University of Sci & Tech, ‘08
(Steinar Westin, Department of Public Health and General Practice, Norwegian University of Science and Technlogy. “Welfare for all
– or only the needy.” The Lancet. Novermber 2008.http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6T1B-4TVTJ124&_user=4257664&_coverDate=11%2F14%2F2008&_alid=964550294&_rdoc=1&_fmt=high&_orig=search&_cdi=4886&_sort=r&
_docanchor=&view=c&_ct=1&_acct=C000022698&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=4257664&md5=9b96abd289ae226e43ee8
669a1f10c77)[mary]
Universal welfare programmes and redistributive policies have traditionally been promoted by the labour movement
and the political left, and for reasons that reach beyond health. At least in the Nordic countries, such policies have
been as much about dignity and solidarity. Targeting of “the truly needy” may seem economically
attractive, but implies stigmatisation and “more tests of the poor”. Furthermore, economic research
shows that universal welfare programmes might be more eff ective in achieving sustained alleviation of
poverty because such programmes are more likely to retain political support among voters.10 Several
surveys show that the Nordic countries score high on indicators of social capital, especially generalised trust. Economists
seem puzzled by the fact that economies with high levels of taxation and a strong public sector do work quite dynamically:
“the bumble bee can fl y”. There is already renewed interest within several disciplines in aspects of Nordic welfare models
and Lundberg and colleagues’ paper will probably encourage this approach.
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Universal Good - Stability
Universal programs’ stability and availability are to to assuring access
Starfield and Birn, Profs at Johns Hopkins and University of Toronto, ’07
Barbara Starfield, prof at Johns Hopkins, Anne-Emanuelle Birn, Department of Public Health Sciences prof at the University of
Toronto. Journal of Epidemology and Community Health April 9, 2007. “Evdence-based Public Health Policy and Practice.”
http://jech.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/61/12/1038?rss=1) [mary]
Universal
programs generally have a greater and more stable effect upon life-course security than targeted
programs because they have a larger political base of support. Moreover, in their very universality, these
programs are aimed at ensuring access to and solidarity in social services across a society in order to
minimise differences in receipt of services due to social class, geographic location, income level, and
other characteristics. Where these entitlements exist, they are associated with less income inequality,
even in the absence of specific governmental policies to redistribute income.15
Targeted income or social transfers under one political administration can be easily abolished under the next.
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Universal Empirically Best
Disregard their theoretical mumbo jumbo – empirics prove universalism more successful
Mkandawire Director of UNRISD 2005
(Thandika Mkandawire Director of UNRISD 2005 Targeting and Universalism in Poverty Reduction
http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/%28httpAuxPages%29/955FB8A594EEA0B0C12570FF00493EAA/$file/mkandatarget.
pdf)
One remarkable feature of the debate on universalism and targeting is the disjuncture between an unrelenting
argumentation for targeting, and a stubborn slew of empirical evidence suggesting that targeting is not effective
in addressing issues of poverty (as broadly understood). Many studies clearly show that identifying the poor with
the precision suggested in the theoretical models involves extremely high administrative costs and an
administrative sophistication and capacity that may simply not exist in developing countries. The story of
both the political and administrative difficulties of targeting is repeated so many times that one
wonders why it is still insisted upon. Indeed, from the literature it is clear that where poverty is rampant and
institutions are weak, what may be wrong is not the lack of appropriate data but targeting per se. It is definitely the case that
in many countries, the shredding of the state apparatus has left it singularly incapable of effective targeting in the social
sector. Most of the proposed refinements of targeting methods are likely to compound the problems that are often cited as
constraints on it. An interesting phenomenon is that while the international goals are stated in
international conferences, in universalistic terms (such as “education for all” and “primary health care
for all”), the means for reaching them are highly selective and targeted.
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Means Testing Bad – Neoliberalism
Means testing perpetuates neoliberalism by upholding a limited role of the state
Mkandawire, Director of UNRISD, 2005
(Thandika Mkandawire, director of United Nations Research Institute for Social development, December 2005, Social Policy and
Development Programme paper Number 23,
http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpAuxPages)/955FB8A594EEA0B0C12570FF00493EAA/$file/mkandatarget.pdf)
In the 1980s and 1990s the rise of the Right, which privileged individual responsibility and a limited role for the state, had a
profound influence in some of the key industrial countries. Margaret Thatcher’s insistence that “there is no such
thing as community” touched on one of the most important ideological underpinnings of social
policy—solidarity and citizenship. It is this neoliberal ideological position that has set the limits on
social policy and underpins the preferences for “user fees”, means-testing, market delivery of social services
or “partnerships” in their delivery. This ideology has also eliminated the equity concerns that have been
central to all the successful experiences of poverty eradication. And with ideologies of equality in
retreat, policies pushing for universalistic policies, together with their accompanying redistributive
measures, were bound to experience setbacks.
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Means Testing Bad – Ethnic Conflict
Targeted programs leads to hierarchies among the poor and results in ethnic conflict
Mkandawire, Director of UNRISD, 2005
(Thandika Mkandawire, director of United Nations Research Institute for Social development, December 2005, Social Policy and
Development Programme paper Number 23,
http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpAuxPages)/955FB8A594EEA0B0C12570FF00493EAA/$file/mkandatarget.p
df)
Targeting itself almost by definition leads to segmentation and differentiation. In service provision,
targeting leads to the creation of a dual structure—one aimed at the poor and funded by the state, and one aimed at the wellto-do and provided by the private sector. Or, as Amartya Sen argues, “Benefits meant exclusively for the poor often end up
being poor benefits.” (Sen 1995:14). One reason why such an eventuality is not taken seriously is that in many countries in
which targeting has been effectively implemented, income inequality is already high, so that the segmentation in social
provision does not raise eyebrows. Geographical targeting often leads to horizontal inequality so that the
poor in one area might benefit more than the poor in non-targeted areas—assuming, of course, that the
rich in the targeted area do not capture the resources. Such inequality can be explosive politically and
is often the basis of ethnic conflicts. In many countries where ethnic, religious and cultural space is
coterminous with geographical space, such geographical targeting can lead to inequitable geographical
7
selectivity.
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Means Testing Bad – Stigma
Means-tested programs create a visible division between the poor and ordinary citizens
Stuber and Schlesinger, PhD Columbia University and PhD Yale University, 06
(Stuber and Schlesinger, PhD Columbia University and PhD Yale University, “Sources of stigma for means-tested government
programs.” Social Science & Medicine March 2006.
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6VBF-4JHMS681&_user=4257664&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_searchStrId=963848299&_rerunOrigin=scho
lar.google&_acct=C000022698&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=4257664&md5=f0c77f8444acf836f13261e51cbbe43a) [Mary]
Negative attitudes about welfare recipients are reinforced through media portrayals of the poor and by policy elites (Gilens,
1999; Iyengar, 1990). However, the act of seeking public benefits also exposes individuals to potentially
negative responses from those administering program benefits. Consistently, recipients describe their
experiences of applying for public assistance as unpleasant and negative (Goodban, 1985; Piven & Cloward,
1993). Case managers’ negative attitudes about welfare recipients have been identified as one cause of poor treatment
(Goodsell, 1985; Lipsky, 1980). Other potential signals of stigma include (a) long lines in waiting areas, since
delayed access serves as an indicator of social status (Lipsky, 1980; Sarat, 1990) and (b) program
requirements that require disclosure of personal information, which may be perceived as unduly
intrusive, depriving public assistance recipients of the privacy accorded to “ordinary citizens ” (Spicker,
1984).
Recipients of means-tested programs’ aid are perceived as lesser citizens
Stuber and Schlesinger, PhD Columbia University and PhD Yale University, 06
(Stuber and Schlesinger, PhD Columbia University and PhD Yale University, “Sources of stigma for means-tested government
programs.” Social Science & Medicine March 2006.
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6VBF-4JHMS681&_user=4257664&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_searchStrId=963848299&_rerunOrigin=scho
lar.google&_acct=C000022698&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=4257664&md5=f0c77f8444acf836f13261e51cbbe43a) [Mary]
In his seminal research, Goffman (1963, p. 3) defined stigma as “an attribute which is deeply discrediting” in a given
society. Applied to certain anti-poverty programs, this negative attribution involves the perception that individuals who
participate lack the independence and autonomy that is expected when contending with vulnerable circumstances.
Rainwater (1982) argued that the stigmatization of recipients in means-tested programs can be seen as a
special case of the stigmatization of poor people in the United States. In the eyes of many Americans,
being poor constitutes a form of social deviance because pulling oneself out of poverty is believed to
be both possible and praiseworthy. As a result, people on public assistance have been labeled as lazy,
lacking in ambition, shiftless, morally weak, and even bad parents (Rainwater, 1982; Soss, 2000). The
conventional portrayal of welfare stigma links these negative attitudes to broadly shared cultural
perceptions about deservingness and individual responsibility for poverty.
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Means Testing Bad – Stigma
Only universal services avoid the demeaning nature of means-tested progrmams
Rothstein and Uslaner, Profs at Goteberg University and University of Maryland,’05
(Bo Rothstein, Chair of Political Science at Goteberg University, Eric M Uslaner, Prof at University of Maryland - CP “All for all:
Equality,
Corruption,
and
Social
trust.”
Johns
Hopkins
University
Press
2005.
Pages
59-60.
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v058/58.1rothstein.html) [Mary]
Additionally, the implementation of universal programs follows two important equality principles.
First, these programs treat everyone in the same situation equally. Second, because they are given
without means testing, universal programs do not have to organize a large bureaucracy to determine
eligibility. Selective welfare programs often stigmatize recipients as "welfare clients." They demarcate
the rich and the poor, with those at the bottom made to feel that they are less worthy, not least because
of the bureaucratic intrusion entailed in the process of implementation.70 Universal programs are
connected to citizens' rights, [End Page 59] while selective welfare programs have trouble with
legitimacy because they have to single out the "deserving" from the "nondeserving poor." This will
always imply discretionary decisions by street-level bureaucrats who may intrude on the personal
integrity of clients. People who receive selective welfare benefits often feel demeaned and apart from
others in society. Recipients of means-tested benefits, for example, from Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) in the United States, are more likely to believe that the government was
distant and unresponsive—and that efforts on their part to participate in the political process would be
futile. In the United States, recipients of benefits that are not means tested, such as, for example,
disability insurance under Social Security, did not differ from the broader population that received no
government benefits.71 Soss writes of means-tested benefits in the United States through AFDC: "The
act of welfare claiming, especially in a public assistance program, can be mortifying. The degraded
identity it conveys can effectively strip individuals of full and equal community membership."72 One
AFDC recipient spoke of the how she felt when applying for benefits: They're the cowboys and you're
a cow. . . . You go all the way through this line to do this, and then this time to do that. It's like a cattle
prod. . . . I felt like I was in a prison system . . . these people are like, "I'm helping you. This is
something I'm doing for you. So just be quiet and follow your line."73 People who receive Social
Security disability benefits in the U.S., the universal program, are not required to answer detailed
questions about their personal life, do not feel threatened with loss of benefits, and believe that their
case workers treat them with respect—and are not alienated from others
Direct targeting of policies can often lead to conflict within the community and stigma on a larger scale.
IFAD, 06
(Interntaional Fund for Agricultural Development, organization to help impoverished, November 2006,
http://www.ifad.org/pub/policy/target/targeting_e.pdf)
Direct targeting. When services are to be channelled to specific individuals or households , eligibility criteria
have to be used. IFAD’s experience and that of others shows that, in these cases, community-based targeting approaches are
the best option, where eligibility criteria are identified and applied by the community. Survey-based means testing (for
example, on income or consumption, or ownership of assets) can be costly and often presents numerous methodological
problems. Local poverty definitions and criteria may be more appropriate and can more accurately capture non-income
dimensions of poverty and vulnerability. In general, the social acceptability of the method needs to be assessed
case by case. Care must be taken to avoid risks of conflict and division within the community as well
as creating stigma.
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Means Testing Bad – Stigma
Federal programs targeted towards the poor makes them more recognized – this stigma causes
opportunities to be fewer for them, isolating them in their poverty.
Bigman and FoFack, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Family at the World Bank, 01
(David Bigman and Hippolyte Fofack, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Family at the World Bank, January 2001, THE
WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REVIEW, VOL. 14, NO. l, http://wber.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/14/1/129.pdf)
These disparities arise because of large differences in the price and quality of housing, the quality of
physical infrastructure (primarily the quality of roads), socioeconomic characteristics of the population, and
the quality of public services (particularly health and education)—which perpetuate the cycle of poverty. Low
housing costs in poor neighborhoods attract migrants from rural areas and deter local residents who
manage to raise their incomes from staying, thereby deepening the pockets of poverty. The quality of the road
infrastructure—primarily the availability of all-weather roads—is an important factor in determining an area's development
and capacity to trade. And the concentration of welfare recipients in some areas stigmatizes these areas and
deters private sector investment and trade.
Targeted policies inevitably marginalize those that need the service
Mkandawire, Director of UNRISD, 2005
(Thandika Mkandawire, director of United Nations Research Institute for Social development, December 2005, Social Policy and
Development Programme paper Number 23,
http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpAuxPages)/955FB8A594EEA0B0C12570FF00493EAA/$file/mkandatarget.p
df)
policies not only have a mobilizing effect on
citizens but may also affect the capacities of citizens for civic and political engagement (Pierson 1993).
Sen has argued that “any system of subsidy that requires people to be identified as poor and that is seen
as a special benefaction for those who cannot fend for themselves would tend to have some effects on
their self-respect as well on the respect accorded them by others” (Sen 1995:13). The process of meanstesting or identifying the “deserving poor” is often invasive and stigmatizing. Indeed, in some cases,
relying on self-targeting in the design of programmes actually serves to increase their disutility. Given
the growing attention now being paid to self-respect and empowerment, the danger of stigmatization
inherent in targeting is an important policy issue.
Political scientists remind us that, through processes of feedback,
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Means Testing Bad – Stigma
Poverty reduction programs are wildly unpopular, attaching stigma and humiliation to those who are
recipients
Spicker
’84
(Paul
Spicker,
Ph.DUniversity
of
London,
‘Stigma
and
Social
Welfare’,
pp.91-92,
http://books.google.com/books?id=49wOAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA91&lpg=PA91&dq=%22poverty%22+stigma&source=bl&ots=T03ew
eTRXq&sig=oyNuZWzhXvaMo7xTgK4c2BimKL0&hl=en&ei=wSRnSrLCB5S4lAept5TdDA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&re
snum=7)
Poor people are rejected, but people who are poor and dependent are rejected more. The distaste for dependent poverty is evident in
the dislike people feel for 'charity', or social services which they see as a form of charity. This feeling is not, I have suggested, a major
element in the failure of demand; nor is it a strong factor distinguishing types of service, because the reason for disliking a service, its
association with dependent poverty, is the same for any sort of residual welfare. The emphasis people put on independence is almost
certainly made for the same reason. The survey of pensioners in 1966 found, in addition to those who were too proud to claim or who
disliked the National Assistance Board, a substantial proportion who said they were 'managing alright'- nearly 20% of couples, 30% of
single men, and 37.7% of single women (Ministry of Pensions, 1966, 42). It is possible that many of these were not ready to become
dependent, although the precise proportion is a matter for speculation. The public rejection of dependent poverty is strong.
Unemployment is one of the most disreputable forms, and one which is prominent in the public mind; in the European study, 'laziness'
and 'chronic unemployment' were the most common reasons given by those in the UK who had seen people in poverty (Riffault,
Rabier, 1977, 69). The two are closely linked: there was a time when unemployment was called 'idleness', which has pronounced
moral overtones. In its consideration of social security, the popular press devotes a disproportionate amount of space to unemployment
benefit- disproportionate both in terms of its cost and the numbers of people who claim it. Stubbs (1980) found, in a sample taken
from the national popular dailies over six months, that out of 457.5 column inches on social security, 226.5 were given to
unemployment benefit. (63.75 more went on Supplementary Benefit, of which a proportion goes to unemployed people.) Most of the
stories were judged to be unfavourable. The other main groups dependent on welfare benefits are people who are old, sick, disabled,
widows or single parents. In the US, programmes for income maintenance are often related to specific groups in need- unlike
Supplementary Benefit in the UK, which covers all groups. The American practice gives us some indication of the extend to which
groups of welfare recipients are rejected, and how that affects the services that deal with them. Williamson (1974c) asked people to
rank several programmes according to how much stigma they inflicted. General relief was felt to cause the most, probably because
this benefit goes to the rump of the poor, like tramps, who are not covered in other ways. It was followed by AFDC, which is
specifically given to unsupported mothers with children; Unemployment Compensation; Aid to the Disabled; and Old Age Assistance
(pp. 217-220). All of these groups are, to some degree, rejected in their own right, and it can be argued that the order in which
benefits are placed reflects feelings about the recipients. At the same tie, it should be emphasised that the receipt of welfare carries
with it a stigma of its own. As one old man told Walsm (1970), I am a welfare case. I have humbled myself (p. 148.)
Selectivity generates stigma through labeling.
Spicker, Professor and Grampian Chair of Public Policy at the Robert Gordon University, 84 [Paul Spicker,
Professor and Grampian Chair of Public Policy at the Robert Gordon University, 1984, Stigma and Social Welfare, pg. 179]
The second objection is that selectivity acts, in itself, as a form of labeling. It announces that a person is poor and in
need, and indicates what that need is by marking the benefit as one for the unemployed, the disabled, the sick, and so on.
To claim a service, a person must accept the label attached to it. But residual welfare also affects the
identity of these groups in ways other than labeling. Much concern has been expressed that groups should not
be marked out as undeserving; this emerges in many debates on policy. The Seebohm report commented as follows
on the idea of giving Social Services departments responsibility for a difficult tenants: To relieve (housing departments) of
responsibility for the dependent or unreliable tenants would discourage them from looking at the housing needs of their area
as a whole and create or reinforce degrading stigmas and social distinctions. (Cmnd. 3703, 1968, 126.)
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Means Testing Bad - Stigma
Non-take-up rates are considerably high in western countries where means-tested programs are
assosciated with stigma
Mood, prof of sociology at Stockholm University, ‘06
(Caprina Mood, Prof in the department of sociology, Stockholm University. European Sociological Review: June 22, 2006. “Take-Up
Down Under: Hits and Misses of Means-Tested Benefits in Australia”http://esr.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/22/4/443) [mary]
For a welfare system to be efficient, benefits must reach the people they are aimed at. When the
initiative of claiming a benefit lies with the eligible individual, there is a risk that people in the target
population do not claim it. Studies from several western welfare states have revealed considerable nontake-up rates of benefits. Apart from the obvious relevance to those interested in the functioning of welfare states, the
existence of non-take-up also signals that choices in economic matters may not be guided by economic motivations alone.
The choices to claim, or to abstain from, benefits are embedded in a social context—including interpersonal influences and
social norms—which makes the study of non-take-up highly relevant from a general sociological perspective (Mood, 2006).
When benefits have to be claimed, the efficiency of the welfare state depends on individual take-up choices. However,
these individual choices also depend on information and incentives provided by the welfare state. To
better understand the relation between the welfare state context and take-up, we need studies from countries with different
welfare state organizations. The bulk of research about non-take-up has been carried out in the United Kingdom and the
United States, but during the past decade there has been increasing interest in the issue in other western countries. Most
research on take-up has focused on means-tested benefits. This is probably partly because the non-take-up of
such benefits is regarded as particularly serious, as they are normally the final formal safety nets for the poor, and partly
because it is believed that means-tested benefits have lower take-up than other benefits because they are
associated with stigma (Corden, 1995).
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Means Testing Bad - Stigma
Means testing undermines social integration and stigmatizes those in poverty
van Oorschot Department of Sociology. Tilburg University 2
(Wim van Oorschot. Department of Sociology. Tilburg University2002 from World poverty ed by Peter Townsend, David Gordon pg.
178-9)
{CARD CONTINUES, NO TEXT OMITTED}
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Means Testing Bad – Stigma
Turns Case – Means testing stigmatizes programs causing chronic underfunding
van Oorschot Department of Sociology. Tilburg University 2
(Wim van Oorschot. Department of Sociology. Tilburg University2002 from World poverty ed by Peter Townsend, David Gordon pg.
180-1)
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Means Testing Bad - Dichotomy
Means testing recreates the deserving/undeserving poor dichotomy
Seekings Prof at University of Cape Town 8
(Jeremy Seekings Prof at University of Cape Town Transformation 68 2008 MUSE)
Social assistance programmes mitigate significantly poverty among groups of deserving poor – the elderly, the disabled, and children
– and among their dependents more broadly (Samson 2002, Bhorat 2003). The three categories of deserving poor comprise people
who cannot work on the grounds of either age or disability. The social assistance system makes no provision for able-bodied adults of
working age, ie between the ages of 16 (the age at which young people can leave school) and 60 or 65 (the ages at which women and
men respectively become eligible for the old-age pension). (The absence of any provision for children aged 14 or 15 is the starkest
anomaly in the design of the social assistance system.) Many adults of working age benefit indirectly from social assistance
programmes in that they are the dependents of the recipients of the grants. The state has chosen to focus its efforts on poor
adults of working age on public works programmes, which are supposed to provide the poor with the ‘dignity of
work’. The design of the social assistance system – including public works programmes – reflects a classic ‘northern’
conception of desert, ie the conception that underlies the design of welfare states in most of the global North . Those
poor who are unable to work should be assisted, but those of working age must go out and earn a living (or be dependent on
a breadwinner, for example, through marriage). This design makes sense if two conditions are met. First, unemployment must be low,
whether through Keynesian macro-economic policies, active labour market policies or American-style growth of low-wage
employment. Secondly, working people can insure themselves against the risk of short-term unemployment or joblessness because of
poor health through contributory welfare programmes. A third condition is of a lesser importance: enough working people provide for
their own retirement through contributory pension schemes that the cost of paying pensions is sustainable
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Means Testing Bad - Dichotomy
Targeting recreates class dichotomies
Shaver prof at Macquarie University 89
(Sheila Shaver prof at Macquarie University Summer 1989 Feminist Review, No. 32 JSTOR)
Provisions are 'classed' in the way they articulate income security with labour markets and social relationships derived from
employment. The establishment of a social right to subsistence income effectively decommodifies labour power, providing sustenance
without labour market obligation (Esping-Andersen, 1987). The terms and conditions under which labour power is decommodified are
political constructions of class relations. Gender and family are basic elements in these terms and conditions, both immediately in a
labour market structured by a deeply rooted sexual division of labour and secondarily in enduring mechanisms of class inheritance
such as wealth, education and social connection, racial and ethnic subordination. Welfare provisions are 'gendered' in the way
they articulate income security with family structure and dependency relations. Social rights to subsistence or
supplementary income reflect and reconstruct relations between men and women in terms of marriage, fertility, parenthood, kinship.
These rights establish a framework of breadwinner and dependency statuses for men and women institutionalized through the welfare
state (Shaver, 1983). The actual social meaning of dependency is strongly affected by class. This is expressed in
class structuring of its provisions through means tests on income and property, differential class entitlement through
'welfare' and 'taxation' expenditures, and most concretely in the prospect of actually being subjected to the controlling
forces of the welfare state. The political institutions of Australian liberal democracy originated in class conflict, and class
interests remain the salient frame- work of electoral politics. The Australian welfare state has, in concert with other changes, meant a
reconstruction of class relations (Shaver, 1987: 431). T he politics of decommodification define the role of the state in
regulating labour force obligation and apportioning the social burden of its cost. While class has been a visible
point of conflict in welfare politics, gender has been a point of covert agreement across the political spectrum.
Its very invisibility reflects the tension in liberal thought between woman as dependant and woman as citizen
(Brennan and Pateman, 1979; Nelson, 1984). The politics of family income support operate through liberal democratic institutions
under male control and have until recently made no distinction between the interests of the family unit and the interests of women.
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Means Testing Bad – Construction (threat)
Means Testing constructs the poor as deviant
van Oorschot Department of Sociology. Tilburg University 2
(Wim van Oorschot. Department of Sociology. Tilburg University2002 from World poverty ed by Peter Townsend, David Gordon pg.
179)
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Means Testing Bad – Participation
Stigmas surround means-tested assistance can prevent their use
Mickelson and Williams, PhDs in Psychology, ’08.
Stacy L. Williams, PhD East Tennessee State University, Kristin D. Mickelson, PhD Kent State University. Novermber 2008.
“Perceived Stigma of Poverty and Depression: Examination of Interpersonal and Intrapersonal Mediators’ Journal of Social and
Clinical Psychology pg. 905.http://www.atypon-link.com/GPI/doi/abs/10.1521/jscp.2008.27.9.903 ) [Mary]
In one study, using a qualitative design, poor women tended to believe others looked down on them because of their lowincome status (Collins, 2005). Other research has primarily focused on perceptions of stigma with respect to
welfare status or use of public assistance or means-tested government programs (e.g., Aid to Families with
Dependent Chil- dren; e.g., Horan & Austin, 1974; Jarrett, 1996; Kerbo, 1976; Stuber & Kronebusch, 2004). Stuber and
Schlesinger (2006) examined the sources of stigma for means-tested government programs and found
that participation in these programs is related to two distinct forms of stigma—namely, identity stigma
(which is defined as internaliz- ing negative stereotypes) and treatment stigma (which is defined as a fear that others
may treat them poorly). This research shows that poor people feel the stigma of their situation from agency
staff as well as society; and, these perceptions can inhibit their use of social services. Similarly, we define
perceived stigma in the present study as an individual’s personal negative feelings about their poverty, such as
embarrassment, shame, or deviance (what we term internal- ized stigma), and the individual’s perception of being
stigmatized by others (which may or may not accurately reflect network mem- bers’ behaviors and feelings; what we term
experienced stigma). We believe that both internalized and experienced stigma of poverty will be related to an
individual’s depression, but through different pathways.
Means testing process precludes social service participants
GAO, Government Accountability Office, 2005
(Report to the Ranking Majority Member, Committee on the Budget, House of Representatives, March 2005, “Means Tested
Programs”, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=gao&docid=f:d05221.pdf)
Factors that influence the ease with which potential participants can access a program—including
office hours, program location, and the ability of program participants to redeem or use their
benefits—can also affect the number and groups of people who participate in the programs. Several of the
programs we reviewed require applicants to visit the program office to establish and maintain eligibility. For instance,
local WIC, TANF, and Food Stamp Program offices typically require face-to-face interviews before
individuals can receive benefits.18 Those programs that keep traditional office hours—8:00 a.m. to 5:00
p.m.—pose a barrier to potential applicants who work and would have to take time away from their job
in order to apply. Studies on child care and WIC programs identify traditional office hours as a barrier
for working families. Similarly, Medicaid officials in California told us that one of their barriers to participation is
office hours that do not accommodate working families. Although many program officials suggested that having flexible
office hours is important to participants, some offices are challenged to extend their operating hours. WIC officials in
Connecticut told us that they have attempted to promote extended hours and have made some progress; however, instituting
extended hours remains problematic due to limited funding and contracts governing the workforce.
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Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Means Testing Bad – Participation
Targeted programs drastically hinder social service participation
GAO, Government Accountability Office, 2005
(Report to the Ranking Majority Member, Committee on the Budget, House of Representatives, March 2005, “Means Tested
Programs”, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=gao&docid=f:d05221.pdf)
many individuals do not
participate in low-income programs because they do not know that they are potentially eligible for
benefits. Numerous studies have documented instances where participation was compromised because individuals
were unaware of program benefits or had misconceptions about eligibility. For example, several EITC,
Medicaid, Food Stamp, Head Start, and SSI studies indicate that one of the primary barriers to
participation is that individuals do not know that they are eligible for these benefits. For some
individuals—like the elderly and non-English speakers—this unfamiliarity with program benefits is
even more widespread, creating a larger barrier to participation and an under representation of these
individuals in the caseload. Many program officials we visited agreed and explained that individuals also have
misconceptions about program eligibility. For example, some individuals do not believe that they are eligible for
benefits because they are employed while others do not want to be attached to the perceived stigma
associated with the programs. In Los Angeles, Medicaid officials noted that rumors circulated about the eligibility
From our literature review and interviews with program officials, we also found that
criteria for Medicaid prevent many potential recipients from applying for the program. Particularly in non-English speaking
communities, information about social services is often received through word of mouth; thus, when incorrect information
circulates, it can have a significant impact on participation.
Targeted programs hinder access – kills solvency
GAO, Government Accountability Office, 2005
(Report to the Ranking Majority Member, Committee on the Budget, House of Representatives, March 2005, “Means Tested
Programs”, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=gao&docid=f:d05221.pdf)
Federal agencies responsible for administering means-tested programs are charged with ensuring that
those eligible for program benefits and services are able to access them and with ensuring prudent
oversight of taxpayer dollars by maintaining program integrity, including preventing improper payments. Program
administrators may find it challenging to achieve these goals in part because they may conflict—
ensuring program integrity can potentially come at the expense of program access . While we identified a
number of strategies that have been implemented by federal, state, and local agencies that could potentially achieve both of
these goals, unless agencies track progress toward meeting these goals in a way that signals to program
administrators at all levels of government that both access and integrity are federal priorities, there is a
risk that one of the goals may be compromised. Estimating participation rates for means-tested programs is
difficult—and more difficult for some than for others—and cannot be considered “an exact science.” Nevertheless, when
done rigorously—in a way that ensures that estimates are comparable over time and quantifies the errors that result from the
estimation methodology—these estimates can provide a basic understanding of the extent to which needy
populations are being served by federal programs and can be a key component of a federal agency’s
efforts to establish a culture of accountability that emphasizes the importance of program access. Federal
agencies responsible for administering only four of the programs we covered in this review—CCDF, food stamps, WIC,
and EITC—either currently collect and report information on the extent to which they are reaching their target populations
in key performance and program reports or plan to do so. As a result, the federal agencies that administer the other nine
programs covered by this review may lack data that could inform their budgetary and programmatic decisions, assist them
in ensuring that their programs are coordinated with and appropriately complement other programs available to their target
populations, help them to manage their programs effectively, and enable them to provide policymakers with the information
they need to make decisions.
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Means Testing Bad – Participation
Means tested benefits drastically deter participation – stigma and bureaucratic hoops
Kreiswirth, Yale Law School, 1998
(Brian J. Kreiswirth, J.D. candidate, Spring 1998, Comparative Labor Law and Policy Review, Lexis)
Despite these strong theoretical arguments for means-testing, however, some analysts argue that provision of a basic state
pension to all accomplishes both poverty prevention and targeting more effectively. Means-tested benefits are
plagued by several problems that may compromise their adequacy. First, weak political support may
generate benefit cuts or exceedingly stringent eligibility restrictions; thus, benefits may be inadequate
to guarantee subsistence to all in need. n339 Second, benefits may not be collected by all individuals entitled to them.
This low take-up may be explained by fear of stigma, lack of information about entitlement,
unwillingness to deal with the intrusive and complex process of qualification, and other factors. n340
Evidence suggests that approximately twenty to thirty percent of British pensioners eligible for means-tested assistance do
not collect benefits, n341 while upwards of forty percent of American senior citizens eligible for SSI fail to apply. n342 Low
take-up undermines adequacy because the success of targeting depends critically on the willingness of people entitled to
benefits to claim them. n343 These problems do not arise as seriously for the basic public pension, which
tends to be well- supported and collected by almost all potential beneficiaries (due to [*450] lack of
stigma, much simpler administrative requirements, etc.). Moreover, the fact that universal pensions go to elderly
individuals who are not poor does not imply poor targeting because many pensioners would be poor without state benefits.
n344
Thus, a generous basic pension may prevent poverty and target more effectively than means-tested
assistance because benefits are more likely to be received by almost everyone in need. n345
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Means Testing Bad – Poverty
Targeted policies create internal and external stigmas in communities which make rising out of poverty
difficult.
Bigman and FoFack, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Family at the World Bank, 01
(David Bigman and Hippolyte Fofack, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Family at the World Bank, January 2001, THE
WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REVIEW, VOL. 14, NO. l, http://wber.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/14/1/129.pdf)
Political opposition to targeted programs may arise because only a portion of the general population is bearing their
cost and because programs create a stigma for beneficiaries. Smolensky, Reilly, and Evenhouse (1995)
distinguish between external and internal stigmas, that is, the stigma created because the welfare
program lowers the self-esteem of participants and the stigma created by the society at large, which
often leads to tensions between participants and the members of society who bear the tax burden of
financing the program. Besley and Kanbur (1993) point out that by stigmatising welfare recipients, incomebased programs have reduced recipients' ability to acquire skills and grow out of poverty. Moffitt (1983)
describes the stigma as the "disutility arising from participation in the welfare program"; Besley and Coate (1992)
emphasize the "psychiccosts of being on welfare."
Targeted programs inevitably exclude people in need – marriage act proves
Barbara Stark, University of Tennessee Law Professor, 2001
(Barbara Stark, Professor of Law at the University Of Tennessee College of Law, October 2001, California Law Review, Lexis)
All Marriage Proposals would be subject to two caveats. n250 First, while parties would have considerable scope to modify
existing domestic relations law, they could not violate other law. n251 Second, they could neither exacerbate existing
economic inequalities between the parties nor create new ones, within specified limits. n252 The Uniform Marriage
Proposals Act n253 would establish a ceiling (i.e., the maximum inequality allowed) which the parties
could always lower. This may be understood as a strong version of the bar, frequently found in state law, against
agreements that leave one of the parties a public charge. n254 By incorporating standards from means-
tested assistance programs, n255 however, such laws perpetuate poverty for those who receive too
much to qualify for such programs, but not enough to support an adequate standard of living. This
version is justified because of the continuing economic disparities between men and women. n256 While this caveat may not
be as necessary for same-sex couples, [*1523] couples in which the partners' earnings are roughly the same, or couples in
which the woman earns more; it not only affirms and strengthens the notion of marital sharing endorsed in all American
jurisdictions, but also quantifies it, enabling the partners to predict the result with greater certainty.
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Means Testing Bad – Inequality
Means-tested policies breed resentment and entrench inequality
Rothstein and Uslaner, Profs at Goteberg University and University of Maryland,’05
(Bo Rothstein, Chair of Political Science at Goteberg University, Eric M Uslaner, Prof at University of Maryland - CP “All for all:
Equality,
Corruption,
and
Social
trust.”
Johns
Hopkins
University
Press
2005.
Pages
44.
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v058/58.1rothstein.html) [Mary]
Ironically, when you need to prove you are poor to get government benefits, the system creates
resentment and distrust rather than empowerment and trust—and these very "means-tested' policies fail to
alleviate inequality and therefore fail to increase trust in fellow citizens. Policies designed to reduce poverty
instead create a trap of high inequality, less optimism for the future, less trust in others, greater ingroup identification, and persistent inequities in the distribution of wealth.
Selectivity creates stigma that creates a hierarchical society resulting in poverty and social inequality.
Spicker, Professor and Grampian Chair of Public Policy at the Robert Gordon University, 84 [Paul Spicker,
Professor and Grampian Chair of Public Policy at the Robert Gordon University, 1984, Stigma and Social Welfare, pg. 179]
The first objection to selectivity is that it creates an underclass – a pariah group. Titmuss argued that “the
greatest source of stigma is likely, in a competitive society, to derive from the continuous process of
selection and rejection that the individual experiences in the private sector. (Reisman, 1977, 51-52.)
He identified this process with selectivity in the social services. Residual welfare is intended to help
people who are least able to cope in the market society , and selectivity is the mechanism by which this
is done. Selectivity therefore defines those who have failed in a competitive society. Dependency on
social services becomes stigmatising because it identifies the lowest class – people who are not only
dependent, but dirty and immoral. Selectivity, Townsend (1976) argues, “fosters hierarchical relationships
of superiority and inferiority in society, diminishes rather than enhances the status of the poor, and has
the effect of widening rather than reducing social inequalities. Far from sensitivity discriminating different
kinds of need it lumps the unemployed, sick, widowed, aged and others into one undifferentiated and inevitably stigmatized
category. (p.126).
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Means Testing Bad – Future Support
Targeted programs are subject to political and financial distortion – kills solvency
Cassel, Chief of the Section of General Internal Medicine, 1994
(Christine Cassel, M.D., Fall 1994, Saint Louis University School of Law)
The other thing that happened in 1965 was almost an afterthought: the establishment of Medicaid. Medicaid was intended
to cover the poor who do not get insurance with their employment. The fact that Medicaid would cover [*58] long term
care was nearly an afterthought. No one ever considered that it would grow to the degree it did. Medicaid is not based
on a social contract model. It is based on a welfare model that requires means testing. That is, it requires
that each state establish what level of poverty is severe enough to warrant public insurance. It is
therefore much more vulnerable to politics and to budget cutting. Medicaid has very few effective advocates or
interest groups, and therefore is considered a failure by most policy experts. If one considers combining Medicaid and
Medicare into one public program, the Medicare beneficiaries say "We don't want Medicare turning into
Medicaid". You don't hear the Medicaid beneficiaries saying "We don't want to turn into Medicare". It
is clear that the Medicare model for many reasons has been much more successful in maintaining standards of care, from
the perspective of both beneficiaries and providers.
Targeting reduces the total amount of money going to the poor
Mkandawire, Director of UNRISD, 2005
(Thandika Mkandawire, director of United Nations Research Institute for Social development, December 2005, Social Policy and
Development Programme paper Number 23,
http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpAuxPages)/955FB8A594EEA0B0C12570FF00493EAA/$file/mkandatarget.p
df)
The usual assumption is that the amount spent on subsidies remains the same after introducing strict
targeting, and that the targeted groups will therefore receive more. But in most cases the total
allocation to subsidies is reduced, and in most cases the switch to targeting leads to reduced effort. In
situations where the focus has been on poverty alleviation, the level of efficiency in addressing certain aspects of poverty
has outweighed efforts. Thus “effort” and targeting are negatively related: countries with higher
“efficiency” due to targeting have traded a good part of this by reducing “effort” (Korpi and Palme 1998;
Oxley et al. 2001). The “paradox of targeting” is that optimal targeting requires that an increase in the
needs of some group be met by a reduction in the resources allocated to it (Keen 1992). Targeting tends
to lead to reduced budgets devoted to poverty and welfare, so that “more for the poor mean(s) less for
the poor” (Gelbach and Pritchett 1995). Thus the more countries target benefits to low-income categories, the smaller
redistributive budgets they tend to have. Korpi and Palme observe:
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Means Testing Bad – Agency
Targeting undermines the agency of the targets
Sen Nobel prize winner in economics 1995
(A Sen Nobel prize winner in economics 1995 Public spending and the poor: Theory and evidence)
The use of the term “targeting” in eradicating poverty is based on an analogy–a target is something fired at. It
is not altogether clear whether it is an appropriate analogy. The problem is not so much that the word “target” has
combative association. This it does of course have, and the relationship it implies certainly seems more adversarial than
supportive. But it is possible to change the association of ideas, and in fact, to some extent, the usage has already shifted in
a permissive direction. The more serious problem lies elsewhere–in the fact that the analogy of a target does
not at all suggest that the recipient is an active person, functioning on her own, acting and doing things.
The image is one of a passive receiver rather than of an active agent. To see the objects of targeting as patients
rather than as agents can undermine the exercise of poverty removal in many different ways. The people
affected by such policies can be very active agents indeed, rather than languid recipients waiting for their handouts. Not to
focus on the fact that they think, choose, act, and respond is to miss something terribly crucial to the entire exercise. This is
not just a terminological problem. The approach of what is called targeting often has this substantive feature
of taking a passive view of the beneficiaries, and this can be a major source of allocational distortion.1
There is something to be gained from taking, instead, a more activity-centered view of poverty
removal
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Means Testing Bad - Complicated
Complicated requirements surrounding means-tested programs deter potential recipients
Mood, prof of sociology at Stockholm University, ‘06
(Caprina Mood, Prof in the department of sociology, Stockholm University. European Sociological Review: June 22, 2006. “Take-Up
Down Under: Hits and Misses of Means-Tested Benefits in Australia”http://esr.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/22/4/443) [mary]
Although stigma is much discussed, it is not the only potential cause of non-take-up. As noted above, transaction costs and
the availability of information can also be part of the explanation. The fact that there are many different meanstested benefits in Australia, often with complex eligibility rules, can make it difficult for people to know
whether they are eligible for some benefit, and it can also make the application procedure more
demanding. However, eligibility and entitlement criteria are standardized and non-discretionary, features that are shared
by British benefits and have been suggested as a part of the explanation for high take-up in the United Kingdom (Behrendt,
2000). In addition, almost all benefits are distributed from the same source (Centrelink), and once a claim has been made,
one generally does not have to renew claims but must only report relevant changes. The transaction costs for continuing
recipiency should thus be relatively small. As described above, the choice to claim a benefit can be seen as
weighing the different costs of claiming against the size of the economic incentives. At given costs, takeup will thus be higher among people with higher entitlements or with smaller economic resources. The maximum rates of
means-tested benefits in Australia are relatively high (Eardley et al., 1996; OECD, 1998). However, eligible people can
have rather high pre-benefit incomes, and benefits at high incomes are relatively small because of high taper rates. This can
lead to low take-up rates in Australia as compared with other countries, where the eligible population is poorer.
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Means Testing Bad - Empirically
Means-tested programs empirically have substantially decreased participation by the needy
Mood, prof of sociology at Stockholm University, ‘06
(Caprina Mood, Prof in the department of sociology, Stockholm University. European Sociological Review: June 22, 2006. “Take-Up
Down Under: Hits and Misses of Means-Tested Benefits in Australia”http://esr.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/22/4/443) [mary]
The major means-tested SA benefit in the United States is Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF),
which in 1996 replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). TANF/AFDC is/was given to very poor
households with children, primarily single-parent households. Benefit levels vary but are generally very low and are phased
out at incomes well below the poverty line1 (Eardley et al., 1996; Behrendt, 2000; Nelson, 2003; Hoynes et al., 2006).
TANF has stricter criteria than AFDC, including extensive job search requirements and a lifetime limit
of five years’ participation in the programme (Moffitt, 2003). During the 1980s and up to 1996, the take-up of AFDC has
been estimated to be between 62 and 86 per cent (Blank and Ruggles, 1996; DHHS, 2005). However, the introduction
of TANF appears to have dramatically decreased take-up: DHHS (2005) estimated that it fell from 84
to 48 per cent between 1996 and 2002.
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Means Testing Bad – Private Insurers
Means-tested benefits push much of the population to expensive private insurers
Sarasa, Prof of poly sci at uni of Pompeu, ‘07
(Sebastian Sarasa, prof at the Political and Social Sciences Department in the University of. Pompeu Fabra European Sociological
Review:
October
3,
2007.“Do
Welfare
Benefits
Affect
Women's
Choices
of
Adult
Care
Giving?”
http://esr.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/24/1/37) [mary]
Targeting proposals have also been made in the field of adult care benefits (Brodsky et al., 2003), but there is no clear
empirical evidence to support this proposal. In favour of universalism, Korpi and Palme (1998) have identified the
redistributive paradox. Through comparative analysis of social insurance institutions, Korpi and Palme (1998)
highlighted that encompassing schemes providing earnings related benefits have more beneficial
effects on poverty reduction than targeted or flat-rate schemes. Limiting public expenditure to the very
poor paradoxically limits redistribution for two main reasons. First, the size of the redistributive budget is not fixed,
but reflects the structure of welfare institutions in such a way that encompassing and earnings related schemes help the
formation of interests and coalitions in favour of greater availability of redistributive budgets flourish. Second,
redistribution is limited because targeting benefits pushes most of the population to market insurances,
which are more unequal than comprehensive social protection. Other authors have also criticized the
negative impact of means-tested unemployment benefits on the households’ labour supply (Dex et al., 1995;
Ercolani and Jenkins, 2000) but little information has been collected on the effects of targeted old age and disability
benefits on women's care giving time among different social strata.
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Stigma Link – Targeted Housing
Federal housing policies targeted at the poor are the reason stigmatization of the poor exists because they
use an approach that actually increases marginalization.
Warr, Research Fellow at University of Melbourne, 06
(Deborah Warr, University of Melbourne Centre for Health & Society, 2006, There goes the neighbourhood: the malign effects of
stigma, http://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/81410/social-city-19-warr.pdf) SS
Across Australia in the post World War II period public housing projects were established in new suburbs that flanked
industrial precincts. The new estates, located on what was then the fringes of the metropolis, were large and filled with
housing stock built with uniform materials and styles (Arthurson, 2004). The homogeneous housing stock of these
public housing estates is an effect of what Lipietz (1998:185) describes as ‘the fordist, mass production
solution to the housing question’. He is referring to the similarity of ways in which welfare societies, both in
Australia and across the industrial world, supported the working classes to achieve stable and decent
accommodation, on the way to eventual home ownership, by subsidising tracts of housing stock in suburbs
close to key areas of industrial production. Invariably, the conspicuous and distinctive building styles
and materials that were adopted by state housing commissions have ensured that the spatial
characteristics of the suburbs remain easily recognised. Increasingly, the distinctive topography of these suburbs
signals an array of economic and social disadvantages as economic restructuring has been transformed these
neighbourhoods from ‘working to workless’ suburbs over a very short period of time (Peel, 2003:118). The provision of
public housing has become residualised and reserved for the most disadvantaged who, for different reasons,
are often not able to participate in the paid work force (Arthurson, 2004, Peel, 1995).
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Stigma Impact – Takes Out Solvency
Stigma systematically creates problems with quality and demand of social services, no solvency.
Spicker, Professor and Grampian Chair of Public Policy at the Robert Gordon University, 84 [Paul Spicker,
Professor and Grampian Chair of Public Policy at the Robert Gordon University, 1984, Stigma and Social Welfare, pg. 24]
Stigma is associated with two problems fundamental to social welfare. The first is the quality of service
provided. The second, closely related to this, is its effect on the demand for services. Stigma has been
represented as a form of rationing; under the Poor Law, it was used explicitly to hold down demand to a
manageable level, and reduce the burden on the ratepayer. But this does not imply the best or most efficient use
of resources to achieve the aims of the social services (if these aims are to a minimum), and the effect stigma is
supposed to have on demand nullifies the efforts of the services to reach people in need.
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Stigma Impact – Victim Blaming
The label of poverty blames the victim and rationalizes state disciplinary practices
Schram ‘95, (Sanford teaches social theory and social policy at Bryn Mawr College, 1995, @ Words of
Welfare: The Poverty of Social Science and the Social Science of Poverty {U of Minnesota Press} Page: 15-16)
The racially coded "underclass" is probably the most glaring example of how ETM encourages the production
of disembodied information that has profound political implications. William Julius Wilson, Isabel Sawhill, and
many others have offered statistical analyses of what they call they "underclass"-"a subgroup of the American
population that engages in behaviors at a variance with those of mainstream populations' often indicated such
“dysfunctional" behaviors as dropping out of school, female heading of families with children, welfare
"dependency;" and adult male unemployment or underemployment.66 Adolph Reed Jr. has noted: "Instead of
clarifying or correcting the impressionistic generalities and simple-minded prejudices..., social scientists have
legitimated them with an aura of scientific verity, surrounding them in an authenticating mist of quantification
.”67 In the quest to be politically relevant, welfare policy researchers have often accepted the idea that there is
an "underclass," that is, a distinct group of poor people with behavioral deficiencies. In the quest to provide
"useful" quantitative information, they often fail to examine sufficiently the political implications of the use of
this term." This is not a matter of how the word sounds in polite company; instead, it is an issue for how
research gets framed and results get interpreted. The concept of an "underclass" encourages locating the causes
of poverty in individual pathology. Even when authors seek to explain "the underclass" in terms of societal
racial prejudice, the discourse is unavoidably almost always one of pathology. In American Apartheid, Douglas
Massey and Nancy Denton marshal census tract data to reject William Julius Wilson's argument for
decliningracism. Yet their analysis also suggests that racism has helped produce an underclass concentrated in
poor, African American neighborhoods. Even if racism is the primary cause, the underclass is afflicted with
behavioral pathologies. Massey and Denton underscore how segregation has systematically worked to
undermine social, educational, and economic opportunities for African Americans; however, like so many other
analysts today, they resort to suggesting that segregation produces behavioral pathologies that must be
discouraged. The study of the underclass may easily end up serving to rationalize state disciplinary practices, if
for no other reason than that such research reinforces the idea that individual behavioral pathologies lie near, if
not at, the heart of the problem of poverty today. Irrespective of what scholars such as Massey and Denton
intend, the study of the underclass may easily end up serving to reinforce the idea that individual choices rather
than constraining structures are the primary causes of contemporary poverty.76 Lou Turner addresses this issue
forthrightly:As much as they are at pains to critique the neoconservative "culture ofpoverty" arguments, Massey
and Denton succumb to just such a tendencyin their discussion of the "personal failings," "individual
shortcomings,""normative" behavior and "oppositional culture" in the Black community,Their distortion of
"being black" as a form of social deviance because of itsoppositional nature represents a depoliticization of
Black consciousness. 7
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Universal CP
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Stigma Impact – Racism
Poverty stigma can morph into race stigma and it dehumanizes the poor.
Waxman, prof sociology Rutgers, 77
(Chaim I. Waxman, professor of sociology at Rutgers University, 1977, “The Stigma of Poverty”)
We would suggest that stigma of poverty is a special type of stigma which attributes to the poor a status of
being “less than human,” and that the stigma has taken various shapes at different historical stages. Without positing
any historical process to its development, we shall demonstrate that the stigma was initially attributed to the poor as a group
stigma, that as the result of the history of government social welfare legislation and the subsequent professionalization of
social work, the stigma became individualized, and that with the focusing of sociologists upon the poor in the past several
decades in the United States, the stigma of poverty is once again becoming a group stigma. Thus while the
stigma of poverty cannot be pigeonholed neatly into any of Goffman’s three types, it has at times resembled the “blemishes
of individual character” type .Moreover, in recent years it has taken on, in addition, a strong dosage of “tribal
stigma of race,” because of the strong identification or association in the minds of many of welfare
poor with blacks. That this association is unfounded to a great extent is irrelevant in terms of the stigma, because, as was
stated previously, what is important is the “language of relationships,” or what W.I. Thomas (1966) called, “the definition
of the situation”: “If a situation is defined as real, it is real in its consequences.”
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Stigma Impact – Violence
Stigmatization enacts social inequality and symbolic violence
Parker and Aggleton, Professor of Columbia and Professor of University of London, 5/02 [Richard Parker and Peter Aggleton,
Professor and Chair of the Department of Sociomedical Sciences, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University and Dean of
Research, Professor in Education and Director of the Thomas Coram Research Unit, Institute of Education, University of London,
May 2002, “HIV/AIDS-related Stigma and Discrimination: A Conceptual Framework and an Agenda for Action,”
http://pdf.dec.org/pdf_docs/Pnacq832.pdf
Similarly, concepts of symbolic violence and hegemony highlight the role of stigmatization in
establishing social order and control, and identify stigmatization as part of the social struggle for
power. Symbolic violence is a process where words, images and practices promote the interests of
dominant groups (Bourdieu 1977; Bourdieu 1984; Bourdieu and Passeron 1977), and hegemony is
achieved through the use of political, social and cultural forces to promote dominant meanings and
values that legitimize unequal social structures (Foucault 1977 and 1978; Gramsci 1970; Williams
1977; Williams 1982). So all cultural meanings and practices embody interests and are used to
enhance social distinctions between individuals, groups, and institutions.
Sociological analyses of discrimination are also useful because they emphasize the structural
aspects of discrimination and “concentrate on patterns of dominance and oppression, viewed as
expressions of a struggle for power and privilege” (Marshall 1998).
Following from the notion that stigmatization is a process that involves identifying differences
between groups of people, and using these differences to determine where groups fit into structures
of power, is the idea that stigma and discrimination are used to produce and reproduce social
inequality. Stigmatization, therefore, not only helps to create difference but also plays a key role in
transforming difference based on class, gender, race, ethnicity, or sexuality into social inequality.
Stigmatization perpetuates inequality through symbolic violence and hegemony
Parker and Aggleton, Professor of Columbia and Professor of University of London, 5/02 [Richard Parker and Peter Aggleton,
Professor and Chair of the Department of Sociomedical Sciences, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University and Dean of
Research, Professor in Education and Director of the Thomas Coram Research Unit, Institute of Education, University of London,
May 2002, “HIV/AIDS-related Stigma and Discrimination: A Conceptual Framework and an Agenda for Action,”
http://pdf.dec.org/pdf_docs/Pnacq832.pdf
Stigmatization is also used by dominant groups to legitimize and perpetuate inequalities, and
concepts of symbolic violence and hegemony can also help us understand how it is that those who
are stigmatized and discriminated against so often accept, and even internalize, the stigma to which
they are subjected. This is because the processes of symbolic violence and hegemony convince the
dominated to accept existing hierarchies and allow social hierarchies to persist over generations,
without generating conscious recognition from those who are dominated. In addition, these
processes limit the ability of oppressed and stigmatized groups and individuals to resist the forces
that discriminate against them.
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Stigma Impact – Social Control
Stigmatization creates hierarchies of social control and inequality
Parker and Aggleton, Professor of Columbia and Professor of University of London, 5/02 [Richard Parker and Peter Aggleton,
Professor and Chair of the Department of Sociomedical Sciences, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University and Dean of
Research, Professor in Education and Director of the Thomas Coram Research Unit, Institute of Education, University of London,
May 2002, “HIV/AIDS-related Stigma and Discrimination: A Conceptual Framework and an Agenda for Action,”
http://pdf.dec.org/pdf_docs/Pnacq832.pdf
Social and political theory can help us to understand that stigmatization and discrimination are not
isolated phenomena or the expression of individual attitudes, but are social processes used to create
and maintain social control and to produce and reproduce social inequality.
S&D are used to create “difference” and social hierarchy.
Stigma is something that is “produced” and used to help order society. For example, most societies
achieve conformity by contrasting those who are “normal” with those who are “different” or
“deviant.” Cultures therefore produce “difference” in order to achieve social control. In many nonWestern societies, local knowledge systems may perform the same function at a more localized
level (Geertz 1983).
Social Services are a tool for society to control the behaviors it finds unacceptable
Spicker ’84 (Paul Spicker, Ph.D- University of London, ‘Stigma and Social Welfare’, pp.
84,http://books.google.com/books?id=49wOAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA91&lpg=PA91&dq=%22poverty%22+stigma&source=bl&ots=T0
3eweTRXq&sig=oyNuZWzhXvaMo7xTgK4c2BimKL0&hl=en&ei=wSRnSrLCB5S4lAept5TdDA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result
&resnum=7)
One part of the function of social services is to control behaviour that is socially unacceptable. The prevention
of child abuse, the committal to institutions of mentally ill people, or the treatment of truancy as a social
problem, are all cases in which the idea of welfare is strapped to a big stick. Stigmatisation has been
represented as another form of social control, a deliberate policy to make people behave themselves. This is
closely related to the question of power. It has been argued that power is concentrated in the hands of those
who own the means of production, and poor people are controlled because the people who have the power wish
to preserve it. But I do not think it necessary to posit the existance of a conspiratorial ruling class to explain
social control. Some behaviour cannot be reconciled with certain types of social organisation, whether because
it breaches social norms, it hurts others, or it imposes a burden on others which they are not prepared to accept.
Stigmatisation is, in part, a response to behaviour of this sort. It controls behaviour by punishing the offender
and by acting as a warning to others.
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Universal CP
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Stigma Impact – Isolation
Labeling eventually leads to embarrassment and retreat of those labeled, preventing collective action to
rise out of poverty and causing isolation in both their own communities and the rest of the world.
Warr, Research Fellow at University of Melbourne, 06
(Deborah Warr, University of Melbourne Centre for Health & Society, 2006, There goes the neighbourhood: the malign effects of
stigma, http://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/81410/social-city-19-warr.pdf) SS
In addition to making the important point that this ‘territorial stigma’ adds extra burden on the inhabitants of poor
neighbourhoods, he also notes that among those ‘exiled’ inside such neighbourhoods, there is a weakening of
communal bonds and social networks as households respond to the pressures confronting them in different ways.
The problem is that in the absence of positive narratives of place, residents may feel that their best chance of
combating (supposed) negative influences is to maintain aloofness from the neighbourhood. For residents
of stigmatised neighbourhoods, this is often achieved by regulating social interaction with others in the
neighbourhood (Warr, 2005, Lupton, 2004). Unfortunately, this undermines potential social solidarity in which
residents could collectivise and mobilise in order to challenge and resist the demonisation of their
neighbourhood (Wacquant 1996). At the same time, people outside the stigmatised neighbourhood, in response to its
demonisation, exert great efforts to maintain a social distance from such neighbourhoods, thus exacerbating the social and
personal isolation of residents. These reactions - retreating from community among the residents of stigmatised
neighbourhoods, and retreating into fortified and exclusive experiences of community among the nonpoor – further intensifies socio-spatial polarisation of poor and non-poor.
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Stigma Impact – Dehumanization
Stigmatization creates a cycle of degradation turning case.
Spicker, Professor and Grampian Chair of Public Policy at the Robert Gordon University, 84 [Paul Spicker,
Professor and Grampian Chair of Public Policy at the Robert Gordon University, 1984, Stigma and Social Welfare, pg. 25-26]
Thirdly, within the context of the service, stigmatized people may be treated as inferior individuals . One
of the most degrading features of the old people’s homes described by Townsend (1963) found, in a survey of hospitals for
mentally handicapped people, no only a lack of personal possessions and storage space, but a lack of anywhere that was
private – a proportion and toilets without doors, and others had them without partitions. Institutions affect the
behaviour and character of the residents. Goffman suggests, in Asylums, that much of the bahaviour of people in
mental institutions can be understood as a reaction to a situation where sanity seems to have been abandoned rather than
pathological madness (Goffman, 1961). And Barton (1959) describes one effect of institutional life as a clinical
syndrome, which he terms ‘institutional neurosis’. May residential institutions are insufficiently protected
from these problems. The buildings are physically isolated, the staff – especially trained staff, who are
substantially in the majority tend, for there own convenience, and because they are severely overburdened
to favour methods that facilitate the control of residents rather than their care, and the residents are not in a
position protest (see K.Jones et el. 1967).
The provision of services reflects an underlying attitude to the people who use social services. They
are supposed not to care about the quality of service they receive. Privacy, personal possessions and
consideration for personal needs are thought of as dispensable luxuries. The recipient is treated as
something less than human, and this treatment both implies and encourages the degradation.
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Stigma Impact – Poverty
Poverty discrimination and labeling turns case and makes the burden of poverty unbearable, rather than
solving.
Warr, Research Fellow at University of Melbourne, 06
(Deborah Warr, University of Melbourne Centre for Health & Society, 2006, There goes the neighbourhood: the malign effects of
stigma, http://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/81410/social-city-19-warr.pdf) SS
Wacquant identifies a tendency for poverty in the metropolis to become increasingly concentrated in particular areas.
These neighbourhoods become clearly recognised, by insiders and outsiders alike, as problem places for
problem people. Territorial prominence of neighbourhoods where the poor live heightens susceptibility for developing
bad reputations for being unpleasant, and even dangerous, places. These depictions perceptions tend to be
deceptive mixtures of experience and perception, fact and fiction. Significantly, bad reputations that adhere to
neighbourhoods where the poor live bear little connection to the reality of everyday life in these places : It matters little
that the discourses of demonisation that have mushroomed about them often have only tenuous
connections to the reality of everyday life in them. A pervading territorial stigma is firmly affixed upon
the residents of such neighbourhoods of socioeconomic exile that adds its burden to the disrepute of poverty
and resurging prejudice against ethnic minorities and immigrants (Wacquant 1996:1644).
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Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Stigma Impact – Participation
Welfare stigma cause of two two thirds of eligible Americans not to receive benefits
Stuber and Schlesinger, PhD Columbia University and PhD Yale University, 06
(Stuber and Schlesinger, PhD Columbia University and PhD Yale University, “Sources of stigma for means-tested government
programs.” Social Science & Medicine March 2006.
between one and two-thirds of eligible Americans forego participation in
means-tested government programs for which they are eligible (Blank & Ruggles, 1996; Moffitt, 1987).
Various factors have been shown to contribute to this low “take-up”, including confusion about
Depending on the program,
administrative requirements and burdensome enrollment processes (Stuber & Kronebusch, 2004). Low take-up has also
been attributed to the so-called “welfare stigma” (Moffitt, 1983). The stigmatized character of certain public
benefits may have implications beyond program participation. Researchers have suggested that stigma
can profoundly undermine recipients’ well-being and their relationships with others (Crocker, Major, &
Steele, 1998) and may even contribute to long-term dependency in anti-poverty programs (Kerbo, 1976).
Although program-related stigma can have a variety of undesirable consequences, little is known about how this stigma is
generated or about how policymakers might mediate its effects. This study broadens our understanding of stigma related to
means-tested programs.
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Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Stigma Impact – Future Support
Stigmatization creates a cycle of poverty by diverting political clout and resources.
Spicker, Professor and Grampian Chair of Public Policy at the Robert Gordon University, 84 [Paul Spicker,
Professor and Grampian Chair of Public Policy at the Robert Gordon University, 1984, Stigma and Social Welfare, pg. 25]
Secondly, because stigmatized people are “undeserving, they tend to lack the political influence that is
needed to divert resource towards them. In cases where their stigma is morally reprehensible, as it may
be, for example, in the case of unemployment, they may have resources diverted away from them; it is more
likely though, that they will simply be ignored.
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AT: Stigma Inevitable
A 1990 survey shows reduction of stigma.
Link et. al., 97
(Jo Phelan, prof Columbia, Bruce G. Link, Robert E. Moore, Ann Stueve, prof Columbia. Social Psychology Quarterly, 1997, vol. 60
no. 4, pgs. 323-337)
Nevertheless, there are some indications that these predictions may be wrong. Although attitudes
toward homeless people are not uniformly positive (Link et al. 1995b), the level of compassion expressed
by the public is surprisingly high, and the propensity to blame them for their situation surprisingly low
(Lee, Jones, and Lewis 1990; Lee, Lewis, and Jones 1992; Link et al. 1995a; Toro and McDonell 1992). The most direct
comparison of attitudes toward homeless people and toward other poor people focused on blame. Lee
et al. (1990, 1992) discovered, in contrast to previous findings on beliefs about the causes of poverty (e.g.,
Feagin 1975; Kluegel and Smith 1986), that Americans were more likely to attribute homelessness to
structural conditions than to individual shortcomings. In a nationally representative sample, more
respondents said that "society is mainly at fault" for homelessness (45 percent) than that "the homeless
personally are mainly at fault" (33 percent) (Lee et al. 1992).4 In a survey of Nashville residents, 59 percent
agreed that "homelessness is due to forces people can't control, such as housing shortages or changes in
the economy"; smaller proportions attributed homelessness to factors such as aversion to work (45 percent), personal
choice (37 percent), alcoholism (45 percent), or mental illness (53 percent) (Lee et al. 1990).
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AT: Stigma Low
Lower stigma toward homeless based on comparisons, not true compassion.
Link et. al., 97
(Jo Phelan, prof Columbia, Bruce G. Link, Robert E. Moore, Ann Stueve, prof Columbia. Social Psychology Quarterly, 1997, vol. 60
no. 4, pgs. 323-337)
As noted by Lee et al. (1990:263), if public attitudes toward homeless
people are more positive than toward other poor people, "conventional sociological wisdom about a whole
range of stratification beliefs could be in need of revision." Such a state of affairs would suggest that in the case
of contemporary homelessness, we may have found a limit to the robust tendency to legitimate inequality by
blaming and punishing those who have fared worst in life.
Such conclusions are premature, however: We cannot yet say that homeless people are stigmatized or blamed less than
other poor people because the existing research has not directly compared attitudes toward the two groups. Lee
et al. (1992) came closest to allowing such a comparison, but (as they acknowledge) the data they compare are based
on surveys conducted at different points in time with different samples and question wording. Moreover, as Lee
et al. (1990) point out, the apparently more compassionate responses toward people described as "homeless"
rather than "poor" may result from another methodological artifact: Focusing on a particular category of poor
people may make the referents seem more "precise and human" and consequently more difficult to blame for
their situation.
These results are potentially very significant.
In this paper we directly compare stigmatizing attitudes toward homeless and domiciled poor people. Are attitudes toward homeless
people more stigmatizing, as suggested by the theories discussed? Are these attitudes less stigmatizing, as suggested by some
research? Or does homelessness per se have little effect on attitudes toward poor people? We also consider several related questions
that help us understand more clearly the strength, sources, meaning, and generality of public responses to homelessness; these are
elaborated below.
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Stephen Caputo, Grant Gaither, Anna Gordan, Devon Manley, Nishu Mehta, Mary Rassenfoss, Shruti Satish, Alexis Shklar, Dru Svoboda, Don Virts
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
AT: People Aren’t Stigmatized
Stigma exists. Statistics are skewed by fear of accepting the stigma.
Spicker, Professor and Grampian Chair of Public Policy at the Robert Gordon University, 84 [Paul Spicker,
Professor and Grampian Chair of Public Policy at the Robert Gordon University, 1984, Stigma and Social Welfare, pg. 28-29]
However, there are grounds on which to question this interpretation. Firstly, it is possible that an admission of stigma
is itself stigmatising. People may be eager to deny that they feel any stigma . The parent of a mentally
handicapped child claims, “I let everyone know we’ve got a daughter like it and that there is no stigma (Cooper, Henderson,
1973, 119); the assertion seems to contradict itself. Tucker (1966) asked a man who lived on a council estate
weather he felt any stigma and received the reply: Certainly not. Why should you say that? Do you think
we’ve all go some terrible disease here? (p.35.) The same person continued to express the fear – irrationally,
in view of his denial – that if there was any stigma, it might harm his daughter. The reason for denial
is not difficult to establish: a person who complains of stigma is admitting to degradation, the contempt
of others, a loss of social standing; it may be a truth he would rather avoid.
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Stephen Caputo, Grant Gaither, Anna Gordan, Devon Manley, Nishu Mehta, Mary Rassenfoss, Shruti Satish, Alexis Shklar, Dru Svoboda, Don Virts
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
AT: Stigma Lower Now
Stigmatizing continues in modern day, people perceive fault of persons involved, not fault of market.
Link et. al., 97
(Jo Phelan, prof Columbia, Bruce G. Link, Robert E. Moore, Ann Stueve, prof Columbia. Social Psychology Quarterly, 1997, vol. 60
no. 4, pgs. 323-337)
In more recent times, the official treatment of poor people has become less harsh, but the public's
inclination to blame the poor for their condition and the stigmatizing nature of public assistance still
prevail. Several studies (Commission of the European Communities 1977; Feagin 1975; Free and Cantril 1967;
Golding and Middleton 1982; Huber and Form 1973; Kluegel and Smith 1986) have discovered that Americans and
Britons tend to attribute poverty to poor people's personal shortcomings. In a national survey in the
United States, for example, Feagin (1975) found that, when respondents evaluated the causes of poverty,
they placed more importance on poor people's behavioral characteristics, such as lack of thrift and
proper money management (59 percent said this was a "very important" reason for poverty), lack of effort (57
percent), lack of ability and talent (54 percent), and loose morals and drunkenness (50 percent), than on
economic and social factors such as low wages (43percent), scarcity of jobs (29 percent), poor schools (38
percent), and racial discrimination (34 percent). These results were essentially replicated in 1980 by Kluegel and
Smith (1986). A series of polls conducted between 1982 and 1995, however, reveals clear variation in these attitudes over
time (Weaver, Shapiro, and Jacobs 1995): The tendency to blame the poor is substantially higher in the mid-
1990s than it was in the early 1980s.
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Stephen Caputo, Grant Gaither, Anna Gordan, Devon Manley, Nishu Mehta, Mary Rassenfoss, Shruti Satish, Alexis Shklar, Dru Svoboda, Don Virts
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Targeting Bad – Linear Impact
The more programs target the poor the less likely they are to have a positive outcome
Korpi and Palme, Prof and researcher, 98
(Walter Korpi and Joakim Palme, Prof at the Swedish institute for Social Research and External Research Coordinator for the
UNRISD research on Social Policy in Late Industrializers. “The Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of Equality:
Welfare State Institutions, Inequality and Poverty in the Western Countries” 1998 American Sociological Review - Jstor:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2657333) mary
The debates on how to reduce poverty and inequality have focused on two controversial
questions. One is whether social policies should be targeted to low-income groups or
universal; another whether benefits should be equal for all or earnings-related.
Traditional arguments in favor of targeting and flat-rate benefits, focusing on the
distribution of the money actually transferred, have neglected three policy-relevant
considerations: 1. The size of redistributive budgets is not fixed but reflects the structure
of welfare state institutions. 2. There tends to be a tradeoff between the degree of lowincome targeting and the size of redistributive budgets. 3. Outcomes of market-based
distribution are often even more unequal than those of earnings-related social insurance
programs. We argue that social insurance institutions are of central importance for
redistributive outcomes. Using new data bases, our comparative analyses of the effects
of different institutional types of welfare states on poverty and inequality indicate that
institutional differences lead to unexpected outcomes and generate the paradox of
redistribution: The more we target benefits at the poor and the more concerned we are
with creating equality via equal public transfers to all, the less likely we are to reduce
poverty and inequality.
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Stephen Caputo, Grant Gaither, Anna Gordan, Devon Manley, Nishu Mehta, Mary Rassenfoss, Shruti Satish, Alexis Shklar, Dru Svoboda, Don Virts
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Means Testing Unpopular
Means tested programs unpopular – empirically proven
Lowi, Professor at Cornell University, 1987
(Theodore J. Lowi, Professor of American institutions at Cornell University, Winter 1987, American University Law Review)
The last of the great expansions of the welfare state, Supplemental Security Income and the indexing
of social security benefits on top of a twenty-percent boost in those benefits, occurred in
1972. n20 These were followed within a year by official recognition of a fiscal crisis in the welfare state.
The problem was less one of financing, however, than of political support. There had been considerable political
support for medicare and medicaid, adopted in 1965. n21 There had been initial support for the boost in social
security benefits and for indexing pegged to the cost of living. But over the years after 1965, many corporate and
middle class supporters of welfare were one-by-one jumping ship, despite the fact that many of the
expansions of the welfare state had been aimed at benefiting the middle classes themselves. They were
jumping ship largely because of the welfare programs of Aid to Families with Dependant Children, public
assistance, welfare-in-kind, and other "means tested" programs associated with the War
on Poverty. n22 Why? Because these were discretionary welfare programs, in contrast to the first several
social security titles adopted after 1935, which were relatively nondiscretionary. n23
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Universal CP
Dartmouth 2K9 - Clark
Universal Popular
Universal polices are popular with conservative government – regressive taxation
Mkandawire, Director of UNRISD, 2005
(Thandika Mkandawire, director of United Nations Research Institute for Social development, December 2005, Social Policy and
Development Programme paper Number 23,
http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpAuxPages)/955FB8A594EEA0B0C12570FF00493EAA/$file/mkandatarget.p
df)
Predictably, the main objection to universalism is often aimed at the redistributive policies that come
along with it (such as tax structures and labour market policies). Stripped of these other redistributive
measures, universalistic policies may actually be embraced by conservative governments, especially
when, as is often the case, they are based on regressive taxation. This might explain why, even among
the late industrializers, the push for universalism was not always made by radical movements but by
conservative regimes concerned with social peace and nation-building à la Bismarck.
The developing world proves that universalism generates broad coalitions of liberals and conservatives
Sen Nobel prize winner in economics 1995
(A Sen Nobel prize winner in economics 1995 Public spending and the poor: Theory and evidence)
Turning to the second question–that of political feasibility–it is worth noting that there are some remarkable gaps in
the focusing of public policy in many developing economies. For example, women in general and female children in
particular are relatively deprived in terms of health care and basic education to an astonishing extent in many countries in the world,
especially in Asia and North Africa. To do something about these inequalities would require policies more directed toward these
deprived groups, including paying greater atten- tion to female education and medical care in rural programs. Similarly if there is clear
evidence of so-called urban bias in the distribution of governmental support and attention, there will be a good argument for general
reorientation of policies in the direction of supporting the rural population. That does point to the case for more targeting of that type,
if it is politically feasible to do so. The political feasibility of such differential use of public services depends to a
considerable extent on what the more powerful groups in a poor country see as imperative. For example, easily
infectious diseases receive much greater attention than other types of maladies do, and they tend to get
eliminated with remarkable efficiency. It has happened to smallpox, has nearly happened to malaria, and is on the way to
happening to cholera. Even the poor would tend to get a lot of attention partly for good humanitarian reasons but
also because a poor person with an infectious disease is a source of infection for others. Ailments that are not so
infectious, including regular undernourishment, do not get quite that comprehensive attention
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