CHRISTIAN FAMILY—GIFT AND HOPE
BY ROSA LINDA G. VALENZONA
The world appears to be bent on the destruction of marriage and the family. This
attack was spearheaded by the globalization of contraception and abortion promoted by
the anti-natalist propaganda and justified by doomsday predictions of population
explosion. The world is in for a rude awakening. The dominant demographic problem
is not going to be population explosion. Ageing and population implosion will
dominate the social, economic, political and demographic horizon of this century. The
UN has openly admitted that population ageing is due to the drastic fall in fertility.
Sub-replacement fertility has persisted in spite of the subsidies and incentives devised
by European governments. UN projections also forecast that even in Less Developed
Countries fertility will also fall below replacement levels by the middle of this century.
Sub-replacement fertility will probably be the most important global problem of
the 22nd century. This paper will attempt to shed some light on understanding the real
cause of sub-replacement fertility by looking at the impact of contraception and abortion
on marriage and the family. The long term impact of sub-replacement fertility on the
demographic structure will also be examined.
SUB-REPLACEMENT FERTILITY
Total Fertility Rate
Source: UN Population Prospects 2004 Revision
7
Anti-natalist
World
6
propaganda
promoted
Europe
5
fertility
reduction
in
LDC
4
developed countries as a
3
means to stabilize population
2
growth—a condition reached
1
by reducing fertility at the 2.1
0
replacement level. The noble
19501965198019952010202520401955
1970
1985
2000
2015
2030
2045
justification of saving the
world’s
resources
from
overpopulation was a convenient cover-up for venting the libertarian rejection of the
repressive sexual discipline demanded by marriage as well as gratifying hedonistic
ideologies that shunned the burdensome demands of child rearing. The end result was
the speedy and widespread acceptance of contraception and legalization of abortion.
Europe whose fertility rate was already a low 2.66 in 1950 took the plunge down to 2.13
by 1970 and has been on sub-replacement fertility since them. But sub-replacement
fertility is not limited to Europe; Nicolas Eberstadt claims that sub-replacement fertility
has come amazingly close to describing the norm for childbearing the world over. 1 The
phenomenon of the persistence of sub-replacement fertility is now considered the
second demographic transition (the first having been the transition from high mortalityhigh fertility to low mortality-low fertility). For some unexplained reason UN projects a
rise of Europe’s fertility back to replacement level by mid-century although there is not
the slightest sign of a baby boom.
Demographers now agree that the so-called population explosion of the Less
Developed Countries was really due to reduction in infant mortality rates when fertility
rates were still high. Anti-natalist propaganda insisted that family planning is a
condition sine qua non to development although some economists argue that in fact a
modicum of development was in fact this sine qua non before fertility fall could take
place.2 Poor families are really making rational decisions when they match fertility with
survival rates to achieve the number of children they would like to have. In any case
anti-natalist groups wielding political power for the widespread promotion of family
planning through contraception and abortion eventually achieved the legalization of
these practices in many poor countries.
Intuitively one concludes that a race that fails to reproduce is committing racial
suicide. History attests to the disappearance of ancient civilizations whose citizens
refuse to have babies. The advanced countries appear bent on disappearing as a race.
Peter Drucker affirms this: “The developed world is in the process of committing
collective national suicide. Its citizens are not producing enough babies to reproduce
themselves…”3 In spite of UN projections of population implosion as imminent for
many countries it is perplexing how sub-replacement fertility continues to persist and
the UN itself continues to promote family planning.
IMPACT OF FERTILITY FALL ON MARRIAGE
A variety of reasons for the persistence of sub-replacement fertility have been
advanced and some of them are worth mentioning at this point. First are the increasing
opportunities for women. Children have come to be viewed as an impediment to self1
“In all, 83 countries and territories are thought to exhibit below replacement fertility patterns
today. The total number of persons inhabiting those countries is estimated at nearly 2.7 billion,
roughly 44% of the world’s total population.” Population Implosion, Nicolas Eberstadt, Foreign
Policy Vol. 123 (March/April 2001)
http://www.catholiceducation.org/articles/population/pc0029.html
2
Sen, Amartya, Population Delusion and Reality
http://finance.sauder.ubc.ca/~bhatta/ArticlesByAmartyaSen/amartya_sen_on_population.html
3
Peter Drucker, The Future That Has Already Happened,
http://iranscope.ghandchi.com/Anthology/Drucker-Future.htm
fulfillment and therefore pregnancy is delayed or even foregone altogether in favor of
the pursuit of fulfilling ones’ possibilities. There is the widespread negative attitude
against the of the high opportunity cost for child bearing. It is also claimed that as the
economy becomes more complex investing in children has become more expensive and
returns to parents are low.
Be that as it may, these are not satisfactory reasons for explaining why societies
are bent on racially suicidal behavior. Other more weighty explanations are needed to
justify this behavior. This is where the closer consideration of the impact fertility fall on
marriage itself could shed more light on the issue. It was Pope John Paul II who gave a
deeply theological and anthropological explanation of how contraception violates the
truth of the language of the body in the marital union.4
However, sociological
arguments are needed to reinforce these natural law arguments.
Reproduction and parenting are biological functions that equally exist among
humans and animals and therefore are not distinctively human. But animal behavior is
always a consequence of natural programming and therefore instinctual. In contrast
human beings socialize these biological functions in a stable relationship. At the spiritual
level the children are an extension of the love between spouses, making the family an
image of Trinitarian communion. At the human level reproductive and parenting
behavior is reasoned rather than instinctual behavior, with reason collaborating and
affirming the instinctual purpose. With parental instincts reinforced by reason the
vulnerability and helplessness of the human baby elicits from parents a well-spring of
generosity far exceeding what spousal love would. Thus parental instincts are one of
the strongest bonds that tie spouses together. Moreover, since human survival is
essentially cultural rather than instinctual the education of young children in the family
likewise demands the collaboration of both parents. This is the basis justifying marriage
and family as natural institutions whose primordial origin precedes culture itself.
Beyond this natural law argument marriage as an institution deserves further
examination. Christopher Dawson in his essay on the Patriarchal Family is a good
starting point: “Marriage is a social consecration of the biological functions, by which the
instinctive activities of sex and parenthood are socialized and a new synthesis of cultural
and natural elements is created in the shape of the family. This synthesis differs from
anything that exists in the animal world in that it no longer leaves man free to follow his
own sexual instincts; he is forced to conform them to a certain social pattern.”5 The
patriarchal family underlying the Western civilization looked at marriage as the bond
that holds the father to the mother-child ties, sharply contrasting with contemporary
culture’s definition limiting marriage to the relationship between spouses. To consecrate
is to hold something as sacred, treating it with reverence and protecting it from abuse or
4
Pope John Paul II, Wednesday discourses from 1979 to 1984 on the theme of human sexuality.
Christopher Dawson, The Patriarchal Family in History, Dynamics of World History, NY: Sheed
and Ward, 1956
5
violation. Marriage is thus a deliberate constructive repression of the sexual instinct
where spouses commit to forsake all others for specific purpose of protecting of
children. The universal postulate of legitimacy affirms that the consequences of giving
free reign to the sexual instinct is anti-social—a crime against the family.6 This capacity
to subordinate one’s sexual impulses for a social purpose is the primordial root of social
life and the beginning of culture because it safeguards what is so elemental to human
existence—the transmission of life itself. 7
Contraception and abortion therefore strikes at the very heart of marriage
because elimination of procreation deprives marriage of its social purpose. Marriage is
the social consecration of the child-bearing function. When sexual gratification of
spouses becomes its only purpose marriage this social consecration becomes
meaningless and the family forms resulting from this watered down marriage also loses
its capacity for child-bearing. The loss of the child-centeredness of marriage is in fact the
cause of the fragility of the family—easily broken apart. This loss of child-centeredness
also caused the gradual dismantling of the civil, social and religious protection that
marriage enjoyed and the creeping social decadence of our contemporary culture. This
gives truth to Dawson’s observation that it is the fundamental error of the modern
hedonist to believe that man can abandon the moral effort and throw off every
repression and spiritual discipline and yet preserve all the achievements of culture.8 The
case for the social function of marriage was recently argued by 60 prominent scholars
under the auspices of the Witherspoon Institute. 9
6
In all cultures “bastard” is part of the lingua franca. This is but another evidence of how
universality of the concept of legitimacy.
7
This made the patriarchal family in the Judeo-Christian culture the most important organ for
social and cultural progress. Human action is reasoned behavior not instinctual. Culture is what
distinguishes human beings from animals. The formation of human culture is nothing more than
the fixation of behavior patterns—the outcome of the application of reason to the problems of
daily living towards the fulfillment of the instinctive purpose. Culture frees man from the
slavery of blind instinct to achieve a progressively better way of life than irrational animals. This
fundamental repression that is at the root of social life is a deliberate constructive effort against
anti-social impulse that is the beginning of culture. Marriage offered man the primordial
opportunity to conquer instinct for a social purpose. The patriarchal family became the most vital
organ for cultural achievements since it ceased to be limited to its primary sexual and
reproductive functions and became the dynamic principle of society and the source of social
continuity. Dawson traces the rise and fall of ancient civilizations to the rise and fall of the
prestige enjoyed by marriage and family.
8
Op. cit.
The following principles which they listed are based on the cross-cultural fruit of broad human
experience and reflection and supported by considerable social science evidence:
9
1.
Marriage is a personal union, intended for the whole of life, of husband and wife.
STATISTICAL EVIDENCE
Due to fertility decline in the US households with children under the age of 18
has decreased. This reduction in
%
children % of Live Births No. of Cohabiting
the child centeredness has been
under
18 to
Unmarried couples living with 1
Living with 2 Women
child under age of 15
associated to the weakening of
parents
10
the institution of marriage.
1960
88
5.3
.197
The rise in out-of-wedlock births 1965
7.7
85
10.7
.196
as well as children born to 1970
1975
14.2
cohabiting couples is indicative
1980
77
18.4
.431
of the loss of prestige of 1985
22.0
73
28.0
.891
childbearing. Children have 1990
1995
33.2
ceased to be the main purpose of
2000
69
34
1.675
marriage and the rise in divorce
rate is evidence of how the even the presence of children in marriage has become a very
minor inhibitor of divorce. 11
The fall in the percentage of children living with two parents, the rise in single
parenthood, and the rise of cohabitation took place very soon after the introduction of
contraception and abortion in the US. Both served to relax the moral restraints so
essential to the social vitality of the institution of marriage. This loss of prestige for
2.
Marriage is a profound human good, elevating and perfecting our social and sexual
nature.
3. Ordinarily, both men and women who marry are better off as a result.
4. Marriage protects and promotes the wellbeing of children.
5. Marriage sustains civil society and promotes the common good.
6. Marriage is a wealth-creating institution, increasing human and social capital.
7. When marriage weakens, the equality gap widens, as children suffer from the
disadvantages of growing up in homes without committed mothers and fathers.
8. A functioning marriage culture serves to protect political liberty and foster limited
government.
9. The laws that govern marriage matter significantly.
10. "Civil marriage" and "religious marriage" cannot be rigidly or completely divorced
from one another.
Marriage and the Public Good: Ten Principles, Princeton, New Jersey, May, 2006.
http://www.princetonprinciples.org/contents.html
10
Barbara Dafoe Whitehead and David Popenoe, The Marrying Kind, Which Men Marry and Why, The
State of Our Unions, Social Health of Marriage in America 2004 , marriage.rutgers.edu/
11
Ibid. “In the Detroit area sample of women, the proportion of women answering “no” to the
question “Should a couple stay together for the sake of children?” jumped from 51% to 82%
between 1962 to 1985. A nationally represented 1994 sample found only 15% of the population
agreeing that “When there are children in the family, parents should stay together even if they
don’t get along.”
marriage gradually led to the dismantling of civil, social and religious safeguards
protecting it and what was behaviorally deviant ceased to be exceptional. The slippery
downhill slope which started with widespread practice of contraception and abortion
led to rise in divorce rates, single parenthood and unmarried cohabitation. The move to
legalize same sex marriage is merely a logically continuum in this chain.
FRAGILE FAMILIES
The natural result of the weakening of marriage was the emergence of the
phenomenon of fragile families. These families which were typically fatherless were
emerging family forms due to the increase of divorce, out-of-wedlock births and
unmarried cohabitations. US statistics from the National Marriage Project show that:12




In 1960 only 9% of children lived in single parent families; by 2003 this percentage
had jumped to 27%.
The number of children under 18 affected by parental divorce went from 500,000 in
1960 to well over a million in 1975;
Since 1960 the percentage of babies born to unwed mothers had increased more than
6 times.
An estimate of 40% of all children was expected to spend some time in a cohabiting
household during their growing up years.
A recent demographic study looks at sub-replacement fall of fertility in Europe
as the second demographic transition (SDT) and statistically associates it with new types
of household formation: prolonged single living, premarital cohabitation, and
progression to parenthood within cohabiting unions.13 For the sake of simplicity two
separate sets of variables were used to characterize the cultural divide – conformism14
(for those who were adherents of the Judeo-Christian culture) and non-conformism15 (for
those of the secularist orthodoxy persuasion). This cultural divide is also described by
12
Barbara Dafoe Whitehead and David Popenoe, The Marrying Kind, Which Men Marry and Why, The
State of Our Unions, Social Health of Marriage in America 2004
13
Johan Surkyn and Ron Lesthaeghe, Value Orientation and the Second Demographic Transition in
Northern, Western and Southern Europe: An Update, Demographic Research, Special Collection 2,
Article 3, April 17, 2004, www.demographic-research.org. The study used the European Values
Surveys for 1981, 1990 and 1999 covering a fairly large number of countries. The survey cover a
broad variety of domains: marriage, family, gender, religion, civil morality and ethics, political
preferences, trust in institutions, etc.
14
The study defines conformism as “religious, respect for authority, trust institutions,
conservative morality, lower tolerance (of) minorities, local or national identification, expressive
values not stressed.”
15
Non-conformism is defined as secular, stress (on) individual autonomy, weaker civil morality,
expressive values distrust institutions, protest prone, tolerant (of) minorities, world orientation,
“postmaterialist”.
Robert P. George.16 Types of family formation were related with varying degrees of
conformism and non-conformism.
Childless cohabitants were found to be on the highest end of non-conformism
while married parents who never cohabited scored lowest in non-conformism. The child
who leaves parental home to get married and have children also scores high in
conformism. Cohabitants with children who get married move towards conformism but
are always more non-conformist than those who never cohabited.17 This conclusion is
valid for populations in the Iberian Peninsula as well as for Scandinavian populations.
This statistical evidence supports the conclusion that marriage and a child-oriented
family are somehow getting more closely associated with religious belief or simply said
only believers are having children.
Phillip Longman also strongly correlates fertility with religious convictions: In
the United States fully 47% of people who attend church weekly say that their ideal
family size is three or more children. By contrast only 27% of those who seldom attend
church want to have any kids. 18
These facts provide a very interesting explanation to the persistence of subreplacement fertility in advanced countries. The promotion of contraception and
abortion to bring down fertility relaxed sexual discipline imposed by marriage. This
alteration of this essentially vital aspect weakened the institution of marriage and gave
rise to the formation of fragile family forms prone to childlessness. This is why the
subsidies and incentives to encourage child-bearing do not have the desired effect.
POPULATION AGEING
% Of Population 65 and Over
UN Population Prospects, 2004 Revision
40
The natural consequence of subWorld (%)
35
Europe (%)
replacement fertility is ageing. The ageing
30
LDC (%)
25
looming in the horizon of the 21st century
20
will
be
unprecedented,
pervasive,
15
10
enduring
and
full
of
profound
5
implications. 19 It is without parallel in the
0
1950
1970
1990
2010
2030
2050
human history and will affect every man
woman and child even though different
countries will go through different stages and at different paces. The world population
16
http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft9908/articles/george.html
The study states that this suggests that earlier cohabitation experience have a lasting effect
operating in the opposite direction.
18
Phillip Longman, Political Victory: From Here to Maternity, Washington Post, Thursday,
September 2, 2004; Page A 23. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A547002004Sep1.html
19
World Population Ageing 1950-2050, UN Population Division
17
will not be able to return to the young populations that our ancestors knew—at least not
in our lifetimes.
Ageing is measured in terms of the relative size of the population age 65 and
over. Since 1950 the elderly population has increased by more than threefold (from 130
million or 4% of total to Europe’s population is the oldest and growing older over time.
Italy is the world’s “oldest” nation with more than 18% of its population aged 65 and
over. Finally the UN has admitted that the ageing process is directly related to the
dramatic fall in fertility although it is partly caused by the rise in life expectancy.20
World Dependency Rate
Source: UN Population Prospects 2004 Revision
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
Total
Child
Old-age
10
0
1950
1970
1990
2010
2030
2050
Both falling fertility and rise in life
expectancy impact heavily on the
dependency rate. Since at both extremes of
the life cycle human beings are unable to
independently support themselves there
are two types of dependents – children and
the elderly. The fall in total dependents
until 2030 is due to the decrease in the
number of children but its eventual rise
soon after is due to the increase in the
elderly population.
In Europe this reversal which took place in 2005 is especially dramatic. From
then on there are more elderly dependents than children. Cutting back on the financial
burden of raising children by reducing
Dependency Rate, Europe
fertility has the unexpected result of taking
Source: UN Population Prospects 2004 Revision
on the heavier burden of ballooning health
80
Total
70
Child
care requirements for the elderly—
60
Old-age
exchanging investment in society’s future
50
40
for the irrecoverable cost of supporting the
30
20
elderly. Longman calculates that even after
10
considering the cost of education, a typical
0
1950
1970
1990
2010
2030
2050
child in the US consumes 28 per cent less
than the typical working-age adult, while
elders consume 27% more, mostly in health related expenses. 21 Drucker states that the
offsetting the burden of supporting the older nonworking population by cutting back on
spending on children also serves as a disincentive to child-bearing.22
20
op. cit.
Phillip Longman, Everywhere, even in Africa, the World is Running out of Children, New Statesman
(UK), May 31, 2004 http://www.newamerica.net/index.cfm?pg=article&DocID=1602
21
22
Peter Drucker, The Future That Has Already Happened,
http://iranscope.ghandchi.com/Anthology/Drucker-Future.htm
Even more surprising is the
fact that the Less Developed
90
Countries,
with
younger
80
populations than Europe,
70
have not been exempted from
60
50
ageing. The same reversal is
Total
40
Child
still predicted to happen later
30
Old-age
in this century.
Many
20
economists predict a bleak
10
0
future for the elderly in poor
1950
1970
1990
2010
2030
2050
countries, majority of who
will be low productivity
workers. These trends reinforce the conclusion that fertility reduction is the main cause
of ageing. In the case of LDC’s anti-natalist propaganda had its own contribution
towards bringing about fertility decline.
LDC Dependency Rate
Source: UN Population Prospects 2004 Revision
Population Implosion
The idea of falling population
growth must look odd to a world
that has been saturated with
apocalyptic population explosion
propaganda. The slowness and
graduality of change in demography
breeds complacency over a false
sense of status quo. It is inevitable
that falling birth rates and shrinking
family sizes will eventually translate
to negative population change.23
Population Change (In Thousands)
France Italy Germany Spain
2010-2015
-72
-38
2015-2020
-137
-46
2020-2025
-165
-63
-35
2025-2030
-177
-91
-47
2030-2035
-188
-125
-42
2035-2040 -12
-208
-145
-47
2040-2045 -53
-237
-141
-75
2045-2050 -81
-269
-138
-129
23
Population Change (Millions)
Source: UN World Population Prospects 2004 Revision
95
85
75
65
55
45
WORLD
35
EUROPE
25
LDC
15
5
-5
1950-1955
1970-1975
1990-1995
2010-2015
2030-2035
Here also Europe leads in the negative
population change starting in the 2005. The
turning point for Spain is 2020, for Italy it is
2010, for France it is 2035 and Germany started
losing population as early as 1975. It could
easily lose the equivalent of the current
population of East Germany in the next halfcentury.
Russia’s population is already
contracting by three-quarters of a million a
year.
Population change is defined as the net of population increase (due to births and migration, etc.) and
population decrease (due to deaths and migration).
The Past, Present and Future—Population Structures
Changes in the size and shape of the population age structure
are often the best way to capture these three trends—sub-replacement
fertility, population ageing and population implosion. For instance
the 1950 population age structure of Italy still has the likeness of a
pyramid except for the age groups who fought the war. On the other
hand the 2000 population structure shows the rapidly shrinking base
due to the steep fall in fertility. The 2050 population structure shows
the overwhelming growth of the elderly population and the shrinking
of population size as a consequence of population implosion.
Spain
1950
Although differences in the demographic
history of each country are obvious it is nevertheless
apparent that the common trend in the fall of fertility,
ageing and population implosion is shared across
Europe.
Italy
1950
Italy
2000
Italy
2050
Spain
2000
Spanish population structure was a healthy pyramid in 1950
during the pro-natalist government of Franco. It
remained so until 1960 since its fertility was stable up
to this point. In 1980 fertility began to fall and this
Spain
France
steep descent brings about the rapid changes in its
2050
1950
population structure. By the year 2000 sustained fall
in fertility had already shrunk the birth groups. The rapid growth of
ageing is apparent in the population age structure of 2050.
France
2000
The 1950 age structure shows the expected aftermath of
World War II on the French population. Post war baby boom made
up for pregnancies postponed by the war. The early onset of subFrance
replacement fertility, as early as 1980 gave an early start to
2050
population ageing in France. TFR in France which was already a
low 2.73 in 1950 did not fall as drastically as in Spain and Italy. UN projects that from
the low of 1.71 in 1990 it will stabilize at 1.8 until the middle of the next century.
Notwithstanding this it is clear that France will be unable to avoid the sad consequences
of ageing.
Economic Impact
Ever since Malthus anti-natalist propaganda had blindly raised the scepter of
famine and hunger due to overpopulation. Modern economic growth has always taken
for granted the increased labor force and consumer demand as a main source of growth
from the supply and demand side. When the world faces the cataclysm of ageing its
most important discovery will be the true relationship between population and
economics. History has shown that the absolute population size does not matter
because technological improvements will more than suffice to meet the requirements of
population growth. One could even say that population growth is the necessary
stimulus to economic growth. It is the relative size of the active versus inactive
population that is much more relevant in the relationship of Economics and Population.
In the normal course of things the
population age structure forms a pyramid with
a lot of children at the base and a sharp apex
with a small proportion of elderly. This would
ensure that the population reaching retirement
age is less than the population joining the labor
force.
65-69 age
group entering
Retirement
2030
It is the radical change in the population
15-19 age group
age structure due to fertility reduction that
Entering the
causes the collapse of the pension system.
Labor Force
When the population entering the economically
active age (15-19) becomes increasingly smaller than the population at retirement age
(65-69) the deficit generated from a mismatch between collections and payments
eventually causes the pension system to be bankrupt.
In 2005 Spain is enjoying its demographic
dividend – a time when the working age population
“freed” from the onerous burdens of child-bearing was
at a peak—graphically shown by the pregnant bulge in
the
age
structure
encompassing the 15-69
age group. This windfall
of a huge working
population enjoying low
dependency
rate
is
supposed to be associated with high savings, high
investment and therefore high economic growth. This
apparent prosperity is very deceptive since by 2030
onwards the workforce will be shrinking due to the
delayed impact of sub-replacement fertility, even as
ageing expands the ranks of the retired population. The
situation will continue growing worse and eventually
lead to the collapse of the pension fund.
2005
204
0
The so called demographic dividend is not a windfall; it is actually a
demographic time bomb waiting to explode. The apparent prosperity it brings about is
in reality the wasteful use of the country’s demographic capital whose potential is
wasted in the luxury and ease of infertile years. Nature eventually exacts a future payback with the collapse of the pension system when the childless generation comes to
their old age dependent on other people’s children for their economic sustenance. In the
case of Spain crunch time is not too far away—beginning as early as 2015 to continue
onwards.
A DIGRESSION ON PENSION FUNDS
Transactions from the pension fund are what economists refer to as transfers
because it involves money given in exchange for nothing. In other words a transfer is a
gift. Pension funds are a modern invention. Previously there was only the family—that
social unit formed by the mutual gift of self of husband and wife. The power of this
mutual gift-giving is so explosive that it extends to children who love parents out of a
deep sense of piety and gratitude. The family is richly endowed by nature to provide for
this need because it is the venue where one becomes a human being capable of giving
oneself to others. Man’s dependence at both extremes of the human life cycle finds its
raison d’ etre in providing family members the opportunity to give themselves.
Undoubtedly setting up pension funds to provide a secure future for the elderly
was full of good intentions. But there is the saying that the road to hell is paved with
good intentions. Public and private pension systems were in fact taking over a function
that families were naturally equipped to perform. The negative effect of this “violation”
of the principle of subsidiarity was the removal of a natural motivation for parents to
have children.
Economists claim that one of the reasons for the fall in fertility is the inability of
parents to enjoy the returns on their investment in the children’s education. The pension
fund freed children from the burden of supporting their parents in their old age. The
shift to the knowledge economy meant more investment in education for parents and
even lesser possibility of getting any return from this investment. In purely economic
terms children became a “leisure” good instead of an asset out of which one can enjoy a
future benefit. Having been freed of this burden it became easy for parents to succumb
to the lure of comfortable lives made easier by having no children not realizing that in
the process they have jeopardized the security of their future retirement. This
disincentive spells the future collapse of the pension funds. Other factors have
reinforced this disincentive. Improvements in the status of women have reduced the
window of opportunity for child-bearing. Longer education has delayed marriage and
postponed childbearing.
In poor countries the reasoned decision to have fewer children was an
adjustment to higher child survival rates. Anti-natalist propaganda and the cultural
influence of advanced countries are expected to bring fertility to sub-replacement levels
in poor countries. Their poverty and the lack financially elaborate pension systems will
reduce their ability to cope with ageing. Fortunately families in traditional societies tend
to be more cohesive. This will be their last resort for coping with ageing.
Culture Divide
Earlier evidence presented showed how contraception and abortion weakened
marriage and gave rise to fragile families prone to low fertility and less capable of
rearing children. There is also strong evidence associating religious beliefs with
procreation.
It is therefore relevant at this point to talk about the cultural divide and its
demographic impact. The cultural divide refers to the polarization of modern societies
into two camps – those who adhere to Secularist Orthodoxy (this would be the nonconformist group referred to earlier) and those faithful to the legacy of the JudeoChristian culture and other believers of Monotheism (this would be the conformist
group).
Robert P. George lumps into the family of Secularist Orthodoxy those who have
abandoned the Judeo-Christian culture’s worldview in favor of all the “isms” of modern
contemporary societies—feminism, multiculturalism, gay liberationism, lifestyle
liberalism. 24 He points out that the most important battlefront of this cultural war has to
do with sexuality, the transmitting and taking of human life, and the place of religion
and religiously informed moral judgment in public life. More and more debates such as
the legalization of abortion, of same-sex marriage, of euthanasia and assisted suicide is
firming up the battle front of this cultural war and as people take sides one notices the
crystallization of striking difference in values, attitudes and behavior of each side of the
culture war.
The non-conformist fragile family forms statistically associated with low fertility
would be on the side of Secularity Orthodoxy. 25 One concludes that there is a fertility
24
Robert P. George, A Clash of Orthodoxies, First Things, August-September 1999, page 33-40,
http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft9908/articles/george.html
25
These fragile family forms using the format of the study of Surkyn and Lesthaeghe would be
made up of single never married and not in a union, Cohabiting with no children, Married and
no children, Cohabiting with children, Married with children and ever cohabited. Formerly
married or in union, not yet in new union. Johan Surkyn and Ron Lesthaeghe, Value Orientation
and the Second Demographic Transition in Northern, Western and Southern Europe: An Update,
Demographic Research, Special Collection 2, Article 3, April 17, 2004, www.demographicresearch.org
divide underlying the cultural divide. In the 1980’s Professor Jerome Lejuene when
asked what he thought would be the world’s demographic future replied: “The time will
come when there will be only supernatural family planning—only those who believe in
God will have children.”
Fertility Divide
Childless fragile families coming from the feminist, the gays, and other
countercultural movements will leave no genetic legacy. In the absence of children they
will also be unable to exert their emotional and psychological influence on the next
generation. It is obvious that childless families are prone to extinction. A single child
replaces one of his or her parents, but not both. Phillip Longman’s insight sheds light on
future demographics.
“The 17.4% baby boomer women who had only one child account for a mere
7.8% of the children born in the next generation. On the other hand nearly a
quarter of the baby boomers children descended from a mere 11% of baby
boomer women who had four or more children. There is every reason to believe
that a new society will emerge whose members will disproportionately be
descended from parents who rejected the social tendencies that once made
childlessness and small families the norm. These values include adherence to
traditional, patriarchal religion, and a strong identification of one’s own fold or
nation.” 26
Based on UN population forecasts there does not seem to be an end to
population implosion. This gloomy picture is akin to the fall of the Roman Empire.
History’s hindsight tells us that what followed was a period of transformation. When
the Roman Empire came to an end the sterile, secular and noble families of imperial
Rome died off, and with them their ancestors’ idea of Rome. But what was once Rome
remained populated—by different people—who after having converted to Christianity
gave birth to feudal Europe with its own rich legacy to the Western civilization.
Longman uses France demographics to illustrate how the fertility divide spells a
vast demographically driven change in modern societies:
“Consider the demographics of France, for example. Among French women
born in the early 1960s, less than a third have three or more children. But this
distinct minority of French women (most of them presumably practicing
Catholics and Muslims) produced more than 50% of all children born to their
26
Phillip Longman, The Return of Patriarchy, Foreign Policy, March 1, 2006
http://www.keepmedia.com/pubs/ForeignPolicy/2006/03/01/1332578
generation, in large measures because so many of their contemporaries had one
child or none at all.” 27
The demographic evolution foreseen by Longman can be depicted with a
segmentation of the population with the inner
pyramid representing patriarchal families of
believers. The natural demographic evolution of this
segment of the population with above replacement
fertility will naturally be expansive in spite of the fact
that the aggregate demographics show the population
to be ageing and imploding. The pyramidal structure
has an added survival advantage. It has a built-in
mechanism which protects these families from the
negative economic impact of ageing when the welfare
state is forced to abandon the pension system. The
burden of supporting elderly parents will be shared
by several children thus opening still another spur to
even higher fertility. While the population of the other side of the cultural divide will be
ageing and imploding, the Christian population will eventually evolve into a critical
mass to eventually renew society.
The secularized childless segment of the population will bear the burnt of the
pension fund collapse and will slowly disappear through natural depletion. The
greatest danger they face will come from their own anti-life culture and their efforts to
legalize euthanasia, assisted suicide, etc. If their efforts are successful they themselves
will hasten the victory of pro-life culture.
Longman foresees that societies that are most secular and most generous with
their underfunded welfare states will be the most prone to religious revivals and a
rebirth of the patriarchal family. The absolute population may fall drastically but the
remaining population will, by a process similar to survival of the fittest, be adapted to a
new environment in which no one can rely on government to replace the family, and in
which a patriarchal God commands family members to suppress their individualism
and submit to father.28
Families—Gift and Hope
Societies can succumb to the lure of re-engineering families and societies while
ignoring the natural origin of marriage and family. Nature is claiming its right in the
demographically driven change that will bring about great social upheaval. Christian
families who will be true to their calling by upholding patriarchal values are the hope
27
28
op. cit.
op. cit.
for Europe and for the World. They are the seed that will demographically renew
societies and the world’s population. By having children and handing down to their
children a strong pro-life legacy they will eventually restore a demographically vital
population to Europe and to the World. The Christian family is truly gift and hope and
the demographic leaven of society.