Blankinship Khalid Y., The End of jihâd State: The Reign of Hisham ibn ‘Abd al Malîk and
the Collapse of the Umayyad, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1994, p. 232.
230
.= THE END OF THE JIHAD STATE
unique and original reform program was read only as a sign of
weakness in most of the provinces, and troubles began to break out
everywhere. With the sudden death of Yazid III alter only six
months in office, it was brushed aside; as the Jazirans under Marwân II and later the Khuràsàrffs under the 'Abbàsidsbattled for
dominance. The triumph of the latter, with their pseudo-Shi 1 imamate and messianic daims, snuffed out whatever hopes there may
have been for official limitations on the powers of the caliphal
office.
General Conclusions
Looking back over the military reverses of Hishâm s reign and their
results, his rule should have been considered generally adisastrous
failure from the Muslim point of view. Hishâm and his advisers cannet be exculpated from blame for the debacle. Their unswerving pursuit of the traditional policy of expansion on almost ail the frontiers
at once, coupled with their refusai to modify or to abandon it after it
had shown its bankruptcy in changed circumstances, led directly to
the fatal weakening of the Umayyad caliphate that caused its collapse. It was net so much that the total casualties of the Muslim
armies were so high that the Muslims were fatally weakened and
threatened with collapse as a whole. Rather, it was the decimation
and scattering of the Syrian troops on whom the caliph's main support had been based that undermined the Umayyad regime.
Once the Syrians' military superiority in manpower and fighting
ability had been ended by defeats inflicted by the various external.
enemies and Berber rebels, it was only a malter of time before the
varions provincial armies, especially the nearby Jazirans, would be
tempted to intervene. In a last desperate effort to prevent that, the
Syrians themselves killed a caliph in order to implement a radical
reforrn program and appeal for broader support. But it was toc late.
Indeed, the killing of al-Walid II mainly destroyed whatever
legitimacy was left to the Umayyad caliphate and, if anything, may
have hastened its downfall.
The most decisive element in this process of breakdown was the
series of external military defeats suffered by the Muslims, both
Syrians and others, in Hishâm's reign. Naturally, losses of Syrian
troops directly weakened the main pillar of military support for the
caliph. But the losses suffered by other caliphal armies, such as that
of Khurâsân, aise weakened the caliph by requiring him to send
more of his precious Syrians to hold the fron tiers and to spend more
meney to mebilize, equip, and maintain them..S. Y ,ft e & t% n K
/ers Conclusion -~ 231
Nevertheless, it had taken a very long series of reverses, lasting
almost throughout Hishëm's reign, before the Syrians were weakened enough, in both numbers and resolve,.te becomevulnerable to
overtl row; In fact, the Umayyad caliphate's ability to recover from
its defeats was almost as spectacular as the series of defeats themselves. But the defeats continued, building up finally to the
•
crescendo of lossesin the Berber war. By the end of Hishàm's
reign,
•'the series of disasters had clearly overloaded the state's military
• capacity, decimating its army and creating a financial crisis that led
• te ever more severe exactions on the populace in order to pay for
replacements. In particular, the army losses almost certainly would
have to be made. up from new sources of recruitment to the east of
• Syria, such as Iraq and Khurâsàn. Such a change in the nature of
the army would lead to incalculable political consequences, as
indeed happened with the rise of the'Abbâsids to power.
this work, I have tried to trace the stages in this process of military
breakdown with some precision. In the earliest part of Hishâm's
reign, about 105-11/724-29, the wars of expansion resumed by
Yazid II continued on virtually ail the frontiers, even the remote and
chronically disastrous Sijistân front against the Zunbil of.
Zâbulistân. This period was characterized by hard fighting
punctuated by a few disasters, especially those of Muslim b. Sa-d in
Transoxiana and al-Asfah b. 'Abd Allâh in Sijistân. Alter This, in
112-14/730-32, events took a turn for the worse, as the caliphate
suffered at least four major defeats in the Caucasus, Transoxiana,
India, and France. In the Caucasus in 112/730, a major Syrian army
was annihilated for the first time. The Transoxianan disaster of
113/731 net only caused a considerable decline in the morale of the
provincial army owing to the destruction of so many of its fighters,
but also forced the caliph to mobilize potentially rebellious Iragis to
bolster the frontier.
After these concentrated disasters, a relative lull ensued from 11521/733-39. This period, nevertheless, saw many more disasters,
especially on the sea in the western Mediterranean and in India,
where the front totally collapsed. Possibly these new disasters did
net warrant so much attention as they fell in more marginal areas and
as the fosses of Syrians in them may net have been so great as those
of other groups. But in the final period of Hisham's ride,
122.25/74Q..43, the number of disasters increased dramaticallY and
finally threatened to destroy the Syrian army altogether.
The disasters suffered by the Muslims under Hishâm have been
arranged for comparison in table 4. The column entitled'Fate gives
the face of the Muslim commander in the battle. Of course, the fact
232
THE END 0F THÉ JIHAD STATE
that a commander survived the battie does not imply that the reverse
suffered was minor. But it is dramatic how many comman-' Bers fell
in battle, and especially how the number increased sharply. toward
the end of Hishâm's reign. Many of the slain commanders were
provincial governors, their disasters inviting comparison with those
suffered by Roman consular armies in the Second Punic War. The
column marked Troops' shows the predominant element among the
Muslims in each battle. For nome obscure battles, these
identifications are only probable. From this column, it can be seen
that the Syrians burdens and disasters also increased dramatically as
the reign wore on. The column entitled 'Cosses' gives the best
estimate available where there is any basis for an estimate from the
sources. Those battles for which numbers are given were probably
among the worst disasters. Though medieval numbers must always
be carefully assessed, those I have given seem most reasonable. For
evidence about this and other aspects of each battle mentioned in the
table, the reader should refer to the text above.
Not only did the cost of these disasters in money and, especially, in
lives begin to erode support for the caliph's war policy, but also the
Muslim armies' continuai lack of success in the field turned the
Muslim warriors and others into opponents of that policy. The
caliphate's military failures under Hishâm were Idghlighted by
actual territorial losses. In India, the caliphate gained nothing and
was barely able to hold onto an unspecified proportion of Sind.
Elsewhere, the Byzantines became more organized and posed a real
threat by the end of Hishâm's reign, inflicting a major disaster on the
Muslims at Akroinon in 122/740 and besting the Muslims repeatedly
on the sea. For a state which derived its military success from divine
approval, these were ominous signs. But worse was to corne as the
Berbers dealt the caliphate one catastrophic defeat alter another in a
short period, pushing the caliphate's boundaries all the way back to
al-Qayrawân in Tunisia and practically cutting off Spain. Only in the
Caucasus and Transoxiana was the caliphate able to triumph over ils
Turkish opponents. But even these victories brought little territorial
gain or booty.
The inability of the Umayyad caliphate to recover from the various
disasters probably helped to undermine its legitimacy. The caliphate
constituted the jihhd state par excellence. Ils main reason for
existence, aside from maintaining God's law, was to protect Islam
and to expand the territory under its control, and its reputation was
strongly bound to lis military success. Not only did military success
bring greater power to Islam as well as other material benefits, but it
must have seemed a sign of divine approval. Despite
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